I.) AIDS to Construction
, and ARTEMIO
1) Ebarle vs. Sucaldito 156 SCRA 803 (1987)
2) City of Baguio Vs Marcos 27 SCRA 342 (1969)
J.) Legislature cannot overrule Judicial Construction
1) Endencia vs. David 93 Phil. 696,699,700,701 (1953)
2) Quimpo vs. Mendoza GR No. 33052 August 31,1981
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-33628 December 29, 1987
BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, SANTIAGO EISMA, MIRUFO
CELERIAN, JOSE SAYSON, CESAR TABILIRAN, and MAXIMO
ADLAWAN, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUDGE MELQUIADES B. SUCALDITO, RUFINO
LABANG, MENELEO MESINA, ARTURO GUILLERMO, IN
THEIR RESPECTIVE CAPACITIES AS JUDGE OF THE COURT
OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR, CITY
FISCAL OF PAGADIAN CITY AND STATE PROSECUTOR, and
ANTI-GRAFT LEAGUE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC., respondents.
No. L-34162 December 29, 1987
BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE ASAALI S. ISNANI, RUFINO LABANG,
ALBERTO S. LIM, JR., JESUS ACEBES, IN THEIR
RESPECTIVE CAPACITIES AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF
FIRST INSTANCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR, CITY FISCAL
OF PAGADIAN CITY AND STATE PROSECUTORS, ANTI-
GRAFT LEAGUE OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.
ROMANILLOS, respondents.
SARMIENTO, J.:
The petitioner, then provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur and a
candidate for reelection in the local elections of 1971, seeks injunctive
relief in two separate petitions, to enjoin further proceedings in Criminal
Cases Nos. CCC XVI-4-ZDS, CCC XVI-6-ZDS, and CCC XVI-8-ZDS
of the then Circuit Criminal Court sitting in Pagadian City, as well as
I.S. Nos. 1-70, 2-71, 4-71, 5-71, 6-71, and 7-71 of the respondent
Fiscal's office of the said city, all in the nature of prosecutions for
violation of certain provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act (Republic Act No. 3019) and various provisions of the Revised
Penal Code, commenced by the respondent Anti-Graft League of the
Philippines, Inc.
On June 16, 1971 and October 8, 1971, respectively, we issued
temporary restraining orders directing the respondents (in both
petitions) to desist from further proceedings in the cases in question
until further orders from the Court. At the same time, we gave due
course to the petitions and accordingly, required the respondents to
answer.
The petitions raise pure question of law. The facts are hence,
undisputed.
On September 26, 1970, the private respondent Anti-Graft League of the
Philippines, Inc., filed a complaint with the respondent City Fiscal,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 1-70 thereof, for violation of the
provisions of the Anti-Graft Law as well as Article 171 of the Revised
Penal Code, as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
SPECIFICATION NO. I —
That on or about October 10, 1969, above-named respondents,
conspiring and confabulating together, allegedly conducted a bidding
for the supply of gravel and sand for the Province of Zamboanga del
Sur: that it was made to appear that Tabiliran Trucking Company won
the bidding; that, thereafter, the award and contract pursuant to the said
simulated bidding were effected and executed in favor of Tabiliran
Trucking Company; that, in truth and in fact, the said bidding was really
simulated and the papers on the same were falsified to favor Tabiliran
Trucking Company, represented by the private secretary of respondent
Bienvenido Ebarle, formerly confidential secretary of the latter; that
said awardee was given wholly unwarranted advantage and preference
by means of manifest partiality; that respondent officials are hereby also
charged with interest for personal gain for approving said award which
was manifestly irregular and grossly unlawful because the same was
facilitated and committed by means of falsification of official
documents.
SPECIFICATION NO. II
That after the aforecited award and contract, Tabiliran Trucking
Company, represented by respondent Cesar Tabiliran, attempted to
collect advances under his trucking contract in the under his trucking
contract in the amount of P4,823.95 under PTA No. 3654; that the same
was not passed in audit by the Provincial Auditor in view of the then
subsisting contract with Tecson Trucking Company; which was to
expire on November 2, 1969; that nevertheless the said amount was paid
and it was made to appear that it was collected by Tecson Trucking
Company, although there was nothing due from tile latter and the
voucher was never indorsed or signed by the operator of Tecson
Trucking; and that in facilitating and consummating the aforecited
collection, respondent officials, hereinabove cited, conspired and
connived to the great prejudice and damage of the Provincial
Government of Zamboanga del Sur. 1
xxx xxx xxx
On the same date, the private respondent commenced Criminal Case
No. 2-71 of the respondent City Fiscal, another proceeding for violation
of Republic Act No. 3019 as well as Article 171 of the Revised Penal
Code. The complaint reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
That on or about April 8, 1970, a bidding was held for the construction
of the right wing portion of the Capitol Building of the Province of
Zamboanga del Sur, by the Bidding Committee composed of
respondents cited hereinabove; that the said building was maliciously
manipulated so as to give wholly unwarranted advantage and preference
in favor of the, supposed winning bidder, Codeniera Construction,
allegedly owned and managed by Wenceslao Codeniera, brother-in-law
of the wife of respondent Bienvenido Ebarle; that respondent official is
interested for personal gain because he is responsible for the approval of
the manifestly irregular and unlawful award and contract aforecited; and
that, furthermore, respondent, being a Member of the Bidding
Committee, also violated Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, by
making it appear in the very abstract of bids that another interested
bidder, was not interested in the bidding, when in truth and in fact, it
was not so. 2
xxx xxx xxx
On January 26, 1971, the private respondent instituted I.S. No. 4-71 of
the respondent Fiscal, a prosecution for violation of Articles 182, 183,
and 318 of the Revised Penal Code, as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
That on or about April 4, 1967, in Pagadian City, said respondent
testified falsely under oath in Cadastral Case No. N-17, LRC CAD
REC. NO. N-468, for registration of title to Lot No. 2545 in particular;
That respondent BIENVENIDO EBARLE testified falsely under oath
during the hearing and reception of evidence that he acquired said lot by
purchase from a certain Brigido Sanchez and that he is the owner, when
in truth and in fact Lot 2545 had been previously acquired and is owned
by the provincial Government of Zamboanga del Sur, where the
provincial jail building is now located.
2. That aforesaid deceit, false testimony and untruthful statement of
respondent in said Cadastral case were made knowingly to the great
damage and prejudice of the Provincial Government of Zamboanga del
Sur in violation of aforecited provisions of the Revised Penal Code. 3
On February 10, 1971, finally, the private respondent filed a complaint,
docketed as I.S. No. 5-71 of the respondent Fiscal, an action for
violation of Republic Act No. 3019 and Articles 171 and 213 of the
Revised Penal Code, as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
We hereby respectfully charge the above-named respondents for
violation of Sec. 3, R.A. No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, Articles 171 and 213, Revised Penal Code
and the rules and regulations of public bidding, committed as follows:
1. That on June 16, 1970, without publication, respondents conducted
the so-called "bidding" for the supply of gravel and sand for the
province of Zamboanga del Sur; that said respondents, without any
valid or legal ground, did not include or even open the bid of one Jesus
Teoson that was seasonably submitted, despite the fact that he is a
registered duly qualified operator of "Teoson Trucking Service," and
notwithstanding his compliance with all the rules and requirements on
public bidding; that, instead, aforecited respondents illegally and
irregularly awarded said contract to Cesar Tabiliran, an associate of
respondent Governor Bienvenido Ebarle; and
2. That in truth and in fact, aforesaid "bidding" was really simulated and
papers were falsified or otherwise "doctored" to favor respondent Cesar
Tabiliran thereby giving him wholly unwarranted advantage, preference
and benefits by means of manifest partiality; and that there is a statutory
presumption of interest for personal gain because the transaction and
award were manifestly irregular and contrary to applicable law, rules
and regulations. 4
xxx xxx xxx
The petitioner initially moved to dismiss the aforesaid preliminary
investigations, but the same having been denied, he went to the
respondent Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Sur, the Honorable
Melquiades Sucaldito presiding, on prohibition and mandamus (Special
Case No. 1000) praying at the same time, for a writ of preliminary
injunction to enjoin further proceedings therein. The court granted
preliminary injunctive relief (restraining order) for which the Anti-Graft
League filed a motion to have the restraining order lifted and to have the
petition itself dismissed.
On May 14, 1971, the respondent, Judge Sucaldito, handed down the
first of the two challenged orders, granting Anti-Graft League's motion
and dismissing Special Case No. 1000.
On June 11, 1971, the petitioner came to this Court on certiorari with
prayer for a temporary restraining order (G.R. No. 33628). As we said,
we issued a temporary restraining order on June 16, 1971.
Meanwhile, and in what would begin yet another series of criminal
prosecutions, the private respondent, on April 26, 1971, filed three
complaints, subsequently docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. CCC XVI-4-
ZDS, CCC XVI-6-ZDS, and CCC XVI-8-ZDS of the Circuit Criminal
Court of Pagadian City for violation of various provisions of the Anti-
Graft Law as well as Article 171(4) of the Revised Penal Code, as
follows:
xxx xxx xxx
That on or about December 18, 1969, in Pagadian City, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE,
Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur, did then and there
unlawfully and feloniously extended and gave ELIZABETH EBARLE
MONTESCLAROS, daughter of his brother, his relative by
consanguinity within the third degree, and appointment as Private
Secretary in the Office of the Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del
Sur, although he well know that the latter is related with him within the
third degree by consanguinity.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 5
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
That on or about December 18, 1969, in Pagadian City, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, then
and there unlawfully and feloniously made untruthful statements in a
narration of facts by accomplishing and issuing a certificate, to wit: ,
c. That the provisions of law and rules on promotion, seniority and
nepotism have been observed.
required by law in such cases, in support of the appointment he
extended to ELIZABETH EBARLE-MONTESCLAROS as Private
Secretary in the Office of the Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del
Sur, although he well know that the latter is related with him within the
third degree of consanguinity.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 6
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
