CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
Final Examination Reviewer [Case Doctrines]
SECTION 5 [FREEDOM OF RELIGION]
List of Cases
GAAEEII
Garces vs. Estenzo
Aglipay vs. Ruiz
American Bible Society vs. City of Manila
Ebralinag vs. Division Superintendent of Cebu
Estrada vs. Escritor
Iglesia ni Cristo vs. CA
Imbong vs. Ochoa
GARCES vs. ESTENZO
Not every governmental activity which involves the expenditure of
public funds and which has some religious tint is violative of the
constitutional provisions regarding separation of church and state,
freedom of worship and banning the use of public money or property.
AGLIPAY vs. RUIZ
Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is not
inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not denial of its
influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an
active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized.
And, in so far as it instills into the minds the purest principles of
morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated.
AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY vs. CITY OF MANILA
The power to tax the exercise of a privilege is the power to control or
suppress its enjoyment. . . . Those who can tax the exercise of this
religious practice can make its exercise so costly as to deprive it of
the resources necessary for its maintenance. Those who can tax the
privilege of engaging in this form of missionary evangelism can close
all its doors to all those who do not have a full purse. Spreading
religious beliefs in this ancient and honorable manner would thus be
denied the needy. . . .
EBRALINAG vs. DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF CEBU
The idea that one may be compelled to salute the flag, sing the
national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge, during a flag
ceremony on pain of being dismissed from one's job or of being
expelled from school, is alien to the conscience of the present
generation of Filipinos who cut their teeth on the Bill of Rights which
guarantees their rights to free speech ** and the free exercise of
religious profession and worship
ESTRADA vs. ESCRITOR
Four Qualifications/Criteria of Religion
(1) there must be belief in God or some parallel belief that
occupies a central place in the believers life;
(2) the religion must involve a moral code transcending
individual belief, i.e., it cannot be purely subjective.
(3) a demonstrable sincerity in belief is necessary, but the
court must not inquire into the truth or reasonableness of
the belief
(4) there must be some associational ties although there is also
a view that religious beliefs held by a single person rather
than being part of the teachings of any kind of group or sect
are entitled to the protection of the Free Exercise Clause.
Jeffersonian and William’s Wall
Jeffersonian wall that is meant to protect the state from the church;
instead, the wall is meant to protect the church from the state, i.e.,
the garden of the church must be walled in for its own protection
from the wilderness of the world with its potential for corrupting
those values so necessary to religious commitment.
Accommodation vs. Strict Neutrality
An accommodationist holds that it is good public policy, and
sometimes constitutionally required, for the state to make conscious
and deliberate efforts to avoid interference with religious freedom.
On the other hand, the strict neutrality adherent believes that it is
good public policy, and also constitutionally required, for the
government to avoid religion-specific policy even at the cost of
inhibiting religious exercise.
Two-step balancing process
(1) (h)as the statute or government action created a burden on
the free exercise of religion?
(2) (i)s there a sufficiently compelling state interest to justify
this infringement of religious liberty?
(3) (h)as the state in achieving its legitimate purposes used the
least intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is
not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the
legitimate goal of the state?
The Court and Benevolent Neutrality
Benevolent neutrality does not mean that the Court ought to grant
exemptions every time a free exercise claim comes before it. But it
does mean that the Court will not look with hostility or act
indifferently towards religious beliefs and practices and that it will
strive to accommodate them when it can within flexible constitutional
limits; it does mean that the Court will not simply dismiss a claim
under the Free Exercise Clause because the conduct in question
offends a law or the orthodox view for this precisely is the protection
afforded by the religion clauses of the Constitution.
IGLESA NI CRISTO vs. CA
Two-fold aspect of Right to Religious Profession and Worship
1. freedom to believe and
2. freedom to act on one’s beliefs.
The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm
of thought. The second is subject to regulation where the belief is
translated into external acts that affect the public welfare.
However absurd his beliefs may be to others, even if they be hostile
and heretical to the majority, he has full freedom to believe as he
pleases. But where the individual externalizes his beliefs in acts or
omissions that affect the public, his freedom to do so becomes
subject to the authority of the State.
Clear and Present Danger Rule
The test was originally designed to determine the latitude which
should be given to speech that espouses anti-government action.
IMBONG vs. OCHOA
Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause
The establishment clause "principally prohibits the State from
sponsoring any religion or favoring any religion as against other
religions. It mandates a strict neutrality in affairs among religious
groups."Essentially, it prohibits the establishment of a state religion
and the use of public resources for the support or prohibition of a
religion.
On the other hand, the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect
for the inviolability of the human conscience. Under this part of
religious freedom guarantee, the State is prohibited from unduly
interfering with the outside manifestations of one's belief and faith.
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Final Examination Reviewer [Case Doctrines]
Benevolent Neutrality
The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to these
governmental actions, accommodation of religion may be allowed,
not to promote the government's favored form of religion, but to
allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without
hindrance.
Tests
1. American Bible Society, the Court mentioned the "clear
and present danger" test but did not employ it.
2. Gerona case then pronounced that the test of
permissibility of religious freedom is whether it violates
the established institutions of society and law.
3. The Victoriano case mentioned the "immediate and grave
danger" test as well as the doctrine that a law of general
applicability may burden religious exercise provided the
law is the least restrictive means to accomplish the goal of
the law. The case also used, albeit inappropriately, the
"compelling state interest" test.
4. After Victoriano , German went back to the Gerona rule.
Ebralinag then employed the "grave and immediate
danger" test and overruled the Gerona test.
5. The fairly recent case of Iglesia ni Cristo went back to the
" clear and present danger" test
SECTION 6 [LIBERTY OF ABODE AND OF TRAVEL]
List of Cases
MMS
Marcos vs. Manglapus
Manotoc vs. CA
Silverio vs. CA
MARCOS vs. MANGLAPUS
he right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which treats only of the liberty of
abode and the right to travel, but it is our well-considered view that
the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted
principle of international law and, under our Constitution, is part of
the law of the land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution.]
However, it is distinct and separate from the right to travel and
enjoys a different protection under the International Covenant of
Civil and Political Rights, i.e., against being "arbitrarily deprived"
thereof [Art. 12 (4).]
MANOTOC vs. CA
A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from
leaving the Philippines. This is a necessary consequence of the
nature and function of a bail bond.
Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court defines bail as the
security required and given for the release of a person who is in the
custody of the law, that he will appear before any court in which his
appearance may be required as stipulated in the bail bond or
recognizance.
SILVERIO vs. CA
Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should by no means be
construed as delimiting the inherent power of the Courts to use all
means necessary to carry their orders into effect in criminal cases
pending before them. When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a
Court or judicial officer, all auxillary writs, process and other means
necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such Court or
officer (Rule 135, Section 6, Rules of Court).
SECTION 7 [RIGHT TO INFORMATION]
List of Cases
VP-LECI
Valmonte vs. Belmonte Jr
Province of Cotabato vs. Peace Panel on AD
Legaspi vs. CSC
Echagaray vs. Secretary of Justice
Chavez vs. PCGG
In Re: Production of Court Records and Documents and the
Attendance of Court officials and employees as witnesses
under the subpoenas of February 10, 2012 and the various
letters for the Impeachment Prosecution Panel dated
January 19 and 25, 2012
VALMONTE vs. BELMONTE JR.
Right to Information, Freedom of Speech and of Expression
The right to information goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional
policies of full public disclosure * and honesty in the public service.
** It is meant to enhance the widening role of the citizenry in
governmental decision-making as well as in checking abuse in
government.
Requisites before the right to information may be enforced
1. it must be clear that the information sought is of "public
interest" or "public concern," and
2. is not exempted by law from the operation of the
constitutional guarantee.
PROVINCE OF COTABATO vs. PEACE PANEL
Requiring a consummated contract will keep the public in the dark
until the contract, which may be grossly disadvantageous to the
government or even illegal, becomes fait accompli. This negates the
State policy of full transparency on matters of public concern, a
situation which the framers of the Constitution could not have
intended. Such a requirement will prevent the citizenry from
participating in the public discussion of any proposed contract,
effectively truncating a basic right enshrined in the Bill of Rights. We
can allow neither an emasculation of a constitutional right, nor a
retreat by the State of its avowed policy of full disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest.
LEGASPI vs. CSC
A distinction has to be made between the discretion to refuse
outright the disclosure of or access to a particular information
and the authority to regulate the manner in which the access is to
be afforded.
1. The first is a limitation upon the availability of access to the
information sought, which only the Legislature may impose
(Art. III, Sec. 6, 1987 Constitution).
2. The second pertains to the government agency charged with
the custody of public records. Its authority to regulate
access is to be exercised (a) solely to the end that damage
to, or loss of, public records may be avoided, (b) undue
