ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
ELECTION LAW PRE-BAR REVIEW the place wherein they propose to vote, for at least 6 months
Atty. Jocelyn Arro-Valencia
A. SUFFRAGE
THEORY OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY -Section 1, Article 11
of the Constitution: “The Philippines is a democratic and
republican state. Sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them.” A democratic and
republic government derives all its powers, directly or indirectly,
from the people – who represents the sovereign power of the
state.
SUFFRAGE
 Is the right to vote in the election of officers chosen by
the people and in the determination of questions
submitted to the people. (Nachura, Outline Reviewer in
Political Law 2009 edition)
 Suffrage applies not only to elections, but may also
extend to initiatives, referenda, plebiscite and recall.
 Means by which people express their sovereign
judgment. (Nolasco v. Comelec 275 SCRA 763).
 Right and obligation of qualified citizens to vote in the
election of certain national and local officers of the
government and in the decision of public questions
submitted to the people.
 It is both a right and a privilege. Right being the
expression of the sovereign will of the people.
Privilege because its exercise is conferred only to such
persons or class of persons as are most likely to
exercise it for the purpose of the public good.
 Suffrage as a duty is in the nature of a public trust and
constitutes a voter a representative of the whole
people. This duty requires that the privileged
bestowed should be exercised not exclusively for the
benefit of the citizen or citizens proferring it but in good
faith and with intelligent zeal for the general benefit
and welfare of the State. (Cipriano Abanil v. Justice of
the Peace Court of Bacolod, Negros Occidental et. al.
70 Phil. 28 (1940)).
Sec. 1, Art. V of 1987 the Constitution provides, “Suffrage
may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines, not otherwise
disqualified by law, who are at least 18 years of age, and who
shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in
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immediately preceding the election. No literacy, property, or other
substantive requirements shall be imposed on the exercise of
suffrage.
Suffrage may also be exercised by qualified Filipinos
abroad. Article V, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution further
provides that, “The Congress shall provide a system for securing
the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for
absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.” Congress enacted
R.A. 9189 “Overseas Absenting Voting Act of 2003” now
amended by the Overseas Absenting Voting Act of 2013.
SCOPE OF SUFFRAGE: FORMS OF POPULAR
INTERVENTION
Sec. 2(1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution, the Comelec
is vested with the power to “enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum and recall”.
1) Election – is the means by which the people choose,
through the use of the ballot, their officials for
definite and fixed periods and to whom they entrust,
for the time being as their representatives, the
exercise of powers of government (Garchitorena v.
Crsecini 39 Phil. 258 (1918)). In ordinary dialect or
understanding, the Court in Carlos v. Angeles, 346
SCRA 571 (2000) held that elections refers to the
conduct of the poles – listing of votes, holding of
electoral campaign, act of casting and receiving the
ballots from the voters, counting them, and making
the election returns and proclaiming the candidates.
. .it refers to the entire and complete electoral
process.
a. Kinds of Election
1 Regular election – refers to an election
participated in by those who possess the right of suffrage and
not disqualified by law and who are registered voters.
2. Special elections – election not regularly held
but which is conducted
 to supply a vacancy in a particular office before the
expiration of the full term for which the incumbent was
elected. Sec. 4 of RA 7166 provides that, “in case a
permanent vacancy shall occur in the Senate or House
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of Representative at least one (1) year before the
expiration of the term, the Comelec shall call and hold
a special elections to fill the vacancy not earlier than 60
days nor longer than 90 days after the occurrence of
the vacancy.
 Article VI, Section 9, Constitution provides that case
such vacancy in the Senate, the special elections shall
be held simultaneously with the next succeeding
regular elections.
 Article VII, Sec. 10 of the Constitution, in case a
vacancy occurs in the offices of the President and
Vice-President, a special election cannot be called if
the vacancy occurs within 18 months before the date of
the next presidential elections.
 In cases were a postponement and failure of elections
are declared by the Comelec in accordance with
Sections 5,6,7 of BP 881). Lucero v. Comelec 234
SCRA 280 (1994); Borja v. Comelec 260 SCRA 604
(1996).
In fixing the date for special elections the Comelec
should to see to it that:
1) it should not be later than thirty (30) days after the
cessation of the cause of the postponement or
suspension of the election or the failure to elect;
2) it should be reasonably close to the date of the
election not held, suspended or which resulted in the
failure to elect. (Lucero v. Comelec 234 SCRA 280).
3. Manual Elections – Manual/mechanical casting/voting,
counting, and canvassing stages which involves the following –
a. Use of paper “write-in” ballots during the casting
stage;
b.The “direct reading and manual tallying of votes” in
multiple copies of election returns (ER); and
c. The manual addition of results in Statement of Votes
(SOVs) and the Certificates of Canvass (COCCs)
4. Automated Election System (AES) – a system using
appropriate technology which has been demonstrated in the
voting, counting, consolidating, canvassing, and transmission of
election result, and other electoral process. (Sec. 2, RA 9369,
The Automated Election System Law, As Amended)
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2) Plebiscite –an electoral process by which an
initiative on the Constitution is approved or rejected
by the people (Sec. 3 R.A. 6735 “The Initiative and
Referendum Act). Generally associated with the
ratification process. Plebiscite is required:
a. Section 4, Article XVII of the Constitution, with
reference to the voting to determine whether
the voters in the country are in favor of or
against the ratification of the Constitution or an
amendment thereto and
b. Sec. 10, Art. X, in connection with the voting to
determine whether the voters in the political
units affected agree to a proposed creation,
division, merger, abolition or boundary change
of a political unit.
Padilla Jr. v. Comelec 214 SCRA 735, the Comelec resolved to
approve the conduct of the plebiscite in the area or units affected
for the proposed Municipality of Tulay-na-Lupa and the remaining
areas of the mother Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte,
Majority of the electorates in the units affected rejected the
creation of Tulay-na-Lupa.
Petitioner Gov. of Camarines Norte in a Special Civil Action for
Certiorari, seek to set aside the Plebiscite asserting that it was a
complete failure and that the results obtained were invalid and
illegal because the Plebiscite as mandated by Comelec Res. No.
2312 should have been conducted only in the political unit or units
affected (which is the 12 barangays and should not have included
the mother unit of the Municipality of Labo.)
HELD: With the approval and ratification of the 1987 Constitution,
more specifically, Art. X, Section 10, the creation, division,
merger, abolition or alteration of the boundaries of any political
unit shall be subject to the approval by a majority of the votes cast
in a Plebiscite in the ‘POLITICAL UNITS AFFECTED” was held to
mean that residents of the political entity who would be
economically dislocated by the separation of a portion thereof
have a right to vote in the said Plebiscite or the plurality of political
units which would participate in the Plebiscite. The Court
reiterated its ruling in Tan v. Comelec 142 SCRA 727 (1986), that
“in the conduct of a Plebiscite, it is imperative that all the
constituents of the mother and daughter units affected shall be
included.
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Sanidad v. Comelec 181 SCRA 529, the Supreme Court declared
as unconstitutional the restriction imposed by Comelec on media
relative to discussing on air and print the features of the plebiscite
issues in the creation of the autonomous region for the Cordilleras
and held that plebiscite are matters of public concern and
importance and the peoples right to be informed and to be able to
freely and intelligently make a decision would be best served by
access to an unabridged discussion of the issues.
City of Pasig v. Comelec/Municipality of Cainta Province of Rizal,
Sept. 10, 1999, the issue raised was the propriety of the
suspension of the plebiscite proceedings pending the decision of
the boundary dispute between the Municipality of Cainta and the
City of Pasig. The City of Pasig passed an Ordinance creating
barangays Karangalan and Napico. The Municipality of Cainta
moved to suspend or cancel the respective plebiscitedue to the
pending case before the RTC of Antipolo for the settlement of the
boundary dispute and that the said activities await the decision of
the RTC on the matter.
That Comelec suspended the holding of the plebiscite
for the creation of Brgy. Karangalan but rendered the creation of
Napico as moot as the same has already been ratified in the
plebiscite held for the purpose. The SC held that the creation of
Napico cannot be considered as moot and it is most proper that
the plebiscite be declared null and void in view of the pending
boundary dispute between Pasig and Cainta which presents a
prejudicial question and must be decided first before the
plebiscite for the proposed barangays be conducted.
