THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES

De Leon v. Esguerra, 153 SCRA 602, August, 31, 1987

(En Banc), J. Melencio-Herrera

Facts: On May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected Barangay Captain together with the other petitioners as
Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Muncipality of Taytay, Province of Rizal in a Barangay election held under Batas
Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise known as Barangay Election Act of 1982.

On February 9, 1987, petitioner De Leon received a Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986 but signed by respondent OIC
Governor Benjamin Esguerra on February 8, 1987 designating respondent Florentino G. Magno as Barangay Captain of Barangay
Dolores and the other respondents as members of Barangay Council of the same Barangay and Municipality.

Petitoners prayed to the Supreme Court that the subject Memoranda of February 8, 1987 be declared null and void and that
respondents be prohibited by taking over their positions of Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen.

Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982 (BP Blg. 222), their terms of office shall be six
years which shall commence on June 7, 1988 and shall continue until their successors shall have elected and shall have qualified. It
was also their position that with the ratification of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, respondent OIC Governor no longer has the
authority to replace them and to designate their successors.

On the other hand, respondents contend that the terms of office of elective and appointive officials were abolished and that
petitioners continued in office by virtue of Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the Provisional Constitution and not because their term of six years had
not yet expired; and that the provision in the Barangay Election Act fixing the term of office of Barangay officials to six years must
be deemed to have been repealed for being inconsistent with Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the Provisional Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not the designation of respondents to replace petitioners was validly made during the one-year period which
ended on Feb 25, 1987.

Ruling: Supreme Court declared that the Memoranda issued by respondent OIC Gov on Feb 8, 1987 designating respondents as
Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal has no legal force and effect.

The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on Feb 2, 1987, therefore, the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have
superseded. Having become inoperative, respondent OIC Gov could no longer rely on Sec 2, Art 3, thereof to designate respondents
to the elective positions occupied by petitioners. Relevantly, Sec 8, Art 1 of the 1987 Constitution further provides in part:

"Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years
x x x."

Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by aw, therefore, the term of office of 6 years provided for in the
Barangay Election Act of 1982 should still govern.
Angara vs. Electoral Commission 63 Phil 139

DOCTRINE OF SUPREMACY OF THE CONSTITUTION

FACTS:

In the elections of Sept. 17, 1935, petitioner Jose A. Angara and the respondents Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo, and Dionisio Mayor
were candidates for the position of members of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas.

On Oct. 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect of the National Assembly and on Nov. 15,
1935, he took his oath of office.

On Dec. 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8, which in effect, fixed the last date to file election protests.

On Dec. 8, 1935, Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against Angara and praying, among other things,
that Ynsua be named/declared elected Member of the National Assembly or that the election of said position be nullified.

On Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution (No. 6) stating that last day for filing of protests is on Dec.
9. Angara contended that the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the Electoral Commission solely as regards the merits
of contested elections to the National Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the case.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the controversy upon
the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative,

RULING:

In the case at bar, here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict of a grave constitutional nature
between the National Assembly on one hand, and the Electoral Commission on the other. Although the Electoral Commission may
not be interfered with, when and while acting within the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the reach of the
constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not subject to constitutional restrictions. The Electoral Commission is
not a separate department of the government, and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law
between departmental powers and agencies of the government are necessarily determined by the judiciary in justiciable and
appropriate cases.

The court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose of
determining the character, scope, and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly."
The Electoral Commission was created to transfer in its totality all the powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters
pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an independent and impartial tribunal. The express lodging of that power in
the Electoral Commission is an implied denial in the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. And thus, it is as effective a
restriction upon the legislative power as an express prohibition in the Constitution.

Therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary
implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.

It appears that on Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission met for the first time and approved a resolution fixing said date as the last
day for the filing of election protests. When, therefore, the National Assembly passed its resolution of Dec. 3, 1935, confirming the
election of the petitioner to the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission had not yet met; neither does it appear that said body
had actually been organized.

While there might have been good reason for the legislative practice of confirmation of the election of members of the legislature
at the time the power to decide election contests was still lodged in the legislature, confirmation alone by the legislature cannot be
construed as depriving the Electoral Commission of the authority incidental to its constitutional power to be "the sole judge of all
contests...", to fix the time for the filing of said election protests.

The Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance
of the protest filed by the respondent, Pedro Ynsua against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and that the
resolution of the National Assembly on Dec. 3, 1935, cannot in any manner toll the time for filing protest against the election,
returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of protests within such time as the rules
of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.

The petition for a writ of prohibition against the electoral commission is hereby denied, with cost against the petitioner.

Nonsuability doctrine

BACANI VS NACOCO

G.R. No. L-9657 100 Phil 471 November 29, 1956

LEOPOLDO T. BACANI and MATEO A. MATOTO, Plaintiffs–Appellees,

NATIONAL COCONUT CORPORATION, ET AL., Defendants, NATIONAL COCONUT CORPORATION and BOARD OF
LIQUIDATORS, Defendants–Appellants.

Facts:

Plaintiffs Bacani and Matto are both court stenographers assigned in Branch VI of the Court of First Instance of Manila.
During the pendency of a civil case in the said court, Francisco Sycip vs. National Coconut Corporation, Assistant Corporate Counsel
Federico Alikpala, counsel for Defendant, requested said stenographers for copies of the transcript of the stenographic notes taken
by them during the hearing. Plaintiffs complied with the request by delivering to Counsel Alikpala the needed transcript containing
714 pages and thereafter submitted to him their bills for the payment of their fees.

The National Coconut Corporation (NACOCO) paid the amount of P564 to Leopoldo T. Bacani and P150 to Mateo A. Matoto for said
transcript at the rate of P1 per page. But the Auditor General required the plaintiffs to reimburse said amounts by virtue of a
Department of Justice circular which stated that NACOCO, being a government entity, was exempt from the payment of the fees in
question. For reimbursement to take place, it was further ordered that the amount of P25 per payday be deducted from the salary
of Bacani and P10 from the salary of Matoto.

Petitioners filed an action in Court countering that NACOCO is not a government entity within the purview of section 16, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court. On the other hand, the defendants set up a defense that NACOCO is a government entity within the purview of
section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 hence, it is exempted from paying the stenographers’ fees under Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court.

Issues:

Whether or not National Coconut Corporation (NACOCO), which performs certain functions of government, make them a part of
the Government of the Philippines.

Discussions:

NACOCO is not considered a government entity and is not exempted from paying the stenographers’ fees under Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court.

Sec. 2 of the Revised Administrative Code defines the scope of the term “Government of the Republic of the Philippines”. The term
“Government” may be defined as “that institution or aggregate of institutions by which an independent society makes and carries
out those rules of action which are necessary to enable men to live in a social state, or which are imposed upon the people forming
that society by those who possess the power or authority of prescribing them” (U.S. vs. Dorr, 2 Phil., 332). This institution, when
referring to the national government, has reference to what our Constitution has established composed of three great departments,
the legislative, executive, and the judicial, through which the powers and functions of government are exercised. These functions
are twofold: constitute and ministrant. The former are those which constitute the very bonds of society and are compulsory in
nature; the latter are those that are undertaken only by way of advancing the general interests of society, and are merely optional.

Rulings:

No. NACOCO do not acquire that status for the simple reason that they do not come under the classification of municipal or public
corporation. While NACOCO was organized for the purpose of “adjusting the coconut industry to a position independent of trade
preferences in the United States” and of providing “Facilities for the better curing of copra products and the proper utilization of
coconut by-products”, a function which our government has chosen to exercise to promote the coconut industry. It was given a
corporate power separate and distinct from the government, as it was made subject to the provisions of the Corporation Law in so
far as its corporate existence and the powers that it may exercise are concerned (sections 2 and 4, Commonwealth Act No. 518). It
may sue and be sued in the same manner as any other private corporations, and in this sense it is an entity different from our
government.
PVTA v CIR Digest

Facts:

This case involves the expanded role of the government necessitated by the increased responsibility to
provide for the general welfare.

In 1966 private respondents filed a petition seeking relief for their alleged overtime services and the petitioner’s failure to pay for
said compensation in accordance with CA No. 444.

Petitioner denied the allegations for lack of a cause of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction. Judge Martinez issued an order,
directing petitioner to pay. Hence, this petition for certiorari on grounds that the corporation is exercising governmental functions
and is therefore exempt from Commonwealth Act No. 444.

