^^MHR9h !■ 3f; KMÉÉHÉ •?

& •» ■
 SKETCH

OF TILE

CAMPAIGN

IN

Portugal.

LONDOjST;

PRIXTED FOR JOHN MURRAY, 32, FLEEt STREET

w, blackwoqd, edi>tel'rgh; anji
U. N. MAHON, DUBLIM.

1810.
 Lewimi PrinUd bfC.SumA, Bcll-yard, Templcbtr.

0
 À

S JE T C 3ff,

tfife %c.

Dcc. lst. 1810.

Th E misconceptious which have

prevailed, and the misrepresentations
which have been circula ted., with re-
spcct to the campaign iu Portugal >

have determined me to lay before the

public what appears to me a more
correct view oí" this hnportant sub-
ject than lias hitherto appeared. I
confess that I have been additionally
urge d to this uadertaking, b y the in-

dignation which I have felt at the

unworthy altempts which have been

made to undermine the miKtaryrepu-

a tation
 ( 4 )

tation of the distinguished officer at

the head of the allied army in Portu-

gal : attempts which, whcther thcj
have proceeded from the violcnce of
politicai hostility, or the rancour of

personal malice, are cqually disgusting

to the feelings, and inconsistent with

the generosity of the British nation.

The íirst question which suggests

itself, in considering this subject, is,

What was Lord Wellingtons object

in the present campaign ? I answer,
strictly and literally the defence of
Portugal, involving (exclusively of ali
politicai considerations) the conse-
quent occupation of a powerful French
army, which would otherwise have
been applicable to a variety of im-
portant points, and equal perhaps (if

not so occupied and opposed) to the

subjugation
 ( 5 )

subjugation of the whole península,

His planwouId,ina merc military point

of view, have necessarily bcen defen-
sive, whether in reference to the nu-

merical inferiority of his force, at least

at the opening of the campaign, or to
the then state of the Portuguese
army, which, being perfeetly un-

tried, ought upon 110 account to have

been risked in the field, in the first

insta rice, except under circumstances

of peculiar advantage or of absolute

nccessity.

What, on tlie other hand, was the

object of the enemy ? Nothing less

tlian the expulsion of the British army,
the conquest of Portugal, and ali the
momcntous consequences on the fate

of the península, which these successes

would produce. With these objects a

a 3 very
 C tf )

very power fui force iv as assemblctl, con-

sistingof the corps d'armêe of Ney, Ju-
not, and Regnier, under thc conimand
of Marshffl Massena, one uilâíjubtedly

of the bcst generais in the French

service, supported by a staff, whose
names are eminently distinguishcd in
ali thc campaigns of Buonaparté.
Massena, in his proclamation to

the Portuguese, estimatcd bis army

at a himdred and ten thoúsand men :

its real force was probably between
eighty and ninety thousand. I have

110 means of jndging accuratelyòf thc

allied force at the samc period, but I
should apprehend that it could ccr-

tainly not cxceed, and probably did

not nearly amount to sixty thousand
men. Indeed, exclusive of tlie militia,
which was divided tipon many diflfe—
rent p.oints, I cannot, 011 any in form-
ai ion
 ( 7 )

ation of which I am possessed, carry

it higher than fifty thousand regu-
lars. The plan of the enerny was
therefore ofFensive, for bis object
could not be attained, unless hc
compelled the British army to eva-
cuate Portugal. Let us see tben how

far he has attained this object; and

let us with tbat view trace the course

of evcnts during the campaign.

T ts commencement may be d a te d

froni the movementofthe French army

to invest Ciudad Rodrigo : The force
which was assembled for that purpose,
consistcd of the two corps of Ney and
Junot, whilst that under Regnier
moved from the neighbourliood of
BadajoSj to the right bank of the
Tagus, where it threatened the fron-
tier of Portugal, along the course of
a 4 that
 ( 8 )

that viver, and communicated with

tlie rnaiii body underMassena,through

tlie mountains to the northwaíd of
the Vale of Placentla,

In order to oppose th is plan of at-

taek, Lord Wellington assembled the
main body of tlie allied anny in the
neiglibourhood of Almeida, and direct-

ed General Hill, who watched the mo-

tions of ítegnier from the vicinity of
Elvas,tomake amovement to the right

bank of the Tagus, and to cover the

road to Lisbon by Castello Branco,

which was threatenéd by the corps of
Regnier : and a reserve was assembled

at Thomar under General Leith.