Jurisdiction over controversies involving Plebiscite Issues - Ma.
Salvacion Buac/Antonio Bautista v. Comelec/Alan Peter
Cayetano and some Intervenors, G.R. No. 155855, January 26,
2004, a petition for certiorari and mandamus was filed by
petitioners Buac and Bautista assailing the October 28, 2002 en
banc resolution of the Comelec which held that it has no
jurisdiction over controversies involving the conduct of plebiscite
and the annulment of its results.
The facts show that in April 1988, a plebiscite was held
in Taguig for the ratification of the Taguig Cityhood Law (RA No.
8487) proposing the conversion of Taguig from a municipality into
a city. Without completing the canvass of 64 other election
returns, the Plebiscite Board of Canvassers (PBOC) declared that
the “NO” votes won and that the people rejected the conversion of
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Taguig to a city. The PBOC was however ordered by the
Comelec en banc to reconvene and complete the canvass which
the board did and in due time issued an Order proclaiming that
the negative votes prevailed.
Petitioners filed with the Comelec a petition to annul the results of
the plebiscite with a prayer for revision and recount of the ballots.
Cayetano intervened and moved to dismiss the petition on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Comelec. He claimed that a
plebiscite cannot be the subject of an election protest and that the
jurisdiction to hear a complaint involving the conduct of a
plebiscite is lodged with the RTC.
Comelec 2nd division initially gave due course to the petition ruling
that it has jurisdiction over the case. It treated the petition as akin
to an election protest considering that the same allegations of
fraud and irregularities in the casting and counting of ballots and
preparation of returns are the same grounds for assailing the
results of an election. It then ordered the Taguig ballot boxes to
be brought to its Manila Office and created revision committees to
revise and recount the plebiscite ballots.
Intervenor Cayetano, in an unverified motion, moved for
reconsideration of the Comelec Order insisting that it has no
jurisdiction to hear and decide a petition contesting the results of
a plebiscite.
In a complete turnaround, the Comelec 2nd division issued an
Order granting the Motion for Reconsideration. It dismissed the
petition to annul the results of the plebiscite and ruled that
Comelec has no jurisdiction over said case as it involves an
exercise of QJ powers not contemplated under Section 2(2),
Article IX-C of the Constitution.
On appeal, the Comelec en banc affirmed the ruling of its 2 nd
division. It held that the Comelec cannot use its power to enforce
and administer all laws relative to plebiscites as this power is
purely administrative or executive and not QJ in nature. It
concluded that the jurisdiction over the petition to annul the
Taguig plebiscite results is lodged with the RTC under Section
19(6) of BP 129 which provides that the RTC shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction in cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of
any court or body exercising judicial or QJ functions. Hence, the
petition before the SC.
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The SC held that the key to the case is its nature, which involves
the determination of whether the electorate of Taguig voted in
favor of or against the conversion of the municipality of Taguig.
The invocation of judicial power to settle disputes involving the
conduct of a plebiscite is misplaced. Judicial power as defined
under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution as the duty of the
court of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine
whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the government.
This case assailing the regularity of the conduct of the Taguig
plebiscite does not fit the kind of a case calling for the exercise of
judicial power. There is no plaintiff or defendant in the case for it
merely involves the ascertainment of the vote of the electorate on
whether they approve or disapprove the conversion of their
municipality into a highly urbanized city.
In referring to Article IX-C, Section 2(1), the SC said that the said
provision is explicit that Comelec has power to “enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall. To enforce
means to cause to take effect or to cause the performance of
such act or acts necessary to bring into actual effect or operation,
a plan or measure which entails all the necessary and incidental
power for it to achieve the holding of honest, orderly, peaceful,
free and credible elections (HOPE FRECRE). The SC was
surprised that for the first time, Comelec yielded its historic
jurisdiction over a motion for reconsideration which was even filed
out of time, thus rendering it without jurisdiction to entertain the
same.
INITIATIVE – are lawmaking powers that belong to the people
and have been described as the “people power” features of our
Constitution (Asked in the 2000 BAR). Initiative under RA 6735
is defined as the power of the people to propose amendments to
the Constitution or to propose and enact legislation through an
election called for the purpose.
REFERENDUM–power of the electorate to approve or reject a
piece of legislation through an election called for the purpose.
(Sec. 2©, R.A. 6735).
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Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution provides that
“Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at
least 12% of the total number of registered voters, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least 3% of the
registered voters therein”.
Section 32, Article VI of the Constitution provides that “Congress
shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of initiative and
referendum and the exceptions therefrom, where the people can
directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or
law or part thereof passed by Congress or local legislative body
after the registration of a petition thereof signed by at least 10% of
the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least 3% of the registered
voters thereof.”
RA 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 also provides for
a “local initiative” defined as the “legal process whereby the
registered voters of a local government unit may directly propose,
enact, or amend any ordinance. Sec. 126 thereof provides for a
“local referendum” defined as the “legal process whereby the RV
of the local government units may approve, amend or reject any
ordinance enacted by the sanggunian.”
Classes of Initiative – 1) On the Constitution; 2) On Statutes; 3)
On Local Legislation.Indirect Initiative is exercised by the people
through a proposition sent to Congress or the local legislative
body for action.
Classes of Referendum – 1) On Statutes; 2) On Local Laws.
Santiago, et. al. v. Comelec, et. al., 270 SCRA 106 (336 SCRA
843), the controversy brought to the Supreme Court by way of a
petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is “the
right of the people to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution through the system of Initiative under Section 2 of
Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution”.
Atty. Jesus Delfin filed a petition with the Comelec to amend the
constitution, specifically to lift the term limits of elective officials,
by people’s initiative. Atty. Delfin asked the Comelec for an order:
(1) to fix the time and dates for signature gathering all over the
country (2) to cause the necessary publications of said Order and
the said petition in newspapers of general and local circulation
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and (3) instruct the municipal election registrars in all regions in
the Philippines to assist petitioners and volunteers in establishing
signing station at the time and on the dates designated for the
purpose.
The Comelec issued an Order granting the petition. Santiago
filed this special civil action for prohibition raising among other
grounds that RA 6735 does not provide for people’s initiative to
amend the constitution considering that the same is still pending
with the Senate of which she is the author. The petition of Atty.
Delfin was not validly initiated as it failed to comply with the
signature requirement for initiating an initiative. The Comelec
never acquired jurisdiction over the petition as jurisdiction is
acquired only after its filing – the petition being the initiatory
pleading.
The SC gave due course to the Petition on the legal
premise that the Constitution recognizes only two (2) methods of
proposing amendments to the Constitution, viz (1) by Congress
upon a vote of ¾ of all its members and (2) by constitutional
convention.
The SC interpreted Sec. 2 of RA 6735 which provides
that “the power of the people under a system of initiative and
referendum to directly propose, enact, approved or reject, in
whole or in part the Constitution, laws, ordinance or resolutions
passed by any legislative body upon compliance with the
requirements of this Act, is hereby affirmed, recognized and
guaranteed.” It held that the inclusion of the word “constitution”
here is neither germane nor relevant to said action which
exclusively relates to initiative and referendum on national and
local laws, ordinances and resolution. Therefore, the people are
not accorded the power to “directly propose, enact, approved or
reject, in whole or in part the Constitution, through the system of
initiative.
The SC further declared that Comelec cannot validly
promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the
right of the people to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution through the system of initiative. The power of
Comelec to issue rules and regulations (QJ power) is limited only
to what is provided under –
(a) Section 2 of Article IX-C of the Constitution and
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(b) by a law where subordinate legislation is authorized
and which satisfied the “completeness” and the
“sufficient standard” tests.
