Journal of Public Affairs

Volume 12 Number 4 pp 293–302 (2012)

Published online 9 December 2011 in Wiley Online Library
(www.wileyonlinelibrary.com) DOI: 10.1002/pa.434

■ Academic Paper

Three faces of political marketing strategy

Sigge Winther Nielsen*
Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, Denmark

The term strategy is appearing with great frequency in the political marketing literature. However, the concept of
political marketing strategy has been criticized for being unidimensional, ill-defined and neglecting the contingencies
of strategy theories. This article argues that a minimal definition and a division of epistemological terms could
respond to the outlined critique. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Keywords: political marketing, marketing strategy, strategy selection, epistemology, conceptual analysis

The term strategy is appearing with great frequency
in the political marketing literature. In fact, many
different entities and phenomena are analyzed
through a strategy lens, from candidates and
campaigns to governments and parties. At the same
time, a host of new political marketing strategy
theories is presented, related to, for example,
positioning strategies (Baines and Worcester, 2006),
military strategy (Marland, 2003; Smith, 2006) or
market orientation (e.g. Lees-Marshment, 2009: 42).
However, the concept of political marketing strategy
has been criticized for being ill-defined, because it
summarizes a broad body of literature (Barber,
2005; Collins and Butler, 2002) where much focus
has been dedicated to prescription instead of the
essential concept analysis. Furthermore, critics have
argued that the concept of political marketing
strategy is applied in a unidimensional fashion,
meaning it is underspecified in terms of the different
postures embedded in the concept (Henneberg,
2006; Fischer et al., 2007). It continues that the under-
standing of ‘. . .the contingencies of strategic frameworks
have been largely neglected’ (Henneberg, 2006: 31).
Indeed, less attention has been devoted to under
what conditions, for instance, a political party selects
one marketing strategy over another relevant strategy
(Strömbäck, 2007: 60).
If this premise is accepted, the overall lack of
clarity is problematic both for researchers and
marketers. For a researcher, it is worrying that
*Correspondence to: Sigge Winther Nielsen, Department of
Political Science, Copenhagen University, ster Farimagsgade 5,
Copenhagen, Denmark.
E-mail: swn@ifs.ku.dk
the current status of theory building, only to a
low extent, accounts for a way to predict why a
certain political organization selects one strategy
instead of another. As such, it is a fundamental
function of a solid theory in that it can predict
outcomes under specific circumstances (Collier
and Gerring, 2009). On the other hand, for political
marketers, it is currently troublesome to figure out
which strategy theory is most prosperous to
subscribe to under altering circumstances in the
political market.
Yet some of the confusing natures of political
marketing strategy can be dispelled. This article
argues for us to explicitly realize that the strategy
concept does not make up a unified framework of
thought. Thus, the aim is to identify unambiguous
boundaries within the field. Accordingly, a minimal
definition of political marketing strategy must be
developed to encompass the breadth of strategy
literature on the field. At the same time, it must be
underscored that the political marketing strategy
concept, by its minimal definition, has a variety of
distinct faces. These are built upon different
epistemologies that apply and dominate under
changing conditions.
The article is divided into four parts. First, we
construct a minimal definition of strategy in political
marketing. Second, three faces of political marketing
strategy are outlined—design, emergent and inter-
pretive—to elucidate how the concept applies under
altering conditions. Third, we look at how some po-
litical marketers implicitly use this categorization
in selecting a political marketing strategy, which is
exemplified with historical cases from US politics.
Fourth, suggestions to further research are delineated.

Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

294 S. Winther Nielsen
A MINIMAL DEFINITION OF POLITICAL
MARKETING STRATEGY
Strategy in political marketing is considered by
many authors to be one of the most valuable assets
for a candidate or party (Lynch et al., 2006; Barber,
2005; Collins and Butler, 2002; Lees-Marshment,
2009). However, the many and varied contributions
can make it difficult for scholars and practitioners to
understand what strategy really is and when a
certain strategy perspective is relevant. Hence,
drawing on the concept formation literature, we
can seek to respond to the aforementioned critique
in order to develop a more rigorous political
marketing strategy concept (e.g. Collier and Gerring,
2009; Goertz, 2006). In that light, the seminal work
on concepts by Giovanni Sartori (1984) suggests the
following in broad terms: first, to develop a minimal
definition with non-idiosyncratic attributes that can
be distinguished from other adjacent concepts and
second, underneath the minimal definition, one
should outline a body of subclassifications, broadly
capturing the diversity of approaches that inhibit
the concept. In this article the subclassifications are
termed the three faces of strategy.
How do we extract a minimal definition? The
marketing analogy of ‘companies as parties and
costumers as voters’ is now broadly acknowledged
in political marketing strategy, although important
differences between marketing and politics have
been emphasized (e.g., Lock and Harris, 1996: 14–16).
On this foundation, various authors propose differ-
ent definitions. Newman (1994) posits that a political
marketing strategy concerns a plan to win an election
campaign. Barber (2005: 9) states that ‘strategy is about
forming objectives given resources available and carrying
out a plan to achieve those objectives. . .’, a definition that
Lees-Marshment echoes (Lees-Marshment, 2009: 40).
Finally, Smith and Hirst (2001: 1059) assert that a
political marketing strategy focuses on creating a
long-term advantage by segmenting and positioning
the offering.
The aforementioned conceptions of a political
marketing strategy1 are important contributions,
but they are not minimal definitions, as this article
attempts to find. Rather, they are ‘situation-specific
strategies’ that concentrate on a particular case
(Henneberg, 2006: 30). A minimal definition, on
the other hand, does not exclude or contradict other
understandings of political marketing strategy
because it highlights a few, but universal attributes.
In fact, some scholars have embarked on a minimal
definition—implicitly. For instance, the definition
of strategy by Lynch and Baines (2005: 2) is ‘the
1
It is important to underscore that this conceptualization relates
to political marketing strategy, not marketing strategy or political
strategy, but political marketing strategy. However, the chapter
will naturally cite and be inspired by literature on strategy in
marketing and political science.
Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
identification of the purpose of a political party and the
actions to achieve that purpose’. Likewise do Collins
and Butler (2002: 2) outline a definition that ap-
proaches the goal of a minimal definition: ‘Strategy
is a scheme or principal idea through which an objective
will be achieved’.
This article draws on these two definitions, each
of which can be traced back to commercial market-
ing literature. However, to create an even more
inclusive minimal definition, we first need to
rework the two definitions.
Lynch and Baines (2005: 2) exclude entities that
are not political parties, such as the marketing
strategy of a nation or a candidate. Additionally, by
referring to actions in their definition, they restrict
the ground for creating strategy. A scheme, which
Collins and Butler (2002) write about, is broader in
scope. Scheme, as a term, is therefore able to allow
more strategic perspectives. Yet, Collins and Butler
also have difficulties in complying with a full
minimal definition, because they do not explicitly
state that the objective of a political entity should be
found, which Lynch and Baines surmise. As a
consequence, this article proposes this minimal
definition: ‘Political marketing strategy is the identifica-
tion of a political entity’s purpose and the scheme through
which that purpose will be achieved.’
It is important to note that this minimal definition
seemingly includes the different strategy concepts
involved in political marketing. In other words,
the definition does not exclude or contradict other
important defining attributes in the field (Gerring,
1997: 966). There are three components in the min-
imal definition that can be identified:
(i) Political entity: The strategy literature in political
marketing employs a wide range of actor figures.
These can include nations, NGOs, parties, cam-
paigns and candidates. The term political entity
summarizes all these cases without excluding any.
(ii) Purpose: In the literature, the different political
entities identify—consciously or subconsciously—
a purpose when embarking on a strategy. For
example, a party could have the purpose of
long-term survival and maximization of influ-
ence, although the purpose is subject to change
over time, from being office seeking to vote
seeking, depending on the arena of focus at the
moment.
(iii) Scheme: The diverse body of literature on polit-
ical marketing strategy delineates suggestions
on how the political entity accomplishes its
purpose. That is a mechanism, which in the
definition is termed as scheme. A scheme is
the knowledge structures a political entity uti-
lizes, whether simply a sketch of action points,
a template for trial and error, an ideational
construction of symbols to alter the existing
logic or a precise long-term plan for gearing
the political entity to meet market demands.
J. Public Affairs 12, 293–302 (2012)
DOI: 10.1002/pa
 On the concept of political marketing strategy 295

Following the recipe of Sartori (1984), the concept
of political marketing strategy shall be untangled
from neighboring terms after settling on a minimal
definition. Because of the limited space, we will
only focus on the two obvious terms: (i) tactic and
(ii) plan. Essentially, a tactic concentrates on simple
short-term operations relating to dealing with a
concrete problem for the political entity; on the other
hand, a strategy entails a more long-term perspective
(e.g., Barber, 2005: 8). At the same time, a plan refers
to a list of promotional initiatives, whereas a strategy
concerns a scheme for tackling challenges that cannot
be achieved by performing a set of activities. It is a
worldview that directs action, not just to the battle at
hand, but for the one ahead (e.g., Harrop, 1990: 277).
After settling on a minimal definition of political
marketing strategy and relating it to adjacent terms,
we will turn to the different subclassifications of
strategy.
SUBCLASSIFICATIONS: THREE FACES OF
POLITICAL MARKETING STRATEGY
A strategy face is a certain way of doing strategy. In
this article, it is understood as an ideal type in a
Weberian (1949) sense. Thus, it is an abstraction
not to be found in a pure version in the real world.
The field of political marketing strategy can be
divided into three faces—design, emergent and in-
terpretive (for an overview, see Figure 1). These
are subclassifications to the mother concept of
political marketing strategy and direct attention to
different assumptions about actors, behavior and
environment. Accordingly, within this logic of
concept formation, as the field of political marketing
strategy grows, potentially new faces can be added
(Collier and Gerring, 2009: 273; Goertz, 2006).
But how does the article arrive at these three faces
of strategy? First of all, few scholars have categor-
ized the field of political marketing strategy. One
important contribution, however, makes the case
for dividing the field into three dimensions—
content, context and process (Lynch and Baines,
2005: 2). This categorization illuminates the fact that
a strategy is more than the content of the marketing
plan, but also involves the legal, cultural and insti-
tutional context constraining actors and finally, the
complexities of the process of managerial decision
making. However, this labeling does not grapple
with the presuppositions that underpin the different
actor figures on the field. Consequently, it does not
address under what conditions different strategy
theories apply. Instead, it is assumed that political