That on or about December 18, 1969, in Pagadian City, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, then
and there unlawfully and feloniously made untruthful statements in a
narration of facts by accomplishing and issuing a certificate, to wit:
c. That the provisions of law and rules on promotion, seniority and
nepotism have been observed.
required by law in such cases, in support of the appointment he
extended to TERESITO MONTESCLAROS, husband of his niece
Elizabeth Ebarle, as Motor Pool Dispatcher, Office of the Provincial
Engineer of Zamboanga del Sur, although he well knew that the latter is
related with him within the third degree affinity.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 7
xxx xxx xxx
Subsequently, on August 23, 1971, the private respondent brought I.S.
No. 6-71 of the respondent Pagadian City Fiscal against the petitioner,
still another proceeding for violation of Republic Act No. 3019 and
Article 171 (4) of the Revised Penal Code, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
First Count.
That on or about December 1, 1969, in Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO
A. EBARLE, Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur, did then and
there unlawfully and feloniously extended and gave MARIO EBARLE,
son of his brother, his relative by consanguinity within the third degree,
an appointment as SECURITY GUARD in the Office of the Provincial
Engineer of Zamboanga del Sur although he well knew that the latter is
related with him in the third degree by consanguinity and is not
qualified under the Civil Service Law.
Second Count.
That in January, 1970, at Pagadian City, Gov. BIENVENIDO A.
EBARLE replaced JOHNNY ABABONwho was then the incumbent
Motor Pool Dispatcher in the Office of the Provincial Engineer of
Zamboanga del Sur with his nephew-in-law TERESITO
MONTESCLAROS relative by affinity within the third Civil degree, in
violation of the Civil Service Law, this knowingly causing undue injury
in the discharge of his administrative function through manifest
partiality against said complaining employee.
Third Count:
That on or about December 18, 1969, in Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO
A. EBARLE, Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur, did then and
there unlawfully and feloniously extended and gave ELIZABETH
EBARLE MONTESCLAROS, daughter of his brother, his relative by
consanguinity within the third degree, an appointment as Private
Secretary in the Office of the Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del
Sur, although he well know that the latter is related with him within the
third degree of consanguinity, and said appointment is in violation of the
Civil Service Law.
Fourth Count.
That on or about January 22, 1970, in Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO A.
EBARLE, Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur, did then and
there unlawfully and feloniously extended and gave ZACARIAS
UGSOD, JR., son of the younger sister of Governor Ebarle, his relative
by consanguinity within the third degree, an appointment as
Architectural Draftsman in the Office of the Provincial Engineer of
Zamboanga del Sur although he well know that the latter is related with
him in the third degree of consanguinity.
Fifth Count.
That on February 5, 1970, at Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO A.
EBARLE, Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur, did then and
there unlawfully and feloniously extended and gave TERESITO
MONTESCLAROS, husband of his niece ELIZABETH EBARLE, his
relative by affinity within the third degree, an appointment as Motor
Pool Dispatcher, Office of the Provincial Engineer of Zamboanga del
Sur, although he wen knew then that the latter was not qualified to such
appointment as it was in violation of the Civil Service Law, thereby
knowingly granting and giving unwarranted advantage and preference
in the discharge of his administrative function through manifest
partiality.
II. SPECIFICATION FOR VIOLATION OF SECTION 4 (b), R.A. 3019
That on August 19, 1967, respondent BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE,
Governor of Zamboanga del Sur, taking advantage of his position
caused, persuaded, induced, or influence the Presiding Judge to perform
irregular and felonious act in violation of applicable law or constituting
an offense into awarding and decreeing Lot 2645 of the Pagadian Public
Lands subdivision to him who, according to the records of the case,
failed to establish his rights of ownership pursuant to the provisions of
the Land Registration law and the Public Land Act, it appearing that the
Provincial Government of Zamboanga del Sur as and is a claimant and
in adverse possession of Lot 2545 whereon the Provincial Jail Building
thereon still stands.
III. SPECIFICATION FOR VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 171 (4),
REVISED PENAL CODE
First Count.
That on or about December 18, 1969, in Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO
A. EBARLE, then and there unlawfully and feloniously made untruthful
statement in a narration of facts by accomplishing and issuing a
certificate, to wit:
c. That the provisions of law and rules on promotion, seniority and
nepotism have been observed.
required by law in such cases, in support of the appointment he
extended to TERESITO MONTESCLAROS, husband of his niece
ELIZABETH EBARLE, as Motor Pool Dispatcher, Office of the
Provincial Engineer of Zamboanga del Sur, although he wen knew that
the latter is related with him within the third degree of affinity and is in
violation of the Civil Service Law.
Second Count.
That on or about December 18, 1969, in Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO
A. EBARLE, then and there unlawfully and feloniously made untruthful
statements a certificate, to wit:
c. That the provisions of the law and rules on promotion, seniority and
nepotism have been observed.
required by law in such cases, in support of the appointment he
extended to ELIZABETH EBARLE-MONTESCLAROS as Private
Secretary in the Office of the Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del
Sur, although he well knew that the latter is related with him within the
third degree of consanguinity, and is in violation of the Civil Service
Law. CONTRARY to aforecited laws. 8
xxx xxx xxx
On September 21, 1971, the private respondent instituted I.S. No. 7-71
of the said City Fiscal, again charging the petitioner with further
violations of Republic Act No. 3019 thus:
xxx xxx xxx
First Count.
That on or about December 2, 1969, in Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO
EBARLE, Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur, did then and
there unlawfully and feloniously extend and give unwarranted benefits
and privileges BONINDA EBARLE, wife of his brother Bertuldo
Ebarle, the former being his relative by affinity within the second civil
degree, an appointment as LABORATORY TECHNICIAN in Pagadian
City, although he well knew that the latter is related to him in the second
degree by affinity and is not qualified under the Civil Service Law.
Second Count.
That on or about January 1, 1970, at Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO
EBARLE, Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur, did then and
there unlawfully and feloniously extend and give unwarranted benefits
and privileges JESUS EBARLE, nephew of said respondent, an
appointment as DRIVER of the Provincial Engineer's Office, Pagadian
City, although he well knew that Jesus Ebarle is related to him within
the third civil degree by consanguinity and is not qualified under the
Civil Service Law.
Third Count.
That on or about November 1, 1969, at Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO
EBARLE, Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur, did then and
there unlawfully and feloniously extend and give unwarranted benefits
and privileges PHENINA CODINERA, sister-in-law of said respondent,
an appointment as CONFIDENTIAL ASSISTANT in the Office of the
Provincial Governor, Pagadian City, although he well knew that Phenina
Codinera is related to him in the second civil degree of consanguinity
and is not qualified under the Civil Service Law.
ALL CONTRARY TO AFORECITED LAW.
Please give due course to the above complaint and please set the case
for immediate preliminary investigation pursuant to the First
Indorsement dated August 27, 1971 of the Secretary of Justice, and in
the paramount interest of good government. 9
xxx xxx xxx
The petitioner thereafter went to the respondent Court of First Instance
of Zamboanga del Sur, the Honorable Asaali Isnani presiding, on a
special civil action (Special Civil Case No. 1048) for prohibition
and certiorari with preliminary injunction. The respondent Court issued
a restraining order. The respondent Anti-Graft League moved to have
the same lifted and the case itself dismissed.
On September 27, 1971, Judge Isnani issued an order, dismissing the
case.
On October 6, 1971, the petitioner instituted G.R. No. 34162 of this
Court, a special civil action for certiorari with preliminary injunction.
As earlier noted, we on October 8, 1971, stayed the implementation of
dismissal order.
Subsequently, we consolidated both petitions and considered the same
submitted for decision.
Principally, the petitioner relies (in both petitions) on the failure of the
respondents City Fiscal and the Anti-Graft League to comply with the
provisions of Executive Order No. 264, "OUTLINING THE
PROCEDUE BY WHICH COMPLAINANTS CHARGING
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES WITH
COMMISSION OF IRREGULARITIES SHOULD BE
GUIDED," 10 preliminary to their criminal recourses. At the same time,
he assails the standing of the respondent Anti-Graft League to
commence the series of prosecutions below (G.R. No. 33628). He
likewise contends that the respondent Fiscal (in G.R. No. 34162), in
giving due course to the complaints notwithstanding the restraining
order we had issued (in G.R. No. 33628), which he claims applies as
well thereto, committed a grave abuse of discretion.
He likewise submits that the prosecutions in question are politically
motivated, initiated by his rivals, he being, as we said, a candidate for
reelection as Governor of Zamboanga del Sur.
We dismiss these petitions.
The petitioner's reliance upon the provisions of Executive Order No.
264 has no merit. We reproduce the Order in toto:
MALACAÑANG
OUTLINING THE PROCEDURE BY WHICH COMPLAINANTS
CHARGING GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES
WITH COMMISSION OF IRREGULARITIES SHOULD BE
GUIDED.
WHEREAS, it is necessary that the general public be duly informed or
reminded of the procedure provided by law and regulations by which
complaints against public officials and employees should be presented
and prosecuted.
WHEREAS, actions on complaints are at times delayed because of the
failure to observe the form.91 requisites therefor, to indicate with
sufficient clearness and particularity the charges or offenses being aired
or denounced, and to file the complaint with the proper office or
authority;
WHEREAS, without in any way curtailing the constitutional guarantee
of freedom of expression, the Administration believes that many
complaints or grievances could be resolved at the lower levels of
government if only the provisions of law and regulations on the matter
are duly observed by the parties concerned; and
WHEREAS, while all sorts of officials misconduct should be eliminated
and punished, it is equally compelling that public officials and
employees be given opportunity afforded them by the constitution and
law to defend themselves in accordance with the procedure prescribed
by law and regulations;