Raul Lambino, et. al. vs. Comelec G.R. No. 174153, October 25,
2006 the issue on initiative to propose amendments to the 1987
Constitution was again at issue. FACTS: Raul Lambino of Sigaw
ng Bayan and Erico Aumentado of the Union of Local Authorities
of the Philippines (ULAP) filed a petition for people’s initiative
before the Commission on Elections on August 26, 2006, after
months of gathering signatures all over the country. Lambino
claimed that the petition is backed by 6.3M registered
voters.constituting at least 12% of all registered voters, with each
legislative district represented by at least 3% of the registered
voters. They further claimed that the provincial and city Comelec
officials had already verified the 6.3M signatures
The Comelec denied the petition, reasoning that a lack of
enabling law keeps them from entertaining such petitions. It
invoked the 1997 Supreme Court ruling in Santiago vs. Comelec
(336 SCRA 843), where it declared RA 6735 inadequate to
implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the
Constitution. The Comelec ruling prompted Lambino and
Aumentado to bring their case before the Supreme Court on the
following issues -
(1) Whether the initiative petition of the Lambino group complied
with the provisions of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
(2)Whether the Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago vs.
Comelec declaring RA 6735 “incomplete and inadequate or
wanting in essential terms and conditions” to implement the
initiative clause to amend the Constitution.
The Supreme Court upheld the Comelec’s ruling on the petition
for people’s initiative on October 25, 2006 with a close 8-7
vote.As ruled:
 The Lambino Group miserably failed to comply with the
basic requirement of the Constitution for the conductof
people’s initiative. The Constitution require that the
amendment must be “directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition.”

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Lambino’s group failed to include the full text of the
proposed changes in the signature sheets –a fatal
omission, according to the Supreme Court ruling,
because it means a majority of the 6.3M people who
signed the signature sheets could not have known the
nature and effect of the proposed changes. For the
petition to be valid, two essential requisites must be
complied with, namely: (a) the people must author, and
thus sign, the entire proposal; no agent or representative
can sign on their behalf; and (b) as an initiative upon a
petition, the proposed amendments must be embodied
in the petition itself.
 A people’s initiative to change the Constitution applies
only to an amendment of the Constitution and not to its
revision. Only Congress or a constitutional convention
may propose revisions to the Constitution. A people’s
initiative may propose only amendments to the
Constitution.
 The SC declared that “A popular clamor, even one
backed by 6.3M signatures, cannot justify a deviation
from the specific modes prescribed in the Constitution
itself.”
The rationale for the second requisite is that the signature
requirement would be rendered meaningless if the person affixing
his signature has not first seen and understood what it is that he
is signing. Further, and more importantly, loose interpretation of
the subscription requirement can pose a significant potential for
fraud. On-compliance with the above mentioned requirement is
fatal to the initiative petition. For sure, the great majority of the
6.3M people who signed the signature sheets did not see the full
text of the proposed changes before signing, as the proposed
amendments were not stated in the signature sheets. They were
not apprised of the nature and effect of the proposed
amendments, among which are substantial changes as follows:
1) the term limits on members of the legislature will be
lifted and thus member of the Parliament may be re-
elected indefinitely;
2) The Interim Parliament whose membership
comprised of present members of Congress can
decide when to call the parliamentary elections.
Thus, leaving them the absolute discretion to
determine their term limits.
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3) That within 45 days from the ratification of proposed
changes, the interim Parliament may further
propose revision or amendments to the Constitution.
Furthermore, a people’s initiative to change the
Constitution applies only to an amendment to the Constitution and
not revision. Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three
modes of proposing amendments to the Constitution: a) by direct
congressional action (3/4 votes of all its members), b) through a
constitutional convention, and c) through a people’s initiative.
The first and second modes, as provided in Section 1 of Article
XVII, apply to both amendment and revision, but the 3rd mode
applies only to amendments. The distinction between the first two
modes and the third was intentional as shown by the deliberations
of the Constitutional Commission.
There can be no dispute that a people’s initiative can only
propose amendments to the Constitution since the Constitution
itself limits initiatives to amendments. There can be no deviation
from the constitutionally prescribed modes of revising the
Constitution. A popular clamor, even one backed by 6.3M
signatures, cannot justify a deviation from the specific modes
prescribed in the Constitution itself. The Lambino’s group
proposed changes constituted not just an amendment but a
revision, because of the change in the form of government from
Presidential to Parliamentary, and the shift from a bicameral to a
unicameral legislature.
DISTINCTION BETWEEN REVISION AND AMENDMENT.
Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in
the constitution, like altering the principle of separation of power
or the system of checks and balances. There is also revision if
the change alters the substantial entirety of the Constitution. On
the other hand, amendment broadly refers to a change that adds,
reduces, deletes, without altering the basic principle involved.
Revision generally affects several provisions of the constitution,
while amendment generally affects only the specific provision
being amended.
On the second pivotal issue of revisiting the ruling of the Court in
Santiago vs. Comelec, the Court held that an affirmation or
reversal of the same will not change the outcome of the case.
The Court must avoid revisiting a ruling involving the
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constitutionality of a statute if the case before the Court can be
resolved on some grounds.
In the resolution on the motion for reconsideration, the Court
maintaining its 8-7 vote, denied with finality the motions for
reconsideration of its October 25, 2006 decision dismissing the
said petition to amend the 1987 Constitution through a people’s
initiative. . Ten justices however reiterated their earlier opinions
that RA 6735 is sufficient and adequate as an enabling law to
amend the Constitution through a people’s initiative, effectively
abandoning Santiago v. Comelec.
Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority v. Comelec 252 SCRA 492
(1996), an action for certiorari and prohibition was brought to the
SC seeking to nullify the ruling of the Comelec and Resolution
No. 2848 denying petitioner’s plea to stop the holding of a local
initiative and referendum on the proposition to recall Pambayang
Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 of the SB of Morong Bataan.
In this case, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan
on April 1993, passed Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye
1993, expressing therein its absolute concurrence to join the
Subic Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) as required by Sec. 12 of
RA 7227 (Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992). On
September 5, 1993, the SB submitted the Kapasyahan to the
Office of the President. On May 24, 1993, respondent Garcia, et.
al. filed a petition with the SB of Morong to annul PK Blg. 10,
Serye 1993 and therein proposed for amendments to the said
law. The SB acted upon the petition and promulgated PK Blg. 18,
requesting Congress to amend certain provisions of RA 7227 and
informed respondents that the other matters in the proposed
amendments were already submitted to the Office of the
President.
Not satisfied and within 30 days from submission of their petition,
respondent resorted to their power of initiative under the LGC of
1991. On June 18, 1996 Comelec issued Resolution No. 2845
adopting a calendar of activities for local referendum to annul or
repeal Kapasyahan Bldg. 10.
Petitioner SBMA seeks to nullify the Order of Comelec denying
petitioner’s plea to stop the holding of a local initiative and
referendum on the proposition to recall the Kapasyahan as it was
proceeding with a local initiative that proposes an amendment of
a national law. ISSUE:
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 whether Comelec committed grave abuse of
discretion in promulgating and implementing
its Res. No. 2842 which govern the conduct of
the referendum proposing to annul or repeal
PK Blg. 10 and
 whether the questioned local initiative covers a
subject within the powers of the people of
Morong to enact (whether such initiative seeks
the amendment of a national law.
In this case, the SC was compelled to distinguish Initiative from
Referendum. To begin with, the process started by Garcia et. al.,
was an Initiative but respondent Comelec made preparations for a
referendum. In the body of the Comelec Resolution No. 2842, the
word“referendum” is repeated at least 27 times, but initiative is
not mentioned at all. The Comelec labeled the exercise as a
referendum, the counting of votes was entrusted to a referendum
committee, the documents were called referendum returns and so
forth. As distinguished, initiative is a process of law making by
the people themselves without the participation and against the
wishes of their elected representatives while referendum consists
merely with the electorate approving or rejecting what has been
drawn up or enacted by the legislative body by simply indicating
yes or no in the ballot.
