P11,299.
00 for the reconditioning of the tank
Aguirre v Pheng September 3, 1966
Barrera, J.
FACTS:
June 28, 1954: Vicente and Teresa
Aldaba sold to Jesus Aguirre a steel tank with
a capacity of 5,000 gallons for P900 (He paid
using a cheque of Security Bank and Trust
Company). Aguirre failed to take possession of
the tank. He was prevented by the municipal
authorities of Los Banos because the Bureau of
Public Highways is also claiming ownership
over it. It appears the spouses Aldaba sold it
to Zosimo Gabriel. Gabriel then sold it to
Leonora and Company. Leonora then sold it to
National Shipyard and Steel Corp (NASSCO).
Aguirre filed a case in the CFI [CC case no.
24914] Leonora also filed against NASSCO
because the latter hasn’t paid yet [CC case no.
27988]. Court jointly
heard the cases. CFI ruled in favor of Aguirre
as absolute owner of the tank. The other sales
were declared null and void. If not returned,
they will pay Aguirre, P900 [CC 24914]. In CC
27988, Aguirre was declared the owner but
NASSCO will pay Leonora P11,299. When
Aguirre saw this, he appealed even though he
won. CA affirmed the CFI ruling.
Aguirre now appeals to the SC.
ISSUE:
WON, under Art 440 of the CC, his ownership
of the property entitles him to everything that
is produced or attached thereto either
naturally or artificially.
HELD:
Petition DISMISSED.
It is clear that we have here a case of accession
by specification: Leonora and Company, as
purchaser acting in good faith, spending
which is later adjudged to belong to petitioner
Aguirre. There is no showing that without the
works made by Leonora & Company, the tank
in its original condition when Aguirre paid
P900.00 therefor, would command the price of
P14,500 which NASSCO was willing to pay. -
Although ordinarily, therefore, Aguirre, as
owner of the tank, would be entitled to any
accession thereto, the rule is different where
the works or improvements or the accession
was made on the property by one who acted in
good faith.
And, it is not contended that the making of the
improvements and incurring of expenses
amounting to P11,299.00 by Leonora &
Company was done in bad faith. Furthermore,
to uphold petitioner's contention that he is
entitled to the sum of P14,500.00 the price of
the tank in its present condition, would be to
allow him to enrich himself at the expense of
another. It must also be remembered that the
judgment in Civil Case No. 24914 of the Court
of First Instance of Manila, wherein NASSCO
was directed to pay to Aguirre the of P900.00,
in case delivery of the same tank is no longer
possible, has already become final.
Jagualing v. Court of Appeals194 SCRA 607
FACTS:
A certain parcel of land is located in
Sta. Cruz, Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental with an
area of 16,452 sq. meters forming part of an
island in a non-navigable river, bounded by
the Tagoloan River on the north, south, and
east and by the portion belonging to Vicente
Neri on the west. Janita Eduave claims that she
inherited the land from her father, Felomino
Factura, together with his co-heirs, Reneiro
Factura and Aldenora Factura, and acquired
sole ownership of the property by virtue of a
Deed of Extra Judicial Partition with sale. The
land is declared for tax purposes under Tax
Declaration 26137 with an area of 16,452 sq.
m. Since the death of her father on 5 May1949,
Eduave had been in possession of the property
although the tax declaration remains in the
name of the deceased father. The entire land
had an area of 16,452 sq. m. appearing ain the
deed of extrajudicial partition while in tax
declaration the area is only 4,937 sq. m., and
she reasoned out that she included the land
that was under water. The land was eroded
sometime in November 1964 due to typhoon
Ineng, destroying the bigger portion and the
improvements leaving only a coconut tree. In
1966 due to the movement of the river
deposits on the land that was not eroded
increased the area to almost half a hectare and
in 1970 Eduave started to plant banana trees.
In 1973, Maximo and Anuncita Jagualing asked
her permission to plant corn and bananas
provided that they prevent squatters to come
to the area. Eduave engaged the services of a
surveyor who conducted a survey and placed
concrete monuments over the land. Eduave
also paid taxes on the land in litigation, and
mortgaged the land to the Luzon Surety and
Co., for a consideration of P6,000.00. Eduave
also applied for concession with the Bureau of
Mines to extract 200 m3 of grave, and after an
ocular inspection the permit was granted.