Design Emergent Interpretive

Actor assumptions Foundational: Rational Foundational: Historical Anti-foundational: Socio-
calculus – eclectic basis psychology

Political Stable and unchangeable Unstable and unchangeable Unstable and changeable
environment

Strategic political Outline a precise long-term Trial and error. Create a fit Develop norms, rituals, signs,
plan with means and ends between internal and external and symbols
behavior events

Strategy objective Goal attainment Match and learn Create legitimacy

Problems in The planning becomes too
overwhelming. At the same
strategy execution time, there is no room for
adaptive actions and response
to feedback from the
environment
Institutional inertia and the
deep-rooted culture in
political organizations
complicates the “fitting
process”
The cognitive and normative
limitations of top managers
hamper the ability to scan
input, fabricate meaning, and
change the environment

Points of critique a) Super humans a) The unlearning of a) Lopsided focus on

valuable outside-in
(theoretical and b) Assumptions of procedures explanations
practical) environmental
status quo b) Epistemological b) Install a social
confusion determinism

Empirical In Newman’s (1994) New Labour’s trial and error The Obama campaign’s
description, Clinton’s 1992 preparations to fit policies to ability to transform the
example campaign was planned voters (Gould, 1998) language, symbols, norms,
carefully and playing field of the 2008
presidential election (Plouffe,
2009)

Key inspirations in Kotler (1984) Hutt et al. (1988) Firat et al. (1995)
marketing strategy

Figure 1 Three faces of strategy in political marketing.

Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Public Affairs 12, 293–302 (2012)
DOI: 10.1002/pa
296 S. Winther Nielsen
marketers subscribe to more or less the same idea
about what is real (ontology) and to the status of
the constitutive knowledge structures (epistemology)
that circulate in connection to that reality (Ming and
Moufahim, 2009; Savigny, 2007).
In contrast, the identification of the three political
marketing strategy faces follows a natural epistemo-
logical trajectory. It entails that we can discover the
embedded perception of actors within theories on
the field (Savigny, 2007: 34). For example, the role
of the marketer in political marketing strategy
theories relies implicitly on the various ways of
dealing with strategy making, which in turn is
inspired by disciplines such as economy, history
and sociology. Indeed, these disciplines have their
own epistemologies that undergird a certain way
of understanding the world. So, when perceiving
the political marketing strategy literature, three
broad perspectives stand out when we divide the
field in terms of the strategy conceptions’ constitu-
tive truth claims. Put differently, when a researcher
asks whether the political marketer is for example
considered rational, cognitive or cultural in his
way of reasoning and perceiving the environment,
it is argued that we can distill three faces. That
is, the political marketing strategy faces—design,
emergent and interpretive—respectively based on
economy, history and socio-psychology.
This categorization is in line with widespread
mappings of the much broader field of business
strategy, for example, the three models of strategy
of Chafee (1985) and the four strategy schools of
Whittington (1993) that likewise employ actor
assumptions as the dividing principle. Furthermore,
other fields of study have successfully followed the
same basic idea of an epistemological division, for
example, neo-institutional theory (Hall and Taylor,
1996) organizational theory (Allison, 1971) or for-
eign policy theory (Carlsnaes, 2002).
Nonetheless, the three faces of political marketing
strategy, which will be illustrated later in the article,
are not independent islands. In reality, they can and
will be combined. In the following, we will describe
the three faces based on four tenets: (i) actor
assumptions, (ii) political environment, (iii) strategic
behavior and objective and (iv) relevant critique.2
The first face of political marketing strategy:
design
The first face of strategy is concerned with designing
a game plan. The strategy-making process revolves
mainly around a controlled and planned platform
2
It is pivotal to note that in the following, we will focus on polit-
ical organizations, primarily parties (their top management) and
voters to exemplify the three outlined strategy faces. Yet it does
not mean that the strategy faces exclusively relate to voters and
parties; they should, indeed, be applicable to other actor figures
and political entities.
Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
entrenched in the top management of the political
organization. The axiomatic ground is shaped by
rational actors, which engage in a linear decision-
making process with the capacity to plan ahead and
implement change (Kotler and Kotler, 1999; Maarek,
1995; Niffenegger, 1989). Most actions are based on
political marketers’ ability to predict the moves of
competitors and voters in a relatively stable environ-
ment. In this context, scholars agree that political
marketers will follow a carefully crafted strategy
fostered by, for example, these phases: (i) identifying
segments in the population, (ii) targeting segments of
voters, (iii) positioning the party and (iv) implement-
ing the strategy (Baines et al., 2002; Marland, 2003;
Newman, 1994; Smith and Hirst, 2001: 1063–1069).
Bruce Newman (1994), for instance, shows in his
classical contribution that the Clinton presidential
campaign in 1992 followed an outlined game plan.
A plan that tapped into the concerns of precise voter
segments on the basis of huge data sources, leading
to an impressive victory. In addition, Faucheux
(2002) exemplifies the notion of a design strategy
by emphasizing the use of a SWOT analysis in polit-
ical campaigning to meticulously plan the course of
the race. Finally, Baines et al. (2002) have formulated
one of the most thorough analyses that can be
ascribed to the design strategy face. This model also
accounts for the difficulties in working with the pol-
itical marketing strategy design face. The authors
direct attention to the essential steps of orchestrat-
ing a strategy, just as the scholars mentioned previ-
ously; but at the same time, they highlight the
complexities in coordinating between the center
and the periphery of a national party organization
while a campaign unfolds. The overwhelming plan-
ning activities can be time consuming, and more
importantly, they leave no particular room for adap-
tive actions and feedback from the environment
(Baines et al., 2002: 9f).
This strategy face is the most widespread in polit-
ical marketing, yet two points of critique are
relevant.
First of all, this rational strategy face is premised
on the idea of a super human who is able to
manage, foresee and control most events. It is a per-
son that can, roughly speaking, calculate utility
functions and absorb enormous amounts of data
(Savigny, 2007). Scholars being critical of this
premise underscore that, in fact, the rational
assumptions about actors were initially formulated
as a way to capture how the perfectly rational
human would act and not how the real human acts.
But over time, rational theories have evolved into
accepting that people actually behave in a per-
fectly rational way (Green and Shapiro, 1994: 12).
Although many scholars within the design face
acknowledge that marketers do not have a brain
that functions similar to a calculator, they do
not develop strategy theories based on the more
mainstream political or marketing psychological
J. Public Affairs 12, 293–302 (2012)
DOI: 10.1002/pa

