I.

National Economy and Patrimony

1. Republic v. Villanueva

June 29, 1982

Garcia, J.
Gabe Ruaro

SUMMARY:
The INC bought land, and wanted to have it registered. The CFI and the SC agreed that it
could not own land, as it is a private corporation.

DOCTRINE:
A corporation sole, a juridical person, is disqualified to acquire or hold alienable lands of
the public domain, in accordance with the constitutional prohibition in Section 11, Art.
XIV of the 1973 Consti that “no private corporation or association ma hold alienable lands
of the public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area.”
Further a church is not entitled to avail itself of the benefits of Section 48(b) which
only applies to Filipino citizens or natural persons. A corporation sole, an unhappy freak
of English law, has no nationality.
Teehankee, dissent:
The lands had already become private by the time the INC acquired them. Thus, the consti.
Prohibition against private corporations owning public land no longer applies.

FACTS:
Lots nos. 568 and 569 in Barrio Dampol, Plaridel Bulacan, with an area of 313 sqm were
acquired by Iglesia ni Cristo in exchange for a lot with an area of 247 sqm. The said lands
are in an area certified as alienable or disposable by the Bureau of Forestry, nad have
santol, mango, and banana trees planted on them. The taxes covering them had been paid.
The INC, a corporation sole, thus filed an application for the registration of the two
lots, alleging that it and its predecessors-in-interest had possessed the land for more than
30 years, citing Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Law.
The Republic, through the director of lands, opposed the application, on the grounds
that as a private corporation, INC is disqualified from holding alienable lands of the public
domain, that the land applied for is public land not susceptible of private appropriation,
and that INC and its predecessors had not been in OCEAN possession since June 12, 1945.
CFI ordered registration of the 2 lots in the name of the INC, represented by
Executive Minister Erano G. Manalo. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE:
WON the INC is allowed to acquire or hold alienable lands of the public domain.

RULING: No.
RATIO:
A corporation sole, a juridical person, is disqualified to acquire or hold alienable lands of
the public domain, in accordance with the constitutional prohibition in Section 11, Art. XIV
of the 1973 Consti that “no private corporation or association ma hold alienable lands of
the public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area.”
Further a church is not entitled to avail itself of the benefits of Section 48(b) which
only applies to Filipino citizens or natural persons. A corporation sole, an unhappy freak of
English law, has no nationality.
Other matters
1. The lots are not private lands, following the doctrine of Susi v. Razon. What was
considered private land in that case was a parcel of land possessed by a Filipino
citizen since time immemorial. Here, the lands are still public lands. A land
registration proceeding presupposes that the land is public.
2. All lands that were not acquired from the government belong to the public domain,
except those in the possession of an occupant and his predecessors since time
immermorial. (Oh Cho v Director of Lands)
3. the right of an occupant of public agricultural land to obtain the confirmation of his
title is derecho dominical incoativo and before the issuance of the certificate of title,
the land still belongs to the state.

DISPOSITIVE: Lower Court Judgment reversed and set aside. Application for
registration dismissed.

Dissenting Opinion, De Castro, J.:

Supposedly a dissenting opinion, but only written to rebut Teehankee’s dissent, wherein
one of De Castro’s ponencias, Herico v. Dar, was cited as proving that lands of the public
domain which by reason of possession and cultivation for a length of time gives rise to the
presumption of a grant by the State. De Castro merely wanted to clarify that only through
the prescribed procedure known as judicial confirmation can full and absolute title be
granted to convert the land into a truly private land. He concurs otherwise.
Just because land has been set aside from the mass of public domain subject to
judicial confirmation of incomplete or imperfect title does not make it private land. It is still
private land, Only when the court adjudicates the land to an applicant does it become
privately owned.
None of this matters because of the constitutional provision quoted. De Castro just
wanted to write this because he’s mad at Teehankee.
Dissenting Opinion, Fernando, C.J.:
The Constitution must be respected. However, it is not the prohibition against private
corporations owning land which is decisive of the case. Rather, it is the provision on
religious freedom which bans the enactment of any law prohibiting its free exercise. Here,
the INC as a corporation sole seeks registration of land, on which a chapel is located.
Religious freedom must be respected, so the land must be registered. Besides, the right of
the Roman Catholic Church to buy land from a Filipino citizen was recognized in RCA of
Davao v. Land Registration.
Dissenting Opinion, Teehankee, J.
Somehow in this opinion Teehankee discussed Meralco’s registration, which was not
included anywhere else in the case.
Teehankee posits that the registration should be allowed, on the thesis that the
lands in question had become private lands after the OCEAN possession for at least 30
years of their predecessors in interest.
In adherence to the established doctrines of Carino, Susi, and all the cases down to
Herico, pursuant to the Public Land Act, the possessor of the subject lands shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a government
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title. Thus, by legal fiction the land has ceased
to be of the public domain and has become private property. As such, the Constitutional
prohibition against private corporations holding lands of the public domain no longer
applies.
The acquisitive prescription provided for in Sec. 48 (b) of the Public Land Act
happens by operation of law, and the public land is converted to and becomes private
property under a showing of OCEAN possession under bona fide claim of ownership for the
statutory period of 30 years immediately preceding the filing of the application.
Cases cited to support this doctrine: Susi v. Razon, Mesina v. Vda. De Sonza, Lacaste v.
Director of Lands, Manaarpac v. Cabanatan, Miguel v. CA, Herico v. DAR.

