SAN BEDA COLLEGE

ALABANG, MUNTINLUPA

MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE

(GROUP 8)

SUBMITTED BY:
AGUILAR, STANLY NOEL C.
AMENE, YALESLIE B.
CABAGBAG, ANDREA M.
MALABANAN, TRIZIA V.
MARQUEDA, MARIE ANN CLAIRE D.C.
UY, RONNE KENDRICK C.

4-B

SUBMITTED TO:
DEAN ULPIANO P. SARMIENTO III
 MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE

Marriage Conflict of Laws - Conflict of laws usually arises in marriage cases due to the presence of
a foreign element. This foreign element may appear in a situation where the marriage is celebrated
abroad and this marriage is sought to be recognized in another jurisdiction. It may also appear in
situations where the parties to the marriage are citizens or nationals of different states such that
their capacity to contract marriages is governed by their national laws.

Full Faith and Credit - Marriages celebrated outside the Philippines are valid and binding unless
they violate public policy or contravene our prohibitive laws. The Philippines gives full faith and
credit to marriages celebrated abroad as a matter of comity with other nations. In determining
the validity of foreign marriages, courts usually look to the compliance by the parties of the
requirements of foreign laws. Hence, if a marriage is valid in the place of celebration, it must also
be valid here. Validity is adjudged according to the law of the place where the marriage is
celebrated. The reason for this rule is the "predictability and the interstate order arising from
society’s interest in marriage.” Otherwise, chaos would ensue if a man or a woman can or may be
married in one jurisdiction and not considered married in another. While some requirements of
foreign law may be strange not similar to ours, so long as the marriage is considered valid by the
law of the place of execution, it is also valid here. It must be noted that certain rituals performed
by members of indigenous tribes are also considered valid through state recognition and practice.

US v. Jarvison
409 F. 3d 1221 (2005)
Facts: Esther and Ben Jarvison, both members of the Navajo tribe, were married in Navajo rites in
1953. Ben is accused for the sexual molestation of their granddaughter and the government is
now +compelling Esther to testify against Ben for circumstances known to her concerning the
molestation. Esther refused to testify and invoked spousal testimonial privilege. The district court
sustained her on the ground that the Jarvisons had a valid marriage based on their 1953 traditional
Navajo marriage ceremony. The government appealed.
Issues: Whether the Jarvisons' marriage in a traditional Navajo ceremony on June 25, 1953 was
valid?
Held: Yes. Under Navajo tradition, celebration of a traditional marriage ceremony and the
knowledge thereof by the community were sufficient to create a valid marriage. A marriage license
or other documentation was unnecessary. Current Navajo law allows parties to contract marriage
through a traditional ceremony or by common-law marriage within the Navajo Nation. In this
case, Esther testified having married Jarvison in a traditional Navajo ceremony on June 25, 1953
at Coyote Canyon within the Navajo Reservation. She identified the particular Navajo medicine
man who performed the ceremony. She answered yes when the court asked her "[is] that a
traditional marriage under Navajo law?” Although the government makes much of the fact that
Esther did not testify to the exact requirements outlined in the Navajo Code provision, the statute
itself requires only that the couple "engage in a traditional Navajo wedding ceremony which shall
have substantially the following features..." Esther’s testimony and the inferences arising
therefrom support the district court's conclusion that a valid traditional Navajo marriage
ceremony occurred in 1953, crediting "due regard to the district court's opportunity to judge
witness credibility." Under Navajo law, such an
unlicensed traditional marriage occurring prior to 1954 was valid. The Jarvisons' failure to license
or validate their 1953 traditional marriage does not result in their marriage being invalid under
Navajo law. As noted above, the 1954 Navajo Tribal Council Resolution explicitly validated
unlicensed traditional marriages performed prior to 1954. Taken as a whole, the Navajo Domestic
Code takes care to maintain the validity of prior marriages that would not necessarily meet current
code requirements for marriage. In addition to longstanding Navajo common law and current
Navajo Code recognizing unlicensed traditional marriages performed at times when licenses were
ostensibly required, current Navajo law does not necessarily require a license.

Cook v. Cook
104 P.3d 857 (2005)
Facts: Alan and Peggy Cook were first cousins and they were married in Virginia on April 7, 1984.
Marriage between first cousins are valid in Virginia. They then moved to Arizona in 1989. At that
time, Arizona considered as void marriages between first cousins except that "[m]arriages valid by
the laws of the place where contracted are valid in this state.” SS 63-108, Arizona Code of 1939).
In 1996, Arizona marriage laws were amended to provide that "[m]arriages valid by the laws of
the place where contracted are valid in this state, except marriages that are void and prohibited
by SS 25-101."
Issue: Whether the marriage of Allan and Peggy Cook is valid under Arizona law?
Held: Yes. Under a conflict-of-law analysis, Arizona authorities require us to recognize the
preeminence of the Arizona legislature's express statutory enactments as to whether a particular
out-of-state marriage is valid or void in Arizona. We do not apply the law from the state of Virginia,
even though Virginia had the most significant relationship to the parties at the time of the
marriage. By construing the statute to apply prospectively only, we harmonize the 1996
amendments with Arizona's constitutional prohibitions against retroactive legislation. We do not
impair the legislature's expressly recognized ability to declare as "void" marriages recognized as
valid in other jurisdictions, so long as the party asserting the right to the valid out-of-state marriage
did not have a vested right as defined herein. Further, A.R.S. SS 1-244 (2000) expressly provides
that "[n]o statute is retroactive unless expressly declared therein." We can give effect to the
legislature's use of the word "void" in the 1996 amendments by applying that term to exclude
vested rights in existing marriages as we have described them. Had the legislature chosen to nullify
existing marriages (thus having the retroactive effect described) it could have expressly stated so.
It did not. Accordingly, we can give legitimate meaning to the term "void" in the 1996 amendments
by applying it to marriages from other jurisdictions in which the parties
had no vested right to have their marriage recognized in Arizona. By construing the term "void" to
apply to marriages where rights in Arizona have not "vested," we adopt an "alternate construction"
that "avoids constitutional difficulty" as required by our law.

