Compilation of Rape Cases

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 174473. August 17, 2007.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ALVIN ABULON y SALVANIA,appellant.
DECISION
TINGA, J p:
For automatic review is the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated 28 April 2006, affirming with
modification the decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santa Cruz, Laguna, Branch 28, 3 dated 27
December 2000, finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of qualified rape and one (1) count of
acts of lasciviousness.
In three (3) separate Informations 4 for Criminal Cases No. SC-7422, SC-7423 and SC-7424 all dated 16
June 1999, appellant was indicted before the RTC for three (3) counts of qualified rape against his minor daughter
AAA. 5 The accusatory portions in all the Informations are identical, except as regards the date of commission of the
crime. The Information in Criminal Case No. SC-7422 reads:
At the instance of the private complainant [AAA] with the conformity of her mother
[BBB] 6 in a sworn complaint filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Lumban-Kalayaan
(Laguna), the undersigned Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Laguna hereby accuses
ALVIN ABULON Y SALVANIA, of the crime of "RAPE," committed as follows:
"That on or about March 14, 1999, in the Municipality of Kalayaan, Province of
Laguna, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
with lewd designs, with grave abuse of confidence or obvious ungratefulness, and with
force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully [sic], unlawfully and feloniously have
carnal knowledge of his legitimate minor daughter, [AAA], who at the [sic] time was thirteen
(13) years of age, against her will and consent and to her damage and prejudice."
CONTRARY TO LAW.
After appellant pleaded not guilty, trial ensued with AAA herself, as the first prosecution witness, testifying to
the following facts:
AAA is the oldest of five (5) legitimate children born to appellant and BBB. On 14, 15, and 16 March 1999,
appellant raped AAA. The first rape incident occurred at around 1:30 in the morning of 14 March 1999. AAA was
home, fast asleep next to her brother and sister when she suddenly woke up to the noise created by her father who
arrived drunk, but who likewise soon thereafter returned to the wedding festivities he was attending. Abiding by their
father's instructions, AAA and her siblings went back to sleep. 7
AAA was next awakened by the weight of her father lying naked on top of her. Appellant had removed her
underwear while she slept. He poked a knife on AAA's waist and threatened to kill her and her siblings if she reported
the incident to anyone. She begged him to stop but he proceeded to kiss her mouth, vagina, and breast, and to have
carnal knowledge of her. 8 Although they witnessed the ongoing ordeal, AAA's siblings could do nothing but cry as
appellant likewise poked the knife on them. 9 The following morning, AAA found a whitish substance and blood
stains on her panty. 10
On 15 March 1999, at around 10:30 in the evening, AAA and her siblings were awakened as appellant came
home drunk. He told them to eat first as they had not taken their supper yet. After dining together, appellant left and
AAA, her brother, and her sister went back to sleep. 11 As in the previous evening, appellant roused AAA in mid-
sleep. This time, she woke up with her father holding her hand, covering her mouth and lying on top of her. He
undressed AAA, then mounted her. Repeatedly, he inserted his penis into her vagina, and AAA felt pain in her private
parts. Appellant also kissed and fondled AAA on different parts of her body. 12
Again, AAA's siblings could only cry as they saw appellant rape their sister. AAA's sister, however, took a
pen and wrote her a note which read: "Ate, let us tell what father was doing to the police officer." After appellant had
raped AAA, the latter's sister asked their father why he had done such to AAA. In response, appellant spanked AAA's
sister and threatened to kill all of them should they report the incidents to the police. 13 The sisters nonetheless
related to their relatives AAA's misfortune, but the relatives did not take heed as they regarded appellant to be a kind
man. 14
The third rape episode happened at around 3:30 in the morning of 16 March 1999. Although appellant did
not insert his penis into AAA's vagina on this occasion, he took off her lower undergarments and kissed her
vagina. 15 On cross-examination, AAA asserted that her father inserted his tongue into the hole of her vagina and
she felt pain because of this. 16
To corroborate AAA's testimony, the prosecution presented BBB and AAA's 6-year old brother CCC. 17 BBB
testified that she was a stay-in housemaid working in Las Piñas on the dates that her daughter was raped by
appellant. On 26 March 1999, she went home and stayed with her family. However, it was only on 4 May 1999 that
BBB learned of the rape, when CCC told her that appellant had raped AAA three (3) times and that he had seen his
father on top of his sister during those occasions. BBB then verified the matter with AAA herself, and the latter
affirmed the incidents. BBB thus took AAA with her to the barangay and police authorities to report the incidents,
and later to the provincial hospital for medical examination. 18
CCC testified that on three (3) separate occasions, he saw his father lying naked on top of AAA, who was
likewise naked. 19
The prosecution also presented SPO1 Bayani G. Montesur (SPO1 Montesur) and Dr. Gloria Cabael (Dr.
Cabael). SPO1 Montesur identified the Police Blotter of 4 May 1999 which recorded the complaints of rape against
appellant and the report of the latter's arrest. 20 Dr. Cabael, on the other hand, testified that she examined AAA on 4
May 1999 upon the request of Police Officer Gallarosa. She identified the Rape Case Report she prepared
thereafter. 21
Appellant testified as the sole witness on his behalf, proffering denial and alibi as his defenses. According to
appellant, he was hired by his aunt, Raquel Masangkay, to deliver hogs and that at 1:30 in the morning of 14 March
1999, he was in Calamba, Laguna pursuant to such employment. He averred that he went home at 7:00 in the
morning of the following day and thus could not have raped his daughter as alleged. 22 Likewise denying the second
rape charge, appellant testified that on 15 March 1999, he attended a wedding ceremony in Sityo Kalayaan, San
Antonio, Kalayaan, Laguna. He went home drunk at 6:00 that evening and promptly went to sleep. 23Similarly, at
3:00 in the morning of 16 March 1999, appellant claimed to have been asleep with his children and could not have
thus committed the rape as charged. 24
Finding that the prosecution had proven beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of appellant of the crime of
qualified rape in Criminal Case Nos. SC-7422 and SC-7423 and the crime of acts of lasciviousness in Criminal Case
No. SC-7424, the RTC rendered a Consolidated Judgment against appellant and sentenced him accordingly, thus:
WHEREFORE:
Under Criminal Case No. SC-7422, this Court finds the accused ALVIN ABULON y
SALVANIA GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT as PRINCIPAL of CONSUMMATED
QUALIFIED RAPE as defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Rep. Act No. 7639, otherwise known as the DEATH PENALTY LAW, and hereby
sentences him to suffer the SUPREME PENALTY of DEATH and to indemnify the offended party
[AAA] the following sums:
P75,000.00 — as civil indemnity
50,000.00 — as moral damages; and
50,000.00 — as exemplary damages.
SALVANIA GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT as PRINCIPAL of CONSUMMATED
QUALIFIED RAPE as defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Rep. Act No. 7639, otherwise known as the DEATH PENALTY LAW, and hereby
sentences him to suffer the SUPREME PENALTY of DEATH and to indemnify the offended party
[AAA] the following sums:

SALVANIA GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT as PRINCIPAL of ACTS OF
LASCIVIOUSNESS as defined and penalized under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code and
hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for SIX (6) MONTHS of ARRESTO
MAYOR as MINIMUM to SIX (6) YEARS of PRISION CORRECCIONAL as MAXIMUM.
The accused is further ordered to pay the costs of the instant three (3) cases.
SO ORDERED. 25
With the death penalty imposed on appellant, the case was elevated to this Court on automatic review.
However, pursuant to this Court's ruling in People v. Mateo, 26 the case was transferred to the Court of Appeals. On
28 April 2006, the appellate court rendered its decision affirming appellant's conviction, but with modification as to
damages awarded to the victim. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Santa Cruz, Laguna, Branch 28,
in Criminal Case Nos. SC-7422 and SC-7423 finding appellant Alvin S. Abulon guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes of qualified rape, and in Criminal Case No. SC-7424, finding
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of acts of lasciviousness, are
hereby AFFIRMED.
The civil aspect of the case is MODIFIED to read: In Criminal Case Nos. SC-7422-7423,
the award of exemplary damages in the amount of [P]50,000.00 is reduced to [P]25,000.00. In
Criminal Case No. SC-7424, appellant is ordered to pay the victim the amount of [P]30,000.00 as
moral damages. We affirm in all other respects.
Pursuant to A.M. 00-5-03-SC (Amendments to the Revised Rule of Criminal Procedure to
Govern Death Penalty Cases), which took effect on October 15, 2004, this case is elevated and
certified to the Supreme Court for its automatic review.
SO ORDERED. 27
In his Brief, 28 appellant assails his conviction and imputes grave error to the trial court for giving weight and
credence to the testimony of AAA. In particular, he makes capital of AAA's delay in reporting the incidents to her
mother. He likewise impugns the trial court's alleged bias in propounding inappropriate leading questions to private
complainant AAA. Finally, he maintains that the Informations against him are defective as they failed to allege the key
element of force and/or intimidation. 29
We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals with modifications.
The duty to ascertain the competence and credibility of a witness rests primarily with the trial
court, 30 because it has the unique position of observing the witness's deportment on the stand while testifying.
Absent any compelling reason to justify the reversal of the evaluations and conclusions of the trial court, the
reviewing court is generally bound by the former's findings. 31
In rape cases particularly, the conviction or acquittal of the accused most often depends almost entirely on
the credibility of the complainant's testimony. By the very nature of this crime, it is generally unwitnessed and usually
the victim is left to testify for herself. 32 Her testimony is most vital and must be received with the utmost
caution. 33 When a rape victim's testimony, however, is straightforward and marked with consistency despite
grueling examination, it deserves full faith and confidence and cannot be discarded. Once found credible, her lone
testimony is sufficient to sustain a conviction. 34
The court a quo found the testimony of AAA in its entirety to be credible, made in a candid, spontaneous,
and straightforward manner and never shaken even under rigid cross-examination. 35We agree that AAA's narration
of her harrowing experience is worthy of credence, thus:
Criminal Case No. SC-7422
Trial Prosecutor:
Q: Tell us what happened at around 1:30 in the morning of March 11, [sic] 1999 to you?
A: My brother and sister and I were already asleep when my father who was drank [sic] came
home. We told him to just sleep. My father told us that he would still return to the wedding
celebration (kasalan).
xxx xxx xxx
Q: What happened next when you continued sleeping?
A: I was awakened when I felt my father already on top of me, sir.
Q: Tell us exactly what was [sic] your position then at that time you woke up?
A: I was still lying straight down, sir.
Q: How about your father in relation to you, where was he at the time you woke up?
A: He was on top (nakadagan) of me, sir.
Court:
Q: Was he naked?
A: Already naked, Your Honor.
Q: How about you, do [sic] you have your clothes on?

A: I have [sic] my lady sando on, Your Honor.
Trial Prosecutor:
Q: Are [sic] you still wearing your panty when you were awakened?
A: No more, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: What did your father do aside from placing his body on top of you?
A: He poked a knife on [sic] me, sir.
Court:
Q: Did he say something?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: What did he say?
A: He said that if he [sic] report her [sic] to anybody he would kill us, Your Honor.
xxx xxx xxx
Trial Prosecutor:
Q: What else did he do aside from telling you "huag kang magsusumbong"?
A: He also poked the knife on [sic] my brother and sister, sir.
Q: They were already awakened at that time?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What else did he do aside from poking a knife on [sic] you and your brother and sister?
A: No more, sir.
Court:
Q: While your father according to you is [sic] on top of you, what did he do if any?
A: "Kinayog na po niya ako."
Q: What do you mean by telling [sic] "kinayog na po niya ako"?

A: He was moving, Your Honor.
Q: While your father was moving, what else was happening at that time?
A: I felt pain, Your Honor.

Trial Prosecutor:
Q: From where did you feel that pain?

A: From my private part, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Do you know if you know why you felt the pain on the lower portion of your body?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Please tell us if you know?
A: Something whitish coming out from it, sir.

Court:
Q: From where did it come from [sic]? That whitish substance?

A: From my father's private part, Your Honor.
Q: Why, what happened to the private part of your father?

A: I do not know, Your Honor.
Q: When you felt pain, what was your father doing then?
A: He repeated what he told [sic] previously not to tell to [sic] anybody.

Q: At that time, did you see the private part of your father?
A: Yes, Your Honor.

Q: When you felt pain. Do you know what is [sic] happening to the private part of your
father?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: What was happening?
A: His private part stiffened or hardened (tumirik), Your Honor.
Q: Where was it placed if any?
A: Into my private part, Your Honor.
Q: Did the private part of you father actually penetrate your vagina?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: What did you feel at the time the penis of your father entered your vagina?
A: It was painful, Your Honor.

Q: At that time was your father making any movement?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: Will you describe the movement made by your father?

A: (Witness demonstrating an upward and downward stroke by placing her right palm over
her left hand)
Trial Prosecutor:
Q: Did he kiss you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: In what part of your body?
A: On my mouth, sir.
Q: Aside from your mouth, what other part or parts of your body did he kiss?
A: On my private part, sir.
Q: When did he kiss you private part, before inserting his penis or after?
A: After he inserted his penis, sir.
Q: What other part of your body did he kiss?
A: On my breast, sir. 36
xxx xxx xxx
TP. Arcigal, Jr.:
Q: Now, you said that the second incident happened [on] March 15, 1999, am I correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And where and what time said [sic] second incident happened?
A: 10:30 in the evening, sir, also in our house, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: And what were you doing when your father returned at around 11:00 o'clock in the evening?
A: We were all asleep, sir.
Q: And how did you come to know that he returned at around 11:00 P.M.?
A: My father suddenly held my hand, sir.
Q: And because of that, you were awakened?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And what happened when you were awakened because your father held your hand?
A: He covered my mouth, sir.
Q: And after covering your mouth, what else did he do?
A: He removed the lower portion of my clothes. "Hinubuan po niya ako."
xxx xxx xxx

Q: After removing your lady sando, what else did he do?
A: He laid himself on top of me, sir.
xxx xxx xxx

Q: Now, what did he do to you when he was already on top of you?
A: He was "kinakayog niya po ako."
Q: Aside from "kinakayog," what else did he do?

A: He kissed my breast, sir.
Q: Aside from that, what else?

A: He likewise touched my private part, sir.
Q: When he was on top of you, do you know where was [sic] his penis at that time?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where?
A: Into my vagina, sir.
Q: How did you come to know that the penis of your father was inside your vagina?
A: I felt pain in my private part, sir.
Q: And do you know why you felt pain in your private part?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Why?
A: His private part . . . . (Thereafter witness is crying while uttering words: "I am afraid I
might be killed by my father.") He held his penis into my vagina. Thereafter, inserted
it repeatedly into mine, sir.
Q: And you were able to actually feel his penis inside your vagina?
A: Yes, sir. 37
xxx xxx xxx
TP. Arcigal, Jr.:
Q: Now, you said also that you were raped on March 16, 1999, am I correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What time?
A: It was 3:30 o'clock in the morning, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
TP. Arcigal, Jr.:
Q: Now, how did it happen, that third incident?
A: I was able to run downstairs but when I was about to open the door, he was able to hold my
dress, sir.
Q: Was your father drunk at that time?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How did you come to know?
A: His eyes were red and he was laughing at me while telling me: "It is your end." (Witness crying
while answering the question.)
Q: Now, what happened when your father was able to hold your dress?
A: He carried me upstairs, sir.
Q: Was he able to carry you upstairs?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What did he do, if any, when you were upstairs?
A: He removed my panty and shortpants, sir.
Q: After removing your shorts and panty, what else did he do?
A: No more but he kissed my vagina.
Q: Which part of your vagina did he kiss?

A: That part of my vagina with hold [sic].
Court:
Q: What about your upper garments at that time?
A: He did not remove it, Your Honor.
Q: What else did he do, aside from that?

A: Nothing more, just that.
Q: After kissing your vagina, what else happened, if any?

A: He again poked the knife on us, Your Honor.
Q: At that time, was your father naked or not?

A: Still with his clothes on, Your Honor.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: For clarification, what else, if any, did your father do after your father kissed your vagina?
A: Nothing more, merely that act, Your Honor.
Q: You mean your father did not insert his penis to [sic] your vagina anymore?
A: No more, Your Honor.

xxx xxx xxx
TP. Arcigal, Jr.:
Q: Now, what did he use in kissing your clitoris?
A: His tongue, sir.
Q: How did you come to know that it was his tongue that he used?
A: It is because I saw him put out his tongue, sir. 38
Verily, it is inconceivable and contrary to human experience for a daughter, who is attached to her father by
the natural bond of love and affection, to accuse him of rape, unless he is the one who raped and defoliated
her. 39 As we have pronounced in People v. Canoy: 40
It is unthinkable for a daughter to accuse her own father, to submit herself for examination of her
most intimate parts, put her life to public scrutiny and expose herself, along with her family, to
shame, pity or even ridicule not just for a simple offense but for a crime so serious that could mean
the death sentence to the very person to whom she owes her life, had she really not have been
aggrieved. Nor do we believe that the victim would fabricate a story of rape simply because she
wanted to exact revenge against her father, appellant herein, for allegedly scolding and maltreating
her. 41
In stark contrast with AAA's convincing recital of facts, supported as it was by the testimonies of BBB and
CCC, are appellant's uncorroborated and shaky defenses of denial and alibi. Nothing is more settled in criminal law
jurisprudence than that alibi and denial cannot prevail over the positive and categorical testimony and identification
of the complainant. 42 Alibi is an inherently weak defense, which is viewed with suspicion because it can easily be
fabricated. 43 Denial is an intrinsically weak defense which must be buttressed with strong evidence of non-
culpability to merit credibility. 44
The records disclose that not a shred of evidence was adduced by appellant to corroborate his alibi. Alibi
must be supported by credible corroboration from disinterested witnesses, otherwise, it is fatal to the
accused. 45 Further, for alibi to prosper, it must be demonstrated that it was physically impossible for appellant to be
present at the place where the crime was committed at the time of its commission. 46 By his own testimony,
appellant clearly failed to show that it was physically impossible for him to have been present at the scene of the
crime when the rapes were alleged to have occurred. Except for the first incident, appellant was within the vicinity of
his home and in fact alleged that he was supposedly even sleeping therein on the occasion of the second and third
incidents.
Appellant's contention that AAA's accusations are clouded by her failure to report the alleged occurrences of
rape is unmeritorious. To begin with, AAA categorically testified that she told her father's niece about the incidents.
However, the latter doubted her, believing instead that appellant was not that kind of man. AAA's subsequent
attempt to report the incidents to the barangay turned out to be futile as well as she was only able to speak with the
barangay driver, who happened to be appellant's brother-in-law. She was likewise disbelieved by the latter. Her
disclosure of the rapes to a certain Menoy did not yield any positive result either. Fearing for the lives of her
grandparents, AAA decided not to tell them about the incidents. 47
A child of thirteen years cannot be expected to know how to go about reporting the crime to the
authorities. 48 Indeed, We see how AAA must have felt absolutely hopeless since the peoplearound her were
relatives of her father and her attempts to solicit help from them were in vain. Thus, AAA's silence in not reporting the
incidents to her mother and filing the appropriate case against appellant for over a month is sufficiently explained.
The charge of rape is rendered doubtful only if the delay was unreasonable and unexplained. 49 It is not beyond ken
that the child, living under threat from appellant and having been turned away by trusted relatives, even accused by
them of lying, would simply opt to just suffer in silence thereafter. In People v. Gutierrez, 50 we held:
Complainant's failure to immediately report the rape does not diminish her credibility. The
silence of a victim of rape or her failure to disclose her misfortune to the authorities without loss of
material time does not prove that her charge is baseless and fabricated. It is not uncommon for
young girls to conceal for some time the assault on their virtues because of the rapist's threat on
their lives, more so when the offender is someone whom she knew and who was living with her. 51
Appellant brands the trial judge as partial against him for propounding leading questions to AAA. According
to him, were it not for the lower court's and the prosecution's biased leading questions, AAA would not have proven
the elements of the crimes charged. 52
Appellant's argument is not well-taken. It is the judge's prerogative to ask clarificatory queries to ferret out
the truth. 53 It cannot be taken against him if the questions he propounds reveal certain truths which, in turn, tend to
destroy the theory of one party. 54 After all, the judge is the arbiter and ought to be satisfied himself as to the
respective merits and claims of both parties in accord with the stringent demands of due process. 55 Also, being the
arbiter, he may properly intervene in the presentation of evidence to expedite proceedings and prevent unnecessary
waste of time. 56
Besides, jurisprudence explains that allegations of bias on the part of the trial court should be received with
caution, especially when the queries by the judge did not prejudice the accused. The propriety of the judge's
questions is determined by their quality and not necessarily by their quantity and, in any event, by the test of whether
the defendant was prejudiced by such questioning or not. 57 In the instant case, the Court finds that on the whole,
the questions propounded by the judge a quo were but clarificatory in nature and that, concomitantly, appellant
failed to satisfactorily establish that he was prejudiced by such queries.
The matter of the purportedly defective Informations was properly addressed by the Court of Appeals,
pointing out that a close scrutiny of the Informations would reveal that the words "force and/or intimidation" are
specifically alleged therein. 58 Even if these were not so, well-established is the rule that force or intimidation need
not be proven in incestuous cases. The overpowering moral influence of a father over his daughter takes the place of
violence and offer of resistance ordinarily required in rape cases where the accused is unrelated to the victim. 59
Now, we turn to the determination of the crime for which appellant under the third charge is liable and the
corresponding penalty therefor. In the Brief for the People, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argues that all
three (3) charges of rape, including the rape committed on 16 March 1999 subject of Criminal Case No. SC-7424,
were proved beyond reasonable doubt. The court a quoheld that it was clear from the evidence that appellant merely
kissed the vagina of AAA and made no attempt of penetration, meaning penile penetration, and for that reason found
him guilty of acts of lasciviousness only. 60 Yet, in affirming the trial court, the Court of Appeals did not find any
categorical testimony on AAA's part that appellant had inserted his tongue in her vagina, stressing instead that the
mere probability of such insertion cannot take the place of proof required to establish the guilt of appellant beyond
reasonable doubt for rape. 61
The automatic appeal in criminal cases opens the whole case for review, 62 as in this case. Thus, this Court
is mandated to re-examine the vital facts established a quo and to properly apply the law thereto. The two courts
below were both mistaken, as we note that AAA unqualifiedly testified on cross-examination to appellant's insertion
of his tongue into her vagina, viz:
Court:
Q: On the third time you are [sic] allegedly raped, you said it happened at 3:30 in the morning of
March 16, 1999.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you said yesterday that he did not insert his pennies [sic] to [sic] your vagina on March 16?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What he did is he kissed your vagina?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: For how long did he kiss your vagina?

A: Two minutes, sir.
Q: What did he actually do when he kissed your vagina?
A: He kissed my vagina, thereafter he laughed and laughed.

Q: You mean to tell the court when he kissed your vagina he used his lips?
A: His lips and tongue, sir.
Q: What did he do?

A: He put out his tongue thereafter he "inano" the hole of my vagina.
Court:
Q: What did your father do with his tongue?
A: He placed it in the hole of my vagina.
Q: Did you feel pain?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: By just kissing your vagina you felt pain?