2. Meralco V. Castro-Bartolome 114 SCRA 799

G.R. No. L-49623 June 29, 1982

FACTS:
Manila Electric Company, a domestic corporation organized under Philippine
laws, more than sixty percent of whose capital stock is owned by Filipino citizens, in
its application filed on December 1, 1976 prayed for the confirmation of its title to
two lots with a total area of one hundred sixty-five square meters located at Tanay,
Rizal acquired from Piguing spouses on August 13, 1976. Piguing spouses bought
the land from Olympia Ramos who possessed it since Pacific war. The land was
declared for realty tax purposes since 1945 and had been paid thereon up to 1977.
The Republic of the Philippines opposed the application on the grounds that
the applicant, as a private corporation,is disqualified to hold alienable public lands
and that the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest have not been in the open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land for at
least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application.The lower
rendered a decision dismissing the application because in its opinion the Meralco is
not qualified to apply for the registration of the said land since under section 48(b)
of the Public Land Law only Filipino citizens or natural persons can apply for
judicial confirmation of their imperfect titles to public land.
 Meralco contends that the said land after having been possessed in the
concept of owner by Olimpia Ramos and the Piguing spouses for more than thirty
years, had become private land and, therefore, the constitutional prohibition,
banning a private corporation from acquiring alienable public land, is not applicable.
It has invoke section 48(b) of the Public Land Law, not for itself, but for the Piguing
spouses who, as Filipino citizens, could secure a judicial confirmation of their
imperfect title to the land.

ISSUE:
(1)W/N Meralco is allowed under the Law to acquire lands of public domain
and apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
(2)Does the possession tacked to predecessor private corporation
automatically guarantee its rights to possession of the land.
(3)W/N it is contingent for a judicial confirmation of title before any grant
would be extended to a juridical person?

RULING:
(1)No. Private corporation or juridical person is prohibited and not allowed
under the law to acquire lands of public domain.
(2)No. The presumption that since they bought the property from the person
who occupied the land in open, continuous, and notorious possession of the public
land for more than thirty years,does not automatically amount to rights and
possession. It would cease to be public only upon the issuance of the certificate of
Title to any Filipino citizen claiming it under the law. This conclusion is anchored on
the principle that,”all Lands that were not acquired from the Government either by
purchase,grant, or homestead shall belong to the public domain. The exception to
the rule is only when the occupant and his predecessor-in-interest possessed and
occupied the same since time immemorial. In which case, it justifies the
presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or had been a
private property even before the Spanish government.
(3)Yes. In this case, the court declared that is is contingent upon the issuance
of title before a juridical entity may acquire possession over a property. It simply
means that until the certificate of title is issued, a piece of land, over which an
imperfect title is sought to be confirmed remains a part of public land. As between
the State and the Meralco, the said land is still public land. Any levy and execution
were void. Section 11 of Article XIV makes no distinction between alienable
agricultural public lands as to which no occupant has an imperfect title and
alienable lands of the public domain as to which an occupant has an imperfect title
subject to judicial confirmation, thus we should not make any distinction or
qualification
3. Director of Lands V. IAC146 SCRA 509
G.R. No. 73002 December 29, 1986
Lessons Applicable: Sec. 3 Art. XII, 1987 Constitution (Land Titles and Deeds)

FACTS:
Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., a corp. represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario,
acquired from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe 5 parcels of
land
possession of the Infiels over the landdates back before the Philippines was
discovered by Magellan
land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to RA 3872 granting absolute
ownership to members of the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or
their ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or disposable public land or within
the public domain
Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than P45M worth of
improvements
ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered was duly recognized
by the government when the Municipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela
donated part of the land as the townsite of Maconacon Isabela
IAC affirmed CFI: in favor of
ISSUES:
W/N the land is already a private land - YES
W/N the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private corporations
or associations applies- NO
HELD: IAC affirmed Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc
YES
already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the
Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of title should be issued in
order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is
sufficient
it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property,
at least by presumption
The application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not affect
the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens
title to be issued upon the strength of said patent.
The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to
establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law
2. NO
 If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which the
Infiels had a legally sufficient and transferable title on October 29, 1962 when Acme
acquired it from said owners, it must also be conceded that Acme had a perfect right
to make such acquisition
The only limitation then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or
lease public agricultural lands in excess of 1,024 hectares

4. Godines V. Pak Luen 120 SCRA 223

FACTS:Jose Godinez married to Martina Alvarez Godinez has acquired a parcel of

land in Jolo Townsiteduring their marriage. Martina died in 1938 leaving the
plaintiffs as their sole surviving heirs. InNovember 1941 Jose Godinez sold the said
land to Fong Pak Luen a chinese citizen without theknowledge of the plaintiffs. On
January 11, 1963, defendant Fong Pak Luen executed a powerof attorney in favor of
his co-defendant Kwan Pun Ming, also an alien, who conveyed and soldthe above
described parcel of land to co-defendant Trinidad S. Navata.The plaintiffs filed this
case to seek the recovery of said land on the ground that the sale wasnull and void
ab initiosince it violates the Constitution and the Civil Code because respondent isan
alien not allowed to acquire property and since Gidonez could not have legally
conveyed theentire property being a conjugal property. Thus, the alleged attorney-
in-fact, defendant KwanPun Ming had not conveyed any title or interest over said
property and defendant Navata. Defendant Navata responded that the complaint
does not state a cause of action since itappears from the allegation that the property
is registered in the name of Jose Godinez so thatas his sole property he may dispose
of the same and that the cause of action has been barredby the statute of limitations
as the alleged document of sale executed by Jose Godinez onNovember 27, 1941 and
the action was brought only on on September 30, 1966, beyond the 10year period
provided for by law

ISSUE: Whether or not the heirs of a person who sold a parcel of land to an alien in
violation of aconstitutional prohibition may recover the property if it had, in the
meantime, been conveyed toa Filipino citizen qualified to own and possess it.