Eduave, after permit was granted, entered into
an agreement with Tagoloan Aggregates to
extract sand and gravel, which agreement was
registered in the office of the Register of
Deeds. Maximo and Anuncita Jagualing assert
that they are the real owners of the land in
litigation containing an area of 18,000 sq. m.
During the typhoon Ineng in 1964 the river
control was washed away causing the
formation of an island. Jagualing started
occupying the land in 1969, paid land taxes as
evidenced by tax declaration 26380 and tax
receipts, and tax clearances. Actual occupation
of the land by Jagualing included
improvements and the house. Rudygondo and
Janita Eduave filed with the RTC Misamis
Oriental an action to quiet title and/or remove
a cloud over the property in question against
Jagualing. On 17 July 1987 the trial court
dismissed the complaint for failure of Eduave
to establish by preponderance of evidence
their claim of ownership over the land in
litigation. The court found that the island is a
delta forming part of the river bed which the
government may use to reroute, redirect or
control the course of the Tagoloan River.
Accordingly, it held that it was outside the
commerce of man and part of the public
domain, citing Article 420 of the Civil Code. As
such it cannot be registered under the land
registration law or be acquired by
prescription. The trial court, however,
recognized the validity of Jagualing’s
possession and gave them preferential rights
to use and enjoy the property. The trial court
added that should the State allow the island to
be the subject of private ownership, the
Jagualings’ have rights better than that of
Eduave. On appeal to the CA, the court found
that the island was formed by the branching
off of the Tagoloan River and subsequent
thereto the accumulation of alluvial deposits.
Basing its ruling on Articles 463 and 465 of the
Civil Code, the CA reversed the decision of the
trial court, declared Eduave as the lawful and
true owners of the land subject of the case and
ordered Jagualing to vacate the premises and
deliver possession of the land to Eduave.
ISSUE:
Who between the one who has actual
possession of an island that forms in a non-
navigable and non-floatable river and the
owner of the land along the margin nearest the
island, has the better right thereto?
HELD:
The parcel of land is part of an island
that formed in a non-navigable and non-
floatable river; from a small mass of eroded or
segregated outcrop of land, it increased to its
present size due to the gradual and successive
accumulation of alluvial deposits. The CA did
not err in applying Article 465 of the Civil
Code. Under this provision, the island belongs
to the owner of the land along the nearer
margin as sole owner thereof; or more
accurately, because the island is longer than
the property of Eduave, they are deemed ipso
jure to be the owners of that portion which
corresponds to the length of their property
along the margin of the river. Lands formed by
accretion belong to the riparian owner. This
preferential right is, under Article 465, also
granted the owners of the land located in the
margin nearest the formed island for the
reason that they are in the best position to
cultivate and attend to the exploitation of the
same. In fact, no specific act of possession over
the accretion is required. If, however, the
riparian owner fails to assert his claim thereof,
the same may yield to the adverse possession
of third parties, as indeed even accretion to
land titled under the Torrens system must
itself still be registered. There is no need to
make a final determination regarding the
origins of the island, i.e., whether the island
was initially formed by the branching off or
division of the river and covered by Article 463
of the Civil Code, in which case there is strictly
no accession because the original owner
retains ownership, or whether it was due to
the action of the river under Article 465, or
whether it was caused by the abrupt
segregation and washing away of the stockpile
of the river control, which makes it a case of
avulsion under Article 459, as the case in
between.
ROSALES VS. CASTELLFORT
FACTS:
Spouses-petitioners Rodolfo V.