interference with the duties of said agencies may be
prevented, and more importantly, (c) that the exercise of the
same constitutional right by other persons shall be assured.
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Final Examination Reviewer [Case Doctrines]
The incorporation in the Constitution of a guarantee of access to
information of public concern is a recognition of the essentiality of
the free flow of ideas and information in a democracy.
ECHAGARAY vs. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
The contents of the manual are matters of public concern "which the
public may want to know, either because these directly affect their
lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of
an ordinary citizen."
CHAVEZ vs. PCGG
However, the following are some of the recognized restrictions:
(1) national security matters and intelligence information,
(2) trade secrets and banking transactions,
(3) criminal matters, and
Also excluded are classified law enforcement matters, such as those
relating to the apprehension, the prosecution and the detention of
criminals, which courts may not inquire into prior to such arrest,
detention and prosecution. Efforts at effective law enforcement
would be seriously jeopardized by free public access to, for example,
police information regarding rescue operations, the whereabouts of
fugitives, or leads on covert criminal activities.
(4) other confidential information.
(a) diplomatic correspondence,
(b) closed door Cabinet meetings and
(c) executive sessions of either house of Congress,
(d) internal deliberations of the Supreme Court.
IN RE: PRODUCTION OF COURT RECORDS AND
DOCUMENTS
Specifically, the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court (IRSC)
prohibits the disclosure of
(1) the result of the raffle of cases,
(2) the actions taken by the Court on each case included in
the agenda of the Court’s session, and
(3) the deliberations of the Members in court sessions on
cases and matters pending before it.
Qualifications for protection under Deliberative Process Privilege
To qualify for protection under the deliberative process privilege, the
agency must show that the document is both
(1) predecisional and
(2) deliberative.
A document is “predecisional” under the deliberative process
privilege if it precedes, in temporal sequence, the decision to which it
relates. In other words, communications are considered
predecisional if they were made in the attempt to reach a final
conclusion.
A material is “deliberative,” on the other hand, if it reflects the give
and-take of the consultative process. The key question in determining
whether the material is deliberative in nature is whether disclosure of
the information would discourage candid discussion within the
agency.
Two other grounds for denying access to court records
(1) the disqualification by reason of privileged
communication and
(2) the pendency of an action or matter.
Judge and Justices may not be compelled
To state the rule differently, Justices of the Court cannot be compelled
to testify on matters relating to the internal deliberations and
actions of the Court, in the exercise of their adjudicatory functions
and duties. This is to be differentiated from a situation where the
testimony is on a matter which is external to their adjudicatory
functions and duties.
What are not subject to public disclosure
(1) Court actions such as the result of the raffle of cases and the actions
taken by the Court on each case included in the agenda of the Court’s
session on acts done material to pending cases, except where a party
litigant requests information on the result of the raffle of the case,
pursuant to Rule 7, Section 3 of the IRSC;
(2) Court deliberations or the deliberations of the Members in court
sessions on cases and matters pending before the Court;
(3) Court records which are “predecisional” and “deliberative” in nature,
in particular, documents and other communications which are part of
or related to the deliberative process, i.e., notes, drafts, research
papers, internal discussions, internal memoranda, records of internal
deliberations, and similar papers.
(4) Confidential Information secured by justices, judges, court officials
and employees in the course of their official functions, mentioned in
(2) and (3) above, are privileged even after their term of office.
(5) Records of cases that are still pending for decision are privileged
materials that cannot be disclosed, except only for pleadings, orders
and resolutions that have been made available by the court to the
general public.
(6) The principle of comity or inter-departmental courtesy demands that
the highest officials of each department be exempt from the
compulsory processes of the other departments.
(7) These privileges belong to the Supreme Court as an institution, not to
any justice or judge in his or her individual capacity. Since the Court
is higher than the individual justices or judges, no sitting or retired
justice or judge, not even the Chief Justice, may claim exception
without the consent of the Court.
SECTION 8 [RIGHT TO FORM ASSOCIATION]
List of Cases
SIV
SSS Employees Association vs. CA
In Re Edillon
Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union
SSS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION vs. CA
The principle behind labor unionism in private industry is that
industrial peace cannot be secured through compulsion by law.
Relations between private employers and their employees rest on an
essentially voluntary basis. Subject to the minimum requirements of
wage laws and other labor and welfare legislation, the terms and
conditions of employment in the unionized private sector are settled
through the process of collective bargaining. In government
employment, however, it is the legislature and, where properly given
delegated power, the administrative heads of government which fix
the terms and conditions of employment. And this is effected through
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
Final Examination Reviewer [Case Doctrines]
statutes or administrative circulars, rules, and regulations, not through
collective bargaining agreements.
Government employees may, therefore, through their unions or
associations, either
(a) petition the Congress for the betterment of the terms and
conditions of employment which are within the ambit of
legislation or
(b) negotiate with the appropriate government agencies for the
improvement of those which are not fixed by law.
If there be any unresolved grievances, the dispute may be referred to
the Public Sector Labor - Management Council for appropriate
action. But employees in the civil service may not resort to strikes,
walk-outs and other temporary work stoppages, like workers in the
private sector, to pressure the Government to accede to their
demands.
IN RE EDILLON
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which
he is not already a member. He became a member of the Bar when
he passed the Bar examinations. All that integration actually does is
to provide an official national organization for the well-defined but
unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is a ready a
member.
VICTORIANO vs. ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS’ UNION
whatever theory of right one subscribes to, a right comprehends at
least two broad notions, namely:
(1) liberty or freedom, i.e., the absence of legal restraint,
whereby an employee may act for himself without being
prevented by law; and
(2) power, whereby an employee may, as he pleases, join or
refrain from Joining an association.
a closed shop, by virtue of which the employer may employ only
member of the collective bargaining union, and the employees must
continue to be members of the union for the duration of the contract
in order to keep their jobs.
SECTION 10 [NON-IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE]
List of Cases
GLOR
Ganzon vs Inserto
Lozano vs. Martinez
Ortigas & Co. Ltd. Partnership vs. Feati Bank & Trust Co.
Rutter vs. Esteban
GANZON vs. INSERTO
The mortgage lien in favor of Petitioner Rodolfo Ganzon is
inseparable from the mortgaged property. It is a right in rem, a lien
on the property. To substitute the mortgage with a surety bond would
convert such lien from a right in rem, to a right in personam. This
conversion can not be ordered for it would abridge the rights of the
mortgagee under the mortgage contract.
LOZANO vs. MARTINEZ
The freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected is
freedom to enter into "lawful" contracts. Contracts which
contravene public policy are not lawful. Besides, we must bear in
mind that checks can not be categorized as mere contracts. It is a
commercial instrument which, in this modem day and age, has
become a convenient substitute for money; it forms part of the
banking system and therefore not entirely free from the regulatory
power of the state.
ORTIGAS vs. FEATI
it should be stressed, that while non-impairment of contracts is
constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since it has to be
reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power, i.e., "the
power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people.
RUTTER vs. ESTEBAN
the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also
read into contracts as a postulate of the legal order.
The policy of protecting contracts against impairment presupposes
the maintenance of a government by virtue of which contractual
relations are worthwhile a government which retains adequate
authority to secure the peace and good order of society. This principle
of harmonizing the constitutional prohibition with the necessary
residuum of state power has had progressive recognition in the
decision of this Court.
SECTION 11 [FREE ACCESS TO THE COURTS]
IN RE: QUERY OF MR. ROGER PRIORESCHI
The clear intent and precise language of the aforequoted provisions of
the Rules of Court indicate that only a natural party litigant may be
regarded as an indigent litigant. The Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc.,
being a corporation invested by the State with a juridical personality
separate and distinct from that of its members, is a juridical person.
Among others, it has the power to acquire and possess property of all
kinds as well as incur obligations and bring civil or criminal actions,
in conformity with the laws and regulations of their organization. As
a juridical person, therefore, it cannot be accorded the exemption
from legal and filing fees granted to indigent litigants.
That the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. is working for indigent and
underprivileged people is of no moment. Clearly, the Constitution has
explicitly premised the free access clause on a persons poverty, a
condition that only a natural person can suffer.
SECTION 12 [CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION]
List of Cases
HGN
PEOPLE vs. DBM PAJA
Ho Wai Pang vs. People
Gamboa vs. Cruz
Navallo vs. Sandiganbayan
PEOPLE versus
Dy
Bolanos
Macam
Pinlac
Andan
Judge Ayson
Alicando
HO WAI PANG vs. PEOPLE
The admissibility of other evidence, provided they are relevant to the
issue and [are] not otherwise excluded by law or rules, [are] not
affected even if obtained or taken in the course of custodial
investigation.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
Final Examination Reviewer [Case Doctrines]
[a]ny allegation of violation of rights during custodial investigation is