Those who are at ali acquainted with
military subjects, and above ali with

the military topography of Portugal,

will easily perceive the ability with
which
 ( 9 )

which tliis disposition wasmade, The

ground taken up by Lord Welling-
ton himself was so strong as to be

secure frora any direct attack, and

General Hill was enablcd from his po-

sition at Elvas to anticipate any

movement which Regnier inight make

with a view to turn Lord Welling-

ton^ right; which aceordingly we

fmd that lie actually did; and the
moment that the Frendi general en-
tered into direct co-operation with

Massena by moving to the right of

the Tagus, General Ilill, by a corre-
sponding movement, placed himself

npon Lord Wellington'^ right, and

thus securcd that important point. The
position occnpied by General Leith

at Thomar, enabled hirn to move ei-

ther on his leftr to the Mondego, to

suppprt Lord Wellington, if he retired

along
 ( 10 )

álong the valley of that rirer; to his

front to support General Hill; 01* on
bis right to maintain thc line of the
Tagusí

Aftcr a siege which cost the encniy

many lives, and, what he valued more,

much time,—which did great honor
to the brave garrison who defended
it, and was of considerable ultimato
advantage to the Allies by deferring

the invasion of Portugal, Ciudad Ro-

drigo was compelled to surrender.

And here it may be necessary

to say a few words in answcr to

a charge which was attenipted to

be made against Lord Wellington

for not endeavouring to raise the

siege of that fortress. In the first
place, his force was, as I have stated,
numerically
 ( 11 )

numerieally inferior to that oí tiic

enemy, particularly in cavalry; and
secondly, the Portuguese army liad

ncver becn uncler fire, and it was im-

possiblc to kiíow what miglit be the
eonsequenees of exposing it to an
nttack in an open country against a

superior force, and exposing it too,

in a situation wliere the advantages

to resnlt from success were doubtful,

but where even a chéek might have
bcen attendcd with ali the conse-

quences of an eritire defeat. J have

no hesitation, therefore, in stating, that
if Lord Wellington had moved his
army from the iriountains into the
plain under such circutnstances, he
would have comniitted an act of con-
summate rashness, and risbed not obly
i
the safety of his own army, but pos-
sibly the fate of the whole península:
and,
 ( 12 )

and, after ali, thc object was in 110

degfee worth the risk ; for the fali

of Cindad Rodrigo (however impor-
tant the place raight bc in many re-
spects) did by 110 incans involve the
loss of the campaign, whereas the

loss of a battle in attempting to savc

it, might, in that advanced position

of the allied armies, have been found

irreparable and fatal. It appears, in-

deed, by an íntercepted letter from

Bertliier, that the enemy calculated

npon the possibility of such an at-
tack, and considered themselves as

strong enough to render it inef-

fectual, and to take the place into

the bargain. But this very circum-
stance is only an additional rea-
son to induce us to conclude that
-
Loi d Wellington, instead of deserv-
ing censure for not attempting to re-

lieve
 ( 13 )

lieve that fortress, is entitled to the

greatest praise for the skill and
foresiglit, which indnced him to for-

bcar. The same reasoning will apply,

in a great measure, to the case of
Almeida, although undonbtedly from

the neighbourhood of that place to

Lord Wellington's position, a move-

ment in its support would have bcen

less hazardous than in tlic former in-

stance; and possibly such an opera-
tion inight have been attempted, had

not its untimely and accidental fali

prevented it. It may not be inipro-
per, however, to observe, that in this

case also, the fortress of Almeida was

of inuch less consequente to the final
result of the campaign, than lias been
generally imagined. It certainly was

of importance in so far as it tended

to delay thel-progress of the enemy,
i and
 ( 14 )

and to procrastinate the campaign;

but, I believe, ali mi li ta ry authori-
tics agree in considering tbe posses-
sion of it as giving no decisive advan-
tages to an arrny aítacking Portugal.

