EDGAR SAN LUIS, petitioner, vs. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, respondent.

G.R. No. 133743

February 6, 2007.

FACTS
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was
the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three
marriages. The first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six
children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia
predeceased Felicisimo. The second was Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias; and
Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, with whom he had no children with respondent but
lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death.

Respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of
Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 146.

Thereater, the heirs of Virginia Sulit filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of improper venue and
failure to state a cause of action. But the trial court issued an order denying the two motions to
dismiss. On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It
held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the
Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in
Makati City. It also ruled that respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition for letters of
administration because her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. The Court of
Appeals reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court, and, hence, the case before the Supreme
Court.

ISSUE
Whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration

HELD
Respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo
by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the
validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with
him was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner
under Article 144 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the property relations between parties
who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from
the beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or
industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co-
ownership, it is not necessary that the property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts
and industry. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained
through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal,
unless the contrary is proven.

Moreover, the Supreme Court founnd that respondent’s legal capacity to file the subject petition for
letters of administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-
owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.

The order of the Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss and its October 24,
1994 Order which dismissed petitioners’ motion for reconsideration is affirmed. It was also
REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
B. E. JOHANNES, vs. Honorable GEORGE R. HARVEY
G.R. No. 18600
March 9, 1922

FACTS
Mrs. Carmen Theodora Johannes nee Carmen D'Almeida, died intestate in Singapore, Straits
Settlements, on August 31, 1921. Of her immediate family there remained the husband, B. E.
Johannes, the brothers, Frederick Charles D'Almeida and Alfred D'Almeida, and the sister, Ida
D'Almeida Johannes. Of these, the husband, the brother Frederick, and the sister Ida, were residents of
Singapore, while the brother Alfred was in Manila. The Singapore heirs apparently joined in asking
that letters of administration be granted by the Supreme Court of the Straits Settlements to B. E.
Johannes, the lawful husband of the deceased. At least, on September 19, 1921, the husband was
named the administrator of the property of the deceased wife, which was locally situate within the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the Straits Settlements. (Under the British law [22 & 23 Charles
II c 10, 29 Charles II c 3, and James II c 17], it would seem that the husband is entitled to the whole of
the estate of his wife if she die intestate to the exclusive of any other next of kin.) On October 1, 1921,
the brother Alfred D' Almeida was, on his petition, appointed administrator of the Manila estate of the
deceased consisting of P109,732.55. This sum it appears, was on deposit in the Manila banks under
and by virtue of guardianship proceedings for the late Carmen Theodora Johannes, which were finally
terminated by the discharge of the guardian, the Philippine Trust Company, on January 16, 1922.

ISSUE
WON (1) Honorable George R. Harvey, as judge of First Instance of the City of Manila, has acted in
excess of his jurisdiction in appointing Alfred D'Almeida administrator of the funds of the estate on
deposit in the Philippines, and (2) WON an administration in the jurisdiction is unnecessary.

RULING
(1) No. It is often necessary to have more than one administration of an estate. When a person dies
intestate owning property in the country of his domicile as well as in a foreign country, administration
is had in both countries. That which is granted in the jurisdiction of decedent's last domicile is termed
the principal administration, while any other administration is termed the ancillary administration.
The reason for the latter is because a grant of administration does not ex proprio vigore have any
effect beyond the limits of the country in which it is granted. Hence, an administrator appointed in a
foreign state has no authority in the United States. The ancillary administration is proper, whenever a
person dies, leaving in a country other than that of his las domicile, property to be administered in the
nature of assets of the decedent, liable for his individual debts or to be distributed among his heirs.

(2) No. It is almost a universal rule to give the surviving spouse a preference when an administrator is
to be appointed, unless for strong reasons it is deemed advisable to name someone else. This
preference has particular force under Spanish law precedents. However, the Code of Civil Procedure,
in section 642, while naming the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, as one to whom
administration can be granted, leaves this to the discretion of the court to determine, for it may be
found that the surviving spouse is unsuitable for the responsibility. Moreover, nonresidence is a factor
to be considered in determining the propriety of the appointment, and in this connection, it is to be
noted that the husband of the deceased, the administrator of the principal administration, resides in
Singapore. Undoubtedly, if the husband should come into this jurisdiction, the court would give
consideration to this petition that he be named the ancillary administrator for local purposes. Ancillary
letters should ordinarily be granted to the domicilliary representative, if he applies therefor, or to his
nominee, or attorney; but in the absence of express statutory requirement the court may in its
discretion appoint some other person.

Pursuant to section 783 of the Code of Civil Procedure, an order of a Court of First Instance
appointing an administration of the estate of a deceased person constitutes a final determination of the
rights of the parties thereunder, within the meaning of the statute, and is appealable