1

Historicus [Quarterly Journal of Pakistan Historical Society], Vol. LIX,

No. 2, Aprial-June, 2011.

Final Submission

Historical Process of Marginalization:

The Case of Indian-Bengali Muslims

Dr. Mahfuz Parvez

Professor,
Political Science
University of Chittagong
Chittagong, Bangladesh
mahfuzparvez@gmail.com
 2

*I should like to thank many experts for their valuable comments and suggestions on this article,
especially Dr. Anser Zahid Khan and an anonymous reviewer.
1. Introduction and Background

Bengali Muslims living in West Bengal province of India is an interesting topic to

explore and deserves to be examined for its perspective as well as its significance in
terms of civil and human rights conditions under the political process and democratic
experience in pre and post liberation (1947) period. This article examines the historical
process of marginalization of Bengali Muslims and its impact particularly on the Muslim
community living in today’s West Bengal of India. The term ‘marginalization’ has been
used here to denote a state of affairs whereby a community is placed in a disadvantageous
and subservient (political, economic, socio-cultural, religious etc.) position as a
consequence of federal and provincial policies. 1

Needless to say, Bengal’s historical experience was extraordinary not only in its
widespread reception of Islam but also in its frontier character. The thirteenth-century
Turkish drive eastward—both to Bengal and within Bengal—was the product of a
process triggered by political convulsions in thirteen-century Inner Asia. For several
centuries before and after the Mongol irruption into West Asia, newly Islamicized Turks
from Central Asia and the Iranian Plateau provided a ready supply of soldiers, both as
slaves and as free men, for commanders such as Muhammad Bakhtiyar Khiljee. Once
within Bengal’s fertile delta, these men pushed on until stopped only by geographical
barriers. Surrounded on the north and east by mountains, and to the south by the sea,
Bengal was the terminus of a continent-wide process of Turko-Mongol conquest and
migration.2

Historically, a Muslim sultanate with headquarters at Lakhnauti (Gaur) in the district of

Malda had been established at the beginning of the thirteenth century, just after the first
Muslim victory in the then undivided Bengal by Bakhtiyar Khiljee in 1204 3. Following
the Mughal conquest of Bengal in Akbar’s reign, in 1612 Dacca (now written Dhaka)
became the capital of whole Bengal. In the eighteenth century Murshidabad became the
center of the Nawab of Bengal’s government which was followed by Calcutta, a capital
established by emerging colonial power—British. Yet according to the first British
censuses in Bengal only Dacca district had more than half of its population Muslim, and
the proportion in Malda and Murshidabad (now in West Bengal of India) districts was
appreciably less. In contrast, in what Britis observers contemptuously described as the
‘rice swamps’, districts such as Bogra, Rajshahi, Noakhali, Pubna, Bakarganj (Barisal),

1
To learn more about marginalization, see Amena Mohsin (1997), The Politics of Nationalism: The Case
of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh, (Dhaka: University Press Ltd.).
2
Hardy, P.(2002), The Muslims of British India, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
3
Maulana Minhaj-ud-Din Abu`l-`Umar-i-`Usman (1970), Tabakat-i-Nasiri: A General History of the
Muhammadan Dynasties of Asia, Inculding Hindustan (810-1260), trans. H. G. Raverty (Calcutta: Asiatic
Society of Bengal, 1881; reprint, New Delhi: Oriental Books Reprint, 1970). This account by Minhaj is the
earliest narrative we have of this important event. It is likely that some of the historian’s informants had
been eyewitnesses to the events they described; some may well have participated in them.
 3

Tippera (Comilla) and Mymensingh, areas of no particular strategic importance in the

maintenance of Muslim rule, from two-thirds to more than three-quarters of the
population, mostly poor cultivators, were Muslim. In the Presidency of Bengal under
British rule (which included Bihar, Orissa, Asam and Choto Nagpur) the proportion of
agriculturalists among Muslims was higher than in the Panjab-628 per thousand-with 31
engaged in local textile production and 73 as laborers. As in other provinces, many
Muslims in Bengal claimed foreign origin; a somewhat speculative calculation in the
Bengal census report in 1901, which, however, took account of recent Bengali Muslim
protests against being considered as mainly of low indigenous origin, suggested that
perhaps one-sixth of the population of the Presidency as a whole had some foreign blood
in their veins.4
What was exceptional, however, was that among India’s interior provinces only in Bengal
—a region approximately the size of England and Scotland combined—did a majority of
the indigenous population adopt the religion of the ruling class, Islam. The outcome
proved to be as fateful as it is striking, for in 1947 British India was divided into two
independent states, Pakistan and India, on the basis of the distribution of Muslims. In
Bengal, those areas with a Muslim majority would form the eastern wing of Pakistan—
since 1971, Bangladesh—whereas those parts of the province with a Muslim minority
became the state of West Bengal within the Republic of India. According to an
ethnographic survey, “in 1984 about 93 million of the 152 million Bengalis in
Bangladesh and West Bengal were Muslims, and of the estimated 96.5 million people
inhabiting Bangladesh, 81 million, or 83 percent, were Muslims; in fact, Bengalis today
comprise the second largest Muslim ethnic population in the world, after the Arabs.”5

2. Historical Overview
The Bengal delta was no social vacuum when Turkish cavalrymen entered it in thirteenth
century. In fact, it had inhabited long before the earliest appearance of dated inscriptions
in the third century B.C.6
By the time Muslims conquered Bengal in 1204, Islamic political thought and
administration evolved a good deal in the context of governance of Bengal. Important
cultural changes coincided with demographic and political developments. According to
Eaton:
“when Bengal was conquered by Muslim Turks, sultans and Sufis had both
inherited models of authority that, though embedded in a shared pool of symbols,
made quite different assumptions about the world and the place that God, kings,
and saints occupied in it. Moreover, both models differed radically from the ideas
of political legitimacy current among the Hindu population formerly ruled by
orthodox kings of the conquered Sena Dynasty.”7

4
E. A. Gait (1902), Report on the Census of Bengal 1901, part 1, (Calcutta: Imperial Press), p. 169.
5
Richard V. Weekes (1984), ed., Muslim Peoples: A World Ethnographic Survey, 2nd ed. (Westport,
Conn.:Greenwood Press), p. 137.
6
For details account on ancient Bengal, see, Barrie M. Morrison (1970), Political Centers and Cultural
Regions in Early Bengal (Tucson: University of Arizona Press), For a discussion of Bengal’s physical sub-
regions, see, O. H. K. Spate and A. T. A. Learmonth (1967), India and Pakistan: A General and Regional
Geography (London: Methuen).
7
Eaton, Richard, M. (2000), The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier (1204-1760), (New Delhi: Oxford
University Press), p. 31-2.
 4