literature, considering people as cognitive misers
(O’Cass and Nataraajan, 2003; Popkin, 1994). Then
it follows that even though a parsimonious ground
can be fertile, the assumption of a super human
can, in practice, sometimes dilute the usefulness of
the design strategy face.
Second, the design face of strategy, as some argue,
stipulates a conception of the organization’s
environment as if it was constituted by an almost
stable configuration of elements that managers can
analytically break down. In contrast, many practi-
tioners and theorists contend that the political
environment often presents itself as an uninvited
and uneasy pressure to be reckoned with when,
for instance, running a campaign (Farrell, 1996).
Sometimes the environment can be an unpredict-
able force,3 which is hard to interpret and respond
to, because of ‘regular polling, strong media attention
and “events” outside the control of the political party’
(Lynch and Baines, 2005: 10).
Despite its challenges, this design face of strategy
is a constructive starting point—a tempting
template for creating strategy. Moreover, it fosters
a language of political marketing strategy, which is
indispensible when it comes to the components of
strategic planning and implementation.
The second face of political marketing strategy:
emergent
The idea behind the emergent political marketing
strategy face can be summarized in one sentence:
It is marketing strategy carried out on the run. The
axiomatic foundation of this perspective is eclectic,
drawing on both rational and sociological
understandings fashioned by a focus on historical
context. It means that actor assumptions are taken
from various sources and do not exhibit a clean,
parsimonious structure (Hall and Taylor, 1996),
unlike rational propositions in the design perspective.
Nevertheless, much of the literature agrees that
the environment of a political organization is
unstable. Consequently, the political world is
constantly taking new shapes and forms, making it
a necessity for a strategy to be reactive. As such, it
becomes pivotal for political marketers to realize
that they face a complex mix of information and
intelligence, which they need to understand and
address. Alniacik (2009: 227) bolsters this notion
by examining the last three elections in Turkey. Each
took an unexpected turn due to the sudden involve-
ment of a terrorist, the military, an economic crisis
3
Political marketing scholars grouped in the design face of strat-
egy are not as dogmatic as their business strategy counter-
parts—according to some authors, they virtually neglect the
existence of the environment (e.g., Mintzberg et al., 2005). A
broader group of political marketing scholars contend they are
aware of the challenge from the surroundings. These include,
for instance, Baines et al., (2002: 12) and Smith and Hirst (2001:
1069–1070).
Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
On the concept of political marketing strategy 297
and the bad health of a political leader. In these
situations, marketers seek to constantly try to adjust
the course.
Under conditions of unpredictability, political
marketing strategy becomes an emergent process.
The focal point is to adapt by means of ‘matching
and learning’ in order to have a competitive advan-
tage in the market.
First, organizations match new findings with old
knowledge. Essentially, marketers engage in an
incremental process where they must deal with a
bureaucracy of fragmented decision-making struc-
tures and a focus on solving day-to-day problems,
rather than exploring opportunities in the environ-
ment (Fischer et al., 2007: 191; Quinn, 1980). Strategy
then becomes a science of ‘muddling through’ as
Lindblom (1959: 79) states this troubled process of
finding a direction. As a consequence, one of the
key tenets in newer political marketing strategy
literature is that adjustments are paramount to a
political organization because the media scrutiny
and regular polling of opinions constantly trans-
form the dynamics in the political marketplace
(Lynch and Baines, 2005: 10). This idea of matching
internal and external events is proposed in theories
on obtaining competitive resources and developing
capabilities. By constantly creating a fit with the
external world, an organization can create assets
that are hard to imitate by competitors and thereby
initiate a long-term advantage (Lynch et al., 2006;
Barber, 2005).
Second, political organizations try to learn. An
emergent strategy will develop feedback
mechanisms that factor in information from the
environment. For instance, in a political campaign
where the market testing of public opinion or focus
groups related to sudden ‘events’ takes place before
presenting the policy offerings in a more detailed
way during an election (Fischer et al., 2007; Sparrow
and Turner, 2001). A political organization will thus
embark on a mission of trial and error when
developing a marketing strategy by constantly moni-
toring the surroundings (Gould, 1998). Although
most of the attention in the literature has been direc-
ted toward top management (Lynch and Baines,
2005), another important aspect is the art of collective
puzzlement that comprises the totality of the
organization (Senge, 2006).
In fact, people closest to the front line, it could be
party members or volunteers, are sometimes those
who have the most valuable information, for
instance, people who canvass and note information
about voters, they meet and send this knowledge
back to the strategy headquarters; this is a practice
used in campaigns in the USA (Melber, 2010).
In sum, it must be underscored, that an emergent
strategy distinguishes itself from a product launch
where the product stays the same over the whole
campaign. The emergent fine-tuning processes are
