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The Facts
On July 14, 2006, Azuelo, instead of submitting his position paper, moved that
the submission of his position paper be extended to August 4, 2006, which was
granted by LA Bactin. On August 4, 2006, Azuelo again failed to submit his
position paper. LA Bactin then directed Azuelo to submit his position papers on
August 22, 2006. On the said date, Azuelo, instead of submitting his position
paper, moved for the issuance of an order directing ZAMECO to furnish him
with a complete copy of the investigation report as regards his dismissal.
ZAMECO opposed the said motion, asserting that it has already furnished
Azuelo with a copy of its investigation report.
Record shows that respondent has already filed its position paper while
complainant, despite ample opportunity given him, failed to file his[,] leaving
this office with no option but to dismiss this case for lack of interest.
WHEREFORE, let this case be, as it is hereby dismissed for lack of [merit].
SO ORDERED.[8]
On November 21, 2006, Azuelo again filed a complaint with the RAB of the
NLRC in San Fernando City, Pampanga for illegal dismissal with money claims
against ZAMECO, containing the same allegations in his first complaint. The
case was docketed as NLRC Case No. RAB-III-11-10779-06 and was assigned
to LA Reynaldo V. Abdon (LA Abdon).
Issue
Essentially, the issue set forth by Azuelo for the Court's resolution is whether
the dismissal of his first complaint for illegal dismissal, on the ground of lack of
interest on his part to prosecute the same, bars the filing of another complaint
for illegal dismissal against ZAMECO based on the same allegations.
Ruling of the Court
At the outset, it should be stressed that in a petition for review under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, such as the instant petition, where the CA's disposition in a
labor case is sought to be calibrated, the Court's review is quite limited. In ruling
for legal correctness, the Court has to view the CA decision in the same context
that the petition for certiorari it ruled upon was presented to it; the Court has to
examine the CA decision from the prism of whether it correctly determined the
presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC decision before
it, not on the basis of whether the NLRC decision on the merits of the case was
correct.[19]
SO ORDERED.
The Petition
The petitioners bewail the CA's grant of certiorari to the company, which it had
denied in its decision of December 9, 2011 (when it found that the NLRC did
not commit any grave abuse of discretion in its appealed rulings). They find no
justification for the CA's change of mind considering that even in its amended
decision of August 30, 2012, the appellate court reiterated its opinion that the
NLRC committed no grave abuse of discretion in its assailed resolutions of June
30, 2009[20] and July 21, 2010.[21] They contend that the CA amended decision
had no legal basis on both substantive and procedural grounds; it ran counter to
both the basic tenet of a Rule 65 petition for certiorari, and rewarded PHIMCO
for unduly derailing the enforcement of a final and executory decision rendered
way back in 2001.
The three dismissed employees were surprised that despite the lack of any grave
abuse of discretion in the NLRC resolutions, the CA reversed its previous
decision and set aside said resolutions "merely by reason of the Hon. Supreme
Court's subsequent decisions in G.R. No. 170830 and G.R. No. 192875 which
the appellate court considered as supervening events,"[22] in relation to its
decision of February 27, 2001 decreeing their reinstatement. They submit that
this Court's decisions were not raised by PHIMCO in its petition for certiorari
before the CA and thus cannot be made a basis of the appellate court's decision.
They maintain that the present case is separate and distinct from the cases in
G.R. No 170830 and G.R. No. 192875 which was decided more than a decade
ahead of the decisions of the Court invoked by the CA in its amended decision.
The petitioners entreat the Court to rectify the situation "if only to forestall a
bad precedent to debase the sanctity of final and executory judgments."[23] They
urge that the doctrine of immutability of final judgments be respected in
their case They tell the Court that the "supervening event" PHIMCO raised at
this point in the proceedings does not fall under any of the exceptions to the
doctrine and these are: the correction of clerical errors, the so called nunc pro tune
entries which cause no prejudice to any party, void judgments, and
circumstances which transpire after the finality of the decision and which render
the execution unjust and inequitable.[24]
In its Comment (on the petition),[25] the respondent PHIMCO asks for the
dismissal of the petition on grounds that: (1) the CA is correct in relying on the
decisions of this Court in the illegal strike case (G.R. No. 170830) and the illegal
dismissal case (G.R. No. 192875) as basis for its amended decision; and (2) the
rule on "commonality of interests" is applicable to the petitioners.
