Mamaril vs.

BSP
Facts: Ruling:
 Spouses Benjamin C. Mamaril and Sonia P. Mamaril (Sps. Mamaril) are jeepney  The records are bereft of any finding of negligence on the part of BSP. Neither will
operators. They would park their six (6) passenger jeepneys every night at the Boy the vicarious liability of an employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code apply in this
Scout of the Philippines' (BSP) compound for a fee. On May 26, 1995 at 8 o'clock in case. It is uncontested that Peña and Gaddi were assigned as security guards by AIB
the evening, all these vehicles were parked inside the BSP compound but the to BSP pursuant to the Guard Service Contract. Clearly, therefore, no employer-
following morning, however, one of the vehicles was missing and was never employee relationship existed between BSP and the security guards assigned in its
recovered. According to the security guards (Peña) and (Gaddi) of AIB Security premises. Consequently, the latter's negligence cannot be imputed against BSP but
Agency, Inc. (AIB) with whom BSP had contracted for its security and protection, a should be attributed to AIB, the true employer of Peña and Gaddi.
male person who looked familiar to them took the subject vehicle out of the  Moreover, the Court concurs with the finding of the CA that the contract between
compound. the parties herein was one of lease as defined under Article 1643 of the Civil Code. It
 Sps. Mamaril filed a complaint for damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of has been held that the act of parking a vehicle in a garage, upon payment of a fixed
Manila, Branch 39, against BSP, AIB, Peña and Gaddi. Sps. Mamaril averred that the amount, is a lease. Even in a majority of American cases, it has been ruled that where
loss of the subject vehicle was due to the gross negligence of the above-named a customer simply pays a fee, parks his car in any available space in the lot, locks the
security guards on-duty who allowed the subject vehicle to be driven out by a car and takes the key with him, the possession and control of the car, necessary
stranger despite their agreement that only authorized drivers duly endorsed by the elements in bailment, do not pass to the parking lot operator, hence, the contractual
owners could do so. The two guards admitted their negligence. The BSP and denied relationship between the parties is one of lease. In relation thereto, Article 1664 of
any liabilities ontending that not only did Sps. Mamaril directly deal with AIB with the same Code states that "the lessor is not obliged to answer for a mere act of
respect to the manner by which the parked vehicles would be handled, but the trespass which a third person may cause on the use of the thing leased; but the lessee
parking ticket8 itself expressly stated that the "Management shall not be responsible shall have a direct action against the intruder." Here, BSP was not remiss in its
for loss of vehicle or any of its accessories or article left therein." It also claimed that obligation to provide Sps. Mamaril a suitable parking space for their jeepneys as it
Sps. Mamaril erroneously relied on the Guard Service Contract. Apart from not being even hired security guards to secure the premises; hence, it should not be held liable
parties thereto, its provisions cover only the protection of BSP's properties, its for the loss suffered by Sps. Mamaril.
officers, and employees.
 The RTC found that the act 2 guards constituted gross negligence. BSP was also
adjudged liable because of the Guard Service Contact it entered into with the AIB
offered protection to all properties inside the BSP premises, which includes the
Mamaril’s vehicles. Accorrdingly BSP, AIB and two guards are jointly and severally
liable to the Mamarils.
 The CA affirmed the finding of negligence on the part of security guards Peña and
Gaddi. However, it absolved BSP from any liability, holding that the Guard Service
Contract is purely between BSP and AIB and that there was nothing therein that
would indicate any obligation and/or liability on the part of BSP in favor of third
persons, such as Sps. Mamaril. Nor was there evidence sufficient to establish that
BSP was negligent.
Issue: Won the BSP should be held liable for the loss of their vehicle based on the Guard
Service Contract and the parking ticket it issued.
Tolentino vs Gonzales
Facts:
 Tolentino and Manio purchased to Luzon Rice Mills a piece of land with the camarin
for a certain price, promising therefore to pay in 3 installments. One of the conditions
of that contract of purchase was that on failure of Tolentino and Manio to pay the
balance of said purchase price or any of the installments on the date agreed upon,
the property bought would revert to the original owner.
 The 1st and 2nd installments were paid on the due date, the 3rd installment was paid
beyond the due date. On the date when the balance with interest was paid, the
vendor of said property had issued to the purchasers transfer certificate of title to
said property. Said transfer certificate of title was transfer certificate of which shows
that said land was originally registered in the name of the vendor on the 7th day of
November, 1913.
 On Nov 7, 1922, a representative of vendor of said property wrote Manio , notifying
her that if the balance of said indebtedness was not paid, they would recover the
property with damages for non-compliance with the condition of the contract of
purchase.
 Upon receiving the letter of the vendor of said property of November 7, 1922, the
purchasers, the appellants herein, realizing that they would be unable to pay the
balance due, began to make an effort to borrow money with which to pay the balance
due. Finally, an application was made to the Gonzalez for a loan for the purpose of
satisfying their indebtedness to the vendor of said property, upon condition that the
plaintiffs execute and deliver to him a pacto de retro of said property.