PVTA contended it is beyond the jurisdiction of respondent Court as it is exercising governmental functions and that it is exempt
from the operation of Commonwealth Act No. 444.

Issue: Whether or not PVTA discharges governmental and not proprietary functions.

YES. But the distinction between the constituent and ministrant functions of the government has become obsolete. The
government has to provide for the welfare of its people. RA No. 2265 providing for a distinction between constituent and the
ministrant functions is irrelevant considering the needs of the present time: “The growing complexities of modern society have
rendered this traditional classification of the functions of government obsolete.”

The contention of petitioner that the Labor Code does not apply to them deserve scant consideration.

There is no question based on RA 4155, that petitioner is a governmental agency. As such, the petitioner can rightfully invoke the
doctrine announced in the leading ACCFA case. The objection of private respondents with its overtones of the distinction between
constituent and ministrant functions of governments as set forth in Bacani v. Nacoco, is futile. It does not necessarily follow, that
just because petitioner is engaged in governmental rather than proprietary functions, that the labor controversy was beyond the
jurisdiction of the now defunct respondent Court. Nor is the objection raised that petitioner does not come within the coverage of
the Eight-Hour Labor Law persuasive.

A reference to the pertinent sections of both Republic Acts 2265 and 2155 renders clear the differentiation that exists. If as a result
of the appealed order, financial burden would have to be borne by petitioner, it has only itself to blame. It need not have required
private respondents to render overtime service. It can hardly be surmised that one of its chief problems is paucity of personnel.
That would indeed be a cause for astonishment. It would appear, therefore, that such an objection based on this ground certainly
cannot suffice for a reversal. To repeat, respondent Court must be sustained.
Doctrine of Parens Patria

GP VS MONTE DE PIEDAD

G.R. No. L-9959 December 13, 1916

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, represented by the Treasurer of the Philippine Islands, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EL MONTE DE PIEDAD Y CAJA DE AHORRAS DE MANILA, defendant-appellant.

Facts:

A devastating earthquake took place in the Philippines sometimes in 1863. Contributions amounting to $400,000 were collected
during the Spanish regime for the relief of the victims of an earthquake. Out of the aid, $80,000.00 was left untouched. The Monte
de Piedad, a charitable institution, in need for more working capital, petitioned the Governor-General for the transfer of $80,000 as
a loan.

In June 1893, the Department of Finance called upon the Monte de Piedad to return the $80,000. The respondent bank declined to
comply with this order upon the ground that only the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands and not the Department of
Finance had the right to order the reimbursement.

On account of various petitions of the persons, the Philippine Islands, through the Attorney-General, bring suit against the Monte
de Piedad for a recover of the $80,000, together with interest, for the benefit of those persons or their heirs. After due trial,
judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of $80,000 gold or its equivalent in Philippine currency, together with
legal interest from February 28, 1912, and the costs of the cause.

The defendant appealed. One of the assignment of errors made by the defendant was to question the competence of the plaintiff
(government) to bring the action, contending that the suit could be instituted only by the intended beneficiaries themselves or by
their heirs.
Issues:

Whether or not the Philippine government is competent to file a complaint against the respondent bank for the reimbursement of
the money of the intended beneficiaries?

Discussions:

In accordance with the doctrine of Parens Patriae. The government being the protector of the rights of the people has the inherent
supreme power to enforce such laws that will promote the public interest. No other party has been entrusted with such right hence
as “parents” of the people the government has the right to take back the money intended for the people.

Rulings:

Yes. The Supreme Court upheld the right of the Government to file the case as parens patriae in representation of the legitimate
claimants. The legislature or government of the State, as parens patriae, has the right to enforce all charities of public nature, by
virtue of its general superintending authority over the public interests, where no other person is entrusted with it.

This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every State, whether that power is lodged in a royal person
or in the legislature. It is a most beneficient functions, and often necessary to be exercised in the interest of humanity, and for the
prevention of injury to those who cannot protect themselves. The beneficiaries of charities, who are often in capable of vindicating
their rights, and justly look for protection to the sovereign authority, acting as parens patriae. They show that this beneficient
functions has not ceased to exist under the change of government from a monarchy to a republic; but that it now resides in the
legislative department, ready to be called into exercise whenever required for the purposes of justice and right, and is a clearly
capable of being exercised in cases of charities as in any other cases whatever.