In initiative, there is a need for the Comelec to supervise the
process closely, it’s authority therein extending not only to the
counting and canvassing of votes but also to seeing to it that the
matter or act submitted to the people is in the proper form and
language so it may be easily understood and voted upon by the
electorate. Care in this activity must be exercise that “no petition
embracing more than one subject shall be submitted to the
electorate, although two or more propositions may be submitted
in an initiative. “
As to the second issue, SBMA insists that the creation of the
SSEZ is now a fait accompli for the benefit of the entire nation
and Morong cannot unilaterally withdraw its concurrence or
impose new conditions for such concurrence as this would
effectively render nugatory the creation of the SSEZ. The SC
agreed with the contention of Garcia that the position of SBMA is
premature and conjectural because at this point the resolution is
just a proposal. If the people should reject it during the
referendum, then there is nothing to declare as illegal. A writ of
prohibition cannot issue upon a mere conjecture or possibility as
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courts may decide only actual controversies and not hypothetical
questions or cases.
3) RECALL – is the termination of official relationship of a
local elective public official for loss of confidence by the people
prior to the end of his term of office (Sec. 69, R.A. 7160 LGC). In
Angobung v. Comelec 269 SCRA 246 (1997), the Supreme Court
ruled that recall is the mode of removal of a public officer by the
people before the end of his term of office which shall be
exercised by the registered voters of a local government unit to
which the local elective official subject of such recall belongs.
The mode of initiating recall against a public elective official is
now limited to a petition commenced only by the registered voters
in the local unit concerned. Section 70 and 71 of RA 7160 is now
amended by RA 9244, otherwise known as An Act Eliminating the
Preparatory Recall Assembly as a Mode of Instituting Recall of
Elective Local Government Officials.
Section 70 of RA 7160 now reads as follows: “The recall of any
elective provincial, city, municipal or barangay official shall be
commenced by a petition of a registered voter in the LGU
concerned and supported by the registered voters in the LGU
concerned during the election in which the local official sought to
be recalled was elected subject to the following percentage
requirements:
 At least 25% in the case of an LGU with a voting
population of not more than 20,000
 At least 20% in the case of LGUs with a voting
population of at least 20,000 but not more than 75,000:
Provided, that in no case shall the required petitioners
be less than 5,000.
 At least 15% in the case of local government units with a
voting population of at least 75,000 but not more than
300,000: Provided however, that in no case shall the
required number of petitioners be less than 15,000; and
 At least 10% in the case of local government units with a
voting population of over 300,000 thousand: Provided
however, that in no case shall the required petitioners be
less than 45,000.
DATE OF RECALL – Upon the filing of a valid petition for recall
with the appropriate local office of the Comelec, the Comelec or
its duly authorized representative shall set the date of the election
or recall, which shall not be later than 30 days upon the
8
completion of the procedure outlined in the preceding article, in
the case of the barangay, city or municipal officials, and 45 days
in the case of provincial officials.
The official sought to be recalled shall automatically be
considered as duly registered candidate or candidates to the
pertinent positions and like other candidates, shall be entitled to
be voted upon.” (Sec. 71)
EFFECTIVITY OF RECALL– recall shall become effective only
upon the election and proclamation of a successor in the person
of the candidate who received the highest number of votes cast
during the election in recall. Should the official sought to be
recalled receive the highest number of votes, confidence in him is
thereby affirmed and he shall continue in office. (Sec. 72).
LIMITATIONS ON RECALL – an elective official may be subject
of recall elections only ONCE during his term of office exclusively
on the ground of LACK OF CONFIDENCE. The recall cannot be
undertaken within one (1) year from the date of the official’s
assumption of office or within one (1) immediately preceding a
regular election. (Sec. 74)
In Paras v. Comelec 264 SCRA 49, Paras, incumbent punong
brgy sought to bar the recall proceedings against him citing Sec.
74 (B) of RA 7160 that it was barred by the scheduled SK
elections. The SC settled the issue and held that the SK
elections is not considered a “regular local elections” for purposes
of recall under Sec. 74. The term regular local elections is
construed as one referring to an election where the office held by
the local elective official sought to be recalled will be contested
and be filled up by the electorate. It is confined to the regular
elections of elective national and local officials.
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
REGISTRATION OF VOTERS
Article V Section 1.Suffrage may be exercised by all
citizens of the Philippines NOT otherwise disqualified
by law, who are at least 18 years of age who shall
have resided in the Philippines for at least one (1)
year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for
at least six (6) months in the immediately preceding
the elections.No literacy, property or other
substantive requirements shall be imposed on the
exercise of suffrage.
Section 2. The Congress shall provide for a system
of securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as
well as a system of absentee voting by qualified
Filipinos abroad.
The Congress shall also design a procedure
for the disabled and illiterates to vote without the
assistance of other persons. Until then, they shall be
allowed to vote under existing laws and such rules as
the Commission on Elections may promulgate to
protect the secrecy of the ballot.
WHO MAY REGISTER (RA 8189, (An Act Providing
for the General Registration of Voters providing for a
System of Continuing Registration which took effect
on June 11, 1996)
9
Registration of voters is a means of determining who
possess the qualifications asa voter and regulating
the exercise of the right of suffrage.
Registration does not confer the right to vote; it is but
a condition precedent to the exercise of the right.
How is Registrationdone – Registration refers to the
ACTof accomplishing and filing of a sworn application
for registration (Voters Registration Record VRR) by a
qualified voter before the election officer of the city or
municipality wherein he resides and including the
VRR in the book of RV upon approval by the Election
Registration Board (Sec. 3(a)).
REGISTRATION IS EXTENDED TO: DOMESTIC
AND OVERSEAS VOTERS
FOR DOMESTIC VOTERS – GOVERNED BY RA
8189 The Voters Registration Act
(Sec. 9 (repealed Sections 116 and 117 of the OEC).
Sec. 9 clarified when the residency and age
requirements should be attained) – Salient
amendments:
Section 9 – Who may Register – All citizens of the
Philippines NOT otherwise disqualified by law who
are at least 18 years of age, who shall have resided
in the Philippines for at least one (1) year, and in the
place wherein they propose to vote, for at least six (6)
months immediately preceding the elections.
Any person who temporarily resides in another city,
municipality or country solely by reason of his
occupation, profession, employment in private or
public service, educational activities, work in the
military or naval reservations, within the Philippines,
service in the AFP, or confinement or detention in
government institution in accordance with law, shall
NOT be deemed to have lost his original residence.
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
Any person who, on the day of registration may not
have reached the required age or period of residence
but, who on the day of election shall possess such
qualifications, may register as a voter.”
Meynard Sabili v. Comelec/Florencio Librea 670
SCRA 670 (2012) – The Court have held that
“absence from residence to pursue studies or practice
a profession or registration as a voter other than the
place where one is elected, does not constitute loss
of residence”. Section 117 of the OEC provides that
“transfer of residence to any other place by reason of
one’s occupation, profession employment in private
and public service, educational activities work force,
the constabulary or national police force, or
confinement or detention in government institutions in
accordance with law” is not deemed as loss of
residence.
The Court ruled that there is nothing wrong in an
individual changing residences so he could run for an
elective post, for as long as he is able to prove with
reasonable certainty that he has effected a change of
residence for election law purposes for the period
required by law.
Sec. 11– Disqualifications: (Section 11 of R.A. 8189
repealed Sec. 118 of the OEC)
 Any person who has been sentenced by final
judgment to suffer imprisonment for not less
than one (1) year.
 Any person who has been adjudged by final
judgment by competent court or tribunal of
having committed any crime involving
disloyalty to the duly constituted government
such as rebellion, sedition, violation of the
10
anti-subversion and firearms law, or any crime
against national security in accordance with
law.
 Insane or incompetent as declared by a
competent authority.
WHEN DISABILITY REMOVED –
 Plenary pardon or amnesty – those sentenced
by final judgment. Article IX-C, Section 5
provides that the President cannot, without the
favorable recommendation of the Comelec
grant pardon, amnesty, parole or suspension
of sentence in cases involving violation of
election laws and violation of election rules
and regulations.
 Expiration of five (5) years after service of
sentence
 Official declaration by the proper authority that
the insanity or incompetency no longer exist.
Double Registrants – In all cases where registrants
are found to be registered in two (2) or more
districts/cities/municipalities, the latest registration
shall prevail which is deemed to be more in
consonance with the intent of the concerned
registered votes. Accordingly, they shall be allowed
to vote only in the district/city/municipality of their
latest registration.
