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Case 3:10-cv-00142-MCR -MD Document 79 Filed 10/18/10 Page 1 of 11

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT


NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
PENSACOLA DIVISION

MARY E. ALLEN, et al.,

Plaintiffs,
3:10-CV-00142/MCR-MD
v.

SCHOOL BOARD FOR SANTA


ROSA COUNTY, FLORIDA; and
TIM WYROSDICK, in his official
capacity as Superintendent, Santa Rosa
County School District,

Defendants.
/

DEFENDANT OFFICE OF THE PRINCIPAL’S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION


TO PLAINTIFFS’ RENEWED MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Co-Defendant, BRYAN STEPHEN SHELL, in his Official Capacity as

Principal of Pace High School (“Office of the Principal”), by and through the

undersigned counsel and pursuant to Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and

Local Rule 7.1 of the Rules of the United States District Court for the Northern District

of Florida, respectfully requests this Court deny Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary

Injunction [(Doc. 12)] and Renewed Motion for Preliminary Injunction [(Doc. 66)], and

as grounds for denial states:

I. Relevant Facts for Adjudicating the Motion

The Co-Defendant, Office of the Principal, is an entity directed by the School

Board of Santa Rosa County (“School Board”), over which the School Board has control,

and which was included as a party to the Consent Decree arising out of the case of Minor
Case 3:10-cv-00142-MCR -MD Document 79 Filed 10/18/10 Page 2 of 11

I Doe, et al. v. School Board Santa Rosa County, et al., N.D. Fla. Case No.: 3:08-cv-361-

MCR-EMT (“Doe Litigation”). Because the Office of the Principal was a separate party

to the Doe Litigation, and a signatory to the Consent Decree which Plaintiffs seek to

vacate, this Court found that it was an indispensible party to this action. (Doc. 45). As

such, this Court provided the Office of the Principal fourteen days to file a response to

Plaintiffs’ renewed motion, as it was not yet a party at the time the original motion for

preliminary injunction was filed. (Doc. 68).

II. Argument and Authority – Plaintiffs Are Not Entitled to a Preliminary


Injunction

A. Standards Governing Motions for Preliminary Injunction

Due to the Court’s familiarity with the standards governing motions for

preliminary injunctions, Defendant will provide only a brief synopsis. To prevail on their

Motion, Plaintiffs must each prove: “(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits;

(2) irreparable injury will be suffered if the relief is not granted; (3) the threatened injury

outweighs the harm the relief would inflict on the non-movant; and (4) entry of the relief

would serve the public interest.” Siebert v. Allen, 506 F.3d 1047, 1049 (11th Cir. 2007)

(citing Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223, 1225-26 (11th Cir. 2005)). In

analyzing the evidence presented with respect to each of these elements, district courts

must exercise their discretion with caution. As the Supreme Court recently reiterated,

“[a]n injunction is an exercise of a court’s equitable authority, to be ordered only after

taking into account all of the circumstances that bear on the need for prospective relief.”
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Case 3:10-cv-00142-MCR -MD Document 79 Filed 10/18/10 Page 3 of 11

Salazar v. Buono, ___ S. Ct. ___, 2010 WL 1687118 at *10 (April 28, 2010) (citations

omitted). “Equitable relief is not granted as a matter of course…and a court should be

particularly cautious when contemplating relief that implicates public interests.” Id.

(citing Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311-312, 102 S.Ct. 1798 (1982)

(“In exercising their sound discretion, courts of equity should pay particular regard for

the public consequences in employing the extraordinary remedy of injunction.”)).

Pursuant to Rule 10(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Co-Defendant

Office of the Principal adopts and incorporates by reference Defendants’ Response in

Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction. (Doc. 28). In addition to the

arguments set forth in that Response, Plaintiffs are also not entitled to the issuance of a

preliminary injunction because Defendants’ compliance with the Consent Decree is a

complete defense to Plaintiffs’ claims for damages and other individualized relief until

the point at which the Consent Decree is modified or dissolved, as more further discussed

below.

B. Plaintiffs Cannot Establish Likelihood Of Success On The Merits (Element


1)

Consent Decrees are a type of court order which must be obeyed by the parties

subject to it, and violations are punishable by contempt in either a fine or imprisonment.

See, e.g., Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976). Additionally,

violations of a court order “are punishable as criminal contempt even though the order is

set aside on appeal.” U.S. v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 294 (1947). It is a well
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established doctrine that persons subject to an injunctive order issued by a court with

jurisdiction are expected to obey that decree until it is modified or reversed, even if they

have proper grounds to object to the order. GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumers Union of

the U.S., Inc., 445 U.S. 375, 386, 100 S.Ct. 1194, 1201 (1980); see also Spangler, 427

U.S. at 439 (“[D]isobedience of such an outstanding order of a federal court subjects the

violator to the contempt even though his constitutional claim might be later upheld.”),

citing United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258. Indeed, the Supreme Court frequently1

quotes its own statement in the earlier decision of Howat v. Kansas, 258 U.S. 181, 42

S.Ct. 277 (1922):

It is for the court of first instance to determine the question


of the validity of the law, and until its decision is reversed
for error by orderly review, either by itself or by a higher
court, its orders based on its decision are to be respected,
and disobedience of them is contempt of its lawful
authority, to be punished.