In 1342 a powerful noble, Shams al-Din Ilyas Shah (1342-57), wrested Bengal free from
Delhi’s grip8 and established the first of several dynasties that remained independent from
North India for the next two and a half centuries. The break with Delhi was marked by a
shift of the Ilyas Shahi capital from Lakhnauti, the provincial capital throughout the age
of Delhi’s hegemony, to the new site of Pandua, located some twenty miles to the north.
In reality, the emergence of the independent Ilyas Shah dynasty represented the political
expression of a long-present cultural autonomy. In the late thirteenth century, Marco Polo
made mention of “Bangala”, a place he had apparently heard of from his Muslim
informants, and which he understood as being a region distinct from India.9
The Mughal Empire, centered in far-off Delhi, had taken control over Bengal in 1612
after many battles with local opponents. The delta became one of the Mughals’ conquered
dependencies, a source of large amounts of tax.
On a fine June day in 1757 thousands of men were fighting in a mango orchard close to
the border of present-day Bangladesh. This battle became famous as a turning-point in
the history of South Asia. It took place in the small village of Polashi, and the encounter
established the British East India Company as a new territorial overlord over Muslim
Bengal. Within a century this trading conglomerate captured practically all of South Asia.
Historians have often described the Battle of Polashi as the beginning of British colonial
rule in South Asia, a rule that continued till 1947. According to a recent book titled ‘A
History of Bangladesh’ (2009), Willem Van Schendel viewed:
“In many ways Polashi is a useful marker of change. It brought to an end a style
of government that the Mughal state had introduced some 150 years previously.
British rule introduced new ideas, arrangements and coercions that would shake
Bengal’s society profoundly. ... When foreigners took control of the state and a
colonial system of exploitation took effect. It also took an anti-colonial struggle to
remove this blot on the national escutcheon: the colonial state was dismantled and
sovereign power returned to indigenous rulers in 1947.”10
The British were unlike the Mughals—they wanted more than just to extract Bengal’s
riches. It was their ambition to transform Bengal’s economy to make it yield them much
more income. To this end they combined experience from Britain and Ireland with South
Asian practices, subjecting the population of Bengal to an endless series of administrative
and economic experiments. Some of these turned out to be successful, others were
disastrous. The early introduction of a system of increased tax collection proved to be

8
Delhi did not allow Bengal’s assertions of independence to go unchallenged. In 1353 Sultan Firuz Shah
Tughluq took an enormous army down the Ganges to punish the breakaway kingdom. Although Firuz selw
up to 180,000 Bengalis and even temporarily dislodged Shams-al-Din Ilyas Shah from his capital at
Pandua, he failed to reannex the delta. Six years later, Firuz made another attempt to restore the delta to
Delhi’s authority, but he was again rebuffed, this time by Shams al-Din’s son and successor, Sikander Shah
(1357-89). These inconclusive invasions of Bengal, and the successful tactics of the two Bengali kings to
elude the North Indian imperialists by fading into the interior and finally persuaded Firuz and his
successors of the futility of trying to hold onto the distant province. After 1359 Bengal was left undistrubed
by North Indian armies for nearly two centuries.
For detailed account on the events, see, Shams-i Siraj `Afif, Tarikh-i-Firuz Shahi, in The History of India
as Told by Its Own Historians, trans. and ed. H.M. Elliot and John Dowson (Allahabad: Kitab Mahal,
1964).
9
The Book of Ser Marco Polo, Trans. and ed. Henry Yule and Henri Cordier, 3d ed. (Amsterdam: Philo
Press, 1975), p. 115.
10
Willem Van Schendel (2009), A History of Bangladesh, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 49.
 5

calamitous in the uncertain natural conditions of Bengal. It was applied rigidly despite a
depletion of people’s incomes as a result of drought and then floods in 1769-70. Together
with unchecked profiteering in the food-grain markets, this led to intense suffering and an
epic famine which is still remembered as the ‘Great Famine of 1176’ or ‘Chhiyattarer
manbantar’. It is thought that one third of Bengal’s population, or a staggering 10 million
people, perished.11
This unconscionable debacle forced the British overlords to find more sustainable ways
of exploiting the resources of their new colony—Bengal. They developed policies that
shaped a new colonial society under the leadership of Hindu community of Bengal. 12 The
most momentous decision of the early colonial period was the creation of a new system
of land taxation which came to be known as the ‘permanent settlement’ (PS). 13 After the
PS, the composition of the zamindai gentry changed. Whereas Muslims had dominated
during the reclamation of the eastern delta in the Sultani and Mughal periods, the colonial
period saw an advance of Hindu landlords. Consequently, in many parts of the eastern
delta religious and class identities began to merge, with Hindu zamindars at the apex of a
local society consisting largely of Muslim cultivators. The second major change in the
colonial period was the introduction of large-scale export-oriented cash cropping. It led to
a new regional specialization as well as separation of the Bengal economy into west and
east. Old relations of social and political control broke down again, giving way to
increasing violent conflicts between Muslim-peasants of eastern part and the Hindu-elite
made up of moneylenders, traders and landlords of western part. British rule introduced
further major changes, some of which had long-lasting effects. By the 1830s the British
dropped Persian—the language of rule—as the state’s official language. English-language
schools and colleges trained a population of the Bengali elite, mostly from Hindu
community, to prepare them for employment at the lower and middle levels of the
colonial system. The final major change during the colonial period was the emergence of
Calcutta (now Kolkata) as the new center of political power and cultural renewal. This
Hindu dominated city, established by the British in 1690, became the capital of colonial
Bengal damaging old centers like Dhaka and Murshidabad resulting marginalization of
traditional Muslim population, system and power. Under the British rule, Bengal became
a land of Hindu and Muslim ‘elite-conflict’ 14 resulting serious Hindu communal and
terrorist activities in the socio-political and economic arena of Bengal as described in
Joya Chatterji’s Bengal Divided: Hindu Communalism and Partition.15
11
The Bengali calendar, introduced by Great Mughal ruler Akber, differs from the Common Era calendar
(C E) in its starting point. It has solar years and each tear begins in mid-April. Thus the year 2000 C E
equals the year 1406/7 B E (Bengali Era) and the great Famine of 1176 (B E) refers to the year 1769/70 (C
E).For details on Great Famine’ see, W.W. Hunter (1868), The Annals of Rural Bengal: Vol. I. The Ethnical
Frontier of Lower Bengal, with the Ancient Principalities of Beerbhoom and Bishenpore, (New York:
Leypoldt and Holt), p. 26-7, 29-30.
12
Historians of Bengal, who have concentrated their studies mostly on the colonial period, have provided
us with a richly texured and enormously detailed understanding of the complex social and economic
permutions of Bengal under British rule between 1757 and 1947. Here we highlight only a few major
effects of special significance for the marginalization of Indian-Bengali Muslims.
13
See, Sirajul Islam (1979), The Permanent Settlement in Bengal: A Study of Its Operation, (Dacca: Bangla
Academy).
14
J. H. Broomflied (1968), Elite Conflict in a Plural Society: Twentieth-Century Bengal, (Berkeley and
Los Angeles: University of California Press).
15
Joya Chatterji (1995), Bengal Divided: Hindu Communalism and Partition 1932-1947, (New Delhi:
Foundation Books and Cambridge University Press).
 6