 The contract includes a contract of lease on the property whereby the lessees as
vendors apparently bind themselves to pay rent at the rate of P375 per month and
whereby "Default in the payment of the rent agreed for two consecutive months will
terminate this lease and will forfeit our right of repurchase, as though the term had
expired naturally". Upon maturation of loan, Tolentino defaulted payment and
Gonzales demanded recovery of land.
 Tolentino alleges in his complaint that the contract of pacto de retro sale is a
mortgage and not an absolute sale.
 Issue: WON the contract is a mortgage?
Ruling: SC ruled in favor of Gonzales. The Contract herein is an absolute sale w/ right to
repurchase and not a mortgage. Gonzalez is the owner of the land and Tolentino is only
holding it as a tenant by virtue of a contract of lease
 The contract in question is undeniably a pacto de retro and not a mortgage. The
purpose of the contract is expressed clearly in said quotation that there can certainly
be no doubt as to the purpose of the plaintiff to sell the property in question,
reserving the right only to repurchase the same. The intention to sell with the right
to repurchase cannot be more clearly expressed.
 The purchase and sale, once consummated, is a contract which by its nature transfers
the ownership and other rights in the thing sold. A pacto de retro, or sale with right
to repurchase, is nothing but a personal right stipulated between the vendee and the
vendor, to the end that the latter may again acquire the ownership of the thing
alienated.
 A contract of "loan" differs materially from a contract of "rent." In a contract of "rent"
the owner of the property does not lose his ownership. He simply loses his control
over the property rented during the period of the contract. In a contract of "loan"
the thing loaned becomes the property of the obligor. In a contract of "rent" the thing
still remains the property of the lessor. He simply loses control of the same in a
limited way during the period of the contract of "rent" or lease. In a contract of "rent"
the relation between the contractors is that of landlord and tenant. In a contract of
"loan" of money, goods, chattels or credits, the relation between the parties is that
of obligor and obligee. "Rent" may be defined as the compensation either in money,
provisions, chattels, or labor, received by the owner of the soil from the occupant
thereof. It is defined as the return or compensation for the possession of some
corporeal inheritance, and is a profit issuing out of lands or tenements, in return for
their use. It is that, which is to paid for the use of land, whether in money, labor or
other thing agreed upon. A contract of "rent" is a contract by which one of the parties
delivers to the other some nonconsumable thing, in order that the latter may use it
during a certain period and return it to the former; whereas a contract of "loan", as
that word is used in the statute, signifies the delivery of money or other consumable
things upon condition of returning an equivalent amount of the same kind or
quantity, in which cases it is called merely a "loan." In the case of a contract of "rent,"
under the civil law, it is called a "commodatum."
 In the present case the property in question was sold. It was an absolute sale with
the right only to repurchase. During the period of redemption, the purchaser was the
absolute owner of the property. During the period of redemption, the vendor was
not the owner of the property. During the period of redemption, the vendor was a
tenant of the purchaser. During the period of redemption, the relation which existed
between the vendor and the vendee was that of landlord and tenant. That relation
can only be terminated by a repurchase of the property by the vendor in accordance
with the terms of the said contract. The contract was one of rent. The contract was
not a loan.
Chee Kiong Yam v. Hon. Malik G.R. No. L-50550-52
Facts:
 Chee Kiong Yam and Yap Kieng Yam were charged with estafa through
misappropriations by respondent Rosalinda Amin. But the complaint states on its
face that said petitioners Chee received the amount from respondent Rosalinda M.
Amin "as a loan."
 An independent action for the collection of the same was filed by the respondent
which complaint likewise states that the amount was a “simple business loan’, which
earned interest.
 Several Criminal charges of estafa were filed against the petitioners, but the
complaint information said that the money was a simple loan.
 Unlike the complaints in the other two cases, the complaint in Criminal Case No. M-
208 does not state that the amount was received as loan. However, in a sworn
statement dated September 29, 1976, submitted to respondent judge to support the
complaint, respondent Augusto Sajor states that the amount was a "loan."
 Petitioners allege that the Respondent judge is said to have acted without
jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion because the
facts recited in the complaints did not constitute the crime of estafa, and assuming
they did, they were not within the jurisdiction of the respondent judge. Hence this
petition.
Issue: WON the facts in the complaints constitutes estafa.
Ruling:
 The Court agrees that the facts in the complaint does not constitute estafa.
 In order that a person can be convicted under Art 315 of the RPC, it must be proven
that he has the obligation to deliver or return the same money, goods or personal
property that he received. Petitioners had no such obligation to return the same
money, i.e., the bills or coins, which they received from private respondents. This is
so because as clearly stated in criminal complaints, the related civil complaints and
the supporting sworn statements, the sums of money that petitioners received were
loans.
 The nature of simple loan is defined in Articles 1933 and 1953 of the Civil Code;
 "Art. 1933. - By the contract of loan, one of the parties delivers to another, either
something not consumable so that the latter may use the same for a certain time and
return it, in which case the contract is called a commodatum; or money or other
consumable thing, upon the condition that the same amount of the same kind and
quality shall be paid, in which case the contract is simply called a loan or mutuum.