RULING:
The heirs cannot recover the property sold to an alien if it had been conveyed to a
Filipinocitizen qualified to own and possess it.There can be no dispute that the sale
in 1941 by Jose Godinez to Fong Pak Luen, a Chinesecitizen residing in Hongkong,
was violative of the Constitution which provides that aliens maynot acquire private
or agricultural lands, including residential lands." Consequently, prescriptionmay
never be invoked to defend that which the Constitution prohibits. It does not
 necessarilyfollow that the appellants may be allowed to recover the property sold to
an alien as thedisqualified alien vendee later sold the same property to Trinidad S.
Navata, a Filipino citizenqualified to acquire real property. The litigated property is
now in the hands of a naturalizedFilipino. It is no longer owned by a disqualified
vendee.

5. Philippine Ports Authority vs. Hon. Rafael L. Mendoza, G.R. No. L-48304,
September 11, 1985
Facts: The Board of Directors of PPA passed Resolution No. 10 placing on only one
organization the responsibility for the operation of arrastre and stevedoring
services in one port. To implement its policy of integration, PPA issued
Memorandum Order No. 21 which provides that it is necessary that two or more
contractors presently operating within the same port premises who desire to
continue or renew their cargo handling services must merge into only one
organization. Accordingly, the eleven port services contractors in the Cebu City Port
formed the United South Dockhandlers, Inc. (USDI). The latter corporation was
recognized by PPA and granted a special permit to handle exclusively the cargo
handling requirements of the entire port in the City of Cebu pending the eventual
award of a management contract.
Private respondents Pernito, et al. instituted an action for declaratory relief and
mandamus with preliminary preventive and mandatory injunction and damages
against PPA and USDI. They assail the policy adopted by PPA to grant only one
permit to only one group as violative of the constitutional and statutory provision
on monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade.
Issue: Whether or not PPA's policy of integration through compulsory merger is
unconstitutional and void for being violative of the constitutional and statutory
provision on monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade.
Ruling: No.
Section 2, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution provides that “the state shall regulate
or prohibit private monopolies when the public interest so requires. No
combination in restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed.”
Private monopolies are not necessarily prohibited. The use of the word "regulate" in
the Constitution indicates that some monopolies, properly regulated, are allowed.
Regulate means includes the power to control, to govern, and to restrain, but
regulate should not be construed as synonymous with suppress or prohibit.
"Competition can best regulate a free economy. Like all basic beliefs, however, that
principle must accommodate hard practical experience. There are areas where for
special reasons the force of competition, when left wholly free, might operate too
destructively to safeguard the public interest. Public utilities are an instance of that
 consideration." By their very nature, certain public services or public utilities such
as those which supply water, electricity, transportation, telegraph, etc. must be
given exclusive franchises if public interest is to be served. Such exclusive franchises
are not violative of the law against monopolies (Anglo-Fil Trading Corporation vs.
Lazaro, supra).
In the case at bar, the area affected is maritime transportation in the port of Cebu.
The operations there, particularly arrastre and stevedoring, affect not only the City
of Cebu, the principal port in the South, but also the economy of the whole country
as well. Any prolonged disjunction of the services being rendered there will
prejudice not only inter-island and international trade and commerce. Operations in
said port are therefore imbued with public interest and are subject to regulation and
control for the public good and welfare. PPA's policy of integration through
compulsory merger may not even be in this instance considered as promoting a
monopoly because the fact of the matter is that while the sole operator permitted by
PPA to engage in the arrastre and stevedoring operations in the port of Cebu is only
USDI, actually USDI is comprised of the eleven (11) port services contractors that
previously used said ports but decided to merge and ultimately constituted
themselves as USDI.
But over and above the platter of whether the monopoly has been created, the
overriding and more significant consideration is public interest. Accordingly, PPA's
policy of integration is not violative of any constitutional and legal provision on
monopolies.
6. The Secretary of DENR V Mayor Jose Yap et. Al. October 8 ,2008
G.R. No. 167707

October 8, 2008

FACTS: On November 10, 1978, then President Marcos issued Proc. No. 1801
declaring Boracay Island, among other islands, caves and peninsulas in the
Philippines, as tourist zones and marine reserves under the administration of the
Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). President Marcos later approved the issuance
of PTA Circular 3-82 dated September 3, 1982, to implement Proclamation No.
1801.

Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded them
from filing an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of
land for titling purposes, respondents-claimants Mayor . Yap, Jr., and others filed a
petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan
In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proc. No. 1801 and PTA
Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied
lands. They declared that they themselves, or through their predecessors-in-
interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time immemorial. They
declared their lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on them. Respondents-
claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and its implementing Circular did not
place Boracay beyond the commerce of man. Since the Island was classified as a
tourist zone, it was susceptible of private ownership. Under Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act, they had the right to have the lots registered in their names
through judicial confirmation of imperfect titles.