seemingly a more difficult task, and even for the
J. Public Affairs 12, 293–302 (2012)
DOI: 10.1002/pa
298 S. Winther Nielsen
most dedicated organization, the constant adjust-
ment can cause problems relating to organizational
inertia and deep-rooted cultural practices that
complicate the ‘fitting process’ between internal
and external events (Vera and Crossan, 2004: 227f).
The emergent strategy face is a pragmatic tool kit
available to scholars and marketers. Meanwhile,
two challenging caveats can be discerned.
(1) A learning organization can be considered as a
fad that has attracted enormous attention—but
the more political managers try to learn, the more
often it is possible that they unlearn existing
practices. Hence, the backside of learning is that
well-functioning procedures might be eliminated.
People simply start heralding new ideas because
they are new. The desire to reevaluate becomes
a trajectory in itself. But without a clear long-term
direction, the ability to absorb information can be
damaged because the organization becomes dis-
tracted by minor changes in the environment
(Mintzberg et al., 2005).
(2) A central theoretical critique concerns the epis-
temological inconsistencies stemming from the
multitude of different assumptions within this
perspective. It can be argued that actor assump-
tions are at best eclectic and at worst confusing
(Campbell, 2004). The historical calculus under-
pinning the emergent strategy face is a mixture
of rational and sociological axioms, which makes
it hard to stipulate clear empirical expectations
and attempts to falsify the theoretical propositions.
The third face of political marketing strategy:
interpretive
The world outside the political organization is a
construction. The interpretive political marketing
strategy face is built on this bold statement, and it
dictates that the world is shaped by inter-subjective
thoughts and actions we all assemble. It represents a
certain logic that is present in, for example,
constructivist and postmodern marketing theories
(Brown, 1993; Firat et al., 1995). From this departure,
political marketers are condemned to interpret the
environment, infuse meaning into the world and
act upon it.4 These are the basic assumptions within
the interpretive strategy face—reality is a social
construction (Berger and Luckmann, 1967). In short,
the political sphere is what parties and voters make
of it, to paraphrase Alexander Wendt (1992).
The interpretive strategy face can at first be
conceived of as a radical view, and it is only slowly
4 ing ‘. . . to symbolical characters of Peruvian history, as
This strategy face entangles a wide range of diverse approaches,
from constructivism, postmodernism, post-structuralism and
critical theory to certain variants of neo-institutional theory and
social psychology (Ming and Moufahim, 2009). The frame of
reference is the unstable but changeable nature of the environ-
ment, in addition to the assumption of fabrication of meaning:
No political structures stay frozen; everything can be melted.
Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
evolving in political marketing (e.g., Ming and
Moufahim, 2009). However, ultimately this perspec-
tive collects a wide range of prominent scholars
who acknowledge that the world is socially
constructed, and therefore, managers do not have
to respond to it simply as it unfolds. Instead, the
world is something we can give form to and frame.
For example, while debating global warming, every
political organization is trying to invoke its version
of reality (Stone, 1989). Moreover, when George W.
Bush enacted a doctrine for American foreign policy
after 9/11, he could have embarked on many differ-
ent marketing strategies, but he decided to write the
story of what he called the ‘War on Terror’, the good
fighting the evil, the legal fighting the illegal. This
story has created a new narrative that has become
the prevalent language in the Western world from
which to comprehend the international political
situation. This type of reasoning is at the core of
Lakoff’s (2005) understanding of political marketing
strategy, when he writes about the importance of
‘symbolic mechanisms of the political mind—the
worldviews, frames, metaphors, cultural narratives,
and stereotypes’ (Lakoff, 2008).
However, in this context, the most important
question is how political organizations operate
within this strategy perspective. The foundation of
the interpretive strategy face is that a party, for
instance, builds strategies to manipulate and alter
the environment with the overall aim of gaining
legitimacy. By envisioning and enforcing new world-
views, symbols, norms and metaphors, a party can
transform the general perception of a policy output,
societal problem or even the political landscape
(Patrón-Galindo, 2004; Nielsen 2011; Smircich and
Stubbart, 1985; Gamson and Modigliani, 1989).
Instead of accepting the world as it is, and planning
in accordance (design) or adapting to it by the pursuit
of the acknowledged oceans of opportunities
(emergent), there is empowering potential in the
interpretive political marketing strategy face.
The interpretive political marketing strategy
perspective is not as developed as the other two
described faces. That is mainly because the adoption
of constructivist and postmodern theories, for some
scholars, is still at the periphery of mainstream
marketing (e.g., Brown, 1993). Yet, an illustrative
framework of an interpretive strategy is outlined
by Patrón-Galindo (2004). He analyzes the political
marketing strategies in Peru by pointing to how pol-
itical actors are ‘. . .struggling symbolically to obtain
discursive hegemony’ (2004: 119). In this vein, the
Peruvian president Toledo, tries to appeal to the
electorate for change processes in society by allud-