Mowever desirable tbcrcfore it might

have been to retain its it was not
worth the considerable risk which
I think might have been ineurred in
the attempt to relieve it.

Immediately aftcr the fali of Al"

mcida, the French aimy began to be
more decided in its measures, and
Lord Wellington soon ascertained
that their object was to turn bis left,
and that in order to support tbis ope-
ration, the corpsof Regnier had mov-
cd by its right to the northward, and
advaneed tovvards the position oceu-
pied by the corps undcr the iinme-

diate
 ( 14 )

diate command of His Lordship,

whilst tlie remaining divisions of tlie
ÍYench army also move d still further
to their right; Lord Wellington im-

mediately saw the expediency oí re-

tiring; and moving himself along the

valley of the Mondego, lie dtrected
Generais Hill and Leitli to move

by their left and to join him on

the Alva at the position of the

Ponte de Marcella. It is generally
understood that at this point lie de-
termined to make a stand; and the

position was one of such strength

(which will be obvious on mere in-
spection of the map) as to give him

every reason to hope for a,fayourable

issue, in case it were attacked. Tlie
enemy, however, instead of following

the British army along the left bank

of the Mondego, crossed o ver, in pre-
ference
 ( 16 )

ference to the course that would have

led him to an attack upon the Bri-

tishj to the right, and took the road

to Viseu, which is the very worst
road in Portugal, and materially im-
peded the course of their operations.
Their object was to avoid, and by

avoiding to turn, without risking

an engagement, the position of the
Ponte de Marcella, by marehing
upon Coimbra; by this movement

they threatened Lord Wellingtons

rear on the one hánd, and Oporto on
the other. But his Lordship pene-

trating their design, made a rapid and

brilliant movement by his left, and
placed himself in the powerful posi-
tion of Busaco, where I believe the
enemy never expected to find him,
and where, perhaps from ignoranee

as to the extent of force which had

been
 ( 17 )

been moved to this point, tliej made

a inost rash and fruitless attempt to
carry his posilion. * It is needless to
enter into any detaib of this afFair,
farther thaa to state, that while the
enemas force/vvas considerabiy wéak^
ened, the spirits and confidence of
tlie Aliies were iníinitely incrcased by

the courage and steadiness displayed

by the Portuguese troops.

The enemy, howevcr, baving sue-

eecded iri turning Lord Wellington^

tianlv by a movement which lhe in-
tended occupation of Sardao, if it
could have been effected jn time,
míght have preveilted, or at least
considerably delàyed, rendered the
position of Busaco no longer tena-

blc, aiui Lord Wellington retired

behind the Mondego, upon íhe ve-
u inforcements
 ( 18 )

inforcements wbich were marcliing

to join him from Lisbon. Th is

river, riotwithstanding the assertions

;n the Mon item- of lhe (

supcrb po-
sitions of the Mondego,' affords, as is
well known, no position which, con-
sidcred with a rcfcrence to the de-
fence of Lisbon, may not be turned;
and consequently, wben the enemy
evinced an intention of advancing,

his Lordship, in pursuance of his pre-

vious resolutions, dctermined to retire
before him, and not to attempt to
mnkè any serious stand till he had
reached those positions nearer to Lis-
bon, whieh he had before examined,

and liad caused to be fortified with

ereàt carc, and which lie conceived

to be of such natural and artificial

strength, as to justify his detctmina-
tion thcre to await the collected efforts
of
 ( 19 )

of the enemy, and to contend íbr the

ultimate deliverance of Vortugal.

As an additional securíty, exertions

had been made to deprive the country
through which the enemy was to pass,

and that which hewould atlast be com-

peli ed to occupy, of those resources
which otherwise would have been oí.

great advantage lo him. lt is ob-

vious, that it is extremely difiicult,

if not impossible, to render such

a measure completely efficacious.

But Lo rd Wellington, knowing that
the enemy had advanced without any
magazines, and that in pursuance oí'

the arrangements which had been pre-

viously made, the enemy's rcar would

he extremely harasscd by tlic Portu-

(Tucse militiu, felt persuaded that the
b 2 more
 ( 20 J

more he could draw the French ínto

theheart ófthe country, and thelonger

he could retain them there withoufc

exposing íiis own army to hazard,

the more difficult wouid their situa-
tion become, and the more uneqnal

woukl they prove to subsequent ope-

rations.