The Republic, through the OSG, opposed the petition for declaratory relief. The OSG
countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. It
formed part of the mass of lands classified as “public forest,” which was not
available for disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of the Revised Forestry Code, as
amended. The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants’ reliance on PD No. 1801
and PTA Circular No. 3-82 was misplaced. Their right to judicial confirmation of
title was governed by Public Land Act and Revised Forestry Code, as amended.
Since Boracay Island had not been classified as alienable and disposable, whatever
possession they had cannot ripen into ownership.

On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents-claimants,

declaring that, “PD 1810 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 Revised Forestry Code, as
amended.

The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied. The Republic then
appealed to the CA. On In 2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto the RTC
decision. Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly denied. Hence,
the present petition under Rule 45.

On May 22, 2006, during the pendency the petition in the trial court, President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064 classifying Boracay Island
partly reserved forest land (protection purposes) and partly agricultural land
(alienable and disposable).

On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Sacay,and other landowners in Boracay

filed with this Court an original petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification
of Proclamation No. 1064. They allege that the Proclamation infringed on their
“prior vested rights” over portions of Boracay. They have been in continued
possession of their respective lots in Boracay since time immemorial.

On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of the two petitions

ISSUE: the main issue is whether private claimants have a right to secure titles over
their occupied portions in Boracay.

HELD: petitions DENIED. The CA decision is reversed.

Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an unclassified land
of the public domain prior to Proclamation No. 1064. Such unclassified lands are
considered public forest under PD No. 705.

PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of the
public domain as public forest. Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a public forest as
“a mass of lands of the public domain which has not been the subject of the present
system of classification for the determination of which lands are needed for forest
purpose and which are not.” Applying PD No. 705, all unclassified lands, including
those in Boracay Island, are ipso facto considered public forests. PD No. 705,
however, respects titles already existing prior to its effectivity.

The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest
or timber, such classification modified by the 1973 Constitution. The 1987
Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution classification with one addition:
national parks. Of these, only agricultural lands may be alienated. Prior to
Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006, Boracay Island had never been expressly
and administratively classified under any of these grand divisions. Boracay was an
unclassified land of the public domain.

A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping

with the presumption of State ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized
that there must be a positive act of the government, such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports
of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant may
also secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to have been
possessed for the required number of years is alienable and disposable. The burden
of proof in overcoming such presumption is on the person applying for registration
 (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is
alienable or disposable.

In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action,

report, statute, or certification was presented to the Court. The records are bereft of
evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private
claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the land is alienable and
disposable. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed.
They call for proof.

Proc. No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to classify Boracay Island
as alienable and disposable land. If President Marcos intended to classify the island
as alienable and disposable or forest, or both, he would have identified the specific
limits of each, as President Arroyo did in Proclamation No. 1064. This was not done
in Proclamation No. 1801.

7. Republic of the Philippines V CA. August 6 2008

8. Province of North Cotabato V. The Government

President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in line with the government‘s policy of pursuing

peace negotiations with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), asked Prime
Minister Mahathir Mohammad to convince the MILF to continue negotiating with
the government. MILF, thereafter, convened its Central Committee and decided to
meet with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP). Formal peace
talks were held in Libya which resulted to the crafting of the GRP-MILF Tripoli
Agreement on Peace (Tripoli Agreement 2001) which consists of three (3) aspects:
a.) security aspect; b.) rehabilitation aspect; and c.) ancestral domain aspect. Various
negotiations were held which led to the finalization of the Memorandum of
Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD). The said memorandum was set to
be signed last August 5, 2008. In its body, it grants ―the authority and jurisdiction
over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro to the
Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE). The latter, in addition, has the freedom to enter
into any economic cooperation and trade relation with foreign countries. ―The
sharing between the Central Government and the BJE of total production pertaining
to natural resources is to be 75:25 in favor of the BJE. The MOA-AD further provides
for the extent of the territory of the Bangsamoro. It describes it as ―the land mass as
well as the maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial domains, including the aerial
domain and the atmospheric space above it, embracing the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan
geographic region. With regard to governance, on the other hand, a shared
responsibility and authority between the Central Government and BJE was
provided. The relationship was described as ―associative. With the formulation of
the MOA-AD, petitioners aver that the negotiation and finalization of the MOA-AD
violates constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation, as mandated
by Executive Order No. 3, and right to information. They further contend that it
violates the Constitution and laws. Hence, the filing of the petition.

ISSUES:

1) Whether or not the MOA-AD violates constitutional and statutory provisions on

public consultation and right to information 2) Whether or not the MOA-AD violates
the Constitution and the laws.

HELD:

The MOA-AD subject of the present cases is of public concern, involving as it does
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State, which directly affects the lives
of the public at large. Intended as a ―splendid symmetry to the right to information
under the Bill of Rights is the policy of public disclosure under Section 28, Article II
of the Constitution which provides that subject to reasonable conditions prescribed
by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest. Moreover, the policy of full public disclosure
enunciated in above-quoted Section 28 complements the right of access to
information on matters of public concern found in the Bill of Rights. The right to
information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while Section
28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands.
The policy of public disclosure establishes a concrete ethical principle for the
conduct of public affairs in a genuinely open democracy, with the people‘s right to
know as the centerpiece. It is a mandate of the State to be accountable by following
such policy. These provisions are vital to the exercise of the freedom of expression
and essential to hold public officials at all times accountable to the people.
Indubitably, the effectivity of the policy of public disclosure need not await the
passing of a statute. As Congress cannot revoke this principle, it is merely directed
to provide for ―reasonable safeguards.‖ The complete and effective exercise of the
right to information necessitates that its complementary provision on public
disclosure derive the same self-executory nature. Since both provisions go hand-in-
hand, it is absurd to say that the broader right to information on matters of public
concern is already enforceable while the correlative duty of the State to disclose its
transactions involving public interest is not enforceable until there is an enabling
law. Respondents cannot thus point to the absence of an implementing legislation as
an excuse in not effecting such policy. An essential element of these freedoms is to
keep open a continuing dialogue or process of communication between the
government and the people. It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free
political discussion be maintained to the end that the government may perceive and
be responsive to the people‘s will. Envisioned to be corollary to the twin rights to
information and disclosure is the design for feedback mechanisms. The imperative
of a public consultation, as a species of the right to information, is evident in the
―marching orders‖ to respondents. The mechanics for the duty to disclose
information and to conduct public consultation regarding the peace agenda and
process is manifestly provided by E.O. No. 3. The preambulatory clause of E.O. No. 3
declares that there is a need to further enhance the contribution of civil society to
the comprehensive peace process by institutionalizing the people‘s participation.
One of the three underlying principles of the comprehensive peace process is that it
―should be community-based, reflecting the sentiments, values and principles
important to all Filipinos and ―shall be defined not by the government alone, nor by
the different contending groups only, but by all Filipinos as one community.
Included as a component of the comprehensive peace process is consensus-building
and empowerment for peace, which includes ―continuing consultations on both
national and local levels to build consensus for a peace agenda and process, and the
mobilization and facilitation of people‘s participation in the peace process.Clearly,
E.O. No. 3 contemplates not just the conduct of a plebiscite to effectuate “continuing”
consultations, contrary to respondents’ position that plebiscite is “more than
sufficient consultation.Further, E.O. No. 3 enumerates the functions and
responsibilities of the PAPP, one of which is to ―conduct regular dialogues with the
National Peace Forum (NPF) and other peace partners to seek relevant information,
comments, recommendations as well as to render appropriate and timely reports on
the progress of the comprehensive peace process. E.O. No. 3 mandates the
establishment of the NPF to be ―the principal forum for the Presidential Adviser on
Peace Progress (PAPP) to consult with and seek advi[c]e from the peace advocates,
peace partners and concerned sectors of society on both national and local levels, on
the implementation of the comprehensive peace process, as well as for
government[-]civil society dialogue and consensus-building on peace agenda and
initiatives. In fine, E.O. No. 3 establishes petitioners’ right to be consulted on the
peace agenda, as a corollary to the constitutional right to information and
disclosure. In general, the objections against the MOA-AD center on the extent of the
powers conceded therein to the BJE. Petitioners assert that the powers granted to
the BJE exceed those granted to any local government under present laws, and even
go beyond those of the present ARMM. Before assessing some of the specific powers
that would have been vested in the BJE, however, it would be useful to turn first to a
general idea that serves as a unifying link to the different provisions of the MOA-AD,
namely, the international law concept of association. Significantly, the MOA-AD
explicitly alludes to this concept, indicating that the Parties actually framed its
provisions with it in mind. Association is referred to in paragraph 3 on TERRITORY,
paragraph 11 on RESOURCES, and paragraph 4 on GOVERNANCE. It is in the last
mentioned provision, however, that the MOA-AD most clearly uses it to describe the
envisioned relationship between the BJE and the Central Government.