Importance of Marriage- All societies consider marriage as essential to the functioning of society.
Marriage hold the members together and prevent the disintegration of family life. It is an
institution whose maintenance the public is deeply interested, for it is the "foundation of the
family and of society, without which there would be neither civilization nor progress." Section 2,
Article XV of the 1987 Constitution defines as an “inviolable social institution” and as the
foundation of family life. This is reiterated in Article 1, Chapter I, Title 1 of the Family Code of the
Philippines. The same Section 2 of the mandates the state to protect the marriage institution, with
the State defending the “right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious
convictions.”

Marriages Not Subject of Recognition- While the Philippines gives full faith and credit to
conventions and contracts performed abroad, the same is true only when the acts and contracts
do not violate public policy or prohibitive laws. Hence, not all marriages celebrated abroad and
valid in the place of celebration are valid in our jurisdiction. There are exceptions to the general
rule of according validity to marriages celebrated abroad.
The following marriages shall not be recognized in our jurisdiction:
I. Incestuous Marriages under Article 37, Chapter 3, Title 1 of the Family Code
a. Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and
b. Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood.
Il. Void Marriages by reason of public policy under Article 38, Chapter 3, Title 1 Of the
Family Code
a. Between collateral blood relatives whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the
fourth civil degree;
b. Between step-parents and step-children;
c. Between parents-in-law and children -in-law;
d. Between the adopting parent and the adopted child;
 e. Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child;
f. Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter;
g. Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter;
h. Between adopted children of the same adopter; and
i. Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that
other person's spouse, or his or her own spouse.
Ill. Polygamous or Bigamous Marriages under Article 35, Chapter 3, Title I of the Family
Code
IV. Same-sex marriages (contracting parties must be male and female under Article 2,
Chapter 1, Title 1 of the Family Code)
If the foreign marriage falls under any of the foregoing categories, the same is not
recognized in our jurisdiction. Hence, while same-sex marriages have been legalized in some
jurisdictions, the Philippines is still sticking to the time-honored definition of marriage as "being
between a man and a woman." The Philippines also has no law on same-sex unions, as the same
is still a union between man and man or woman and woman.

Obergefell v. Hodges
135 S. ct. 2584 (2015)

Facts: Fourteen same-sex couples and two men whose same-sex partners are deceased filed suits
before the district courts in their home states against state officials responsible for enforcing state
laws that define marriage as a union between one man and one woman. They claimed that the
respondent state officials violated the Fourteenth Amendment by denying them their right to
marry or to have their marriages, lawfully performed in another State, given full recognition. The
district courts ruled in their favor but on appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of
the district courts. Petitioners then sought review with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the Fourteenth Amendment requires a State to license a marriage between two
people of the same sex?
Held: Yes.
1. The ancient origins of marriage confirm its centrality, but it has not stood in
isolation from developments in law and society. The history of marriage is one of
both continuity and change. That institution- even as confined to opposite-sex
relations- have evolved over time.
2. This analysis compels the conclusion that same-sex couples may exercise the right
to marry. The four principles and traditions to be discussed demonstrate that the
reasons marriage is fundamental under the Constitution apply with equal force to
same-sex couples. A first premise of the Court’s relevant precedents is the right to
personal choices regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of individual
autonomy. This abiding connection between marriage and liberty is why Loving
invalidated interracial marriage bans under the Due Process Clause.

3. The nature of marriage is that, through its enduring bond, two persons together
can find other freedoms, such as expression, intimacy, and spirituality. This is true
for all persons, whatever their sexual orientation. There is dignity in the bond
between two men or two women who seek to marry and their autonomy to make
such profound choices.

4. A second principle in this Court’s jurisprudence is that the right to marry is

fundamental because it supports a two-person union unlike any other in its
importance to the committed individuals. As this Court held in Lawrence, same-sex
couples have the same right as opposite-sex couples to enjoy intimate association.

5. A third basis for protecting the right to marry is that it safeguards children and
families and thus draws meaning from related rights of childrearing, procreation,
and education. As all parties agree, many same-sex couples provide loving and
nurturing homes to other children, whether biological or adopted. And hundreds
of thousands of children are presently being raised by such couples. Most states
have allowed gays and lesbians to adopt, either as individuals or as couples, and
many adopted and foster children have same-sex parents. This provides powerful
confirmation from the law itself that gays and lesbians can create loving, supportive
families.

6. Excluding same-sex couples from marriage thus conflicts with a central premise of
the right to marry. Without the recognition, stability, and predictability marriage
offers, their families are somehow lesser. They also suffer significant material costs
of being raised by unmarried parents, relegated through no fault of their own to a
more difficult and uncertain family life. The marriage laws at issue here thus harm
and humiliate the children of same-sex couples.

