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Plaintiffs,
3:10-CV-00142/MCR-MD
v.
Defendants.
/
Principal of Pace High School (“Office of the Principal”), by and through the
undersigned counsel and pursuant to Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
Local Rule 7.1 of the Rules of the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Florida, respectfully requests this Court deny Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary
Injunction [(Doc. 12)] and Renewed Motion for Preliminary Injunction [(Doc. 66)], and
Board of Santa Rosa County (“School Board”), over which the School Board has control,
and which was included as a party to the Consent Decree arising out of the case of Minor
Case 3:10-cv-00142-MCR -MD Document 79 Filed 10/18/10 Page 2 of 11
I Doe, et al. v. School Board Santa Rosa County, et al., N.D. Fla. Case No.: 3:08-cv-361-
MCR-EMT (“Doe Litigation”). Because the Office of the Principal was a separate party
to the Doe Litigation, and a signatory to the Consent Decree which Plaintiffs seek to
vacate, this Court found that it was an indispensible party to this action. (Doc. 45). As
such, this Court provided the Office of the Principal fourteen days to file a response to
Plaintiffs’ renewed motion, as it was not yet a party at the time the original motion for
Due to the Court’s familiarity with the standards governing motions for
preliminary injunctions, Defendant will provide only a brief synopsis. To prevail on their
Motion, Plaintiffs must each prove: “(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits;
(2) irreparable injury will be suffered if the relief is not granted; (3) the threatened injury
outweighs the harm the relief would inflict on the non-movant; and (4) entry of the relief
would serve the public interest.” Siebert v. Allen, 506 F.3d 1047, 1049 (11th Cir. 2007)
(citing Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223, 1225-26 (11th Cir. 2005)). In
analyzing the evidence presented with respect to each of these elements, district courts
must exercise their discretion with caution. As the Supreme Court recently reiterated,
taking into account all of the circumstances that bear on the need for prospective relief.”
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Salazar v. Buono, ___ S. Ct. ___, 2010 WL 1687118 at *10 (April 28, 2010) (citations
particularly cautious when contemplating relief that implicates public interests.” Id.
(citing Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311-312, 102 S.Ct. 1798 (1982)
(“In exercising their sound discretion, courts of equity should pay particular regard for
Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction. (Doc. 28). In addition to the
arguments set forth in that Response, Plaintiffs are also not entitled to the issuance of a
complete defense to Plaintiffs’ claims for damages and other individualized relief until
the point at which the Consent Decree is modified or dissolved, as more further discussed
below.
Consent Decrees are a type of court order which must be obeyed by the parties
subject to it, and violations are punishable by contempt in either a fine or imprisonment.
See, e.g., Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976). Additionally,
violations of a court order “are punishable as criminal contempt even though the order is
set aside on appeal.” U.S. v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 294 (1947). It is a well
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established doctrine that persons subject to an injunctive order issued by a court with
jurisdiction are expected to obey that decree until it is modified or reversed, even if they
have proper grounds to object to the order. GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumers Union of
the U.S., Inc., 445 U.S. 375, 386, 100 S.Ct. 1194, 1201 (1980); see also Spangler, 427
U.S. at 439 (“[D]isobedience of such an outstanding order of a federal court subjects the
violator to the contempt even though his constitutional claim might be later upheld.”),
citing United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258. Indeed, the Supreme Court frequently1
quotes its own statement in the earlier decision of Howat v. Kansas, 258 U.S. 181, 42
Id. at 190.
The only possible exceptions to this “important public policy,” W.R. Grace & Co.
v. Local Union 759, Int’l Union of the United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic
Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983), arise if a court lacks jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the order, or if the order has “only a frivolous pretense to validity.” G.T.E., 445
U.S. at 386 (quoting Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. at 315). In the case below,
1
E.g., Pasadena 427 U.S. at 439; Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258; Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S.
307, 87 S.Ct. 1824 (1967).
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there is no doubt that the Northern District of Florida had jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the Consent Decree entered in the Doe Litigation, or that it continues to have
jurisdiction, as the Consent Decree specifically provided for this Court to retain
jurisdiction for five years following its entry. Furthermore, on several occasions, this
Court has reviewed and considered the constitutionality of the Consent Decree and has, in
all instances, determined that it is constitutionally sound. As such, no one can suggest
that the Consent Decree has only a frivolous pretense to validity. See, e.g., Belk v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 269 F.3d 305, 399 (4th Cir. 2001); Martinez v. City
of St. Louis, 539 F.3d 857, 860 (8th Cir. 2008) (“The significance of the district court’s
ruling that the decree was constitutionally valid when entered cannot be overstated.”).