A: Yes, Your Honor. 63
Notwithstanding the explicit testimony of AAA on the matter, this Court cannot find appellant guilty of rape
as proved, but of acts of lasciviousness only. In reaching this conclusion, we take a route different from the ones
respectively taken by the courts below.
With the enactment of Republic Act No. 8353 (R.A. No. 8353), otherwise known as the Anti-Rape Law of
1997, 64 the concept of rape was revolutionized with the new recognition that the crime should include sexual
violence on the woman's sex-related orifices other than her organ, and be expanded as well to cover gender-free
rape. 65 The transformation mainly consisted of the reclassification of rape as a crime against persons and the
introduction of rape by "sexual assault" 66as differentiated from the traditional "rape through carnal knowledge" or
"rape through sexual intercourse."
Section 2 of the law provides:
Sec. 2. Rape as a Crime Against Persons. — The crime of rape shall hereafter be classified as a
Crime Against Persons under Title Eight of Act No. 9815, as amended, otherwise known as
the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, there shall be incorporated into Title Eight of the same Code
a new chapter to be known as Chapter Three on Rape, to read as follows:
Article 266-A. Rape; When And How Committed. — Rape Is Committed —

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
(a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
(b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise is unconscious;
(c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
(d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof,
shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person's mouth or
anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
Paragraph 1 under Section 2 of R.A. No. 8353, which is now Paragraph 1 of the new Article 266-A of
the Revised Penal Code, covers rape through sexual intercourse while paragraph 2 refers to rape by sexual assault.
Rape through sexual intercourse is also denominated as "organ rape" or "penile rape." On the other hand, rape by
sexual assault is otherwise called "instrument or object rape," 67 also "gender-free rape," 68 or the narrower
"homosexual rape." 69
In People v. Silvano, 70 the Court recognized that the father's insertion of his tongue and finger into his
daughter's vaginal orifice would have subjected him to liability for "instrument or object rape" had the new law been
in effect already at the time he committed the acts. Similarly, in Peoplev. Miranda, 71 the Court observed that
appellant's insertion of his fingers into the complainant's organ would have constituted rape by sexual assault had it
been committed when the new law was already in effect.
The differences between the two modes of committing rape are the following:
(1) In the first mode, the offender is always a man, while in the second, the offender may be a man
or a woman;
(2) In the first mode, the offended party is always a woman, while in the second, the offended party
may be a man or a woman;
(3) In the first mode, rape is committed through penile penetration of the vagina, while the second
is committed by inserting the penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice, or any
instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of another person; and
(4) The penalty for rape under the first mode is higher than that under the second.
In view of the material differences between the two modes of rape, the first mode is not necessarily included
in the second, and vice-versa. Thus, since the charge in the Information in Criminal Case No. SC-7424 is rape
through carnal knowledge, appellant cannot be found guilty of rape by sexual assault although it was proven, without
violating his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
However, following the variance doctrine embodied in Section 4, in relation to Section 5, Rule 120, Rules of
Criminal Procedure, appellant can be found guilty of the lesser crime of acts of lasciviousness. Said provisions read:
Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. — When there is a
variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the
offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be
convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense
charged which is included in the offense proved.
Sec. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. — An offense charged
necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the
former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitutes the latter. And an offense charged is
necessarily included in the offense proved when the essential ingredients of the former constitute
or form part of those constituting the latter.
Indeed, acts of lasciviousness or abusos dishonestos are necessarily included in rape. 72

In light of the passage of R.A. No. 9346, entitled "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the
Philippines," 73 the penalty of death can no longer be imposed. Accordingly, the penalty meted out to appellant for
rape through sexual intercourse in Criminal Cases No. SC-7422 and SC-7423 is reduced in each case from death
to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. 74 We affirm the conviction of appellant in Criminal Case No. SC-
7424 for acts of lasciviousness but modify the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals instead to an indeterminate
sentence of imprisonment of six (6) months of arresto mayor as minimum to four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional as maximum as neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances attended the commission of
the crime.
With respect to the civil liability of appellant, we modify the award in Criminal Cases No. SC-7422 and SC-
7423 in light of prevailing jurisprudence. Therefore, appellant is ordered to indemnify AAA, for each count of qualified
rape, in the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages. 75 The award of damages in Criminal Case No. SC-7424 is affirmed.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CR-HC No. 01926 is AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATIONS. In Criminal Cases No. SC-7422 and SC-7423, appellant is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of qualified rape and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole
and to pay the victim, AAA, in the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages plus costs. In Criminal Case No. SC-7424, appellant is found guilty of the crime
of acts of lasciviousness and sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for six (6) months
of arresto mayoras minimum to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional as maximum, and to pay
AAA moral damages in the amount of P30,000.00 plus costs.
SO ORDERED.
||| (People v. Abulon y Salvania, G.R. No. 174473, [August 17, 2007], 557 PHIL 428-456)
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 187495. April 21, 2014.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EDGAR JUMAWAN, accused-appellant.
DECISION
REYES, J p:
"Among the duties assumed by the husband are his duties to love, cherish and protect his wife,
to give her a home, to provide her with the comforts and the necessities of life within his means,
to treat her kindly and not cruelly or inhumanely. He is bound to honor her . . . ; it is his duty not
only to maintain and support her, but also to protect her from oppression and wrong." 1
Husbands do not have property rights over their wives' bodies. Sexual intercourse, albeit within the
realm of marriage, if not consensual, is rape. This is the clear State policy expressly legislated in Section 266-A
of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353 or the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.
The Case
This is an automatic review 2 of the Decision 3 dated July 9, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR-HC No. 00353, which affirmed the Judgment 4 dated April 1, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 19, in Criminal Case Nos. 99-668 and 99-669 convicting
Edgar Jumawan (accused-appellant) of two (2) counts of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua for each count.
The Facts
Accused-appellant and his wife, KKK, 5 were married on October 18, 1975. They lived together since
then and raised their four (4) children 6 as they put up several businesses over the years.
On February 19, 1999, KKK executed a Complaint-Affidavit, 7 alleging that her husband, the accused-
appellant, raped her at 3:00 a.m. of December 3, 1998 at their residence in Phase 2, Villa Ernesto, Gusa,
Cagayan de Oro City, and that on December 12, 1998, the accused-appellant boxed her shoulder for refusing to
have sex with him.
On June 11, 1999, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City issued a Joint
Resolution, 8 finding probable cause for grave threats, less serious physical injuries and rape and recommending
that the appropriate criminal information be filed against the accused-appellant.
On July 16, 1999, two Informations for rape were filed before the RTC respectively docketed as Criminal
Case No. 99-668 9 and Criminal Case No. 99-669. 10 The Information in Criminal Case No. 99-668 charged the
accused-appellant as follows:
That on or about 10:30 in the evening more or less, of October 9, 1998, at Gusa, Cagayan
de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused by means of force upon person did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
carnal knowledge with the private complainant, her [sic] wife, against the latter[']s will. IDAESH
Contrary to and in Violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.
Meanwhile the Information in Criminal Case No. 99-669 reads:
That on or about 10:30 in the evening more or less, of October 10, 1998, at Gusa, Cagayan
de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused by means of force upon person did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
carnal knowledge with the private complainant, her [sic] wife, against the latter's will.
Contrary to and in Violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.
The accused-appellant was arrested upon a warrant issued on July 21, 1999. 11 On August 18, 1999,
the accused-appellant filed a Motion for Reinvestigation, 12 which was denied by the trial court in an
Order 13 dated August 19, 1999. On even date, the accused-appellant was arraigned and he entered a plea of
not guilty to both charges. 14
On January 10, 2000, the prosecution filed a Motion to Admit Amended Information 15averring that the
name of the private complainant was omitted in the original informations for rape. The motion also stated that
KKK, thru a Supplemental Affidavit dated November 15, 1999, 16 attested that the true dates of commission of
the crime are October 16, 1998 and October 17, 1998 thereby modifying the dates stated in her previous
complaint-affidavit. The motion was granted on January 18, 2000. 17 Accordingly, the criminal informations were
amended as follows:
Criminal Case No. 99-668:
That on or about October 16, 1998 at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of force upon person
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the private
complainant, his wife, [KKK], against the latter's will.
Contrary to and in violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997. 18

Criminal Case No. 99-669:
That on or about October 17, 1998 at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of force upon person
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the private
complainant, his wife, [KKK], against the latter's will.
Contrary to and in violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997. 19

The accused-appellant was thereafter re-arraigned. He maintained his not guilty plea to both indictments
and a joint trial of the two cases forthwith ensued.
Version of the prosecution
The prosecution's theory was anchored on the testimonies of KKK, and her daughters MMM and OOO,
which, together with pertinent physical evidence, depicted the following events:
KKK met the accused-appellant at the farm of her parents where his father was one of the laborers. They
got married after a year of courtship. 20 When their first child, MMM, was born, KKK and the accused-appellant
put up a sari-sari store. 21 Later on, they engaged in several other businesses — trucking, rice mill and
hardware. KKK managed the businesses except for the rice mill, which, ideally, was under the accused-
appellant's supervision with the help of a trusted employee. In reality, however, he merely assisted in the rice mill
business by occasionally driving one of the trucks to haul goods. 22
Accused-appellant's keenness to make the businesses flourish was not as fervent as KKK's dedication.
Even the daughters observed the disproportionate labors of their parents. 23 He would drive the trucks
sometimes but KKK was the one who actively managed the businesses. 24She wanted to provide a comfortable
life for their children; he, on the other hand, did not acquiesce with that objective. 25 TDCAIS
In 1994, KKK and the accused-appellant bought a lot and built a house in Villa Ernesto, Gusa, Cagayan
de Oro City. 26 Three of the children transferred residence therein while KKK, the accused-appellant and one of
their sons stayed in Dangcagan, Bukidnon. She shuttled between the two places regularly and sometimes he
accompanied her. 27 In 1998, KKK stayed in Gusa, Cagayan De Oro City most of the days of the week. 28 On
Wednesdays, she went to Dangcagan, Bukidnon to procure supplies for the family store and then returned to
Cagayan de Oro City on the same day. 29
Conjugal intimacy did not really cause marital problems between KKK and the accused-appellant. It was,
in fact, both frequent and fulfilling. He treated her well and she, of course, responded with equal degree of
enthusiasm. 30 However, in 1997, he started to be brutal in bed. He would immediately remove her panties
and, sans any foreplay, insert her penis in her vagina. His abridged method of lovemaking was physically painful
for her so she would resist his sexual ambush but he would threaten her into submission. 31
In 1998, KKK and the accused-appellant started quarrelling usually upon his complaint that she failed to
attend to him. She was preoccupied with financial problems in their businesses and a bank loan. He wanted KKK
to stay at home because "a woman must stay in the house and only good in bed (sic) . . . ." She disobeyed his
wishes and focused on her goal of providing a good future for the children. 32
Four days before the subject rape incidents or on October 12, 1998, KKK and the accused-appellant
slept together in Cebu City where the graduation rites of their eldest daughter were held. By October 14, 1998,
the three of them were already back in Cagayan de Oro City. 33
On October 16, 1998, the accused-appellant, his wife KKK and their children went about their nightly
routine. The family store in their residence was closed at about 9:00 p.m. before supper was taken. Afterwards,
KKK and the children went to the girls' bedroom at the mezzanine of the house to pray the rosary while the
accused-appellant watched television in the living room. 34 OOO and MMM then prepared their beds. Soon
after, the accused-appellant fetched KKK and bid her to come with him to their conjugal bedroom in the third
floor of the house. KKK complied. 35
Once in the bedroom, KKK changed into a daster and fixed the matrimonial bed but she did not lie
thereon with the accused-appellant and instead, rested separately in a cot near the bed. Her reclusive behavior
prompted him to ask angrily: "[W]hy are you lying on the c[o]t[?]",and to instantaneously order: "You transfer here
[to] our bed." 36
KKK insisted to stay on the cot and explained that she had headache and abdominal pain due to her
forthcoming menstruation. Her reasons did not appease him and he got angrier. He rose from the bed, lifted the
cot and threw it against the wall causing KKK to fall on the floor. Terrified, KKK stood up from where she fell,
took her pillow and transferred to the bed. 37
The accused-appellant then lay beside KKK and not before long, expressed his desire to copulate with
her by tapping his fingers on her lap. She politely declined by warding off his hand and reiterating that she was
not feeling well. 38
The accused-appellant again asserted his sexual yearning and when KKK tried to resist by holding on to
her panties, he pulled them down so forcefully they tore on the sides. 39 KKK stayed defiant by refusing to bend
her legs. 40
The accused-appellant then raised KKK's daster, 41 stretched her legs apart and rested his own legs on
them. She tried to wrestle him away but he held her hands and succeeded in penetrating her. As he was carrying
out his carnal desires, KKK continued to protest by desperately shouting: "[D]on't do that to me because I'm not
feeling well." 42
With a concrete wall on one side and a mere wooden partition on the other enclosing the spouses'
bedroom, 43 KKK's pleas were audible in the children's bedroom where MMM lay awake. cIHSTC
Upon hearing her mother crying and hysterically shouting: "Eddie, don't do that to me, have pity on
me," 44 MMM woke up OOO who prodded her to go to their parents' room. 45 MMM hurriedly climbed upstairs,
vigorously knocked on the door of her parents' bedroom and inquired: "Pa, why is it that Mama is
crying?" 46 The accused-appellant then quickly put on his briefs and shirt, partly opened the door and
said: "[D]on't interfere because this is a family trouble," before closing it again. 47 Since she heard her mother
continue to cry, MMM ignored his father's admonition, knocked at the bedroom door again, and then kicked
it. 48 A furious accused-appellant opened the door wider and rebuked MMM once more: "Don't interfere us. Go
downstairs because this is family trouble!" Upon seeing KKK crouching and crying on top of the bed, MMM
boldly entered the room, approached her mother and asked: "Ma, why are you crying?" before asking her
father: "Pa, what happened to Mama why is it that her underwear is torn[?]" 49
When MMM received no definite answers to her questions, she helped her mother get up in order to
bring her to the girls' bedroom. KKK then picked up her torn underwear and covered herself with a
blanket. 50 However, their breakout from the room was not easy. To prevent KKK from leaving, the accused-
appellant blocked the doorway by extending his arm towards the knob. He commanded KKK to "[S]tay here, you
sleep in our room," when the trembling KKK pleaded: "Eddie, allow me to go out." He then held KKK's hands but
she pulled them back. Determined to get away, MMM leaned against door and embraced her mother tightly as
they pushed their way out. 51
In their bedroom, the girls gave their mother some water and queried her as to what happened. 52 KKK
relayed: "[Y]our father is an animal, a beast; he forced me to have sex with him when I'm not feeling well." The
girls then locked the door and let her rest." 53
The accused-appellant's aggression recurred the following night. After closing the family store on
October 17, 1998, KKK and the children took their supper. The accused-appellant did not join them since,
according to him, he already ate dinner elsewhere. After resting for a short while, KKK and the children
proceeded to the girls' bedroom and prayed the rosary. KKK decided to spend the night in the room's small bed
and the girls were already fixing the beddings when the accused-appellant entered. "Why are you sleeping in the
room of our children", he asked KKK, who responded that she preferred to sleep with the children. 54 He then
scoffed: "It's alright if you will not go with me, anyway, there are women that could be paid [P]1,000.00." She
dismissed his comment by turning her head away after retorting: "So be it." After that, he left the room. 55
He returned 15 minutes later 56 and when KKK still refused to go with him, he became infuriated. He
lifted her from the bed and attempted to carry her out of the room as he exclaimed: "Why will you sleep here[?]
Let's go to our bedroom." When she defied him, he grabbed her short pants causing them to tear apart. 57 At
this point, MMM interfered, "Pa, don't do that to Mama because we are in front of you." 58
The presence of his children apparently did not pacify the accused-appellant who yelled, "[E]ven in front
of you, I can have sex of your mother [sic] because I'm the head of the family." He then ordered his daughters to
leave the room. Frightened, the girls obliged and went to the staircase where they subsequently heard the pleas
of their helpless mother resonate with the creaking bed. 59
The episodes in the bedroom were no less disturbing. The accused-appellant forcibly pulled KKK's short
pants and panties. He paid no heed as she begged, "[D]on't do that to me, my body is still aching and also my
abdomen and I cannot do what you wanted me to do [sic]. I cannot withstand sex." 60
After removing his own short pants and briefs, he flexed her legs, held her hands, mounted her and
forced himself inside her. Once gratified, the accused-appellant put on his short pants and briefs, stood up, and
went out of the room laughing as he conceitedly uttered: "[I]t's nice, that is what you deserve because you are [a]
flirt or fond of sex." He then retreated to the masters' bedroom. 61
Sensing that the commotion in their bedroom has ceased, MMM and OOO scurried upstairs but found
the door locked. MMM pulled out a jalousie window, inserted her arm, reached for the doorknob inside and
disengaged its lock. Upon entering the room, MMM and OOO found their mother crouched on the bed with her
hair disheveled. The girls asked: "Ma, what happened to you, why are you crying?" KKK replied: "[Y]our father is
a beast and animal, he again forced me to have sex with him even if I don't feel well." 62 IcSEAH
Version of the defense
The defense spun a different tale. The accused-appellant's father owned a land adjacent to that of KKK's
father. He came to know KKK because she brought food for her father's laborers. When they got married on
October 18, 1975, he was a high school graduate while she was an elementary graduate.
Their humble educational background did not deter them from pursuing a comfortable life. Through their
joint hard work and efforts, the couple gradually acquired personal properties and established their own
businesses that included a rice mill managed by the accused-appellant. He also drove their trucks that hauled
coffee, copra, or corn. 63
The accused-appellant denied raping his wife on October 16 and 17, 1998. He claimed that on those
dates he was in Dangcagan, Bukidnon, peeling corn. On October 7, his truck met an accident somewhere in
Angeles Ranch, Maluko, Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon. He left the truck by the roadside because he had to attend
MMM's graduation in Cebu on October 12 with KKK. When they returned to Bukidnon on October 14, he asked
KKK and MMM to proceed to Cagayan de Oro City and just leave him behind so he can take care of the truck
and buy some corn. 64
Ryle Equia (Equia), the spouses' driver from January 1996 until June 1999 corroborated the above
claims. According to him, on October 16, 1998, the accused-appellant was within the vicinity of the rice mill's
loading area in Dangcagan, Bukidnon, cleaning a pick-up truck. On October 17, 1998, he and the accused-
appellant were in Dangcagan, Bukidnon, loading sacks of corn into the truck. They finished loading at 3:00 p.m.
The accused-appellant then instructed Equia to proceed to Maluko, Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon while the former
attended a fiesta in New Cebu, Kianggat, Dangcagan, Bukidnon. At around 4:00 p.m., Equia, together with a
helper and a mechanic, left for Maluko in order to tow the stalled truck left there by the accused-appellant in
October 7 and thereafter, bring it to Cagayan de Oro City together with the separate truck loaded with corn.
They arrived in Maluko at 7:00 p.m. and it took them three hours to turn the truck around and hoist it to
the towing bar of the other truck. At around 10:00 p.m., the accused-appellant arrived in Maluko. The four of
them then proceeded to Cagayan de Oro City where they arrived at 3:00 a.m. of October 18, 1998. The accused-
appellant went to Gusa while the other three men brought the damaged truck to Cugman. 65
The accused-appellant asserted that KKK merely fabricated the rape charges as her revenge because he
took over the control and management of their businesses as well as the possession of their pick-up truck in
January 1999. The accused-appellant was provoked to do so when she failed to account for their bank deposits
and business earnings. The entries in their bank account showed the balance of P3,190,539.83 on October 31,
1996 but after only a month or on November 30, 1996, the amount dwindled to a measly P9,894.88. 66 Her
failure to immediately report to the police also belies her rape allegations. 67
KKK wanted to cover-up her extra-marital affairs, which the accused-appellant gradually detected from
her odd behavior. While in Cebu on October 12, 1998 for MMM's graduation rites, the accused-appellant and
KKK had sexual intercourse. He was surprised when his wife asked him to get a napkin to wipe her after having
sex. He tagged her request as "high-tech," because they did not do the same when they had sex in the past.
KKK had also become increasingly indifferent to him. When he arrives home, it was an employee, not her, who
opened the door and welcomed him. She prettied herself and would no longer ask for his permission whenever
she went out. 68
Bebs, 69 KKK's cousin and a cashier in their Bukidnon store, gave the accused-appellant several love
letters purportedly addressed to Bebs but were actually intended for KKK. 70
KKK had more than ten paramours some of whom the accused-appellant came to know as: Arsenio,
Jong-Jong, Joy or Joey, somebody from the military or the Philippine National Police, another one is a
government employee, a certain Fernandez and three other priests. 71 Several persons told him about the
paramours of his wife but he never confronted her or them about it because he trusted her. 72
What further confirmed his suspicions was the statement made by OOO on November 2, 1998. At that
time, OOO was listening loudly to a cassette player. Since he wanted to watch a television program, he asked
OOO to turn down the volume of the cassette player. She got annoyed, unplugged the player, spinned around
and hit the accused-appellant's head with the socket. His head bled. An altercation between the accused-
appellant and KKK thereafter followed because the latter took OOO's side. During the argument, OOO blurted
out that KKK was better off without the accused-appellant because she had somebody young, handsome, and a
businessman unlike the accused-appellant who smelled bad, and was old, and ugly. 73 cCaIET
KKK also wanted their property divided between them with three-fourths thereof going to her and one-
fourth to the accused-appellant. However, the separation did not push through because the accused-appellant's
parents intervened. 74 Thereafter, KKK pursued legal separation from the accused-appellant by
initiating Barangay Case No. 00588-99 before the Office of Lupong Tagapamayapa of Gusa, Cagayan de Oro
City and thereafter obtaining a Certificate to File Action dated February 18, 1999. 75
Ruling of the RTC
In its Judgment 76 dated April 1, 2002, the RTC sustained the version proffered by the prosecution by
giving greater weight and credence to the spontaneous and straightforward testimonies of the prosecution's
witnesses. The trial court also upheld as sincere and genuine the two daughters' testimonies, as it is not natural
in our culture for daughters to testify against their own father for a crime such as rape if the same was not truly
committed.
The trial court rejected the version of the defense and found unbelievable the accused-appellant's
accusations of extra-marital affairs and money squandering against KKK. The trial court shelved the accused-
appellant's alibi for being premised on inconsistent testimonies and the contradicting declarations of the other
defense witness, Equia, as to the accused-appellant's actual whereabouts on October 16, 1998. Accordingly, the
RTC ruling disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds accused Edgar Jumawan "GUILTY" beyond
reasonable doubt of the two (2) separate charges of rape and hereby sentences him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua for each, to pay complainant [P]50,000.00 in each case as moral
damages, indemnify complainant the sum of [P]75,000.00 in each case, [P]50,000.00 as exemplary
damages and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED. 77
Ruling of the CA
In its Decision 78 dated July 9, 2008, the CA affirmed in toto the RTC ruling. The CA held that Section
14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, sanctioned the amendment of the original informations. Further,
the accused-appellant was not prejudiced by the amendment because he was re-arraigned with respect to the
amended informations.
The CA found that the prosecution, through the straightforward testimony of the victim herself and the
corroborative declarations of MMM and OOO, was able to establish, beyond reasonable doubt, all the elements
of rape under R.A. No. 8353. The accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of KKK by using force and
intimidation.
The CA also ruled that KKK's failure to submit herself to medical examination did not negate the
commission of the crime because a medical certificate is not necessary to prove rape.
The CA rejected the accused-appellant's argument that since he and KKK are husband and wife with
mutual obligations of and right to sexual intercourse, there must be convincing physical evidence or
manifestations of the alleged force and intimidation used upon KKK such as bruises. The CA explained that
physical showing of external injuries is not indispensable to prosecute and convict a person for rape; what is
necessary is that the victim was forced to have sexual intercourse with the accused.
In addition, the CA noted that the fact that KKK and the accused-appellant are spouses only reinforces
the truthfulness of KKK's accusations because no wife in her right mind would accuse her husband of having
raped her if it were not true.
The delay in the filing of the rape complaint was sufficiently explained by KKK when she stated that she
only found out that a wife may charge his husband with rape when the fiscal investigating her separate complaint
for grave threats and physical injuries told her about it. HcaDTE
Finally, the CA dismissed the accused-appellant's alibi for lack of convincing evidence that it was
physically impossible for him to be at his residence in Cagayan de Oro City at the time of the commission of the
crimes, considering that Dangcagan, Bukidnon, the place where he allegedly was, is only about four or five hours
away. Accordingly, the decretal portion of the decision read:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the appealed Judgment is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. 79
Hence, the present review. In the Court Resolution 80 dated July 6, 2009, the Court notified the parties
that, if they so desire, they may file their respective supplemental briefs. In a Manifestation and Motion 81 dated
September 4, 2009, the appellee, through the Office of the Solicitor General, expressed that it intends to adopt
its Brief before the CA. On April 16, 2012, the accused-appellant, through counsel, filed his Supplemental Brief,
arguing that he was not in Cagayan de Oro City when the alleged rape incidents took place, and the presence of
force, threat or intimidation is negated by: (a) KKK's voluntary act of going with him to the conjugal bedroom on
October 16, 1998; (b) KKK's failure to put up resistance or seek help from police authorities; and (c) the absence
of a medical certificate and of blood traces in KKK's panties. 82
Our Ruling
I. Rape and marriage: the historical connection
The evolution of rape laws is actually traced to two ancient English practices of 'bride capture' whereby
a man conquered a woman through rape and 'stealing an heiress' whereby a man abducted a woman and
married her. 83
The rape laws then were intended not to redress the violation of the woman's chastity but rather to
punish the act of obtaining the heiress' property by forcible marriage 84 or to protect a man's valuable interest in
his wife's chastity or her daughter's virginity. 85 If a man raped an unmarried virgin, he was guilty of stealing her
father's property and if a man raped his wife, he was merely using his property. 86
Women were subjugated in laws and society as objects or goods and such treatment was justified under
three ideologies.
Under the chattel theory prevalent during the 6th century, a woman was the property of her father until
she marries to become the property of her husband. 87 If a man abducted an unmarried woman, he had to pay
the owner, and later buy her from the owner; buying and marrying a wife were synonymous. 88
From the 11th century to the 16th century, a woman lost her identity upon marriage and the law denied
her political power and status under the feudal doctrine of coverture. 89 A husband had the right to chastise his
wife and beat her if she misbehaved, allowing him to bring order within the family. 90
This was supplanted by the marital unity theory, which espoused a similar concept. Upon marrying, the
woman becomes one with her husband. She had no right to make a contract, sue another, own personal
property or write a will. 91
II. The marital exemption rule
In the 17th century, Sir Matthew Hale (Hale), a Chief Justice in England, conceived the irrevocable
implied consent theory that would later on emerge as the marital exemption rule in rape. He stated that:
[T]he husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by himself upon his lawful wife, for by their
mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given up herself in this kind unto her
husband, which she cannot retract. 92
The rule was observed in common law countries such as the United States of America (USA) and
England. It gives legal immunity to a man who forcibly sexually assaults his wife, an act which would be rape if
committed against a woman not his wife. 93 In those jurisdictions, rape is traditionally defined as "the forcible
penetration of the body of a woman who is not the wife of the perpetrator." 94 cTECHI
The first case in the USA that applied the marital exemption rule was Commonwealth v.
Fogerty 95 promulgated in 1857. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts pronounced that it would always
be a defense in rape to show marriage to the victim. Several other courts adhered to a similar rationale with all of
them citing Hale's theory as basis. 96
The rule was formally codified in the Penal Code of New York in 1909. A husband was endowed with
absolute immunity from prosecution for the rape of his wife. 97 The privilege was personal and pertained to him
alone. He had the marital right to rape his wife but he will be liable when he aids or abets another person in
raping her. 98
In the 1970s, the rule was challenged by women's movements in the USA demanding for its abolition for
being violative of married women's right to be equally protected under rape laws. 99
In 1978, the rule was qualified by the Legislature in New York by proscribing the application of the rule in
cases where the husband and wife are living apart pursuant to a court order "which by its terms or in its effects
requires such living apart," or a decree, judgment or written agreement of separation. 100
In 1983, the marital exemption rule was abandoned in New York when the Court of Appeals of New York
declared the same unconstitutional in People v. Liberta 101 for lack of rational basis in distinguishing between
marital rape and non-marital rape. The decision, which also renounced Hale's irrevocable implied consent
theory, ratiocinated as follows:
We find that there is no rational basis for distinguishing between marital rape and
nonmarital rape. The various rationales which have been asserted in defense of the exemption are
either based upon archaic notions about the consent and property rights incident to marriage or
are simply unable to withstand even the slightest scrutiny. We therefore declare the marital
exemption for rape in the New York statute to be unconstitutional.
Lord Hale's notion of an irrevocable implied consent by a married woman to sexual
intercourse has been cited most frequently in support of the marital exemption. . . . Any argument
based on a supposed consent, however, is untenable. Rape is not simply a sexual act to which
one party does not consent. Rather, it is a degrading, violent act which violates the bodily integrity
of the victim and frequently causes severe, long-lasting physical and psychic harm . . . . To ever
imply consent to such an act is irrational and absurd. Other than in the context of rape statutes,
marriage has never been viewed as giving a husband the right to coerced intercourse on demand .
. . . Certainly, then, a marriage license should not be viewed as a license for a husband to
forcibly rape his wife with impunity. A married woman has the same right to control her own body
as does an unmarried woman . . . . If a husband feels "aggrieved" by his wife's refusal to engage in
sexual intercourse, he should seek relief in the courts governing domestic relations, not in "violent
or forceful self-help . . . ."
The other traditional justifications for the marital exemption were the common-law
doctrines that a woman was the property of her husband and that the legal existence of the
woman was "incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband . . . ." Both these doctrines,
of course, have long been rejected in this State. Indeed, "[nowhere] in the common-law world —
[or] in any modern society — is a woman regarded as chattel or demeaned by denial of a separate
legal identity and the dignity associated with recognition as a whole human being . . .
." 102 (Citations omitted)
By 1993, marital rape was a crime in all 50 states, with 17 of them, as well as the District of Columbia,
outlawing the act without exemptions. Meanwhile, the 33 other states granted some exemptions to a husband
from prosecution such as when the wife is mentally or physically impaired, unconscious, asleep, or legally unable
to consent. 103
III. Marital Rape in the Philippines
Interestingly, no documented case on marital rape has ever reached this Court until now. It appears,
however, that the old provisions of rape under Article 335 of the RPC adhered to Hale's irrevocable implied
consent theory, albeit in a limited form. According to Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino, 104 a husband may not be
guilty of rape under Article 335 of Act No. 3815 but, in case there is legal separation, the husband should be held
guilty of rape if he forces his wife to submit to sexual intercourse. 105 caSEAH
In 1981, the Philippines joined 180 countries in ratifying the United Nations Convention on the Elimination
of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (UN-CEDAW). 106 Hailed as the first international women's bill of
rights, the CEDAW is the first major instrument that contains a ban on all forms of discrimination against women.
The Philippines assumed the role of promoting gender equality and women's empowerment as a vital element in
addressing global concerns. 107The country also committed, among others, to condemn discrimination against
women in all its forms, and agreed to pursue, by all appropriate means and without delay, a policy of eliminating
discrimination against women and, to this end, undertook:
(a) To embody the principle of the equality of men and women in their
national constitutions or other appropriate legislation if not yet incorporated therein and to ensure,
through law and other appropriate means, the practical realization of this principle;
(b) To adopt appropriate legislative and other measures, including sanctions where
appropriate, prohibiting all discrimination against women;
xxx xxx xxx
(f) To take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing
laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimination against women;
(g) To repeal all national penal provisions which constitute discrimination against
women. 108
In compliance with the foregoing international commitments, the Philippines enshrined the principle of
gender equality in the 1987 Constitution specifically in Sections 11 and 14 of Article II thereof, thus:
Sec. 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect
for human rights.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the
fundamental equality before the law of women and men.
The Philippines also acceded to adopt and implement the generally accepted principles of international
law such as the CEDAW and its allied issuances, viz.:
Article II, Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy,
and adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the
land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all
nations. (Emphasis ours)
The Legislature then pursued the enactment of laws to propagate gender equality. In 1997, R.A. No.
8353 eradicated the stereotype concept of rape in Article 335 of the RPC. 109 The law reclassified rape as a
crime against person and removed it from the ambit of crimes against chastity. More particular to the present
case, and perhaps the law's most progressive proviso is the 2nd paragraph of Section 2 thereof recognizing the
reality of marital rape and criminalizing its perpetration, viz.:
Article 266-C. Effect of Pardon. — The subsequent valid marriage between the offended
party shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty imposed.
In case it is the legal husband who is the offender, the subsequent forgiveness by the
wife as the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty: Provided, That the
crime shall not be extinguished or the penalty shall not be abated if the marriage is void ab initio.
Read together with Section 1 of the law, which unqualifiedly uses the term "man" in defining rape, it is
unmistakable that R.A. No. 8353 penalizes the crime without regard to the rapist's legal relationship with his
victim, thus:
Article 266-A. Rape: When and How Committed. — Rape is committed:
circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation; aHcDEC
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented,
even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
The explicit intent to outlaw marital rape is deducible from the records of the deliberations of the 10th
Congress on the law's progenitor's, House Bill No. 6265 and Senate Bill No. 650. In spite of qualms on tagging
the crime as 'marital rape' due to conservative Filipino impressions on marriage, the consensus of our lawmakers
was clearly to include and penalize marital rape under the general definition of 'rape,' viz.:
MR. DAMASING:
Madam Speaker, Your Honor, one more point of clarification in the House version on Anti-
Rape Bill, House Bill No. 6265, we never agreed to marital rape. But under Article 266-C, it
says here: "In case it is the legal husband who is the offender . . ." Does this presuppose
that there is now marital rape? . . . .
MR. LARA:
. . . [I]n this jurisdiction, well, I only have a limited, very limited 17 years of private practice in the
legal profession, Madam Speaker, and I believe that I can put at stake my license as a
lawyer in this jurisdiction there is no law that prohibits a husband from being sued by the
wife for rape. Even jurisprudence, we don't have any jurisprudence that prohibits a wife
from suing a husband. That is why even if we don't provide in this bill expanding the
definition of crime that is now being presented for approval, Madam Speaker, even if we
don't provide here for marital rape, even if we don't provide for sexual rape, there is the
right of the wife to go against the husband. The wife can sue the husband for
marital rape and she cannot be prevented from doing so because in this jurisdiction there
is no law that prohibits her from doing so. This is why we had to put second paragraph of
266-C because it is the belief of many of us. . . . , that if it is true that in this jurisdiction
there is marital rape even if we don't provide it here, then we must provide for something
that will unify and keep the cohesion of the family together that is why we have the second
paragraph.
MR. DAMASING:
Madam Speaker, Your Honor, under the House version specifically House Bill No. 6265 our
provision on a husband forcing the wife is not marital rape, it is marital sexual assault.
MR. LARA:
That is correct, Madam Speaker.
MR. DAMASING:
But here it is marital rape because there is no crime of sexual assault. So, Your Honor, direct to the
point, under Article 266-C, is it our understanding that in the second paragraph, quote: "In
case it is the legal husband who is the offender, this refers to marital rape filed against the
husband? Is that correct?
MR. LARA:
No, Madam Speaker, not entirely, no. The answer is no.
MR. DAMASING:
So if the husband is guilty of sexual assault, what do you call it?
MR. LARA:
Sexual assault, Madam Speaker.
MR. DAMASING:
There is no crime of sexual assault, Your Honor, we have already stated that. Because under 1 and
2 it is all denominated as rape, there is no crime of sexual assault. That is why I am sorry
that our House version which provided for sexual assault was not carried by the Senate
version because all sexual crimes under this bicameral conference committee report are all
now denominated as rape whether the penalty is from reclusion perpetua to death or
whether the penalty is only prision mayor. So there is marital rape, Your Honor, is that
correct? HEacDA
xxx xxx xxx
MR. DAMASING:
Madam Speaker, Your Honor, I am in favor of this. I am in favor of punishing the husband
who forces the wife even to 30 years imprisonment. But please do not call it
marital rape, call it marital sexual assault because of the sanctity of marriage. . . .
. 110 (Emphasis ours)
HON. APOSTOL:
In our version, we did not mention marital rape but marital rape is not excluded.
HON. ROCO:
Yeah. No. But I think there is also no specific mention.
HON. APOSTOL:
No. No. No. Silent lang 'yung marital rape.
xxx xxx xxx
HON. ROCO:
. . . [I]f we can retain the effect of pardon, then this marital rape can be implicitly contained in the
second paragraph. . . . So marital rape actually was in the House version . . . . But it
was not another definition of rape. You will notice, it only says, that because you are
the lawful husband does not mean that you cannot commit rape. Theoretically, I
mean, you can beat up your wife until she's blue. And if the wife complains she was
raped, I guess that, I mean, you just cannot raise the defense . . . [:] I am the
husband. But where in the marriage contract does it say that I can beat you up?
That's all it means. That is why if we stop referring to it as marital rape, acceptance
is easy. Because parang ang marital rape, married na nga kami. I cannot have sex. No,
what it is saying is you're [the] husband but you cannot beat me up. . . . . That's why to me
it's not alarming. It was just a way of saying you're [the] husband, you cannot say when I
am charged with rape . . . .
PRESIDING OFFICER SHAHANI:
All right, so how do you propose it if we put it in[?]
HON. ROCO:
. . . [A]ll we are saying [is] that if you are the lawful husband does not mean you can have
carnal knowledge by force[,] threat or intimidation or by depriving your wife reason, a
grave abuse of authority, I don't know how that cannot apply. Di ba yung, or putting an
instrument into the, yun ang sinasabi ko lang, it is not meant to have another
classification of rape. It is all the same definition . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
HON. ROCO:
What is 266-F? . . . . Now if we can retain 266-F . . . , we can say that this rule is implicit
already in the first proviso. It implies na there is an instance when a husband can be
charged [with] rape . . . .
HON. ROXAS:
Otherwise, silent na.