7. Fourth and finally, this Court’s cases and the Nation’s traditions make clear that
marriage is a keystone of our social order.

8. For that reason, just as couple vows to support each other, so does society pledge
to support the couple, offering symbolic recognition and material benefits to
 protect and nourish the union. Indeed, while the States are in general free to vary
the benefits they confer on all married couples, they have throughout our history
made marriage the basis for an expanding list of governmental rights, benefits, and
responsibilities.

9. There is no difference between same and opposite-sex couples with respect to this
principle. Yet, by virtue of their exclusion from that institution, same-sex couples
are denied the constellation of benefits that the State have linked to marriage. This
harm results in more than just material burdens. Same-sex couples are consigned
to an instability many opposite sex couples would deem intolerable in their own
lives. As the State itself makes marriage all the more precious by the significance it
attaches to it, exclusion from that status has the effect of teaching that gays and
lesbians are unequal in important respects. It demeans gays and lesbians for the
State to lock them out of a central institution of the Nation’s society. Same-sex
couples, too, may aspire to the transcendent purposes of marriage and seek
fulfillment in its highest meaning.

10. The right to marry is fundamental as a matter of history and tradition, but rights
come not from ancient sources alone. They rise, too, from a better-informed
understanding of how constitutional imperatives define a liberty that remains
urgent in our own era. Many who deem same-sex marriage to be wrong to reach
that conclusion based on a decent and honorable religious or philosophical
premise, and neither they nor their beliefs are disparaged here. But when that
sincere, personal opposition becomes enacted law and public policy, the necessary
consequence is to put the imprimatur of the State itself on an exclusion that soon
demeans or stigmatizes those whose liberty is then denied. Under the Constitution,
same-sex couples seek in marriage the same legal treatment as opposite-sex
couples, and it would disparage their choices and diminish their personhood to
deny them this right.

11. The right of same-sex couples to marry that is part of the liberty premised by the
Fourth Amendment is derived, too, from the Amendment’s guarantee of the equal
protection of the laws. The Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause
are connected in a profound way, though they set forth independent principles.
Rights implicit in liberality and rights secured by equal protection may rest on
different precepts and are not always coextensive, yet in some instances each may
be instructive as to the meaning and reach of the other. In any particular case, one
Clause may be thought to capture the essence of the right in a more accurate and
comprehensive way, and definition of the right. This interrelation of the two
principles furthers our understanding of what freedom is and must become.
 12. The synergy between the two protections is illustrated further in Zablocki. There,
the Court invoked the Equal Protection Clause as its basis for invalidating the
challenged law, which, as already noted, barred fathers who are behind on child-
support payments from marrying without judicial approval. The Equal Protection
analysis depended in central part on the Court’s holding that the law burdened a
right “of fundamental importance.” It was the essential nature of the marriage
right, discussed at length in Zablocki, that made apparent the law’s incompatibility
with the requirements of equality. Each concept-liberty and equal protection- leads
to a stronger understanding of the other. Indeed, in interpreting the Equal
Protection Clause, the Court has recognized that new insights and societal
understandings can reveal unjustified inequality within our most fundamental
institutions that once passed unnoticed and unchallenged.

13. This dynamic also applies to same-sex marriage. It is now clear that the challenged
laws burden the liberality of same-sex couples, and it must be further
acknowledged that they abridge central precepts of equality. Here, the marriage
laws enforced by the respondents are in essence unequal: same-sex couples are
denied all the benefits afforded to opposite-sex couples and are barred from
exercising a fundamental right. Especially against a long history of disapproval of
their relationships, this denial to same-sex couples of the right to marry works a
grave and continuing harm. The imposition of this disability on gays and lesbians
serves to disrespect and subordinate them. And the Equal Protection Clause, like
the Due Process Clause, prohibits this unjustified infringement of the fundamental
right to marry.

14. These considerations lead to the conclusion that the right to marry is a fundamental
right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, couples of the same-sex may
not be deprived of the right and that liberty. The Court now holds that same sex
couples may exercise the fundamental right to marry. No longer may this liberty be
denied to them. Baker v. Nelson must be and now is overruled, and the State laws
challenged by the Petitioners in these cases are now held invalid to the extent they
exclude same-sex couples from civil marriage on the same terms and conditions as
opposite sex couples.

Issue: Whether the Fourteenth Amendment requires a State to recognize same sex marriage
licensed, and performed in a State which grants that right?
Held: YES. This Court, in this decision, holds same sex couples may exercise the fundamental right
to marry in all States. It follows that the Court must hold- and it now does hold- that there is no
lawful basis for a State to refuse to recognize a lawful same-sex marriage performed in another
state on the ground of its same sex character.

Civil Unions
Certain jurisdictions have enacted laws recognizing the right of same sex couples to live
together as husband and wife. Some jurisdictions call these civil unions, while other refer to them
as traditional marriage relationship. Civil unions are a creation of statute where the rights and
obligations of the parties are governed by the law creating the relationship. Hence, no husband-
wife relationship is created in civil unions as this kind of relationship inheres only in the traditional
marriage relationship. Same sex couples cannot therefore rely on the rights and obligations of
couples in the traditional marriage relationship as these two kinds of civil union are different from
one another.