Court, or by a higher court, the Defendants are obligated to abide by it up until that point
at which it is modified or reversed. G.T.E., 445 U.S. at 386. The Defendants must obey
the Consent Decree, and in so doing, may be required to forego competing obligations,
including those seemingly required by a federal statute, see G.T.E. at 378 & n. 2, 386-87,
or the Constitution itself. See Walker, 388 U.S. at 317. Although Plaintiffs may assert
that because the Consent Decree is vague and overbroad Defendants do not have a
compelling interest in complying with it, the Supreme Court has explicitly rejected the
argument that a court order needs to mandate specific or precise procedures to compel
obedience. Id. (Noting the “breadth and vagueness” of the injunction challenged by
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Plaintiffs, the Court nonetheless held that the injunction had to be obeyed until “modified
or dissolved.”). “[A] school board and a school constituency which attempt to comply
with a [court-ordered] plan to the best of their ability should not be penalized.” Dayton
Whether or not these Plaintiffs are bound by the Consent Decree, the Defendants
obviously are, and thus have a compelling governmental interest in compliance and
avoiding any contempt liability until the Consent Decree is modified or dissolved.
Defendants’ compelling interest in complying with the Decree so as to avoid any further
charges of contempt, along with the compelling interests of righting the wrongs
underlying the decree and respecting the court, is a complete defense to Plaintiffs’ claims
and, as such, prevents Plaintiffs from establishing a likelihood of success on the merits,
which is a necessary prerequisite to obtaining injunctive relief. See, e.g., Martinez v. City
of St. Louis, 539 F.3d 857, 862 (8th Cir. 2008) (Compliance with valid remedial consent
decree until it was dissolved is a complete defense to the pre-dissolution claims for
damages and other individualized relief); Pope v. Alabama, 2008 WL 2874483 (M.D.
Ala. 2008) (granting summary judgment in favor of defendant because compliance with a
valid consent decree is a complete defense), aff’d, U.S., et al. v. Flowers, 281 Fed. Appx.
960 (11th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 130 S.Ct. 1523 (2010).
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Motion for a Preliminary Injunction [(Doc. 28)], Plaintiffs have failed to meet their
burden of establishing irreparable injury because many of the alleged deprivations feared
Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. Aside from the graduation ceremony and baccalaureate
services that have already occurred, as discussed in Defendants’ previous Motion, the
“See You At the Pole” events have taken place in the Santa Rosa County School District
involving students from several schools in the county, including at Milton High School
on September 22, 2010.2 Indeed, despite Plaintiffs’ assertion that the Consent Decree and
Defendants’ policies interfere with the rights of Plaintiff Waters to conduct religious
programs for students in his community [(Doc. 12 at p. 14)], Plaintiff Waters was invited
by students to speak at the See You at the Pole rally held at Milton High School and did
so without any obstacle. Because Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden of
establishing irreparable harm, this Court should deny their motion for injunctive relief.
Under these circumstances, where the School District has already been faced with
2
“Students Gather at Flagpole for Prayer,” Pensacola News Journal, September 23, 2010,
http://www.pnj.com/article/20100923/NEWS01/9230313/1125
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Santa Rosa County public schools, and contempt charges against two of its employees, it
is unquestionable that the District could again face a lawsuit by adversely affected
individuals, as well as possible contempt sanctions by this Court, if it does not comply
Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries clearly do not outweigh the possibility that the District
could again be faced with an extremely costly lawsuit, or that its employees could be
faced with fines or even jail time, should their requested injunctive relief be granted
because “[a]voiding contempt and respecting the court to enter the consent decree suffice
to make obedience a compelling interest.” Citizens, 193 F.3d 1285, 1292 (11th Cir.
1999). This is especially the case here, where many of the events evidencing
constitutional injuries or deprivations that Plaintiffs allege they will sustain absent the
entry of a preliminary injunction have in fact already taken place, without the
infringement on Plaintiffs’ rights they allegedly feared, during the 2010-2011 school
year.
Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction [(Doc. 28)], the
entry of the relief requested by Plaintiff does not serve the public interest because it
contravenes important public policy. Exposing the District and its employees to the
potential for being held in contempt is a compelling interest in and of itself for the
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Defendants to abide by the Consent Decree’s provisions and enact policies to implement
it. While the potential for contempt alone provides the Defendants with a compelling
interest to observe the Consent Decree, “any rule that punished Defendants for failing to
disobey the court would not comport with the sanctity of an unchallenged court order.”
Citizens Concerned About Our Children v. Sch. Bd. of Broward County, Fla., 193 F.3d
As the Supreme Court has consistently recognized, “[i]t is beyond question that
obedience to judicial orders is an important public policy” and court orders do not simply
bend because the enjoined party, by virtue of the order, becomes liable to a third party for
damages. W.R. Grace & Co. 461 U.S. at 766-69. The entry of an injunction in this
instance would contravene the public interest as Defendants are required to obey the
Consent Decree out of “respect for judicial process.” Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388
U.S. at 315.
Plaintiffs are not entitled to a preliminary injunction because they have failed to
meet their burden of establishing likelihood of success on the merits, as Defendants have
have not sufficiently established the irreparable harm which they would suffer if an
injunction was not granted in this instance. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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