Re: application for admission to the bar Vs.Vicente D. Ching, applicant.

Bar matter no. 914, October 1, 1999

Facts:
Vicente D. Ching, a legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a chinese citizen, and Priscila Dulay, a
Filipina, was born in Tubao, La Union on April 11, 1964. Since birth, Ching has resided in the Philippines.
On July 17, 1998, Ching, after graduated of Bachelor of Laws course at St. Louis University in Baguio City,
filed an application to take the 1998 bar exam. The Supreme Court allowed him to take the Bar
Examinations, provided that he can produce proof of his Philippine Citizenship. In compliance with said
requirements, Ching submitted the following documents:

A.) Certification from board of accountancy of the PRC showing that he is a certified public
accountant.
B.) Voter certification from COMELC Tubao La Union.
C.) Certification that showing that Ching was elected as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Tubao, La Union.

On April 5, 1999 Ching was included as one of the successful bar examinee and the schedule of
their oath taking was on May 5, 1999 but he was not allowed to take his oath due the questionable
citizenship issue. The OSG filed its comment stating that Ching, being the "legitimate child of a Chinese
father and a Filipino mother born under the 1935 Constitution was a Chinese citizen and continued to be
so, unless upon reaching the age of majority he elected Philippine citizenship.

Issue:
1. WON Ching is a filipino citizen?
2. WON his election to Philippine citizenship within the reasonable time prescribed by the law?

Ruling:
1. No. Since the applicant was born on 1964, the governing charter with regards to citizenship issue
is the 1935 constitution. Therefore as what is provided by the said constitution, which said that
the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother with an alien father followed the
citizenship of the father unless upon reaching the age of majority which is 21 years of
age elected Philippine citizenship.
2. In the case at bar, Ching did not elect his citizenship when he reach 21 years old but instead in
1999 which is 14 years after reaching the age of majority which the court considered as
not within the reasonable period of time considering the length of 14 years after he reaches
21 year sold. In addition to that, the court said that Philippine citizenship can never be treated
like commodity that can be claimed when needed and suppressed when convenient. In view
of the foregoing, the court denies Vicente D. Ching’s application for admission to the Philippine
bar.
The Supreme Court Resolves to DENY Vicente D. Ching's application for admission to the
Philippine Bar.

ag: B.M. No. 1678

 PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME
PRACTICE OF LAW
EN BANC[ B.M. No. 1678, December 17, 2007 ]

PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW, BENJAMIN M.

DACANAY, PETITIONER

Facts:

Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he
migrated to Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He
subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada’s free medical aid
program. His application was approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.

On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-
Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship. On that day, he
took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in
Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume his
law practice.

Issue:

Whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership in the Philippine bar
when he gave up his Philippine citizenship

Ruling:

The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be
limited to Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by law. Since Filipino citizenship is a
requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the
Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other
words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law in
the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners.
 The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen
of another country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because “all
Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have
lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225].” Therefore, a Filipino
lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost his
Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225. Although he is also
deemed never to have terminated his membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic
right to resume law practice accrues.

Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and
he reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions “(he) shall apply with the
proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice.

PENTECOSTES VS MARASIGAN
SECOND DIVISION[ A.M. No. P-07-2337 (Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No.
04-2060-P), August 03, 2007 ]
ROLLY PENTECOSTES, COMPLAINANT,
VS.
ATTY. HERMENEGILDO MARASIGAN, CLERK OF COURT VI,
OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
KABACAN, NORTH COTABATO, RESPONDENT.

Facts:

The administrative case against respondent stemmed from a sworn affidavit-

complaint filed by Rolly Pentecostes, the owner of a Kawasaki motorcycle, which
was recovered by members of the PNP of M’lang, North Cotabato from suspected
carnappers against whom a criminal case for carnapping, was lodged at RTC.

On the order of the trial court, the chief of police of M’lang, North Cotabato
turned over the motorcycle to respondent who acknowledged receipt thereof.

After the conduct of hearings to determine the true owner of the motorcycle, the
trial court issued an Order for its release to Pentecostes.

Pentecostes immediately asked respondent to release the motorcycle to him.

Respondent, however, told him to wait and come back repeatedly from 2001 up
to the filing of the complaint.
Issue:

On the topic of good moral character

Ruling:

,Section 7 of Rule 136 of the Rules of Court, provides:

SEC. 7. Safekeeping of property. – The clerk shall safely keep all record, papers,
files, exhibits and public property committed to his charge, including the library
of the court, and the seals and furniture belonging to his office.

From the above provisions, it is clear that as clerk of court of the RTC, Kabacan,
respondent was charged with the custody and safekeeping of Pentecostes’
motorcycle, and to keep it until the termination of the case, barring
circumstances that would justify its safekeeping elsewhere, and upon the prior
authority of the trial court.

No explanation was offered by respondent, however, for turning over the

motorcycle. But whatever the reason was, respondent was mandated to secure
prior consultations with and approval of the trial court.