Langan v. St, Vincent’s Hosp. of NY

802 N.Y.S.2d 476 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005)

Facts: Neil Conrad Spicehandler and John Langan were same sex couples who entered into a civil
union in November 2000 in Vermont. Conrad met an accident in New York and was brought to St.
Vincent’s Hospital of New York where he subsequently died. John sued the hospital for wrongful
death. The defendant hospital moved to dismiss on the ground that the plaintiff had no standing
as a surviving spouse to initiate the present action. The Supreme Court denied the motion and the
plaintiff appealed.
Issue: Whether the plaintiff had standing as surviving spouse to sue the defendant hospital for
wrongful death.
Held: No, plaintiff was not a surviving spouse.
1. An action alleging wrongful death, unknown at common law, is a creature of statute
requiring strict adherence to the four corners of the legislation. The relevant
portion of the EPTL.5-4-1 provides as follows: “The personal representative, duly
appointed in this State or any other jurisdiction, of a decedent who is survived by
distributees may maintain an action to recover damages for a wrongful act, neglect
or default which caused the decedent’s death.” (emphasis added). The class of
distributees is set forth in EPTL. 4-1-1. Included in that class is a surviving spouse.
At that time of the drafting of these statutes, the thought that the surviving spouse
would be of the same sex as the decedent was simply inconceivable and certainly
there was no discriminatory intent to deny benefits of the statute to a directed
class. On the contrary, the clear and unmistakable purpose of the statute was to
 afford distributes right to seek compensation for loss sustained by the wrongful
death of the decedent.

2. Similarly, this Court, in ruling on the very same issue in Matter of Copper, 187 AD2d
128 (1993), appeal dismissed, 82 NY2d 801 (1993) not only held the term “surviving
spouse” did not include same sex life partners, but expressly stated as follows:
“Based on these authorities (including Baker, supra), we agree with “Acting
Surrogate Paused’s conclusion that purported (homosexual) marriages do not give
rise to any rights… pursuant to… EPTL 5-1-1 (and that) (n)o constitutional rights
have been abrogated or violated in so holding”(Matter of Cooper, id. At 134-135
[emphasis added])

3. The fact that since the perfection of this appeal the state of Massachusetts has
judicially created such right for its citizens is of no moment here since the plaintiff
and the decedent were not married in that jurisdiction. They opted for the most
intimate sanctification of their relationship the permitted, to wit, a civil union
pursuant to the laws of the State of Vermont. Although the dissenters equate a civil
union relationship with traditional heterosexual marriage, we note that neither the
State of Vermont nor the parties to the subject relationship have made that jump
in logic. In following the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Baker v. State,
the Vermont Legislature went to great pains to expressly decline to place civil
unions and marriage on an identical basis. While affording same sex couples the
same rights as those afforded married couples, the Vermont Legislature refused to
alter traditional concepts of marriage. (i.e. limiting the ability to marry, to couples
of two different sexes). The import of that action is of small moment. The decedent
herein, upon entering the defendant hospital, failed to indicate that he was
married. Moreover, in filing the various probate papers in this action, the plaintiff
likewise declined to state that he was married. In essence, this Court is being asked
to create a relationship never intended by the State of Vermont in creating civil
unions or by the decedent or the plaintiff in entering into their civil unions. For the
same reason, the theories of full faith and credit and comity have no application to
the present fact pattern.

4. The circumstances of the present case highlight the reality that there is a
substantial segment of the population of this state that is desirous of achieving
state recognition and regulation of their relationships on an equal footing with
married couples. There is also a substantial segment of the population of this state
that wishes to preserve traditional concepts of marriage as a unique institution
confined solely to one man and one woman. Whether these two positions are not
so hopelessly at variance (to all but extremists in each camp) to prevent some type
of redress is an issue not for the courts but for the Legislature. Unlike the Court,
 which can only rule on the issues before it, the Legislature is empowered to act on
all facets of the issue including, but not limited to, the issues solemnization and
creation of such

DIVORCE AND PUBLIC POLICY

In the Philippines, there is no Divorce. Our jurisdiction does not recognize Divorce in Marriages
contracted by Filipino citizens. A divorce decree obtained abroad is violative of our public policy in
protecting the sanctity of marriage.

Why?

Marriage is protected by the Constitution and the Civil Laws of our country.
“xxx It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, xxx”, Art. 1, Family
Code.

Acts inimical to marriage include Divorce obtained by Filipinos abroad which is prohibited pursuant
to Article 15 and Par. 3 of Art. 17 of the New Civil Code.

Art. 15. “Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.”

Art. 17. “Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have, for
their object, public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws
or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign
country.”

CASE:

TENCHAVEZ v. ESCANO
G.R. No. L-19671
November 29, 1965

Facts: Vicenta Escano married Pastor Tenchavez on Feburary 24, 1948 in the Philippines. Later on,
Escano left for the United States and filed a complaint for divorce against Pastor which was later
on approved and issued by the Second Judicial Court of the State of Nevada. Thereafter, Escano
married Russell Leo Moran, an American, in Nevada and has begotten children. She acquired
citizenship on August 8, 1958. Petitioner filed a complaint for Legal Separation. In her defense,
Escano presented the Decree of Divorce obtained abroad. However, the plea was denied. Hence,
this appeal.
Issue: Whether the divorce decree in Nevada should be recognized in the Philippines?