relevant and material only to cases in which an extrajudicial
admission or confession extracted from the accused becomes the
basis of their conviction.
GAMBOA vs. CRUZ
The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e.
when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit
information and/or confessions or admissions from the
respondent/accused.
the waiver shall be made in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
NAVALLO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
A person under a normal audit examination is not under custodial
investigation. An audit examiner himself can hardly be deemed to be
the law enforcement officer contemplated in the above rule.
PEOPLE vs. DY
The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the
offense charged may be given in evidence against him. It may in a
sense be also regarded as part of the res gestae.
The rule is that, any person, otherwise competent as a witness, who
heard the confession, is competent to testify as to the substance of
what he heard if he heard and understood all of it. An oral confession
need not be repeated verbatim, but in such a case it must be given in
substance.
What was told by the Accused to Pat, Padilla was a spontaneous
statement not elicited through questioning, but given an ordinary
manner. No written confession was sought to be presented in
evidence as a result of formal custodial investigation.
PEOPLE vs. BOLANOS
Considering the clear requirements of the Constitution with respect to
the manner by which confession can be admissible in evidence, and
the glaring fact that the alleged confession obtained while on board
the police vehicle was the only reason for the conviction, besides
appellant's conviction was not proved beyond reasonable doubt, this
Court has no recourse but to reverse the subject judgment under
review.
PEOPLE vs. MACAM
It is therefore appropriate to extend the counsel guarantee to critical
stages of prosecution even before the trial. The law enforcement
machinery at present involves critical confrontations of the accused
by the prosecution at pre-trial proceedings "where the result might
well settle the accused's fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere
formality." A police line-up is considered a "critical" stage of the
proceedings.
PEOPLE vs. PINLAC
When the Constitution requires a person under investigation "to be
informed" of his right to remain silent and to counsel, it must be
presumed to contemplate the transmission of a meaningful
information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation
of an abstract constitutional principle.
As a rule, therefore, it would not be sufficient for a police officer
just to repeat to the person under investigation the provisions of the
Constitution. He is not only duty-bound to tell the person the rights to
which the latter is entitled; he must also explain their effects in
practical terms.
PEOPLE vs. ANDAN
Beginning of the Investigation
An investigation begins when it is no longer a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime but starts to focus on a particular person as a suspect,
i.e., when the police investigator starts interrogating or exacting a
confession from the suspect in connection with an alleged offense.
Constitutional Procedure does not apply to spontaneous statement
Thus, it has been held that the constitutional procedures on custodial
investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited
through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary
manner whereby appellant orally admitted having committed the
crime.
The Constitution bars compulsory disclosure
What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of
incriminating facts or confessions. The rights under Section 12 are
guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state as
would lead the accused to admit something false, not to prevent him
from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. Hence we hold that
appellant's confession to the mayor was correctly admitted by the trial
court.
Spontaneous statements to news reporters admissible
Appellant's confessions to the media were likewise properly admitted.
The confessions were made in response to questions by news
reporters, not by the police or any other investigating officer. We have
held that statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news
reporters on a televised interview are deemed voluntary and are
admissible in evidence.
PEOPLE vs. JUDGE AYSON
Custodial Investigation meant "questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way."
SECTION 13 [RIGHT TO BAIL]
List of Cases
2PM-2B2GC
People vs. Judge Donato
People vs. Fortes
Manotoc vs. CA
Basco vs. Rapatalo
Baylon vs. Judge Sison
Government of US vs. Judge Puruganan
Government of HK vs. Hon. Olalia
Comendador vs. De Villa
PEOPLE vs. JUDGE DONATO
Therefore, before conviction bail is either a matter of right or of
discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense charged is
punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua. To that
extent the right is absolute.
Upon the other hand, if the offense charged is punishable by
reclusion perpetua bail becomes a matter of discretion.
It shall be denied if the evidence of guilt is strong. The court's
discretion is limited to determining whether or not evidence of guilt is
strong. But once it is determined that the evidence of guilt is not
strong, bail also becomes a matter of right.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
Final Examination Reviewer [Case Doctrines]
PEOPLE vs. FORTES
Bail must not then be granted to the accused during the pendency of
his appeal from the judgment of conviction.
MANOTOC vs. CA
The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at
all times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a
valid restriction on his right to travel.
BASCO vs. RAPATALO
In theory, the only function of bail is to ensure the appearance of
the defendant at the time set for trial. The sole purpose of
confining the accused in jail before conviction, it has been observed,
is to assure his presence at the trial.
Lord Mansfield, speaking of the discretion to be exercised in
granting or denying bail said: "But discretion when applied to a court
of justice, means sound discretion guided by law. It must be governed
by rule, not by humour; it must not be arbitrary, vague and fanciful;
but legal and regular."
BAYLON vs. JUDGE SISON
. . . The prosecution must first be accorded an opportunity to present
evidence because by the very nature of deciding applications for bail,
it is on the basis of such evidence that judicial discretion is weighed
against in determining whether the guilt of the accused is strong.
In other words, discretion must be exercised regularly, legally and
within the confines of procedural due process, that is, after
evaluation of the evidence submitted by the prosecution. Any order
issued in the absence thereof is not a product of sound judicial
discretion but of whim and caprice and outright arbitrariness.
GOVERNMENT OF US vs. JUDGE PURUGANAN
International Extradition is a process under which a sovereign state
surrenders to another sovereign state a person accused in a case or a
fugitive offender in the latter state.
Starting with the declaration that the right to bail is available to all
persons, the Constitution proceeds to define its exceptions and
qualifications —
1. when a criminal offense is a capital one and the evidence of
guilt is strong, and
2. when granted the bail shall not be excessive.
The circumstance of "high risk of flight" upon which the main
decision anchors its refusal to grant bail is conspicuously absent from
the recital.
GOVERNMENT OF HK vs. HON. OLALIA
Reexamination of the PURGANAN Ruling
1. First, we note that the exercise of the State’s power to
deprive an individual of his liberty is not necessarily
limited to criminal proceedings. Respondents in
administrative proceedings, such as deportation and
quarantine, have likewise been detained.
2. Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to
close our eyes to our jurisprudential history. Philippine
jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of the right to
bail to criminal proceedings only. This Court has admitted
to bail persons who are not involved in criminal
proceedings. In fact, bail has been allowed in this
jurisdiction to persons in detention during the pendency of
administrative proceedings, taking into cognizance the
obligation of the Philippines under international
conventions to uphold human rights.
It is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential
extraditee. Nor is it a full-blown civil action, but one that is merely
administrative in character. Its object is to prevent the escape of a
person accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the
state from which he fled, for the purpose of trial or punishment.
COMENDADOR vs. DE VILLA
We find that the right to bail invoked by the private respondents in
G.R. Nos. 95020 has traditionally not been recognized and is not
available in the military, as an exception to the general rule
embodied in the Bill of Rights. This much was suggested in ARULA,
where we observed that "the right to a speedy trial is given more
emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not exist.
Reasons:
1. The unique structure of the military
2. Fiduciary use of firearms by the government
3. National security considerations
SECTION 14 [CRIMINAL DUE PROCESS]
List of Cases
TAG
Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan
Alonte vs. Savellano
Galman vs. Sandiganbayan
TATAD vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
We find the long delay in the termination of the preliminary
investigation by the Tanodbayan in the instant case to be violative of
the constitutional right of the accused to due process. Substantial
adherence to the requirements of the law governing the conduct of
preliminary investigation, including substantial compliance with
the time limitation prescribed by the law for the resolution of the
case by the prosecutor, is part of the procedural due process
constitutionally guaranteed by the fundamental law.
ALONTE vs. SAVELLANO
Jurisprudence acknowledges that due process in criminal proceedings,
in particular, require
(a) that the court or tribunal trying the case is properly clothed
with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before
it;
(b) that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person
of the accused;
(c) that the accused is given an opportunity to be heard; and
(d) that judgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing
The principles find universal acceptance and are tersely expressed in
the oft-quoted statement that procedural due process cannot possibly
be met without a "law which hears before it condemns, which
proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial.”
GALMAN vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
The Supreme Court cannot permit such a sham trial and verdict and
travesty of justice to stand unrectified. The courts of the land under
its aegis are courts of law and justice and equity. They would have no
reason to exist if they were allowed to be used as mere tools of
injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth,
instead of repositories of judicial power whose judges are sworn and
committed to render impartial justice to all alike who seek the
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
Final Examination Reviewer [Case Doctrines]