a way to legitimize the process associatively in the public
imagination’.
Another linked contribution by Nielsen (2011)
wrestles with how a party strategizes in the intersec-
tion between pressure from historical macrocleavages
J. Public Affairs 12, 293–302 (2012)
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and micropressure from voters. It is argued that a
party’s interpretation of macropressure and micro-
pressure—either as a threat or a possibility—will
determine their strategic path (Henneberg, 2006: 43);
a path the party pursues in order to gain legitimacy
by manipulating the agenda, fabricating new
meaning structures or developing cleavages and
discourses through speech acts (Nielsen, 2011). This
type of logic could be found in the 2008 Obama presi-
dential campaign, according to the campaign man-
ager (Plouffe, 2009: 69). It unfolded in this case by
Obama’s campaign trying to install a new interpret-
ation of the political landscape, which diffused an al-
ternative style of language and symbols (Harfoush,
2009). Nevertheless, there are also limitations and
complexities related to this strategy outlook. Indeed,
the cognitive and normative constraints of top man-
agers will hamper the ability to scan input, fabricate
meaning, and change the environment.
In general, two notable critiques of the interpretive
political marketing strategy face are worth outlining.
First, the interpretive perspective mainly seeks to
understand rather than to explain, because it is pre-
mised on the great traditions of continental thinkers
of constructivism and postmodernism. In this con-
text, the observation point is a bit asymmetrical
because it is more fashioned on an outside-in view
(i.e., scholars searching for meaning) than on an
inside-out view (i.e., scholars looking at how political
marketers search for meaning) of the organization.
In contrast, the other strategy faces outline a more
balanced attitude toward the two extremes.
Second, it can be argued that the interpretive
strategy face entails a social determinism that replaces
a material determinism associated with the design
perspective. Roughly speaking, the interpretive
school of thought to some extent downplays the
brute facts of physical power or material resources
in the political struggle, thereby sometimes under-
estimating the basic sources on which most human
interaction is actually built.
ON SELECTING A POLITICAL MARKETING
STRATEGY FACE
The three faces of strategy laid out previously
demonstrates that what political marketers actually
do in the real world, when they set out to strategize,
is highly contingent on which kind of strategy out-
look–implicitly or explicitly–they subscribe to. A
political marketer utilizing a design face of strategy
thus employs a scheme very different from a polit-
ical marketer utilizing the emergent strategy face.
With this argument, the article has achieved its first
and primary goal, namely to develop a framework
for the concept of political marketing strategy. How-
ever, in the following, we will investigate more
concretely how political marketers undertake the
outlined strategy categorization. Hence, the article
Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
On the concept of political marketing strategy 299
attempts to situate the three faces of strategy in the
working environment of the political marketer.
Consequently, the article first describes a template
of three steps—diagnosis, analysis, and implemen-
tation—that we suggest some political marketers
implicitly employ when, for instance, a party deci-
des to select a particular marketing strategy. Second,
the article exemplifies this template in connection to
the strategy faces by delineating three small cases
from US politics.
Diagnosis—collecting knowledge
Over the years, many new valuable strategy
theories within political marketing have been
proposed (e.g., Newman, 1994; Marland, 2003;
Smith, 2006). However, what is characteristic of
many of those approaches is that the party or the
candidate has already decided on the handful of
strategy options available to them, which are
proposed in the particular author’s strategy theory
(Henneberg, 2006: 30). Although this step of imple-
mentation is a very important step, the distance
between theory and practice is often longer (George,
1993: 117). As a consequence, it is argued that there
is a step before going into one particular strategy
theory’s epistemology and prescription for strategy
implementation—and that step is the diagnosis.
A diagnosis is here understood as a process
wherein the political marketer seeks to uncover the
current political conditions by drawing on different
sources of knowledge, which could be
• media situation
• voter opinions
• competitors
• stakeholders
• political culture and history
• institutional setup
In essence, a diagnosis activates the above
relevant sources of information. The aim is to
decipher whether these components of knowledge
are substantially changing or stay more or less the
same (Strömbäck, 2007). It entails that the political
marketer needs to figure out the current conditions
of the political market, for example, is the environ-
ment stable or unstable? Can political actors change
the environment or is it unchangeable?
Analysis—settling on a particular strategy
After diagnosing the current political conditions, a
matching treatment to these challenges will have
to be found, which implies an analysis to find the
right political marketing strategy. However, creat-
ing a strategy analysis requires that marketers ac-
knowledge the contingent nature of theory. Theories
are sometimes presented as if they are universal,
applicable always and everywhere. In reality, as
Figure 1 propels, the three strategy faces, and at
J. Public Affairs 12, 293–302 (2012)