The colonial period ushered in major political and cultural renewal favoring Hindu
interest. Therefore, right at outset British rule was challenged severely and unexpectedly
by thousands of armed religious mendicants who were enraged by ill-advised government
policies. The revolt gained widespread support from a rural population, mostly Muslim,
suffering under the newly imposed system of British with the collaboration of Hindu. To
protect from Anglo-Hindu political, cultural, religious, economic aggression, protests like
‘Fara`izi Movement’ emerged.16 By the middle of the nineteenth century, British rule was
no longer threatened in the Bengal delta. When the large revolt of 1857—known to the
British as ‘the Mutiny’ and to nationalist historians as ‘the First War of Independence’—
brought the near-collapse of British rule in many parts of northern and central India, the
capital of Bengal—Calcutta remained aloof with its Hindu middle class elite and
intellectuals.17 Certainly, there was a rebellion in eastern part of Bengal like in Chittagong
and trepidation among the British in Dhaka, but because neither the landlords nor the
middle class—both from Hindu community—supported the revolt, it fizzled out after
some skirmishes.18
However, late nineteenth century saw the beginnings of a political connection between
members of ‘the bhodrolok gentry’ (Hindu Gentlemen or middle class). it reached it apex
with Hindu terrorist and nationalist approach when the British divided the huge province
of Bengal into a western part (as named ‘Bengal’) and an eastern part (as named ‘Eastern
Bengal and Assam’). This decision led to a sharp division of minds all over Bengal and
indeed all over India on the line of Hindu and Muslim interest. A very vocal opposition
developed, especially among the middle and upper classes Hindu-Bengali in Kolkata.
They feared a loss of economic power,19 inconvenience20 and competition.21 They
galvanized the Hindu nationalist movement namely ‘Swadeshi Movement’ 22 both with
conventional moderate forms of protest and new strategies of terrorism 23 giving birth of
militancy in the politics of the South Asia. After 1905, according to a recent observation
(2009): ‘Muslims’ and ‘Hindus’ became clear-cut ‘political categories’ and these
categories have figured very prominently in Bengal political life ever since.24

16
The account of the ‘Far’izi Movement’ follows closely MUin-ud-din Ahmad Khan (1968), History of
Fara’idi Movement in Bengal (1818-1906), (Karachi: Asiatic Society of Pakistan).
17
Mahfuz Parvez (2009), “1857: Phire Dekha Prothon Sadhinoter Judha (Review of First Liberation War
1857), Fahmid-ur-Rahman ed., Mohabidroho 1857 (Great Revolt 1857), (Dhaka: Badip Prokason).
18
ibid
19
Tea and jute exports might now go through the port of Chittagong, East-Bengal.
20
East-Bengal’s absentee landlords had settle in Kolkata.
21
A new court system in east Bengal might exclude Kolkata lawyers and new newspapers might restrict the
circulation of the Kolkata press.
22
The ‘Bhodrolok gentry’ took the lead in the anti-division movement protesting another province in east
with its capital at Dhaka. This group was dominated by high-caste Hindus from Kolkata. They sought to
mobilize popular support by connecting this with Hindu revivalism, equating the Motherland with the
goddess ‘Kali’ and adopting the communal song ‘Bande Mataram’, to which Muslims objected, as the
movement’s anthem. Plans for national education underlined the need to revive a glorious Hindu past,
revolutionary youth clubs were inspired by Hindu spirituality.
23
Sumit Sarkar (1973), The Swadeshi Movement in Bengal, 1903-1908 (New Delhi: People’s Publishing
House); David M. Laushey (1975), Bengal Terrorism and the Marxist Left: Aspects of Regional
Nationalism in India, 1905-1942 (Calcutta: Firma K.L. Mukhopadhyay); Peter Heehs (1993), The Bonb in
Bengal: The Rise of Revolutionary Terrorism in India 1900-1910 (Delhi: Oxford University Press).
24
Willem Van Schendel (2009), A History of Bangladesh, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p.80.
 7

This religious flavor strengthened the movement’s hold over millions of Hindus—but it
antagonized non-Hindus of Bengal. Thus, Muslims in Bengal began to define themselves
self-consciously as a community. Moreover, tensions between Hindus and Muslims in
Bengal were intensified by economic grievance. In eastern Bengal the tenants (over-
whelming Muslims) began to asert their economic rights vis-à-vis the landlords and
moneylenders (mostly Hindus). At the same time the emerging Muslim middle class was
frustrated in its social and political ambitions by the disdainful attitude of Hindu notables.
Thus the idea of a political party representing all Muslims became a possibility, and at a
meeting in Dhaka in 1906 a group of politicians established the All-India Muslim League.
The new party emerged to counter the anti-division agitation and the party behind it, the
Indian National Congress. Its appeal to the Muslim community—not just in Bengal but
all over India—was a harbinger of a new era of political mobilization on the basis of
religious community.
In 1911 the British annulled the 1905 division of Bengal into two provinces. But what it
did affect was creation of a specific regional political framework in which religious
identity began to overrule regional and class identification. Thus for Muslims and Hindus
across Bengal, irrespective of their local and class diversities, the region of Bengal
became the focus of lively—but largely separate and antagonistic—identity politics.
In the 1940s the Bengal delta went through breathtaking change. It began the end-game
of nationalist politics under colonial rule. The two major parties were sharply divided
over the future, and their differences were popularly perceived in terms of Muslim/non-
Muslim, or Muslim/Hindu, rivalry. Subsequently, people of Bengal were divided between
the cause of Pakistan and India accordingly. In February, 1947, they announced that they
would leave in a year and a half, but in June they changed the date to 15 August 1947.
Feverish weeks of politicking and administrative preparation followed amidst increasing
political radicalization and violence.25 Only six weeks before British rule was to end, two
Boundary Commissions for Punjab and Bengal were formed to decide where the new
bounders between Pakistan and India should be drawn. These commissions—both headed
by the same chairman, Cyril Radcliffe—were besieged by lobbyists trying to sway the
verdict. In the end, neither of the two commissions could come to a unanimous decision
and the chairman had to take responsibility for the territorial dismemberment of the
colony.