enforcement or protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a during any appropriate stage of the proceedings to refute or deny
wrong, without fear or favor and removed from the pressures of the statements they made. This was not done by petitioner. Hence, the
politics and prejudice. presumption that official duty was regularly performed stands.

SECTION 14 [PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE] SECTION 14 [RIGHT TO BE HEARD BY HIMSELF AND

List of Cases COUNSEL]
PDMCF List of Cases
PAP
People vs. Dramayo
Dumlao vs. COMELEC People vs. Holgado
Marquez vs. COMELEC Amion vs. Judge Chiongson
Corpus vs. People People vs. Agbayani
Feeder International Line vs. CA
PEOPLE vs. HOLGADO
PEOPLE vs. DRAMAYO Four important duties of the courts
It is thus required that circumstance favoring his innocence be duly Under this provision, when a defendant appears without attorney, the
taken into count. The proof against him must survive the reason; the court has four important duties to comply with:
strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway away judgment.
The conscience must be satisfied that on the defendant could be laid 1. — It must inform the defendant that it is his right to have
the responsibility for the offense charged; that not only did he attorney before being arraigned;
perpetrate the act but that it amounted to a crime. What is required 2. — After giving him such information the court must ask
then is moral certainty. him if he desires the aid of an attorney;
3. — If he desires and is unable to employ attorney, the court
By Reasonable Doubt must assign attorney de oficio to defend him; and
"By reasonable doubt is meant that which of possibility may arise, 4. — If the accused desires to procure an attorney of his own
but it is doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and the court must grant him a reasonable time therefor.
an inability, after such investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the
certainty of guilt. Absolute certain of guilt is not demanded by the Right to be heard
law to convict of any carnal charge but moral certainty is required, Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the
and this certainty is required as to every proposition of proof regular science of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without
to constitute the offense." counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because
he does not know how to establish his innocence.
DUMLAO vs COMELEC
An accusation, according to the fundamental law, is not synonymous AMION vs. JUDGE AYSON
with guilt. The challenged proviso contravenes the constitutional Even if we were to extend the application of the concept of
presumption of innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from preference in the choice of counsel to an accused in a criminal
running for public office on the ground alone that charges have been prosecution, such preferential discretion cannot partake of a
filed against him before a civil or military tribunal. discretion so absolute and arbitrary as would make the choice of
counsel refer exclusively to the predilection of the accused.
MARQUEZ vs. COMELEC
The Court believes and thus holds, albeit with some personal PEOPLE vs. AGBAYANI
reservations of the ponente (expressed during the Court's en banc If we should insist on finding every fact fully recorded before a
deliberations), that Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations citizen can be punished for an offense against the laws, we should
Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, to the extent destroy public justice, and give unbridled license to crime. Much
that it confines the term "fugitive from justice" to refer only to a must be left to intendment and presumption, for it is often less
person (the fugitive) "who has been convicted by final judgment." is difficult to do things correctly than to describe them correctly.
an inordinate and undue circumscription of the law.
SECTION 14 [RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE
CORPUS vs. PEOPLE AND CAUSE OF ACCUSATION]
The equipoise rule invoked by the petitioner is applicable only List of Cases
where the evidence of the parties is evenly balanced, in which case BSPP
the constitutional presumption of innocence should tilt the scales in
favor of the accused. There is no such equipoise here. The evidence Borja vs. Mendoza
of the prosecution is overwhelming and has not been overcome by Soriano vs. Sandiganbayan
the petitioner with his nebulous claims of persecution and conspiracy. People vs. Quitlong
Pecho vs. People
FEEDER INTERNATIONAL LINE vs. CA
Besides, if ever there was any doubt as to the veracity of the sworn BORJA vs. MENDOZA
statements of Deposa and Torres, they should have been presented
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
Final Examination Reviewer [Case Doctrines]
At the very least then, he must be fully informed of why the
prosecuting arm of the state is mobilized against him. An arraignment
serves that purpose. Thereafter he is no longer in the dark. It is
true, the complaint or information may not be worded with sufficient
clarity. He would be in a much worse position though if he does not
even have such an opportunity to plead to the charge.
It is not useless formality, much less an Idle ceremony.
SORIANO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
The petitioner also claims that he cannot be convicted of bribery
under the Revised Penal Code because to do so would be violative of
as constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. Wrong. A reading of the information which
has been reproduced herein clearly makes out a case of bribery so
that the petitioner cannot claim deprivation of the right to be
informed.
PEOPLE vs. QUITLONG
Informing must be in writing of the charges
(1) First. To furnish the accused with such a description of the
charge against him as will enable him to make his defense;
(2) Second, to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for
protection against a further prosecution for the same cause;
(3) Third, to inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it
may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a
conviction, if one should be had.
What must be included in the Information
An information, in order to ensure that the constitutional right of the
accused to be informed of the nature and cause of his accusation is
not violated, must state
(a) the name of the accused;
(b) the designation given to the offense by the statute;
(c) a statement of the acts or omissions so complained of as
constituting the offense;
(d) the name of the offended party;
(e) the approximate time and date of the commission of the
offense; and
(f) the place where the offense has been committed.
PECHO vs. PEOPLE
What determines the real nature and cause of accusation against an
accused is the actual recital of facts stated in the information or
complaint and not the caption or preamble of the information or
complaint nor the specification of the provision of law alleged to
have been violated, they being conclusions of law. An incorrect
caption is not a fatal mistake.
Accused may convicted of a crime not charged
It follows then that an accused may be convicted of a crime which,
although not the one charged, is necessarily included in the
latter. Section 4, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court thus provides:
SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and
proof. -- When there is variance between the offense charged in the
complaint or information, and that proved or established by the
evidence, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily
includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the
offense proved included in that which is charged, or of the offense
charged included in that which is proved.
SECTION 14 [RIGHT TO SPEEDY, IMPARTIAL AND PUBLIC
TRIAL]
List of Cases
CFM-GRIPPPP
Conde vs. Rivera
Flores vs. People
Mateo Jr. vs. Villaluz
Garcia vs. Domingo
Re Maguindanao Governor Zaldy Ampatuan
In Re: Plunder Cases
People vs. Tee
People vs. Teehankee Jr.
People vs. Mapalao
People vs. Valeriano
CONDE vs. RIVERA
We lay down the legal proposition that, where a prosecuting officer,
without good cause, secures postponements of the trial of a
defendant against his protest beyond a reasonable period of time, as
in this instance for more than a year, the accused is entitled to relief
by a proceeding in mandamus to compel a dismissal of the
information, or if he be restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to
obtain his freedom.
FLORES vs. PEOPLE
"The Government should be the last to set an example of delay and
oppression in the administration of justice and it is the moral and
legal obligation of this court to see that the criminal proceedings
against the accused come to an end and that they be immediately
discharged from the custody of the law."
MATEO JR. vs. VILLALUZ
every litigant is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an
impartial judge."
He should, to quote from another decision "at all times manifest
depth of commitment and concern to the cause of justice according to
legal norms, a cerebral man who deliberately holds in cheek the tug
and pull of purely personal preferences and prejudices which he
shares with the rest of his fellow mortals."
A judge then, to quote from the latest decision in point, Geotina v.
Gonzales, penned by Justice Castro, should strive to be at all times
"wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent.
GARCIA vs. DOMINGO
It possesses that character when anyone interested in observing the
manner a judge conducts the proceedings in his courtroom may do so.
There is to be no ban on such attendance. His being a stranger to
the litigants is of no moment.
RE MAGUINDANAO GOVERNOR ZALDY AMPATUAN
An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs
to him, more than anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held
critically in balance.
A public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would
not be unjustly condemned and that his rights are not compromised
in secrete conclaves of long ago.
IN RE: PLUNDER CASES (ESTRADA)
Reasons for televised recording
1. the hearings are of historic significance. They are an
affirmation of our commitment to the rule that "the King is
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
Final Examination Reviewer [Case Doctrines]

under no man, but he is under God and the law." (Quod Rex notice requiring him to be present at the promulgation is served
non debet esse sub homine, sed sub Deo et Lege.) through his bondsmen or warden and counsel.
2. the Estrada cases involve matters of vital concern to our
people who have a fundamental right to know how their SECTION 14 [RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION]
government is conducted. This right can be enhanced by List of Cases
audio-visual presentation. UT
3. audio-visual presentation is essential for the education and
civic training of the people. US vs. Javier
Talino vs. Sandiganbayan

US vs. JAVIER
In other words, confrontation is essential because cross-examination
is essential.