HON. ROCO:
Otherwise, we are silent na. So parang i-delete natin ito. But it is understood that this rule of
evidence is now transport[ed], put into 266-F, the effect of pardon.
PRESIDING OFFICER APOSTOL:
We will retain this effect of pardon. We will remove marital rape. DHcEAa
HON. ROCO:
No, yun ang, oo we will remove this one on page 3 but we will retain the one on page 8, the
effect of pardon. . . . [I]t is inferred but we leave it because after all it is just a rule of
evidence. But I think we should understand that a husband cannot beat at his wife to
have sex. Di ba? I think that should be made clear. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
HON. ROCO:
. . . [W]e are not defining a crime of marital rape. All we are saying is that if you're [the] legal
husband, Jesus Christ, don't beat up to have sex. I almost want, you are my wife,
why do you have to beat me up.
So, ganoon. So, if we both justify it that way in the Report as inferred in proviso, I mean, we can
face up, I hope, to the women and they would understand that it is half achieved.
HON. ZAMORA:
I think, Raul, as long as we understand that we are not defining or creating a new crime but
instead, we are just defining a rule of evidence. . . . .
HON. ROCO:
Then, in which case we may just want to clarify as a rule of evidence the fact that he is husband is
not, does not negate. 111
CHAIRMAN LARA:
. . . We all agree on the substance of the point in discussion. The only disagreement now is where
to place it. Let us clear this matter. There are two suggestions now on marital rape. One is
that it is rape if it is done with force or intimidation or any of the circumstances that would
define rape . . . immaterial. The fact that the husband and wife are separated does not
come into the picture. So even if they are living under one roof . . . for as long as the
attendant circumstances of the traditional rape is present, then that is rape. 112
PRESIDING OFFICER ANGARA-CASTILLO:
Mr. Chairman, . . . [t]his provision on marital rape, it does not actually change the meaning
of rape. It merely erases the doubt in anybody's mind, whether or not rape can
indeed be committed by the husband against the wife. So the bill really says, you
having been married to one another is not a legal impediment. So I don't really think
there is any need to change the concept of rape as defined presently under
the revised penal code. This do[es] not actually add anything to the definition of rape.
It merely says, it is merely clarificatory. That if indeed the wife has evidence to show
that she was really brow beaten, or whatever or forced or intimidated into having
sexual intercourse against her will, then the crime of rape has been committed
against her by the husband, notwithstanding the fact that they have been legally
married. It does not change anything at all, Mr. Chairman.
PRESIDING OFFICER APOSTOL:
Yes, I think, there is no change on this . . . . 113

The paradigm shift on marital rape in the Philippine jurisdiction is further affirmed by R.A. No.
9262, 114 which regards rape within marriage as a form of sexual violence that may be committed by a man
against his wife within or outside the family abode, viz.:
Violence against women and their children refers to any act or a series of acts
committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman
with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common
child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode,
which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic
abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation
of liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the following acts:
A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm; CcAHEI
B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed against a
woman or her child. It includes, but is not limited to:
a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating a woman or her
child as a sex object, making demeaning and sexually suggestive remarks, physically
attacking the sexual parts of the victim's body, forcing her/him to watch obscene
publications and indecent shows or forcing the woman or her child to do indecent
acts and/or make films thereof, forcing the wife and mistress/lover to live in the
conjugal home or sleep together in the same room with the abuser;
b) acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to engage in any sexual activity
by force, threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm or
coercion;
c) prostituting the woman or child.
Statistical figures confirm the above characterization. Emotional and other forms of non-personal
violence are the most common type of spousal violence accounting for 23% incidence among ever-married
women. One in seven ever-married women experienced physical violence by their husbands while eight percent
(8%) experienced sexual violence. 115
IV. Refutation of the accused-appellant's arguments
The crux of the accused-appellant's plea for acquittal mirrors the irrevocable implied consent theory. In
his appeal brief before the CA, he posits that the two incidents of sexual intercourse, which gave rise to the
criminal charges for rape, were theoretically consensual, obligatory even, because he and the victim, KKK, were
a legally married and cohabiting couple. He argues that consent to copulation is presumed between cohabiting
husband and wife unless the contrary is proved.
The accused-appellant further claims that this case should be viewed and treated differently from
ordinary rape cases and that the standards for determining the presence of consent or lack thereof must be
adjusted on the ground that sexual community is a mutual right and obligation between husband and wife. 116
The contentions failed to muster legal and rational merit.
The ancient customs and ideologies from which the irrevocable implied consent theory evolved have
already been superseded by modern global principles on the equality of rights between men and women and
respect for human dignity established in various international conventions, such as the CEDAW. The Philippines,
as State Party to the CEDAW, recognized that a change in the traditional role of men as well as the role of
women in society and in the family is needed to achieve full equality between them. Accordingly, the country
vowed to take all appropriate measures to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women,
with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices, customs and all other practices which are based on the
idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and
women. 117 One of such measures is R.A. No. 8353 insofar as it eradicated the archaic notion that
marital rape cannot exist because a husband has absolute proprietary rights over his wife's body and thus her
consent to every act of sexual intimacy with him is always obligatory or at least, presumed.
Another important international instrument on gender equality is the UN Declaration on the Elimination of
Violence Against Women, which was promulgated 118 by the UN General Assembly subsequent to the CEDAW.
The Declaration, in enumerating the forms of gender-based violence that constitute acts of discrimination against
women, identified 'marital rape' as a species of sexual violence, viz.:
Article 1
For the purposes of this Declaration, the term "violence against women" means any act of
gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or
psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary
deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life. HSATIC
Article 2
Violence against women shall be understood to encompass, but not be limited to, the
following:
(a) Physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring in the family,

including battering, sexual abuse of female children in the household, dowry-related
violence, marital rape, female genital mutilation and other traditional practices
harmful to women, non-spousal violence and violence related to
exploitation; 119 (Emphasis ours)
Clearly, it is now acknowledged that rape, as a form of sexual violence, exists within marriage. A man
who penetrates her wife without her consent or against her will commits sexual violence upon her, and the
Philippines, as a State Party to the CEDAW and its accompanying Declaration, defines and penalizes the act
as rape under R.A. No. 8353.
A woman is no longer the chattel-antiquated practices labeled her to be. A husband who has sexual
intercourse with his wife is not merely using a property, he is fulfilling a marital consortium with a fellow human
being with dignity equal 120 to that he accords himself. He cannot be permitted to violate this dignity by
coercing her to engage in a sexual act without her full and free consent. Surely, the Philippines cannot renege on
its international commitments and accommodate conservative yet irrational notions on marital activities 121 that
have lost their relevance in a progressive society.
It is true that the Family Code, 122 obligates the spouses to love one another but this rule sanctions
affection and sexual intimacy, as expressions of love, that are both spontaneous and mutual 123 and not the
kind which is unilaterally exacted by force or coercion.
Further, the delicate and reverent nature of sexual intimacy between a husband and wife excludes
cruelty and coercion. Sexual intimacy brings spouses wholeness and oneness. It is a gift and a participation in
the mystery of creation. It is a deep sense of spiritual communion. It is a function which enlivens the hope of
procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations. It is an expressive interest in each other's feelings at
a time it is needed by the other and it can go a long way in deepening marital relationship. 124 When it is
egoistically utilized to despoil marital union in order to advance a felonious urge for coitus by force, violence or
intimidation, the Court will step in to protect its lofty purpose, vindicate justice and protect our laws and State
policies. Besides, a husband who feels aggrieved by his indifferent or uninterested wife's absolute refusal to
engage in sexual intimacy may legally seek the court's intervention to declare her psychologically incapacitated
to fulfill an essential marital obligation. 125 But he cannot and should not demand sexual intimacy from her
coercively or violently.
Moreover, to treat marital rape cases differently from non-marital rape cases in terms of the elements
that constitute the crime and in the rules for their proof, infringes on the equal protection clause. The
Constitutional right to equal protection of the laws 126 ordains that similar subjects should not be treated
differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others; no person or class of
persons shall be denied the same protection of laws, which is enjoyed, by other persons or other classes in like
circumstances. 127
As above discussed, the definition of rape in Section 1 of R.A. No. 8353 pertains to: (a) rape, as
traditionally known; (b) sexual assault; and (c) marital rape or that where the victim is the perpetrator's own
spouse. The single definition for all three forms of the crime shows that the law does not distinguish
between rape committed in wedlock and those committed without a marriage. Hence, the law affords protection
to women raped by their husband and those raped by any other man alike.
The posture advanced by the accused-appellant arbitrarily discriminates against married rape victims
over unmarried rape victims because it withholds from married women raped by their husbands the penal
redress equally granted by law to all rape victims. EAcCHI
Further, the Court adheres to and hereby adopts the rationale in Liberta in rejecting the argument akin to
those raised by herein accused-appellant. A marriage license should not be viewed as a license for a husband to
forcibly rape his wife with impunity. A married woman has the same right to control her own body, as does an
unmarried woman. 128 She can give or withhold her consent to a sexual intercourse with her husband and he
cannot unlawfully wrestle such consent from her in case she refuses.
Lastly, the human rights of women include their right to have control over and decide freely and
responsibly on matters related to their sexuality, including sexual and reproductive health, free of coercion,
discrimination and violence. 129 Women do not divest themselves of such right by contracting marriage for the
simple reason that human rights are inalienable. 130
In fine, since the law does not separately categorize marital rape and non-marital rape nor provide for
different definition or elements for either, the Court, tasked to interpret and apply what the law dictates, cannot
trudge the forbidden sphere of judicial legislation and unlawfully divert from what the law sets forth. Neither can
the Court frame distinct or stricter evidentiary rules for marital rape cases as it would inequitably burden its
victims and unreasonably and irrationally classify them differently from the victims of non-marital rape.
Indeed, there exists no legal or rational reason for the Court to apply the law and the evidentiary rules
on rape any differently if the aggressor is the woman's own legal husband. The elements and quantum of proof
that support a moral certainty of guilt in rape cases should apply uniformly regardless of the legal relationship
between the accused and his accuser.
Thus, the Court meticulously reviewed the present case in accordance with the established legal
principles and evidentiary policies in the prosecution and resolution of rape cases and found that no reversible
error can be imputed to the conviction meted the accused-appellant.
The evidence for the prosecution was
based on credible witnesses who gave
equally credible testimonies
In rape cases, the conviction of the accused rests heavily on the credibility of the victim. Hence, the strict
mandate that all courts must examine thoroughly the testimony of the offended party. While the accused in
a rape case may be convicted solely on the testimony of the complaining witness, courts are, nonetheless, duty-
bound to establish that their reliance on the victim's testimony is justified. Courts must ensure that the testimony
is credible, convincing, and otherwise consistent with human nature. If the testimony of the complainant meets
the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof. 131
It is settled that the evaluation by the trial court of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are
entitled to the highest respect. This is in view of its inimitable opportunity to directly observe the witnesses and
their deportment, conduct and attitude, especially during cross-examination. Thus, unless it is shown that its
evaluation was tainted with arbitrariness or certain facts of substance and value have been plainly overlooked,
misunderstood, or misapplied, the same will not be disturbed on appeal. 132
After approximating the perspective of the trial court thru a meticulous scrutiny of the entire records of
the trial proceedings and the transcript of each witnesses' testimony, the Court found no justification to disturb
its findings.
Rather, the Court observed that KKK and her testimony were both credible and spontaneous. Hailed to
the witness stand on six separate occasions, KKK never wavered neither did her statements vacillate between
uncertainty and certitude. She remained consistent, categorical, straightforward, and candid during the rigorous
cross-examination and on rebuttal examination, she was able to convincingly explain and debunk the allegations
of the defense. HDCTAc
She vividly recounted how the accused-appellant forced her to have sex with him despite her refusal on
October 16, 1998. He initially ordered her to sleep beside him in their conjugal bed by violently throwing the cot
where she was resting. In order not to aggravate his temper, KKK obeyed. On the bed, he insinuated for them to
have sex. When she rejected his advances due to abdominal pain and headache, his request for intimacy
transformed into a stubborn demand. Unyielding, KKK held her panties but the accused-appellant forcibly pulled
them down. The tug caused the small clothing to tear apart. She reiterated that she was not feeling well and
begged him to stop. But no amount of resistance or begging subdued him. He flexed her two legs apart, gripped
her hands, mounted her, rested his own legs on hers and inserted his penis into her vagina. She continued
pleading but he never desisted. 133
Her accurate recollection of the second rape incident on October 17, 1998 is likewise unmistakable. After
the appalling episode in the conjugal bedroom the previous night, KKK decided to sleep in the children's
bedroom. While her daughters were fixing the beddings, the accused-appellant barged into the room and
berated her for refusing to go with him to their conjugal bedroom. When KKK insisted to stay in the children's
bedroom, the accused-appellant got angry and pulled her up. MMM's attempt to pacify the accused-appellant
further enraged him. He reminded them that as the head of the family he could do whatever he wants with his
wife. To demonstrate his role as patriarch, he ordered the children to go out of the room and thereafter
proceeded to force KKK into sexual intercourse. He forcibly pulled down her short pants and panties as KKK
begged "Don't do that to me, my body is still aching and also my abdomen and I cannot do what you wanted me
to do. I cannot withstand sex." 134 But her pleas fell on deaf ears. The accused-appellant removed his shorts
and briefs, spread KKK's legs apart, held her hands, mounted her and inserted his penis into her vagina. After
gratifying himself, he got dressed, left the room as he chuckled: "It's nice, that is what you deserve because you
are [a] flirt or fond of sex." 135
Entrenched is the rule that in the prosecution of rape cases, the essential element that must be proved is
the absence of the victim's consent to the sexual congress. 136 Under the law, consent is absent when: (a) it
was wrestled from the victim by force, threat or intimidation, fraudulent machinations or grave abuse of authority;
or (b) the victim is incapable of giving free and voluntary consent because he/she is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious or that the offended party is under 12 years of age or is demented.
Contrary to the accused-appellant's asseverations, KKK's consent was wrestled from her through force
and intimidation both of which were established beyond moral certainty by the prosecution through the pertinent
testimony of KKK, viz.:
On the October 16, 1998 rape incident:
(Direct Examination)
ATTY. LARGO:
Q So, while you were already lying on the bed together with your husband, do you remember
what happened?
A He lie down beside me and asked me to have sex with him.
Q How did he manifest that he wanted to have sex with you?
A He put his hand on my lap and asked me to have sex with him but I warded off his hand.
Q Can you demonstrate to this Court how did he use his hand?
A Yes. "witness demonstrating on how the accused used his finger by touching or knocking her
lap which means that he wanted to have sex."
Q So, what did you do after that?
A I warded off his hand and refused because I was not feeling well. (at this juncture the witness is
sobbing)
Q So, what did your husband do when you refused him to have sex with you?
A He insisted and he pulled my pantie forcibly, that is why my pantie [sic] was torn.
Q Why, what did you do when he started to pull your pantie [sic]?
A I resisted and tried to hold my pantie [sic] but I failed, because he is so strong. DCISAE
xxx xxx xxx
Q So, when your pantie [sic] was torn by your husband, what else did he do?
A He flexed my two legs and rested his two legs on my legs.
Q So after that what else did he do?
A He succeeded in having sex with me because he held my two hands no matter how I wrestled
but I failed because he is stronger than me.
COURT:
Make it of record that the witness is sobbing while she is giving her testimony.
ATTY. LARGO:
(To the witness cont'ng.)
Q So, what did you do when your husband already stretched your two legs and rode on you and
held your two hands?
A I told him, "don't do that because I'm not feeling well and my whole body is aching."
Q How did you say that to your husband?
A I told him, "don't do that to me because I'm not feeling well."
Q Did you say that in the manner you are saying now?
xxx xxx xxx
A I shouted when I uttered that words.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Was your husband able to consummate his desire?
xxx xxx xxx
A Yes, sir, because I cannot do anything. 137