3. The Case of Indian-Bengali Muslims

The province of Bengal was divided between the two new states in 1947. Pakistan
received the largest part of the province’s territory and majority of its population (East
Pakistan). Smaller sections to the west, north and east joined the new Republic of India
(West Bengal). The point of Partition was to create a homeland for Muslims. In Bengal,
Islam had become a mass religion in the Mughal period, when the fertile eastern delta
was brought under the plough. For the first time in its history, the Bengal delta was
encased in a modern international border, a phenomenon that its inhabitants had no
previous experience of whatsoever. The new border encircled most Muslim-majority
areas of Bengal and in that sense East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) became the homeland

25
For details, see, Suranjan Das (1991), Communal Riots in Bengal, 1905-1947 (Delhi: Oxford University
Press).
 8

of most of Bengal’s Muslims. But millions of Bengali Muslims were now in Indian
Territory.
At the time of Partition in 1947, 19.85% Muslims turned into a religious minority
community in West Bengal.26 Partition dramatically changed the demographic profile of
Muslim population of West Bengal. Massive displacement of population partly explains
this. In West Bengal rehabilitation and resettlement brought about much needed stability,
and both the communities lived in peace. However, occasionally communal conflicts did
mar the harmonious relation between the two communities in two parts of Bengal. For
instance, in 1965, at the time of war between India and Pakistan, the two communities
experienced the worst crisis, which eventually led to loss of life and displacement.27 In
spite of these events there were uniting forces that helped the minority Muslim com-
munity to live in peace and harmony. They remained an integral part of Bengali society.
However, of late, some exclusionary state policies are drawing lines between the majority
and the minority communities. This is one of the factors that led to the marginalization of
Muslims in West Bengal like the Muslims of Indian states. So it is important to deals with
some issues that are linked with the question of social exclusion of the minority Muslim
community in the state of West Bengal with special attention. Apart from Indian national
policy, in the context of West Bengal, two broad areas that have been addressed here are:
affirmative action for “dalit” and “backward” Muslims, and local-level politics. It is also
a burning case to examine why these issues are crucial to an understanding of relations
between the majority and the minority communities in the state where once upon time
Muslims were leading force and the majority in the days of undivided Bengal.
At the end of 2001 Census operations in West Bengal, it was found that Muslims
constitute 25.25% of the total population. It has been noted by several scholars that the
underprivileged sections of this numerically significant minority group has not received
social and political support from the state, especially if their position is compared with
their counterpart in the Hindu community. This brings us to the important point about
affirmative action for Muslim other backward classes (OBCs) and dalits.28
In a short account on Muslims in India W W Hunter wrote,“...earlier it was impossible for
a well born Musalman to become poor; at present it is almost impossible for him to
continue rich.”29 According to Hunter during their supremacy the code of Islam remained
the law of the land and the whole ministerial and subordinate offices of government
remained property of the Musalmans. They alone could speak the official language and
they alone could read the official records written in the Persian.30

26
An estimate based on 1941 Census of India.
27
Very little is known about riots in 1965.
28
Dalit Muslims would include all those occupational categories whose social positions are similar to those
of Hindu untouchables, e g, weavers, barbers, cobblers. Muslim OBCs, likewise, are the counterpart of the
Hindu OBCs. Some of the Muslim OBCs were included in the Mandal Commission Report for affirmative
action, their names figure in the central and state lists of OBCs.
29
The first edition of the book appeared in 1888. Hunter, W W (1969): The Indian Muslims (London,
Delhi: Indological Book House), p. 168. (Later on several editions of the book have come out from
Calcutta, Dacca and Karachi).
30
Ibid. 167.
 9

He added, there is now scarcely a government office in Calcutta in which a

Muhammadan can hope for any post above the rank of porter, messenger, filler of ink-
pots and mender of pens.31
These observations were made in the context of changes in the distribution and nature of
power in the Indian subcontinent especially at a time when the Colonial British
government was tightening its grip over political administration in Bengal. Hunter L
Dumont also argued that Muslims did not take to English and were consequently replaced
by Hindus in almost all walks of life. He wrote, As the Hindus, with the same flexibility
as before, hastened to adapt themselves to the new political order, the Muslims were
outdistanced not only in economic pursuits, but also in administrations and the
professions.32
Both Hunter and Dumont were trying to explain how changing equations of power
adversely affect a community.
During the British rule the question of affirmative action for certain sections of Muslims
was raised from time to time. As early as late 19th and early 20th century, when it was
found that the Muslims were lagging far behind from the Hindus in the economic sphere,
especially in government services, the demand for positive discrimination was raised. A
spokesperson from the Muslim community wrote in the early 20th century: The only
practicable measure that may be adopted to secure the Mahomedans their fair share of
employment seems to me to reserve a fairly proportionate number of appointments for
Mahomedans, without which there is very little hope of improving their deplorable
condition.33 Such a move was invariably opposed to by the Hindu fundamentalists. The
absence of the Muslims in government jobs remained a vexed political issue during the
British rule.
After independence the question of affirmative action for the Muslims had again been
raised on several occasions.34 The issue of the inclusion of dalit Muslims in the list for
scheduled castes (SCs) was debated earlier, the Indian judiciary, however, found no merit
in the case, and it was noted that caste system is an integral part of the Hindu religion and
that it has no place in Islam.
As a result, dalit Muslims were out of the purview of the reservation for the SCs. The
contentious issue was settled by the judiciary on the ground that the outcast-like
occupational groups among the Muslims were not like the dalits in Hindu caste system.
This is why Hindu outcasts who converted to Islam and Christianity were found
ineligible for reservation benefits, although dalits among the Sikhs and Buddhist were
included in 1950, and in 1990, respectively. Dalit Muslims and backward classes were
included in the OBC lists of several states in accordance with the recommendations of the

31
Ibid. 162.
32
Dumont, Louis (1970): Religion, Politics, and History in India: Collected Papers in Indian Sociology
(Paris: Mouton), p. 99.
33
For a detailed account on the disproportionate representation of Muslims in jobs, see Ahmed, Sufia
(1974): Muslim Community in Bengal 1884-1912 (Dacca: OUP), p. 139-42.
34
Dalit Muslims are the counterpart of the Hindu untouchables although basic tenets of Hindu caste system,
e g, the notion of purity and pollution, commensality are not present in Islam but the practice of endogamy,
division of labor, etc, give different occupational categories caste-like character. Muslim activists
demanded from time to time that dalits among them should be treated at par with the scheduled castes, as it
was done in the case of Sikhs, and Buddhists.
 10