PEOPLE vs. TEE
The concept of speedy trial is necessarily relative. A determination as
to whether the right has been violated involves the weighing of
several factors such as
(a) the length of the delay,
(b) the reason for the delay,
(c) the conduct of the prosecution and the accused, and
(d) the efforts exerted by the defendant to assert his right, as
well as
(e) the prejudice and damage caused to the accused.
The right to a speedy trial is deemed violated only when:
(1) the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays; or
(2) when unjustified postponements are asked for and secured;
or
(3) when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of
time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case
tried.
A second reason for the prohibition is that a tribunal may have
before it the department and appearance of the witness while
testifying.
TALINO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
It is settled that if a separate trial is allowed to one of two or more
defendants, his testimony therein imputing guilt to any of the co-
accused is not admissible against the latter who was not able to cross-
examine him.
No accusation is permitted to be made against his back or in his
absence nor is any derogatory information accepted if it is made
anonymously, as in poison pen letters sent by persons who cannot
stand by their libels and must shroud their spite in secrecy.
SECTION 14 [COMPULSORY PROCESSES]
ROCO vs. CONTRERAS
In this jurisdiction, there are two (2) kinds of subpoena, to wit:

PEOPLE vs. TEEHANKEE JR. 1. subpoena ad testificandum and

Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused 2. subpoena duces tecum.
to fair trial. The mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a day-
to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that the The first is used to compel a person to testify, while the second is
publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired used to compel the production of books, records, things or documents
his impartiality. therein specified.

we rejected this standard of possibility of prejudice and adopted the
test of actual prejudice as we ruled that to warrant a finding of
prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the
judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be,
by the barrage of publicity.
The subpoena duces tecum is, in all respects, like the ordinary
subpoena ad testificandum with the exception that it concludes with
an injunction that the witness shall bring with him and produce at the
examination the books, documents, or things described in the
subpoena.

PEOPLE vs. MAPALAO Requisites for Subpoena duces tecum

What the Constitution guarantees him is a fair trial, not continued (1) the books, documents or other things requested must
enjoyment of his freedom even if his guilt could be proved. With the appear prima facie relevant to the issue subject of the
categorical statement in the fundamental law that his absence cannot controversy (test of relevancy); and
justify a delay provided that he has been duly notified and his failure (2) such books must be reasonably described by the parties to
to appear is unjustified, such an abuse could be remedied. That is the be readily identified (test of definiteness).
way it should be, for both society and the offended party have a
legitimate interest in seeing to it that came should not go unpunished. SECTION 15 [SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS]
PEOPLE vs. VALERIANO List of Cases
. Paragraph (2), Section 14, Article III of the Constitution permits JIL
trial in absentia after the accused has been arraigned provided he has
been duly notified of the trial and his failure to appear thereat is Jackson vs. Macalino
unjustified. One who jumps bail can never offer a justifiable reason In Re Aurora Parong vs. Ponce Enrile
for his non-appearance during the trial. Accordingly, after the trial in Lansang vs. Garcia
absentia, the court can render judgment in the case and promulgation
may be made by simply recording the judgment in the criminal JACKSON vs. MACALINO
docket with a copy thereof served upon his counsel, provided that the What is to be inquired into is the legality of his detention as of, at
the earliest, the filing of the application for a writ of habeas corpus,
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
Final Examination Reviewer [Case Doctrines]

for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of
same supervening events such as the instances mentioned in Section
4, Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the
application. Any such supervening events are the issuance of a
judicial process preventing the discharge of the detained person.
IN RE AURORA PARONG vs. PONCE ENRILE
The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus must,
indeed, carry with it the suspension of the right to bail, if the
government's campaign to suppress the rebellion is to be enhanced
and rendered effective.
Reason: If the right to bail may be demanded during the continuance
of the rebellion, and those arrested, captured and detained in the
course thereof will be released, they would, without the least doubt,
rejoin their comrades in the field thereby jeopardizing the success of
government efforts to bring to an end the invasion, rebellion or
insurrection.
LANSANG vs. GARCIA
Indeed, the grant of power to suspend the privilege is neither absolute
nor unqualified. The authority conferred by the Constitution, both
under the Bill of Rights and under the Executive Department, is
limited and conditional.
FIVE TYPES OF WRIT OF AMPARO
1. amparo libertad
2. amparo contra leyes
3. amparo casacion
4. amparo administrative
5. amparo agrario
SECTION 16 [RIGHT TO SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES]
PADUA vs. ERICTA
Courts should not brook undue delays in the ventilation and
determination of causes.
It should be their constant effort to assure that litigations are
prosecuted and resolved with dispatch.
Postponements of trials and hearings should not be allowed except
on meritorious grounds; and the grant or refusal thereof rests
entirely in the sound discretion of the Judge.
The maxim of the common law, Nemo tenetur seipsum accusare,
was recognized in England in early days, but not in the other legal
systems of the world, in a revolt against the thumbscrew and the rack.
A legal shield was raised against odious inquisitorial methods of
interrogating an accused person by which to extort unwilling
confessions with the ever present temptation to commit the crime of
perjury.
MAPA JR. vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
In the United States, there are two types of statutory immunity
granted to a witness. They are the
(a) transactional immunity and the
(b) used-and-derivative-use immunity.
Transactional immunity is broader in the scope of its protection. By
its grant, a witness can no longer be prosecuted for any offense
whatsoever arising out of the act or transaction
In contrast, by the grant of use-and-derivative-use immunity,
a witness is only assured that his or her particular testimony and
evidence derived from it will not be used against him or her in a
subsequent prosecution.
BELTRAN vs. SAMSON
The rights intended to be protected by the constitutional provision
that no man accused of crime shall be compelled to be a witness
against himself is so sacred, and the pressure toward their relaxation
so great when the suspicion of guilt is strong and the evidence
obscure, that is the duty of courts liberally to construe the
prohibition in favor of personal rights, and to refuse to permit any
steps tending toward their invasion. Hence, there is the well-
established doctrine that the constitutional inhibition is directed not
merely to giving of oral testimony, but embraces as well the
furnishing of evidence by other means than by word of mouth , the
divulging, in short, of any fact which the accused has a right to hold
secret.
CHAVEZ vs. CA
Petitioner, as accused, occupies a different tier of protection from an
ordinary witness. Whereas an ordinary witness may be compelled to
take the witness stand and claim the privilege as each question
requiring an incriminating answer is shot at him, and accused may
altogether refuse to take the witness stand and refuse to answer
any and all questions.

SECTION 17 [RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION] For, in reality, the purpose of calling an accused as a witness for the
List of Cases People would be to incriminate him. The rule positively intends to
UV-MB-CPP avoid and prohibit the certainly inhuman procedure of compelling a
person "to furnish the missing evidence necessary for his conviction."
US vs. Tan Teng This rule may apply even to a co-defendant in a joint trial.
Villaflor vs. Summers
PEOPLE vs. GALLARDE
Mapa Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan The constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination
Beltran vs. Samson proscribes the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communications from the accused and not the inclusion of his body
Chavez vs. CA in evidence when it may be material.
People vs. Gallarde
Pascual vs. Board of Medical Examiners Purely mechanical acts are not included in the prohibition as the
accused does not thereby speak his guilt, hence the assistance and
US vs. TAN TENG guiding hand of counsel is not required.
But the prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a
witness against himself, is a prohibition of the use of physical or PASCUAL vs. BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS
moral compulsion, to extort communications from him, not an We reiterate that such a principle is equally applicable to a
exclusion of his body as evidence, when it may be material. proceeding that could possibly result in the loss of the privilege to
practice the medical profession.
VILLAFLOR vs. SUMMERS
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
Final Examination Reviewer [Case Doctrines]

SECTION 18 [RIGHT AGAINST INVOLUNTARY Having received the highest penalty which the law imposes, he is
SERVITUDE] entitled under that law to have the sentence and all the facts and
List of Cases circumstances upon which it is founded placed before the highest
PI tribunal of the land to the end that its justice and legality may be
clearly and conclusively determined.
PH Refining Company Worker’s Union vs. PH Refining Co.
In Re Segifredo Aclaracio SECTION 20 [NON-IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT]
List of Cases
PH REFINING COMPANY WORKER’S UNION vs. PH SL
REFINING CO
The voluntariness of the employee's entering into such a contract of Serafin vs. Lindayag
employment — he has a free choice between entering into it or not Lozano vs. Martinez
— with such an implied condition, negatives the possibility of
involuntary servitude ensuing. . . .