He therefore most wisely and ju-

diciously, and consistently with ali
bis previoús opinions and proceed-
ings, adopted the eourse which I have

described; and, having caused to the

French army a loss incalculably greater
than that suffered by his owtí, he has
placed himself and the enemy iri a
sitnation anxious and criticai, it mnst

be confessed, from the importanee òf

the interests at stake, but whi6h, from
being greatly misunderstood, has occa-

sioned
 ( 21 )

sioned mucb on tbe one side of unrea-

sonable hope, and 011 tbe other oí

unnecessary despondeney.

As soon as it was known tbat

Lord Wellington bad retircd in se-
curity to bis present position» and
that tlie enemy, being eonsiderably
straitened for provisions, and ha-
rassed upon his rigbt and rear, had
not vcntured to attack tbe allied
army, (wbich bisrapid advance seem-

ed to protnise that lie would not have

delayed to do,) tbe most sanguine
anil extravagant bopes were enter-
tained. It was universal!^ sapposed
tbat Massena would eitlier be starved

into a surrender» 01*, at least, coinpelled

by famine iinmodiately to retreat witb

a dceadful and ineparable loss; and

inanv, wlio five months l)efore bad

b 3 propbesied
 ( 22 )

propbcsied the expulsion, and even

the capture, of the British army,
ivere now ready to censure and to vi-
lify its General because he did not
" k
(by wliat means it wa» to be done
those critics did not state) make tiie

French General and his whole army

prisoners of war. Now, Ithiuk I niay
yentufe to assert, tliat Lo rd Welling-
ton lias ncver written a single line,

or uttered a single word which

could justify so absurd and unreason-
able an expectation; and I would
appeal to the liberal feelings of
mankind, whether it be not, at the

Icast, jinjust (to spcak miídly of ii)

to cliarge the disappointment arising
frora our own high-íiovvn and foolish
hopes to the acconnt of a galíant
oíllcer, the final efíect of whose ope-
rations cannot yet be fully ascertained.
Lord
 ( 23 )

Lord Wellington, it is true, teils us,

that, from ali tlie accounta which he

receives, the enemy finda considerable
and
difficulty in procuring supplies.

that he is much harassed on his right

and rear; but what man of sense,
what military man is there, who would

thence conclude that the I rench

army was in a state to be stai \ cd

into surrender? Webave on recoid
numberíess instances of crews o£ ships

and of extensivo ganisons subaist-

h\cr for a considerable perlod upon
O
short allowances, and yet retaining
their spirits and courage to the last:

but such vague notions exist in this

country, (whieh lias not for ages been
theseat of war,) with regard to what an

army can or cannot do, thataltbòugh

wc may laraent, \ve cannot wonder at
u 4 any
 ( 24 )

any errors which prevail upon tliese

subjects.

^,
It lias also becn argued, by those
who are disappointed, that Lord

Welliíigtoii is ineonsistent, when he

says ' that the enemy occupies 110
more ground than lie stands upon
ivhereas it appears that in faet he lias
pushcd a corps across the Zezere, and
opened thereby a new source of sup-

ply. ow Lord W ellington appears

to me to be perfectly accurate in his

statement; lie does not mean to say,

nor does lie say, lliat M asse na could
not hi\\e forced a communication with
other neighbouring districts, but lie

says, witli great trutli, tliat so far from

having subdncd wjien he had over-ruu
the country, lie could not without

sueh
 ( 2-5 )

such a direct application of his forces

attain sucli communications; that a
hostile population surrounded and
even pressed upon the outposts of his

armies ; that his hospitais were taken,

and his sick and wounded inade pri-
soners, within a few leagues of his
head-quarters; and that liis route

throudi
O tlie whole kinsfdorn
O was

marked, not bj any acquiescence,

either of fcar or favour, in his power,
bnt by a most detcrmined and vigo-

rous hostility:

In such a position of the enémy,

and in such a state of the country,
Lord Wellington's assertion is trué
in the spirit, and even in lhe let-

ter; for, àdmitting that by large

detachments Massena is enabled to

push to a distant point, and to ob-

tain
 ( 26 )

tain supplies by mere militavy power,

it is obvious that such an extension

of force implies an extension of the

ground upon which the army stands:

but does it thence follow, that, in-

dependent of the presence of the
French army, any portion of the

country is under their controul?—this

point may be thus illustrated; Mas-
sena, by pushiug a corps across the
Zezere, lias extended his position,
and may draw firom the country so
occupied the resources whisefa it con-
tains; but still his supplies are limitcd

to that extent, and can only be cotem-

porary with such occupation ; whereas

jii Germany or Italy, where the com-

munications to the French arraies have

always been free, and where maga-

zines have been formed either previ-
ous toor during thecourse ofthe cam-
paign,
 ( 27 )

paign, the order of a mere cotnmissary,

without the application of any military
force, luís been sufficient to procure
the necessary supplies, draivn, ia some
degree atleast, from traets of country
not occupied, strictly speaking, by
tbe army, and therefore not form-
ing part of the ground upon which

it may be said to stand.

What lias been stated witli respect

to Massena's means of forcing a

comm única tion for the purpose oí
procunng provisioris, will also ap-

ply to his power of retreating from

Portugal altogether, if he should fmd

it necessary to do so. No one, in-

decd, who lias studied military history,
covil d have supposed tháta gfeat army,
conducted by a brave and skilful

commander (and such undoubtedly

are
 ( 28 )

are the Frendi army and its general),

■woulc] suffer itself to be dctained ia a
fixed position, till it was starved into
a surrender? a retreat rnust be ahnost

necessarily aeeompanied with more or

Jess ciisaster and loss ; but no general,

fertile in the resources of war, will suf-

fer his retreat to be entirely cut off, un-
less the superiority of his opponents
numbcrs be so great as to render use-
less the utmóst exertion of skill and

eourage, by opposing to him an

equal force on every si de to which
his course could be directed; and
we may be perfectjy sure that no

suChgeneral will ever commenee a re-

treat, and particularly in difficult eir-
eumstanees, till he finds it indispen-
sably necessary. These observations
may, I thjpk, shew, that if we' are

final ly
 ( 29 )

tinally disappointed in the result of

the campaign, as far at least as refers

to the capture of the enemy, or to bis

immediate and total evacuation of the

eountry, it will be in consequence of
our own impatient and unreasonable
hopes, not in consequence of Lord
Wellington'» conduet.

It is now neeessary to advert to the

opinions of those,who,ha.ving tln ough-
outlooked upon the campaign as hope-

less, are now disposed to view the situa-

tion of the Allies in a still rnoregloomy
light,and to accnse Lord Wellington of
having undertaken more than lie can
ésecutei undértaking the deíence

of Portugal.

It is to be observed that persons of

th is description are no less severe ih

their
 ( 30 )

their animadversions upon his Lord-

ship's conduct, than those whose
dissatisfaction arises from the feeling

to which the preceding arguments ap-

ply. They admit of coursc that Lord

Wellington has succeeded in effect-

ing His retreat in safety to lãs positioa

near Lisbon, although they propher
sied long since that it could only be
effected under the most afílicting cir-
cumstances; hut they ask, has he effect-

ed his object of defending Portugal?

Is he not shut up in a nook oí the
couutry, and compelled to derive ali

his supplies from Lisbon? Can he

prevent the enemy from receiving re-
inforcements ? Are not reinforcexnents

actually on their march to join himr

Can he resist tliem when they are ali
eolleeted ? or even if he can, can lie
be said to have rendered any service
to
 ( 31 )

to thc cause of Spain by his conduct

during the campaign P I will endea-
voúr to examine the force of these
different questions. To the first, I

answer, yes; for as long as hc is able

to inaintain his position before Lis-
bon, (which, be it Temembered, is the
spot on which it was always intended
to make the final stand for the libe-
ration of Portugal,) the euemy cannot
be said to have conquered the coun-
try, or to be themselves free fiora dií-
ficulty, or eveti from danger. I shall
' presently eonsider the questioti with

a refereuce to rei nforcem eu ts; but in

the m ean time, 1 think [ am jus ti fie d
íq saying, that in the present situation
of the French they are harassed on
almost every poiut, nor can they