This is distinguished from the policy on
double/multiple registrants found within the same
district/city/municipality where original registration
shall prevail over subsequent registrations. (Comelec
Res. 7893, 07 May 2007. See also Sec. 261 (y(5)) of
the OEC (Prohibited Acts) which provides “Any
person who, being a registered voter, registers anew
without filing an application for cancellation of his
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
previous registration” shall be guilty of an election
offense).
Residency Requirement:
Romeo A. Jalosjos v. Comelec Dan Erasmo, Sr. 670
SCRA 572 (2012)
Residence – The Local Government Code requires a
candidate seeking the position of provincial governor
to be a resident of the province for at least (1) year
before the election. For purposes of the election
laws, the requirement of residence is synonymous
with domicile, meaning that a person must not only
intend to reside in a particular place but must also
have personal presence in such place coupled with
conduct indicative of such intention. There is no hard
and fast rule to determine a candidate’s compliance
with residency requirement since the question of
residence is a question of intention. Still,
jurisprudence had laid down the following guidelines:
(a) every person has a domicile or residence
somewhere;
(b) where once established, that domicile remains
until he acquires a new one; and
(c) a person can have but one domicile at a time.
The Comelec concluded that Jalosjos has not come
to settle his domicile in Ipil since he has merely been
staying at his brother’s house. But this circumstance
alone cannot support such conclusion. Indeed, the
Court has repeatedly held that a candidate is not
required to have a house in a community to establish
his residence or domicile in a particular place. It is
sufficient that he should live there even if it be in a
rented house or in the house of a friend or relative.
To insist that the candidate own the house where he
lives would make property a qualification for public
office. What matters is that Jalosjos has proved two
11
things: actual physical presence in Ipil and an
intention of making it his domicile.
Mitra vs. Commission on Elections, Antonio Gonzales
and Orlando Balbon, Jr. 622 SCRA 744 (July 2010).
In this case, following the conversion of Puerto
Princesa (Mitra’s domicile of origin) from a component
city to a highly urbanized city whose residents can no
longer vote for provincial officials, Mitra abandoned
his domicile in Puerto Princesa and acquired a new
one in Aborlan which is within the LGU where he
intended to run. Mitra bought the old Maligaya
Feedmill and used the second floor as his residence.
In considering the residency issue, the
dwelling where a person permanently intends to
return to and to remain – his or her capacity or
inclination to decorate the place, or the lack of it, IS
IMMATERIAL. Comelec gravely abused its discretion
when it determined the fitness of a dwellingas a
person’s residence based solely on very personal and
subjective assessment standards when the law is
replete with standards that can be used. Comelec
used wrong considerations in arriving at the
conclusion that Mitra’s residence is not the residence
contemplated by law.
Assitio vs. Aguirre 619 SCRA 518 –Residence as
used in the law prescribing the qualifications for
suffrage and for elective office, is DOCTRINALLY
SETTLED to mean ‘domicile”, importing not only an
intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal
presence in that place, coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention inferable from a person’s
acts, utterances and activities. Domicile is not easily
lost. To successfully effect a transfer, one must
demonstrate: (1) an actual removal or change of
domicile; (2) bonafide intention of abandoning the
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
former place of residence and establishing a new
one; and (3) acts which correspond to said
purpose.Same ruling in earlier case of Romualdez-
Marcos v. Comelec, 248 SCRA 300.Requisites when
new domicile is acquired by choice.
ILLITIERATE AND DISABLED VOTERS – Illiterates
or disabled are referred to as a persons who cannot
by themselves prepare an application for registration
because of their physical disability and/or inability to
read and write. (Section 3 (e))
Section 14.Procedure for illiterate applicants (those
who cannot read and write) – assisted by the election
officer or any member of an accredited citizens arm.
The election officer shall place such illiterate person
under oath, ask him the questions and record the
answers given in order to accomplish the application
form in the presence of the majority of the members
of the Board. The accomplished form shall be
subscribed by the applicant in the presence of the
Board by means of thumbmark or some other
customary mark and it shall be subscribed and
attested by the majority of the members of the Board.
Procedure for disabled voters – the application for
registration of a physically disabled person (ex. blind,
no hands, senior citizen, mute) may be prepared by
any relative within the 4th civil degree
consanguinityor affinity or by the election officer or
any member of an accredited citizen’s arm using the
data supplied by the applicant.
NOTE: Common to both procedures, the fact of
illiteracy and disability shall be so indicated in the
application.
12
RA 10366 now provides accessible Polling Places for
Persons with Disabilities (PWDS and Senior Citizens
and also provides for, among others, assistance in
the accomplishment of registration forms. The law
was in line with the objective of Sec. 29 of the “Magna
Carta for Persons with Disability” (RA No. 7277)
which provides that “polling places should be made
accessible to disabled persons during national and
local elections.”
The Comelec shall likewise keep an updated
record of PWDs and SC registered voters, indicating
the types of disability and the assistance they need.
(Sec. 6, RA 10366). In designing the ballot, Comelec
shall ensure reasonable accommodation to PWDs
and SC to enable them to accomplish the ballots by
themselves (Sec. 10)
Comelec, in coordination with the National
Council on Disability Affairs (NCDA), the Commission
on Human Rights (CHR), and PWD and Senior
Citizens organization shall organize, design, and
implement sensitivity training programs for person
performing electoral duties to familiarize them the
needs of the PWDs and SC. (Sec. 12)
HOW TO REGISTER
Section 8– System of Continuing Registration of
Voters/Creation of Election Registration Boards
of  A qualified voter personally files an application
for registration DAILY with the office of the
election officer during regular office hours.
The ERB are authorized to act on all
applications for registration .
LIMITATION: No registration shall be conducted
during the period starting 120 days before a regular
elections and 90 days before a special elections.
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
Sec. 15 – Election Registration Board – There shall
be in each city and municipality as many as ERB’s as
there are election officers therein.
Composition – Election Officer (EO) as chairman and
as members, the public school official most senior in
rank and the local civil registrar (LCR), or in his
absence, the city or municipal treasurer (MT).
In case of disqualification of the EO, the
Commission shall designate as acting EO who shall
serve as chairman of the ERB. In cases of the non-
availability of the LCR or the MT, Comelec shall
designate any other appointive civil service official
from the same locality as substitute.
Restrictions to appointment – No member of the
board shall be related to each other or to any
incumbent city or municipal elective official within the
4th civil degree of consanguinity or affinity. If in
succeeding elections, any of the newly elected city or
municipal officials is related to a member of the board
within the same degree, such member is
automatically disqualified to preserve the integrity of
the ERB.
Every registered party and such organizations
as may be authorized by the Comelec shall be
entitled to a watcher in every registration board.
Sec. 17 – Procedure for hearing of applications.
 Date of hearing posted in the city or municipal
bulletin board and EO office at least 1 week
before date of hearing
 If objected to, EO shall receive evidence.
Physical presence of applicant in this case is
mandatory to rebut evidence presented in
opposition thereto
13
 If no objection to application, physical
appearance not required and will be duly
informed in writing
 Applications for registration shall be heard and
processed on a quarterly basis. Board shall
convene on the 3rd day of Monday of April,
July, October and January of every calendar
year except in an election year to conform with
the 120 days prohibitive period before election
day.
Section. 21 – Publication of Action on Application for
Registration
SECTION 12.Change of Residence to another City or
Municipality – Any registered voter who has
transferred residence to another city or municipality
may apply with the EO of his new residence for the
transfer of his registration records. The application
for transfer of registration shall be subject to the
requirements of notice and hearing and the approval
of the ERB in accordance with this Act. Upon
approval of the application for transfer, and after
notice of such approval to the EO of the former
residence of the voter, said EO shall transmit by
registered mail the voter’s registration record to the
EO of the voter’s new residence.
Section 13.Change of Address in the Same City or
Municipality –Any voter who has changed his address
in the same city or municipality shall immediately
notify the EO in writing. If the change of address
involves a change in precinct, the Board shall transfer
his registration record to the precinct book of voters of
his new precinct and notify the voter of his new
precinct. All changes of address shall be reported to
the office of the provincial election supervisor and the
Commission in Manila.