RESIDENCE OF THE PRESIDENT NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the

Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby
OF THE PHILIPPINES order:

MANILA 1. Complaints against public officials and employees shall be in writing,

subscribed and sworn to by the complainants, describing in sufficient
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES detail and particularity the acts or conduct complained of, instead of
generalizations.
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 264
2. Complaints against presidential appointees shag be filed with the
Office of the President or the Department Head having direct
supervision or control over the official involved.
3. Those against subordinate officials and employees shall be lodged
with the proper department or agency head.
4. Those against elective local officials shall be filed with the Office of
the President in case of provincial and city officials, with the provincial
governor or board secretary in case of municipal officials, and with the
municipal or city mayor or secretary in case of barrio officials.
5. Those against members of police forces shall be filed with the
corresponding local board of investigators headed by the city or
municipal treasurer, except in the case of those appointed by the
President which should be filed with the Office of the President.
6. Complaints against public officials and employees shall be promptly
acted upon and disposed of by the officials or authorities concerned in
accordance with pertinent laws and regulations so that the erring
officials or employees can be soonest removed or otherwise disciplined
and the innocent, exonerated or vindicated in like manner, and to the
end also that other remedies, including court action, may be pursued
forthwith by the interested parties after administrative remedies shall
have been exhausted.
Done in the City of Manila, this 6th day of October, in the year of Our
Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy.
(Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS
President of the Philippines
By the President:
(Sgd.) ALEJANDRO MELCHOR
Executive Secretary 11
It is plain from the very wording of the Order that it has exclusive
application to administrative, not criminal complaints. The Order itself
shows why.
The very title speaks of "COMMISSION OF IRREGULARITIES."
There is no mention, not even by implication, of criminal "offenses,"
that is to say, "crimes." While "crimes" amount to "irregularities," the
Executive Order could have very well referred to the more specific term
had it intended to make itself applicable thereto.
The first perambulatory clause states the necessity for informing the
public "of the procedure provided by law and regulations by which
complaints against public officials and employees should be presented
and prosecuted. 12 To our mind, the "procedure provided by law and
regulations" referred to pertains to existing procedural rules with respect
to the presentation of administrative charges against erring government
officials. And in fact, the aforequoted paragraphs are but restatements
thereof. That presidential appointees are subject to the disciplinary
jurisdiction of the President, for instance, is a reecho of the long-
standing doctrine that the President exercises the power of control over
his appointees. 13 Paragraph 3, on the other hand, regarding subordinate
officials, is a mere reiteration of Section 33 of Republic Act No. 2260,
the Civil Service Act (of 1959) then in force, placing jurisdiction upon
"the proper Head of Department, the chief of a bureau or office" 14 to
investigate and decide on matters involving disciplinary action.
Paragraph 4, which refers to complaints filed against elective local
officials, reiterates, on the other hand, the Decentralization Act of 1967,
providing that "charges against any elective provincial and city officials
shall be preferred before the President of the Philippines; against any
elective municipal official before the provincial governor or the
secretary of the provincial board concerned; and against any elective
barrio official before the municipal or secretary concerned. 15
Paragraph 5, meanwhile, is a reproduction of the provisions of the
Police Act of 1966, vesting upon a "Board of Investigators" 16 the
jurisdiction to try and decide complaints against members of the
Philippine police.
Clearly, the Executive Order simply consolidates these existing rules
and streamlines the administrative apparatus in the matter of complaints
against public officials. Furthermore, the fact is that there is no
reference therein to judicial or prejudicial (like a preliminary
investigation conducted by the fiscal) recourse, not because it makes
such a resort a secondary measure, but because it does not intend to
serve as a condition precedent to, much less supplant, such a court
resort.
To be sure, there is mention therein of "court action[s] [being] pursued
forthwith by the interested parties, " 17 but that does not, so we hold,
cover proceedings such as criminal actions, which do not require a prior
administrative course of action. It will indeed be noted that the term is
closely shadowed by the qualification, "after administrative remedies
shall have been exhausted," 18 which suggests civil suits subject to
previous administrative action.
It is moreover significant that the Executive Order in question makes
specific reference to "erring officials or employees ... removed or
otherwise vindicated. 19 If it were intended to apply to criminal
prosecutions, it would have employed such technical terms as
"accused", "convicted," or "acquitted." While this is not necessarily a
controlling parameter for all cases, it is here material in construing the
intent of the measure.
What is even more compelling is the Constitutional implications if the
petitioner's arguments were accepted. For Executive Order No. 264 was
promulgated under the 1935 Constitution in which legislative power
was vested exclusively in Congress. The regime of Presidential
lawmaking was to usher in yet some seven years later. If we were to
consider the Executive Order law, we would be forced to say that it is an
amendment to Republic Act No. 5180, the law on preliminary
investigations then in effect, a situation that would give rise to a
Constitutional anomaly. We cannot accordingly countenace such a view.
The challenge the petitioner presents against the personality of the Anti-
Graft League of the Philippines to bring suit is equally without merit.
That the Anti-Graft League is not an "offended party" within the
meaning of Section 2, Rule 110, of the Rules of Court (now Section 3 of
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure), cannot abate the complaints in
question.
A complaint for purposes of preliminary investigation by the fiscal need
not be filed by the "offended party." The rule has been that, unless the
offense subject thereof is one that cannot be prosecuted de oficio, the
same may be filed, for preliminary investigation purposes, by any
competent person. 20 The "complaint" referred to in the Rule 110
contemplates one filed in court, not with the fiscal, In that case, the
proceeding must be started by the aggrieved party himself. 21
For as a general rule, a criminal action is commenced by complaint or
information, both of which are filed in court. In case of a complaint, it
must be filed by the offended party; with respect to an information, it is
the fiscal who files it. But a "complaint" filed with the fiscal prior to a
judicial action may be filed by any person.
The next question is whether or not the temporary restraining order we
issued in G.R. No. 33628 embraced as well the complaint subject of
G.R. No. 34162.
It is noteworthy that the charges levelled against the petitioner —
whether in G.R. No. 33628 or 34162 — refer invariably to violations of
the Anti-Graft Law or the Revised Penal Code. That does not, however,
make such charges Identical to one another.
The complaints involved in G.R. No. 34162 are, in general, nepotism
under Sections 3(c) and (j) of Republic Act No. 3019; exerting influence
upon the presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga
del Sur to award a certain parcel of land in his favor, over which the
provincial government itself lays claims, contrary to the provisions of
Section 4(b) of Republic Act No. 3019; and making untruthful
statements in the certificates of appointment of certain employees in his
office. On the other hand, the complaints subject matter of G.R. No.
33628 involve charges of simulating bids for the supply of gravel and
sand for certain public works projects, in breach of Section 3 of the
Anti-Graft statute; manipulating bids with respect to the construction of
the capitol building; testifying falsely in connection with Cadastral Case
No. N-17, LRC Cad. Rec. N-468, in which the petitioner alleged that he
was the owner of a piece of land, in violation of Articles 182, 183, and
318 of the Revised Penal Code; and simulating bids for the supply of
gravel and sand in connection with another public works project.
It is clear that the twin sets of complaints are characterized by major
differences. When, therefore, we restrained further proceedings in I.S.
Nos. 1-71, 2-71, and 4-71, subject of G.R. No. 33628. we did not
consequently stay the proceedings in CCC-XVI-4-ZDS, CCC XVI-6-
ZDS, CCC XVI-8-ZDS, and I.S. Nos. 6-71 and 7-71, the same
proceedings we did restrain in G.R. No. 34162.
This brings us to the last issue: whether or not the complaints in
question are tainted with a political color.
It is not our business to resolve complaints the disposition of which
belongs to another agency, in this case, the respondent Fiscal. But more
than that, and as a general rule, injunction does not lie to enjoin criminal
prosecutions. 22 The rule is subject to exceptions, to wit: (1) for the
orderly administration of justice; (2) to prevent the use of the strong arm
of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner; (3) to avoid
multiplicity of actions; (4) to afford adequate protection to constitutional
rights; and (5) because the statute relied on is constitutionally infirm or
otherwise void.23 We cannot perceive any of the exceptions applicable
here. The petitioner cries foul, in a manner of speaking, with respect to
the deluge of complaints commenced by the private respondent below,
but whether or not they were filed for harassment purposes is a question
we are not in a position to decide. The proper venue, we believe, for the
petitioner's complaint is precisely in the preliminary investigations he
wishes blocked here.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. The temporary
restraining orders are LIFTED and SET ASIDE. Costs against the
petitioners.
It is so ORDERED.
Yap (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Paras, and Padilla, JJ., concur.
156 SCRA 803
GL 33628
Ebarle vs. Sucaldito (DIGEST)
Date: December 29, 1987
Facts:
 petitioner Bienvenido Ebarle was then provincial Governor of
Zamboanga and a candidate for re-election in the 1971 local elections
 Anti-Graft League of the Phils. filed different complainst with the City
Fiscal against the petitioner for violations of provisions of the Anti-
Graft Law (RA 3019) as well as Arts. 171, 182, 183, 213 & 318 of the
Revised Penal Code
o on the bidding for the supply of gravel and sand for the
province of Zamboanga del Sur in favour of Tabiliran
Trucking Company
o on the collection of advances under the trucking contract of
Tabiliran Trucking Company, making it appear that it was
collected by Teoson Trucking Company, who held the
subsisting contract
o on the bidding for the construction of the right wing portion of
the Capitol Building of the Province of Zamboanga del Sur, in
favour of supposed winning bidder who is the brother-in-law
of Ebarle
o on petitioner’s testifying falsely under oath that he acquired a
certain lot by purchase but the lot was in fact owned by the
provincial government of Zamboanga del Sur (where the
provincial jail is located)
o on the simulated bidding in favour of Tabiliran Trucking
Company
o on appointments of people related to Ebarle to different
positions in the government
 petitioner filed for prohibition and certiorari in the Court of First
Instance of Zamboanga del Sur but the case was dismissed
 in the petition filed before the SC, petitioner claims that the
respondents City Fiscal and the Anti-Graft League failed to comply
with the provisions of EO 264 preliminary to their criminal recourses
o OUTLINING THE PROCEDURE BY WHICH
COMPLAINANTS CHARGING THE GOV’T OFFICIALS
AND EPLOYEES WITH THE COMMISSION OF
IRREGULARITIES SHOULD BE GUIDED
  petitioner assails the standing of respondent Anti-Graft League to
commence the series of prosecutions
 petitioner contends that the respondent Fiscal (in G.R. No. 34162) in
giving due course to the complaints notwithstanding the order the SC
had issued (in G. R. 33628) which he claims applies as well thereto,
committed a grave abuse of discretion
 petitioner claims that the prosecutions were politically motivated,
initiated by his rivals
Issues:
 WoN respondents had to comply with the provisions of EO 264
 WoN Anti-Graft League had standing to commence the series of
prosecutions
 WoN the complaints are politically motivated and thus should be
dismissed
Ruling: Petitions Dismissed.
 Held: the petitioner’s reliance upon the provisions of EO 264 has no
merit
o it is plain from the very wording of the Order that it has
exclusive application to administrative, and not criminal
complaints
o Title: “Commission of Irregularities”
 no mention, not even by implication, of criminal
“offenses”, or crimes
 while “crimes” amount to “irregularities”, the EO
could have very well referred to the more specific
term had It intended to make itself applicable thereto
o “procedure provided by law and regulations”
 pertains to existing procedural rules with respect to
the presentation of administrative charges against
erring government officials
o the aforequoted paragraphs are but restatements of existing
rules
 Paragraph 3 = Sec. 33 of RA 2260, Civil Service Act
of 1959
 Paragraph 4 = Decentralization Act of 1967
 Paragraph 5 = Police Act of 1966
o specific reference to “erring officials or employees…removed
or otherwise vindicated”
 if it were to apply to criminal prosecutions, it would
have employed such technical terms as “accused,”
“convicted,” or “acquitted”
 is here material in construing the intent of the
measure
o more compelling is the Constitutional implications if the
petitioner’s arguments were accepted
 EO 264 was promulgated under the 1935 Constitution
in which the legislative power was vested exclusively
in Congress
 if the EO was to be considered law, SC would be
forced to say that it is an amendment to RA 5180
which would give rise to a Constitutional anomaly
 Challenge against the personality of Anti-Graft League has no merit
o a complaint filed with the fiscal prior to a judicial action may
be filed by any person
 the TRO issued in G.R. No. 33628 does not embrace the complaint
subject of G.R. No. 34162 because the charges are not identical to one
another
 the proper venue for determining whether the cases were filed to
harass petitioner is the preliminary wishes he wishes to block
Petitions dismissed, TROs lifted and set aside.
Ebarle v. Sucaldito G.R. No. L-33628. December
29, 1987
Facts: Ebarle, the petitioner, was then provincial governor of Zamboanga and a
candidate for re-election in 1971 local elections. The Anti-Graft League of the
Philippines filed complaints with the city fiscal against the petitioner for
violations of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft Law) and Articles 171, 182,183, 213, and
318 of the Revised Penal Code. The petitioner filed petitions for prohibition
and certiorari in CFI but they were dismissed. He petitioned to the Supreme
Court and alleged that the City Fiscal and Anti-Graft League failed to comply
with the provisions of EO 264, which outlined the procedure how
complainants charging the government officials and employees with the
commission of irregularities should be guided.
Issue: Whether or not EO 264 is exclusively applicable to administrative
charges and not to criminal complaints

Held: Petition dismissed.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Ratio: The title of the EO 264 is of “Commission of Irregularities”. It speaks Manila
of commission of irregularities and not criminal offenses. Had the order
intended to make it applicable thereto, it could have been referred to the more EN BANC
specific terms like “accused,” “convicted,” and the like.
G.R. No. L-26100 February 28, 1969

CITY OF BAGUlO, REFORESTATION ADMINISTRATION,

FRANCISCO G. JOAQUIN, SR., FRANCISCO G. JOAQUIN, JR.,
and TERESITA J. BUCHHOLZ petitioners,
vs.
HON. PIO R. MARCOS, Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Baguio,
BELONG LUTES, and the HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.

1st Assistant City Fiscal Dionisio C. Claridad, Augusto Tobias and

Feria, Feria, Lugtu and La'O for petitioners.
Bernardo C. Ronquillo for respondents.

SANCHEZ, J.:

Petitioners attack the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of

Baguio to reopen cadastral proceedings under Republic Act 931. Private
petitioner's specifically question the ruling of the Court of Appeals that
they have no personality to oppose reopening. The three-pronged
contentions of all the petitioners are: (1) the reopening petition was filed
outside the 40-year period next preceding the approval of Republic Act
931; (2) said petition was not published; and (3) private petitioners, as
lessees of the public land in question, have court standing under
Republic Act 931. The facts follow:
On April 12, 1912, the cadastral proceedings sought to be reopened,
Civil Reservation Case No. 1, GLRO Record No. 211, Baguio Townsite,
were instituted by the Director of Lands in the Court of First Instance of
Baguio. It is not disputed that the land here involved (described in Plan
Psu-186187) was amongst those declared public lands by final
decision rendered in that case on November 13, 1922.
On July 25, 1961, respondent Belong Lutes petitioned the cadastral
court to reopen said Civil Reservation Case No. 1 as to the parcel of
land he claims. His prayer was that the land be registered in his name
upon the grounds that: (1) he and his predecessors have been in actual,
open, adverse, peaceful and continuous possession and cultivation of the
land since Spanish times, or before July 26, 1894, paying the taxes
thereon; and (2) his predecessors were illiterate Igorots without personal
notice of the cadastral proceedings aforestated and were not able to file
their claim to the land in question within the statutory period.
On December 18, 1961, private petitioners Francisco G. Joaquin, Sr.,
Francisco G. Joaquin, Jr., and Teresita J. Buchholz registered opposition
to the reopening. Ground: They are tree farm lessees upon agreements
executed by the Bureau of Forestry in their favor for 15,395.65 square
meters on March. 16, 1959, for 12,108 square meters on July 24, 1959,
and for 14,771 square meters on July 17, 1959, respectively.
On May 5, 1962, the City of Baguio likewise opposed reopening.
On May 8, 1962, upon Lutes' opposition, the cadastral court denied
private petitioners' right to intervene in the case because of a final
declaratory relief judgment dated March 9, 1962 in Yaranon vs.
Castrillo [Civil Case 946, Court of First Instance of Baguio] which
declared that such tree farm leases were null and void.
On May 18, 1962, private petitioners moved to reconsider. They averred
that said declaratory relief judgment did not bind them, for they were
not parties to that action.
On September 14, 1962, the cadastral court reversed its own ruling of
May 8, 1962, allowed petitioners to cross-examine the witnesses of
respondent Lutes.
On October 16, 1962, Lutes replied to and moved to dismiss private
petitioners' opposition to his reopening petition. On October 25, 1962,
private petitioners' rejoinder was filed.
On August 5, 1963, the cadastral court dismissed private petitioners'
opposition to the reopening. A motion to reconsider was rejected by the
court on November 5, 1963.
On January 6, 1964, it was the turn of the City of Baguio to lodge a
motion to dismiss the petition to reopen. This motion was adopted as its
own by the Reforestation Administration. They maintained the position
that the declaratory judgment in Civil Case 946 was not binding on
those not parties thereto. Respondent Lutes opposed on February 24,
1964. On April 6, 1964, private petitioners reiterated their motion to
dismiss on jurisdictional grounds.
On September 17, 1964, the court denied for lack of merit the City's
motion as well as the April 6, 1964 motion to dismiss made by private
petitioners.
On November 13, 1964, all the petitioners went to the Court of Appeals
on certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with preliminary
injunction. 1 They then questioned the cadastral court's jurisdiction over
the petition to reopen and the latter's order of August 5, 1963 dismissing
private petitioners' opposition. The appellate court issued a writ of
preliminary injunction upon a P500-bond.
Then came the judgment of the Court of Appeals of September 30,
1965. The court held that petitioners were not bound by the declaratory
judgment heretofore hated. Nevertheless, the appellate court ruled that
as lessees, private petitioners had no right to oppose the reopening of the
cadastral case. Petitioners moved to reconsider. It was thwarted on May
6, 1966.
Petitioners now seek redress from this Court. On July 6, 1966,
respondents moved to dismiss the petition before us. On August 5, 1966,
petitioners opposed. On August 12, 1966, we gave due course.
1. Do private petitioners have personality to appear in the reopening
proceedings?
First, to the controlling statute, Republic Act 931, effective June 20,
1953.
The title of the Act reads —
AN ACT TO AUTHORIZE THE FILING IN THE PROPER COURT,
UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS, OF CERTAIN CLAIMS OF TITLE
TO PARCELS OF LAND THAT HAVE BEEN DECLARED PUBLIC
LAND, BY VIRTUE OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS RENDERED
WITHIN THE FORTY YEARS NEXT PRECEDING THE APPROVAL
OF THIS ACT.
Section 1 thereof provides —
SECTION 1. All persons claiming title to parcels of land that have been
the object of cadastral proceedings, who at the time of the survey were
in actual possession of the same, but for some justifiable reason had
been unable to file their claim in the proper court during the time limit
established by law, in case such parcels of land, on account of their
failure to file such claims, have been, or are about to be declared land
of the public domain by virtue of judicial proceedings instituted within
the forty years next preceding the approval of this Act, are hereby
granted the right within five years 2 after the date on which this Act
shall take effect, to petition for a reopening of the judicial proceedings
under the provisions of Act Numbered Twenty-two hundred and fifty-
nine, as amended, only with respect to such of said parcels of land as
have not been alienated, reserved, leased, granted, or
otherwise provisionally or permanently disposed of by the Government,
and the competent Court of First Instance, upon receiving such petition,
shall notify the Government through the Solicitor General, and if after
hearing the parties, said court shall find that all conditions herein
established have been complied with, and that all taxes, interests and
penalties thereof have been paid from the time when land tax should
have been collected until the day when the motion is presented, it shall
order said judicial proceedings reopened as if no action has been taken
on such parcels. 3
We concede that in Leyva vs. Jandoc, L-16965, February 28, 1962, a
land registration case where oppositors were "foreshore lessees of
public land", a principle was hammered out that although Section 34,
Land Registration Act, 4 "apparently authorizes any person claiming any
kind of interest to file an opposition to an application for registration, ...
nevertheless ... the opposition must be based on a right of dominion or
some other real right independent of, and not at all subordinate to, the
rights of the Government."5 The opposition, according to
the Leyva decision, "must necessarily be predicated upon the property in
question being part of the public domain." Leyva thus pronounced that
"it is incumbent upon the duly authorized representatives of the
Government to represent its interests as well as private claims
intrinsically dependent upon it."
But the Leyva case concerned an ordinary land registration proceeding
under the provisions of the Land Registration Act. Normally and
logically, lessees cannot there present issues of ownership. The case at
bar, however, stands on a different footing. It involves a special statute
R.A. 931, which allows a petition for reopening on lands "about to be
declared" or already "declared land of the public domain" by virtue of
judicial proceedings. Such right, however, is made to
cover limited cases, i.e., "only with respect to such of said parcels of
land as have not been alienated, reserved, leased, granted, or
otherwise provisionally or permanently disposed of by the
6
Government." The lessee's right is thus impliedly recognized by R.A.
931. This statutory phrase steers the present case clear from the impact
of the precept forged by Leyva. So it is, that if the land subject of a
petition to reopen has already been leased by the government, that
petition can no longer prosper.
This was the holding in Director of Land vs. Benitez, L-21368, March
31, 1966. The reopening petition there filed was opposed by the
Director of Lands in behalf of 62 lessees of public land holding
revocable permits issued by the government. We struck down the
petition in that Case because the public land, subject-matter of the
suit, had already been leased by the government to private persons.
Of course, the Benitez ruling came about not by representations of the
lessees alone, but through the Director of Lands. But we may well scale
the heights of injustice or abet violations of R.A. 931 if we entertain the
view that only the Director of Lands 7 can here properly oppose the
reopening petition. Suppose the lands office fails to do so? Will
legitimate lessees be left at the mercy of government officials? Should
the cadastral court close its eyes to the fact of lease that may be proved
by the lessees themselves, and which is enough to bar the reopening
petition? R.A. 931 could not have intended that this situation should
happen. The point is that, with the fact of lease, no question of
ownership need be inquired into pursuant to R.A. 931. From this
standpoint, lessees have sufficient legal interest in the proceedings.
The right of private petitioners to oppose a reopening petition here
becomes the more patent when we take stock of their averment that they
have introduced improvements on the land affected. It would seem to us
that lesseesinsofar as R.A. 931 is concerned, come within the purview
of those who, according to the Rules of Court, 8 may intervene in an
action. For, they are persons who have "legal interest in the matter in
litigation, or in the success of either of the parties." 9 In the event herein
private petitioners are able to show that they are legitimate lessees, then
their lease will continue. And this because it is sufficient that it be
proven that the land is leased to withdraw it from the operation of
Republic Act 931 and place it beyond the reach of a petition for
reopening. 10
In line with the Court of Appeals' conclusion, not disputed by
respondent Lutes herein, the cadastral court should have ruled on the
validity of private petitioners 'tree farm leases — on the merits. Because
there is need for Lutes' right to reopen and petitioners' right to continue
as lessees to be threshed out in that court.
We, accordingly, hold that private petitioners, who aver that they are
lessees, have the necessary personality to intervene in and oppose
respondent Lutes' petition for reopening.
2. Petitioners next contend that the reopening petition below, filed under
R.A. 931, should have been published in accordance with the Cadastral
Act.
To resolve this contention, we need but refer to a very recent decision of
this Court in De Castro vs. Marcos, supra, involving exactly the same
set of facts bearing upon the question. We there held, after a discussion
of law and jurisprudence, that: "In sum, the subject matter of the petition
for reopening — a parcel of land claimed by respondent Akia — was
already embraced in the cadastral proceedings filed by the Director of
Lands. Consequently, the Baguio cadastral court already acquired
jurisdiction over the said property. The petition, therefore, need not be
published." We find no reason to break away from such conclusion.
Respondent Lutes attached to the record a certified true copy of the
November 13, 1922 decision in the Baguio Townsite Reservation case
to show, amongst others, that the land here involved was part of that
case. Petitioners do not take issue with respondent Lutes on this point of
fact.
We here reiterate our ruling in De Castro, supra, that the power of the
cadastral court below over petitions to reopen, as in this case, is not
jurisdictionally tainted by want of publication.
3. A question of transcendental importance is this: Does the cadastral
court have power to reopen the cadastral proceedings upon the
application of respondent Lutes?
The facts are: The cadastral proceedings sought to be reopened were
instituted on April 12, 1912. Final decision was rendered on November
13, 1922. Lutes filed the petition to reopen on July 25, 1961.
It will be noted that the title of R.A. 931, heretofore transcribed,
authorizes "the filing in the proper court, under certain conditions, of
certain claims of title to parcels of land that have been declared public
land, by virtue of judicial decisions rendered within the forty years next
preceding the approval of this Act." The body of the statute, however, in
its Section 1, speaks of parcels of land that "have been, or are about to
be declared land of the public domain, by virtue of judicial proceedings
instituted within the forty years next preceding the approval of this Act."
There thus appears to be a seeming inconsistency between title and
body.
It must be stressed at this point that R.A. 931 is not under siege on
constitutional grounds. No charge has been made hero or in the courts
below that the statute offends the constitutional injunction that the
subject of legislation must be expressed in the title thereof. Well-
entrenched in constitutional law is the precept that constitutional
questions will not be entertained by courts unless they are "specifically
raised, insisted upon and adequately argued." 11 At any rate it cannot be
seriously disputed that the subject of R.A. 931 is expressed in its title.
This narrows our problem down to one of legal hermeneutics.
Many are the principles evolved in the interpretation of laws. It is thus
not difficult to stray away from the true path of construction, unless we
constantly bear in mind the goal we seek. The office of statutory
interpretation, let us not for a moment forget, is to determine legislative
intent. In the words of a well-known authority, "[t]he true object of all
interpretation is to ascertain the meaning and will of the law-making
body, to the end that it may be enforced." 12 In varying language, "the,
purpose of all rules or maxims" in interpretation "is to discover the true
intention of the law." 13 They "are only valuable when they subserve this
purpose." 14 In fact, "the spirit or intention of a statute prevails over the
letter thereof." 15 A statute "should be construed according to its spirit
and reason, disregarding as far as necessary, the letter of the law." 16 By
this, we do not "correct the act of the Legislature, but rather ... carry out
and give due course to" its true intent. 17
It should be certain by now that when engaged in the task of construing
an obscure expression in the law 18 or where exact or literal rendering of
the words would not carry out the legislative intent, 19 the title thereof
may be resorted to in the ascertainment of congressional will. Reason
therefor is that the title of the law may properly be regarded as an index
of or clue or guide to legislative intention. 20 This is especially true in
this jurisdiction. For the reason that by specific constitutional precept,
"[n]o bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one
subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill." 21 In such case,
courts "are compelled by the Constitution to consider both the body and
the title in order to arrive at the legislative intention." 22
With the foregoing guideposts on hand, let us go back to the situation
that confronts us. We take another look at the title of R.A. 931, viz: "AN
ACT TO AUTHORIZE THE FILING IN THE PROPER COURT,
UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS, OF CERTAIN CLAIMS OF TITLE
TO PARCELS OF LAND THAT HAVE BEEN DECLARED PUBLIC
LAND, BY VIRTUE OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS RENDERED
WITHIN THE FORTY YEARS NEXT PRECEDING THE APPROVAL
OF THIS ACT." Readily to be noted is that the title is not merely
composed of catchwords. 23 It expresses in language clear the very
substance of the law itself. From this, it is easy to see that Congress
intended to give some effect to the title of R.A. 931.
To be carefully noted is that the same imperfection in the language of
R.A. 931 aforesaid — from which surfaces a seeming inconsistency
between the title and the body — attended Commonwealth Act 276, the
present statute's predecessor. That prior law used the very same
language in the body thereof and in its title. We attach meaning to this
circumstance. Had the legislature meant to shake off any legal effects
that the title of the statute might have, it had a chance to do so in the
reenactment of the law. Congress could have altered with great facility
the wording of the title of R.A. 931. The fact is that it did not.
It has been observed that "in modern practice the title is adopted by the
Legislature, more thoroughly read than the act itself, and in many states
is the subject of constitutional regulation." 24 The constitutional in
jurisdiction that the subject of the statute must be expressed in the title
of the bill, breathes the spirit of command because "the Constitution
does not exact of Congress the obligation to read during its deliberations
the entire text of the bill." 25Reliance, therefore, may be placed on the
title of a bill, which, while not an enacting part, no doubt "is in some
sort a part of the act, although only a formal part." 26 These
considerations are all the more valid here because R.A. 931 was passed
without benefit of congressional debate in the House from which it
originated as House Bill 1410, 27 and in the Senate. 28
The title now under scrutiny possesses the strength of clarity and
positiveness. It recites that it authorizes court proceedings of claims to
parcels of land declared public land "by virtue of
judicial decisions rendered within the forty years next preceding the
approval of this Act." That title is written "in capital letters" — by
Congress itself; such kind of a title then "is not to be classed with words
or titles used by compilers of statutes" because "it is the legislature
speaking." 29 Accordingly, it is not hard to come to a deduction that the
phrase last quoted from R.A. 931 — "by virtue of judicial decisions
rendered" — was but inadvertently omitted from the body. Parting from
this premise, there is, at bottom, no contradiction between title and
body. In line with views herein stated, the title belongs to that type of
titles which; should be regarded as part of the rules or provisions
expressed in the body. 30At the very least, the words "by virtue of
judicial decisions rendered" in the title of the law stand in equal
importance to the phrase in Section 1 thereof, "by virtue of judicial
proceedings instituted."
Given the fact then that there are two phrases to consider the choice of
construction we must give to the statute does not need such reflection.
We lean towards a liberal view. And this, because of the principle long
accepted that remedial legislation should receive the blessings of liberal
construction. 31 And, there should be no quibbling as to the fact that R.A.
931 is a piece of remedial legislation. In essence, it provides a mode of
relief to landowners who, before the Act, had no legal means of
perfecting their titles. This is plainly evident from the explanatory note
thereof, which reads:
This bill is intended to give an opportunity to any person or claimant
who has any interest in any parcel of land which has been declared as
public land in cadastral proceeding for failure of said person or claimant
to present his claim within the time prescribed by law.
There are many meritorious cases wherein claimants to certain parcels
of land have not had the opportunity to answer or appear at the hearing
of cases affecting their claims in the corresponding cadastral
proceedings for lack of sufficient notice or for other reasons and
circumstances which are beyond their control. Under C.A. No. 276, said
persons or claimants have no more legal remedy as the effectivity of
said Act expired in 1940.
This measure seeks to remedy the lack of any existing law within said
persons or claimants with meritorious claims or interests in parcels of
land may seek justice and protection. This bill proposes to give said
persons or claimants their day in court. Approval of this bill is earnestly
requested.
In fine, we say that lingual imperfections in the drafting of a statute
should never be permitted to hamstring judicial search for legislative
intent, which can otherwise be discovered. Legal technicalities should
not abort the beneficent effects intended by legislation.
The sum of all the foregoing is that, as we now view Republic Act 931,
claims of title that may be filed thereunder embrace those parcels of
land that have been declared public land "by virtue of judicial decisions
rendered within the forty years next preceding the approval of this Act."
Therefore, by that statute, the July 25, 1961 petition of respondent
Belong Lutes to reopen Civil Reservation Case No. 1, GLRO Record
No. 211 of the cadastral court of Baguio, the decision on which was
rendered on November 13, 1922, comes within the 40-year
period.lawphi1.nêt
FOR THE REASONS GIVEN, the petition for certiorari is hereby
granted; the cadastral court's orders of August 5, 1963, November 5,
1963 and September 17, 1964 are hereby declared null and void and the
cadastral court is hereby directed to admit petitioners' oppositions and
proceed accordingly. No costs. So ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee and
Barredo, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J., Castro and Capistrano, JJ., took no part..
 StatCon maxim: The title is an indispensable part of a statute, and what may
inadequately be omitted in the text may be supplied or remedied by its title.
City of Baguio v. Marcos G.R. No. L-26100.
February 28, 1969
Facts: In April 12, 1912, the director of lands in the CFI of Baguio
INSTITUTED the reopening of cadastral proceedings. In November 13, 1922,
a decision was RENDERED. The land involved was the Baguio Townsite
which was declared public land. In July 25, 1961, Belong Lutes petitioned to
reopen the civil case on the following grounds: 1) he and his predecessors have
been in continuous possession and cultivation of the land since Spanish times;
2) his predecessors were illiterate Igorots, thus, were not able to file their
claim. On the contrary, F. Joaquin Sr., F. Joaquin Jr., and Teresita Buchholz
opposed Lutes’ reopening on the following grounds: 1) the reopening was filed
outside the 40-year period provided in RA 931; 2) the petition to reopen the
case was not published; and 3) as lessees of the land, they have standing on the
issue.