Mandal Commission. 35 However, the lists blurred the conventional distinction between
dalit Muslims and backward Muslims. By including dalit Muslims in the OBC list along
with the backward Muslims, the policymakers ignored the fact that backward Muslims
were better off than dalit Muslims, both socially and economically, as was the case with
SCs and OBCs among Hindus. In comparison to OBCs among the Hindus and Muslims,
dalit Muslims are underprivileged. To use Kaka Kalelkar’s phrase this group, then, is
“twice discriminated”, by the community and the state. 36 Therefore, dalit Muslims will
hardly enjoy any benefit from reservation in jobs and higher education.
The Muslim outcasts that are similar to that of dalits among the Hindus existed in Bengal
for centuries. Richard M Eaton, an eminent scholar of Islam in Bengal, points out that
caste-like social stratification began to emerge among the Muslims in Bengal from the
13th century under the Sultans. It flourished from the 13th to the 16th century. He noted
broad divisions of the Ashrafs and non-Ashrafs/Atraf among the Muslims. He observed,
socially distinct from the Ashraf were Muslim urban artisans who formed part of
Bengal’s growing industrial proletariat. Their organization into separate, endogamous
community with distinctive occupations paralleled the organization of Hindu society in
the southwestern delta, and suggests their origin in that society. 37 Mukundaram mentions
fifteen Muslim jatis in a list of communities inhabiting an idealized Bengali city of his
day-weavers (jola), livestock herders (mukeri), cake sellers (pithari), fishmongers
(kabari), converts from the local population (garasal), loom makers (sanakar),
circumcisers (hajam), bow makers (tirakar), papermakers (kagaji), wandering holy men
(kalandar), tailors (darji), weavers of thick cord (benata), dyers (rangrej), users of hoes
(halan), and beef sellers (kasai). So thoroughly these groups were integrated with Bengali
society that by the late 16th century, when Mukundaram was writing, it was impossible to
conceive of a city that did not have, alongside a long list of Hindu jatis, a full com-
plement of Muslim artisan groups.38
By the turn of the 19th century when the British administrators began collecting data on
castes among the Muslims, the Jola, Mukeri, Sanakar, Hazzam, Benata and Kasai were
included in the census as outcasts within the Muslim community. On the basis of census
reports, Risley included the following as outcasts among the Muslims: Bhisti (water
carrier), Chamar (leather worker), Chitrakar (painter), Dafali (weaver or drum maker),
Jamadar (sweeper), Mala (boatman), Methor (scavenger), Nikhari (fish seller), Patua
(painter).39 Ahmed noted that in the 1901 Census the following outcasts among the
Muslims were mentioned: Nikari (fish sellers), Kalu (oil pressers), Muchi (cobbler),
Hazzam (barber), Jolaha (weaver) and others. While commenting on the findings of
census in the early 20th century, Ahmed also observed, some of the occupations such as
gravediggers, washer-men, fish mongers, were considered permanently degraded;
Nikharis, Bajadars, Beharis, Dais, Dhuniyas and Hazzams too regarded as outcastes by
others.40
35
The OBC lists in the Mandal Commission Report were prepared in 1979 in consultation with the state
governments.
36
In 1953, Kaka Kalelkar used the phrase in his report while describing conditions of dalit Christians. The
OBC lists of most of the states have included dalit converts to Christianity.
37
Eaton (1993), pp. 100-01
38
Quoted from Eaton (1993), p. 101.
39
Risley, H H (1892): Tribes and Castes of Bengal (Calcutta: Bengal Secretariat Press), p. 342.
40
Ahmed, Rafiuddin (1988): The Bengal Muslims 1871-1906: A Quest for Identity (Delhi: OUP), p. 18.
 11

These accounts help us in understanding caste-like hierarchy among the Muslims in West
Bengal. At the time of 1931 Census operation in Bengal, an attempt was made to collect
data on castes more systematically. The enumerators were asked to collect information
about caste from each Muslim household. In one district the clergy of a mosque asked the
district census officer to delete the caste backgrounds of the Muslims as Islam is a
religion that upholds egalitarianism. The district census officer pointed out that he would
be willing to do so if the clergy issues a fatwa encouraging intermarriage between
Sayyads and Jolahas. This indeed was an ingenious method in convincing the clergy that
there were castes among the Muslims and they needed to be recorded in the census.
While compiling the 1931 Census data on castes, Porter pointed out that Muslims always
had Jolaha-like outcasts within the community and this was by no means a 20th century
phenomenon.41 Commenting on the Jolahas, Ahmed noted that handloom weavers were
found both among the Muslims and the Hindus, only the names given to them by the two
communities were different. The Hindus called them Tanti, Tantwas, and Jogis. The
Muslims, on the other hand, called them Jolahas, and sometimes, Momins. The weavers
occupied a very low social position among their own community, and they usually
married within their own caste. Intermarriage with others was regarded as improper and
undignified and not allowed except on the payment of special penalties to the clergy.
Therefore, along with hierarchy Muslim castes began to follow endogamy.42
We learn a great deal from sociologists and social anthropologists who carried out
fieldwork in Bengal villages and commented on an elaborate caste like stratification
among the Muslims. Mukherjee, for instance, pointed out that the Muslim communities
in his surveyed villages were differentiated between Muslims and Kolu Muslims, the
latter occupied an outcast-like position at the bottom of social hierarchy because of their
caste occupation of oil pressing.43 Nazmul Karim, who surveyed villages in east Bengal
districts, found an elaborate caste-like stratification. He observed divisions among
Muslim outcasts based on endogamous practices.44 Anthropologist Ranjit Bhattacharya45
also studied the issue of social stratification among the Muslims in some villages in
Birbhum district. He too noted an elaborate division at the lower rung of the hierarchy.
He pointed out that the outcast-like groups among the Muslims are Fakirs, Momins,
Patuas, and there were restrictions on marriage among these groups. Therefore, in this
hierarchical system the position of the Muslim outcasts is similar to those of their
counterparts in the Hindu caste system. This is why the question of reservation benefits to
dalit and backward Muslims was considered from time to time. They were left out at the
time of 1950 presidential promulgation that offered reservation benefits to dalits among
the Sikhs, and in 1990 when the same benefit was offered to dalit Buddhists. In 1979, the
Backward Classes Commission or what is popularly known as the Mandal Commission,
41
Porter, A E (1933): Census of India 1931: Bengal and Sikkim (Calcutta: Bengal Secretariat Press), p. 423.
42
Ahmed, Sufia (1974): Muslim Community in Bengal 1884-1912 (Dacca: OUP), p. 127.
43
Mukherjee, Ramkrishna (1971): Six Villages of Bengal (Bombay: Popular Prakashan).
44
Karim, A K (1984): “Social Stratification Patterns among the Muslims of Certain Districts of East
Pakistan” in Muhammad Afsaruddin (ed.), A K Najmul Karim Smarak Grantha in Bengali, (Dhaka:
Sociology Department).
45
Bhattacharya, Ranjit Kumar (1973): “The Concept and Ideology of Caste among the Muslims of Rural
West Bengal” in Imtiaz Ahmed (ed.), Caste and Social Stratification among the Muslims (Delhi: Manohar
Publications).
 12