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW 14

special election. Upon approval, the Board, shall

Sec. 27 – DEACTIVATION – is a process wherein the retrieve the registration records from the inactive file
registration record of a voter is removed by the ERB and include the same in the corresponding precinct
from the corresponding precinct book of voters and book of voters.
places the same in an inactive file properly marked REQUIREMENT: Local heads or representatives of
and dated in indelible ink and after entering the cause political parties shall be properly notified of the
for deactivation which are as follows: approved applications.
 Those who are disqualified by virtue of a final
judgment, insane and incompetent persons Sec.29 – CANCELLATION – is a process wherein the
as officially declared. Board cancels the registration records of those who
 Any person who failed to vote in the two (2) have died as certified by the local civil registrar who
successive preceding regular elections as shall submit each month a certified list of persons
shown by his voting records. who died during the previous month to the election
 Any person whose registration has been officer of the place where the deceased is registered.
ordered excluded by the court.
 Any person who has lost his Filipino PETITION FOR INCLUSION OR EXCLUSION.
citizenship. Remedies of persons whose application for
For purposes of the above – the Clerks of Court reactivation, inclusion or correction has been
of the MTC, MTCC, RTC and SB shall furnish the EO disapproved or those who intend to exclude a voter
of the city or municipality concerned at the end of from the list of voters.
each month a certified list of persons who are
disqualified by virtue of a final judgment, with their Panlaqui v. Comelec 613 SCRA 573 –Voters’
addresses. inclusion/exclusion proceedings essentially involve
For those who lost their citizenship, insanity and the issue of whether a voter shall be included in or
incompetency, the Comelec may request a certified excluded from the list of voters based on the
list of such persons from the government agencies qualifications required by law and the facts presented
concerned. to show possession of these qualifications. As
distinguished from the procedure in certificate of
Sec. 28 – REACTIVATION – is a process whereby a candidacies (petition to deny due course or cancel a
voter whose registration records has been certificate of candidacy) on the other hand, the
deactivated files with the election officer a sworn denial/cancellation proceedings involve the issue of
application for reactivation of his registration in the whether there is a false representation of a material
form of an affidavit by stating therein that the grounds fact (Sec. 78).
for the deactivation no longer exist.
Sec. 33 JURISDICTION – The Municipal and
PERIOD TO FILE – Any time but not later than 120 Metropolitan Trial Courts shall have original
days before a regular election and 90 days before a jurisdiction over all cases of inclusion and exclusion
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
of voters in their respective cities or municipalities.(By
express provision of Article IX-C, Section 2 (3) of the
Constitution, the Comelec shall decide all questions
affecting elections, except the right to vote. This
question is a justiciable issue which finds redress in
the judiciary.(Pungutan v. Comelec 43 SCRA 1
(1972).
Again – in Panlaqui vs. Comelec 613 SCRA 573 - It is
not within the province of the RTC in a voter’s
inclusion/exclusion proceedings to take cognizance of
and determine the presence of a false representation
of a material fact. It has no jurisdiction to try the
issues of whether the misrepresentation relates to
material fact and whether there was an intension to
deceive the electorate in terms of one’s qualifications
for public office. The finding that Velasco was not
qualified to vote due to lack of residency requirement
does not translate into a finding of a deliberate
attempt to mislead, misinform or hide a fact which
would otherwise render him ineligible.
Canicosa v. Comelec 282 SCRA 512 (1997). The
question of inclusion or exclusion from the list of
voters involves the right to vote which is not within the
power and authority of the Comelec to rule upon.
The determination of whether one has the right to
vote is a justiciable issue properly cognizable by our
regular courts.
WHERE TO APPEAL – Decisions of the Municipal or
Metropolitan Trial Courts may be appealed by the
aggrieved party to the Regional Trial Court within five
(5) from receipt of notice thereof. Otherwise, said
decision shall become final and executory. Regional
Trial Court shall decide the appeal within ten (10)
days from the time it is received and the Regional
15
Trial Court decision shall immediately become final
and executory. No motion for reconsideration shall
be entertained.
Domino v. Comelec 310 546 (1999). Except for the
right to remain in the list of voters or for being
excluded thereform for the particular election in
relation to which the proceedings had been held, a
decision in an exclusion proceeding, even if final and
unappealable does not acquire the nature of res
judicata. Thus, a decision in an exclusion proceeding
would neither be conclusive on the voters political
status, nor bar subsequent proceedings on his right to
be registered as a voter in any other election.
Sec. 34 – Petition for Inclusion of Voters in the list –
WHO MAY FILE: any person whose application for
registration –
 Has been disapproved by the Board; or
 Whose name has been stricken out from the
list;
 Whose name was not included in the precinct
list of voters
 Who has been included therein with a wrong
or misspelled name (after the Board
disapproves its application for reinstatement
or correction of name) may file with the court.
PERIOD TO FILE: Any time except 105 days prior to
a regular election or 75 days prior to a special
election. The petition should be supported by a
certificate of disapproval of his application and proof
of service of notice upon the Board. MTC shall
decide within fifteen (15) days after it’s filing.
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
If the decision is for the inclusion of voters in the
permanent list of voters, the Board shall place the
application for registration previously disapproved in
the corresponding BV and indicate in the application
for registration the date of the order of inclusion and
the court which issued the same.
Section 35 – Petition for Exclusion of Voters from the
list – WHO MAY FILE: any registered voter,
representative of a political party or the Election
Officer.
PERIOD TO FILE: Any time except 100 days prior to
a regular election or 65 days prior to a special
election. Supporting documents shall be proof of
notice to the Board and to the challenged voter. MTC
shall decide within ten (10) days.
If the decision is for exclusion, the Board, shall
remove the voters registration record from the
corresponding BV, enter the order of exclusion
therein.
Akbayan v. Comelec March 26, 2001 – The petition
for exclusion is a necessary component to registration
since it is a safety mechanism that gives a measure
of protection against flying voters, non-qualified
registrants, and the like. The prohibitive period, on
the other hand, serves as the purpose of securing the
voters substantive right to be included in the list of
voters.
The bone of contention of petitioners in this case in
praying for a 2-day special registration of new voters
for the May 14, 2001 elections which was denied by
the Comelec on account of operational impossibility,
undermined their constitutional right to vote and
16
caused the disenfranchisement of around 4M
Filipinos of voting age who failed to register before
the registration deadline set by the Comelec.
As ruled, the right of suffrage is not absolute, as in
the enjoyment of all other rights, it is subject to
existing substantive and procedural requirements
embodied in our Constitution, statute and other
repositories of law.
Procedural limitation – must undergo the process of
registration, in addition to the maximum requirements
set by the Constitution under Section 1, Article V, the
act of registration being an indispensable
precondition and essential to the right of suffrage and
election process. Referring to Section 8 of RA 8189,
the law is explicit that “no registration shall however
be conducted during the period starting 120 days
before a regular election and 90 days before a special
election.”
Sec. 35 of RA 8189 on the hand speaks of the
prohibitive period within which to file a sworn petition
for the exclusion of voters from the permanent list of
voters. Thus if the special registration of voters will
be conducted, then the prohibitive period for filing
petitions for exclusion must likewise be adjusted to a
later date, if not, then no one can challenge the voters
list which is violative of the principles of due process
and would open the registration process to abuse and
seriously compromise the integrity of the voter’s list
and that of the entire election.
ABSENTEE VOTING
Local Absentee Voting – In local absentee voting,
public officials and employees, in the performance of
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
their election duties, stationed in places other than
the place where they are registered voters of (e.g.
members of the PNP, AFP, offices of the Comelec,
school teachers, among others) are allowed to vote in
their respective place of work (Sec. 12, RA 7166).
RA No.10380, otherwise known as the “Local
Absentee Voting for Media Act”, now allow media
practitioners to vote on specified days earlier than
Election Day so that that even if on Election Day, they
are assigned to cover election events away from their
place of registration as voters, they would
nonetheless have the opportunity to cast their votes.
Limitation: Those entitled to avail of local absentee
voting shall only be allowed to vote for President, VP,
Senators, and Party-List Representative
Grounds for disapproval of the Application for Local
Absentee Voting
1) The applicant is not a RV or his registration
records have been deactivated.