DOI: 10.1002/pa
300 S. Winther Nielsen
times the subschools within, apply under different
conditions. So, a political marketer can make an
analysis that builds upon the diagnosis of the
present situation in order to decide whether the
events he or she evaluates, correspond to a particular
theory corpus.
One way to grapple with this selection process is to
make an analysis based on conditional reasoning. As
such, we have to discover under what conditions one
strategy face is potentially more successful over an-
other in the electoral market. Traditionally in social
science, scholars will seek to uncover causal inference
patterns to solve this problem. In this case, this is a
path that political marketers could also follow—
and some tacitly do. In short, from this departure
we will seek to find a universal truth that comprises
the logic; if we in the diagnosis stage have estab-
lished that A (stable environment) is present, then B
(a model within the logics of the design strategy face)
will be a sensible strategic posture. However, the
notion that a relationship entailing that A is neces-
sary and sufficient for the existence of B is not likely,
as mentioned, when thinking about the dynamic
nature of the political world (e.g., Lynch and Baines,
2005). So, a more modest but feasible trajectory for
marketers selecting a political marketing strategy
might be to look at favoring conditions (George,
1993). Therefore if we cannot generalize strictly from
A to B, then we might better detect when more epi-
sodes of X and Y push for the success of C. Funda-
mentally, the demanding hunt for necessary and
sufficient conditions can to some extent obscure the
logic of probability as a useful tool.
With this reasoning about favoring condition in
place, for instance, a political party can diagnose—
simply expressed—that if X and Y happen (X = the
environment is unstable; Y = the environment is
changeable), then C will be a sensible marketing
strategy to pursue (C = a model within the logics
of the interpretive strategy face). In this fashion, pol-
itical marketers have a systematic way of making an
analysis that informs political marketing strategy.
Implementation—strategy prescription
The last step of implementing the chosen political
marketing strategy is, broadly speaking, about
executing it, making it work in the organization
and on the battlefield. Yet, this is probably the most
well-known and well-researched area in political
marketing strategy (e.g., Kavanagh, 1995; Mauser,
1983; Newman, 1994; Niffenegger, 1989), which we
have described in the outline of the three strategy
faces. Due to limited space and because the focus
of this section is primarily on selecting a strategy,
we will not investigate this step further.
Historical examples
One of the lessons of the three identified steps—
diagnosis, analysis and implementation—is again
Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
the contingent nature of theories. There are some
times and places in which the design face of strategy
helps one to think rigorously about the political com-
petition, others in which the emergent strategy face is
more prosperous, and others in which the interpre-
tive strategy face is more relevant. The determination
of a political marketing strategy lens presupposes a
dispassionate diagnosis of the situation to analyze
and select a potentially successful strategy.
To further explore the dynamics of this framework
we will look at three historical cases. These exam-
ples illuminate how the three steps are implicitly
used in order to determine which strategy is chosen.
• At the beginning of the 1990s, the Bill Clinton
campaign for the 1992 presidential election
crafted a heavy plan. The strategists Begala and
Carville (2002) diagnosed the political environ-
ment as stable and unchangeable: It was all about
the economy and only the economy. ‘It’s the econ-
omy stupid’ as it was epitomized in the Clinton
war room. In that light, the campaign had to
win the media agenda and portray Clinton as an
efficient leader. The strategy memos analyzed
that what was needed was a careful plan that
grappled with the economic issue in terms of
voter attitudes, target groups and message devel-
opment. It was about ‘staying on message’, the
economic message, and sticking to the master
plan (Begala and Carville, 2002; Newman, 1994).
At its core, the strategy memos were about the
stable configuration of issues on the agenda that
Clinton needed to address. The diagnosis impli-
citly depicted the strategy design face’s typical
emphasis on a stable and unchangeable environ-
ment, leading to the creation of a clearly designed
marketing plan that could be executed from the
headquarters.
• In February 2005, Howard Dean became chair-
man of the Democratic National Committee
(DNC) and conducted a thorough diagnosis of
the political landscape. The Democrats were in
trouble. They had lost seats in Congress and at
the same time badly trailed George W. Bush, the
incumbent president, in the 2004 election. The
idea that something had to happen to regain
momentum was pervasive among the Democrats.
The DNC’s strategy memo concluded in a potent
analysis that they had to constantly match and
learn their resources according to their diagnosis
of an unstable political environment—but still
with an unchangeable dominance of Republican
attitudes. The answer was a ‘50-State Strategy.’
Every state on the map could be valuable, similar
to a chess game where you bring the opponent on
the defense from every angle. A line of thinking
that has resulted is a focus on nurturing long-
term resources and efficient allocation. This
new focus implied hiring full-time staff in all
50 states, training candidates, campaign staff
J. Public Affairs 12, 293–302 (2012)
DOI: 10.1002/pa