Issue: Whether or not the reopening of the peririon was filed outside the 40-
year period provided in RA 931, which was ENACTED on June 20, 1953

Held: The Supreme Court grabted the reopening of cadastral proceedings

Ratio: The title of RA 931 was “An Act to Authorize the Filing in Proper Court
under Certain Conditions, of Certain Claims of Title to Parcels of Land that
have been Declared Public Land, by Virtue of Judicial Decisions RENDERED
within the 40 Years Next Preceding the Approval of this Act.” Section 1 of the
Act reads as “..in case such parcels of land, on account of their failure to file
such claims, have been, or about to be declared land of the public domain by
virtue of judicial proceedings INSTITUTED within the 40 years next
preceding the approval of this act.” If the title is to be followed, November 13,
1922 is the date which should be followed, hence, would allow the reopening
of the case. If Section 1 is to be followed, the date of the institution of
reopening of the case which was April 12, 1912, the petition would be invalid.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-6355-56 August 31, 1953
PASTOR M. ENDENCIA and FERNANDO JUGO, plaintiffs-
appellees,
vs.
SATURNINO DAVID, as Collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-
appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag and Solicitor Jose P.
Alejandro for appellant.
Manuel O. Chan for appellees.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
This is a joint appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Manila declaring section 13 of Republic Act No. 590 unconstitutional,
and ordering the appellant Saturnino David as Collector of Internal
Revenue to re-fund to Justice Pastor M. Endencia the sum of P1,744.45,
representing the income tax collected on his salary as Associate Justice
of the Court of Appeals in 1951, and to Justice Fernando Jugo the
amount of P2,345.46, representing the income tax collected on his
salary from January 1,1950 to October 19, 1950, as Presiding Justice of
the Court of Appeals, and from October 20, 1950 to December 31,1950,
as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, without special
pronouncement as to costs.
Because of the similarity of the two cases, involving as they do the same
question of law, they were jointly submitted for determination in the
lower court. Judge Higinio B. Macadaeg presiding, in a rather
exhaustive and well considered decision found and held that under the
doctrine laid down by this Court in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, 85
Phil., 552, the collection of income taxes from the salaries of Justice
Jugo and Justice Endencia was a diminution of their compensation and
therefore was in violation of the Constitution of the Philippines, and so
ordered the refund of said taxes.
We see no profit and necessity in again discussing and considering the
proposition and the arguments pro and cons involved in the case of
Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, which are raised, brought up and presented
here. In that case, we have held despite the ruling enunciated by the
United States Federal Supreme Court in the case of O 'Malley vs.
Woodrought 307 U. S., 277, that taxing the salary of a judicial officer in
the Philippines is a diminution of such salary and so violates the
Constitution. We shall now confine our-selves to a discussion and
determination of the remaining question of whether or not Republic Act
No. 590, particularly section 13, can justify and legalize the collection
of income tax on the salary of judicial officers.
According to the brief of the Solicitor General on behalf of appellant
Collector of Internal Revenue, our decision in the case of Perfecto vs.
Meer, supra, was not received favorably by Congress, because
immediately after its promulgation, Congress enacted Republic Act No.
590. To bring home his point, the Solicitor General reproduced what he
considers the pertinent discussion in the Lower House of House Bill No.
1127 which became Republic Act No. 590.
For purposes of reference, we are reproducing section 9, Article VIII of
our Constitution:.
SEC. 9. The members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior
courts shall hold office during good behavior, until they reach the age of
seventy years, or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their
office. They shall receive such compensation as may be fixed by
law, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office.
Until the Congress shall provide otherwise, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court shall receive an annual compensation of sixteen
thousand pesos, and each Associate Justice, fifteen thousand pesos.
As already stated construing and applying the above constitutional
provision, we held in the Perfecto case that judicial officers are exempt
from the payment of income tax on their salaries, because the collection
thereof by the Government was a decrease or diminution of their
salaries during their continuance in office, a thing which is expressly
prohibited by the Constitution. Thereafter, according to the Solicitor
General, because Congress did not favorably receive the decision in the
Perfecto case, Congress promulgated Republic Act No. 590, if not to
counteract the ruling in that decision, at least now to authorize and
legalize the collection of income tax on the salaries of judicial officers.
We quote section 13 of Republic Act No. 590:
SEC 13. No salary wherever received by any public officer of the
Republic of the Philippines shall be considered as exempt from the
income tax, payment of which is hereby declared not to be dimunition
of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law.
So we have this situation. The Supreme Court in a decision interpreting
the Constitution, particularly section 9, Article VIII, has held that
judicial officers are exempt from payment of income tax on their
salaries, because the collection thereof was a diminution of such
salaries, specifically prohibited by the Constitution. Now comes the
Legislature and in section 13, Republic Act No. 590, says that "no salary
wherever received by any public officer of the Republic (naturally
including a judicial officer) shall be considered as exempt from the
income tax," and proceeds to declare that payment of said income tax is
not a diminution of his compensation. Can the Legislature validly do
this? May the Legislature lawfully declare the collection of income tax
on the salary of a public official, specially a judicial officer, not a
decrease of his salary, after the Supreme Court has found and decided
otherwise? To determine this question, we shall have to go back to the
fundamental principles regarding separation of powers.
Under our system of constitutional government, the Legislative
department is assigned the power to make and enact laws. The
Executive department is charged with the execution of carrying out of
the provisions of said laws. But the interpretation and application of said
laws belong exclusively to the Judicial department. And this authority to
interpret and apply the laws extends to the Constitution. Before the
courts can determine whether a law is constitutional or not, it will have
to interpret and ascertain the meaning not only of said law, but also of
the pertinent portion of the Constitution in order to decide whether there
is a conflict between the two, because if there is, then the law will have
to give way and has to be declared invalid and unconstitutional.
Defining and interpreting the law is a judicial function and the
legislative branch may not limit or restrict the power granted to the
courts by the Constitution. (Bandy vs. Mickelson et al., 44N. W., 2nd
341, 342.)
When it is clear that a statute transgresses the authority vested in the
legislature by the Constitution, it is the duty of the courts to declare the
act unconstitutional because they cannot shrink from it without violating
their oaths of office. This duty of the courts to maintain the Constitution
as the fundamental law of the state is imperative and unceasing; and, as
Chief Justice Marshall said, whenever a statute is in violation of the
fundamental law, the courts must so adjudge and thereby give effect to
the Constitution. Any other course would lead to the destruction of the
Constitution. Since the question as to the constitutionality of a statute is
a judicial matter, the courts will not decline the exercise of jurisdiction
upon the suggestion that action might be taken by political agencies in
disregard of the judgment of the judicial tribunals. (11 Am. Jur., 714-
715.)
Under the American system of constitutional government, among the
most important functions in trusted to the judiciary are the interpreting
of Constitutions and, as a closely connected power, the determination of
whether laws and acts of the legislature are or are not contrary to the
provisions of the Federal and State Constitutions. (11 Am. Jur., 905.).
By legislative fiat as enunciated in section 13, Republic Act NO. 590,
Congress says that taxing the salary of a judicial officer is not a decrease
of compensation. This is a clear example of interpretation or
ascertainment of the meaning of the phrase "which shall not be
diminished during their continuance in office," found in section 9,
Article VIII of the Constitution, referring to the salaries of judicial
officers. This act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by
the Legislature is an invasion of the well-defined and established
province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary.
The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass any
declaratory act, or act declaratory of what the law was before its
passage, so as to give it any binding weight with the courts. A legislative
definition of a word as used in a statute is not conclusive of its meaning
as used elsewhere; otherwise, the legislature would be usurping a
judicial function in defining a term. (11 Am. Jur., 914, emphasis
supplied)
The legislature cannot, upon passing a law which violates a
constitutional provision, validate it so as to prevent an attack thereon in
the courts, by a declaration that it shall be so construed as not to violate
the constitutional inhibition. (11 Am. Jur., 919, emphasis supplied)
We have already said that the Legislature under our form of government
is assigned the task and the power to make and enact laws, but not to
interpret them. This is more true with regard to the interpretation of the
basic law, the Constitution, which is not within the sphere of the
Legislative department. If the Legislature may declare what a law
means, or what a specific portion of the Constitution means, especially
after the courts have in actual case ascertain its meaning by
interpretation and applied it in a decision, this would surely cause
confusion and instability in judicial processes and court decisions.
Under such a system, a final court determination of a case based on a
judicial interpretation of the law of the Constitution may be undermined
or even annulled by a subsequent and different interpretation of the law
or of the Constitution by the Legislative department. That would be
neither wise nor desirable, besides being clearly violative of the
fundamental, principles of our constitutional system of government,
particularly those governing the separation of powers.
So much for the constitutional aspect of the case. Considering the
practical side thereof, we believe that the collection of income tax on a
salary is an actual and evident diminution thereof. Under the old system
where the in-come tax was paid at the end of the year or sometime
thereafter, the decrease may not be so apparent and clear. All that the
official who had previously received his full salary was called upon to
do, was to fulfill his obligation and to exercise his privilege of paying
his income tax on his salary. His salary fixed by law was received by
him in the amount of said tax comes from his other sources of income,
he may not fully realize the fact that his salary had been decreased in the
amount of said income tax. But under the present system of withholding
the income tax at the source, where the full amount of the income tax
corresponding to his salary is computed in advance and divided into
equal portions corresponding to the number of pay-days during the year
and actually deducted from his salary corresponding to each payday,
said official actually does not receive his salary in full, because the
income tax is deducted therefrom every payday, that is to say, twice a
month. Let us take the case of Justice Endencia. As Associate Justice of
the Court of Appeals, his salary is fixed at p12,000 a year, that is to say,
he should receive P1,000 a month or P500 every payday, — fifteenth
and end of month. In the present case, the amount collected by the
Collector of Internal Revenue on said salary is P1,744.45 for one year.
Divided by twelve (months) we shall have P145.37 a month. And
further dividing it by two paydays will bring it down to P72.685, which
is the income tax deducted form the collected on his salary each half
month. So, if Justice Endencia's salary as a judicial officer were not
exempt from payment of the income tax, instead of receiving P500
every payday, he would be actually receiving P427.31 only, and instead
of receiving P12,000 a year, he would be receiving but P10,255.55. Is it
not therefor clear that every payday, his salary is actually decreased by
P72.685 and every year is decreased by P1,744.45?
Reading the discussion in the lower House in connection with House
Bill No. 1127, which became Republic Act No. 590, it would seem that
one of the main reasons behind the enactment of the law was the feeling
among certain legislators that members of the Supreme Court should not
enjoy any exemption and that as citizens, out of patriotism and love for
their country, they should pay income tax on their salaries. It might be
stated in this connection that the exemption is not enjoyed by the
members of the Supreme Court alone but also by all judicial officers
including Justices of the Court of Appeals and judges of inferior courts.
The exemption also extends to other constitutional officers, like the
President of the Republic, the Auditor General, the members of the
Commission on Elections, and possibly members of the Board of Tax
Appeals, commissioners of the Public Service Commission, and judges
of the Court of Industrial Relations. Compares to the number of all these
officials, that of the Supreme Court Justices is relatively insignificant.
There are more than 990 other judicial officers enjoying the exemption,