2) It was filed out of time;
3) It was not sworn to or otherwise not under
oath by any person authorized to administer
oath;
4) It was only photocopied/faxed;
5) The Certification portion of the application
form is not duly accomplished.
OVERSEAS ABSENTEE VOTING (OAV) – RA 9189
Absentee Voters Act of 2003
Under RA 9189, Filipino citizens who are overseas
workers, immigrants or permanent residents in other
countries may vote in Philippine national elections
when they are away from the country on the day of
17
the elections; Provided, That in the case of
immigrants or permanent residents, they file a sworn
statement that they will resume actual physical
permanent residence within three (3) years from
approval of their registration. (Sec. 5(d))
A. Scope of OAV – Definition: Absentee voting
refers to the process by which qualified
citizens of the Philippines abroad exercise
their right to vote. (Sec. 3(a))
B. Coverage – All citizens of the Philippines
abroad who are not disqualified by law, at
least 18 years of age on election day, may
vote for President, VP, Senators and Party
List Representatives (Sec.
Section 5 – Disqualification:
(a) Those who have lost their Filipino
citizenship in accordance with Philippine
laws;
(b) Those who have expressly renounced
their Philippine citizenship and who have
pledged allegiance to a foreign country;
(c) Those who have committed and are
convicted by a final judgment by a court or
tribunal of an offense punishable by
imprisonment of not less than one (1)
year, including those who have committed
and been found guilty of Disloyalty as
defined under Article 137 of the Revised
Penal Code, such as disability not having
removed by plenary pardon or amnesty;
Provided, however, That any person
disqualified to vote upon the expiration of
five (5) years after service of sentence;
Provided further, That the Commission
may take cognizance of final judgments
ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
issued by foreign courts or tribunals only
on the basis of reciprocity and subject to
the formalities and processes prescribed
by the Rules of Court on execution of
judgments;
(d) An immigrant or a permanent resident
who is recognized as such in the host
country, unless he/she executes, upon
registration, an affidavit prepared for the
purpose by the Commission declaring that
he/she shall resume actual physical
permanent residence in the Philippines
not later than three (3) years from
approval of his/her registration under this
Act.
a. Such affidavit shall also state that
he/she has not applied for
citizenship in another country.
b. Failure to return shall be cause for
the removal of the name of the
immigrant or permanent resident
from the National Registry of
Absentee Voters and his/her
permanent disqualification to vote
in absentia;
(e) Any citizen of the Philippines abroad
previously declared insane or incompetent
by competent authority in the Philippines
or abroad, as verified by the Philippine
embassies, consulates or foreign service
establishments concerned, unless such
competent authority subsequently certifies
that such person is no longer insane or
incompetent.
18
Macalintal v. Comelec 405 SCRA 614 (2003) – The
execution of the affidavit itself is not the enabling or
enfranchising act. The affidavit required in Section
5(d) is not only proof of the intention of the immigrant
or permanent resident to go back and resume
residency in the Philippines, but more significantly, it
serves as an explicit expression that he had not in
fact abandoned his domicile of origin. The affidavit is
required of immigrants and permanent residents
abroad because by their status in the host countries,
they are presumed to have relinquished their intent to
return to this country; thus, without the affidavit, the
presumption of abandonment of Philippine domicile
shall remain.
3. Casting of Ballots in OAV – The overseas
voter shall cast his ballot within 30 days before
election day or 60 days before election day in the
case of seafarers. (Sec. 16.3)
4. Counting of Ballots of OAV – a) Only
ballots cast and mailed ballots received by
embassies, consulates and other foreign
establishments before the closing of voting on
election day shall be counted (Sec. 16.7 and Sec.
18.3).
b) The counting shall be conducted on site
and shall be synchronized with the start of counting in
the Philippines (Sec. 18.1).
c. The Special Board of Election Inspectors
(SBEI) shall composed of a chairman and two (2)
members
 The ambassador, consul general or
career public officer designated by the
Comelec shall be the chairman.
 In the absence of government officers,
two Filipino citizens qualified to vote under
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
this Act shall be deputized as members
(Sec. 18.3)
 Immediately after the counting, the SBEI
shall transmit by facsimile or electronic
mail the result to the Comelec and the
accredited major political parties.
5. Canvassing of OAV – A Special Board of
Canvassers (SBOC) composed of a lawyer preferably
of the Comelec as chairman, a senior career officers
from any government agency maintaining a post
abroad and, in the absence of another government
officer, a citizen of the Philippines qualified to vote
under this Act, shall be constituted to canvass the
election returns.
The SBOC shall transmit by facsimile,
electronic mail or any other safe and reliable means
of transmission, the certificate of canvass and the
statements of votes to the Comelec and the major
accredited parties.
The certificates of canvass and the statements
of votes shall be the primary basis for the national
canvass. (Sec. 18.4)
Overseas Voting Act of 2013– The President on May
27, 2013 signed into lawRA 10590, OAV 2013,
amending the Overseas Voting Act of 2003. With the
passage of the law, Filipino immigrants abroad will no
longer need to execute an affidavit stating that they
will return to the Philippines within 3 years before they
are allowed in absentia.
In the landmark case of Nicolas-Lewis vs. Comelec,
dual citizens were refused by Comelec to register and
vote in the 2004 Philippine elections, the Supreme
Court ruled in 2006 that “there is no provision in the
dual citizenship law, RA 9225 (Citizenship Retention
19
and Reacquisition Act of 2003 – requiring duals to
actually establish residence and physically stay in the
Philippines first before they can exercise their right to
vote.”
The ruling established a precedent that dual citizens
can register and vote without establishing residence
in the Philippines. A provision in the amended law is
inserted to emphasize that dual citizens who
reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship
under RA 9225 can exercise their right of suffrage.
The amended law also mandates the creation of the
Resident Election Registration Boards (RERB). The
specific provision is a new insertion institutionalizing
the overseas voting system by creating an office
within the Comelec exclusively for overseas voting.
The amendments also empowers the Comelec to
attain the most effective and innovative way of using
advance technology in enfranchising Filipinos
overseas without compromising the secrecy and
sanctity of the electoral process.
Loida Nicolas-Lewis, et. al. vs. Comelec G.R. No.
162759, August 6, 2006. - Petitioners are dual
citizens having retained or reacquired Philippine
Citizenship under RA 9225 or the Citizenship
Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003. As such,
they sought registration and certification as overseas
absentee voters under RA 9189 or the Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003, in order to vote in the
May 2004 elections. However, the Philippine
embassy in the US advised them that per Comelec
letter dated September 23, 2003, they have yet no
residence requirement as prescribed by the
Constitution. Petitioners sought a clarification from
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
the Comelec which thereafter, expressed the opinion
that dual citizens under RA 9225 cannot exercise the
right of suffrage under the Overseas Absentee Voting
Law because said law was not enacted for them,
hence, they are considered regular voters who have
to meet requirements of residency, among others.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners and others who
might have meanwhile retained and/or reacquired
Philippine citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 may vote
as absentee voter under RA 9189.
HELD: Section 1 of Article V of the Philippine
Constitution prescribed residency requirement as a
general eligibility factor for the right to vote. On the
other hand, Section 2 thereof, authorizes congress to
devise a system wherein an absentee may vote,
implying that a non-resident may, as an exception to
the residency prescription in the preceding section,
be allowed to vote.
There is no provision in the dual citizenship law (RA
9225), requiring “duals” to actually establish
residence and physically stay in the Philippines first
before they can exercise their right to vote. On the
contrary, RA 9225, in implicit acknowledgement that
“duals” are most likely non-residents, grants under
Section 5(1) the same right of suffrage as granted to
an absentee voter under RA 9189 which aims to
enfranchise as much as possible all overseas
Filipinos, who, save for the residency requirement
exacted of an ordinary conditions, are qualified to
vote as ruled in Makalintal vs. Comelec 405 SCRA
614.
POLITICAL PARTIES, PARTY LIST AND CITIZENS
ARM
20
Article IX-C, Sec. 1 (5), authorizes the
Comelec under the Constitution to “Register, after
sufficient publication, political parties, organizations,
or coalitions which, in addition to other requirements,
must present their platform or program of
government; and accredit citizens’ arms of the
Commission on Elections.