Ruling: No. It is equally clear from the record that the valid marriage between Pastor Tenchavez
and Vicenta Escaño remained subsisting and undissolved under Philippine law, notwithstanding
the decree of absolute divorce that the wife sought and obtained on 21 October 1950 from the
Second Judicial District Court of Washoe County, State of Nevada, on grounds of "extreme cruelty,
entirely mental in character."

SALIENT POINTS:

A. At the time the divorce decree was issued, Vicenta Escaño, like her husband, was still a
Filipino citizen.4 She was then subject to Philippine law, and Article 15 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines (Rep. Act No. 386), already in force at the time.

B. The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in force, does not admit absolute divorce, quo ad
vinculo matrimonii; and in fact does not even use that term, to further emphasize its
restrictive policy on the matter, in contrast to the preceding legislation that admitted
absolute divorce on grounds of adultery of the wife or concubinage of the husband (Act
2710). Instead of divorce, the present Civil Code only provides for legal separation (Title
IV, Book 1, Arts. 97 to 108), and, even in that case, it expressly prescribes that "the marriage
bonds shall not be severed" (Art. 106, subpar. 1).

C. For the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition or effect to a foreign decree of
absolute divorce between Filipino citizens could be a patent violation of the declared public
policy of the state, specially in view of the third paragraph of Article 17 of the Civil Code.

D. Even more, the grant of effectivity in this jurisdiction to such foreign divorce decrees
would, in effect, give rise to an irritating and scandalous discrimination in favor of wealthy
citizens, to the detriment of those members of our polity whose means do not permit them
to sojourn abroad and obtain absolute divorces outside the Philippines.

E. From the preceding facts and considerations, there flows as a necessary consequence that
in this jurisdiction Vicenta Escaño's divorce and second marriage are not entitled to
recognition as valid; for her previous union to plaintiff Tenchavez must be declared to be
existent and undissolved. It follows, likewise, that her refusal to perform her wifely duties,
and her denial of consortium and her desertion of her husband constitute in law a wrong
caused through her fault, for which the husband is entitled to the corresponding indemnity
(Civil Code, Art. 2176). Neither an unsubstantiated charge of deceit nor an anonymous
letter charging immorality against the husband constitute, contrary to her claim, adequate
excuse. Wherefore, her marriage and cohabitation with Russell Leo Moran is technically
"intercourse with a person not her husband" from the standpoint of Philippine Law, and
entitles plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez to a decree of "legal separation under our law, on
the basis of adultery" (Revised Penal Code, Art. 333).
 F. The foregoing conclusions as to the untoward effect of a marriage after an invalid divorce
are in accord with the previous doctrines and rulings of this court on the subject,
particularly those that were rendered under our laws prior to the approval of the absolute
divorce act (Act 2710 of the Philippine Legislature). As a matter of legal history, our statutes
did not recognize divorces a vinculo before 1917, when Act 2710 became effective; and
the present Civil Code of the Philippines, in disregarding absolute divorces, in effect merely
reverted to the policies on the subject prevailing before Act 2710. The rulings, therefore,
under the Civil Code of 1889, prior to the Act above-mentioned, are now, fully applicable.

LIMIED RECOGNITION OF DIVORCE

General Rule: Divorce Decrees are not recognizable in the Philippines.

Exception: If the non-recognition would work injustice and unfairness to Philippine Nationals,
the same may be given limited jurisdiction.

Example:

1. A divorced American citizen may not go against his Filipino wife for the accounting of
conjugal property once the divorce decree is issued.
2. Foreign spouse can no longer claim to be the spouse of his/her Filipino partner.
3. Foreign spouse can therefore not maintain a criminal case against the former spouse
on he ground that she is no longer an interested party to the case.

CASE:

VAN DORN v. HON. JUDGE ROMILLO and UPTON

G.R. No. L-68470
October 8, 1985

FACTS: Petitioner, Alice Van Dorn, Filipino citizen and Private respondent, Richard Upton,
American citizen were married in Hong Kong in 1972 and they established a business and
residence in the Philippines. They were divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982. The petitioner remarried
in Nevada to Theodore Van Dorn. Private respondent filed a suit against petitioner for the
accounting of petitioner’s business in the Philippines called, “The Galleon Shop” alleging the same
to be a conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of
action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court, where
respondent acknowledged that they had no conjugal property. The trial court ruled that the
divorce proceedings had no effect on the case.

ISSUE: Whether the divorce decree in Nevada should be recognized in the Philippines?
RULING: Yes. The private respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged conjugal
property because of the representation he made in the divorce proceedings before the American
Court that they had no community of property; that the Galleon Shop was not established through
conjugal funds, and that respondent's claim is barred by prior judgment.

SALIENT POINTS:

A. The pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada divorce of the parties.

B. The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over
petitioner who appeared in person before the Court during the trial of the case. It also
obtained jurisdiction over private respondent who, giving his address as No. 381 Bush
Street, San Francisco, California, authorized his attorneys in the divorce case, Karp & Gradt
Ltd., to agree to the divorce on the ground of incompatibility in the understanding that
there were neither community property nor community obligations. As explicitly stated in
the Power of Attorney he executed in favor of the law firm of KARP & GRAD LTD., 336 W.
Liberty, Reno, Nevada, to represent him in the divorce proceedings:
xxx xxx xxx
You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to file an Answer, appear
on my behalf and do an things necessary and proper to represent me, without
further contesting, subject to the following:
1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.
2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the Court.
3. 'I'hat there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by the court.
xxx xxx xxx
C. There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of
the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For
instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the
Union. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this
jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy.