4. The relationship between the Central Government and the Bangsamoro juridical
entity shall be associative characterized by shared authority and responsibility with
a structure of governance based on executive, legislative, judicial and administrative
institutions with defined powers and functions in the comprehensive compact. A
period of transition shall be established in a comprehensive peace compact
specifying the relationship between the Central Government and the BJE. The nature
of the ―associative relationship may have been intended to be defined more
precisely in the still to be forged Comprehensive Compact. Nonetheless, given that
there is a concept of ―association in international law, and the MOA-AD – by its
inclusion of international law instruments in its TOR– placed itself in an
international legal context, that concept of association may be brought to bear in
understanding the use of the term ―associative in the MOA-AD. The MOA-AD
contains many provisions which are consistent with the international legal concept
of association, specifically the following: the BJE‘s capacity to enter into economic
and trade relations with foreign countries, the commitment of the Central
Government to ensure the BJE‘s participation in meetings and events in the ASEAN
and the specialized UN agencies, and the continuing responsibility of the Central
Government over external defense. Moreover, the BJE‘s right to participate in
Philippine official missions bearing on negotiation of border agreements,
environmental protection, and sharing of revenues pertaining to the bodies of water
adjacent to or between the islands forming part of the ancestral domain, resembles
the right of the governments of FSM and the Marshall Islands to be consulted by the
U.S. government on any foreign affairs matter affecting them. These provisions of
the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the
status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it. The
concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution. No
province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as
having an ―associative‖ relationship with the national government. Indeed, the
concept implies powers that go beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to
any local or regional government. It also implies the recognition of the associated
entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state in this
jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a
transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for
independence.
Even the mere concept animating many of the MOA-AD‘s provisions, therefore,
already requires for its validity the amendment of constitutional provisions,
specifically the following provisions of Article X:
SECTION 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the
Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be
autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter
provided. SECTION 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and
geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage,
economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the
framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial
integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.
It is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with
the national government being fundamentally different from that of the ARMM.
Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in
the Montevideo Convention, namely, a permanent population, a defined territory, a
government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states.
The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government
and the BJE being itself contrary to the present Constitution, it is not surprising that
many of the specific provisions of the M OA-AD on the formation and powers of the
BJE are in conflict with the Constitution and the laws. Article X, Section 18 of the
Constitution provides that ―[t]he creation of the autonomous region shall be
effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a
plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and
geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the
autonomous region.
The BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even assuming that it is
covered by the term ―autonomous region in the constitutional provision just
quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict with it. Under paragraph 2(c) on
TERRITORY in relation to 2(d) and 2(e), the present geographic area of the ARMM
and, in addition, the municipalities of Lanao del Norte which voted for inclusion in
the ARMM during the 2001 plebiscite – Baloi, Munai, Nunungan, Pantar, Tagoloan
and Tangkal – are automatically part of the BJE without need of another plebiscite,
in contrast to the areas under Categories A and B mentioned earlier in the overview.
That the present components of the ARMM and the above-mentioned municipalities
voted for inclusion therein in 2001, however, does not render another plebiscite
unnecessary under the Constitution, precisely because what these areas voted for
then was their inclusion in the ARMM, not the BJE.
 Article II, Section 22 of the Constitution must also be amended if the scheme
envisioned in the MOA-AD is to be effected. That constitutional provision states:
―The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous cultural communities
within the framework of national unity and development. An associative
arrangement does not uphold national unity. While there may be a semblance of
unity because of the associative ties between the BJE and the national government,
the act of placing a portion of Philippine territory in a status which, in international
practice, has generally been a preparation for independence, is certainly not
conducive to national unity.
The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only
its specific provisions but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative
relationship envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the
concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is
on its way to independence.
While there is a clause in the MOA-AD stating that the provisions thereof
inconsistent with the present legal framework will not be effective until that
framework is amended, the same does not cure its defect. The inclusion of
provisions in the MOA-AD establishing an associative relationship between the BJE
and the Central Government is, itself, a violation of the Memorandum of Instructions
from the President dated March 1, 2001, addressed to the government peace panel.
Moreover, as the clause is worded, it virtually guarantees that the necessary
amendments to the Constitution and the laws will eventually be put in place. Neither
the GRP Peace Panel nor the President herself is authorized to make such a
guarantee. Upholding such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the
constituent powers vested only in Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the
people themselves through the process of initiative, for the only way that the
Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment process is through an undue
influence or interference with that process.
9. Nicasio Alcantara V. DENR, July 31, 2008
Case Name: Nicasio Alcantara vs Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems
(COSLAP), Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and Rolando
Paglangan as private respondent
Citation: G.R. No. 145838. July 20, 2001

Procedural History:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA) affirming the decision of COSLAP and denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.

Facts:
In 1993, petitioner was granted the lease of 923 hectares of public forest land in
Sitio
Lanton, General Santos City through Forest Land Grazing Lease Agreement No. 542
(FLGLA No. 542) for 25 years.
Before the lease was granted, private respondent Paglangan along with Sabel
Esmael and
Lasid Acop filed a letter of complaint with COSLAP to cancel FLGLA No. 542.
Petitioner questioned COSLAP’s jurisdiction to administer and dispose of public
lands.
COSLAP went on with the hearing and petitioner alleged that he was not given the
opportunity to be present and participate in the field investigations conducted.
On August 3, 1998 COSLAP cancelled FLGLA No. 542 and petitioner appealed to CA
for certiorari. CA dismissed the petition for certiorari and subsequent motion for
reconsideration.
Based on the records, the land area being claimed by private respondents belongs
to the B’laan indigenous cultural community since they have been in possession
of, and have been occupying and cultivating the same since time immemorial, a
fact has not been disputed by petitioner.

Issue:
1) Whether or not CA erred in ruling that petitioner has recognized COSLAP’s
jurisdiction over the case by participating actively in the proceedings.
2) Whether or not COSLAP has jurisdiction over the case.

Ratio Decidendi:
1) Active participation of a respondent in the case pending against him before a
court or a quasi-judicial body is tantamount to recognizing its jurisdiction and
therefore cannot question it later after the decision.
2) COSLAP has jurisdiction to resolve land problems or disputes which are
critical and
explosive in nature, for instance, between occupants and lease agreement holders.
3) It was likewise declared by the appellate court that FLGLA No. 542 granted to
petitioner violated Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 410[13] which states that all
unappropriated agricultural lands forming part of the public domain are declared
part of the ancestral lands of the indigenous cultural groups occupying the same,
and these lands are further declared alienable and disposable, to be distributed
exclusively among the members of the indigenous cultural group concerned.

Holding: Petition is denied.

10. Oroport Cargohandling Service Inc V. Phividec Industrial Authority, July 28,
2008
Oroport Cargohandling Services, Inc. v
Phividec Industrial Authority
28 July 2008 | Ponente: Quisumbing

Overview: In 2003, Oroport participated in a bidding for the management and

operation of Mindanao Container Terminal (MCT). No bidder won in the two public
biddings conducted so Phividec Industrial Authority (PIA) took over MCT
operations. Oroport then sued PIA and Phividec in the RTC for injunction and
damages. RTC ruled in Oroport’s favor. In a petition for certiorari and prohibition
filed by PIA with the CA, CA annulled the orders of the RTC ruling that the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing them. SC affirmed the CA ruling that
(1) the RTC has no jurisdiction to issue the writ of preliminary injunction (RA 8975)
and (2) PIA can temporarily operate as a seaport cargo-handler upon agreement
with PPA (Philippine Ports Authority) sans a franchise or a license.