Rosales and Lily Rosqueta-Rosales
(petitioners) are the registered owners of a
parcel of land with an area of approximately
315 square meters, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 36856[4] and
designated as Lot 17, Block 1 of Subdivision
Plan LRC Psd-55244 situated in Los Baños,
Laguna. On August 16, 1995, petitioners
discovered that a house was being constructed
on their lot, without their knowledge and
consent, by respondent Miguel Castelltort
(Castelltort). It turned out that respondents
Castelltort and his wife Judith had purchased a
lot, Lot 16 of the same Subdivision Plan, from
respondent Lina Lopez Villegas (Lina) through
her son-attorney-in-fact Rene Villegas
(Villegas) but that after a survey thereof by
geodetic engineer Augusto Rivera, he pointed
to Lot 17 as the Lot 16 the Castelltorts
purchased. Negotiations for the settlement of
the case thus began, with Villegas offering a
larger lot near petitioners’ lot in the same
subdivision as a replacement thereof. In the
alternative, Villegas proposed to pay the
purchase price of petitioners’ lot with legal
interest. Both proposals were, however,
rejected by petitioners whose counsel, by
letter of August 24, 1995, directed Castelltort
to stop the construction of and demolish his
house and any other structure he may have
built thereon, and desist from entering the lot.
Petitioners subsequently filed on September 1,
1995 a complaint for recovery of possession
and damages with prayer for the issuance of a
restraining order and preliminary injunction
against spousesrespondents Miguel and Judith
Castelltort before the RTC of Calamba, Laguna,
docketed as Civil Case No. 2229-95-C.
ISSUE:
Under Art 448, who has the right of option?
HELD:
Under the foregoing provision (Art
448), the landowner can choose between
appropriating the building by paying the
proper indemnity or obliging the builder to
pay the price of the land, unless its value is
considerably more than that of the structures,
in which case the builder in good faith shall
pay reasonable rent.[34] If the parties cannot
come to terms over the conditions of the lease,
the court must fix the terms thereof. The
choice belongs to the owner of the land, a rule
that accords with the principle of accession,
i.e., that the accessory follows the principal
and not the other way around. Even as the
option lies with the landowner, the grant to
him, nevertheless, is preclusive. The
landowner cannot refuse to exercise either
option and compel instead the owner of the
building to remove it from the land.
The raison d’etre for this provision has
been enunciated thus: Where the builder,
planter or sower has acted in good faith, a
conflict of rights arises between the owners,
and it becomes necessary to protect the owner
of the improvements without causing injustice
to the owner of the land. In view of the
impracticability of creating a state of forced
co-ownership, the law has provided a just
solution by giving the owner of the land the
option to acquire the improvements after
payment of the proper indemnity, or to oblige
the builder or planter to pay for the land and
the sower the proper rent. He cannot refuse to
exercise either option. It is the owner of the
land who is authorized to exercise the option,
because his right is older, and because, by the
principle of accession, he is entitled to the
ownership of the accessory thing. G.R.
Heirs of Marcelino Cabal vs. Sps. Lorenzo
Cabal and Rosita Cabal
G.R. No. 153625
July 31, 2006
FACTS:
During his lifetime, Marcelo Cabal was
the owner of a parcel of land
situated. Sometime in 1954, Marcelo died,
survived by his wife and his children. It
appears that sometime in 1949, five years
before he died, Marcelo allowed his son,
Marcelino, to build his house on a portion of
the lot. Since then, Marcelino resided thereon.
Later, Marcelino’s son also built his house on
the disputed property.
In 1964, Marcelo’s heirs extra-judicially
settled among themselves the lot. In the
interim, based on a consolidated subdivision
plan, it was revealed that Marcelino and his
son occupied and built their houses on an area
located on the southernmost portion of
another lot and not the adjacent lot designated
to him. The spouses Lorenzo and Rosita Cabal
(respondents) confronted Marcelino on this
matter which resulted to an agreement to a re-
survey and swapping of lots for the purpose of
reconstruction of land titles. However, the
agreed resurvey and swapping of lots did not
materialize.
Hence, respondents filed a complaint for
Recovery of Possession with Damages against
Marcelino. They alleged that Marcelino
introduced improvements in bad faith on their
land with knowledge that the adjacent lot is
titled in his name. Marcelino contends that
respondents have no cause of action against
him because he has been in possession in good
faith since 1949 with the respondents’
knowledge and acquiescence. He further avers
that acquisitive prescription has set in.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the lot where Marcelino
built his house was co-owned by Marcelo’s
children
2) Whether or not Marcelino is a builder in
good faith
HELD:
1) NO. It is undisputed that Marcelino built
his house on the disputed property in 1949
with the consent of his father. Marcelino has
been in possession of the disputed lot since
then with the knowledge of his co-heirs, such
that even before his father died in 1954, when
the co-ownership was created, his inheritance
or share in the co-ownership was already
particularly designated or physically
segregated. Thus, even before the lot was
subdivided, Marcelino already occupied the
disputed portion and even then co-ownership
did not apply over the disputed lot.