D. It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil
Code, 5 only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the
same being considered contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However,
aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided
they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released
private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under
which divorce dissolves the marriage.

E. Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband
entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own
country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does
 not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting
his right over the alleged conjugal property.

F. To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be
considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under
Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live
together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The
latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property.
She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be
served.

San Luis v San Luis

514 SCRA 294(2007)
GR No.134029, February 6, 2007

Facts: Former Laguna Governor Felicisio T. San Luis died leaving as heirs the following:

1. children from first wife Virginia Sulit; Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel
2. second wife, Merry Lee Corwin and son, Tobia
3. third wife, Felicidad Salalongos

On December 17, 1993, Felicidad filed a petition for letter of administration with the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City. Rodolfo filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of improper
venue and failure to state a cause of action. He alleged that Laguna was Felicisimo's place of
residence before his death and that Felicidad had no legal personality to file the petition because
she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally
married to Merry Lee. Linda likewise filed a motion to dismiss based on the same grounds. The
RTC denied both motion to dismiss but upon a motion for reconsideration, the RTC dismissed the
petition for letters of administration on the ground that Felicisimo was a resident of Laguna and
that Felicisimo's marriage to Felicidad was bigamous. It ruled that the divorce obtained by Merry
Lee cannot be given effect in the Philippines.

Respondent Felicidad appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals which, in reversing the
RTC decision, held that the venue was properly laind in Makati City and that the marriage between
Felicisimo and Merry Leewas validly dissolved by the Hawaii divorce decree. Petitioners then
appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the divorce obtained by Merry Lee in Hawaii could be recognized in our
jurisdiction?
Held: Yes. Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo,
Jr. The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court
held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines,
and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law. As such, the
Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a divorce is validly obtained abroad
by the alien spouse. With the enactment of the Family Code and paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof,
our lawmakers codified the law already established through judicial precedent.

The divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to
remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as
Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to
prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and
Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A.
With regard to respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she
submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of the Family Law Act
of California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with the said
law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they
must be alleged and proved.
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further
reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of
respondent and Felicisimo.

Pilapil v Ibay-Somera
174 SCRA 653
GR No. 80116, June 30, 1989

Facts: Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married with private respondent, Erich Ekkehard
Geiling, a German national before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler,
Federal Republic of Germany. They have a child who was born on April 20, 1980 and named
Isabella Pilapil Geiling. Conjugal disharmony eventuated in private respondent and he initiated a
divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January
1983. The petitioner then filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property
before the RTC Manila on January 23, 1983. The decree of divorce was promulgated on January
15, 1986 on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted
to the petitioner. On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed 2 complaints for adultery before the
City Fiscal of Manila alleging that while still married to Imelda, latter “had an affair with William
Chia as early as 1982 and another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983”.
Issue: Whether private respondent can prosecute petitioner on the ground of adultery even
though they are no longer husband and wife as decree of divorce was already issued.

Held: The law specifically provided that in prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the person
who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody else. Though in this
case, it appeared that private respondent is the offended spouse, the latter obtained a valid
divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, and said divorce and its legal effects may
be recognized in the Philippines in so far as he is concerned. Thus, under the same consideration
and rationale, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner and has no legal standing
to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time
he filed suit.

Roehr v. Rodriguez et al.

452 Phil 608
G.R. No. 142820, June 20, 2003

Facts: Wolfgang Roehr, a German citizen and resident of Germany, married Carmen Rodriguez, a
Filipina, on December 11, 1980, in Germany. They had two daughters. On August 28, 1996, Carmen
filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage at the Makati RTC, but the petition was
denied. Meanwhile, Wolfgang Roehr obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance
of Hamburg-Blankenese, promulgated on December 16, 1997. The custody of the two children
was granted to Wolfgang by the said court. Because of this, Wolfgang filed a Second Motion to
Dismiss on May 20, 1999, on the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the matter
since there is already a divorce decree obtained abroad. Judge Guevara-Salonga granted the
motion to dismiss. Carmen, however, filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, praying that the
case should proceed for the purpose of determining the issues of custody of their children and the
distribution of the properties. The judge issued an order partially setting aside her order to dismiss
for the purpose of tackling the issues of property relations of the spouses as well as the custody
of the children.

Issue: Whether the RTC was correct in reopening the case to litigate the issues of custody and
distribution of assets despite the divorce between the parties?

Ruling: Yes. First, it is important to point out that the divorce was validly obtained and is recognized
in the Philippines. It has been consistently held that a divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be
recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the
foreigner. In this case, the divorce decree has not been questioned by either party. Only the
custody of the children is doubted. While the court in Germany that granted the divorce decree
has decided regarding the custody of the children, as a general rule, the legal effects of divorce,
even if obtained abroad, must still be determined by our courts. This includes issues on custody
and care and support of children. Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign
judgment, such as the award of custody to petitioner by the German court, it must be shown that
the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds
allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court. It should be noted that the proceedings
in the German court were merely summary. It cannot be said that Carmen Rodriguez was given
the opportunity to challenge the judgment of the German court. While Wolfgang was represented
by two counsels, Rodriguez had no lawyers to assist her in the proceedings.