(Cross-Examination)
ATTY. AMARGA;
Q Every time you have sex with your husband it was your husband normally remove your panty?
A Yes, Sir.
Q It was not unusual for your husband then to remove your panty because according to you he
normally do that if he have sex with you?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And finally according to you your husband have sex with you?
A Yes, Sir because he forcibly used me in spite of holding my panty because I don't want to have
sex with him at that time.
Q You did not spread your legs at that time when he removed your panty?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Meaning, your position of your legs was normal during that time?
A I tried to resist by not flexing my legs.
xxx xxx xxx
Q At that time when your husband allegedly removed your panty he also remove your nightgown?
A No, Sir.
Q And he did pull out your duster [sic] towards your face?
A He raised my duster [sic] up. EIASDT
Q In other words your face was covered when he raised your duster [sic]?
A No, only on the breast level. 138
On the October 17, 1998 rape incident:
(Direct Examination)
ATTY LARGO
Q So, after your children went out of the room, what transpired?
A He successfully having sex with me because he pulled my short pant and pantie forcible.
Q So, what did you say when he forcibly pulled your short and pantie?
A I told him, "don't do that to me, my body is still aching and also my abdomen and I cannot do
what you wanted me to do. I cannot withstand sex."
Q So, what happened to your short when he forcibly pulled it down?
A It was torn.
Q And after your short and pantie was pulled down by your husband, what did he do?
A He also removed his short and brief and flexed my two legs and mounted on me and
succeeded in having sex with me. 139
The accused-appellant forced his wife when he knowingly overpowered her by gripping her hands,
flexing her legs and then resting his own legs thereon in order to facilitate the consummation of his much-desired
non-consensual sexual intercourse.
Records also show that the accused-appellant employed sufficient intimidation upon KKK. His
actuations prior to the actual moment of the felonious coitus revealed that he imposed his distorted sense of
moral authority on his wife. He furiously demanded for her to lay with him on the bed and thereafter coerced her
to indulge his sexual craving.
The fury the accused-appellant exhibited when KKK refused to sleep with him on their bed, when she
insisted to sleep in the children's bedroom and the fact that he exercises dominance over her as husband all
cowed KKK into submission.
The fact that KKK voluntarily went with the accused-appellant to their conjugal bedroom on October 16,
1998 cannot be stretched to mean that she consented to the forced sexual intercourse that ensued. The
accused-appellant was KKK's husband and hence it was customary for her to sleep in the conjugal bedroom. No
consent can be deduced from such act of KKK because at that juncture there were no indications that sexual
intercourse was about to take place. The issue of consent was still irrelevant since the act for which the same is
legally required did not exist yet or at least unclear to the person from whom the consent was desired. The
significant point when consent must be given is at that time when it is clear to the victim that her aggressor is
soliciting sexual congress. In this case, that point is when the accused-appellant tapped his fingers on her lap, a
gesture KKK comprehended to be an invitation for a sexual intercourse, which she refused.
Resistance, medical certificate and
blood traces.
We cannot give credence to the accused-appellant's argument that KKK should have hit him to convey
that she was resisting his sexual onslaught. Resistance is not an element of rapeand the law does not impose
upon the victim the burden to prove resistance 140 much more requires her to raise a specific kind
thereof. ASHECD
At any rate, KKK put up persistent, audible and intelligible resistance for the accused-appellant to
recognize that she seriously did not assent to a sexual congress. She held on to her panties to prevent him from
undressing her, she refused to bend her legs and she repeatedly shouted and begged for him to stop.
Moreover, as an element of rape, force or intimidation need not be irresistible; it may be just enough to
bring about the desired result. What is necessary is that the force or intimidation be sufficient to consummate the
purpose that the accused had in mind 141 or is of such a degree as to impel the defenseless and hapless victim
to bow into submission. 142
Contrary to the accused-appellant's allusions, the absence of blood traces in KKK's panties or the lack
of a medical certificate do not negate rape. It is not the presence or absence of blood on the victim's underwear
that determines the fact of rape 143 inasmuch as a medical certificate is dispensable evidence that is not
necessary to prove rape. 144 These details do not pertain to the elements that produce the gravamen of the
offense that is — sexual intercourse with a woman against her will or without her consent. 145
The accused-appellant harps on the acquittal ruling in People v. Godoy, 146 the evidentiary
circumstances of which are, however, disparate from those in the present case. In Godoy, the testimony of the
complainant was inherently weak, inconsistent, and was controverted by the prosecution's medico-legal expert
witness who stated that force was not applied based on the position of her hymenal laceration. This led the
Court to conclude that the absence of any sign of physical violence on the victim's body is an indication of
consent. 147 Here, however, KKK's testimony is, as discussed earlier, credible, spontaneous and forthright.
The corroborative testimonies of
MMM and OOO are worthy of
credence.
The accused-appellant's assertion that MMM and OOO's testimonies lacked probative value as they did
not witness the actual rape is bereft of merit. It must be stressed that rape is essentially committed in relative
isolation, thus, it is usually only the victim who can testify with regard to the fact of the forced sexual
intercourse. 148 Hence, the probative value of MMM and OOO's testimonies rest not on whether they actually
witnessed the rape but on whether their declarations were in harmony with KKK's narration of the circumstances,
preceding, subsequent to and concurrent with, the rape incidents.
MMM and OOO's testimonies substantiated significant points in KKK's narration. MMM heard KKK
shouting and crying: "Eddie, don't do that to me, have pity on me" 149 on the night of October 16, 1998 shortly
after KKK and the accused-appellant went to their conjugal bedroom. When MMM went upstairs to check on her
mother, the accused-appellant admonished her for meddling. Frustrated to aid her mother who persistently
cried, MMM kicked the door so hard the accused-appellant was prompted to open it and rebuke MMM once
more. OOO heard all these commotion from the room downstairs.
MMM then saw her mother crouched on the bed, crying, with her hair disheveled while her torn panty lay
on the floor. After a brief struggle with the accused-appellant, MMM and KKK were finally able to escape and
retreat to the children's bedroom where KKK narrated to her daughters: "[Y]our father is an animal, a beast; he
forced me to have sex with him when I'm not feeling well."
KKK gave a similar narration to MMM and OOO the following night after the accused-appellant barged
inside the children's bedroom. The couple had an argument and when MMM tried to interfere, the accused-
appellant ordered her and OOO to get out after bragging that he can have sex with his wife even in front of the
children because he is the head of the family. The girls then stayed by the staircase where they afterwards heard
their mother helplessly crying and shouting for the accused-appellant to stop.
Indeed, the testimonies of KKK, MMM and OOO coherently depicted that the accused-appellant,
through the use of force and intimidation, had non-consensual and forced carnal knowledge of his wife, KKK on
the nights of October 16 and 17, 1998.
KKK's helpless screams and pleas from inside the bedroom coupled with her verbal and physical
resistance were clear manifestations of coercion. Her appearance when MMM saw her on the bed after the
accused appellant opened the door on October 16, 1998, her conduct towards the accused-appellant on her
way out of the room, and her categorical outcry to her children after the two bedroom episodes — all generate
the conclusion that the sexual acts that occurred were against her will. TAcCDI
Failure to immediately report to the
police authorities, if satisfactorily
explained, is not fatal to the
credibility of a witness.
The testimonies of KKK and her daughters cannot be discredited merely because they failed to report
the rape incidents to the police authorities or that KKK belatedly filed the rapecharges. Delay or vacillation by the
victims in reporting sexual assaults does not necessarily impair their credibility if such delay is satisfactorily
explained. 150
At that time, KKK and her daughters were not aware that a husband forcing his wife to submit to sexual
intercourse is considered rape. In fact, KKK only found out that she could sue his husband for rape when
Prosecutor Benjamin Tabique, Jr. (Prosecutor Tabique) told her about it when she filed the separate charges for
grave threats and physical injuries against the accused-appellant. 151 It must be noted that the incidents
occurred a year into the effectivity of R.A. No. 8353 abolishing marital exemption in rape cases hence it is
understandable that it was not yet known to a layman as opposed to legal professionals like Prosecutor Tabique.
In addition, fear of reprisal thru social humiliation which is the common factor that deter rape victims
from reporting the crime to the authorities is more cumbersome in marital rapecases. This is in view of the
popular yet outdated belief that it is the wife's absolute obligation to submit to her husband's carnal desires. A
husband raping his own wife is often dismissed as a peculiar occurrence or trivialized as simple domestic
trouble.
Unfamiliarity with or lack of knowledge of the law criminalizing marital rape, the stigma and public
scrutiny that could have befallen KKK and her family had the intervention of police authorities or even the
neighbors been sought, are acceptable explanations for the failure or delay in reporting the
subject rape incidents.
The victim's testimony on the
witness stand rendered
unnecessary the presentation of her
complaint-affidavit as evidence.
The failure of the prosecution to present KKK's complaint-affidavit for rape is not fatal in view of the
credible, candid and positive testimony of KKK on the witness stand. Testimonial evidence carries more weight
than the affidavit since it underwent the rudiments of a direct, cross, re-direct and re-cross examinations.
Affidavits or statements taken ex parte are generally considered incomplete and inaccurate. Thus, by nature, they
are inferior to testimony given in court. 152
Ill motive imputed to the victim
The ill motive, which the accused-appellant imputed to KKK, does not inspire belief as it is riddled with
loopholes generated by incongruent and flimsy evidence. The prosecution was able to establish that the P3
Million deposit in the spouses' bank account was the proceeds of their loan from the Bank of Philippine Islands
(BPI). Exhibit J, which is a BPI ML instruction sheet dated October 31, 1996 in the amount of P3,149,840.63 is
the same amount the accused-appellant claimed to have entrusted to her wife. Although the accused-appellant
denied being aware of such loan, he admitted that approximately P3 Million was spent for the construction of
their house. These pieces of evidence effectively belie the accused appellant's allegation that KKK could not
account for the money deposited in the bank. 153
Anent, KKK's alleged extra-marital affairs, the accused-appellant failed to explain how Bebs could be his
wife KKK when the letter-sender greeted Bebs a "happy birthday" on October 28 while KKK's birthday is June
23. The accused-appellant also did not present Bebs herself, being a more competent witness to the existence
of the alleged love letters for KKK. He likewise failed, despite promise to do so, to present the original copies of
such love letters neither did he substantiate KKK's supposed extra-marital affairs by presenting witnesses who
could corroborate his claims. Further, the Court finds it unbelievable that an able man would not have the
temerity to confront his wife who has fooled around with 10 men — some of whom he has even met. The
accused-appellant's erratic statements on the witness stand are inconsistent with the theory of extra-marital
romance making it reasonable to infer that he merely made up those malicious stories as a desperate ploy to
extricate himself out of this legal quandary. ASHICc
At best, the basis of the alleged illicit affairs of KKK were the accused-appellant's unfounded suspicions
that hold no evidentiary weight in law and thus incompetent to destroy KKK's credibility and that of her
testimony. In sum, the defense failed to present sufficiently convincing evidence that KKK is a mere vindictive
wife who is harassing the accused-appellant with fabricated rape charges.
Alibi
It must be stressed that in raising the irrevocable implied consent theory as defense, the accused-
appellant has essentially admitted the facts of sexual intercourse embodied in the two criminal informations
for rape. This admission is inconsistent with the defense of alibi and any discussion thereon will thus be
irrelevant.
At any rate, the courts a quo correctly rejected his alibi.
Alibi is one of the weakest defenses not only because it is inherently frail and unreliable, but also
because it is easy to fabricate and difficult to check or rebut. It cannot prevail over the positive identification of
the accused by eyewitnesses who had no improper motive to testify falsely. 154
For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was at some other place at
the time of the commission of the crime, but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus
delicti or within its immediate vicinity. Physical impossibility refers not only to the geographical distance between
the place where the accused was and the place where the crime was committed when the crime transpired, but
more importantly, the facility of access between the two places. 155
Even granting in arguendo that the accused-appellant had indeed attended a fiesta in Dangcagan,
Bukidnon or was hauling corn with Equia on the dates of commission of the crime, the same will not easily
exonerate him. The accused-appellant failed to adduce clear and convincing evidence that it was physically
impossible for him to be at his residence in Cagayan de Oro City at the time of the commission of the crime.
Dangcagan, Bukidnon can be traversed by about four or five hours from Cagayan de Oro City, and even less by
private vehicle which was available to the accused appellant at any time. 156 Thus, it was not physically
impossible for him to be at the situs criminis at the dates and times when the two rape incidents were
committed.
Between the accused-appellant's alibi and denial, and the positive identification and credible testimony
of the victim, and her two daughters, the Court must give weight to the latter, especially in the absence of ill
motive on their part to falsely testify against the accused-appellant.
Conclusion
All told, the presumption of innocence endowed an accused-appellant was sufficiently overcome by
KKK's clear, straightforward, credible, and truthful declaration that on two separate occasions, he succeeded in
having sexual intercourse with her, without her consent and against her will. Evidence of overwhelming force and
intimidation to consummate rape is extant from KKK's narration as believably corroborated by the testimonies of
MMM and OOO and the physical evidence of KKK's torn panties and short pants. Based thereon, the reason and
conscience of the Court is morally certain that the accused-appellant is guilty of raping his wife on the nights of
October 16 and 17, 1998.
Penalties
The Court affirms the penalty of reclusion perpetua, for each count of rape, meted upon the accused-
appellant for being in accord with Article 266-A in relation to 266-B of the RPC. Further, he shall not be eligible
for parole pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9346, which states that "persons convicted of offenses punished
with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall
not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103, n otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as
amended." 157
The Court sustains the moral damages awarded in the amount of P50,000.00. Moral damages are
granted to rape victims without need of proof other than the fact of rape under the assumption that the victim
suffered moral injuries from the experience she underwent. 158 CSTcEI
The award of civil indemnity is proper; it is mandatory upon the finding that rape took place. Considering
that the crime committed is simple rape, there being no qualifying circumstances attendant in its commission,
the appropriate amount is P50,000.00 159 and not P75,000.00 as awarded by the RTC.
To serve as an example for public good and in order to deter a similar form of domestic violence, an
award of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages is imperative. 160
The damages awarded shall earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum to be reckoned
from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid. 161
A Final Note
Rape is a crime that evokes global condemnation because it is an abhorrence to a woman's value and
dignity as a human being. It respects no time, place, age, physical condition or social status. It can happen
anywhere and it can happen to anyone. Even, as shown in the present case, to a wife, inside her time-honored
fortress, the family home, committed against her by her husband who vowed to be her refuge from cruelty. The
herein pronouncement is an affirmation to wives that our rape laws provide the atonement they seek from their
sexually coercive husbands.
Husbands are once again reminded that marriage is not a license to forcibly rape their wives. A husband
does not own his wife's body by reason of marriage. By marrying, she does not divest herself of the human right
to an exclusive autonomy over her own body and thus, she can lawfully opt to give or withhold her consent to
marital coitus. A husband aggrieved by his wife's unremitting refusal to engage in sexual intercourse cannot
resort to felonious force or coercion to make her yield. He can seek succor before the Family Courts that can
determine whether her refusal constitutes psychological incapacity justifying an annulment of the marriage.
Sexual intimacy is an integral part of marriage because it is the spiritual and biological communion that
achieves the marital purpose of procreation. It entails mutual love and self-giving and as such it contemplates
only mutual sexual cooperation and never sexual coercion or imposition.
The Court is aware that despite the noble intentions of the herein pronouncement, menacing
personalities may use this as a tool to harass innocent husbands. In this regard, let it be stressed that safeguards
in the criminal justice system are in place to spot and scrutinize fabricated or false marital rape complaints and
any person who institutes untrue and malicious charges will be made answerable under the pertinent provisions
of the RPC and/or other laws.
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the Decision dated July 9, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00353 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant Edgar Jumawan is
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of RAPEand is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua for each count, without eligibility for parole. He is further ordered to pay the victim, KKK,
the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages, for each count of rape. The award of damages shall earn legal interest at the rate of six percent
(6%) per annum from the finality of this judgment until fully paid. SO ORDERED.
|||
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 174473. August 17, 2007.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ALVIN ABULON y SALVANIA,appellant.
DECISION
TINGA, J p:
For automatic review is the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated 28 April 2006, affirming with
modification the decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santa Cruz, Laguna, Branch 28, 3 dated 27
December 2000, finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of qualified rape and one (1) count of
acts of lasciviousness.
In three (3) separate Informations 4 for Criminal Cases No. SC-7422, SC-7423 and SC-7424 all dated 16
June 1999, appellant was indicted before the RTC for three (3) counts of qualified rape against his minor daughter
AAA. 5 The accusatory portions in all the Informations are identical, except as regards the date of commission of the
crime. The Information in Criminal Case No. SC-7422 reads:
At the instance of the private complainant [AAA] with the conformity of her mother
[BBB] 6 in a sworn complaint filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Lumban-Kalayaan
(Laguna), the undersigned Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Laguna hereby
accuses ALVINABULON Y SALVANIA, of the crime of "RAPE," committed as follows:
"That on or about March 14, 1999, in the Municipality of Kalayaan, Province of
Laguna, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
with lewd designs, with grave abuse of confidence or obvious ungratefulness, and with
force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully [sic], unlawfully and feloniously have
carnal knowledge of his legitimate minor daughter, [AAA], who at the [sic] time was thirteen
(13) years of age, against her will and consent and to her damage and prejudice."
CONTRARY TO LAW.
After appellant pleaded not guilty, trial ensued with AAA herself, as the first prosecution witness, testifying to
the following facts:
AAA is the oldest of five (5) legitimate children born to appellant and BBB. On 14, 15, and 16 March 1999,
appellant raped AAA. The first rape incident occurred at around 1:30 in the morning of 14 March 1999. AAA was
home, fast asleep next to her brother and sister when she suddenly woke up to the noise created by her father who
arrived drunk, but who likewise soon thereafter returned to the wedding festivities he was attending. Abiding by their
father's instructions, AAA and her siblings went back to sleep. 7
AAA was next awakened by the weight of her father lying naked on top of her. Appellant had removed her
underwear while she slept. He poked a knife on AAA's waist and threatened to kill her and her siblings if she reported
the incident to anyone. She begged him to stop but he proceeded to kiss her mouth, vagina, and breast, and to have
carnal knowledge of her. 8 Although they witnessed the ongoing ordeal, AAA's siblings could do nothing but cry as
appellant likewise poked the knife on them. 9 The following morning, AAA found a whitish substance and blood
stains on her panty. 10
On 15 March 1999, at around 10:30 in the evening, AAA and her siblings were awakened as appellant came
home drunk. He told them to eat first as they had not taken their supper yet. After dining together, appellant left and
AAA, her brother, and her sister went back to sleep. 11 As in the previous evening, appellant roused AAA in mid-
sleep. This time, she woke up with her father holding her hand, covering her mouth and lying on top of her. He
undressed AAA, then mounted her. Repeatedly, he inserted his penis into her vagina, and AAA felt pain in her private
parts. Appellant also kissed and fondled AAA on different parts of her body. 12
Again, AAA's siblings could only cry as they saw appellant rape their sister. AAA's sister, however, took a
pen and wrote her a note which read: "Ate, let us tell what father was doing to the police officer." After appellant had
raped AAA, the latter's sister asked their father why he had done such to AAA. In response, appellant spanked AAA's
sister and threatened to kill all of them should they report the incidents to the police. 13 The sisters nonetheless
related to their relatives AAA's misfortune, but the relatives did not take heed as they regarded appellant to be a kind
man. 14
The third rape episode happened at around 3:30 in the morning of 16 March 1999. Although appellant did
not insert his penis into AAA's vagina on this occasion, he took off her lower undergarments and kissed her
vagina. 15 On cross-examination, AAA asserted that her father inserted his tongue into the hole of her vagina and
she felt pain because of this. 16
To corroborate AAA's testimony, the prosecution presented BBB and AAA's 6-year old brother CCC. 17 BBB
testified that she was a stay-in housemaid working in Las Piñas on the dates that her daughter was raped by
appellant. On 26 March 1999, she went home and stayed with her family. However, it was only on 4 May 1999 that
BBB learned of the rape, when CCC told her that appellant had raped AAA three (3) times and that he had seen his
father on top of his sister during those occasions. BBB then verified the matter with AAA herself, and the latter
affirmed the incidents. BBB thus took AAA with her to the barangay and police authorities to report the incidents,
and later to the provincial hospital for medical examination. 18
CCC testified that on three (3) separate occasions, he saw his father lying naked on top of AAA, who was
likewise naked. 19
The prosecution also presented SPO1 Bayani G. Montesur (SPO1 Montesur) and Dr. Gloria Cabael (Dr.
Cabael). SPO1 Montesur identified the Police Blotter of 4 May 1999 which recorded the complaints of rape against
appellant and the report of the latter's arrest. 20 Dr. Cabael, on the other hand, testified that she examined AAA on 4
May 1999 upon the request of Police Officer Gallarosa. She identified the Rape Case Report she prepared
thereafter. 21
Appellant testified as the sole witness on his behalf, proffering denial and alibi as his defenses. According to
appellant, he was hired by his aunt, Raquel Masangkay, to deliver hogs and that at 1:30 in the morning of 14 March
1999, he was in Calamba, Laguna pursuant to such employment. He averred that he went home at 7:00 in the
morning of the following day and thus could not have raped his daughter as alleged. 22 Likewise denying the second
rape charge, appellant testified that on 15 March 1999, he attended a wedding ceremony in Sityo Kalayaan, San
Antonio, Kalayaan, Laguna. He went home drunk at 6:00 that evening and promptly went to sleep. 23Similarly, at
3:00 in the morning of 16 March 1999, appellant claimed to have been asleep with his children and could not have
thus committed the rape as charged. 24
Finding that the prosecution had proven beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of appellant of the crime of
qualified rape in Criminal Case Nos. SC-7422 and SC-7423 and the crime of acts of lasciviousness in Criminal Case
No. SC-7424, the RTC rendered a Consolidated Judgment against appellant and sentenced him accordingly, thus:
WHEREFORE:
Under Criminal Case No. SC-7422, this Court finds the
accused ALVIN ABULON ySALVANIA GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT as PRINCIPAL of
CONSUMMATED QUALIFIED RAPE as defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7639, otherwise known as the DEATH PENALTY LAW,
and hereby sentences him to suffer the SUPREME PENALTY of DEATH and to indemnify the
offended party [AAA] the following sums:

CONSUMMATED QUALIFIED RAPE as defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7639, otherwise known as the DEATH PENALTY LAW,
and hereby sentences him to suffer the SUPREME PENALTY of DEATH and to indemnify the
offended party [AAA] the following sums:


ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS as defined and penalized under Article 336 of the Revised Penal
Code and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for SIX (6) MONTHS of
ARRESTO MAYOR as MINIMUM to SIX (6) YEARS of PRISION CORRECCIONAL as MAXIMUM.
The accused is further ordered to pay the costs of the instant three (3) cases.
SO ORDERED. 25
With the death penalty imposed on appellant, the case was elevated to this Court on automatic review.
However, pursuant to this Court's ruling in People v. Mateo, 26 the case was transferred to the Court of Appeals. On
28 April 2006, the appellate court rendered its decision affirming appellant's conviction, but with modification as to
damages awarded to the victim. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Santa Cruz, Laguna, Branch 28,
in Criminal Case Nos. SC-7422 and SC-7423 finding appellant Alvin S. Abulon guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes of qualified rape, and in Criminal Case No. SC-7424, finding
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of acts of lasciviousness, are
hereby AFFIRMED.
The civil aspect of the case is MODIFIED to read: In Criminal Case Nos. SC-7422-7423,
the award of exemplary damages in the amount of [P]50,000.00 is reduced to [P]25,000.00. In
Criminal Case No. SC-7424, appellant is ordered to pay the victim the amount of [P]30,000.00 as
moral damages. We affirm in all other respects.
Pursuant to A.M. 00-5-03-SC (Amendments to the Revised Rule of Criminal Procedure to
Govern Death Penalty Cases), which took effect on October 15, 2004, this case is elevated and
certified to the Supreme Court for its automatic review.
SO ORDERED. 27
In his Brief, 28 appellant assails his conviction and imputes grave error to the trial court for giving weight and
credence to the testimony of AAA. In particular, he makes capital of AAA's delay in reporting the incidents to her
mother. He likewise impugns the trial court's alleged bias in propounding inappropriate leading questions to private
complainant AAA. Finally, he maintains that the Informations against him are defective as they failed to allege the key
element of force and/or intimidation. 29
We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals with modifications.
The duty to ascertain the competence and credibility of a witness rests primarily with the trial
court, 30 because it has the unique position of observing the witness's deportment on the stand while testifying.
Absent any compelling reason to justify the reversal of the evaluations and conclusions of the trial court, the
reviewing court is generally bound by the former's findings. 31
In rape cases particularly, the conviction or acquittal of the accused most often depends almost entirely on
the credibility of the complainant's testimony. By the very nature of this crime, it is generally unwitnessed and usually
the victim is left to testify for herself. 32 Her testimony is most vital and must be received with the utmost
caution. 33 When a rape victim's testimony, however, is straightforward and marked with consistency despite
grueling examination, it deserves full faith and confidence and cannot be discarded. Once found credible, her lone
testimony is sufficient to sustain a conviction. 34
The court a quo found the testimony of AAA in its entirety to be credible, made in a candid, spontaneous,
and straightforward manner and never shaken even under rigid cross-examination. 35We agree that AAA's narration
of her harrowing experience is worthy of credence, thus:

Trial Prosecutor:
Q: Tell us what happened at around 1:30 in the morning of March 11, [sic] 1999 to you?
A: My brother and sister and I were already asleep when my father who was drank [sic] came
home. We told him to just sleep. My father told us that he would still return to the wedding
celebration (kasalan).
xxx xxx xxx
Q: What happened next when you continued sleeping?
A: I was awakened when I felt my father already on top of me, sir.
Q: Tell us exactly what was [sic] your position then at that time you woke up?
A: I was still lying straight down, sir.
Q: How about your father in relation to you, where was he at the time you woke up?
A: He was on top (nakadagan) of me, sir.
Court:
Q: Was he naked?
A: Already naked, Your Honor.
Q: How about you, do [sic] you have your clothes on?
A: I have [sic] my lady sando on, Your Honor.
Trial Prosecutor:
Q: Are [sic] you still wearing your panty when you were awakened?
A: No more, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: What did your father do aside from placing his body on top of you?
A: He poked a knife on [sic] me, sir.
Court:
Q: Did he say something?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: What did he say?
A: He said that if he [sic] report her [sic] to anybody he would kill us, Your Honor.
xxx xxx xxx
Trial Prosecutor:
Q: What else did he do aside from telling you "huag kang magsusumbong"?
A: He also poked the knife on [sic] my brother and sister, sir.
Q: They were already awakened at that time?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What else did he do aside from poking a knife on [sic] you and your brother and sister?
A: No more, sir.
Court:
Q: While your father according to you is [sic] on top of you, what did he do if any?
A: "Kinayog na po niya ako."
Q: What do you mean by telling [sic] "kinayog na po niya ako"?
A: He was moving, Your Honor.

Q: While your father was moving, what else was happening at that time?
A: I felt pain, Your Honor.
Trial Prosecutor:
Q: From where did you feel that pain?
A: From my private part, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Do you know if you know why you felt the pain on the lower portion of your body?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Please tell us if you know?

A: Something whitish coming out from it, sir.
Court:
Q: From where did it come from [sic]? That whitish substance?
A: From my father's private part, Your Honor.

Q: Why, what happened to the private part of your father?
A: I do not know, Your Honor.
Q: When you felt pain, what was your father doing then?
A: He repeated what he told [sic] previously not to tell to [sic] anybody.
Q: At that time, did you see the private part of your father?
A: Yes, Your Honor.

Q: When you felt pain. Do you know what is [sic] happening to the private part of your
father?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: What was happening?
A: His private part stiffened or hardened (tumirik), Your Honor.
Q: Where was it placed if any?
A: Into my private part, Your Honor.

Q: Did the private part of you father actually penetrate your vagina?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: What did you feel at the time the penis of your father entered your vagina?
A: It was painful, Your Honor.
Q: At that time was your father making any movement?
A: Yes, Your Honor.

Q: Will you describe the movement made by your father?
A: (Witness demonstrating an upward and downward stroke by placing her right palm over
her left hand)
Trial Prosecutor:
Q: Did he kiss you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: In what part of your body?
A: On my mouth, sir.
Q: Aside from your mouth, what other part or parts of your body did he kiss?
A: On my private part, sir.
Q: When did he kiss you private part, before inserting his penis or after?
A: After he inserted his penis, sir.
Q: What other part of your body did he kiss?
A: On my breast, sir. 36
xxx xxx xxx
TP. Arcigal, Jr.:
Q: Now, you said that the second incident happened [on] March 15, 1999, am I correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And where and what time said [sic] second incident happened?
A: 10:30 in the evening, sir, also in our house, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: And what were you doing when your father returned at around 11:00 o'clock in the evening?
A: We were all asleep, sir.
Q: And how did you come to know that he returned at around 11:00 P.M.?
A: My father suddenly held my hand, sir.
Q: And because of that, you were awakened?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And what happened when you were awakened because your father held your hand?
A: He covered my mouth, sir.