Statement of the Case

- RTC: (1) April 27, 2004 - the RTC enjoined PIA and Phividec from handling
cargoes not owned or consigned to its industrial estate locators; (2) May 11, 2004 -
RTC issued the two orders (a) denying the MR filed by defendants with urgent
motion for the dismissal of the complaint and (b) granting the injunctive relief
prayed for by the plaintiff.
- CA: January 5, 2005 – Annulled the orders of the RTC.

Background
- Oroport is a cargo-handling contractor at the Cagayan de Oro International
Port.
- PIA (Phividec Industrial Authority) is a Phividec subsidiary created to uplift
the socio-economic condition of war veterans, military retirees and their children by
allowing them to participate in its development undertakings as employees,
developers and business partners with the mission to establish, develop and
professionally administer industrial areas, ports and utilities.
- Mindanao Container Terminal (MCT) is a P3.24 billion government
infrastructure project at Phividec Industrial Estate in Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental.
MCT was funded by a loan contracted by the Philippine government with the Japan
Bank for International Cooperation. It was later renamed Mindanao Container
Terminal Sub-Port and placed under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs as a
sub-port entry.

Statement of Facts
- 2003: Oroport bid for the management and operation of MCT. As no bidder
won in the two public biddings, PIA took over MCT operations.
- April 19, 2004: Oroport sued PIA and Phividec in the RTC for injunction and
damages.
- It accused PIA of illegally operating MCT without a license from PPA or a
franchise from Congress.
- It also alleged unfair competition since PIA handled cargoes of the general
public.
- It further invoked unlawful deprivation of property as it stands to incur
investment losses with PIA’s take over of MCT operations.
- It prayed that PIA be stopped from handling cargoes not owned or consigned
to its industrial estate locators. During the hearings for its application for
preliminary injunction, it contended that since the core business of PIA and Phividec
is the establishment and operation of industrial estates, their authority to build and
operate ports should be construed merely as a complement of their primary
function. Thus, the ports they built should accommodate only cargoes owned or
consigned to its industrial estate locators or else it can build ports and handle
cargoes anywhere, directly competing with PPA.
- PIA and Phividec invoked RA 8975 which prohibits lower courts from issuing
temporary restraining orders or preliminary injunctions on government
infrastructure projects. They highlighted the fact that PIA’s operation of MCT is
endorsed by the government and by various groups.11 They added that preventing
PIA from operating MCT will aggravate the huge financial deficit of the national
government and contribute to the collapse of the economy.
- April 27, 2004: The RTC enjoined PIA and Phividec from handling cargoes
not owned or consigned to its industrial estate locators. PIA sought to reverse the
order and dismiss the complaint which Oroport opposed.
- May 11, 2004: RTC issued the two orders (1) denying the MR filed by
defendants with urgent motion for the dismissal of the complaint and (2) granting
the injunctive relief prayed for by the plaintiff.
- The RTC emphasized that before PIA could operate as a public utility, it
should be properly authorized by PPA since cargo-handling is a regulated activity.
- In imposing low tariff rates and accepting third-party cargoes, PIA unlawfully
deprived Oroport of its property.
- May 18, 2004: PIA sought to dismiss the complaint and filed a P30 million-
counterclaim.
- May 28, 2004: PIA moved to lift and dissolve the preliminary injunction due
to the alleged defective and invalid plaintiff’s bond and insufficiency of the P2
million bond to cover for its projected damage. Oroport opposed. The RTC upheld
the opposition.

- June 1, 2004: PIA filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
invoking Section 3 of Rep. Act No. 8975, arguing that the RTC had no jurisdiction to
issue writs of preliminary injunction against operations of government
infrastructure projects. Assuming it had, it issued the writ without hearing and
Oroport was not entitled thereto. It prayed ex parte for a TRO. Oroport countered
that Rep. Act No. 8975 exempts urgent constitutional issues from the prohibition to
issue injunctive relief.
- January 5, 2005: CA annulled the subject orders, ruling that the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing them. Hence, this petition for review
on certiorari filed by Oroport.

Applicable Laws:
• RA 8975 (AN ACT TO ENSURE THE EXPEDITIOUS IMPLEMENTATION AND
COMPLETION OF GOVERNMENT INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS BY PROHIBITING
LOWER COURTS FROM ISSUING TEMPORARY RESTRANING ORDERS.
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS OR PRELIMINARY MANDATORY INJUNCTIONS,
PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES);
• Article XII, Section 11 of the Constitution;
• PD 538 (CREATING AND ESTABLISHING THE PHIVIDEC INDUSTRIAL
AUTHORITY AND MAKING IT A SUBSIDIARY AGENCY OF THE PHILIPPINE
VETERANS INVESTMENT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION DEFINING ITS POWERS,
FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES);
• Memorandum of Agreement dated October 20, 1980 and October 16, 1995
(Check case.)