asked the state governments to come out with a list of socially and economically
backward classes. Some states found this as an ideal opportunity to include a number of
caste-like socially disadvantaged groups in the Muslim community.
The West Bengal OBC list which apparently was prepared in haste included 64 OBCs.
Only caste-like underprivileged groups among the Muslims that found place in the list are
the Jolas (Ansari Momins), Kasai-qurashi, Chitrakar (a liminal category which observes
both Hindu and Muslim rituals). The list included all the scheduled caste converts to
Christianity and their progeny. One wonders why West Bengal with a 25% Muslim
population missed out an opportunity in including several other socially and
economically disadvantaged groups among the Muslims especially the outcastes, e g,
Nikhari, Bajadar, Dai, Dhuniya, Hazzam and the like. The neighboring state Bihar
included as many as 19 Muslim castes in the list, which included both dalit and backward
Muslims.46
West Bengal possibly recycled the list of OBCs that was prepared way back in 1951. In
accordance with an order from the government of West Bengal, the percentage of the SCs
and STs in each district was compiled in 1951. Ashok Mitra, who was census
superintendent in 1951, pointed out that, that data on castes were also collected but
remained unclassified. As early as 1950 the home department of the government
published a list of non-backward classes which was prepared by a negative reasoning that
any person not belonging to SCs and STs but listed as deserving cases could be
considered as OBCs. Accordingly, a list of 65 castes was prepared who were backward
but not “scheduled”.47 The current OBC list of the state is almost a replica of the 1951
list, barring a few exceptions here and there.
Most states included Muslim castes without specifically affixing or suffixing “Muslim” in
the caste names, for example, in Bihar, Gujarat (before the rule by the Bharatiya Janata
Party-BJP under the leadership of Narendra Modi who also lead a riot in 2002 to
eliminate Muslims leaving the dead body of thousands of hundreds of Muslim),
Karnataka, and Tamil Nadu. The Gujarat list was a comprehensive one and carefully
prepared, as in one case it included Muslim castes only in one area, and the rest were
presumably left out due to their better socio-economic conditions in other parts of the
state. Pondicherry followed a different pattern, and included just “Muslim” in the list.
The central list rejected this generic inclusion, and the state subsequently dropped this
nomenclature. Out of over enthusiasm, Pondicherry list included as many as 262 Hindu
castes and sub-castes, but failed to include Muslim castes by name. Some states took
great care in excluding socially and economically advanced Muslim castes. For instance,
Karnataka excluded from its list castes such as Cutchi Memon, Navayat, Bohra, Sayyid,
Shaik, Pathan and Mughals. Similarly the Kerala OBC list excluded Bohra, Cutchi
Memon, Navayat, Turukkan, Dakahni. In keeping with the principle of exclusion of
socially and economically advanced group, these two states have set examples for others.
In recent years some states enacted special acts to offer reservation benefits to all the
Muslims irrespective of their social background. Andhra Pradesh offered 4% reservation

46
These Muslim castes are Bhathiara, Chik, Dafali, Dhobi, Dhunia, Idrisi or Darzi, Kasab (Kasai), Madari,
Mehtar (including Lalbegi, Halakhor, Bhangi), Mirisin, Mirsikar, Momin, Mukri, Nalband, Nat, Pamaria,
Rangrez, Rayeen or Kunjra, Sayeed.
47
Mitra, A (1953): The Tribes and Castes of West Bengal (Calcutta: West Bengal Government Press).
 13

in educational institutions, Karnataka introduced 4% quota for Muslims in higher

education, and in jobs. Kerala, keeping in view the high percentage of Muslim population
reserved 12% seats in educational institutions. Manipur offered 4% reservation of jobs for
minorities mostly from tribal background with converted-Christian legacy. Such a step
was never considered by the government of West Bengal although year after year official
reports showed dismal performance of the Muslims in education, and their representation
in public sector jobs was far from satisfactory.
In 2003, at the time of the first decennial revision of the central list of OBCs, the
representative of the West Bengal government expressed the difficulty the state had to
face in preparing the list. The representative of the West Bengal government also
observed that there was no database except 1931 Census. He pleaded for more help from
the central government for the enumeration of a revised list. 48 Two points were made with
regard to reservation benefits for dalit and backward Muslims. First, no reliable
information was available for these categories, and this stands in the way for inclusion of
dalit and backward Muslims, and second, the number of dalit and backward Muslims had
depleted because of displacement at the time of Partition. At the deliberations of the
National Backward Classes Commission the representative from West Bengal pointed out
that Hindu backward castes for the OBC list were identified on the basis of 1931 Census
reports. The same Census report included information about Muslim outcastes, their
number in each district, and the nature of segregation that they encountered within their
own community. Social change among many castes and sub-castes during the last several
decades hardly justify their inclusion in the OBC list. A closer look at the OBC list of the
state would show that this fact was ignored while including the castes in the OBC list. Let
us take the case of “telis” or oil pressers, who were included in the list. The Telis
remained upwardly mobile for several years and showed their ability to adjust with the
changing time. They have made significant inroads in trade and commerce. Despite
upward social nd economic mobility Telis were included in the list. Like Telis, Jogis too
were well known for social mobility from the early 20th century. They were traditionally
a part of the weaver caste. Because of uncertainty in the textile trade they had to look for
suitable alternative occupations. According to Bose49, Jogis followed the footsteps of the
service-oriented middle class. The Kansaris too left their caste occupation of making
utensils several decades back. Some have managed to move up socially and
economically, pointed out Sarkar.50 What then was the ground for inclusion of upwardly
mobile Telis, Jogis, and Kansaris? If their inclusion is justified for their position in the
caste hierarchy then can the dalit Muslims be barred, especially those occupying a similar
low position in their own caste-like hierarchy? Other issues too merit investigation with
regard to social and economic status of the Muslims.
In March 2005, the UPA government-lead by Indian National Congress appointed a high-
powered committee under the chairmanship of Rajinder Sachar to study social,
educational and economic status of the Muslim community all over the country. The
48
National Commission for Backward Classes, Annual Report; 2001-2002 and 2002-2003, New Delhi,
2003, p 172.
49
Bose, N K (1975): The Structure of Hindu Society (Hyderabad: Orient Longman Ltd), pp. 73-86.
50
Sarkar, Smriti Kumar (1994): “Caste, Occupation and Social Mobility: A Study of the Kansaris in
Colonial Bengal” in Sekhar Bandyopadhyay, Abhijit Dasgupta and Willem van Schendel (ed.), Bengal:
Communities, Development, and States (New Delhi: Manohar Publications), pp. 65-89.
 14