Id. at 190.

The only possible exceptions to this “important public policy,” W.R. Grace & Co.

v. Local Union 759, Int’l Union of the United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic

Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983), arise if a court lacks jurisdiction over the subject

matter of the order, or if the order has “only a frivolous pretense to validity.” G.T.E., 445

U.S. at 386 (quoting Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. at 315). In the case below,

1
E.g., Pasadena 427 U.S. at 439; Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258; Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S.
307, 87 S.Ct. 1824 (1967).
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there is no doubt that the Northern District of Florida had jurisdiction over the subject

matter of the Consent Decree entered in the Doe Litigation, or that it continues to have

jurisdiction, as the Consent Decree specifically provided for this Court to retain

jurisdiction for five years following its entry. Furthermore, on several occasions, this

Court has reviewed and considered the constitutionality of the Consent Decree and has, in

all instances, determined that it is constitutionally sound. As such, no one can suggest

that the Consent Decree has only a frivolous pretense to validity. See, e.g., Belk v.

Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 269 F.3d 305, 399 (4th Cir. 2001); Martinez v. City

of St. Louis, 539 F.3d 857, 860 (8th Cir. 2008) (“The significance of the district court’s

ruling that the decree was constitutionally valid when entered cannot be overstated.”).

Even if the Consent Decree is ultimately found to be unconstitutional by this

Court, or by a higher court, the Defendants are obligated to abide by it up until that point

at which it is modified or reversed. G.T.E., 445 U.S. at 386. The Defendants must obey

the Consent Decree, and in so doing, may be required to forego competing obligations,

including those seemingly required by a federal statute, see G.T.E. at 378 & n. 2, 386-87,

or the Constitution itself. See Walker, 388 U.S. at 317. Although Plaintiffs may assert

that because the Consent Decree is vague and overbroad Defendants do not have a

compelling interest in complying with it, the Supreme Court has explicitly rejected the

argument that a court order needs to mandate specific or precise procedures to compel

obedience. Id. (Noting the “breadth and vagueness” of the injunction challenged by

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Plaintiffs, the Court nonetheless held that the injunction had to be obeyed until “modified

or dissolved.”). “[A] school board and a school constituency which attempt to comply

with a [court-ordered] plan to the best of their ability should not be penalized.” Dayton

Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 421 (1977).

Whether or not these Plaintiffs are bound by the Consent Decree, the Defendants

obviously are, and thus have a compelling governmental interest in compliance and

avoiding any contempt liability until the Consent Decree is modified or dissolved.

Defendants’ compelling interest in complying with the Decree so as to avoid any further

charges of contempt, along with the compelling interests of righting the wrongs

underlying the decree and respecting the court, is a complete defense to Plaintiffs’ claims

and, as such, prevents Plaintiffs from establishing a likelihood of success on the merits,

which is a necessary prerequisite to obtaining injunctive relief. See, e.g., Martinez v. City

of St. Louis, 539 F.3d 857, 862 (8th Cir. 2008) (Compliance with valid remedial consent

decree until it was dissolved is a complete defense to the pre-dissolution claims for

damages and other individualized relief); Pope v. Alabama, 2008 WL 2874483 (M.D.

Ala. 2008) (granting summary judgment in favor of defendant because compliance with a

valid consent decree is a complete defense), aff’d, U.S., et al. v. Flowers, 281 Fed. Appx.

960 (11th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 130 S.Ct. 1523 (2010).

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Case 3:10-cv-00142-MCR -MD Document 79 Filed 10/18/10 Page 7 of 11

C. Plaintiffs Have Not Met Their Burden Of Establishing Irreparable Injury


(Element 2)

In addition to the arguments set forth in Defendants’ Response to Plaintiffs’

Motion for a Preliminary Injunction [(Doc. 28)], Plaintiffs have failed to meet their

burden of establishing irreparable injury because many of the alleged deprivations feared

by Plaintiffs have, in fact, taken place without any infringement or impediment to

Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. Aside from the graduation ceremony and baccalaureate

services that have already occurred, as discussed in Defendants’ previous Motion, the

“See You At the Pole” events have taken place in the Santa Rosa County School District

involving students from several schools in the county, including at Milton High School

on September 22, 2010.2 Indeed, despite Plaintiffs’ assertion that the Consent Decree and

Defendants’ policies interfere with the rights of Plaintiff Waters to conduct religious

programs for students in his community [(Doc. 12 at p. 14)], Plaintiff Waters was invited

by students to speak at the See You at the Pole rally held at Milton High School and did

so without any obstacle. Because Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden of

establishing irreparable harm, this Court should deny their motion for injunctive relief.