including 15 Justices of the Court of Appeals, about 107 Judges of First
Instance, 38 Municipal Judges and about 830 Justices of the Peace. The
reason behind the exemption in the Constitution, as interpreted by the
United States Federal Supreme Court and this Court, is to preserve the
independence of the Judiciary, not only of this High Tribunal but of the
other courts, whose present membership number more than 990 judicial
officials.
The exemption was not primarily intended to benefit judicial officers,
but was grounded on public policy. As said by Justice Van Devanter of
the United States Supreme Court in the case of Evans vs. Gore (253 U.
S., 245):
The primary purpose of the prohibition against diminution was not to
benefit the judges, but, like the clause in respect of tenure, to attract
good and competent men to the bench and to promote that independence
of action and judgment which is essential to the maintenance of the
guaranties, limitations and pervading principles of the Constitution and
to the administration of justice without respect to person and with equal
concern for the poor and the rich. Such being its purpose, it is to be
construed, not as a private grant, but as a limitation imposed in the
public interest; in other words, not restrictively, but in accord with its
spirit and the principle on which it proceeds.
Having in mind the limited number of judicial officers in the Philippines
enjoying this exemption, especially when the great bulk thereof are
justices of the peace, many of them receiving as low as P200 a month,
and considering further the other exemptions allowed by the income tax
law, such as P3,000 for a married person and P600 for each dependent,
the amount of national revenue to be derived from income tax on the
salaries of judicial officers, were if not for the constitutional exemption,
could not be large or substantial. But even if it were otherwise, it should
not affect, much less outweigh the purpose and the considerations that
prompted the establishment of the constitutional exemption. In the same
case of Evans vs. Gore, supra, the Federal Supreme Court declared "that
they (fathers of the Constitution) regarded the independence of the
judges as far as greater importance than any revenue that could come
from taxing their salaries.
When a judicial officer assumed office, he does not exactly ask for
exemption from payment of income tax on his salary, as a privilege . It
is already attached to his office, provided and secured by the
fundamental law, not primarily for his benefit, but based on public
interest, to secure and preserve his independence of judicial thought and
action. When we come to the members of the Supreme Court, this
excemption to them is relatively of short duration. Because of the
limited membership in this High Tribunal, eleven, and due to the high
standards of experience, practice and training required, one generally
enters its portals and comes to join its membership quite late in life, on
the aver-age, around his sixtieth year, and being required to retire at
seventy, assuming that he does not die or become incapacitated earlier,
naturally he is not in a position to receive the benefit of exemption for
long. It is rather to the justices of the peace that the exemption can give
more benefit. They are relatively more numerous, and because of the
meager salary they receive, they can less afford to pay the income tax
on it and its diminution by the amount of the income tax if paid would
be real, substantial and onerous.
Considering exemption in the abstract, there is nothing unusual or
abhorrent in it, as long as it is based on public policy or public interest.
While all other citizens are subject to arrest when charged with the
commission of a crime, members of the Senate and House of
Representatives except in cases of treason, felony and breach of the
peace are exempt from arrest, during their attendance in the session of
the Legislature; and while all other citizens are generally liable for any
speech, remark or statement, oral or written, tending to cause the
dishonor, discredit or contempt of a natural or juridical person or to
blacken the memory of one who is dead, Senators and Congressmen in
making such statements during their sessions are extended immunity
and exemption.
And as to tax exemption, there are not a few citizens who enjoy this
exemption. Persons, natural and juridical, are exempt from taxes on
their lands, buildings and improvements thereon when used exclusively
for educational purposes, even if they derive income therefrom. (Art.
VI, Sec. 22 [3].) Holders of government bonds are exempted from the
payment of taxes on the income or interest they receive therefrom (sec.
29 (b) [4], National Internal Revenue Code as amended by Republic Act
No. 566). Payments or income received by any person residing in the
Philippines under the laws of the United States administered by the
United States Veterans Administration are exempt from taxation.
(Republic Act No. 360). Funds received by officers and enlisted men of
the Philippine Army who served in the Armed Forces of the United
States, allowances earned by virtue of such services corresponding to
the taxable years 1942 to 1945, inclusive, are exempted from income
tax. (Republic Act No. 210). The payment of wages and allowances of
officers and enlisted men of the Army Forces of the Philippines sent to
Korea are also exempted from taxation. (Republic Act No. 35). In other
words, for reasons of public policy and public interest, a citizen may
justifiably by constitutional provision or statute be exempted from his
ordinary obligation of paying taxes on his income. Under the same
public policy and perhaps for the same it not higher considerations, the
framers of the Constitution deemed it wise and necessary to exempt
judicial officers from paying taxes on their salaries so as not to decrease
their compensation, thereby insuring the independence of the Judiciary.
In conclusion we reiterate the doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto
vs. Meer, supra, to the effect that the collection of income tax on the
salary of a judicial officer is a diminution thereof and so violates the
Constitution. We further hold that the interpretation and application of
the Constitution and of statutes is within the exclusive province and
jurisdiction of the Judicial department, and that in enacting a law, the
Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be interpreted in such
a way that it may not violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying
the hands of the courts in their task of later interpreting said statute,
specially when the interpretation sought and provided in said statute
runs counter to a previous interpretation already given in a case by the
highest court of the land.
In the views of the foregoing considerations, the decision appealed from
is hereby affirmed, with no pronouncement as to costs.
Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Reyes, and Labrador, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J., concurring:
Without expressing any opinion on the doctrine laid down by this Court
in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, G. R. No. L-2314, in view of the part I
had in that case as former Solicitor General, I wish however to state that
I concur in the opinion of the majority to the effect that section 13,
Republic Act No. 590, in so far as it provides that taxing of the salary of
a judicial officer shall be considered "not to be a diminution of his
compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law", constitutes an
invasion of the province and jurisdiction of the judiciary. In this sense, I
am of the opinion that said section is null and void, it being a
transgression of the fundamental principle underlying the separation of
powers.
PARAS, C.J., concurring and dissenting:
I dissent for the same reasons stated in the dissenting opinion of Mr.
Justice Ozaeta in Perfecto vs. Meer, 85 Phil., 552, in which I concurred.
But I disagree with the majority in ruling that no legislation may
provide that it be held valid although against a provision of the
Constitution.
93 Phil 696 August 31 1953 [Salaries of Judges Tax Exemption]
FACTS:
Saturnino David was the Internal Revenue Collector who ordered Judges
Endencio and Jugo’s salaries. A case was filed. However, upon construing
Article VIII Section 9 of the constitution, it shows that judicial officers are
exempt from paying tax from their salaries and thus considered that the
deduction of salaries from the said judges as a violation from the
compensation received by judicial officers.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 13 of RA 590 is constitutional.
RULING:
No, the Section 13 of RA 590 is unconstitutional. The collection of income
taxes in judicial officers is considered as against the provisions given by the
Article VIII Sec 9 of the Constitution. The compensation shall not be
diminished during their continuance of their service. Section 13 of RA 590
stated that no salary received by any public officer of the republic shall be
exempted from paying its taxes. This specific part of RA 590 is in contrary
with what is Article VIII Sec 9 has provided.
ENDENCIA VS. DAVID
FACTS
This is a joint appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance in Manila
declaring section 13 of RA No. 590 unconstitutional and ordering the appellant
Saturnino David as Collector of Internal Revenue to refund to Justice Pastor
Endencia and to Justice Fernando Jugo the income tax collected on their
salary. When the SC held in the Perfecto case that judicial officers exempt
from salary tax because the collection thereof was a decrease or diminution of
their salaries which is prohibited by the Constitution, the Congress thereafter
promulgated RA No. 590, authorizing and legalizing the collection of income
tax on the salaries of 聽 judicial officers.
ISSUE
Whether or not Section 13 of RA 590 is constitutional
HELD
When it is clear that a statute transgresses the authority vested in the
legislature by the Constitution, it is the duly of the courts to declare the act
unconstitutional. Section 13, RA No. 590 is a clear example of interpretation
or ascertainment of the meaning of the phrase found in section 9, Art. VIII of
the Constitution which refers to the salaries of judicial officers. This act
interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature is an
invasion of the well-defined and established province and jurisdiction of the
Judiciary. The Legislature may not legally provide therein that a statue be
interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a Constitutional prohibition,
thus the unconstitutionality of Section 13 of RA No. 590.
Endencia vs. David
By: Gayle Angeli Recto
G.R. No. L-6355-56
August 31, 1953
FACTS
Collector of Internal Revenue Saturnino David ordered the taxing
of Justice Pastor Endencia’s and Justice Fernando Jugo’s
compensation pursuant to Sec 13 of RA 590 which states that
“SEC. 13. No salary wherever received by any public officer of
the Republic of the Philippines shall be considered as exempt from
the income tax, payment of which is hereby declared not to be a
diminution of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by
law.” According to Solicitor General Juan R. Liwanag and Solicitor
Jose P. Alejandro on behalf of appellant Collector of Internal
Revenue, “our decision in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, was
not received favorably by Congress, because immediately after its
promulgation, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 590. The
Solicitor General also reproduces what he considers the pertinent
discussion in the Lower House of House Bill No. 1127 which
became Republic Act No. 590.
ISSUE
Whether Sec 13 of RA 590 is constitutional or not.
HELD
By legislative fiat as enunciated in section 13, RA No. 590,
Congress says that taxing the salary of a judicial officer is not a
decrease of compensation. This is a clear example of interpretation
or ascertainment of the meaning of the phrase “which shall not be
diminished during their continuance in office,” found in section 9,
Article VIII of the Constitution, referring to the salaries of judicial
officers. This act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof
by the Legislature is an invasion of the well-defined and established
province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary. “The rule is recognized
elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass any declaratory act, or act
declaratory of what the law was before its passage, so as to give it
any binding weight with the courts. A legislative definition of a
word as used in a statute is not conclusive of its meaning as used
elsewhere; otherwise, the legislature would be usurping a judicial
function in defining a term. The reason behind the exemption in the
Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Federal Supreme
Court and this Court, is to preserve the independence of the
Judiciary, not only of this High Tribunal but of the other courts,
whose present membership number more than 990 judicial officials.
The independence of the judges is of far greater importance than
any revenue that could come from taxing their salaries.
In conclusion we reiterate the doctrine laid down in the case of
Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, to the effect that the collection of income
tax on the salary of a judicial officer is a diminution thereof and so
violates the Constitution. We further hold that the interpretation and
application of the Constitution and of statutes is within the
exclusive province and jurisdiction of the judicial department, and
that in enacting a law, the Legislature may not legally provide
therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a
Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands of the courts in
their task of later interpreting said statute, especially when the
interpretation sought and provided in said statute runs counter to a
previous interpretation already given in a case by the highest court
of the land.
ENDENCIA vs. DAVID
G.R. No. L-6355-56, August 31, 1953, 93 Phil. 696
FACTS:
Saturnino David, then Collector of Internal Revenue, ordered the taxing of
Justice Pastor Endencia’s and Justice Fernando Jugo’s salary pursuant to Sec
13 of RA 590 which provides that:
“SEC. 13. No salary wherever received by any public officer
of the Republic of the Philippines shall be considered
as exempt from the income tax, payment of which is hereby
declared not to be a diminution of his compensation fixed by
the Constitution or by law.”