report referred to West Bengal’s poor track record in the representation of Muslims in
public sector jobs. According to the report, the highest percentage of government
employment for Muslims is in Assam (11.2%). However, this is far less than the share of
the state’s Muslim population (30.9%). Other states having better representation are
Karnataka (8.5% of state’s share of Muslim population of 12.2%), Gujarat (5.4% of 9.1%
of the total), and Tamil Nadu (3.2% of 5.6% of the total). It was pointed out in the report:
The most glaring cases of Muslim deprivation in government jobs are found in the
Communist-left-ruled states of West Bengal and Kerala. In West Bengal, only 4.2% of
government staff was Muslim as against their population share of 25%. In Kerala, the
Muslim representation in government jobs is 10.4%, a figure that is short of their
population percentage. In Bihar and UP the percentage of Muslims in government jobs
are found to be less than Muslim representation in the population (Shah 2007: 836-
83).The report noted that, “overall, the conditions of Muslim OBCs are worse. The
abysmally low representation of Muslims suggests that the benefits of entitlements meant
for the backward classes are yet to reach them.” 51 West Bengal, then, is lagging behind in
protecting interests of its minority community particularly Muslims. Inclusion of the
underprivileged minority in the affirmative action program is a sine qua non for equality
and social justice, two fundamental principles enshrined in our Constitution.
The “minority” question has assumed special significance in West Bengal in the context
of a shift from class to community-based politics. As a result, the majority community
has gained a privileged position, often at the expense of others creating two polarized
sections of the civil society – the privileged and the marginalized. With the help of data
on local-level politics, the nature of political participation of Muslims in West Bengal can
be explained.
Local politics, as Cox argued, creates a “space for dependence and a space for
engagement”.52 Political changes during the last few decades clearly show an attempt by
the Muslims to take part in mainstream politics by aligning themselves with the secular
national political parties such as the Congress and the Communist Party of India
(Marxist) – CPI(M). The attempts by the Muslims to join the secular, and democratic
political forces in the country may be described as mainstreaming. As a result of
mainstreaming, the political parties that upheld the ideologies of communalism lost their
support base. This is why a party like the Muslim League found it hard to carry on its
activity in the state of West Bengal, and not a single Muslim League candidate won a seat
in the assembly elections, they were eclipsed even from the arena of the three-tier
panchayati (local government organization) politics in the state. Mainstreaming helped
the minority community in protecting its political and economic interests, and at the same
time opened up an opportunity for the mainstream political parties like the Congress and
the CPI(M) to reach out to the Muslim electorate. Mainstreaming of Muslims in politics
meant an acceptance of secular values, and at the same time, rejection of orthodoxy, in
which ideological shift the community did not get their rightful share from the political
masters and power elite with Hindu background. During the first phase of mainstreaming,
51
The Sachar Committee Report, Chapter 12, p 213. The Committee has collected information from
government departments, census, private survey organizations, e g, NCAER, as well as data collected with
the help of their own surveys. Details on Report, see, Economic and Political Weekly, May 2007.
52
Cox, Kevin (1998): “Spaces of Dependence, Spaces of Engagement and the Politics of Scale, or Looking
for Local Politics”, Political Geography, 17:1, p. 1.
 15

for nearly three decades after independence, the Muslims accepted the secular policies of
the Congress Party. Some of the Muslim stalwarts in the state were active members of the
Indian National Congress. During this time, they followed a policy of distancing from the
communal parties like the Muslim League, and similar political outfits. Election results of
1952 show that a large number of Bengali Muslims did support the Congress. Candidates
on the Congress ticket won in most constituencies having large number of Muslims. In
1952, as Chatterji noted53, 80 Muslims contested in the elections out of which 21 were in
the fray with Congress ticket, 14 were opposition candidates, and 45 were independents.
Out of 21 Congress supported Muslims, 17 made it to the assembly, two won as
independent, but not a single Muslim on the opposition ticket managed to win in that
election. Distancing from the Congress Party began when some Muslim leaders
encouraged new groupings before the elections in 1957. The leaders of various
organizations, e g, the Rezai Mustafa, the Jamat-e-Islami, the Muslim Jamat (Bashir
group), the Anjuman Tanjimul, Momenin, the Itefaquia Committee and the Fiayan-i-
Millar decided to form a united front to contest against the Congress, but the front had
very little success in the electoral politics due to serious barriers created by Hindu power
and Hindu political leadership. This made a change of mindset of Muslims to leave
Congress in search for a better friend.
In this context, the assembly election in 1967 was a turning point as far as Muslim
support to non-Congress opposition parties was concerned. In this election opposition
parties fielded 30 Muslim candidates out of which 14 have won. The newly formed
United Front government in the state with its new economic and political agenda
appeared as an alternative to two-decade long Congress rule in the state. 54 From the late
1970s a reconfiguration in state politics began to take place with the victory of the Left
Front in the state assembly. The political victory of the Left Front in 1977 and 1982, and
various programs undertaken by them for the minorities made it a suitable alternative to
the Congress. With this began the second phase in mainstreaming when the Muslims
consistently followed the policy of distancing from the Congress (not an outright
rejection though, as the Congress maintained its stronghold in some Muslim-dominated
areas). It was difficult to dislodge the Congress from some of the constituencies in the
districts of Malda and Murshidabad. In 1982 assembly elections, the Left Front
candidates won from most of the areas having a high concentration of Muslim
population, areas where previously the Congress had a power base. This clearly shows an
acceptance of the new policies of the Left. 55 The land reforms program of the Left Front,
which resulted in redistribution of surplus land among the landless and protection of
rights of the sharecroppers benefited the poorer sections of both the Muslim and Hindu
communities.56 Media reports would help us in understanding how mainstreaming takes
place in politics. At the time of 2001 assembly elections in Muslim dominated Lalbagh
constituency in Murshidabad district, Muslim voters supported a Hindu candidate,
53
Chatterji, Joya (2007): The Spoils of Partition: Bengal and India, 1947-1967 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press), p. 198.
54
Ibid, p. 199.
55
Initially, the left parties particularly the CPI(M) had a large number of prominent Muslim leaders like
Muzaffar Ahmed, Abdul Halim, Abdullah Rasul, Muhammad Ismail and others.
56
Dasgupta, Abhijit (1998): Growth with Equity: New Technologies and Agrarian Change in Bengal (New
Delhi: Manohar Publications), p. 213.
 16