D. Plaintiffs’ Alleged Injuries Are Outweighed By The Harm The Requested


Relief Would Inflict on Defendants (Element 3)

Under these circumstances, where the School District has already been faced with

litigation based upon admitted, long-standing violations of the Establishment Clause in

2
“Students Gather at Flagpole for Prayer,” Pensacola News Journal, September 23, 2010,
http://www.pnj.com/article/20100923/NEWS01/9230313/1125
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Santa Rosa County public schools, and contempt charges against two of its employees, it

is unquestionable that the District could again face a lawsuit by adversely affected

individuals, as well as possible contempt sanctions by this Court, if it does not comply

with the Consent Decree.

Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries clearly do not outweigh the possibility that the District

could again be faced with an extremely costly lawsuit, or that its employees could be

faced with fines or even jail time, should their requested injunctive relief be granted

because “[a]voiding contempt and respecting the court to enter the consent decree suffice

to make obedience a compelling interest.” Citizens, 193 F.3d 1285, 1292 (11th Cir.

1999). This is especially the case here, where many of the events evidencing

constitutional injuries or deprivations that Plaintiffs allege they will sustain absent the

entry of a preliminary injunction have in fact already taken place, without the

infringement on Plaintiffs’ rights they allegedly feared, during the 2010-2011 school

year.

E. The Public Interest Is Served By The Defendants Adhering To The Dictates


Of The Consent Decree And Federal And State Law (Element 4)

In addition to the arguments set forth in Section III(C)(3) of Defendants’

Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction [(Doc. 28)], the

entry of the relief requested by Plaintiff does not serve the public interest because it

contravenes important public policy. Exposing the District and its employees to the

potential for being held in contempt is a compelling interest in and of itself for the
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Case 3:10-cv-00142-MCR -MD Document 79 Filed 10/18/10 Page 9 of 11

Defendants to abide by the Consent Decree’s provisions and enact policies to implement

it. While the potential for contempt alone provides the Defendants with a compelling

interest to observe the Consent Decree, “any rule that punished Defendants for failing to

disobey the court would not comport with the sanctity of an unchallenged court order.”

Citizens Concerned About Our Children v. Sch. Bd. of Broward County, Fla., 193 F.3d

1285 (11th Cir. 1999).

As the Supreme Court has consistently recognized, “[i]t is beyond question that

obedience to judicial orders is an important public policy” and court orders do not simply

bend because the enjoined party, by virtue of the order, becomes liable to a third party for

damages. W.R. Grace & Co. 461 U.S. at 766-69. The entry of an injunction in this

instance would contravene the public interest as Defendants are required to obey the

Consent Decree out of “respect for judicial process.” Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388

U.S. at 315.

Plaintiffs are not entitled to a preliminary injunction because they have failed to

meet their burden of establishing likelihood of success on the merits, as Defendants have

a compelling interest in compliance with the Consent Decree. Furthermore, Plaintiffs

have not sufficiently established the irreparable harm which they would suffer if an

injunction was not granted in this instance. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction

should, therefore, be denied.

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Case 3:10-cv-00142-MCR -MD Document 79 Filed 10/18/10 Page 10 of 11

Dated this 18th day of October, 2010.

/s/ Robert J. Sniffen and


ROBERT J. SNIFFEN
Florida Bar Number: 0000795 /s/ Paul Green
E-Mail: rsniffen@sniffenlaw.com PAUL GREEN
Florida Bar No.: 127448
/s/ Michael P. Spellman E-Mail: paulg1229@bellsouth.net
MICHAEL P. SPELLMAN
Florida Bar Number: 0010212 JOHNSON, GREEN and MILLER, P.A.
E-Mail: mspellman@sniffenlaw.com 6850 Caroline Street
Milton, FL 32570
/s/ Todd D. Engelhardt Telephone: (850) 623-3841
TODD D. ENGELHARDT Facsimile: (850) 623-3555
Florida Bar Number: 0013444
E-Mail: tengelhardt@sniffenlaw.com COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS,
SANTA ROSA COUNTY SCHOOL
SNIFFEN & SPELLMAN, P.A. BOARD and TIM WYROSDICK, IN
211 East Call Street HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
Tallahassee, Florida 32301 SUPERINTENDENT, SANTA ROSA
Telephone: (850) 205-1996 COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT; and
Facsimile: (850) 205-3004 BRYAN STEPHEN SHELL, IN HIS
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
PRINCIPAL OF PACE HIGH
SCHOOL

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Case 3:10-cv-00142-MCR -MD Document 79 Filed 10/18/10 Page 11 of 11

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 18th day of October, 2010, I electronically


filed the foregoing in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida,
Pensacola Division, by using the CM/ECF system which will send a notice of electronic
filing to all counsel of record.

/s/ Robert J. Sniffen


ROBERT J. SNIFFEN

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