According to the brief of the Solicitor General on behalf of appellant Collector
of Internal Revenue, the decision in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, was
not received favourably by Congress, because immediately after its
promulgation, Congress enacted Republic Act No.590. To bring home
his point, the Solicitor General reproduces what he considers the pertinent
discussion in the Lower House of House Bill No. 1127 which became
Republic Act No. 590.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the imposition of an income tax upon the salaries
of Justice Endencia and Justice Jugo and other members of the
Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts amount to a
diminution.
2. Whether or not Section 13 of Republic Act No. 590
constitutional.
HELD:
1. On the issue of imposition of income tax upon the salaries of the
judges, in a rather exhaustive and well considered decision found and
held under the doctrine laid down by the court in the case of Perfecto
vs. Meer, 85 Phil 552, Judge Higinio B. Macadaeg held that the
collection of income taxes from the salaries of Justice Jugo and Justice
Endencia was in violation of the Constitution of the Philippines, and
so ordered the refund of said taxes.
2. On the issue of whether Section 13 of Republic Act No. 590 is
constitutional, the court believes that this is a clear example
of interpretation or ascertainment of the meaning of the phrase “which
shall not be diminished during their continuance in office,” found in
section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, referring to the salaries of
judicial officers. By legislative fiatas enunciated in section 13,
Republic Act No. 590, Congress says that taxing the salary of a
judicial officer is not a decrease of compensation. This act of
interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature
is an invasion of the well-defined and established province
and jurisdiction of the Judiciary. “The rule is recognized elsewhere
that the legislature cannot pass any declaratory act, or act declaratory
of what the law was before its passage, so as to give it any binding
weight with the courts. A legislative definition of a word as used in a
statute is not conclusive of its meaning as used elsewhere; otherwise,
the legislature would be usurping a judicial function in defining a
term. The court reiterates the doctrine laid down in the case of
Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, to the effect that the collection of income tax
on the salary of a judicial officer is a diminution thereof and so
violates the Constitution. Further, the court holds that
the interpretation and application of the Constitution and of statutes
is within the exclusive province and jurisdiction of the judicial
department, and that in enacting a law, the Legislature may not legally
provide therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it may not
violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands of the
courts in their task of later interpreting said statute, especially when
the interpretation sought and provided in said statute runs counter to a
previous interpretation already given in a case by the highest court of
the land. Thus the court holds that judgment is affirmed, that Section
13, Republic Act 590 in so far as it provides that taxing of the salary of
a judicial officer
shall be considered “not to be a diminution of his compensation fixed
by the Constitution or by law”, constitutes and invasion of the
province and jurisdiction of the judiciary. In this sense, the court is of
the opinion that said section is null and void, it being a transgression
of the fundamental principles underlying the separation of powers. In
the light of the issue on imposing income tax on judges salaries,
dissenting opinion of court cited that judges are also citizens and thus
their salaries are subjected to the Income Tax Law prevailing.
The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed regarding
the constitutional provision in question until it was finally approved by
the Commission disclosed that the true intent of the framers of the
1987 Constitution, in adopting it, was to make the salaries of members
of the Judiciary taxable. The ascertainment of that intent is but
in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional
construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the
people adopting it should be given effect. Hence, court
affirms judgment as in Perfecto vs. Meer on the issue of imposing
income tax on judges’ salaries.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
 FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-33052 August 31, 1981
ANGEL R. QUIMPO, petitioner,
vs.
LEONCIO MENDOZA, as Treasurer for the City of Cagayan de
Oro, and in his personal capacity, and JUDGE BERNARDO
TEVES, as Presiding Judge of Branch IV of the Court of First
Instance of Misamis Oriental, respondents.
GUERRERO, J.:
This is a petition to review on certiorari the decision rendered by the
Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental, Branch IV, dismissing the
suit for mandamus and damages filed by herein petitioner Angel R.
Quimpo against herein respondent Leoncio Mendoza, as Treasurer of
the City of Cagayan de Oro and in his personal capacity.
The background facts are stated in the decision of the lower court, thus:
Petitioner Angel Quimpo is the owner of a building located in Cagayan
de Oro City assessed at P20,000.00 for 1969 under Tax Declaration No.
2102. The realty tax of said building is P400.00 yearly payable in four
equal installments, the first installment to be paid on or before March
31. The second installment, on or before June 30; the third installment,
on or before September 30; and the last installment, on or before
December 31. (Sec. 4, RA 5447).
Petitioner paid on time the first three installments amounting to
P300.00, but with respect to the last installment of P100.00 which was
to be paid on or before December 31, it was only on August 27, 1970
that he tendered the amount of P124.00, which covered, according to his
computation, the tax or last installment of P100.00 and the penalty of
P24.00 to herein respondent City Treasurer of Cagayan de Oro, who
refused the payment insisting that petitioner ought to pay the last
installment of P100.00 plus the penalty of P96.00 or a total of P196.00
(Stipulations, pars. 3 & 4) based on and computed according to Section
42 of the City Charter of Cagayan de Oro RA 521) and the Provincial
Circular No. 18-64 dated July 17, 1964 of the Secretary of Finance
(Exhibit 2 and Stipulations, par. 7).
On September 2, 1970 petitioner deposited by way of consignation the
above-mentioned amount of P124.00 with the Clerk of Court
(Stipulations, par. 5) and instituted the instant action of mandamus, with
damages, against herein respondent City Treasurer in his official as well
as personal capacity, praying for judgment:
1. ORDERING the respondent to accept the payment of taxes for the
last installment and the penalty therefor in the amount of ONE
HUNDRED TWENTY FOUR (Pl24.00);
2. ORDERING the respondent to issue the official receipt for the final
payment of the taxes for 1969, and a tax clearance certificate;
3. DECLARING the act of the respondent in imposing the penalty on
the full amount of the tax even if the late payment was only on the last
installment as illegal, unjust, immoral and oppressive;
4. ORDERING respondent in his personal capacity, to pay damages in
the total amount of TWELVE THOUSAND PESOS (Pl2,000.00), by
way of actual moral, exemplary damages, and attorneys fees, and costs;
5. ORDERING such just and equitable reliefs and remedies under the
premises. 1
The court below sustained the City Treasurer, relying on the main
opinion of this Tribunal in the case of Padilla vs. City of Pasay and City
Treasurer (L-24039, June 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 1349).
The decision under review states:
The law imposes only one annual real estate tax (plus the additional tax
under RA 5447). This tax is due and payable only once, on or before
March 31 of every year. Before the effectivity of RA 5447 the taxpayer
was given the option to pay the tax in two installments, the first on or
before May 31, and the second on or before October 30th. The payment
in two installments was a privilege extended to the taxpayer for his
accommodation and convenience. With the imposition of the additional
tax of one per centum on the assessed value of real property in addition
to the real property tax regularly levied thereon the amount of the tax
shouldered by the taxpayer has practically been doubled, and it is for
this reason, to the mind of the Court, that the new law now allows him
to pay his real tax in four equal installments instead of only two. There
is only one tax, payable in four equal installments on specified dates;
not four different taxes, each with a different due date. ... .
Accordingly, the Court concludes that the ruling of the Supreme Court
in the above-mentioned Padilla case applies squarely to the case at bar.
Hence, the tax liability of petitioner is P100.00, corresponding to the
unpaid last installment, plus P96.00 computed at 2% of the original tax
of P400.00 for every full month of delinquency but not to exceed 24%
from April, 1969 to July 1970. 2
The lower court further held that it was without authority to entertain
the suit for failure of petitioner to comply with the provisions of the
Charter of Cagayan de Oro (Republic Act No. 521) on payment of tax
under protest. 3
Against the foregoing judgment, petitioner assigns the following errors:
1. Respondent Judge erred when he ruled that under Section 4, R.A.
5447, the installments for the basic and additional real property tax have
only one due date but are payable in four equal installments
2. Respondent Judge erred in ruling that on the question of the
imposition of the tax penalty, said penalty must first be paid under
protest before the suit can prosper; and
3. Respondent Judge erred in ruling that the error of respondent City
Treasurer, if any, arose from an honest interpretation of the law or their
meaning, and therefore no damages can be awarded.
In resolving the first assignment of error, it is well to set forth the
pertinent provisions of law, R.A. 521 (Charter of Cagayan de Oro City),
to wit:
Section 42. Taxes on real estate. A tax, the rate of which shall not
exceed two per centum ad valorem to be determined by the Municipal
Board, shall be levied annually on or before the second Monday of
January on the assessed value of all real estate in the city subject to
taxation. All taxes on real estate for any year shall be due and payable
annually on the first day of June, and from this date such taxes together
with all penalties accruing thereto shall constitute a lien on the property
subject to such taxation.
xxx xxx xxx
At the option of the taxpayer, the tax for any year may be paid in two
installments to be fixed annually by the Municipal Board
simultaneously with the rate per centum of ad valorem taxation;
Provided, That the time limit for the first and second installments shall
be set at not later than the thirty first day of May and the thirtieth day of
October of each year, respectively.
xxx xxx xxx
At the expiration of the time for the payment of the real estate tax
without penalty, the taxpayer shall be subject, from the first day of
delinquency, to the payment of a penalty at the rate of two per centum
for each full month of delinquency that has expired, on the amount of
the original tax due, until the tax shall have been paid in full or until the
property shall have been forfeited to the city as provided in this Act:
Provided, That in no case shall the total penalty exceed twenty-four per
centum of the original tax due.
xxx xxx xxx
On January 1, 1969, Republic Act No. 5447 took effect, imposing an
additional tax on real property and providing,inter alia, that "the
pertinent provisions of the corresponding charters of chartered cities to
the contrary notwithstanding, the basic and the additional property tax
shall be due and payable in four equal installments; the first installment
shall be due and payable on or before March 31; the second installment,
on or before June 30; the third installment, on or before September 30;
and the last installment on or before December 31." 4
Petitioner contends that R.A. 5447 explicitly amended the respective
city charters, including R.A. 521, by providing that the real property tax
now becomes due in four equal installments and becomes payable in
four equal installments; that the term "original tax due" in R.A. 521 is
only proper if the tax has one due date and is payable in two or more
installments; and, that R.A. 5447, having been enacted after
the Padilla case relied upon by respondent court, was obviously
intended to cure the harsh but mandatory law as interpreted in said
decision.
We agree with petitioner that, contrary to the conclusion of the lower
court, the aforementioned Padilla case does not apply squarely to the
case at bar.
In Padilla, the applicable law was Republic Act No. 183, otherwise
known as the Charter of the City of Pasay. Therein petitioner Teodoro
Padilla paid the first installment of his 1963 real property tax on time
but paid his second installment only on December 23, 1963, instead of
October 30 of the same year, as required by R.A. 183. This Court held
that his delinquency penalty should be based on the amount of the
original tax due, and computed from June first 5 when said tax became
due and payable. We quote below the pertinent portions of the decision
as follows:
In appellant's brief, it is submitted that the taxpayer having been given
an option to pay his realty tax in two installments and the appellant
having paid within the permissible period, the first installment, he could
not be considered delinquent insofar as the first half of the realty tax is
due. His delinquency should date only from November 1, 1963 by
virtue of his failure to pay on October 30 of the same year. For
appellant, it is inconclusive "how he can be declared delinquent from
June 1, 1963 since the second installment of his real estate tax was not
yet due on that date but will have become due and payable only on the
thirtieth of October 1963". The decision then, according to appellant,
"negates the taxpayer's option to pay his realty tax in two (2)
installments as expressly granted" by law and amounted to unwarranty
judicial legislation.
Appellant's theory is not inherently implausible. Nonetheless, it must
yield to the specific language of the law which is controlling. The last
sentence of the first paragraph of the controlling legal provision reads
thus: "All taxes on real estate for any year shag be due and payable
annually on the first day of June and from this date such taxes together
with all penalties accruing thereto shall constitute a lien on the property
subject to such taxation. Two paragraphs later, the taxpayer is given the