and organizers, developing precise voter data to
microtarget and finally, investing heavily in new
technology to build a unified communication
platform (Gilgoff, 2006). The goal was to con-
stantly adapt and spread resources around the
country. Once again, we can identify the diagno-
sis relating to a strategy face, this time the emer-
gent political marketing strategy, highlighting an
unstable but unchangeable environment one had
to adapt to through the creation of long-term cap-
abilities and learning feedbacks.
• Barack Obama declared in Chicago in February of
2007 that he would run for president. Around the
same time, David Plouffe (2009) became Obama’s
campaign manager and started crafting a new
bold strategy. In his strategy memos, he perceived
the political environment differently than what
Howard Dean and the DNC did only 2 years
earlier. It was now possible for the world to
change. People could be swayed after the Bush
Administration because of economic meltdown
and fighting two difficult wars at the same time.
From this diagnosis, Obama, Plouffe and the rest
of the campaign analyzed that they should
engage in setting up the strategy ‘Obama for
America’. This catapulted the idea of altering the
language, norms and metaphors in the American
political discourse (Melber, 2010: 4). It happened
among other things through the initiation of
Obama as an empty blackboard that everybody
could paint their vision on. This type of strategy,
playing to voters’ imaginations, offered people a
new worldview in which to see politics from, at
least that was the intention. Therefore, the strat-
egy was not directly about designing a concrete
marketing plan to guide every step and was not
primarily about emergent adjustments of resources
and issues; rather it was about installing a new
interpretation of the political debate (Plouffe,
2009: 69f). In essence, lessons taken from the inter-
pretive strategy face.
In summary, strategy making is often an iterative
process. The marketer has to work back and forth
between the three outlined steps to encompass the
political reality, because, whenever new information
is obtained, it might change the strategy outlook.
Moreover, even though we focused on three
campaign cases and their affiliations with each of
the three political marketing strategy faces, in reality,
the three campaigns combined elements from all
three faces over the course of time. As an example,
the Obama campaign did not only subscribe to the
interpretive strategy face. At times, it also concen-
trated on ‘match and learn’ from the emergent
strategy face. This reasoning was visible when polls
suggested that a more protectionist trade policy
would be beneficial in a swing state such as
Ohio. Then Obama apparently adapted a different
opinion.
Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
On the concept of political marketing strategy 301
CONCLUSION
This article has attempted to outline an alternative
categorization of the theoretical world within
the field of political marketing strategy. This is a cat-
egorization wherein the underlying epistemological
differences of how actors perceive the world are
uncovered and unpacked. This new categorization of
the three faces of political marketing strategy, as
shown in the article, underlines that different strategy
theories apply under diverse conditions. This logic
has a dual implication. For practitioners, the three
faces of strategy can be employed to select a political
marketing strategy. For scholars, it can be an instru-
ment to explicate the pre-supposition within the
marketing strategy concept—and potentially help to
predict the strategic choice of political entities.
Nonetheless, further research is required. Despite
the numerous fruitful conceptualizations of models
on how to plan and implement a political marketing
strategy, relatively few empirical studies have docu-
mented the conditions favoring the use of one strat-
egy over another (Henneberg, 2006). As such,
researchers have little predictive knowledge about
under what conditions a party will choose a
political marketing strategy that highlights plan-
ning (design), adapting (emergent) or enacting
(interpretive). These three faces of political market-
ing strategy outlined in this article can be a solid
starting point for investigating how political
marketers actually arrive at a particular strategy.
An endeavour which is crucial if the research field
not only will outline strategy models—but also ac-
cumulate knowledge.
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