Q: And after covering your mouth, what else did he do?
A: He removed the lower portion of my clothes. "Hinubuan po niya ako."
xxx xxx xxx

Q: After removing your lady sando, what else did he do?
A: He laid himself on top of me, sir.

xxx xxx xxx
Q: Now, what did he do to you when he was already on top of you?
A: He was "kinakayog niya po ako."
Q: Aside from "kinakayog," what else did he do?
A: He kissed my breast, sir.

Q: Aside from that, what else?
A: He likewise touched my private part, sir.
Q: When he was on top of you, do you know where was [sic] his penis at that time?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where?
A: Into my vagina, sir.

Q: How did you come to know that the penis of your father was inside your vagina?
A: I felt pain in my private part, sir.

Q: And do you know why you felt pain in your private part?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Why?
A: His private part . . . . (Thereafter witness is crying while uttering words: "I am afraid I
might be killed by my father.") He held his penis into my vagina. Thereafter, inserted
it repeatedly into mine, sir.
Q: And you were able to actually feel his penis inside your vagina?
A: Yes, sir. 37
xxx xxx xxx
TP. Arcigal, Jr.:
Q: Now, you said also that you were raped on March 16, 1999, am I correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What time?
A: It was 3:30 o'clock in the morning, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
TP. Arcigal, Jr.:
Q: Now, how did it happen, that third incident?
A: I was able to run downstairs but when I was about to open the door, he was able to hold my
dress, sir.
Q: Was your father drunk at that time?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How did you come to know?
A: His eyes were red and he was laughing at me while telling me: "It is your end." (Witness crying
while answering the question.)
Q: Now, what happened when your father was able to hold your dress?
A: He carried me upstairs, sir.
Q: Was he able to carry you upstairs?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What did he do, if any, when you were upstairs?
A: He removed my panty and shortpants, sir.
Q: After removing your shorts and panty, what else did he do?
A: No more but he kissed my vagina.
Q: Which part of your vagina did he kiss?

A: That part of my vagina with hold [sic].
Court:
Q: What about your upper garments at that time?
A: He did not remove it, Your Honor.
Q: What else did he do, aside from that?

A: Nothing more, just that.
Q: After kissing your vagina, what else happened, if any?

A: He again poked the knife on us, Your Honor.
Q: At that time, was your father naked or not?

A: Still with his clothes on, Your Honor.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: For clarification, what else, if any, did your father do after your father kissed your vagina?
A: Nothing more, merely that act, Your Honor.
Q: You mean your father did not insert his penis to [sic] your vagina anymore?
A: No more, Your Honor.

xxx xxx xxx
TP. Arcigal, Jr.:
Q: Now, what did he use in kissing your clitoris?
A: His tongue, sir.
Q: How did you come to know that it was his tongue that he used?
A: It is because I saw him put out his tongue, sir. 38
Verily, it is inconceivable and contrary to human experience for a daughter, who is attached to her father by
the natural bond of love and affection, to accuse him of rape, unless he is the one who raped and defoliated
her. 39 As we have pronounced in People v. Canoy: 40
It is unthinkable for a daughter to accuse her own father, to submit herself for examination of her
most intimate parts, put her life to public scrutiny and expose herself, along with her family, to
shame, pity or even ridicule not just for a simple offense but for a crime so serious that could mean
the death sentence to the very person to whom she owes her life, had she really not have been
aggrieved. Nor do we believe that the victim would fabricate a story of rape simply because she
wanted to exact revenge against her father, appellant herein, for allegedly scolding and maltreating
her. 41
In stark contrast with AAA's convincing recital of facts, supported as it was by the testimonies of BBB and
CCC, are appellant's uncorroborated and shaky defenses of denial and alibi. Nothing is more settled in criminal law
jurisprudence than that alibi and denial cannot prevail over the positive and categorical testimony and identification
of the complainant. 42 Alibi is an inherently weak defense, which is viewed with suspicion because it can easily be
fabricated. 43 Denial is an intrinsically weak defense which must be buttressed with strong evidence of non-
culpability to merit credibility. 44
The records disclose that not a shred of evidence was adduced by appellant to corroborate his alibi. Alibi
must be supported by credible corroboration from disinterested witnesses, otherwise, it is fatal to the
accused. 45 Further, for alibi to prosper, it must be demonstrated that it was physically impossible for appellant to be
present at the place where the crime was committed at the time of its commission. 46 By his own testimony,
appellant clearly failed to show that it was physically impossible for him to have been present at the scene of the
crime when the rapes were alleged to have occurred. Except for the first incident, appellant was within the vicinity of
his home and in fact alleged that he was supposedly even sleeping therein on the occasion of the second and third
incidents.
Appellant's contention that AAA's accusations are clouded by her failure to report the alleged occurrences of
rape is unmeritorious. To begin with, AAA categorically testified that she told her father's niece about the incidents.
However, the latter doubted her, believing instead that appellant was not that kind of man. AAA's subsequent
attempt to report the incidents to the barangay turned out to be futile as well as she was only able to speak with the
barangay driver, who happened to be appellant's brother-in-law. She was likewise disbelieved by the latter. Her
disclosure of the rapes to a certain Menoy did not yield any positive result either. Fearing for the lives of her
grandparents, AAA decided not to tell them about the incidents. 47
A child of thirteen years cannot be expected to know how to go about reporting the crime to the
authorities. 48 Indeed, We see how AAA must have felt absolutely hopeless since the peoplearound her were
relatives of her father and her attempts to solicit help from them were in vain. Thus, AAA's silence in not reporting the
incidents to her mother and filing the appropriate case against appellant for over a month is sufficiently explained.
The charge of rape is rendered doubtful only if the delay was unreasonable and unexplained. 49 It is not beyond ken
that the child, living under threat from appellant and having been turned away by trusted relatives, even accused by
them of lying, would simply opt to just suffer in silence thereafter. In People v. Gutierrez, 50 we held:
Complainant's failure to immediately report the rape does not diminish her credibility. The
silence of a victim of rape or her failure to disclose her misfortune to the authorities without loss of
material time does not prove that her charge is baseless and fabricated. It is not uncommon for
young girls to conceal for some time the assault on their virtues because of the rapist's threat on
their lives, more so when the offender is someone whom she knew and who was living with her. 51
Appellant brands the trial judge as partial against him for propounding leading questions to AAA. According
to him, were it not for the lower court's and the prosecution's biased leading questions, AAA would not have proven
the elements of the crimes charged. 52
Appellant's argument is not well-taken. It is the judge's prerogative to ask clarificatory queries to ferret out
the truth. 53 It cannot be taken against him if the questions he propounds reveal certain truths which, in turn, tend to
destroy the theory of one party. 54 After all, the judge is the arbiter and ought to be satisfied himself as to the
respective merits and claims of both parties in accord with the stringent demands of due process. 55 Also, being the
arbiter, he may properly intervene in the presentation of evidence to expedite proceedings and prevent unnecessary
waste of time. 56
Besides, jurisprudence explains that allegations of bias on the part of the trial court should be received with
caution, especially when the queries by the judge did not prejudice the accused. The propriety of the judge's
questions is determined by their quality and not necessarily by their quantity and, in any event, by the test of whether
the defendant was prejudiced by such questioning or not. 57 In the instant case, the Court finds that on the whole,
the questions propounded by the judge a quo were but clarificatory in nature and that, concomitantly, appellant
failed to satisfactorily establish that he was prejudiced by such queries.
The matter of the purportedly defective Informations was properly addressed by the Court of Appeals,
pointing out that a close scrutiny of the Informations would reveal that the words "force and/or intimidation" are
specifically alleged therein. 58 Even if these were not so, well-established is the rule that force or intimidation need
not be proven in incestuous cases. The overpowering moral influence of a father over his daughter takes the place of
violence and offer of resistance ordinarily required in rape cases where the accused is unrelated to the victim. 59
Now, we turn to the determination of the crime for which appellant under the third charge is liable and the
corresponding penalty therefor. In the Brief for the People, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argues that all
three (3) charges of rape, including the rape committed on 16 March 1999 subject of Criminal Case No. SC-7424,
were proved beyond reasonable doubt. The court a quoheld that it was clear from the evidence that appellant merely
kissed the vagina of AAA and made no attempt of penetration, meaning penile penetration, and for that reason found
him guilty of acts of lasciviousness only. 60 Yet, in affirming the trial court, the Court of Appeals did not find any
categorical testimony on AAA's part that appellant had inserted his tongue in her vagina, stressing instead that the
mere probability of such insertion cannot take the place of proof required to establish the guilt of appellant beyond
reasonable doubt for rape. 61
The automatic appeal in criminal cases opens the whole case for review, 62 as in this case. Thus, this Court
is mandated to re-examine the vital facts established a quo and to properly apply the law thereto. The two courts
below were both mistaken, as we note that AAA unqualifiedly testified on cross-examination to appellant's insertion
of his tongue into her vagina, viz:
Court:
Q: On the third time you are [sic] allegedly raped, you said it happened at 3:30 in the morning of
March 16, 1999.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you said yesterday that he did not insert his pennies [sic] to [sic] your vagina on March 16?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What he did is he kissed your vagina?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: For how long did he kiss your vagina?

A: Two minutes, sir.
Q: What did he actually do when he kissed your vagina?
A: He kissed my vagina, thereafter he laughed and laughed.

Q: You mean to tell the court when he kissed your vagina he used his lips?
A: His lips and tongue, sir.
Q: What did he do?

A: He put out his tongue thereafter he "inano" the hole of my vagina.
Court:
Q: What did your father do with his tongue?
A: He placed it in the hole of my vagina.
Q: Did you feel pain?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: By just kissing your vagina you felt pain?

A: Yes, Your Honor. 63
Notwithstanding the explicit testimony of AAA on the matter, this Court cannot find appellant guilty of rape
as proved, but of acts of lasciviousness only. In reaching this conclusion, we take a route different from the ones
respectively taken by the courts below.
With the enactment of Republic Act No. 8353 (R.A. No. 8353), otherwise known as the Anti-Rape Law of
1997, 64 the concept of rape was revolutionized with the new recognition that the crime should include sexual
violence on the woman's sex-related orifices other than her organ, and be expanded as well to cover gender-free
rape. 65 The transformation mainly consisted of the reclassification of rape as a crime against persons and the
introduction of rape by "sexual assault" 66as differentiated from the traditional "rape through carnal knowledge" or
"rape through sexual intercourse."
Section 2 of the law provides:
Sec. 2. Rape as a Crime Against Persons. — The crime of rape shall hereafter be classified as a
Crime Against Persons under Title Eight of Act No. 9815, as amended, otherwise known as
the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, there shall be incorporated into Title Eight of the same Code
a new chapter to be known as Chapter Three on Rape, to read as follows:
Article 266-A. Rape; When And How Committed. — Rape Is Committed —

circumstances:
(a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
(b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise is unconscious;
(c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
(d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof,
shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person's mouth or
anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
Paragraph 1 under Section 2 of R.A. No. 8353, which is now Paragraph 1 of the new Article 266-A of
the Revised Penal Code, covers rape through sexual intercourse while paragraph 2 refers to rape by sexual assault.
Rape through sexual intercourse is also denominated as "organ rape" or "penile rape." On the other hand, rape by
sexual assault is otherwise called "instrument or object rape," 67 also "gender-free rape," 68 or the narrower
"homosexual rape." 69
In People v. Silvano, 70 the Court recognized that the father's insertion of his tongue and finger into his
daughter's vaginal orifice would have subjected him to liability for "instrument or object rape" had the new law been
in effect already at the time he committed the acts. Similarly, in Peoplev. Miranda, 71 the Court observed that
appellant's insertion of his fingers into the complainant's organ would have constituted rape by sexual assault had it
been committed when the new law was already in effect.
The differences between the two modes of committing rape are the following:
(1) In the first mode, the offender is always a man, while in the second, the offender may be a man
or a woman;
(2) In the first mode, the offended party is always a woman, while in the second, the offended party
may be a man or a woman;
(3) In the first mode, rape is committed through penile penetration of the vagina, while the second
is committed by inserting the penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice, or any
instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of another person; and
(4) The penalty for rape under the first mode is higher than that under the second.
In view of the material differences between the two modes of rape, the first mode is not necessarily included
in the second, and vice-versa. Thus, since the charge in the Information in Criminal Case No. SC-7424 is rape
through carnal knowledge, appellant cannot be found guilty of rape by sexual assault although it was proven, without
violating his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
However, following the variance doctrine embodied in Section 4, in relation to Section 5, Rule 120, Rules of
Criminal Procedure, appellant can be found guilty of the lesser crime of acts of lasciviousness. Said provisions read:
Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. — When there is a
variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the
offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be
convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense
charged which is included in the offense proved.
Sec. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. — An offense charged
necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the
former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitutes the latter. And an offense charged is
necessarily included in the offense proved when the essential ingredients of the former constitute
or form part of those constituting the latter.
Indeed, acts of lasciviousness or abusos dishonestos are necessarily included in rape. 72