IN RE SEGIFREDO ACLARACION SERAFIN vs. LINDAYAG

Involuntary servitude denotes a condition of enforced, compulsory
service of one to another or the condition of one who is compelled
by force, coercion, or imprisonment, and against his will, to labor.
That situation does not obtain in this case.
NOTES:
either he believed that non-payment of an indebtedness constitutes
the crime of estafa which would make him guilty of gross ignorance
of the law or although knowing the law, of nevertheless disregarding
it and giving due course to the town police chief's "prosecution" on
behalf of the municipal secretary which would constitute an utter
betrayal of his oath of office to render justice to every man.

Right against involuntary servitude is not absolute LOZANO vs. MARTINEZ

Exceptions: Mr. Justice Malcolm speaking for the Supreme Court in Ganaway
1. Punishment of a crime whereof the party shall have been vs. Queen, stated: "The 'debt' intended to be covered by the
duly convicted constitutional guaranty has a well-defined meaning. Organic
2. Render service to defend the state provisions relieving from imprisonment for debt, were intended to
3. Return to work order in assumption jurisdiction cases prevent commitment of debtors to prison for liabilities arising from
4. Naval enlistment actions ex contractu
5. Posse comitatus – command to help them find some
criminals SECTION 21 [DOUBLE JEOPARDY]
6. Patria potestas – authority which is lawfully exercised by List of Cases
the father over his children PEOPLE vs. BOCPART
PP-LIME
SECTION 19 [PROHIBITED PUNISHMENT]
List of Cases PEOPLE versus
PEP Balisacan
Obsania
People vs. Estoisa City Court of Silay
Echagaray vs. Executive Secretary Pineda
People vs. Esparas Adil
Relova
PEOPLE vs. ESTOISA Tampal
The constitutionality of an act of the legislature is not to be judged in
the light of exceptional cases. Small transgressors for which the PS Bank vs. Bermoy
heavy net was not spread are like small fishes, bound to be caught, Paulin vs. Gimenez
and it is to meet such a situation as this that courts are advised to
make a recommendation to the Chief Executive for clemency or Lejano vs. People
reduction of the penalty. Icasiano vs. Sandiganbayan
Melo vs. People
ECHAGARAY vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY Esmena vs. Pogoy
In the oft-cited case of Harden v. Director of Prisons, this Court held
that "[p]unishments are cruel when they involve torture or a PEOPLE vs. BALISACAN
lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the A plea of guilty is an unconditional admission of guilt with respect
meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies there to the offense charged. It forecloses the right to defend oneself from
something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere said charge and leaves the court with no alternative but to impose the
extinguishment of life." penalty fixed by law under the circumstances.

Indisputably, Article 6 of the Covenant enshrines the individual's
right to life. Nevertheless, Article 6 (2) of the Covenant explicitly
recognizes that capital punishment is an allowable limitation on the
right to life, subject to the limitation that it be imposed for the
"most serious crimes".
PEOPLE vs. ESPARAS
In this case, the defendant was only allowed to testify in order to
establish mitigating circumstances, for the purposes of fixing the
penalty. Said testimony, therefore, could not be taken as a trial on
the merits, to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused.
PEOPLE vs. OBSANIA
Three requirements
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
Final Examination Reviewer [Case Doctrines]
1. the dismissal is made upon motion, or with the express
consent, of the defendant, and
2. the dismissal is not an acquittal or based upon
consideration of the evidence or of the merits of the case;
and
3. the question to be passed upon by the appellate court is
purely legal; so that should the dismissal be found
incorrect, the case would have to be remanded to the court
of origin for further proceedings, to determine the guilt or
innocence of the defendant.
Doctrine of Estoppel and Doctrine of Waiver
The doctrine of estoppel is in quintessence the same as the doctrine of
waiver: the thrust of both is that a dismissal, other than on the
merits, sought by the accused in a motion to dismiss, is deemed to be
with his express consent and bars him from subsequently interposing
the defense of double jeopardy on appeal or in a new prosecution for
the same offense.
PEOPLE vs. CITY COURT OF SILAY
The inherent powers of a court to modify its order or decision, under
section 5, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court claimed for the
respondent to set aside his order of dismissal, does not extend to an
order of dismissal which amounts to a judgment of acquittal in a
criminal case; and the power of a court to modify a judgment or set it
aside before it has become final or an appeal has been perfected,
under section 7, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, refers to a
judgment of conviction and does not and cannot include a
judgment of acquittal.
PEOPLE vs. PINEDA
Withal, the mere filing of two informations charging the same offense
is not an appropriate basis for the invocation of double jeopardy since
the first jeopardy has not yet set in by a previous conviction,
acquittal or termination of the case without the consent of the
accused.
PEOPLE vs. ADIL
Stated differently, if after the first. prosecution 'a new fact supervenes
on which defendant may be held liable, resulting in altering the
character of the crime and giving rise to a new and distinct offense,
'the accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if indicted for the
new offense.
PEOPLE vs. RELOVA
Thus, the first sentence prohibits double jeopardy of punishment for
the same offense, whereas the second contemplates double jeopardy
of punishment for the same act.
Put a little differently, where the offenses charged are penalized either
by different sections of the same statute or by different statutes, the
important inquiry relates to the identity of offenses charge: the
constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available only
where an Identity is shown to exist between the earlier and the
subsequent offenses charged.
In contrast, where one offense is charged under a municipal ordinance
while the other is penalized by a statute, the critical inquiry is to
the identity of the acts which the accused is said to have committed
and which are alleged to have given rise to the two offenses: the
constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available so long
as the acts which constitute or have given rise to the first offense
under a municipal ordinance are the same acts which constitute or
have given rise to the offense charged under a statute.
PEOPLE vs. TAMPAL
The three (3) requisites of double jeopardy are:
1. a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second,
2. the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated, and
3. a second jeopardy, must be for the same offense as that in
the first.
PS BANK vs. BERMOY
Elements in the first criminal case for double jeopardy to apply
1. The complaint or information or other formal charge was
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction;
2. The court had jurisdiction;
3. The accused had been arraigned and had pleaded; and
4. He was convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissed
without his express consent
Dismissal with the express consent of the accused
On the last element, the rule is that a dismissal with the express
consent or upon motion of the accused does not result in double
jeopardy.
However, this rule is subject to two exceptions, namely,
1. if the dismissal is based on insufficiency of evidence or
2. on the denial of the right to speedy trial.
A dismissal upon demurrer to evidence falls under the first
exception. Since such dismissal is based on the merits, it amounts to
an acquittal.
When right against double jeopardy can be invoked
1. the accused is charged with the same offense in two
separate pending cases, or
2. the accused is prosecuted anew for the same offense after
he had been convicted or acquitted of such offense, or
3. the prosecution appeals from a judgment in the same
case
Absolute nature of acquittals
The philosophy underlying this rule establishing the absolute nature
of acquittals is part of the paramount importance criminal justice
system attaches to the protection of the innocent against wrongful
conviction.
The interest in the finality-of-acquittal rule, confined exclusively to
verdicts of not guilty, is easy to understand: it is a need for repose, a
desire to know the exact extent of one’s liability. With this right of
repose, the criminal justice system has built in a protection to insure
that the innocent, even those whose innocence rests upon a jury’s
leniency, will not be found guilty in a subsequent proceeding.
PAULIN vs. GIMENEZ
. . . Acquittal is always based on the merits, that is, the defendant is
acquitted because the evidence does not show that defendant's guilt is
beyond reasonable doubt; but dismissal does not decide the case on
the merits or that the defendant is not guilty.
Dismissals terminate the proceedings, either because
a. the court is not a court of competent jurisdiction, or
b. the evidence does not show that the offense was committed
within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, or
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Final Examination Reviewer [Case Doctrines]

c. the complaint or information is not valid or sufficient in The term is never used to indicate the obnoxious character of statutes
form and substance, etc. . . dealing retroactively with civil rights.