Issues:
1. Did the CA err in ruling that the RTC had no jurisdiction to issue the writ of
preliminary injunction? (No)
2. Can PIA temporarily operate as a seaport cargo-handler upon agreement
with PPA (Philippine Ports Authority) sans a franchise or a license? (Yes)

Rationale
1. CA did not err in annulling the writ of preliminary injunction and in ruling
that the RTC had no jurisdiction to enjoin the operation of this multi-billion
government infrastructure project.
a. A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action prior to
the judgment or final order, requiring a party, court, agency or person to refrain
from a particular act or acts. A preservative remedy, its issuance lies upon the
existence of a claimed emergency or extraordinary situation which should be
avoided; otherwise, the outcome of litigation would be useless as far as the party
applying for the writ is concerned. There must be a clear and material right to be
protected and that the facts against which the injunction is to be directed violate
said right.
b. While Section 3 of Rep. Act No. 8975 exempts urgent constitutional issues
from the prohibition to issue injunctive relief, it does not follow that a claim of
unlawful deprivation of property involves such a constitutional issue.
c. Rep. Act No. 8975 is clear that it is not within the RTC’s jurisdiction to issue
an injunctive writ against the operation of a government infrastructure project.
Since Oroport failed to specify what property was robbed of it, the CA ruled that PIA
does not need a license from PPA to operate because the MOA (Check case.) and its
amendment granted PIA exclusive control and supervision of MCT on all cargo-
handling services, including the discretion to impose rates and charges not higher
than those PPA-prescribed.
d. Rep. Act No. 8975 reserves the power to issue injunctive writs on
government infrastructure projects exclusively with this Court and the RTC cannot
issue an injunctive writ to stop the cargo-handling operations at MCT. The issues
presented by Oroport can hardly be considered constitutional, much more
constitutional issues of extreme urgency.
2. PIA properly took over MCT operations sans a franchise or license as it was
necessary, temporary and beneficial to the public.
a. The decision to bid out cargo-handling services is within the province and
discretion of PPA which necessarily required prior study and evaluation. This task is
best left to the judgment of PPA and cannot be set aside absent grave abuse of
discretion on its part. As long as the standards are set in determining the contractor
and such standards are reasonable and related to the purpose for which they are
used, courts should not inquire into the wisdom of PPA’s choice.
i. Philippine Ports Authority v. Court of Appeals - The exercise of such
discretion is a policy decision that necessitates such procedures as prior inquiry,
investigation, comparison, evaluation and deliberation. No other persons or
agencies are in a better position to gauge the need for the floating grains terminal
than the PPA; certainly, not the courts.
b. We have ruled that franchises from Congress are not required before each
and every public utility may operate because the law has granted certain
administrative agencies the power to grant licenses for or to authorize the operation
of certain public utilities. Article XII, Section 11 of the Constitution does not
necessarily imply that only Congress can grant such authorization. The
determination of whether the winning bidder is qualified to undertake the
contracted service should be left to the sound judgment of PPA or PIA as these
agencies are in the best position to evaluate the feasibility of the projections of the
bidders and to decide which bid is compatible with the project’s development plans.
Neither the Court nor Congress has the time and the technical know-how to look
into this matter.
c. Section 4(e) of Presidential Decree No. 538, gives PIA the legal authority to
construct, operate and maintain port facilities including stevedoring and port
terminal services even without PPA’s authority. The MOA granting PIA the exclusive
control and supervision of all ports, wharves, piers and services within the
industrial area, recognizing its power to collect port fees, dues and charges, makes
PIA’s authority over MCT operations more secure.
d. After the two public biddings failed, PIA was left with no other option but to
take over MCT operations so that it could earn, pending the award to a qualified
bidder, some amount to pay the loan to JBIC and to avoid being declared in default.
e. During the September 27, 2004 hearing before the CA-Mindanao, Atty. Raul
Ragandang of PIA said that Phividec will not permanently engage in cargo-handling
considering that it has no capacity to operate MCT.
f. Oroport is estopped from questioning PIA’s authority because it participated
in the two public biddings. As a cargo-handling contractor, it is not a real party-in-
interest in this case as only PPA may protest PIA’s operation of MCT. Even assuming
that Oroport is a real party-in-interest, it is not entitled to an injunction as the
alleged damage or threat of damage is speculative and factually baseless.
g. Oroport failed to convince the SC that it has a clear and actual right to be
enforced and protected.
i. Oroport has no right to manage MCT since it has no contractual relations
with PIA, Phividec or PPA. It has no statutory grant of authority. Clearly, it has no
right in esse to be protected by an injunctive writ.
ii. Even if Oroport won the public bidding and obtained an exclusive contract
for port operations at MCT, it has no vested right to operate MCT because contract
clauses are not inflexible barriers to public regulations.
1. Business permits may be terminated by authorities any time based on policy
guidelines and statutes because what is given is not a property right but a mere
privilege.
2. The law authorizing PPA to take over arrastre and stevedoring services in
government-owned ports and cancel permits issued to private operators is a valid
exercise of police power; it does not violate due process of law as the exercise of
police power is paramount over the right against non-impairment of contracts.
3. Moreover, a regulated monopoly is not proscribed in industries affected with
public interest such as in port rendition of arrastre/stevedoring services in
Philippine ports.
h. Oroport’s allegation of unfair competition also fails because private
monopolies are not necessarily prohibited by the Constitution. Certain public
utilities must be given franchises for public interest and these franchises do not
violate the law against monopolies. PIA’s policy decision to handle the cargo
operation itself enjoys presumption of regularity as it did not violate any relevant
law, rules, regulations, ordinance or issuances in so doing. Even so, there is no unfair
competition as PIA (1) is not a competitor of Oroport; (2) imposes the same tariff
rates as Oroport; and (3) is operating in an entirely separate and distinct port
i. MCT is not exclusive to the industrial estate locators as the feasibility study
of MCT prepared by PIA and approved by the National Economic Development
Authority emphasized that MCT will cater not only to locator firms but also to
outside clients and prospective users. Addressing CDOIP congestion, MCT is
beneficial to shipping lines and the general public.

Judgment: CA affirmed. Petition denied.