although Muslim candidates were contesting for the same seat as independents. A voter
observed: Had we cared for our religious affiliation, then… the Hindu candidate would
have never won from Lal Bagh constituency. 57 Another voter in a village expressed his
views in the following way: I don’t have to listen to Imam Bukhari’s fatwa, the Muslims
in Bengal vote according to their conscience. I will vote for the candidate whom I
promised. One can cite many such examples that show a conscious attempt on the part of
the Muslims to rise above communal considerations when it comes to the question of
taking part in politics. The introduction of the three-tier panchayati raj by the Left offered
new political opportunities to the minority community to play an active role in local
politics, it also created a space for the right-wing political groups. Between 1978 and
2003, panchayat elections in West Bengal were held on six occasions (1978, 1983, 1988,
1993, 1998, and 2003). In a study on panchayat elections in a village in the Jalpaiguri
district in 1978 and 2003, it was observed that Muslims who supported the Congress in
1978 panchayat elections switched over to the CPI(M) later. In 2003, Muslims backed the
CPI(M) candidates in the village for carrying out and implementing land reforms
programs, and for undertaking a number of development programs in the village. Several
other political parties like the Trinamool Congress, the BJP, the Bahujan Samaj Party
contested from time to time, but the CPI(M) has managed to hold on to its support base
especially among the Muslims for about two decades. 58 The introduction of new three-tier
panchayati raj made villages a vibrant arena of local politics. For many years, this local
arena of politics remained free from the interference of communal parties, parties that
represented the Hindutva agenda or carry out propaganda for the spread of Hindu
fundamentalism and it did not allow Islamic political outfits either. Since the mid-1980s
the phenomenal rise of the BJP in Indian politics with its Hindutva agenda helped the
party to spread its tentacles to the remotest part of the country and affected the local
politics in West Bengal as well. The rise of this new political force widened the gap
between the communities. In West Bengal, the popularity of the BJP at the local politics
began to rise slowly and steadily from the early 1990s. The gram-panchayat election data
would reveal how the BJP gained a base in local politics. The BJP increased its strength
from 0.08% of total seats in 1983 to 7.78% in 1998. The rise was spectacular in some
north Bengal districts. For instance, in Cooch Bihar, the BJP increased its electoral gain
in gram panchayat from 3.27% in 1993 to 8.83% in 1998, and in Jalpaiguri the gain was
3.07% to 7.26% during the same period. In some districts in the central part of West
Bengal, BJP’s tally was all the more impressive. Between 1993 and 1998 in Nadia district
the rise was 8.11% to 11.83%. In southern districts such as North 24 Parganas the
percentage of support increased from 4.44 to 8.44 and in a western district like Purulia
this rose from 0.77% to 10.28%.59 Thus the BJP gained in almost all parts of the state –
posing a threat to secular politics in the state.60 Of late, the Left Front with its poor track
record for the development of the minorities is perhaps on the verge of losing a solid vote
bank. In 2001 it was reported that literacy rate among Hindus was 72.44% whereas
among Muslims it was 52.47%. The gap widens when one looks at female literacy rate,
57
Ananda Bazar Patrika, Calctta, 5 May 2001.
58
Dasgupta (2007): “Local Politics and Alternatives in Development in North Bengal” in Hiroshi Ishii et
al, Political and Social Transformations in North India and Nepal (New Delhi: Manohar Publications),
p.122.
59
Ibid.
60
This new brand of communalism is thriving in some parts of the state.
 17

which was 63.09% for Hindus and 49.75% for Muslims. The official reports show higher
infant mortality rate and low life expectancy at birth among Muslims. Participation of
Muslim women in political offices is abysmally low. Out of 26 women candidates who
won 2006 assembly elections with the support of the Left Front, only one was from the
Muslim community. These are some of the factors that are likely to alienate the minority
community from the Left Front. The result of National Election held in early 2009
showed the setback of communist in West Bengal clearly identifying unhappiness of
Muslim minorities under the left-leadership.
Moreover, the electronic media, although very conservative in nature and mostly linked
with Hindu political process, has, more or less, played some role in bringing news of the
events such as the Babri masjid demolition by the Hindu or the Gujarat anti-Muslim riots
to villages and towns. The news of riots, arson and looting are flashed on the electronic
media from the place where event actually takes place. These visual images have a
catalytic effect; they affect almost all sections of civil society alone with marginal
Muslim minorities. As to new generation Muslims, who have no memory of the atrocity
of Hindus against Indian as well as Bengali Muslims in the time of partition in 1947,
these recent and contemporary visuals have a long life in public memory as they are
recycled by the political parties from time to time, especially at the time of elections. For
instance, during the 2006 assembly elections in West Bengal, it was reported that the
election campaign compact discs were distributed by the CPI(M) depicting scenes of
houses being torched and residents being burnt, and a place of worship pulled down in
the Gujarat riots. A poll panel commissioned a team of censors and all such campaign
CDs were censored and scanned before they were brought into circulation. The panel
censored CDs of the CPI(M) and the Congress as they contained inflammatory material.
The campaign of targeting the minority Muslims with the Hindutva agenda has created an
ideal space for the growth of “minority communalism”. In a politically charged
atmosphere, the minority Muslim community has come out with an agenda that is
opposed to secular values of the country. The secular political parties have hardly
questioned its existence, and their indifference has offered an ideal space to this new
brand of communalism to grow. Like its counterpart, minority communalism at times
finds its adversaries within its own community, as it was noticed in the case of a clash
between two sects in Kanpur, UP, and more recently in carrying out protest in Kolkata
against Bangladeshi writer Taslima Nasreen.61 In the latter case the protests turned violent
and the police had to impose curfew in the city, and the writer was asked to leave Kolkata
due to overall reaction of Muslims. As stated earlier, the spread of Hindu communalism,
and the indifference of secular parties to minority issues were creating an ideal breeding
ground for minority communalism to grow in the state.

3. Conclusion
61
On 22 November 2007 the All India Muslims Minority Forum (AIMMF) came out on the streets with
hundreds of supporters from different parts of the state demanding cancellation of visa of the controversial
Bangladeshi writer Taslima Nasreen. The chairman of the AIMMF said that they were forced to take an
imitational path as never before in the history of independent India had someone made such derogatory
remarks against the holy Prophet (SAWS) like Taslima Nasreen. Ananda Bazar Patrika, Calctta, 23
November 2007.
 18

To conclude, it may once again be emphasized that social exclusion and political
alienation have given rise to some important questions as far as minority Muslim
community is concerned. After six decades of independence62, Muslims in West Bengal
are beginning to find themselves on the margins. And Muslims also find themselves in
the political field as a poor play item of political games of both secular Congress and
communist Left.63
Although the question of affirmative action had come up on several occasions, nothing
tangible has happened to address this by the both power elites—Congress and
Communist and Muslims, by and large, remained outside the purview of reservation
benefits. As many as 56 different castes, communities and occupational groups were
included in the OBC list of the state, prepared after the Mandal Commission
recommendation, but deserving dalit and backward Muslims were left out. The social
exclusionary policy of the state was brought to notice in the Sachar Committee report. It
pointed out the dismal presence of Muslims in the public and private sector jobs and
showed that in the education and political arenas Muslims were lagging behind. The
broad contours of local-level politics have been changing in the state during the last few
decades. After independence, West Bengal remained an infertile ground for community-
centric politics which helped Muslims in mainstreaming with the main secular political
forces in the state. However, the emergence of Hindu nationalist politics at the local level
panchayat elections had created a situation that has only alienated the minority
community. They went to Communist for their protection from Hindu attacks. But with
the friendship of the Communist, the minorities Muslims of West Bengal paid a lot in
terms of bloods and life in the case of Singure and Nadigram killings. The exploitation
and attacks against Muslims little-shifted from communalist ground to economic interest
of majority Hindu population and political power. And the sufferings of Muslims as well
as the Muslims of West Bengal are continuing to the crucial pick which demands a new
course of action to save the minorities in a country like India that officially uphold
democracy and secularism but practically perform communalism.

62
Schendel, Willem van (2007): The Bengal Border: Beyond State and Nation in South Asia (London:
Anthem Press).
63
Shah, G (2007): “The Condition of Muslims” in Economic & Political Weekly, Vol 42, No 10.