LEJANO vs. PEOPLE US vs. CONDE

Society’s awareness of the heavy personal strain which a criminal A law imposing a new penalty, or a new liability or disability, or
trial represents for the individual defendant is manifested in the giving a new right of action, must not be construed as having a
willingness to limit the government to a single criminal proceeding to retroactive effect. It is an elementary rule of contract that the laws in
vindicate its very vital interest in the enforcement of criminal laws. force at the time the contract was made must govern its interpretation
and application. Laws must be construed prospectively and not
ICASIANO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN retrospectively.
When the Supreme Court acts on complaints against judges or any
of the personnel under its supervision and control, it acts as personnel NASI-VILLAR vs. PEOPLE
administrator, imposing discipline and not as a court judging A law can never be considered ex post facto as long as it operates
justiciable controversies. Administrative procedure need not strictly prospectively since its strictures would cover only offenses
adhere to technical rules. Substantial evidence is sufficient to sustain committed after and not before its enactment.
conviction.
SALVADOR vs. MAPA JR.
Criminal proceedings before the Sandiganbayan, on the other hand, An ex post facto law has been defined as one
while they may involve the same acts subject of the administrative a. which makes an action done before the passing of the law
case, require proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. and which was innocent when done criminal, and punishes
such action; or
MELO vs. PEOPLE
Under said Rules there is identity between two offenses not only b. which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was
when the second offense is exactly the same as the first, but also when committed; or
when the second offense is an attempt to commit the first or a
frustration thereof, or when it necessary includes or is necessarily
included in the offense charged in the first information. c. which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater
punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was
When offense is said to necessarily include another committed; or
In this connection, an offense may be said to necessarily include
another when some of the essential ingredients of the former as
alleged in the information constitute the latter. And vice-versa, an d. which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or
offense may be said to be necessarily included in another when all different testimony than the law required at the time of the
the ingredients of the former constitute a part of the elements commission of the offense in order to convict the defendant
constituting the latter (Rule 116, sec. 5.)
e. That which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies
When Rule of Identity does not apply
only but in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a
This rule of identity does not apply, however when the second
right which when done was lawful; or
offense was not in existence at the time of the first prosecution, for
the simple reason that in such case there is no possibility for the
accused, during the first prosecution, to be convicted for an offense f. that which deprives a person accused of a crime of some
that was then inexistent. lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as
the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a
ESMENA vs. POGOY proclamation of amnesty
When these three conditions are present, the acquittal or conviction of
the accused or the dismissal or termination of the case without his ARTICLE IV [CITIZENSHIP]
express consent constitutes res judicata and is a bar to another List of Cases
prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the TRICYCL-FAR-BAMMM
same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily
includes or is included therein. Tecson vs. COMELEC
Republic vs. Lim
SECTION 22 [EX POST FACTO LAW AND BILL OF In Re: Application for Admission to the Bar of Vicente Ching
ATTAINDER] Co vs. HOR
List of Cases Yu vs. Defensor-Santiago
CUNS Cabiling Ma vs. Fernandez
Labo vs. COMELEC
Concepcion vs. Garcia
US vs. Conde Frivaldo vs. COMELEC
Nasi-Villar vs. People Aznar vs. COMELEC
Salvador vs. Mapa Jr. Republic vs. Dela Rosa
CONCEPCION vs. GARCIA Bengzon III vs. HRET
Moreover, the term "ex post facto," as applied to statutes, in section 3 Altajeros vs. COMELEC
of our organic law, is a technical term, used only in connection with Maquiling vs. COMELEC
crimes and penalties. Mercado vs. Manzano
Mo Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner on Immigration
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
Final Examination Reviewer [Case Doctrines]
TECSON vs. COMELEC
Treaty of Paris
 entered into on 10 December 1898 between Spain and the
United States
Philippine Bill of 1902
 The term inhabitant was taken to include
1. a native-born inhabitant
2. an inhabitant who was a native of Peninsular Spain,
and
3. an inhabitant who obtained Spanish papers on or
before 11 April 1899
 Controversy arose on to the status of children born in the
Philippines from 11 April 1899 to 01 July 1902, during
which period no citizenship law was extant in the
Philippines. Weight was given to the view, articulated in
jurisprudential writing at the time, that the common law
principle of jus soli, otherwise also known as the principle
of territoriality, operative in the United States and England,
governed those born in the Philippine Archipelago within
that period.
Jones Law
 Under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of the
Philippines was deemed to be a citizen of the Philippines
as of 11 April 1899 if he was
1. a subject of Spain on 11 April 1899
2. residing in the Philippines on said date, and,
3. since that date, not a citizen of some other country.
1935 Philippine Constitution
 While there was, at one brief time, divergent views on
whether or not jus soli was a mode of acquiring citizenship,
the 1935 Constitution brought to an end to any such link
with common law, by adopting, once and for all, jus
sanguinis or blood relationship as being the basis of
Filipino citizenship -
 Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution. The following
are citizens of the Philippines -
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the
time of the adoption of this Constitution
2. Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign
parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution,
had been elected to public office in the Philippine
Islands.
3. Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
4. Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines
and upon reaching the age of majority, elect
Philippine citizenship.
5. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
1973 Philippine Constitution
 Seeking to correct this anomaly, as well as fully cognizant
of the newly found status of Filipino women as equals to
men, the framers of the 1973 Constitution crafted the
provisions of the new Constitution on citizenship to reflect
such concerns
 Section 1, Article III, 1973 Constitution - The following
are citizens of the Philippines:
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time
of the adoption of this Constitution.
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the
Philippines.
3. Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and
thirty-five.
4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
 For good measure, Section 2 of the same article also
further provided that
"A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien retains
her Philippine citizenship, unless by her act or omission she is
deemed, under the law to have renounced her citizenship."
1987 Philippine Constitution
 The 1987 Constitution generally adopted the provisions of
the 1973 Constitution, except for subsection (3) thereof
that aimed to correct the irregular situation generated by the
questionable proviso in the 1935 Constitution.
 Section I, Article IV, 1987 Constitution now provides:
The following are citizens of the Philippines:
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution.
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the
Philippines.
3. Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino
mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority; and
4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
Fr. Bernas: It was not the fault of the child that his parents had illicit
liaison. Why deprive the child of the fullness of political rights for no
fault of his own? To disqualify an illegitimate child from holding an
important public office is to punish him for the indiscretion of his
parents. There is neither justice nor rationality in that. And if there is
neither justice nor rationality in the distinction, then the distinction
transgresses the equal protection clause and must be reprobated.
REPUBLIC vs. LIM
It cites Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, which
provides that the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino
mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father,
unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine
citizenship.
Likewise, the Republic invokes the provision in Section 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 625, that legitimate children born of
Filipino mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing
such intention in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party
concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall
be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany
the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution
and the Government of the Philippines.
Plainly, the above constitutional and statutory requirements of
electing Filipino citizenship apply only to legitimate children.
IN RE: VICENTE CHING
The phrase "reasonable time" has been interpreted to mean that the
election should be made within three (3) years from reaching the
age of majority.
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It is true that this clause has been construed to mean a reasonable
period after reaching the age of majority, and that the Secretary of
Justice has ruled that three (3) years is the reasonable time to elect
Philippine citizenship under the constitutional provision adverted to
above, which period may be extended under certain circumstances,
as when the person concerned has always considered himself a
Filipino.
CO vs. HOR
‘election’ as both formal and informal process
In the case of In Re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the
Court held that the exercise of the right of suffrage and the
participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of
election of Philippine citizenship.
The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of
suffrage. He has established his life here in the Philippines.
In Re Mallare Rule
For those already Filipinos when the time to elect came up, there are
acts of deliberate choice which cannot be less binding. Entering a
profession open only to Filipinos, serving in public office where
citizenship is a qualification, voting during election time, running for
public office, and other categorical acts of similar nature are
themselves formal manifestations of choice for these persons.
The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier definition given
to the word "residence" which regarded it as having the same
meaning as domicile.
The term "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which
when absent for business or pleasure, one intends to return.
The absence of a person from said permanent residence, no matter
how long, notwithstanding, it continues to be the domicile of that
person. In other words, domicile is characterized by animus
revertendi
YU vs. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO
express renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that is made
known distinctly and explicitly and not left to inference or
implication.
CABILING MA vs. FERNANDEZ
The statutory formalities of electing Philippine citizenship are:
1. a statement of election under oath;
2. an oath of allegiance to the Constitution and Government of
the Philippines; and
3. registration of the statement of election and of the oath with
the nearest civil registry.
Purpose of registration
To register is to record or annotate. American and Spanish
authorities are unanimous on the meaning of the term to register as to
enter in a register; to record formally and distinctly; to enroll; to enter
in a list.
Registration, then, is the confirmation of the existence of a fact. In the
instant case, registration is the confirmation of election as such
election.
LABO vs. COMELEC
His divestiture of Australian citizenship does not concern us here.
That is a matter between him and his adopted country. What we must
consider is the fact that he voluntarily and freely rejected Philippine
citizenship and willingly and knowingly embraced the citizenship of
a foreign country. The possibility that he may have been
subsequently rejected by Australia, as he claims, does not mean that
he has been automatically reinstated as a citizen of the Philippines.
FRIVALDO vs. COMELEC
This country of ours, for all its difficulties and limitations, is like a
jealous and possessive mother. Once rejected, it is not quick to
welcome back with eager arms its prodigal if repentant children. The
returning renegade must show, by an express and unequivocal act, the
renewal of his loyalty and love.
Renunciation does not automatically restore citizenship
It should be obvious that even if he did lose his naturalized American
citizenship, such forfeiture did not and could not have the effect of
automatically restoring his citizenship in the Philippines that he had
earlier renounced. At best, what might have happened as a result of
the loss of his naturalized citizenship was that he became a stateless
individual.
Decisions about citizenship cannot govern future status with
finality
Indeed, decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship
cannot govern a person's future status with finality. This is because a
person may subsequently reacquire, or for that matter lose, his
citizenship under any of the modes recognized by law for the
purpose.
Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a
judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or
administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is
generally not considered res judicata, hence it has to be threshed out
again and again, as the occasion demands.
Exceptions:
1. when the issue of citizenship is immaterial to the
controversy
2. active participation of the Solicitor General in the case
3. decision must be sustained by the Supreme Court
AZNAR vs. COMELEC
Parenthetically, the statement in the 1987 Constitution that "dual
allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be
dealt with by law"(Art. IV, Sec. 5) has no retroactive effect. And
while it is true that even before the 1987 Constitution, Our country
had already frowned upon the concept of dual citizenship or
allegiance, the fact is it actually existed. Be it noted further that under
the aforecited proviso, the effect of such dual citizenship or
allegiance shall be dealt with by a future law. Said law has not yet
been enacted.
REPUBLIC vs. DELA ROSA
Section 1 of R.A. No. 530 provides that no decision granting
citizenship in naturalization proceedings shall be executory until after
two years from its promulgation in order to be able to observe if:
1. the applicant has left the country;
2. the applicant has dedicated himself continuously to a lawful
calling or profession;
3. the applicant has not been convicted of any offense or
violation of government promulgated rules; and
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4. the applicant has committed any act prejudicial to the
interest of the country or contrary to government
announced policies.
BENGZON III vs. HRET
Natural-born citizen
A person who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular
country, is a natural-born citizen thereof.
As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens "are
those citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform
any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship."
Naturalization
Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship.
As a mode of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship,
naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as
amended.
On the other hand, naturalization as a mode for reacquiring
Philippine citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63.
Repatriation
Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes
by those who lost their citizenship due to:
1. desertion of the armed forces;
2. service in the armed forces of the allied forces in World
War II;
3. service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any
other time;
4. marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien;
5. political and economic necessity.
ALTAJEROS vs. COMELEC
Hence, in addition to taking the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines, the registration of the Certificate of Repatriation in
the proper civil registry and the Bureau of Immigration is a
prerequisite in effecting the repatriation of a citizen.
MAQUILING vs. COMELEC
If there is any remaining doubt, it is regarding the efficacy of
Arnado’s renunciation of his American citizenship when he
subsequently used his U.S. passport. The renunciation of foreign
citizenship must be complete and unequivocal. The requirement that
the renunciation must be made through an oath emphasizes the
solemn duty of the one making the oath of renunciation to remain
true to what he has sworn to. Allowing the subsequent use of a
foreign passport because it is convenient for the person to do so is
rendering the oath a hollow act. It devalues the act of taking of an
oath, reducing it to a mere ceremonial formality.
MERCADO vs. MANZANO
To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance.
The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of
the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously
considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation
may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which
adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which
follows the doctrine of jus soli.
Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is
concurrently considered a citizen of both states.
Classes of citizens to possess dual citizensip
Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it
is possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to
possess dual citizenship:
1. Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign
countries which follow the principle of jus soli;
2. Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien
fathers if by the laws of their father’s country such children
are citizens of that country;
3. Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter’s
country the former are considered citizens, unless by their
act or omission they are deemed to have renounced
Philippine citizenship.
There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines
may, without performing any act, be also a citizen of another state;
but the above cases are clearly possible given the constitutional
provisions on citizenship.
Dual allegiance
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a
person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or
more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is
the result of an individuals volition.
MOYA LIM YAO vs. COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION
Who might herself be lawfully naturalized
The phrase "who might herself be lawfully naturalized", as contained
in the above provision, means that the woman who is married to a
Filipino citizen must not belong to any of the disqualified classes
enumerated in Section 4 of the Naturalization Law
Unreasonableness of requiring alien wife to prove qualification
1. One of the qualifications required of an Applicant for
naturalization under Section 2 of the law is that the
applicant "must have resided in the Philippines for a
continuous period of not less than ten years."
If this requirement is applied to an alien wife married to a
Filipino citizen, this means that for a period of ten years at
least, she cannot hope to acquire the citizenship of her
husband. If the wife happens to be a citizen of a country
whose law declares that upon her marriage to a foreigner
she automatically loses her citizenship and acquires the
citizenship of her husband, this could mean that for a period
of ten years at least, she would be stateless. And even after
having acquired continuous residence in the Philippines for
ten years, there is no guarantee that her petition for
naturalization will be granted, in which case she would
remain stateless for an indefinite period of time.
2. Section 2 of the law likewise requires of the applicant for
naturalization that he "must own real estate in the
Philippines worth not less than five thousand pesos,
Philippine currency, or must have some known lucrative
trade, profession, or lawful occupation."
Considering the constitutional prohibition against
acquisition by an alien of real estate except in cases of
hereditary succession (Art. XIII, Sec. 5, Constitution), an
alien wife desiring to acquire the citizenship of her husband
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must have to prove that she has a lucrative income derived