PHIMCO takes exception to the petitioners' claim that it never raised with the
CA the issue of "supervening event." It contends that right after the filing of its
Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order dated August 9, 2010 with the
CA, it filed an Urgent Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order (dated August 16, 2010)[26] to enjoin the enforcement of the assailed
NLRC resolutions.
PHIMCO maintains that when the CA denied its urgent motion, it filed on
October 4, 2010 a Motion for Reconsideration with a Reply to the comment of
the employees[27] where it first attempted to raise the "supervening event" issue
by manifesting before the CA that this Court's decision in the illegal strike case
(G.R. No. 170830) positively identified the petitioners Libongcogon, Villareal
and Claudio as among the union members who participated in the strike and
who committed illegal acts during the strike. It adds that for this reason, the
Court declared — in the illegal strike case — that they had been validly
dismissed.
Thereafter, several other related incidents ensued where it again called attention
to the "supervening event" issue, one such incident being the filing of the
parties' memoranda[28] on its petition. PHIMCO submits that the entry of the
Court's ruling in the strike case in the Book of Entries of Judgments[29] put an
end to the issue of petitioners' illegal dismissal as upheld by the Court in its
decision in the illegal dismissal case (G.R. No. 192875).
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review on certiorari are the January 27, 2003 Decision[1] and the February 4,
2004 Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 69878, which
had affirmed the Decision[3] dated November 29, 2001, of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC NCR CA No. 025192-2000. The
NLRC decision upheld the Labor Arbiter's finding of illegal dismissal against
herein petitioner.
Private respondents filed with the Labor Arbiter separate complaints against
petitioner for illegal dismissal. They claimed that they reported for work at their
assigned workplaces for twelve-hour shifts; however, their salaries were below
the minimum wage, they were not given 13th month pay, overtime pay, holiday
pay, night shift differential, and the monthly P50 cash bond petitioner promised
at the start of their employment.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.[4]
The NLRC affirmed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the appeal filed by respondents is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit. The [D]ecision dated 28 April 2000 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.[5]
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit. Undaunted,
petitioner filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, which was
likewise dismissed, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition is DENIED.
The November 29, 2001 Decision of the NLRC, Third Division, as well as its
January 31, 2002 Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration of the
petitioner are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the instant petition
raising the following issues:
I.
II.
III.
Private respondents, for their part, counter that the issue of illegal dismissal was
not amicably resolved. They stress that no compromise agreement or any actual
settlement of the case ever materialized before the Labor Arbiter. They aver that
they have substantially proven the fact of their illegal dismissal. Private
respondents point out that it is now too late for petitioner to allege their
supposed resignation.
Should the parties arrive at any agreement as to the whole or any part of the
dispute, the same shall be reduced to writing and signed by the parties and their
respective counsels, if any[,] before the Labor Arbiter.
In order to be valid, any agreement arrived at in the course of the mandatory
conciliation and mediation conference should be in writing and signed by the
parties, or their counsel, before the Labor Arbiter.
In this case, no such written and duly signed evidence of any amicable
settlement of the dispute, whether in whole or in part, was ever adduced. Thus,
petitioner has no basis for claiming that the issue of illegal dismissal has been
amicably settled.
It may be true that in the course of the mandatory conciliation and mediation
conference, the parties agreed that the only issue left was the payment of money
claims. However, the parties later moved for the submission of their respective
position papers on the issues of both illegal dismissal and money claims, thereby
terminating the conciliation and mediation conference. Clearly then, no amicable
settlement at all was reached by the parties.
Anent the second issue, petitioner's belated submission that private respondents
voluntarily resigned deserves no consideration. It should have been raised in the
hearing before the Labor Arbiter. We are not prepared to indulge petitioner's
defense that he thought illegal dismissal was no longer an issue. He could not
have been unaware that during the conciliation and mediation conference, no
agreement on either of the two issues was ever forged.
In this case, petitioner failed to prove (1) that the dismissal of private
respondents was for a valid cause and (2) that he complied with the two- notice
requirement of procedural due process. Hence, we are constrained to agree that
this case is a matter of illegal dismissal.
As for the third issue, Article 279 of the Labor Code, as amended by Section 34
of Republic Act No. 6715,[9] states that:
ART. 279. Security of Tenure. - In cases of regular employment, the employer
shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when
authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work
shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other
privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his
other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his
compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual
reinstatement. (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, having been illegally dismissed, private respondents should be reinstated
to their former positions without loss of seniority rights and other privileges.
They should also be paid their full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and the
monetary equivalent of other benefits, computed from the time their
compensation was withheld from them up to the time of their actual
reinstatement.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.