This Court has repeatedly emphasized that clerks of court are essential and
ranking officers of our judicial system who perform delicate functions vital to the
prompt and proper administration of justice. Their duties include the efficient
recording, filing and management of court records and, as previously pointed out,
the safekeeping of exhibits and public property committed to their charge.

Misconduct is a transgression of some established or definite rule of action;

more particularly, it is an unlawful behavior by the public officer. The misconduct
is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to
violate the law or to disregard established rules, which must be proved by
substSpouses Amador vs. Atty. Palaña, AC No. 7434 April 15, 2005
JR., JJ.

FACTS:
Ø Petitioners-spouses Rosita and Amador Tejada filed a Complaint Affidavit before the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) to initiate disbarment proceedings against respondent Atty. Antoniutti K.
Palaña for his continued refusal to settle his long overdue loan obligation to the complainants, in
violation of his sworn duty as a lawyer to do justice to every man and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility
Ø It turned out that all his assurances that he had a torrens title, he will reconstitute the same and
deliver an amount of P170,000.00 to petitioner spouses were all fraudulent representations on his
part or else were only fictitious in character to defraud petitioner spouses of their hard owned monies
Ø Despite due notice, respondent failed to file his answer to the complaint as required by the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP. Respondent likewise failed to appear on the scheduled
date of the mandatory conference despite due notice.
Ø Investigating Commissioner recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of law for 3
months.
ISSUE: W/N respondent should be penalized according tothe Code of Responsibility.
HELD: Antoniutti K. Palaña is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of 6 months.
YES.
Ø Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A high sense of morality, honesty,
and fair dealing is expected and required of a member of the bar.
Ø strength of the legal profession lies in the dignity and integrity of its members.
Ø In the instant case, respondent’s unjustified withholding of petitioners’ money years after it
became due and demandable demonstrates his lack of integrity and fairness, and this is further
highlighted by his lack of regard for the charges brought against him. Instead of meeting the charges
head on, respondent did not bother to file an answer nor did he participate in the proceedings to
offer a valid explanation for his conduct.
Ø respondent’s acts, which violated the Lawyer's Oath “to delay no man for money or malice” as
well as the Code of Professional Responsibility, warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanctions
against him.
Ø It is clear that he employed deceit in convincing complainants to part with their hard earned
money and the latter could not have been easily swayed to lend the money were it not for his
misrepresentations and failed promises as a member of the bar.
Ø Failing in this duty as a member of the bar which is being supervised by the Court under the
Constitution, we find that a heavier sanction should fall on respondent. antial evidence.
Otherwise, the misconduct is only simple, as in this case.

CRUZ VS CABRERA
SECOND DIVISION[ A.C. No. 5737, October 25, 2004 ]
FERDINAND A. CRUZ, COMPLAINANT,
VS.
ATTY. STANLEY CABRERA, RESPONDENT.

Facts:

Complainant alleges that he is a fourth year law student; since the latter part of
2001, he instituted several actions against his neighbors; he appeared for and in
his behalf in his own cases; he met respondent who acted as the counsel of his
neighbors; during a hearing on January 14, 2002, in one case before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 112, Pasay City, presided by Judge Caridad Cuerdo.

Respondent’s imputations were uncalled for and the latter’s act of compelling the
court to ask complainant whether he is a lawyer or not was intended to malign
him before the public, inasmuch as respondent knew that complainant is not a
lawyer, having appeared for and in his behalf as a party litigant in prior cases;
respondent’s imputations of complainant’s misrepresentation as a lawyer was
patently with malice to discredit his honor, with the intention to threaten him not
to appear anymore in cases respondent was handling; the manner, substance,
tone of voice and how the words “appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna!” were
uttered were totally with the intention to annoy, vex and humiliate, malign,
ridicule, incriminate and discredit complainant before the public.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent violated Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility

Whether or not complainant is not precluded from litigating personally his cases

Whether or not complainant is engaged in the practice of law

Ruling:

1. We hold that respondent’s outburst of “appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna”

does not amount to a violation of Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Such single outburst, though uncalled for, is not of such
magnitude as to warrant respondent’s suspension or reproof. It is but a product
of impulsiveness or the heat of the moment in the course of an argument between
them. It has been said that lawyers should not be held to too strict an account for
words said in the heat of the moment, because of chagrin at losing cases, and that
the big way is for the court to condone even contemptuous language.

2. Nonetheless, we remind respondent that complainant is not precluded from

litigating personally his cases. A party’s right to conduct litigation personally is
recognized by Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court: SEC. 34. By whom
litigation conducted. — In the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct
his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for
that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may
conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance
must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
 3. The practice of law, though impossible to define exactly, involves the exercise
of a profession or vocation usually for gain, mainly as attorney by acting in a
representative capacity and as counsel by rendering legal advise to others. Private
practice has been defined by this Court as follows:
x x x. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or
customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is
frequent habitual exercise. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute
[referring to the prohibition for judges and other officials or employees of the
superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General from engaging in private
practice] has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one’s self out
to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. x x x.

Clearly, in appearing for herself, complainant was not customarily or habitually

holding herself out to the public as a lawyer. Neither was she demanding
payment for such services. Hence, she cannot be said to be in the practice of law.