from a lawful trade, profession or occupation.

The income requirement has been interpreted to mean that

the petitioner herself must be the one to possess the said
income. In other words, the wife must prove that she has a
lucrative income derived from sources other than her
husband's trade, profession or calling.

It is of common knowledge, and judicial notice may be

taken of the fact that most wives in the Philippines do not
have gainful occupations of their own. Indeed, Philippine
law, recognizing the dependence of the wife upon the
husband, imposes upon the latter the duty of supporting
the former. (Art. 291, Civil Code).

It should be borne in mind that universally, it is an accepted

concept that when a woman marries, her primary duty is to
be a wife, mother and housekeeper. If an alien wife is not to
be remiss in this duty, how can she hope to acquire a
lucrative income of her own to qualify her for citizenship?

3. Under Section 2 of the law, the applicant for naturalization

"must have enrolled his minor children of school age, in
any of the public schools or private schools recognized by
the Office of the Private Education of the Philippines,
where Philippine history, government and civics are taught
or prescribed as part of the school curriculum during the
entire period of residence in the Philippines required of him
prior to the hearing of his petition for naturalization as
Philippine citizen."

If an alien woman has minor children by a previous

marriage to another alien before she marries a Filipino,
and such minor children had not been enrolled in Philippine
schools during her period of residence in the country, she
cannot qualify for naturalization under the interpretation of
this Court.

The reason behind the requirement that children should be

enrolled in recognized educational institutions is that they
follow the citizenship of their father.

Considering that said minor children by her first husband

generally follow the citizenship of their alien father, the
basis for such requirement as applied to her does not
exist. Cessante ratione legis cessat ipsa lex.

4. Under Section 3 of the law, the 10-year continuous

residence prescribed by Section 2 "shall be understood as
reduced to five years for any petitioner (who is) married to
a Filipino woman."

It is absurd that an alien male married to a Filipino wife

should be required to reside only for five years in the
Philippines to qualify for citizenship, whereas an alien
woman married to a Filipino husband must reside for ten
years.

Policy of Selective Admission does not apply when it is by operation

of law
But this policy finds no application in cases where citizenship is
conferred by operation of law.