In light of the passage of R.A. No. 9346, entitled "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the
Philippines," 73 the penalty of death can no longer be imposed. Accordingly, the penalty meted out to appellant for
rape through sexual intercourse in Criminal Cases No. SC-7422 and SC-7423 is reduced in each case from death
to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. 74 We affirm the conviction of appellant in Criminal Case No. SC-
7424 for acts of lasciviousness but modify the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals instead to an indeterminate
sentence of imprisonment of six (6) months of arresto mayor as minimum to four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional as maximum as neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances attended the commission of
the crime.
With respect to the civil liability of appellant, we modify the award in Criminal Cases No. SC-7422 and SC-
7423 in light of prevailing jurisprudence. Therefore, appellant is ordered to indemnify AAA, for each count of qualified
rape, in the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages. 75 The award of damages in Criminal Case No. SC-7424 is affirmed.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CR-HC No. 01926 is AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATIONS. In Criminal Cases No. SC-7422 and SC-7423, appellant is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of qualified rape and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole
and to pay the victim, AAA, in the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages plus costs. In Criminal Case No. SC-7424, appellant is found guilty of the crime
of acts of lasciviousness and sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for six (6) months
of arresto mayoras minimum to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional as maximum, and to pay
AAA moral damages in the amount of P30,000.00 plus costs.
SO ORDERED.
||| (People v. Abulon y Salvania, G.R. No. 174473, [August 17, 2007], 557 PHIL 428-456)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 202124. April 5, 2016.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. IRENEO JUGUETA, accused-appellant.
DECISION
PERALTA, J p:
This resolves the appeal from the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated January 30, 2012 in CA-
G.R. CR HC No. 03252. The CA affirmed the judgments of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 61, Gumaca,
Quezon, finding accused-appellant Ireneo Jugueta y Flores guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Double Murder in
Criminal Case No. 7698-G and Multiple Attempted Murder in Criminal Case No. 7702-G.
In Criminal Case No. 7698-G, appellant was charged with Double Murder, defined and penalized under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of June 2002, at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening, at
Barangay Caridad Ilaya, Municipality of Atimonan, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a caliber .22
firearm, with intent to kill, qualified by treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with said firearm Mary Grace Divina,
a minor, 13 years old, who suffered the following:
"Gunshot wound —
Point of Entry — lower abdomen, right, 2 cm. from the midline and 6 cm.
from the level of the umbilicus, directed upward toward the left upper abdomen."
and Claudine Divina, a minor, 3 1/2 years of age, who suffered the following:
"Gunshot wound —
Point of Entry — 9th ICS along the mid-axillary line, right, 1 cm.
diameter SDHTEC
Point of Exit — 7th ICS mid-axillary line, left;"
which directly caused their instant death.
That the crime committed in the dwelling of the offended party who had not given
provocation for the attack and the accused took advantage of nighttime to facilitate the
commission of the offense.
Contrary to law. 2
In Criminal Case No. 7702-G, appellant, together with Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel, was
charged with Multiple Attempted Murder, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about 9:00 o'clock in the evening of 6th day of June, 2002, at Barangay
Caridad Ilaya, Municipality of Atimonan, Province of Quezon, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating
together and mutually helping one another, armed with short firearms of undetermined calibres,
with intent to kill, qualified by treachery, with evident premeditation and abuse of superior
strength, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and shoot with the
said firearms the house occupied by the family of Norberto Divina, thereby commencing the
commission of the crime of Murder, directly by overt acts, but did not perform all the acts of
execution which would have produced it by reason of some cause or accident other than the
spontaneous desistance of the accused, that is, the occupants Norberto Divina, his wife Maricel
Divina and children Elizabeth Divina and Judy Ann Divina, both elementary pupils and who are
minors, were not hit.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 3
Roger San Miguel, however, moved for reinvestigation of the case against them. At said proceedings,
one Danilo Fajarillo submitted his sworn statement stating that on June 6, 2002, he saw appellant with a certain
"Hapon" and Gilbert Estores at the crime scene, but it was only appellant who was carrying a firearm while the
other two had no participation in the shooting incident. Fajarillo further stated that Roger San Miguel was not
present at the crime scene. Based on the sworn statement of Fajarillo, the Provincial Prosecutor found no prima
facie case against Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel. 4 Thus, upon motion of the prosecution, the case for
Attempted Murder against Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel was dismissed, and trial proceeded only as to
appellant. 5
At the trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of Norberto Divina, the victim, and Dr. Lourdes
Taguinod who executed the Medico-Legal Certificate and confirmed that the children of Norberto, namely, Mary
Grace and Claudine, died from gunshot wounds. Dr. Taguinod noted that the trajectory of the bullet wounds
showed that the victims were at a higher location than the shooter, but she could not tell what kind of
ammunitions were used. 6
Norberto testified that the appellant is his brother-in-law. He recounted that in the evening of June 6,
2002, as his entire family lay down on the floor of their one-room nipa hut to sleep, the "sack" walling of their hut
was suddenly stripped off, and only the supporting bamboo (fences) remained. With the covering of the wall
gone, the three (3) men responsible for the deed came into view. Norberto clearly saw their faces which were
illuminated by the light of a gas lamp hanging in their small hut. Norberto identified the 3 men as appellant,
Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel. The 3 men ordered Norberto to come down from his house, but he
refused to do so. The men then uttered, "Magdasal ka na at katapusan mo na ngayon." Norberto pleaded with
them, saying, "Maawa kayo sa amin, matanda na ako at marami akong anak. Anong kasalanan ko sa
inyo?" Despite such plea for mercy, a gunshot was fired, and Norberto immediately threw his body over his
children and wife in an attempt to protect them from being hit. Thereafter, he heard successive gunshots being
fired in the direction where his family huddled together in their hut. 7
When the volley of shots ceased and the three (3) men left, Norberto saw that his two (2) young
daughters were wounded. His wife went out of their house to ask for help from neighbors, while he and his older
daughter carried the two (2) wounded children out to the street. His daughter Mary Grace died on the way to the
hospital, while Claudine expired at the hospital despite the doctors' attempts to revive her. 8
In answer to questions of what could have prompted such an attack from appellant, Norberto replied
that he had a previous altercation with appellant who was angered by the fact that he (Norberto) filed a case
against appellant's two other brothers for molesting his daughter. 9
On the other hand, appellant was only able to proffer denial and alibi as his defense. Appellant's
testimony, along with those of Gilbert Estores, Roger San Miguel, Isidro San Miguel and Ruben Alegre, was that
he (appellant) was just watching TV at the house of Isidro San Miguel, where he had been living for several years,
at the time the shooting incident occurred. However, he and the other witnesses admitted that said house was a
mere five-minute walk away from the crime scene. 10
Finding appellant's defense to be weak, and ascribing more credence to the testimony of Norberto, the
trial court ruled that the evidence clearly established that appellant, together with two other assailants, conspired
to shoot and kill the family of Norberto. Appellant was then convicted of Double Murder in Criminal Case No.
7698-G and Multiple Attempted Murder in Criminal Case No. 7702-G.
The dispositive portion of the trial court's judgment in Criminal Case No. 7698-G reads:
WHEREFORE and in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds accused
Ireneo Juguetaguilty beyond reasonable doubt for Double Murder defined and punished under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby sentenced to suffer Reclusion Perpetua for
the death of Mary Grace Divina and to indemnify her heirs in the amount of Php50,000.00 and
another to suffer Reclusion Perpetua for the death of Claudine Divina and accused is further
ordered to indemnify the heirs of Claudine Divina in the sum of Php50,000.00. In addition, he is
hereby ordered to pay the heirs of the victims actual damages in the amount of Php16,150.00
and to pay for the costs. AScHCD
SO ORDERED. 11
On the other hand, the dispositive portion of the trial court's judgment in Criminal Case No. 7702-G,
reads:
WHEREFORE and in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds accused
Ireneo Juguetaguilty beyond reasonable doubt for Multiple Attempted Murder defined and
penalized under Article 248 in relation to Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS of Prision
Correccional as minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor as maximum
for each of the offended parties; Norberto Divina, Maricel Divina, Elizabeth Divina and Judy Ann
Divina. Further, accused is ordered to pay for the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED. 12
Aggrieved by the trial court's judgments, appellant appealed to the CA. On January 30, 2012, the CA
rendered a Decision affirming appellant's conviction for the crimes charged. 13
Dissatisfied with the CA Decision, appellant elevated the case to this Court. On July 30, 2012, the Court
issued a Resolution 14 notifying the parties that they may submit their respective Supplemental Briefs. Both
parties manifested that they will no longer submit supplemental briefs since they had exhaustively discussed
their positions before the CA. 15
The main issue advanced in the Appellant's Brief deals with the inconsistencies in Norberto's testimony,
such as his failure to state from the beginning that all three assailants had guns, and to categorically identify
appellant as the one holding the gun used to kill Norberto's children.
The appeal is unmeritorious.
At the outset, it must be stressed that factual findings of the trial court, its assessment of the credibility
of witnesses and the probative weight of their testimonies, and the conclusions based on these factual findings
are to be given the highest respect. Thus, generally, the Court will not recalibrate and re-examine evidence that
had been analyzed and ruled upon by the trial court and affirmed by the CA. 16
The evidence on record fully supports the trial court's factual finding, as affirmed by the CA, that
appellant acted in concert with two other individuals, all three of them carrying firearms and simultaneously firing
at Norberto and his family, killing his two young daughters. Norberto clearly saw all of the three assailants with
their firearms as there is illumination coming from a lamp inside their house that had been laid bare after its
walling was stripped off, to wit:
Q: When the wall of your house was stripped off by these three persons at the same time, do you
have light in your house?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What kind of light was there?
A: A gas lamp.
Q: Where was the gas lamp placed at that time?
A: In the middle of our house.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: when did they fire a shot?
A: On the same night, when they had stripped off the wallings.
Q: How many gunshots did you hear?
A: Only one.
Q: Do you know the sound of a gunshot? A firearm?
A: Yes, sir, it is loud? (sic)
xxx xxx xxx
Q: After the first shot, was there any second shot?
A: After that, successive fire shot (sic) followed and my youngest and eldest daughters were hit.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: How many of the three were holding guns at that time?
A: All of them.
Q: You mean to tell the honorable court that these three persons were having one firearm each?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And they fired shots at the same time?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: To what direction these three persons fired (sic) their firearms during that night? AcICHD
A: To the place where we were.
Q: Then those three persons were firing their respective firearms, what was your position then?
A: I ordered my children to lie down.
Q: How about you, what was your position when you were ordering your children to lie down?
A: (witness demonstrated his position as if covering his children with his body and ordering them
to line (sic) down face down)
Q: Mr. Witness, for how long did these three persons fire shots at your house?
A: Less than five minutes, sir.
Q: After they fired their shots, they left your house?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And when these persons left your house, you inspected your children to see what happened to
them?
A: Yes, sir, they were hit.
xxx xxx xxx 17
Appellant and the two other malefactors are equally responsible for the death of Norberto's daughters
because, as ruled by the trial court, they clearly conspired to kill Norberto's family. Conspiracy exists when two
or more persons come to an agreement regarding the commission of a crime and decide to commit it. Proof of a
prior meeting between the perpetrators to discuss the commission of the crime is not necessary as long as their
concerted acts reveal a common design and unity of purpose. In such case, the act of one is the act of
all. 18Here, the three men undoubtedly acted in concert as they went to the house of Norberto together, each
with his own firearm. It is, therefore, no longer necessary to identify and prove that it is the bullet particularly fired
from appellant's firearm that killed the children.
Murder is defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as the unlawful killing of a person, which
is not parricide or infanticide, attended by circumstances such as treachery or evident premeditation. 19 The
presence of any one of the circumstances enumerated in Article 248 of the Code is sufficient to qualify a killing
as murder. 20 The trial court correctly ruled that appellant is liable for murder because treachery attended the
killing of Norberto's two children, thus:
. . . Evidence adduced show that the family of Norberto Divina, were all lying down side
by side about to sleep on June 6, 2002 at around 9:00 o'clock in the evening, when suddenly
their wall made of sack was stripped off by [appellant] Ireneo Jugueta, Roger San Miguel and
Gilberto Alegre (sic) [Gilbert Estores]. They ordered him to go out of their house and when he
refused despite his plea for mercy, they fired at them having hit and killed his two (2) daughters.
The family of Norberto Divina were unarmed and his children were at very tender ages. Mary
Grace Divina and Claudine who were shot and killed were 13 years old and 3 1/2 years old
respectively. In this case, the victims were defenseless and manifestly overpowered by armed
assailants when they were gunned down. There was clear showing that the attack was made
suddenly and unexpectedly as to render the victims helpless and unable to defend themselves.
Norberto and his wife and his children could have already been asleep at that time of the night. .
. . 21
Verily, the presence of treachery qualified the killing of the hapless children to murder. As held
in People v. Fallorina, 22 the essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack on an unsuspecting
victim without the slightest provocation on his part. Minor children, who by reason of their tender years, cannot
be expected to put up a defense. When an adult person illegally attacks a child, treachery exists.
As to the charge of multiple attempted murder, the last paragraph of Article 6 of the Revised Penal
Code states that a felony is attempted when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by
overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some
cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. In Esqueda v. People, 23 the Court held:
If one inflicts physical injuries on another but the latter survives, the crime committed is
either consummated physical injuries, if the offender had no intention to kill the victim, or
frustrated or attempted homicide or frustrated murder or attempted murder if the offender
intends to kill the victim. Intent to kill may be proved by evidence of: (a) motive; (b) the nature or
number of weapons used in the commission of the crime; (c) the nature and number of wounds
inflicted on the victim; (d) the manner the crime was committed; and (e) the words uttered by the
offender at the time the injuries are inflicted by him on the victim.
In this case, the prosecution has clearly established the intent to kill on the part of appellant as shown by
the use of firearms, the words uttered 24 during, as well as the manner of, the commission of the crime. The
Court thus quotes with approval the trial court's finding that appellant is liable for attempted murder, viz.:
In the case at bar, the perpetrators who acted in concert commenced the felony of
murder first by suddenly stripping off the wall of their house, followed by successive firing at the
intended victims when Norberto Divina refused to go out of the house as ordered by them. If
only there were good in aiming their target, not only Mary Grace and Claudine had been killed
but surely all the rest of the family would surely have died. Hence, perpetrators were liable for
Murder of Mary Grace Divina and Claudine Divina but for Multiple Attempted Murder for
Norberto Divina, Maricel Divina, Elizabeth Divina and Judy Ann Divina. But as [appellant]
Ireneo Jugueta was the only one charged in this case, he alone is liable for the crime
committed. 25 TAIaHE
Meanwhile, the supposed inconsistencies in Norberto's testimony, i.e., that he filed to state from the very
beginning that all three assailants were carrying firearms, and that it was the shots from appellant's firearm that
killed the children, are too trivial and inconsequential to put a dent on said witness's credibility. An examination
of Norberto's testimony would show that there are no real inconsistencies to speak of. As ruled in People v.
Cabtalan, 26 "[m]inor inconsistencies and discrepancies pertaining to trivial matters do not affect the credibility
of witnesses, as well as their positive identification of the accused as the perpetrators of the crime." 27 Both the
trial court and the CA found Norberto's candid and straightforward testimony to be worthy of belief and this
Court sees no reason why it should not conform to the principle reiterated in Medina, Jr. v. People 28 that:
Time and again, this Court has deferred to the trial court's factual findings and evaluation
of the credibility of witnesses, especially when affirmed by the CA, in the absence of any clear
showing that the trial court overlooked or misconstrued cogent facts and circumstances that
would justify altering or revising such findings and evaluation. This is because the trial court's
determination proceeds from its first-hand opportunity to observe the demeanor of the
witnesses, their conduct and attitude under grilling examination, thereby placing the trial court in
unique position to assess the witnesses' credibility and to appreciate their truthfulness, honesty
and candor . . . . 29
The records of this case, particularly the testimonies of the witnesses, reveal no outstanding or
exceptional circumstance to justify a deviation from such long-standing principle. There is no cogent reason to
overturn the trial court's ruling that the prosecution evidence, particularly the testimony of Norberto Divina
identifying appellant as one of the assailants, is worthy of belief. Thus, the prosecution evidence established
beyond any reasonable doubt that appellant is one of the perpetrators of the crime.
However, the Court must make a clarification as to the nomenclature used by the trial court to identify
the crimes for which appellant was penalized. There is some confusion caused by the trial court's use of the
terms "Double Murder" and "Multiple Attempted Murder" in convicting appellant, and yet imposing penalties
which nevertheless show that the trial court meant to penalize appellant for two (2) separate counts of Murder
and four (4) counts of Attempted Murder.
The facts, as alleged in the Information in Criminal Case No. 7698-G, and as proven during trial, show
that appellant is guilty of 2 counts of the crime of Murder and not Double Murder, as the killing of the victims was
not the result of a single act but of several acts of appellant and his cohorts. In the same vein, appellant is also
guilty of 4 counts of the crime of Attempted Murder and not Multiple Attempted Murder in Criminal Case No.
7702-G. It bears stressing that the Informations in this case failed to comply with the requirement in Section 13,
Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court that an information must charge only one offense.
As a general rule, a complaint or information must charge only one offense, otherwise, the same is
defective. The reason for the rule is stated in People of the Philippines and AAA v. Court of Appeals, 21st
Division, Mindanao Station, et al., 30 thus:
The rationale behind this rule prohibiting duplicitous complaints or informations is to give
the accused the necessary knowledge of the charge against him and enable him to sufficiently
prepare for his defense. The State should not heap upon the accused two or more charges
which might confuse him in his defense. Non-compliance with this rule is a ground for quashing
the duplicitous complaint or information under Rule 117 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure and
the accused may raise the same in a motion to quash before he enters his plea, otherwise, the
defect is deemed waived.
However, since appellant entered a plea of not guilty during arraignment and failed to move for the
quashal of the Informations, he is deemed to have waived his right to question the same. Section 9 of Rule 117
provides that "[t]he failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the
complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said
motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections except those based on the grounds provided for in
paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i) of Section 3 of this Rule."
It is also well-settled that when two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information but
the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict him of as many offenses as are charged and
proved, and impose upon him the proper penalty for each offense. 31 Appellant can therefore be held liable for
all the crimes alleged in the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 7698-G and 7702-G, i.e., 2 counts of murder and
4 counts of attempted murder, respectively, and proven during trial.
Meanwhile, in People v. Nelmida, 32 the Court explained the concept of a complex crime as defined in
Article 48 33 of the Revised Penal Code, thus:
In a complex crime, two or more crimes are actually committed, however, in the eyes of
the law and in the conscience of the offender they constitute only one crime, thus, only one
penalty is imposed. There are two kinds of complex crime. The first is known as a compound
crime, or when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies while the other is
known as a complex crime proper, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the
other. The classic example of the first kind is when a single bullet results in the death of two or
more persons. A different rule governs where separate and distinct acts result in a number killed.
Deeply rooted is the doctrine that when various victims expire from separate shot, such acts
constitute separate and distinct crimes. 34
Here, the facts surrounding the shooting incident clearly show that appellant and the two others, in firing
successive and indiscriminate shots at the family of Norberto from their respective firearms, intended to kill not
only Norberto, but his entire family. When several gunmen, as in this case, indiscriminately fire a series of shots
at a group of people, it shows their intention to kill several individuals. Hence, they are committing not only one
crime. What appellant and his cohorts committed cannot be classified as a complex crime because as held
in People v. Nelmida, 35 "each act by each gunman pulling the trigger of their respective firearms, aiming each
particular moment at different persons constitute distinct and individual acts which cannot give rise to a complex
crime." 36 cDHAES
Furthermore, the Court notes that both the trial court and the CA failed to take into account dwelling as
an ordinary, aggravating circumstance, despite the fact that the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 7698-G and
7702-G contain sufficient allegations to that effect, to wit:
Criminal Case No. 7698-G for Double Murder:
That the crime was committed in the dwelling of the offended party who had not given
provocation for the attack and the accused took advantage of nighttime to facilitate the
commission of the offense. 37
Criminal Case No. 7702-G for Multiple Attempted Murder:
. . . the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually
helping one another, armed with short firearms of undetermined calibres, with intent to kill,
qualified by treachery, with evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and shoot with the said firearms the
house occupied by the family of Norberto Divina, thereby commencing the commission of the
crime of Murder, directly by overt acts, but did not perform all the acts of execution which would
have produced it by reason of some cause or accident other than the spontaneous desistance of
the accused . . . 38
In People v. Agcanas, 39 the Court stressed that "[i]t has been held in a long line of cases that dwelling is
aggravating because of the sanctity of privacy which the law accords to human abode. He who goes to
another's house to hurt him or do him wrong is more guilty than he who offends him elsewhere." Dwelling
aggravates a felony where the crime is committed in the dwelling of the offended party provided that the latter
has not given provocation therefor. 40 The testimony of Norberto established the fact that the group of appellant
violated the victims' home by destroying the same and attacking his entire family therein, without provocation on
the part of the latter. Hence, the trial court should have appreciated dwelling as an ordinary aggravating
circumstance.
In view of the attendant ordinary aggravating circumstance, the Court must modify the penalties
imposed on appellant. Murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, thus, with an ordinary aggravating
circumstance of dwelling, the imposable penalty is death for each of two (2) counts of murder. 41 However,
pursuant to Republic Act (RA) No. 9346, proscribing the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty to be
imposed on appellant should be reclusion perpetua for each of the two (2) counts of murder without eligibility for
parole. With regard to the four (4) counts of attempted murder, the penalty prescribed for each count is prision
mayor. With one ordinary aggravating circumstance, the penalty should be imposed in its maximum period.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum penalty should be from ten (10) years and one (1) day to
twelve (12) years of prision mayor, while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in
degree, i.e., prision correccional, in any of its periods, or anywhere from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6)
years. This Court finds it apt to impose on appellant the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months
and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, for each of the four (4) counts of attempted murder.
Anent the award of damages, the Court deems it proper to address the matter in detail as regards
criminal cases where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. Generally, in these types of criminal
cases, there are three kinds of damages awarded by the Court; namely: civil indemnity, moral, and exemplary
damages. Likewise, actual damages may be awarded or temperate damages in some instances.
First, civil indemnity ex delicto is the indemnity authorized in our criminal law for the offended party, in
the amount authorized by the prevailing judicial policy and apart from other proven actual damages, which itself
is equivalent to actual or compensatory damages in civil law. 42 This award stems from Article 100 of
the RPC which states, "Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable."
It is to be noted that civil indemnity is, technically, not a penalty or a fine; hence, it can be increased by
the Court when appropriate. 43 Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be
at least three thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In
addition:
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of
the deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such
indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the court, unless the
deceased on account of permanent physical disability not caused by the
defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death;
(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the
provisions of Article 291, the recipient who is not an heir called to the decedent's
inheritance by the law of testate or intestate succession, may demand support
from the person causing the death, for a period not exceeding five years, the
exact duration to be fixed by the court; ASEcHI
(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants
of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of
the death of the deceased.
In our jurisdiction, civil indemnity is awarded to the offended party as a kind of monetary restitution or
compensation to the victim for the damage or infraction that was done to the latter by the accused, which in a
sense only covers the civil aspect. Precisely, it is civil indemnity. Thus, in a crime where a person dies, in addition
to the penalty of imprisonment imposed to the offender, the accused is also ordered to pay the victim a sum of
money as restitution. Also, it is apparent from Article 2206 that the law only imposes a minimum amount for
awards of civil indemnity, which is P3,000.00. The law did not provide for a ceiling. Thus, although the minimum
amount for the award cannot be changed, increasing the amount awarded as civil indemnity can be validly
modified and increased when the present circumstance warrants it. 44
The second type of damages the Court awards are moral damages, which are also compensatory in
nature. Del Mundo v. Court of Appeals 45 expounded on the nature and purpose of moral damages, viz.:
Moral damages, upon the other hand, may be awarded to compensate one for manifold
injuries such as physical suffering, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings and social humiliation. These damages must be understood to be in the
concept of grants, not punitive or corrective in nature, calculated to compensate the claimant for
the injury suffered. Although incapable of exactness and no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary
in order that moral damages may be awarded, the amount of indemnity being left to the
discretion of the court, it is imperative, nevertheless, that (1) injury must have been suffered by
the claimant, and (2) such injury must have sprung from any of the cases expressed in Article
2219 46 and Article 2220 47 of the Civil Code.. . . .
Similarly, in American jurisprudence, moral damages are treated as "compensatory damages awarded
for mental pain and suffering or mental anguish resulting from a wrong." 48They may also be considered and
allowed "for resulting pain and suffering, and for humiliation, indignity, and vexation suffered by the plaintiff as
result of his or her assailant's conduct, as well as the factors of provocation, the reasonableness of the force
used, the attendant humiliating circumstances, the sex of the victim, [and] mental distress." 49
The rationale for awarding moral damages has been explained in Lambert v. Heirs of Rey Castillon: "[T]he
award of moral damages is aimed at a restoration, within the limits possible, of the spiritual status quo ante; and
therefore, it must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted." 50
Corollarily, moral damages under Article 2220 51 of the Civil Code also does not fix the amount of
damages that can be awarded. It is discretionary upon the court, depending on the mental anguish or the
suffering of the private offended party. The amount of moral damages can, in relation to civil indemnity, be
adjusted so long as it does not exceed the award of civil indemnity. 52
Finally, the Civil Code of the Philippines provides, in respect to exemplary damages, thus:
ART. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or
correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory
damages.
ART. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be
imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Such
damages are separate and distinct from fines and shall be paid to the offended party.
Also known as "punitive" or "vindictive" damages, exemplary or corrective damages are intended to
serve as a deterrent to serious wrong doings, and as a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of
the rights of an injured or a punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct. These terms are generally, but
not always, used interchangeably. In common law, there is preference in the use of exemplary damages when
the award is to account for injury to feelings and for the sense of indignity and humiliation suffered by a person
as a result of an injury that has been maliciously and wantonly inflicted, 53 the theory being that there should be
compensation for the hurt caused by the highly reprehensible conduct of the defendant — associated with such
circumstances as willfulness, wantonness, malice, gross negligence or recklessness, oppression, insult or fraud
or gross fraud 54 — that intensifies the injury. The terms punitive or vindictive damages are often used to refer to
those species of damages that may be awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous conduct. In
either case, these damages are intended in good measure to deter the wrongdoer and others like him from
similar conduct in the future. 55
The term aggravating circumstances used by the Civil Code, the law not having specified otherwise, is to
be understood in its broad or generic sense. The commission of an offense has a two-pronged effect, one on the
public as it breaches the social order and the other upon the private victim as it causes personal sufferings, each
of which is addressed by, respectively, the prescription of heavier punishment for the accused and by an award
of additional damages to the victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver felony underscores the
exacerbation of the offense by the attendance of aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, in its
commission. Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the award of damages, however, is
likewise, if not primarily, intended for the offended party who suffers thereby. It would make little sense for an
award of exemplary damages to be due the private offended party when the aggravating circumstance is
ordinary but to be withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating
circumstance is a distinction that should only be of consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil liability of
the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or
qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of
Article 2230 of the Civil Code.56 ITAaHc
The reason is fairly obvious as to why the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure 57 requires aggravating
circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, to be stated in the complaint or information. It is in order not to
trample on the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature of the alleged offense that he or
she has committed. A criminal complaint or information should basically contain the elements of the crime, as
well as its qualifying and ordinary aggravating circumstances, for the court to effectively determine the proper
penalty it should impose. This, however, is not similar in the recovery of civil liability. In the civil aspect, the
presence of an aggravating circumstance, even if not alleged in the information but proven during trial would
entitle the victim to an award of exemplary damages.
Being corrective in nature, exemplary damages, therefore, can be awarded, not only due to the presence
of an aggravating circumstance, but also where the circumstances of the case show the highly reprehensible or
outrageous conduct of the offender. In much the same way as Article 2230 prescribes an instance when
exemplary damages may be awarded, Article 2229, the main provision, lays down the very basis of the award.
Thus, in People v. Matrimonio, 58 the Court imposed exemplary damages to deter other fathers with perverse
tendencies or aberrant sexual behavior from sexually abusing their own daughters. Also, in People v.
Cristobal, 59 the Court awarded exemplary damages on account of the moral corruption, perversity and
wickedness of the accused in sexually assaulting a pregnant married woman. In People v. Cañada, 60 People v.
Neverio 61 and People v. Layco, Sr., 62 the Court awarded exemplary damages to set a public example, to serve
as deterrent to elders who abuse and corrupt the youth, and to protect the latter from sexual abuse.
Existing jurisprudence pegs the award of exemplary damages at P30,000.00, 63 despite the lack of any
aggravating circumstance. The Court finds it proper to increase the amount to P50,000.00 in order to deter
similar conduct.
If, however, the penalty for the crime committed is death, which cannot be imposed because of the
provisions of R.A. No. 9346, prevailing jurisprudence 64 sets the amount of P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Before awarding any of the above mentioned damages, the Court, however, must first consider the
penalty imposed by law. Under RA 7659 or An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes,
Amending for that Purpose the Revised Penal Laws, and for Other Purposes, certain crimes under the RPC and
special penal laws were amended to impose the death penalty under certain circumstances. 65 Under the same
law, the following crimes are punishable by reclusion perpetua: piracy in general, 66 mutiny on the high
seas, 67 and simple rape. 68 For the following crimes, RA 7659 has imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death: qualified piracy; 69 qualified bribery under certain circumstances; 70 parricide; 71 murder; 72infanticide,
except when committed by the mother of the child for the purpose of concealing her dishonor or either of the
maternal grandparents for the same purpose; 73 kidnapping and serious illegal detention under certain
circumstances; 74 robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons under certain
circumstances; 75 destructive arson, except when death results as a consequence of the commission of any of
the acts penalized under the article; 76attempted or frustrated rape, when a homicide is committed by reason or
on occasion thereof; plunder; 77 and carnapping, when the driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is
killed or raped in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof. 78 Finally, RA
7659 imposes the death penalty on the following crimes:
(a) In qualified bribery, when it is the public officer who asks or demands the gift or present.
b) In kidnapping and serious illegal detention: (i) when the kidnapping or detention was committed for the
purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person; (ii) when the victim is killed or dies as a
consequence of the detention; (iii) when the victim is raped, subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts.
(c) In destructive arson, when as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized under
Article 320, death results.
(d) In rape: (i) when by reason or on occasion of the rape, the victim becomes insane or homicide is
committed; (ii) when committed with any of the following attendant circumstances: (1) when the victim is under
eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law-spouse of the parent of the victim; (2)
when the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities; (3) when the rape is committed in full
view of the husband, parent, any of the children or other relatives within the third degree of consanguinity; (4)
when the victim is a religious or a child below seven years old; (5) when the offender knows that he is afflicted
with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) disease; (6) when committed by any member of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines or the Philippine National Police or any law enforcement agency; and (7) when by
reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered permanent physical mutilation.
From these heinous crimes, where the imposable penalties consist of two (2) indivisible penalties or
single indivisible penalty, all of them must be taken in relation to Article 63 of the RPC, which provides:
Article 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. — In all cases in which the
law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any
mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the
deed. CHTAIc
In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the following
rules shall be observed in the application thereof:
1. when in the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating circumstance, the
greater penalty shall be applied.
2. when there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the
deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
3. when the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and there is no
aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
4. when both mitigating and aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the act, the
courts shall reasonably allow them to offset one another in consideration of their number and
importance, for the purpose of applying the penalty in accordance with the preceding rules,
according to the result of such compensation. (Revised Penal Code, Art. 63)
Thus, in order to impose the proper penalty, especially in cases of indivisible penalties, the court has the
duty to ascertain the presence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances. Accordingly, in crimes where the
imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to death, the court can impose either reclusion perpetua or death,
depending on the mitigating or aggravating circumstances present.
But with the enactment of RA 9346 or An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the
Philippines, the imposition of death penalty is now prohibited. It provides that in lieu of the death penalty, the
penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the
penalties of the RPC. 79
As a result, the death penalty can no longer be imposed. Instead, they have to impose reclusion
perpetua. Despite this, the principal consideration for the award of damages, following the ruling in People v.
Salome 80 and People v. Quiachon, 81 is "the penalty provided by law or imposable for the offense because of
its heinousness, not the public penalty actually imposed on the offender." 82
When the circumstances surrounding the crime would justify the imposition of the death penalty were it
not for RA 9346, the Court has ruled, as early as July 9, 1998 in People v. Victor, 83that the award of civil
indemnity for the crime of rape when punishable by death should be P75,000.00. We reasoned that "[t]his is not
only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the penal law and the financial fluctuations over time, but
also an expression of the displeasure of the Court over the incidence of heinous crimes against
chastity." 84 Such reasoning also applies to all heinous crimes found in RA 7659. The amount was later
increased to P100,000.00. 85
In addition to this, the Court likewise awards moral damages. In People v. Arizapa, 86P50,000.00 was
awarded as moral damages without need of pleading or proving them, for in rape cases, it is recognized that the
victim's injury is concomitant with and necessarily results from the odious crime of rape to warrant per se the
award of moral damages. 87 Subsequently, the amount was increased to P75,000.00 in People v.
Soriano 88 and P100,000.00 in People v. Gambao. 89
Essentially, despite the fact that the death penalty cannot be imposed because of RA 9346, the
imposable penalty as provided by the law for the crime, such as those found in RA 7569, must be used as the
basis for awarding damages and not the actual penalty imposed.
Again, for crimes where the imposable penalty is death in view of the attendance of an ordinary
aggravating circumstance but due to the prohibition to impose the death penalty, the actual penalty imposed
is reclusion perpetua, the latest jurisprudence 90 pegs the amount of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity and
P100,0000.00 n as moral damages. For the qualifying aggravating circumstance and/or the ordinary aggravating
circumstances present, the amount of P100,000.00 is awarded as exemplary damages aside from civil indemnity
and moral damages. Regardless of the attendance of qualifying aggravating circumstance, the exemplary
damages shall be fixed at P100,000.00. "[T]his is not only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the
penal law and the financial fluctuation over time, but also an expression of the displeasure of the Court over the
incidence of heinous crimes . . . ." 91
When the circumstances surrounding the crime call for the imposition of reclusion perpetua only, there
being no ordinary aggravating circumstance, the Court rules that the proper amounts should be P75,000.00 as
civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages and P75,000.00 exemplary damages, regardless of the number of
qualifying aggravating circumstances present.
When it comes to compound and complex crimes, although the single act done by the offender caused
several crimes, the fact that those were the result of a single design, the amount of civil indemnity and moral
damages will depend on the penalty and the number of victims. For each of the victims, the heirs should be
properly compensated. If it is multiple murder without any ordinary aggravating circumstance but merely a
qualifying aggravating circumstance, but the penalty imposed is death because of Art. 48 of the RPC wherein the
maximum penalty shall be imposed, 92 then, for every victim who dies, the heirs shall be indemnified with
P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral damages and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
In case of a special complex crime, which is different from a complex crime under Article 48 of the RPC,
the following doctrines are noteworthy:
In People of the Philippines v. Conrado Laog, 93 this Court ruled that special complex
crime, or more properly, a composite crime, has its own definition and special penalty in
the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Justice Regalado, in his Separate Opinion in the case
of People v. Barros, 94 explained that composite crimes are "neither of the same legal basis as
nor subject to the rules on complex crimes in Article 48 [of the Revised Penal Code], since they
do not consist of a single act giving rise to two or more grave or less grave felonies [compound
crimes] nor do they involve an offense being a necessary means to commit another [complex
crime proper]. However, just like the regular complex crimes and the present case of aggravated
illegal possession of firearms, only a single penalty is imposed for each of such composite
crimes although composed of two or more offenses." 95 EATCcI
In People v. De Leon, 96 we expounded on the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide, as follows:
In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is
to commit robbery, with homicide perpetrated on the occasion or by reason of
the robbery. The intent to commit robbery must precede the taking of human
life. The homicide may take place before, during or after the robbery. It is only
the result obtained, without reference or distinction as to the circumstances,
causes or modes or persons intervening in the commission of the crime that has
to be taken into consideration. There is no such felony of robbery with homicide
through reckless imprudence or simple negligence. The constitutive elements of
the crime, namely, robbery with homicide, must be consummated.
It is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident; or that
the victim of homicide is other than the victim of robbery, or that two or more
persons are killed, or that aside from the homicide, rape, intentional mutilation,
or usurpation of authority, is committed by reason or on the occasion of the
crime. Likewise immaterial is the fact that the victim of homicide is one of the
robbers; the felony would still be robbery with homicide. Once a homicide is
committed by or on the occasion of the robbery, the felony committed is robbery
with homicide. All the felonies committed by reason of or on the occasion of the
robbery are integrated into one and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide.
The word "homicide" is used in its generic sense. Homicide, thus, includes
murder, parricide, and infanticide. 97
In the special complex crime of rape with homicide, the term "homicide"
is to be understood in its generic sense, and includes murder and slight physical
injuries committed by reason or on occasion of the rape. 98Hence, even if any or
all of the circumstances (treachery, abuse of superior strength and evident
premeditation) alleged in the information have been duly established by the
prosecution, the same would not qualify the killing to murder and the crime
committed by appellant is still rape with homicide. As in the case of robbery with
homicide, the aggravating circumstance of treachery is to be considered as a
generic aggravating circumstance only. Thus we ruled in People v.
Macabales: 99
Finally, appellants contend that the trial court erred in concluding that
the aggravating circumstance of treachery is present. They aver that treachery
applies to crimes against persons and not to crimes against property. However,
we find that the trial court in this case correctly characterized treachery as a
generic aggravating, rather than qualifying, circumstance. Miguel was rendered
helpless by appellants in defending himself when his arms were held by two of
the attackers before he was stabbed with a knife by appellant Macabales, as
their other companions surrounded them. In People v. Salvatierra, we ruled that
when alevosia (treachery) obtains in the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide, such treachery is to be regarded as a generic aggravating
circumstance. Robbery with homicide is a composite crime with its own
definition and special penalty in the Revised Penal Code. There is no special
complex crime of robbery with murder under the Revised Penal Code. Here,
treachery forms part of the circumstances proven concerning the actual
commission of the complex crime. Logically it could not qualify the homicide to
murder but, as generic aggravating circumstance, it helps determine the penalty
to be imposed. 100
Applying the above discussion on special complex crimes, if the penalty is death but it cannot be
imposed due to RA 9346 and what is actually imposed is the penalty of reclusion perpetua, the civil indemnity
and moral damages will be P100,000.00 each, and another P100,000.00 as exemplary damages in view of the
heinousness of the crime and to set an example. If there is another composite crime included in a special
complex crime and the penalty imposed is death, an additional P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P100,000.00
moral damages and P100,000.00 exemplary damages shall be awarded for each composite crime committed.
For example, in case of Robbery with Homicide 101 wherein three (3) people died as a consequence of
the crime, the heirs of the victims shall be entitled to the award of damages as discussed earlier. This is true,
however, only if those who were killed were the victims of the robbery or mere bystanders and not when those
who died were the perpetrators or robbers themselves because the crime of robbery with homicide may still be
committed even if one of the robbers dies. 102 This is also applicable in robbery with rape where there is more
than one victim of rape.
In awarding civil indemnity and moral damages, it is also important to determine the stage in which the
crime was committed and proven during the trial. Article 6 of the RPC provides:
Art. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies. — Consummated felonies, as
well as those which are frustrated and attempted, are punishable.
A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and
accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated when an offender performs all the acts of
execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not
produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly
by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by
reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.
As discussed earlier, when the crime proven is consummated and the penalty imposed is death but
reduced to reclusion perpetua because of R.A. 9346, the civil indemnity and moral damages that should be
awarded will each be P100,000.00 and another P100,000.00 for exemplary damages or when the circumstances
of the crime call for the imposition of reclusion perpetua only, the civil indemnity and moral damages should be
P75,000.00 each, as well as exemplary damages in the amount of P75,000.00. If, however, the crime proven is in
its frustrated stage, the civil indemnity and moral damages that should be awarded will each be P50,000.00, and
an award of P25,000.00 civil indemnity and P25,000.00 moral damages when the crime proven is in its
attempted stage. The difference in the amounts awarded for the stages is mainly due to the disparity in the
outcome of the crime committed, in the same way that the imposable penalty varies for each stage of the crime.
The said amounts of civil indemnity and moral damages awarded in cases of felonies in their frustrated or
attempted stages shall be the bases when the crimes committed constitute complex crime under Article 48 of
the RPC. For example, in a crime of murder with attempted murder, the amount of civil indemnity, moral
damages and exemplary damages is P100,000.00 each, while in the attempted murder, the civil indemnity, moral
damages and exemplary damages is P25,000.00 each.
In a special complex crime, like robbery with homicide, if, aside from homicide, several victims (except
the robbers) sustained injuries, they shall likewise be indemnified. It must be remembered that in a special
complex crime, unlike in a complex crime, the component crimes have no attempted or frustrated stages
because the intention of the offender/s is to commit the principal crime which is to rob but in the process of
committing the said crime, another crime is committed. For example, if on the occasion of a robbery with
homicide, other victims sustained injuries, regardless of the severity, the crime committed is still robbery with
homicide as the injuries become part of the crime, "Homicide", in the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide, is understood in its generic sense and now forms part of the essential element of robbery, 103 which
is the use of violence or the use of force upon anything. Hence, the nature and severity of the injuries sustained
by the victims must still be determined for the purpose of awarding civil indemnity and damages. If a victim
suffered mortal wounds and could have died if not for a timely medical intervention, the victim should be
awarded civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages equivalent to the damages awarded in a
frustrated stage, and if a victim suffered injuries that are not fatal, an award of civil indemnity, moral damages
and exemplary damages should likewise be awarded equivalent to the damages awarded in an attempted
stage. CAacTH
In other crimes that resulted in the death of a victim and the penalty consists of divisible penalties, like
homicide, death under tumultuous affray, reckless imprudence resulting to homicide, the civil indemnity awarded
to the heirs of the victim shall be P50,000.00 and P50,000.00 moral damages without exemplary damages being
awarded. However, an award of P50,000.00 exemplary damages in a crime of homicide shall be added if there is
an aggravating circumstance present that has been proven but not alleged in the information.
Aside from those discussed earlier, the Court also awards temperate damages in certain cases. The
award of P25,000.00 as temperate damages in homicide or murder cases is proper when no evidence of burial
and funeral expenses is presented in the trial court. 104 Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate
damages may be recovered, as it cannot be denied that the heirs of the victims suffered pecuniary loss although
the exact amount was not proved. 105 In this case, the Court now increases the amount to be awarded as
temperate damages to P50,000.00.
In the case at bar, the crimes were aggravated by dwelling, and the murders committed were further
made atrocious by the fact of that the victims are innocent, defenseless minors — one is a mere 3 1/2-year-old
toddler, and the other a 13-year-old girl. The increase in the amount of awards for damages is befitting to show
not only the Court's, but all of society's outrage over such crimes and wastage of lives.
In summary:
I. For those crimes 106 like, Murder, 107 Parricide, 108 Serious Intentional
Mutilation, 109Infanticide, 110 and other crimes involving death of a victim where the penalty consists of
indivisible penalties:
1.1 Where the penalty imposed is death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because of RA 9346:
a. Civil indemnity — P100,000.00
b. Moral damages — P100,000.00
c. Exemplary damages — P100,000.00
1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated:
a. Frustrated:
i. Civil indemnity — P75,000.00
ii. Moral damages — P75,000.00
iii. Exemplary damages — P75,000.00
b. Attempted:
ii. Exemplary damages — P50,000.00
2.1 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the above-mentioned:
2.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated:
a. Frustrated:
b. Attempted:
II. For Simple Rape/Qualified Rape:
1.1 Where the penalty imposed is Death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because of RA 9346:
c. Exemplary damages 111 — P100,000.00
1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated but merely attempted: 112
a. Civil indemnity — P50,000.00 IAETDc
2.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated, but merely attempted:
III. For Complex crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code where death, injuries, or sexual
abuse results, the civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages will depend on the penalty, extent of
violence and sexual abuse; and the number of victims where the penalty consists of indivisible penalties:
The above Rules apply to every victim who dies as a result of the crime committed. In other complex
crimes where death does not result, like in Forcible Abduction with Rape the civil indemnity, moral and
exemplary damages depend on the prescribed penalty and the penalty imposed, as the case may be.
IV. For Special Complex Crimes like Robbery with Homicide, 113 Robbery with Rape, 114Robbery with
Intentional Mutilation, 115 Robbery with Arson, 116 Rape with Homicide, 117Kidnapping with
Murder, 118 Carnapping with Homicide 119 or Carnapping with Rape, 120 Highway Robbery with
Homicide, 121 Qualified Piracy, 122 Arson with Homicide, 123 Hazing with Death, Rape, Sodomy or
Mutilation 124 and other crimes with death, injuries, and sexual abuse as the composite crimes, where the
penalty consists of indivisible penalties:
In Robbery with Intentional Mutilation, the amount of damages is the same as the above if the penalty
imposed is Death but reduced to reclusion perpetua although death did not occur.
1.2 For the victims who suffered mortal/fatal wounds 125 and could have died if not for a timely medical
intervention, the following shall be awarded:
1.3 For the victims who suffered non-mortal/non-fatal injuries:
In Robbery with Intentional Mutilation, the amount of damages is the same as the above if the penalty
imposed is reclusion perpetua.
2.2 For the victims who suffered mortal/fatal wounds and could have died if not for a timely medical
intervention, the following shall be awarded:
c. Exemplary damages — P50,000.00 DcHSEa
2.3 For the victims who suffered non-mortal/non-fatal injuries:
In Robbery with Physical Injuries, 126 the amount of damages shall likewise be dependent on the
nature/severity of the wounds sustained, whether fatal or non-fatal.
The above Rules do not apply if in the crime of Robbery with Homicide, the robber/s or perpetrator/s are
themselves killed or injured in the incident.
Where the component crime is rape, the above Rules shall likewise apply, and that for every additional
rape committed, whether against the same victim or other victims, the victims shall be entitled to the same
damages unless the other crimes of rape are treated as separate crimes, in which case, the damages awarded to
simple rape/qualified rape shall apply.
V. In other crimes that result in the death of a victim and the penalty consists of divisible penalties, i.e.,
Homicide, Death under Tumultuous Affray, Infanticide to conceal the dishonour of the offender, 127 Reckless
Imprudence Resulting to Homicide, Duel, Intentional Abortion and Unintentional Abortion, etc.:
1.1 Where the crime was consummated:
1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated, except those crimes where there are no
stages, i.e., Reckless Imprudence and Death under tumultuous affray:
a. Frustrated:
b. Attempted:
If an aggravating circumstance was proven during the trial, even if not alleged in the Information, 128 in
addition to the above mentioned amounts as civil indemnity and moral damages, the amount of P50,000.00
exemplary damages for consummated; P30,000.00 for frustrated; and P20,000.00 for attempted, shall be
awarded.
VI. A. In the crime of Rebellion where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua and death occurs in
the course of the rebellion, the heirs of those who died are entitled to the following: 129
c. Exemplary damages — P100,000.00 130
B. For the victims who suffered mortal/fatal wounds in the course of the rebellion and could have died if
not for a timely medical intervention, the following shall be awarded:
C. For the victims who suffered non-mortal/non-fatal injuries:
VII. In all of the above instances, when no documentary evidence of burial or funeral expenses is
presented in court, the amount of P50,000.00 as temperate damages shall be awarded.
To reiterate, Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides that the minimum amount for awards of civil
indemnity is P3,000.00, but does not provide for a ceiling. Thus, although the minimum amount cannot be
changed, increasing the amount awarded as civil indemnity can be validly modified and increased when the
present circumstance warrants it. 131
Prescinding from the foregoing, for the two (2) counts of murder, attended by the ordinary aggravating
circumstance of dwelling, appellant should be ordered to pay the heirs of the victims the following damages: (1)
P100,000.00 as civil indemnity for each of the two children who died; (2) P100,000.00 as moral damages for each
of the two victims; (3) another P100,000.00 as exemplary damages for each of the two victims; and (4) temperate
damages in the amount of P50,000.00 for each of the two deceased. For the four (4) counts of Attempted
Murder, appellant should pay P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00 as
exemplary damages for each of the four victims. In addition, the civil indemnity, moral damages, exemplary
damages and temperate damages payable by the appellant are subject to interest at the rate of six percent (6%)
per annum from the finality of this decision until fully paid. 132 SCaITA
Lastly, this Court echoes the concern of the trial court regarding the dismissal of the charges against
Gilberto Estores and Roger San Miguel who had been identified by Norberto Divina as the companions of
appellant on the night the shooting occurred. Norberto had been very straightforward and unwavering in his
identification of Estores and San Miguel as the two other people who fired the gunshots at his family. More
significantly, as noted by the prosecutor, the testimonies of Estores and San Miguel, who insisted they were not
at the crime scene, tended to conflict with the sworn statement of Danilo Fajarillo, which was the basis for the
Provincial Prosecutor's ruling that he finds no probable cause against the two. Danilo Fajarillo's sworn statement
said that on June 6, 2002, he saw appellant with a certain "Hapon" and Gilbert Estores at the crime scene, but it
was only appellant who was carrying a firearm and the two other people with him had no participation in the
shooting incident. Said circumstances bolster the credibility of Norberto Divina's testimony that Estores and San
Miguel may have been involved in the killing of his two young daughters.
After all, such reinvestigation would not subject Estores and San Miguel to double jeopardy because the
same only attaches if the following requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy has attached before the second; (2)
the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first. In
turn, a first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment;
(d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused has been acquitted or convicted, or the case
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. 133 In this case, the case against Estores and
San Miguel was dismissed before they were arraigned. Thus, there can be no double jeopardy to speak of. Let
true justice be served by reinvestigating the real participation, if any, of Estores and San Miguel in the killing of
Mary Grace and Claudine Divina.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated January
30, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 03252 is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) In Criminal Case No. 7698-G, the Court finds accused-appellant Ireneo JuguetaGUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of the crime of murder defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code,
attended by the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, and hereby sentences him to suffer two (2) terms
of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole under R.A. 9346. He is ORDERED to PAY the heirs of Mary
Grace Divina and Claudine Divina the following amounts for each of the two victims: (a) P100,000.00 as civil
indemnity; (b) P100,000.00 as moral damages; (c) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (d) P50,000.00 as
temperate damages.
(2) In Criminal Case No. 7702-G, the Court finds accused-appellant Ireneo JuguetaGUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of the crime of attempted murder defined and penalized under Article 248 in
relation to Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, attended by the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, and
sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, for each of the four (4)
counts of attempted murder. He is ORDERED to PAY moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00, civil
indemnity of P50,000.00 and exemplary damages of P50,000.00 to each of the four victims, namely, Norberto
Divina, Maricel Divina, Elizabeth Divina and Judy Ann Divina. cHECAS
(3) Accused-appellant Ireneo Jugueta is also ORDERED to PAY interest at the rate of six percent
(6%) per annum from the time of finality of this decision until fully paid, to be imposed on the civil indemnity,
moral damages, exemplary damages and temperate damages.
(4) Let the Office of the Prosecutor General, through the Department of Justice, be FURNISHED a copy
of this Decision. The Prosecutor General is DIRECTED to immediately conduct a REINVESTIGATION on the
possible criminal liability of Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel regarding this case. Likewise, let a copy of this
Decision be furnished the Secretary of Justice for his information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
||| (People v. Jugueta, G.R. No. 202124, [April 5, 2016])
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 144886. April 29, 2002.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANTONIO SILVANO, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
SYNOPSIS
Accused-appellant was convicted of the crime of rape with homicide. In convicting accused-appellant, the
trial court relied on the testimony of prosecution witness Constancio Jimenez and on what it considered as
circumstantial evidence to justify appellant's conviction. On appeal, appellant assailed the credibility of the testimony
of Jimenez.
The Supreme Court acquitted appellant on ground of reasonable doubt. Witness Jimenez admitted on cross-
examination that there was bad blood between him and appellant. It was, therefore, improbable that appellant went
to Jimenez's house for the birthday of the latter's son, on the occasion of which appellant confessed to the crime. It
was even more improbable that appellant made his confession in the presence of other people. Jimenez named
three persons as being allegedly present when appellant made his confession. However, not one of these persons
was presented to corroborate Jimenez's claim. EScAHT
The Court further ruled that there was no circumstantial evidence to show appellant's guilt. The prosecution
thus failed to prove appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. To secure a conviction, it is not enough that the
evidence establishes a strong suspicion or even a probability of guilt. Moral certainty that the accused committed the
crime is required.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; INDEPENDENT RELEVANT STATEMENT, EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY

RULE; WITNESS IS COMPETENT TO TESTIFY ONLY AS TO THE SUBSTANCE OF WHAT HE HAD HEARD; CASE
AT BAR. — Jimenez was competent to testify only as to the substance of what he had heard, but not as to the truth
thereof. However, despite its ruling during trial that it is admitting Jimenez's account as an independently relevant
statement, the trial court considered the substance of accused-appellant's alleged statements to Jimenez as true
and then proceeded to justify conviction of accused-appellant on circumstantial evidence. In its consideration of the
contents of accused-appellant's alleged statements to Jimenez, the trial court treated them as an extrajudicial
confession made to a private party, and not just as an independent relevant statement. This is error.
2. CRIMINAL LAW; RAPE; MUST AT LEAST BE PROVED BY EVIDENCE OF FINGER GRIPS AND
CONTUSIONS ON THE BODY OF THE VICTIMS, TORN GARMENTS AND LACERATIONS, REDNESS AND
SWELLING OF GENITAL AREA; CASE AT BAR. — The trial court is correct in ruling that the absence of lacerated
wounds in the genitalia does not necessarily mean that rape had not been committed. Rape, however, is never
presumed. We agree with the Solicitor General, who recommends that accused-appellant be absolved of the charge
of rape, that there must at least be some evidence of finger grips and contusions on the body of the victims, torn
garments, and lacerations, redness, and swelling, especially of the genital area, to prove rape. Indeed, not only is
there no proof of rape in this case but the witness for the prosecution who conducted the necropsy categorically
stated that he did not have any findings concerning victim's genitalia.
3. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE; NOT SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT ACCUSED
IN CASE AT BAR. — There is no circumstantial evidence to show accused-appellant's guilt: 1. Disregarding
accused-appellant's alleged admission, the only factual circumstance left is that of flight. Even this is in question in
the face of accused-appellant's assertion that he is actually a resident of Brgy. Kapayawi, Libungan, Cotabato since
childhood. 2. The assertion that accused-appellant was a principal suspect from the start of the investigation is not
corroborated by evidence. 3. There is no proof that accused-appellant was, or could have been, in the place and at
the time of the commission of the crime in question. 4. The injuries sustained by the victim Maramanay Tomas do not
indicate the probability that accused-appellant raped and killed her, if at all. 5. The tubaoallegedly found near the
cadaver of the victim and turned over to the police was not identified, marked, and offered as evidence nor in any
case shown to belong to accused-appellant.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT. — "Accused-appellant's conviction by the trial court
hinged on circumstantial evidence. To validly invoke circumstantial evidence, it must be shown that there is more
than one circumstance and the facts from which the inferences derived are proven. The combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The circumstances must constitute an
unbroken chain of events that can reasonably lead to the conclusion pointing to the accused to the exclusion of all
others as the author of the crime. . . . Like a tapestry made of strands which create a pattern when interwoven, a
judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the circumstances proved constitute
an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all
others, as the guilty person."
5. ID.; ID.; BURDEN OF PROOF; WHEN PROSECUTION FAILS TO DISCHARGE ITS BURDEN, ACCUSED
NEED NOT OFFER EVIDENCE IN HIS BEHALF. — The prosecution thus failed to prove accused-appellant's guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. To secure a conviction, it is not enough that the evidence establishes a strong suspicion
or even a probability of guilt. Moral certainty that the accused committed the crime is required. That alibi (which
accused-appellant invokes) is the weakest defense is irrelevant. For when the prosecution fails to discharge its
burden, an accused need not even offer evidence in his behalf. EaICAD
DECISION
MENDOZA, J p:
This is an appeal from the decision, 1 dated June 26, 2000, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Midsayap,
Cotabato, finding accused-appellant Antonio Silvano guilty of the crime of rape with homicide and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim Maramanay Tomas P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
The crime was committed on October 7, 1991 in Inudaran, Mapurok, Alamada, Cotabato. On March 9, 1993,
more than a year after the commission of the crime, a criminal complaint for attempted rape with homicide was filed
in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Pigcawayan-Alamada, Cotabato 2 against accused-appellant. On March 16,
1993, accused-appellant was arrested.
After appropriate preliminary investigation, Acting Judge Charito Untal-de Guzman of the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court found probable cause and accordingly remanded the case to the Provincial Prosecutor. In a resolution
dated January 25, 1994, Rolando Y. Deiparine, of the Provincial Prosecution Office in Kidapawan, Cotabato,
modified Judge de Guzman's findings and recommended the filing of consummated rape with homicide against
accused-appellant. 3 His recommendation was approved and the following information was filed, alleging —
That on or about October 7, 1991 in the Municipality of Alamada, Province of Cotabato,
Philippines the said accused, armed with a bladed weapon, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously and by means of force and intimidation, succeeded in having carnal knowledge
with one MARAMANAY TOMAS against her will, that after the occasion the said accused, with
intent to kill, stabbed the victim hitting her on the different parts of her body, which is the direct
and proximate cause of her death thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 4
Upon being * on August 23, 1994, accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty, whereupon he was tried. 5
Four witnesses were presented by the prosecution, namely, Constancio Jimenez, accused-appellant's
nephew; Samotor Polayagan, the person who found the body of the victim at the crime scene; Onotan Tomas, the
victim's father; and Dr. Ebenezer Demetillo, who conducted the necropsy.
The prosecution evidence shows: The body of Maramanay Tomas, a Muslim girl, was found by a certain
Margarito near the river at Sitio Inudaran, Barangay Mapurok, Alamada, Cotabato at around 1 o'clock in the
afternoon of October 7, 1991. 6 Upon receipt of the information, prosecution witness Samotor Polayagan said he
proceeded to the crime scene and found the dead body of a girl. He saw a turban (tubao) ten meters, more or less,
from the cadaver. Polayagan said that he did not move the cadaver and waited for the police to arrive at the scene. 7
One policeman arrived, who then made a sketch and a report of the crime. The body of Maramanay Tomas
was subsequently brought to her home. 8 At the request of Alamada Mayor Wenceslao dela Cerna, a necropsy
examination was conducted by Dr. Ebenezer Demetillo on the same day. In describing the injuries sustained by and
the examination conducted on the victim, Dr. Demetillo testified:
PROS. LUMANG:
. . . . There are how many serious wounds in these 21 stab wounds which will cause the
instantaneous death of the victim?
A The serious stab wound is the first stab wound which is 2 cms. in width x 6 cms. depth
supracelanicular area penetrating the upper right lung. This wound is more than enough to
cause the hypovolemia of the victim. Also the number 2 stab wound is fatal. It is 2 cms. in
width x 4 cms. in depth by medial active of the right neck cutting the jugular vein. So, this
is more than enough to cause the hypovolemia of the patient and the rest are minor, sir.
Q When you say hypovolemia, you mean to say the loss of blood of the victim?
A Yes, sir.
Q So, in other words, even if only these two wounds that were inflicted it will cause the immediate
death of the victim?
A Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q So, in totality Doctor, what was then therefore the cause of death of the victim?
A The cause of death of the victim is cardio-respiratory arrest and the second is hypovolemia then
the multiple stab wounds.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Aside from the injuries inflicted on the cadaver of Maramanay Tomas, did you ever try to
conduct any examination?
A Yes, I examined the different parts of her body from head to foot sir.
Q Did you conduct an examination on the genitalia of the victim?
A Yes, sir.
Q Do you still remember what was your findings on the genitalia of the cadaver of the victim when
you conducted a necropsy examination?
A Based on that report, I did not put any findings on the genitalia because I did not find any. 9
More than a year after Maramanay Tomas' death, accused-appellant allegedly confessed to his nephew,
Constancio Jimenez, at a birthday party that he had raped and killed the victim. On the basis of this alleged
confession, Jimenez gave a statement on March 3, 1993 incriminating his uncle, accused-appellant Antonio Silvano.
The statement was given to the Philippine National Police of Alamada, Cotabato.
Testifying on the alleged confession of accused-appellant, Jimenez said that on December 3, 1992,
accused-appellant came to his house in Kapayawi, Libungan, Cotabato for his son's birthday party. While they were
having drinks with three other persons (Garcio Payot, Donita Payot and Orlando Mojado), accused-appellant
allegedly told Jimenez he was not going back to Alamada because the police were looking for him as he had raped
and killed a Muslim girl. Accused-appellant allegedly killed the child after raping her for fear that she would testify
against him. 10 Jimenez testified that accused-appellant had in fact transferred residence many times to escape
from the police. From Alamada, Cotabato, accused-appellant transferred to Malamote, Midsayap, Cotabato, and
then to Kapayawi, Libungan, Cotabato. 11
On cross-examination, however, Jimenez admitted that there was bad blood between him and accused-
appellant. He said:
ATTY. ERAMIS:
. . . . Is it not [true] that on May 4 in Kapayawi you have stated that your house and the
house of the accused is near [to] each other, and is it not [true] that there. was a conflict
between you and the accused in connection with your dogs and your chickens?
A Yes, sir. When he is drunk he stabbed our dogs.
Q And you do not like the behavior of the accused?
A Yes, sir.
Q And as a neighbor you do not like the behavior of the accused?
A Yes, sir.
Q Even if he is your uncle?
A Yes, sir.
Q And in fact you are harboring hatred against the accused?
A Yes, sir.
Q You did not see the commission of the crime in this case?
A Yes, sir. I am not an eyewitness of the incident and I am only telling to this court the words which
were told by the accused to me during the birthday party of my son.
Q And what is the reason why you said you do not like the behavior of the accused and in fact you
harbored hatred [against] him. Why is it that you invited him to the birthday party of your
son[?] What is the reason?
xxx xxx xxx
A Because we are [close to] each other sir and our closeness [ended] when he chased my son, sir.
Q And because of that hatred you decided to testify against him in this case?
A Yes, sir.
Q As an act of vengeance?
A Yes, sir. 12
Testifying in his turn, Onotan Tomas, the victim's father, said he came to know the identity of the person who
allegedly killed his daughter only after more than a year since her death. He claimed to have spent more than
P25,000.00 for his daughter's wake and another P25,000.00 for his daughter's 40 days and first year death
anniversary. 13 These amounts, however, were not supported by receipts.
At the conclusion of its case, the prosecution failed to make a formal offer of its evidence. This was
construed by the trial court as a waiver of the formal offer of evidence. 14
The defense then presented its only witness: accused-appellant Antonio Silvano. He denied going to the
birthday party of Constancio Jimenez's son on December 3, 1992. He denied having told Jimenez that he had raped
and killed a Muslim child in Alamada, Cotabato. Nor did he leave a tubaoand knife at the crime scene. He said that
on October 7, 1991, when the crime was committed, he was in his house in Brgy. Kapayawi, Libungan, Cotabato.
Accused-appellant said he and Jimenez had altercations because accused-appellant hit Jimenez's cows for feeding
in his corn land, while Jimenez's dogs devoured his chickens. Said accused-appellant:
Q You were charged [with] rape with Homicide before this Honorable Court which happened on
October 7, 1991 at Sitio Mapurok, Alamada, Cotabato based on the testimony of
Constancio Jimenez who testified in court that on December 3, 1992 you were invited to
his house and you attended this party and on that occasion you admitted that you
allegedly killed a girl and allegedly you left a knife and tubao in the crime scene, what can
you say about this?
A That is not true, sir.
Q Why do you say that this is not true?
A Because I and Constancio Jimenez used to have a quarrel, sir.
Q Could you tell this Honorable Court when did this first quarrel start?
A 1990, sir.
Q Could you tell this Honorable Court what was your quarrel with Constancio Jimenez?
A It pertains to his cow, sir.
Q Do you know . . . where . . . this Constancio Jimenez live[s]?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where?
A In Kapayawi, sir.
Q You mean to tell us that he is your neighbor?
A Yes, sir.
Q You said you have a quarrel arising from a cow, could you tell us what happened to the cow?
A This Constancio Jimenez had 10 heads of cows and sometimes some of these cows [go] to my
corn land.
Q And what did you do to those cows [which go] to your farm?
A I drove [away] the other cows and there was one cow left. I [h]it that cow, sir.
Q After hitting that cow what was the reaction of Constancio Jimenez if any?
A That was the root of our quarrel, he sided with these cows who destroyed my plants.
Q And you said you have your first quarrel arising from a cow, did you have any [more] quarrel with
this Constancio Jimenez?
A Yes, sir, there was.
Q Could you tell this Honorable Court when was that?
A 1993, sir.
Q Could you tell us what was the root of that quarrel in 1993?
A About the dog, sir?
Q Could you tell us what was the relation of this dog to your quarrel?
A His dog [ate] my chicken, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Why do you say that the testimony of Constancio Jimenez that you left a tubao and a knife, that
you admitted you killed and rape[d] a Muslim girl, you said that that is not true?
A He harbored ill feelings against me, sir. 15