On the other hand, all lawyers should take heed that lawyers are licensed officers
of the courts who are empowered to appear, prosecute and defend; and upon
whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a
consequence. Membership in the bar imposes upon them certain obligations.
Mandated to maintain the dignity of the legal profession, they must conduct
themselves honorably and fairly. Though a lawyer’s language may be forceful and
emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the
legal profession. The use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no
place in the dignity of judicial forum.

BAR MATTER NO. 730 June 13, 1997

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the Court En Banc dated June 10, 1997.

IN RE: NEED THAT LAW STUDENT PRACTICING UNDER RULE 138-A BE ACTUALLY
SUPERVISED DURING TRIAL (BAR MATTER NO. 730).

The issue in this Consulta is whether a law student who appears before the court under the Law
Student Practice Rule (Rule 138-A) should be accompanied by a member of the bar during the trial.
This issue was raised by retired Supreme Court Justice Antonio P. Barredo, counsel for the
defendant in Civil Case No. BCV-92-11 entitled Irene A. Caliwara v. Roger T. Catbagan filed before
the Regional Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite.

The records show that the plaintiff in civil Case No. BCV-92-11 was represented by Mr. Cornelio
Carmona, Jr., an intern at the Office of Legal Aid, UP-College of Law (UP-OLA). Mr. Carmona
conducted hearings and completed the presentation of the plaintiff's evidence-in-chief without the
presence of a supervising lawyer. Justice Barredo questioned the appearance of Mr. Carmona
during the hearing because the latter was not accompanied by a duly accredited lawyer. On
December 15, 1994, Presiding Judge Edelwina Pastoral issued an Order requiring Mr. Carmona to
be accompanied by a supervising lawyer on the next hearing. In compliance with said Order, UP-
OLA and the Secretary of Justice executed a Memorandum of Agreement directing Atty. Catubao
and Atty. Legayada of the Public Attorney's Office to supervise Mr. Carmona during the subsequent
hearings.

Justice Barredo asserts that a law student appearing before the trial court under Rule 138-A should
be accompanied by a supervising lawyer. 1 On the other hand, UP-OLA, through its Director, Atty.
Alfredo F. Tadiar, submits that "the matter of allowing a law intern to appear unaccompanied by a
duly accredited supervising lawyer should be . . . left to the sound discretion of the court after having
made at least one supervised appearance." 2

For the guidance of the bench and bar, we hold that a law student appearing before the Regional
Trial Court under Rule 138-A should at all times be accompanied by a supervising lawyer. Section 2
of Rule 138-A provides.

Sec. 2. Appearance. — The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be under
the direct supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly
accredited by the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to
be filed, must be signed the by supervising attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic.

The phrase "direct supervision and control" requires no less than the physical presence of the
supervising lawyer during the hearing. This is in accordance with the threefold rationale behind the
Law Student Practice Rule, to wit: 3

1. to ensure that there will be no miscarriage of justice as a result of

incompetence or inexperience of law students, who, not having as yet
passed the test of professional competence, are presumably not fully
equipped to act a counsels on their own;

2. to provide a mechanism by which the accredited law school clinic may be

able to protect itself from any potential vicarious liability arising from some
culpable action by their law students; and

3. to ensure consistency with the fundamental principle that no person is

allowed to practice a particular profession without possessing the
qualifications, particularly a license, as required by law.

The matter of allowing a law student to appear before the court unaccompanied by a supervising
lawyer cannot be left to the discretion of the presiding judge. The rule clearly states that the
appearance of the law student shall be under the direct control and supervision of a member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by law schools. The rule must be strictly construed
because public policy demands that legal work should be entrusted only to those who possess
tested qualifications, are sworn to observe the rules and ethics of the legal profession and subject to
judicial disciplinary control. 4 We said in Bulacan v. Torcino: 5

Court procedures are often technical and may prove like snares to the ignorant or the
unwary. In the past, our law has allowed non-lawyers to appear for party litigants in places
where duly authorized members of the bar are not available (U.S. vs. Bacansas, 6 Phil. 539).
For relatively simple litigation before municipal courts, the Rules still allow a more educated
or capable person in behalf of a litigant who cannot get a lawyer. But for the protection of the
 parties and in the interest of justice, the requirement for appearances in regional trial courts
and higher courts is more stringent.

The Law Student Practice Rule is only an exception to the rule. Hence, the presiding judge should
see to it that the law student appearing before the court is properly guided and supervised by a
member of the bar.

The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an inferior court, where the issues
and procedure are relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appear in his personal
capacity without the supervision of a lawyer. Section 34 Rule 138 provides;

Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. — In the court of a justice of the peace, a party
may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for
that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his
litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or
by a duly authorized member of the bar.

Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party without the
supervision of a member of the bar.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, we hold that a law student appearing before the Regional Trial Court under the
authority of Rule 138-A must be under the direct control and supervision of a member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by the law school and that said law student must be
accompanied by a supervising lawyer in all his appearance.

Padilla and Francisco, J.J., on leave.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) LUZVIMINDA D. PUNO