In addition, the divorce decree did not touch on the issue as to who the offending spouse
was. Absent any finding that private respondent is unfit to obtain custody of the children, the trial
court was correct in setting the issue for hearing to determine the issue of parental custody, care,
support and education mindful of the best interests of the children. This is in consonance with the
provision in the Child and Youth Welfare Code that the child’s welfare is always the paramount
consideration in all questions concerning his care and custody. Thus, the court may proceed to
determine the issue regarding the custody of the two children.

Right to Re-marry after divorce

Citizens of the Philippines whose foreign spouses have obtained a divorce abroad are
capacitated to remarry under our laws. We give implicit recognition to the divorce as a way of
equalizing the rights of the Filipino spouse to the foreign spouse who is now freed from the marital
bonds by virtue of divorce. If this were not the case, the Filipino spouse will forever be held
"hostaged" by the marriage which no longer exists. Hence, to remove the unfairness of the
situation, Filipinos are now allowed to remarry once their foreign spouses obtain a divorce decree.
Thus, paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code provide for the following:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as
such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35
(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly

celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

It is important however, that the divorce judicially recognized first by Philippine courts
before the Philippine national can rely on the effects of the divorce. For one, the Filipino cannot
remarry until and unless the divorce is properly recognized and annotated in the local civil registry.
 Republic vs Orbecido
472 SCRA 114 (2005)
G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005

Facts: Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the
Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City in 1981. Five years later, Lady Myros would also obtain a divorce
decree from a US Court. Cipriano then filed a petition for authority to remarry with the RTC
Zamboanga City based on the 2nd paragraph of Artile 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was
filed and the petition was allowed by the lower court. The Office of the Solicitor General moved
for reconsideration but was denied.

Issue: Whether Cipriano can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code

Held: Yes. The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to
the intant case because it only applies to a valid miced marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated
between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper remedy is to file a petition for annulment or
for legal separation. Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that governs respondent’s
situation. The OSG posits tat this is a matter of legislation and not of judicial determination.

The Supreme Court held that 2nd paragraph of Article 26 should be interpreted to include
cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens,
but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree.
The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if he other party were a foreigner at
the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity
and injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would
lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be
construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law.
A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long
as they come within its spirit or intent.

In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of 2nd paragraph
of Article 26 as follows:
A. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner;
and
B. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of
the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating the latter to remarry.

In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a
valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the
naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly,
the twin requisites for the application of 2nd paragraph of Article 26 are both present in this case.
Thus, Cipriano, the divorced Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.

Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that his
wife was naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce can be recognized
by our own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its
conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Such foreign law must also be proved as our courts
cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be alleged and
proved. Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows his former wife
to remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient
to declare that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage.

Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that 2nd paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse
who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However, considering that
in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are unable to
declare, based on respondents bare allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an American
citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an American, had obtained a divorce
decree and had remarried an American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such
declaration could only be made properly upon respondent’s submission of the afforested evidence
in his favor.

As such, the Supreme Court may have exceeded its jurisdiction in holding that Filipinos can
be beneficiaries of 2nd paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code in situations where both parties
are Philippine citizens at the time of the celebration of the marriage. This simply is not the plain
meaning of 2nd paragraph when it states that “where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorces thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
the Philippine law.” It is pretty clear from the provision that the marriage must be between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner, and not between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner, and not between
a Filipino citizen and a fellow Filipino citizen. It is a bit of a stretch to state that the point of
reckoning is the time of the divorce and not the time of marriage. This argument simply will fail
when one looks at the first element enumerated by the Court that “there is a valid marriage that
has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner.”

It is likely, that the support in the legislative records that there was the intent to capacitate
Filipinos to remarry the moment their foreign spouses obtain a divorce decree. However, this
intent is nowhere reflected in the wordings of 2nd paragraph of Article 26 when enacted. And
definitely, when there is a conflict between the legislative records and the law as enacted, it is the
latter that will prevail.
Recognition of Foreign Divorce and Correction of Entry

When the alien spouse obtains a foreign divorce, the same may be given effect in the
Philippines by filing a petition for correction of entry in the civil registry. Under Section 2 of Rule
108 of the Rules of Court is a special proceeding for the declaration of a status or confition and is
different from a civil case which is the enforcement of a right against another.

The Supreme Court has simplified the procedure in recognition of foreign divorce decrees.
To avoid multiplicity of suits, bothe the recognition of divorce and the correction of entry may now
be made in a Rule 108 proceeding. The Court has held that Rule 108 proceedings will also include
the recognition of the foreign divorce itself. This is the logical procedure since mere recognition
under Rule 29 may still require a party to file another petition for correction of entry. A proceeding
for the recognition of a foreign divorce under Rule 39 may not give the party desiring to establish
his status the relief that party desires. As a practical application, even though the foreign divorce
is already recognized, the Filipino spouse may not be able to get the necessary certifications from
the civil registry to allow him or her to remarry.

Therefire, recognitions of foreign divorces now only require one proceeding which is a
special proceeding for correction of entry in the civil registry. There is no more need to file an
initial petition for recognition since the establishment of the authenticity and validity of the foreign
divorce may now be made in the Rule 108 proceeding itself.

Corpus vs Sto. Tomas

628 SCRA 266 (2010)
G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010

Facts: Former Filipino citizen and now naturalized Canadian citizen Gerbert Corpus married
Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipino, in Pasig City. After the wedding, Gerbert returned to Canada. He
came back to the Philippines but to his surprise and astonishment, he discovered that his wife was
having an affair with another man. Gerber then returned to Canada and obtained a decree a
divorce from a court there.