 It can be readily noted from the above-quoted provisions that in simple loan
(mutuum), as contrasted to commodatum, the borrower acquires ownership of the
money, goods or personal property borrowed. Being the owner, the borrower can
dispose of the thing borrowed (Article 248, Civil Code) and his act will not be
considered misappropriation thereof.
 It appears that respondent judge failed to appreciate the distinction between the
two types of loan, mutuum and commodatum, when he performed the questioned
acts. He mistook the transaction between petitioners and respondents Rosalinda
Amin, Tan Chu Kao and Augusto Sajor to be commodatum wherein the borrower
does not acquire ownership over the thing borrowed and has the duty to return the
same thing to the lender.
Quintos v. Beck G.R. No. L-46240
Facts:
 Beck was a tenant of Quintos. upon the novation of the contract of lease between
them, Quintis gratuitously granted to Beck the use of the furniture ubject to the
condition that the defendant would return them to the plaintiff upon the latter's
demand.
 Quintos sold the furnitures to Maria and Rosario Lopez. Beck was notified of the
conveyance giving him sixty days to vacate the premises. Theafter requiring Beck
to return the furnitures transferred to him for them in the house where they were
found.
 Bec, through another person, wrote to Quintos reiterating that she may call for the
furniture in the ground floor of the house. The defendant wrote another letter to the
plaintiff informing her that he could not give up the three gas heaters and the four
electric lamps because he would use them until the 15th of the same month when
the lease in due to expire.
 The plaintiff refused to get the furniture in view of the fact that the defendant had
declined to make delivery of all of them. Before vacating the house, the defendant
deposited with the Sheriff all the furniture belonging to the plaintiff and they are now
on deposit in the warehouse in the custody of the said sheriff.
 The plaintiff brought this action to compel the defendant to return her certain
furniture which she lent him for his use. She appealed from the judgment of the
Court of First Instance of Manila which ordered that the defendant return to her
the three gas heaters and the four electric lamps found in the possession of the
Sheriff of said city, that she call for the other furniture from the said sheriff of Manila
at her own expense, and that the fees which the Sheriff may charge for the deposit
of the furniture be paid pro rata by both parties.
Issue: Whether or not Beck complied with his obligation to return the furniture upon the
plaintiff's demand by depositing the furniture to the sheriff.
Ruling: The defendant is ordered to return and deliver to the plaintiff, in the residence to
return and deliver to the plaintiff, in the residence or house of the latter, all the furniture,
 The contract entered into between the parties is one of commadatum, because
under it the plaintiff gratuitously granted the use of the furniture to the defendant,
 reserving for herself the ownership thereof; by this contract the defendant bound
himself to return the furniture to the plaintiff, upon the latter’s demand.
 The obligation voluntarily assumed by the defendant to return the furniture upon
the plaintiff's demand, means that he should return all of them to the plaintiff at the
latter's residence or house. The defendant did not comply with this obligation when
he merely placed them at the disposal of the plaintiff, retaining for his benefit the
three gas heaters and the four electric lamps. The provisions of article 1169 of the
Civil Code cited by counsel for the parties are not squarely applicable. The trial
court, therefore, erred when it came to the legal conclusion that the plaintiff failed
to comply with her obligation to get the furniture when they were offered to her.
 As the defendant had voluntarily undertaken to return all the furniture to the
plaintiff, upon the latter's demand, the Court could not legally compel her to bear
the expenses occasioned by the deposit of the furniture at the defendant's behest.
The latter, as bailee, was not entitled to place the furniture on deposit; nor was the
plaintiff under a duty to accept the offer to return the furniture, because the
defendant wanted to retain the three gas heaters and the four electric lamps.

Serrano vs. Central Bank of the Phils.

Facts:
 Serrano made a time deposit, for one year with 6% interest, of One Hundred Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00) with the respondent Overseas Bank of Manila.
Concepcion Maneja also made a time deposit, for one year with 6-½% interest, on
March 6, 1967, of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) with the same
respondent Overseas Bank of Manila.
 Concepcion Maneja, married to Felixberto M. Serrano, assigned and conveyed to
petitioner Manuel M. Serrano, her time deposit with respondent Overseas Bank of
Manila.
 Notwithstanding series of demands for encashment of the aforementioned time
deposits from the respondent Overseas Bank of Manila, not a single one of the
time deposit certificates was honored by respondent Overseas Bank of Manila.
 A petition for mandamus with prelim injunction was hereby issued against Central
Bank of the Philippines and Overseas Bank of Manila and its stockholders, on the
alleged failure of the Overseas Bank of Manila to return the time deposits made
by petitioner and assigned to him, on the ground that respondent Central Bank
failed in its duty to exercise strict supervision over respondent Overseas Bank of
Manila to protect depositors and the general public.
 Respondent Central Bank admits that it is charged with the duty of administering
the banking system of the Republic and it exercises supervision over all doing
business in the Philippines, but denies the petitioner's allegation that the Central
Bank has the duty to exercise a most rigid and stringent supervision of banks,
implying that respondent Central Bank has to watch every move or activity of all
banks, including respondent Overseas Bank of Manila.