veuture, with their preseut force, to

make any strong or permaneat de-

tachments
 ( 32 )

tachmèrits capable of disarming the

country»' and of clearing themselves
from the swarms of ene mies whieh
are collected round tliem. Lovd Wel-
lington therefore lias hithetto sue-

ceeded in defending Portugal, and in

the way precisèly in whieh the de-
fenee was originally planned; and
the enemy has hitherto failed iri eon-
queririg it, and failed preeisely on

accourít of the obstacles and difíictil-

ties whieh Lovd Wellington had fore-

seen and created to obstruct him.
I
But seeondly, it is asked, is not Lovd
Wellington shnt up in a -uook of the
country, and compelled to draw ali
his supplies from Lisbon ? It is trne

that the main strength of the allied

army is con centra ted near Lisbon,
buí
 ( 33 )

but it is equally true that Lord Wel-

lington^ conimunication is open witu
every part of the country,. exccpt
that wliere the Frcnch anny stands;

that lie is at liberty to apply the re-

sources, of every description, from ali
Portugal, (wíth the above narrow cx-

ception,) to any point or object wbich

he may dcem expedientj and that the

inaintenance of his eommanding posi-

tion near the capital, and the perfect
security of the southern provinces, give
consistency and eonfidenee to the pa-
triotic spirit and the active pperations
of ali the other parts of Portugal. It is
a shrewd observation of tliose critics,
that Lord Wellington is himself in but
»
one nook of ali Portugal; I do not see
how it could be otherwise as far as

regards his person, and I adniit the

fact; but it would have been candid
c to
 ( 34 )

tohave added, fhat the principies and

spirit which gàide his pròcecdings,
pervadc thc whole kingdom, and re-
ccive co-operation and respect from
a unanimòus people. Lord Vi elling-
ton is at Torres Vedras, but what
spot of Portugal is it to which his in-
fluenco does not extend ?

With respect to bis Lordships

deriving ali his supplies from Lis-

bon, it is neither more nor less than

drawing them from his grand ma-
gazine ; and I am disposed to con-
sider the eircuinstance of Lord Wél-
linstOn's
O neighbôurhood
o to Lisboa

as very advantageous with regard

to provisioning his troops, inasmuch
as the shortness of the distance
ditnimshes in a most important de-
gree botíi the time and labour recjui-

site for transporting the supplies from

the
 ( 35 )

the magazines to the army; besides

which, the resources of the province oí
Alentejo and the kingdom of Algarve
would, in any case, be most conveni-
ently, and I might almost say, ne-
cessarily collected at Lisbon, which

port, adverting to the complete com-

mand which \ve have of the sea and

the mouth of the Tagus, seems, by

its situation, calcnlated to be, in any
plan of campaign which could be
adopted, the great magazine and de-

pôt of the country.

The enemy, on the other hand, hav-

ing advancedinto Portugal withoutany
magazines, must derive his supplies
from the ground which he pcrma-

nently occupies, or, for that special

purposc, overruns; and whoever consi-

ders that Portugal does not feed its own

c -2 population
 ( 36 )

population for above seven months in

thc year, may casily conccive that
thcse resomces muaft, sootier or later,
bc exhausted, vhen applicd to the
subsistcnce of a grcat ariiiy, and ex-
posed to the Waste which invariably

accompanies such an applicatiori of

the produce of a country. So far,
therefore, as the mere question of sub-
sistence goes, ít is, I apprehend, quite
evident, that, at thc present moinent,

Lord Wellington is in a mnch bctter

situation than his adversary.

It is, however, afguecL, that the ar-

rivai of reiuforcements, whether froin
the north under Drouet, or from the
aouth under Mortier, inay change tlie
face of things, nav, may enable Mas-
sena to attack Lord Wellington^ po-
sition with advantage, and compel his
Lordship
 ( 37 )

Lordship to embark; 01* at ali events,

enable the Freneli to extend their
positjpns with security, and by oe-
cupying a larger portion of tlie
country, to cover tlie formation of
magazines and protecfc tlie regular

transportof convoys. With regard to

tlie firet poiot, tliat of attacking Lord
'Wellington with advantage, I ratlier
conceíve tliat neitlier I nor those
who censure, ean speak with any
certainty. In ordcr to forni a just