Elementary is the rule that there is no co-
ownership where the portion owned is
concretely determined and identifiable,
though not technically described, or that said
portion is still embraced in one and the same
certificate of title does make said portion less
determinable or identifiable, or
distinguishable, one from the other, nor that
dominion over each portion less exclusive, in
their respective owners.
Thus, since Marcelino built a house and has
been occupying the disputed portion since
1949, with the consent of his father and
knowledge of the co-heirs, it would have been
just and equitable to have segregated said
portion in his favor and not one adjacent to it.
2) Marcelino is deemed a builder in good faith
at least until the time he was informed by
respondents of his encroachment on their
property. Marcelino’s possession of the
disputed lot was based on a mistaken belief
that the lot covered by his title is the same lot
on which he has built his house with the
consent of his father. There is no evidence,
other than bare allegation, that Marcelino was
aware that he intruded on respondents’
property when he continued to occupy and
possess the disputed lot after partition was
effected.
PARAGUYA v. CRUCILLO
FACTS:
Paraguya filed before the RTC a
Complaint6 against Sps. Crucillo and the RoD
for the annulment of OCT No. P-17729 and
other related deeds, with prayer for
receivership and damages, alleging that
Escurel obtained the aforesaid title through
fraud and deceit. Paraguya claimed that she is
the lawful heir to the subject properties left by
her paternal grandfather, Estabillo, while
Escurel was merely their administrator and
hence, had no right over the same. Sps. Crucillo
filed their answer with motion to dismiss,
averring that Paraguya’s complaint had
already been barred by laches and/or
prescription. During trial, Paraguya presented
a document entitled Recognition of Ownership
and Possession dated December 1, 1972
executed by her siblings, as well as a titulo
posesorio. For their part, Sps. Crucillo
presented several witnesses who testified that
Escurel had been in possession of the subject
properties in the concept of an owner as early
as 1957. Escurel then admitted that her
brother, Adonis, executed an affidavit dated
December 17, 1976 in her favor. She likewise
admitted that she executed an affidavit,
entitled Ratification of Ownership (affidavit of
adjudication), on the same date, in support of
the free patent application with the Bureau of
Lands.
RTC: granted Paraguya’s complaint, ordering
the annulment of the OCT.
CA: Reversed. Citing Section 32 of Presidential
Decree No. (PD) 1529,[19] otherwise known
as the “Property Registration Decree,” it held
that the OCT has became indefeasible and
incontrovertible after the lapse of one (1) year
from its issuance on August 24, 1979, thus
barring Paraguya’s complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Paraguya’s complaint has
prescribed under PD 1529
HELD:
Yes. It is an established rule that a
Torrens certificate of title is conclusive proof
of ownership. Verily, a party may seek its
annulment on the basis of fraud or
misrepresentation. However, such action must
be seasonably filed, else the same would be
barred. In this relation, Section 32 of PD 1529
provides that the period to contest a decree of
registration shall be one (1) year from the date
of its entry and that, after the lapse of the said
period, The Torrens certificate of title issued
thereon becomes incontrovertible and
indefeasible.
The Court likewise takes note that
Paraguya’s complaint is likewise in the nature
of an action for reconveyance because it also
prayed for the trial copurt to order Sps.
Crucillo to "surrender ownership and
possession of the properties in question to
[Paraguya], vacating them altogether x x
x. 26 Despite this, Paraguya’s complaint
remains dismissible on the same ground
because the prescriptive period for actions for
reconveyance is ten (10) years reckoned from
the date of issuance of the certificate of title,
except when the owner is in possession of the
property in which case the action for
reconveyance becomes
imprescriptible. Such exception is, howevee,
27

Crucillo, and Paraguya, who are in possession

of the land.