On June 26, 2000, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, finding accused ANTONIO SILVANO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Rape with Homicide, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and ordered to indemnify the heirs of victim Maramanay Tomas in the amount of
P50,000.00 and to pay them moral damages of P50,000.00.
The accused is credited in the service of his sentence, with the full time during which he
underwent preventive imprisonment. He is ordered committed to the Davao Penal Colony in
Carmen, Davao del Norte from the Cotabato Rehabilitation Center, Amas, Kidapawan City.
SO ORDERED. 16
Hence this appeal. Accused-appellant contends that —
I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDENCE TO THE
TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION WITNESS CONSTANCIO JIMENEZ.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF RAPE WITH HOMICIDE.
First. There is a need to scrutinize Constancio Jimenez's testimony because it is the basis of accused-
appellant's conviction. On direct examination, Jimenez testified:
Q Now, while you were there celebrating the birthday party of your child was there any unusual
thing that took place?
A In that birthday celebration the accused Antonio Silvano told us that he raped and killed a
Muslim child, sir.
Q What else did he [tell] you if any?
A He told us that he is no longer interested in going back to Alamada because the policemen are
looking for him, sir.
Q Was there an instance if you know that he told you why he killed the Muslim?
A He told us that he killed the child of the Muslim because he raped this child and if he will not kill
the [M]uslim child, the child can testify against him, sir.
ATTY. ERAMIS
Before the Prosecution proceed[s] Your Honor we would like to put on record the
objection by reason of hearsay evidence.
FISCAL DEIPARINE
We would like to put on record our opposition to that objection because there is an
exception of the hearsay rule as an independent relevant statement.
COURT
The witness is not testifying as to the truth of his statement. He is only testifying in
connection with the statement given by the accused to him on December 3, 1995.
Proceed.
FISCAL DEIPARINE
What else did the accused tell you if any?
A He told us that a tubao or head band made of cloth and a knife [was] left [on] the scene of the
crime, sir.
Q What else did he tell you if any?
A He told us that he raped that Muslim child and after that he killed and stabbed the child sir.
In convicting accused-appellant, the trial court relied on Jimenez's testimony and on what it considered as
circumstantial evidence to justify accused-appellant's conviction. The trial court said in its decision:
There is no eyewitness in this case. The prosecution is banking on the admissions of the
accused and on circumstantial evidence.
The query now before us is: are Antonio Silvano's admissions to Constancio Jimenez, a
private party, admissible in evidence?
The court believes that the declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging his guilt of
the offense may be given in evidence against him and any person, otherwise competent to testify
as a witness, who heard the confession is competent to testify as to the substance of what he
heard and understood it.
In People vs. Maqueda, 242 SCRA 565, the Supreme Court ruled:
"Accordingly, Maqueda's admissions to Ray Dean Salvosa, a private party, are admissible
in evidence against the former under Section 26, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
In Aballe vs. People, this Court held that the declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging his
guilt of the offense may be given in evidence against him and any person, otherwise competent to
testify as a witness, who heard the confession, is competent to testify as to the substance of what
he heard and understood it. The said witness need not repeat verbatim the oral confession; it
suffices if he gives its substance."
In People vs. Domantay, G.R. No. 130612, May 11, 1999, a very recent case, the Supreme Court ruled:
"We agree with the Solicitor General, however, that accused-appellant's confession to the
radio reporter, Celso Manuel is admissible. In People vs. Andan, the accused in a rapewith
homicide case confessed to the crime during interviews with the media. In holding the confession
admissible, despite the fact that the accused gave his answers without the assistance of counsel,
this Court said:
"[A]ppellant's [oral] confessions to the newsmen are not covered by Section 12(1) and (3)
of Article III of the Constitution. The Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation between
a private individual and another individual. It governs the relationship between the individual and
the State. The prohibitions therein are primarily addressed to the State and its agents. " 17
Jimenez was competent to testify only as to the substance of what he had heard, but not as to the truth
thereof. However, despite its ruling during trial that it is admitting Jimenez's account as an independently relevant
statement, the trial court considered the substance of accused-appellant's alleged statements to Jimenez as true
and then proceeded to justify conviction of accused-appellant on circumstantial evidence. In its consideration of the
contents of accused-appellant's alleged statements to Jimenez, the trial court treated them as an extrajudicial
confession made to a private party, and not just as an independent relevant statement. This is error. As previously
noted, Jimenez admitted on cross-examination that there was bad blood between him and accused-appellant. It
was, therefore, improbable that accused-appellant went to Jimenez's house for the birthday of the latter's son, on
the occasion of which accused-appellant confessed to the crime. It is even more improbable that accused-appellant
made his confession in the presence of other people. Jimenez named three persons as being allegedly present when
accused-appellant made his confession. These were Garcia Payot, Donita Payot, and Orlando Mojado. 18 However,
not one of these persons was presented to corroborate Jimenez's claim.
We are more inclined to believe the claim of accused-appellant that, on the date in question, he was in his
house in Kapayawi, Libungan, Cotabato and that he had never gone to Sitio Mapurok, Alamada,
Cotabato. 19 Accused-appellant denied Constancio Jimenez's allegation that he had transferred residence several
times, as well as Onotan Tomas' allegation that accused-appellant was his neighbor in Sitio Mapurok, Alamada,
Cotabato. Accused-appellant maintained that he had been a resident of Kapayawi, Libungan, Cotabato since his
childhood. 20
Second. There is no evidence that the victim was raped. However, in finding that the victim had been raped,
the trial court stated:
Dr. Demetillo testified that he also examined the [genitalia] of the victim but he did not
enter any finding in the report as he did not find any (TSN, October 29, 1998, pp. 12-13).
The Supreme Court consistently ruled that a medical certificate is not [indispensable] to
prove the commission of rape (People vs. Quaimco, 268 SCRA 516; People vs. Ederalino, 271
SCRA 189; People vs. Bugarin, 273 SCRA 384; People vs. Zaballero, 274 SCRA 627). The Highest
Court also consistently ruled that lack of lacerated wounds does not negate sexual intercourse
(People vs. San Juan, 270 SCRA 693; People vs. Erardo, 277 SCRA 643; People vs. Gabayron, 278
SCRA 78; People vs. Betonio, 279 SCRA 532; People vs. Oliva, 282 SCRA 470).
The trial court is correct in ruling that the absence of lacerated wounds in the genitalia does not necessarily
mean that rape had not been committed. Rape, however, is never presumed. We agree with the Solicitor General,
who recommends that accused-appellant be absolved of the charge of rape, 21 that there must at least be some
evidence of finger grips and contusions on the body of the victims, torn garments, and lacerations, redness, and
swelling, especially of the genital area, to prove rape. 22
Indeed, not only is there no proof of rape in this case but the witness for the prosecution who conducted the
necropsy categorically stated that he did not have any findings concerning the victim's genitalia.
Third. Nor can accused-appellant be held responsible for the death of the victim. Evidence showing a mere
possibility of guilt is insufficient to warrant a conviction. In this case, the trial court stated —
Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that circumstantial evidence is sufficient
for conviction if: (a) There is more than one circumstance; (b) The facts from which the inferences
are derived are proven; and (c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
From the very start of the investigation, accused Silvano was the principal suspect
(Opposition to Motion to Quash, p. 27, Record). After the incident, the accused left Macabasa,
Alamada and transferred his residence to Midsayap, Cotabato and finally at Libungan, Cotabato
where he was arrested. The accused's flight is a strong indication of guilt (People vs. Vitor, 245
SCRA 620) for flight evidences culpability and a guilty conscience, and it strongly indicates a guilty
mind or betrays the existence of a guilty conscience (Peoplevs. Salvame, 270 SCRA 766). The
accused never explained why he fled after the incident took place. The accused's admission is
corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti e.g. the corpse of victim Maramanay Tomas. The
accused's admission that he stabbed and killed the victim is further corroborated by the findings of
Dr. Ebenezer Demetillo that the victim sustained twenty-one (21) stab wounds. (TSN, October 29,
1998, p. 8; Exhibits "B-4" and "B-5"). 23
There is no circumstantial evidence to show accused-appellant's guilt:
1. Disregarding accused-appellant's alleged admission, the only factual circumstance left is that of flight.
Even this is in question in the face of accused-appellant's assertion that he is actually a resident of Brgy. Kapayawi,
Libungan, Cotabato since childhood.
2. The assertion that accused-appellant was a principal suspect from the start of the investigation is not
corroborated by evidence.
3. There is no proof that accused-appellant was, or could have been, in the place and at the time of the
commission of the crime in question.
4. The injuries sustained by the victim Maramanay Tomas do not indicate the probability that accused-
appellant raped and killed her, if at all.
5. The tubao allegedly found near the cadaver of the victim and turned over to the police was not identified,
marked, and offered as evidence nor in any case shown to belong to accused-appellant.
As we have held:
Accused-appellant's conviction by the trial court hinged on circumstantial evidence. To
validly invoke circumstantial evidence, it must be shown that there is more than one circumstance
and the facts from which the inferences derived are proven. The combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The circumstances
must constitute an unbroken chain of events that can reasonably lead to the conclusion pointing to
the accused to the exclusion of all others as the author of the crime. . . . Like a tapestry made of
strands which create a pattern when interwoven, a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial
evidence can be upheld only if the circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain which
leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others,
as the guilty person. 24
Fourth. The prosecution thus failed to prove accused-appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. To secure a
conviction, it is not enough that the evidence establishes a strong suspicion or even a probability of guilt. Moral
certainty that the accused committed the crime is required. 25 That alibi (which accused-appellant invokes) is the
weakest defense is irrelevant. For when the prosecution fails to discharge its burden, an accused need not even offer
evidence in his behalf. 26
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Midsayap, Cotabato, finding accused-
appellant Antonio Silvano guilty of the crime of rape with homicide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim Maramanay Tomas P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and
P50,000.00 as moral damages, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant ANTONIO SILVANO is
ACQUITTED on ground of reasonable doubt and is ordered immediately released unless he is lawfully held in
custody for another cause. CTaIHE
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to implement this Decision and to report to this Court
the action taken hereon within five days upon receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.
||| (People v. Silvano, G.R. No. 144886, [April 29, 2002], 431 PHIL 351-367)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 169078. March 10, 2006.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. RICARDO B. MIRANDA, appellant.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:
Appellant Ricardo B. Miranda was charged with Rape in a criminal complaint which reads:
That on or about the 28th of December 1996, in Barangay San Pedro, Municipality of
Guagua, Province of Pampanga, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, RICARDO B. MIRANDA, with lewd designs, by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with (sic)
Joylene O. Balagtas, a five year old minor, against her will and without her consent.
Contrary to law. 1
On arraignment, appellant pleaded "not guilty." 2 Trial on the merits then ensued.
The prosecution presented as witnesses, the victim, 5-year-old Joylene O. Balagtas (Joylene), her mother
Georgina 3 Balagtas and Dr. Carlos P. Mercado. 4
Joylene testified that in the afternoon of December 28, 1996, she was playing with her friends Lotlot 5 and
Shasha 6 near the billiard hall beside appellant's house in San Pedro, Guagua, Pampanga. Appellant who is also
known as "Tuko," allegedly approached them and forcibly dragged her inside the house and up the stairs. Upon
reaching the second floor, appellant pushed her down on the floor and removed her panties. When Joylene started
crying, he covered her mouth with one hand and proceeded to undress himself with the other.
Appellant tried to insert his penis into Joylene's vagina but was not successful so he inserted his finger into
her instead. Joylene cried throughout her ordeal. After a while, appellant told Joylene to leave and come back again
next time. Joylene went back to her playmates before going home. She relayed the incident to her mother the next
morning. 7
Georgina testified that upon learning about the incident, she immediately confronted appellant but he denied
the accusation. She then proceeded to the house of their Barangay Captain who instructed her to file a report at the
police station. Georgina testified that after the incident, Joylene had trouble sleeping, became withdrawn and no
longer played with her friends like she used to. 8 She also testified that Joylene was born on July 1, 1991 and was 5
years old when the incident happened. 9
Dr. Carlos P. Mercado testified that on January 19, 1997, he examined Joylene and found her "conscious,
coherent and ambulatory." Her genitals appeared normal except for superficial abrasions on the lateral sides of the
labia minora which could have been caused by a hard, sharp object. Her vagina admits a little finger and there were
fresh abrasions on her vulva, between her anus and her vagina. Dr. Mercado also noted that Joylene was in a state
of trauma and was initially unwilling to relate her ordeal. 10 When asked whether the abrasions could have been
caused by a penis, Dr. Mercado stated that only the fingers were used on the victim. 11
The defense presented appellant as its sole witness. He denied the charge against him and maintained that
he did not see Joylene on the day of the alleged rape because he stayed home to take care of his children.
Appellant claimed that in the morning of December 29, 1996, Joylene and her sister J.L. called him to their
house because their mother wanted him to fetch water for them. Later that same morning, he claimed that Georgina
called him again and upon entering the house, the latter physically attacked him and forced him to admit to having
raped Joylene. 12 When he refused, he was brought to the police station. He maintained that he was in good terms
with the family of the victim and could not think of any reason why they would accused him of such crime.
After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga, Branch 49 rendered judgment 13convicting
appellant of the crime of rape, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered finding the accused Ricardo B. Miranda guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentencing him to the extreme penalty of death.
Accused is further directed to pay the offended party Joylene Balagtas the amount of P75,000.00
as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED. 14
Conformably with this Court's decision in People v. Mateo 15 appellant's appeal by way of automatic review
was transferred to the Court of Appeals. On June 16, 2005, the appellate court rendered its decision 16 affirming
appellant's conviction. TEHDIA
Appellant raises the following errors in this petition for review:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF RAPE.
II.
GRANTING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED,
THE TRIAL COURT, HOWEVER, ERRED IN IMPOSING UPON HIM THE SUPREME PENALTY OF
DEATH. 17
Appellant maintains that the test of moral certainty and standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt required
for conviction in criminal cases have not been satisfactorily attained. He argues that assuming he is found guilty, the
evidence adduced by the prosecution only establishes that he inserted his finger in Joylene's vagina, an offense
which falls squarely under paragraph 2 18 of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code. He contends that the death
penalty imposed upon him should be reduced accordingly pursuant to Article 266-B which provides that
"object rape" under paragraph 2 of Article 266-A shall be punished by prision mayor.
Any review of a rape case begins with the settled reality that accusing a person of this crime can be done
with facility. Thus, the testimony of the complainant must always be scrutinized with great caution. It may not be
easy for her to prove the commission of rape; yet it is even more difficult for the accused, though innocent, to
disprove his guilt. This principle must be viewed in relation to that which holds that the evidence for the prosecution
must stand or fall on its own merits; it cannot draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. 19
Where the life of another human being hangs on the balance, nothing but proof beyond reasonable doubt of
every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which the accused is charged must be established in order for the
corresponding penalty thereto to be upheld. 20
Findings of facts of the trial courts carry great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal unless shown to be
contrary to facts or circumstances of weight and substance in the record. For, generally, the evaluation of the
credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by trial courts, because of their unique
opportunity to observe the witnesses and their demeanor, conduct, and attitude, especially under cross-
examination. 21
In this case, however, we have to depart from this settled rule because the evidence on record does not fully
sustain the trial court's findings and conclusions.
During direct examination, Joylene testified that:
Q Do you know the nickname of the accused?
A His nickname is "Tuko", sir.
Q On December 28, 1996, where were you?
A I was then playing with my playmates near the billiard hall, sir.
Q Where is this billiard hall located?
A It is located beside the house of Tuko, sir.
Q And that house of Tuko and your house were located at San Pedro, Guagua, Pampanga?
A Yes, sir.
Q While you were playing somewhere or near the billiard hall, was there any unusual incident that
happened?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was that?
A Tuko brought me to their house, sir, I refused to climb the stairs but he pulled my hands.
Q When Tuko pulled your hands was he able to you (sic) in their house?
A Yes, sir.
Q After you were brought in the house of Tuko, what happened?
A Tuko removed my panty and he also removed his pants, sir.
Q After Tuko removed your panty and he also removed his pants, what else did he do, if he did
anything?
A Yes, sir.
Q What did he do?

A Tuko inserted his penis in my vagina but he was not able to do so and instead he inserted
his finger in my vagina, sir.
Q Before Tuko, the accused, inserted his penis to your vagina and when he failed to do so he
inserted his finger, what did he do to you?
A I was lying down then, sir.
Q What about Tuko?
A He was standing and sitting, sir.
Q While you were lying down and when Tuko was inserting his penis, what was his position?
A He was sitting, sir.
Q After that what happened?
A After than he told me to come back next time, sir.
Q What else did he do?
A No more, sir.
Q What did you feel when he inserted his penis and inserted his fingers?
A I cried out very loud, sir.
Q Why?
A Because I was hurt by his finger, sir.

Q After Tuko told you to come back next time, what else happened?
A No more, sir. 22
On cross examination, Joylene further stated that:
Q You said that Tuko removed your panty and also he removed his pants and he did not
succeeded (sic) in penetrating his penis into your vagina?
A No, sir.
Q He did not actually placed his penis to your vagina?

A No, sir.
Q You did not get hurt?
A I get hurt, sir.
Q Is it not that you only cried because you felt pain when Tuko inserted his penis inside you?
A Yes, sir.
Q But not when he attempted or trying to insert his penis, is it not?
A Yes, sir. IcHSCT
xxx xxx xxx
Q By the way, you said that Tuko inserted his finger inside your vagina, do you know if he was able
to penetrate his finger inside your vagina?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why do you know that?
A Because he inserted it, sir.
Q Do you know the finger he use (sic)?
A One of his fingers, sir.
Court:
Left or right hand?
A Left, sir.
Q Why do you say that his finger penetrated you, what did you feel?
A I got hurt, sir.
Q He only inserted his finger momentarily after which he removed it already?
A Yes, sir.
Q And then he removed his finger and let you go home?
A Yes, sir. 23
On the other hand, the examining physician declared that:
Q How about your genital examination on the victim?
A I found the victim's genitalia appears to be normal except for abrasions on lateral sides of labia
minora, fourchet and urethral meatus which means that the abrasions are only on the
superficial layer of the skin and can be caused by hard, sharp object.
Q When did you find that out?
A On the very same date when the victim was brought to the hospital, sir.
Q Now, Doctor, what do you mean by that findings of yours "vaginal opening admits little finger,
fresh laceration"?
A It means that the vagina of the victim admits little finger because there are fresh abrasions at the
vulva, between the anus and the vagina, sir.
Q Did you interview the victim regarding the said abrasions?
A I was not, sir, because she was shocked at that time. She did not want to relate to us on what
had happened to her, sir.
Q And as a medical practitioner, will you please tell what could be the cause of those abrasions on
the labia minora?
Atty. Maninang:
Already answered, Your Honor, sharp object as the witness stated.
Atty. Maninang:
Q Would that be possible that the said hard object is penis?
A Yes, sir, but in my findings, only the finger was used to the victim. 24
The prosecution also presented the mother of the victim who testified thus:
Q According to your daughter Joylene she was undressed by this Ricardo Miranda, what other
report did Joylene tell you after being undressed?
ATTY. MANINANG:
I think that assumes a fact, it is leading, You Honor.
COURT:
Reform.
Q What other report did Joylene tell you?
WITNESS:
A When she was undressed by Tuko he tried to insert his penis to her vagina but considering
that he cannot penetrate his penis as alleged to me, and when he could not
penetrate his penis he used his finger, sir.
ATTY. MANINANG:
We will object to the interpretation because the answer in the vernacular contained the word
"kanu".
COURT:
Rephrase the interpretation.
A She further reported to me that Tuko allegedly tried to insert his penis into her vagina but
he could not do the penetration he used his finger.
Q What else did she tell you?
A She cried when he used his finger. 25

The foregoing testimonies presented by the prosecution, established that appellant tried to insert his penis
into Joylene's private parts. He was unsuccessful so he inserted his finger instead. This shows that appellant is guilty
only of attempted rape, and not consummated rape as found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
A case in point is People v. Alcoreza, 26 where one of the victims testified:

Q. After the accused had laid (sic) on top of you, what did he do next?
A. He was inserting his penis.
Q. Did he succeed in inserting his penis in your private parts (sic)?
A. No, sir.
Q. How did it happen that the accused failed to insert his penis in your private organs (sic)?
A. Because my brother arrived.
Q. You said that the accused failed to insert, did he attempt to insert his penis in your private
organ?
A. No, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. What did the accused do in (sic) his penis in trying (sic) to insert his penis into your private
organ?
A. It touched my private organ. 27

In that case, the Court ruled that appellant failed to consummate the crime of rape as his penis merely
touched his victim's organ. Citing People v. Campuhan, 28 the Court clarified that mere touching of the private organ
of the victim should be understood as inherently part of the entry of the penis into the labias of the female organ and
not mere touching alone of the mons pubis or pudendum. There must be sufficient and convincing proof that the
penis indeed touched the labias or slid into the female organ and not merely stroked the external surface thereof for
an accused to be convicted of consummated rape. The Court thus held that appellant therein can only be convicted
of attempted rape. 29
In People v. Tolentino, 30 the Court convicted the appellant only of attempted rape because there was
paucity of evidence that penetration took place. Thus:
There was nothing from RACHELLE's testimony that proved that TOLENTINO's penis
reached the labia of the pudendum of RACHELLE's vagina. As translated, she only said: "He
placed his sex organ to my sex organ, sir." This was the translation of the word "binubundul-
bundol." And when asked to explain what she meant by it, she answered: "He was trying to force
his sex organ into mine, sir."
The prosecution did not ask her the appropriate questions to get some more important
details that would demonstrate beyond any shadow of doubt that TOLENTINO's penis reached the
labia of the pudendum or the lips of RACHELLE's vagina. It should have, for instance, asked
whether TOLENTINO's penis was firm and erect or whether RACHELLE's legs were spread apart
to bring us to the logical conclusion that, indeed, TOLENTINO's penis was not flabby and had the
capacity to directly hit the labia of the pudendum or the lips of RACHELLE's vagina. There is
paucity of evidence that the slightest penetration ever took place. Consequently, TOLENTINO can
only be liable for attempted rape. aCTcDH
. . . But there is no conclusive evidence of the penetration, however slight, of RACHELLE's
sex organ. The penetration was an essential act of execution to produce the felony. Thus, in the
absence of a convincing evidence thereof, TOLENTINO should be given the benefit of the doubt
and can be convicted of attempted rape only. 31
Likewise, in People v. Francisco, 32 the Court convicted the appellant of attempted rape after failing to
discern from the victim's testimony that appellant attained some degree of penile penetration necessary to
consummate the rape. 33
Appellant's act would have constituted consummated rape through sexual assault under Republic Act No.
8353 or the Anti-Rape Law of 1997. However, since the offense occurred on December 28, 1996 or prior to the
effectivity of the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, the same finds no application in this case.
We now come to the penalty.
Under Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty to be imposed upon persons found guilty of an
attempted crime is the penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony. The
penalty for consummated rape is death, pursuant to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic
Act No. 7659 or the Death Penalty Law, since Joylene was below 7 years old when raped. The penalty for
attempted rape is reclusion temporal which is two degrees lower than that prescribed for consummated rape.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the appellant may be sentenced to an indeterminate imprisonment
penalty whose minimum is within the range of prision mayor, that is, six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years
and whose maximum shall be within the range of reclusion temporal in its medium period pursuant to Article 64(1) of
the Revised Penal Code, the range of which is fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17)
years and four (4) months.
As to the amount of damages, prevailing jurisprudence 34 sets the amount of the civil indemnity in
attempted rape at P30,000.00. Moral damages may be awarded in recognition of the victim's injury as being
inherently concomitant with and necessarily resulting from the attempted rape, especially since the victim is a girl in
her formative years who shall no doubt be forever haunted by the unpleasant memory. We award her moral damages
in the amount of P25,000.00. In addition, exemplary damages in the amount of P10,000.00 must likewise be awarded
as a deterrent to others with perverse tendencies from sexually abusing young and innocent girls.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00565 finding appellant
Ricardo B. Miranda guilty of rape and sentencing him to death is MODIFIED. Appellant is found GUILTY of
attempted rape and sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum; to indemnify the victim Joylene O.
Balagtas in the sum of P30,000.00 as civil indemnity, P25,000.00 as moral damages and P10,000.00 as exemplary
damages, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
||| (People v. Miranda, G.R. No. 169078, [March 10, 2006], 519 PHIL 531-546)

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EN BANC

[G.R. No. 174473. August 17, 2007.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ALVIN ABULON y SALVANIA,appellant.

P75,000.00 — as civil indemnity

50,000.00 — as moral damages; and

50,000.00 — as exemplary damages.

P75,000.00 — as civil indemnity

50,000.00 — as moral damages; and

Q: How about you, do [sic] you have your clothes on?

Q: What do you mean by telling [sic] "kinayog na po niya ako"?

A: I felt pain, Your Honor.

Q: From where did you feel that pain?

Q: Please tell us if you know?

A: Something whitish coming out from it, sir.

Q: From where did it come from [sic]? That whitish substance?

Q: Why, what happened to the private part of your father?

A: He repeated what he told [sic] previously not to tell to [sic] anybody.

A: Yes, Your Honor.

A: Yes, Your Honor.

Q: What was happening?

A: His private part stiffened or hardened (tumirik), Your Honor.

Q: Where was it placed if any?

A: Into my private part, Your Honor.

A: It was painful, Your Honor.

A: Yes, Your Honor.

Q: Will you describe the movement made by your father?

A: He covered my mouth, sir.

Q: And after covering your mouth, what else did he do?

A: He removed the lower portion of my clothes. "Hinubuan po niya ako."

xxx xxx xxx

A: He laid himself on top of me, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

A: He was "kinakayog niya po ako."

Q: Aside from "kinakayog," what else did he do?

Q: Aside from that, what else?

A: No more but he kissed my vagina.

Q: Which part of your vagina did he kiss?

Q: What else did he do, aside from that?

Q: After kissing your vagina, what else happened, if any?

Q: At that time, was your father naked or not?

A: No more, Your Honor.

A: His tongue, sir.

Q: For how long did he kiss your vagina?

Q: What did he actually do when he kissed your vagina?

A: He kissed my vagina, thereafter he laughed and laughed.

Q: What did he do?

Q: Did you feel pain?

Q: By just kissing your vagina you felt pain?

Article 266-A. Rape; When And How Committed. — Rape Is Committed —

Indeed, acts of lasciviousness or abusos dishonestos are necessarily included in rape. 72

[G.R. No. 187495. April 21, 2014.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EDGAR JUMAWAN, accused-appellant.

Contrary to and in violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997. 18

Contrary to and in violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997. 19

Otherwise, silent na.

Yes, I think, there is no change on this . . . . 113

(a) Physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring in the family,

A Yes, sir, because I cannot do anything. 137

[G.R. No. 174473. August 17, 2007.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ALVIN ABULON y SALVANIA,appellant.

P75,000.00 — as civil indemnity

50,000.00 — as moral damages; and

50,000.00 — as exemplary damages.