èstimate of tlie strenglh of a position,

it is necessary to have the most açeu-
rate knowledge of its locality; of the
numbcr and nature of the roads by

wliiçh it ean be attacked; of the

points which constitute its security,
whether in frppt or 011 its tíanksj of
the number of nicn which are neces-
sary for its defence, and of thenuni-

c 3 ber
 ( 38 )

ber and quality of those actually as-

sem bled in it. Upon these points, I
cannot pretend to speak with ac-
curacy; but it seems gcnerally ad-
mitted, tliat it is a position of very

great strèngth; and there needs no

greater proof of this, than the sud-
den stop which it lias put to the
operations of the enemy, and the
necessity under which he seems to

labour of drawing reinforcemcnts from

otlier quarters: and with regard to

the troops which are assembled in it,
I think no doubt can exist of their
excellent quality, and of their general
competency to meet the enemy when-

ever a fit opportimity may be gi\7en

thebii With the example of Busaco
before their eyes, every tlnng that
vnlour can aehieve may reason-
ably be expected in such aconflict:
although,
 ( 39 )

although, of course, the uneertamty

which accompanies the events oi wai
in general cannot be removed from
th|s individual case. The reinforce-
ments to which 1 have alluded, ií they
either joio jfclarshal Masseiía ot take

up such positions in direct coinmuni-

cation with him as may euable him to
conimand a more extensive tract of

country, will tlius far furnish him tvith

various advantages which he does noí

at present possess: but, unless they

are of such strength as to enable him
completely to rppressthe operations

of the irregular force by which the

Franch position is now so much lui-
rassed, and to drive Lord W ellington
from the country, J conless I do not
see how the concpicst ol Portugal can
fairly i)C considered as achieved, and
the professccl object ol Lord \\ el-
c 4 lington
 ( 40 )

Iington as defcatcd : arul unless they

enable the enemy, as before stated, to
cover the formation of magazines and
protect the transport of convoys, they
will not retíevé liim from his embar-

rassments iu this respect, which, on

the contra rv, will increase in propor-
tion to the increased number of
mouths to consume the existing ve-
sourcfes. I sliall not entcr into a dis-
cussion of the more or less probability
ot Massenas bcing joined by rein-

forcements to any great amoUnt, ,as I

am willing to give those, whose argu-
rflents I am combating, the full ad-
vantageof their suppositiofl upon this
head. Ent it is not to be forgotten,
that the supposed march of reinforcé-
ments from other quarters, amounts
to a distinct admission, that the force

originally destincd for the conquest

of
 ( 41 )

of Portugal has been found, perhaps

I should rather say mude, unequal

to the task; and we are, therefore,

justified in eoncluding, that the calcu-
la ti ons upon which Lo rd Wellington

built his opinion of the defensibility

of Portugal against that force wcie

rational and sound : and further it
is to be obscrved, that upon the
supposition of the necessity ot these
reinfotcemenfcs to enable, Massena

completely to repress the operations

of the Portugucse miiitia and pea-

santry, and to expel the British, every
man, thus added to the lrench arroy»
must be considcred as subtracted from

the offensive means of the enemy in

Spain, and that therefore the mainte-
nance of Lord Wellington1» position

will operateas a most important diver-

sion in favourof that.parfcof the penín-
sula,
 ( 42 )

MiJa, bydetaining in frontofLisbon, in

a state of compara tive inactivity, and

in a certain degree of deterioration, an

immense Frendi army, a large propor-
tion of which inight otherwise be em-

ployed, cither in disarming and rethi-

cing to subjection the reinainder of
Portugal; in ocçupying and securing
the north western provinccs of Spain;
in reducing the remaimng fortresses of
Catalonia; in making a decisive at-

tack upon VaJencia; or iipally in sup-

porting, and perhaps terminating suc-
cessfully, the siege of Cadiz.
* , *
In drawing up this slight sketeh of
operations of the campaign in Portu-
gal, and in making such observations
as have occurred to me upon the sub-
ject, I have purposely abstained from
entering upon the question of the ge-
neral
 ( 43 )