Gerbert found another Filipino to love and wanted to marry her. For this purpose, he filed a
petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of marriage as dissolved with
the RTC. The RTC, however, denied the petition on the ground that “only a Filipino spouse can
avail of the remedy provided by the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.” From the
RTC decision, petition appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether a foreigner may invoke the benefit of 2nd paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code?
Held: No.

Essentially, the 2nd paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse
a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved,
capacitating him or her to remarry. Without the 2nd paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,
the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted
precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance
to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital
bond; Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be
subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the 2nd paragraph in
Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for
recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien
spouse.

Additionally, an action based on the 2nd paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not
limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. Is the court finds that the decree
capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise
capacitated et alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise
capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a
similar declaration for the alien spouse whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by
his national law.

Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the 2nd
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the
provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke
the 2nd paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this
provision.

We qualify the above conclusion, the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26
of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC
for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its
authenticity and conformity with the alien’s national law have been duly proven according to our
rules of evidence, serves as presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section
48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments.

The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as
well as the required certificates proving its authenticity, but failed to include a copy of the
Canadian law on divorce. Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition for
insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to
the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law.

Every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is
made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata between the
parties, as provided under Section 48 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
 This ruling should not be construed as requiring two separate proceedings for the
registration of a foreign decree and another specifically for cancellation of the entry and another
specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition of
the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special
proceedings is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover,
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial proceeding bu which the
applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional
infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

Nature of Recognition of Foreign Divorce Proceedings

To prove the validity of a foreign judgement, there is a proceeding to recognize foreign divorce.
The party applying for recognition must present proof of the appropriate foreign laws as well as
the authenticity of the documents obtained from foreign courts and offices. These are proceedings
with the sole objective of giving effect to a foreign judgement. Philippine courts are not allowed
to relitigate the issues already settled by a foreign court because such decision of the foreign
tribunal is already res judicata to the case. Where the foreign court decides a case, the same settles
the legal issues between the parties and a local court has no power to reopen the issues decided
by the foreign court. A Philippine court exceeds its jurisdiction where it to review the judgment of
the foreign court.

The local court’s role is only to assure that there is indeed a foreign judgement, that this judgement
is in conformity with foreign law, and that these foreign las are duly proved in the proceedings.
The local court cannot absolutely apply Philippine laws to decide a matter already decided by a
foreign tribunal.

The petition for the recognition of foreign divorce may be filed by foreigners as long as foreign
judgement affects their status, condition as a person. Thus, is the wife of a foreigner marries
somebody else under bigamous conditions, or conditions which would render the second marriage
void, the husband in the first marriage has an interest in having the second marriage annulled, as
this will validate the first marriage and remove clouds on his status as husband of his wife.

Fujiki vs Marinay
GR. 196049 June 26, 2013

Facts: Japanese national Fujiki married Philippine national Marinay on January 23, 2004. Due to
some disagreements, they became separated with each other. Marinay met another Japanese
national, Maekara, and they married each other on May 15, 2008. Marinay suffered physical abuse
from Maekara so she re-established her relationship with Fujiki. Marinay later obtained a
judgment from a Japanese court declaring her marriage with Maekara as void on the ground that
the it was a bigamous marriage. Fujiki then filed a petition for recognition of foreign judgment with
the Regional Trial Court involving the judgment annulling the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara. The RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that only the husband or the wife can file
the petition for recognition under AM. 02-11-10 SC which is the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. Fujiki moved for reconsideration
but the same was denied. Fujiki then applead the case to the Supereme Court.

Issue:
1) Whether or not the AM. 02-11-10 SC is applicable to a foreign judgment of nullity.
2) Whether or not a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on
the ground of bigamy.
3) Whether or not the RTC can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for the cancellation
or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

Held:
On Issue #1:

No. The Supreme Court held that AM. 02-11-10 SC does not apply in a petition to recognize
a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a
foreign country.

For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of marriage
where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the
foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To apply AM 02-11-10 SC is to allow the trial
court to relitigate the case anew thus it will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation
under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the foreign
judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the status, condition and legal
capacity of the foreign citizen under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can
only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of evidence.

On Issue #2:

Yes. The Supreme Court held that Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize
the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on
the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For
the same reason that he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108. Section 2(a) of AM.
02-11-10 SC does not preclude a spouse of subsisting marriage to question the validity of a
subsequent marriage of the ground of Bigamy. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife which properly refers to husband or the
wife of the subsisting marriage as persons who engaged to subsequent bigamous marriage are not
under the law recognized as husband and wife. This rule coincides with Article 35(4) of the Family
Code on void marriages. Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy
because any citizen has an interest in the prosecution and prevention of crimes. If anyone can file
a criminal action which leads to the declaration of nullity of bigamous marriage, there is more
reason to confer personality to sue on the husband or the wife of a subsisting marriage.

On Issue #3:

Yes. The Supreme Court held that since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires
proof of fact of the judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction
of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. In the recognition of foreign
judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their judgment on how a case was
decided under a foreign law. They cannot decide on the family rights and duties, or on the status,
condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment. Thus,
Philippine courts are limited to the questions of whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment
in the Philippines. For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) Whether the foreign
judgment is inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) Whether any
alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment. If there is neither
inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts
should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations.