Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
This lesson learned document should be considered a companion document to the “INCIDENT
INVESTIGATION AND ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS REPORT FOR THE GULF OF MEXICO (GOM) MAD DOG SPAR
UNPLANNED GAS RELEASE HIPO, WHICH OCCURRED ON 28 FEBRUARY 2007”. These lessons are
specific to the MadDog facility but may also be applicable to other facilities in the GoM. Some or
all of the lessons could be of benefit to other BP facilities and projects in the E&P Segment,
though it is recognized that each such facility or project is unique. Before a determination is
made to apply these lessons, you must first consider whether they are physically applicable
to your facility or project, and whether their application would have any unintended ramifications
from a safety standpoint.
The lessons from the Mad Dog Gas Release HIPO bridge many aspects of a facility design and
operation; from process design and hazard analysis to alarm response and incident reporting.
Clarification of any lesson learned contained in this document should be directed to Bob
Peloubet, GoM Deputy SPU Engineering Authority, or to Bob Naeger, Holstein / Mad Dog PU
Facilities Manger.
Process Design
1. The Process Technical Authorities for both the Project and the SPU need
to understand in detail the facility process design, ensure the appropriate
level of design review is conducted and that the design is consistent with
the project basis of design.
a. Rupture disks should relieve into a constant back pressure system, otherwise a
tandem rupture disk setup should be used to maintain a constant back pressure
on the primary rupture disk.
c. The reverse burst pressure rating of the secondary disk should be confirmed to
be higher than the maximum operating pressure of the flare header. Checks
should also be made that the secondary disk will burst in the normal direction
when the flare header is at maximum operating pressure.
d. The secondary rupture disk should be proved to not physically impact the
primary disk, should a reverse direction burst occur.
e. The void space between tandem rupture disks should be closed, not vented.
a. All of the flare systems in GoM should be modeled, so that the flare scrubber
pressures and header pressures are known for the range of credible flaring
scenarios. AspenTech FlareNet software should be used to model the flare
system.
b. For new facilities, and for existing facilities that have modified the operation /
capacity of the facility flare system, it is recommended that flaring and
blowdown tests be conducted to confirm the flare system does operate as
designed.
a. Piping downstream of rupture disks should have an adequate rating for the
predicted low temperature during a burst disk scenario.
a. Cooling water piping that could have gas entry from either a tube leak or reverse
flow from the flare header should be designed and installed to handle the
mechanical movement / pressure wave expected during the incident.
7. Compression Systems
c. All shell and tube gas coolers, with gas on the shell side, should have had tube
vibration analyses perform by the supplier. It should be confirmed that these
analyses were made and that the vibration levels predicted are acceptable.
1. The hazard analysis (Hazop) should be performed with the degree of rigor
that would draw particular attention to upset conditions and the flare
system.
2. The Hazop and / or process design review needs to be revisited once the
process design and process equipment selection is finalized. This
may have an effect on the flare system design.
Alarms
Incident Reporting