neral policy of employing a Britwh

force in the península, or of underta-

king to officer and to pay a large pio-

portion of the Portuguese army: these

are questions whidk refer more parti-

cularly to the condnct of the govern-
me.it at home by whom they are de-
cided, and, to what may be called,

the politica of wár. My object has

in th is instance been to do justice

to a great officer, and to rticue
his character from the insinuated

and sarcastic censure of some,

and the dircct obloquy of others;
and whilst attempting to moderate lhe
extravagant expectations of the san-

guine, to discountenance at the sanie

time the apprehensions Of the de-
spondent. lt is impossible for me to

say how far I may have succeeded in

these latter objeetsj but I hope I
have
 ( 44 )

have been able Lo shew tíat the con-

duct oi Lord A\ ellington lias been

throughoút consistent and systematic,

that he foresaw, or at lèast acted as if
he had foreseen, the course that the

campa ign would takc, and that the

rei a ti\ e sitnations iú which tlic con-

tcnding parties fmd themselves, are,

with reference to the present cam-
paign, as favourable to the English as
dístrçssing and ti iscou raging to the

Ffencb army.

Iiow Jong we tnay be able to main-

tain a footing in the península, to in-
spire confidente by our presencc, and

promote activity by our councils

and our exaraple, it is not for me, or

I should think for any reasonable man,

to venture to prediçt: but every hour

that we do remain, every day by which

the
 ( 45 )

the campaign is lengthened, givc, ]

wiíl not say, a greater chance merely,
but a grou n d of more confident hope
of final succcss. Áustria was subdued
in a month, Prússia in a day. For
two years and a balf the war in the
península lias lasted, and Spain and
Portugal are yet unconquered: such a
contest in such a cause will not, I

trust, be abandoned while the power

of continuing it, in any degree and
in any quarter, remains; and I ani
convinced that the conduct of Lord

Wellington, not unifonnly daring or

uniformly defensive, but, enterprising
or cautious as the various oircum-
stances require, is that by which tlie

peninsula is to be saved, if its salva-

tion is within huinan power.

Vcc.
 ( 46 )

Dcc. Sth, 1810.

* P. S. The foregoing observations

were written before intclligenee was
reccived tliat Marshal Massena had

retired from his advaoced position in

front of Lord Wellington, and had
established himself at Santarém. It
does not appear to me that this cir-
eumstance altcrs the view which I
have eudeavoured to give of the eam-

paign; it, on the contravy, confirms

(as far as it afiects) the statements

which I have máde; but I do not,
ín the view which I am at this
distanee enabled to take of this event,
think that I should be authorised
in attributing to it such immediate
and direct impoi tance as the public
feeling seems to have done—it is, per-
haps, the commencement of oceuv-

rences
 ( 47 )

rences of great moment and value;

but corfsidered as a single poition of

the canipaign, I can vfenturé to de-

dnee íroiíi it nóthing more, than that
rn the views and intentions with which
Marshal Massena advanced to liis
position at Villa Francâ, he lias bcen
deceivcd and foilôd, and that the pru-

dence and âbility oí Loul A\ clling-

ton's aiTungements are, to tlus point.

confirmed by experience» lhe cain-
paign, as at íirst còntemplated, is at

an end. Lord Wellington had taken

up his position, and Massena, aftei
pushing forward with every de-
monstration of a resolution to as-

sai! it, has not ventnred npon the

attempt; to tliis extent, thevefore, his

rapid advance seems to have been un-

availing, and his designs appear to
have failed.—What other course of
procecding,
 ( 48 )

proceeding, what new measnres tlie

Freneh, and, in opposition to thcm,
Lo rd Wellington may think fit to
adopt, we have no means of know-
anti no grounds even of con-

jecturing; and as to the result, it

would he falling into the very error
which I have endeavoured to eorreet,
if I were to suífer my entire coníi-
dcnce in Lord Wellington and his
army, and my anxious feelings for
my conntrys glory, to betray me into

brilliant anticipátionS-and predictions,

the value of which, my knowledge of
the aetnal state of the armies, and
of the views of th o ir Joa.de rs, nndcr
these new eircumstanees, would not

enable ine to snbstantiate.

TIIE END.

iondon: Priuttd by C. ítowtirth,

llrll-jard, Tcniple-lnt.
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