option to pay 'in two installments to be fixed annually by the Municipal
Board simultaneously with the rate per centum ad valorem taxation:"
Provided, That the time limit for the first and second installments shall
be set at not later than the thirty-first day of May and the thirtieth day of
October of each year, respectively.' Then comes the provision as to the
penalty to be imposed in case of delinquency and how to fix the same:
At the expiration of the time for the payment of the real estate tax
without penalty, the taxpayer shall be subject, from the first day of
delinquency, to the payment of a penalty at the rate of two per centum
for each fun month of delinquency that has expired, on the amount of
the original tax due, until the tax shall have been paid in fun or until the
property shall have been forfeited to the city as provided in this ACT:
Provided, That in no case shall the total penalty exceed twenty- four per
centum of the original tax due.
Construed together, the above provisions yield no other conclusion but
that the taxes are due and payable 'on the first day of June' from which
date 'such taxes together with all penalties accruing thereto shall
constitute a lien on the property subject to such taxation. It is true the
taxpayer is given the option to pay in two installments with the
respective dates for the payment thereof 'at not later than the thirty-first
day of May and the thirtieth day of October of each year, respectively.'
Then comes the crucial and decisive provision. 'At the expiration of the
time for the payment of the real estate tax without penalty, the taxpayer
shall be subject, from the first day of delinquency, to the payment of a
penalty at the rate of two per centum for each full month of delinquency
that has expired, on the amount of the original tax due, until the tax shall
have been paid in full or until the property shall have been forfeited to
the city ... .
The law is specific and mandatory. It calls for application as thus
worded. There is no room for interpretation. The penalty is to be based
'on the amount of the original tax due.' The fact that the first installment
was made on time does not benefit the taxpayer at all, thereafter the
second installment were not paid on time. In effect then, the option thus
granted, to pay in two installments, must be strictly complied with,
otherwise the operation of the plain statutory command that the tax due
and payable on June 1st becomes unavoidable and delinquency is to be
computed from such a date.
The aforecited provisions of R.A. 183 (Charter of Pasay City) applied
and interpreted in the Padilla case are indeed almost Identical to the
corresponding provisions in R.A. 521 (Charter of Cagayan de Oro City),
the law applicable to the case at bar. However, the Padilla decision was
promulgated on June 29, 1968, or prior to the passage of R.A. 5447
which, as already stated, took effect on January 1, 1969. As the tax
penalty in question was imposed on the real estate tax for 1969, the
subsequent enactment of R.A. 5447 must be taken into consideration
with R.A. 521 and the pronouncements of this Court in the Padilla case.
A careful reading of the applicable provisions of R.A. 521 and R.A.
5447 reveals the extent to which the former law was modified or
amended by the later statute. While R.A. 521, among others, provides
that the real property tax is "due and payable annually on the first day
of June", R.A. 5447 declares that the same tax (including the additional
tax) "shall be due and payable in four equal installments." In other
words, R.A. 521 specifically and expressly provides for one due date for
the whole annual real estate tax. R.A. 5447, on the other hand, does not
provide for such a specific singular date for the payment of the entire
tax, but directly and unmistakably mandates that the tax shall be due
and payable in four equal installments spread over the period of whole
year, Each installment is due and payable on or before a specified
statutory limit. The last installment is due and payable on or before
December 31 of each year, hence it is only thereafter, or commencing
January 1 of the following year, that delinquency starts as to this final
installment. This being so, it only logically follows that the penalty for
delinquency should be computed from January 1.
The next question now poses itself What is the basis for the computation
of the tax penalty in case of delinquency? The sixth paragraph of
Section 42, R.A. 521 (supra), provides that the taxpayer is subject to " a
penalty at the rate of two per centum for each full month of delinquency
that has expired, on the amount of theoriginal tax due ... ." There is no
corresponding or amendatory provision in R.A. 5447. This later law
does not cover the aspect of penalty in case of delinquency in the
payment of the real estate tax. In the absence of such penalty provision,
respondent City Treasurer insists that the penalty of 2% be based on the
original tax due whereas petitioner maintains that it should be the
amount of the installment due and not paid.
We rule for the petitioner, following the general rule in the interpretation
of tax statutes that such statutes are construed most strongly against the
government and in favor of the taxpayer. Moreover, simple logic
fairness and reason cannot countenance an exaction or a penalty for an
act faithfully done in compliance with the law. Since petitioner is
allowed by law to pay his real estate tax in four equal installments due
and payable on four specified dates and having paid the first three (3)
installments faithfully and religiously, it is manifest injustice, sheer
arbitrariness and abuse of power to penalize him for doing so when he
fails to pay the fourth end last installment.
That it is the legislator's intention to subject the taxpayer to the payment
of the penalty of two (2) per centum on the amount of the delinquent tax
for each month of delinquency or fraction thereof, is clearly evident in
the promulgation of P.D. No. 464 enacting the Real Property Tax Code,
Sec. 66 thereof which provides:
Sec. 66. Penalty for delinquency. — Failure to pay the real property tax
before the expiration of the period for the payment without penalty of
the quarterly installments thereof shall subject the taxpayer to the
payment of a penalty of two per centum on the amount of the delinquent
tax for each month of delinquency or fraction thereof until the
delinquent tax shall be fully paid: Provided, That in no case shall the
total penalty exceed twenty-four per centum of the delinquent tax. The
rate of penalty for tax delinquency fixed herein shall be uniformly
applied in all provinces and cities. (emphasis supplied)
P.D. 464 was promulgated effective June 1, 1974. Section 66 of the P.D.
evidently supplies the omission of a penalty provision in Republic Act
5447. However, since R.A. 5447 amended R.A. 521, the City Charter of
Cagayan de Oro City in making the basic and additional property tax to
be due and payable in four (4) equal installments, We hold that the
penalty provision of R.A. 521, Sec. 42 is deemed modified by
implication.
Accordingly, petitioner's total liability as of August 27, 1970 when he
tendered payment to respondent City Treasurer may be computed as
follows: P100.00 (the fourth and last installment) plus P16.00 penalty (8
months of delinquency from January to August, 1970 at two per centum
on the amount of the delinquent tax of P100.00) which totals Pl 16.00.
As to the second assignment of error, We do not agree with the
respondent court that failure of the petitioner to comply with Section 42
and Section 58 (b) of R.A. 521 requiring payment of taxes under
protest, rendered the court without authority to entertain the suit.
Section 58(b) provides that no court shall entertain any suit assailing the
validity of a tax assessed under this Chapter until the taxpayer shall
have paid, under protest, the taxed assessed against him ... ." (emphasis
supplied.) The phrase "tax assessed" clearly refers to the annual real
estate tax imposable on the taxable real property.
May the phrase "tax assessed" be interpreted to include not only the tax
itself but also all penalties accruing thereto'? The legislative intent is not
clear on this point, reading Section 42 to Section 58 of the Act.
However, in the case of Collector of Internal Revenue vs. Bautista, G.R.
No. L-12250 and L-12259, May 27, 1959, this Court, speaking thru
Justice Roberto Concepcion, who later became Chief Justice, held that a
surcharge is not a "tax" in itself, and We quote:
It will be noted that the surcharge of five per centum (5%) and the
interest of one per centum (1 %) a month, referred to in Section 51 (e)
are imposed upon the "tax unpaid." Similarly, under said section 72, the
"surcharge of fifty per centum (50%) of the amount of" the "deficiency
tax," imposable "in case of ... a false or fraudulent return," shall be
"added" to the "tax or to the deficiency tax". In other words, the
aforementioned surcharge of 50% is not a "tax" in itself, and hence, not
subject to the 5% surcharge and to the interest of 1% a month on the
"unpaid tax", prescribed in section 51(e). Although, pursuant to section
72, said 50% surcharge "shall be collected at the same time and in the
same manner and as part of that tax", the likeness to the tax therein
mentioned refers exclusively to the "time" and "manner"-meaning the
method-of collection, not to the amount to be collected which is not
procedural, but substantive in character."
Since a surcharge is in the nature of a penalty, the ruling cited above is
aptly applicable in the instant case. Furthermore, the particular
circumstances herein cast doubt as to the applicability of Section 58(b),
R.A. 521, which must be resolved in favor of the petitioner. We must
take into consideration his apparent good faith in relying on the
amendatory provisions of R.A. 5447, and the admitted fact that he
tendered payment of the last installment of his 1969 realty tax to
respondent City Treasurer, together with the tax penalty in accordance
with his computation, though erroneous, before filing this case in court.
We likewise take into account the fact that even said respondent
Treasurer erred in interpreting the law. It may be added that it could
have been more expedient for the latter to have accepted the amount
tendered by petitioner in August, 1970, for after all, the tax itself was
not in question. As to the balance of the tax penalty, said respondent's
recourse would have been Section 43 of R.A. 521 which provides:
After a property shall have become delinquent in the payment of taxes
and said taxes and the corresponding penalties shall remain unpaid
ninety days after payment thereof shall have become due, the city
treasurer, or his deputy, if he desires to compel payment through seizure
of any personal property of any delinquent person or persons, shall issue
a duly authenticated certificate, based on the records of his office,
showing the fact of delinquency and the amount of the tax
andpenalty due from said delinquent person or persons or from each of
them. Such certificate shall be sufficient warrant for the seizure of the
personal property belonging to the delinquent person or persons in
question not exempt from seizure; and these proceedings may be carried
out by the city treasurer, his deputy, or any other officer authorized to
carry out legal proceedings. (Emphasis supplied.)
Anent the last assigned error, We agree with the conclusion reached by
respondent court that petitioner is not entitled to actual, moral or
exemplary damages prayed for in his Complaint. It does not appear that
herein respondent City Treasurer's actuations or decisions were tainted
with bad faith. As this Court held in the case ofCabungcal, et al. vs.
Mayor Cordova and Gustilo L-16934, July 31, 1964, 11 SCRA 584),
"(a)n erroneous interpretation of the meaning of the provisions of an
ordinance (by the City Mayor) does not constitute nor does it amount to
bad faith that would entitle an aggrieved party to an award of damages."
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering petitioner to pay
to the City Treasurer of Cagayan de Oro City the amount of P116.00
representing full payment of the last installment of P100.00 on the realty
tax for the year 1969 and the tax penalty of P16.00 for eight months of
his delinquency from January, 1970 to August, 1970; and ordering said
City Treasurer to accept the aforesaid payment, issue the official receipt
therefor and a tax clearance certificate covering the aforementioned real
estate tax and penalty. No costs. Judgment modified.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez and Melencio- Herrera,
JJ., concur.
QUIMPO v. MENDOZA (CITY TREASURER)
FACTS
The case is about the basis for computing the penalty for real estate
taxes. Quimpo is the owner of a parcel of land in City of Cagayan De
Oro (CDO) City valued at 20,000 P in 1969. The realty tax for this
property is 400.00 pesos annually payable in 4 equal instalments. He
paid on time for the first 3 installments amounting to 300.00 but he
defaulted with the last payment and it was only on the 27th of August
the next year that he settled the last instalment. He tried paying to the
City Treasurer of CDO for 124.00 inclusive of the penalty however the
Treasurer declined payment saying that he ought to pay 196.00 (100
pesos for the unpaid tax and 96 pesos representing the penalty). As such,
Quimpo filed action for mandamus with damages against the City
Treasurer and consigned 124.00 pesos before the Court of First Instance.
He asserts that he suffered mental anguish caused by the Treasurer
thereby praying for 12,000 Peso worth of Moral, Actual and Exemplary
damages.
ISSUE/S & HELD
1. The basis of computing the penalty of unpaid instalment. The SC
ruled in favor of the petitioner and held that the provision of the Charter
of CDO being invoked by the City Treasurer is not applicable in the
case at bar. It was repealed impliedly by RA 5447. Since petitioner is
allowed by law to pay his real estate tax in four equal instalments due
and payable on four specified due dates and having paid the three
instalments religiously and faithfully, it is manifest injustice, sheer
arbitrariness and abuse of power to penalize him for doing so when he
fails to pay the fourth and last instalment. Accordingly, petitioner’s total
liability as of August 27 when he tendered payment to City Treasurer is
computed as follows: 100.00 (the fourth and last instalment) plus 16.00
penalty (8 months of delinquency from January to August, at two
percentum on the amount of the delinquent tax of (100.00) which totals
116.00 pesos.
2. Whether damages can be obtained by Quimpo against the City
Treasurer. NO. The city treasurer’s actuations and decisions were not
tainted with bad faith. As held in one case “ an erroneous interpretation
of the meaning of the provisions of an ordinance does not constitute nor
does it amount to bad faith that would entitle an aggrieved party to an
award of damages.