Section 60 of the OEC/Section 1, Rule 32 of the
Comelec Rules of Procedure provides that any group
pursuing the same political ideals may register with
the Comelec. HOW?by filing a verified petition with its
Law Department duly verified by its President and
Secretary-General, or any official duly authorized to
do so under its Constitutions and by-laws.
Before Comelec takes action, the Comelec shall first
verify, through its field offices, the status and capacity
of the petitioner and the veracity of the allegations in
the petition. (Sec. 4, Rule 32). After the verification
process, the Petition will be published with the Notice
of Hearing.
Once registered the political party is issued a
Certificate of Registration (Sec. 7) (1) acquires
juridical personality (2) public is informed of the
party’s existence and ideals (3) it identifies the party
and its officers for purposes of regulation by the
Comelec.For purposes of the electoral process that
an organization need not be a political party.
Limitations on Registration –
 It is a religious sect or denomination or
association, organized for religious
purposes. Registration of religious sects are
prohibited for the purpose of the electoral
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
process which is made in the spirit of
separation of church and state and intended
to prevent churches from wielding political
power.Does not extend to organizations with
religious affiliations or to political parties
which derive their principles from religious
beliefs.
 Those who seek to achieve their goals
through unlawful means
 Those which refuse to adhere to the
Constitution
 Those which are supported by any foreign
government (Sec. 2(5) Article IX-C)
Cancellation of Registration (Sec. 8) –Upon verified
complaint of any interested party, or motu propio by
the Commission, the registration of any political party,
coalition of political parties or organizations under the
party-list system may be cancelled after due notice
and hearing on the following grounds:
 (a) Acceptance by the political party, coalition
of political parties, or organizations or any of
its candidates, of financial contributions from
foreign governments and/or their agencies for
activities related to elections.
 (b) Violation of laws, rules or regulations
relating to elections, plebiscites, referenda or
initiative.
 © Untruthful statements in its petition for
registration
 (d) The said political party, coalition of political
parties or organization has become a religious
sect or denomination, is pursuing its goals thru
violence or other unlawful means, is refusing
to adhere to or uphold the Constitution of the
Philippines, or is receiving support from any
foreign government;
21
 (e) Failure to comply with applicable laws,
rules or regulations of the Commission
 (f) Failure to field official candidates in the last
two preceding elections or failure of their
candidates to obtain at least five (5) per
centum of the votes cast in the last two
preceding elections.
Jurisdiction of Comelec over Inter-Party
Disputes/Power to Register Political Parties
Samson Alcantara, et. al. vs. Comelec 696 SCRA
547 (2013) – Under the Constitution, the Comelec is
empowered to register political parties. In the
exercise of its power to register political parties, the
Comelec necessarily possesses the power to pass
upon the question of who, among the legitimate
officers of the part-list group, are entitled to exercise
the right and privileges granted to a party-list group
under the law. The Comelec’s jurisdiction on this
point is well-settled and is not here disputed.
Luis LokinJr./Teresita Planas v. Comelec/CIBAC 674
SCRA 538 (2012)
In Atienza v. Comelec (612 SCRA 961 (2010), it was
expressly settled that the Comelec possessed the
authority to resolve intra-party disputes as a
necessary tributary of its constitutionally mandated
power to enforce election laws and register political
parties. The Court, therein cited Kalaw v. Comelec
and Palmares v. Comelec which uniformly upheld the
Comelec’s jurisdiction over intra-party disputes: As
ruled in Kalaw v. Comelec, the Comelec’s powers and
functions under Section 2, Article IX-C of the
Constitution, “include the ascertainment of the identity
of the political party and its legitimate officers
responsible for the acts.” The Court also declared in
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
another case that the Comelec’s power to register
political parties necessarily involved the determination
of the persons who must act on its behalf. Thus, the
Comelec may resolve an intra-party leadership
dispute, in a proper case brought before it, as an
incident of its power to register political parties.
Liberal Party vs. Commission on Elections 620 SCRA
393 (May 6, 2010), the SC distinguished
REGISTRATION andACCREDITATION of a political
party. The root of this petition before the SC is the
Nationalista Party-Nationalista Party Coalition (NP-
NPC) petition before the COMELEC for registration
as a coalition and accreditation as the dominant
minority party. While the Comelec En Banc claimed
jurisdiction over the registration of coalitions and has
in fact decreed NP-NPC’s registration, the Comelec
however did NOT rule on the accreditation aspect.
The registration of a coalition and the accreditation of
a dominant minority party are two separate matters
that are substantively distinct from each other.
 Section 2(5), Article IX-C and Rule 32 of the
CRPregulate the registration of political
parties, organizations or coalition of political
parties.Accreditation as a dominant party is
governed by Comelec Resolution No. 8752,
Section 1 of which states that the petition for
accreditation shall be filed with the Clerk of the
Commission who shall docket it as an SPP
(means Special Proceedings (DM) case. This
was the manner the NP-NPC was docketed.
 Registration of political parties is a special
proceeding assigned to a Division for handling
under the CRP. No similar clear cut rules is
available to a petition for accreditation as a
dominant party.
22
 Registration must first take place before a
request for accreditation can be made.
Accreditation is the next natural step to follow
after registration.
When the Comelec En Banc, resolved the registration
of the NP- NPC the case is terminated and ripe for
review by the SC via a Petition for Certiorari. The
issue with respect to accreditation is a separate issue
which is treated in a separate proceedings. As ruled,
a Motion for Reconsideration of a Resolution of the
Comelec En Banc is a prohibited pleading (Sec. 1(d)
Rule 13). The remedy available to a party is a
petition for certiorari with the SC pursuant to Article
IX-A, Sec. 7 and Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino, represented by its
Chairman Edgardo J. Angara v. Comelec, et. al. 423
SCRA 665, (the Comelec misapplied equity in this
case). LDP informed the Comelec by way of
Manifestation that only the Party Chairman or his
authorized representative may endorse the COC of
the party’s official candidates; that Rep. Butch Aquino
was on “indefinite force leave” and in the meantime
Ambassador Enrique Zaldivar was designated Acting
Secretary General.
Aquino in a comment alleged that the Party
Chairman does not have the authority to impose
disciplinary sanctions on the Secretary General and
that the Manifestation filed has no basis praying that
Comelec disregards the same. Comelec issued an
order requiring the parties to file verified petition.
Pending resolution, a Certificate of Nomination of
Sen. Panfilo Lacson as LDP candidate for President
was filed with the Comelec which was signed by Rep.
Aquino as LDP Secretary General
Comelec issued a Resolution granting the
petition with LEGAL EQUITY for both Petitioner and
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
Oppositor (Angara Wind and Aquino Wing). ISSUE:
Whether or not Comelec gravely abused its discretion
in issuing the subject Resolution. RULING – the only
issue is simply “Who as between the Party Chairman
and the Secretary General has the authority to sign
certificates of candidacy of the official candidates of
the party. Yes Comelec acted with grave abuse of
discretion. While it has jurisdiction to rule upon
questions of party identity and leadership as an
incident to its enforcement powers.It well within its
competence to inquire into which party officer has
authority to sign and endorse certificate of candidacy
of party’s nominees. And to resolve the issue raised,
the Comelec need only to turn to the Party
Constitution and election laws. The Comelec
Resolution is INDECISION in the guise of equity. It
chose not to because of its irrational fear of treading,
as Aquino contends, on “unchartered” territories but
which have long been chartered by jurisprudence.
Comelec divided the LDP into wings both
having authority to nominate candidates for every
elective position. Consequently, Comelec planted
seeds of confusion among the electorate who are apt
to be confounded by two candidates from a single
political party. This was not only a disservice to the
opposition but to the voting public as well as its
Resolution facilitated, rather than forestalled, the
division of the minority party.
Agapay ng Indigenous Peoples Rights Alliance (A-
IPRA) v. Comelec 696 SCRA 563 – the Supreme
Courtreiterated its ruling in Laban that “the
ascertainment of the identity of a political party and its
legitimate officers is a matter that is well within its
authority. The source of this authority is not other
than the fundamental law itself, which vests upon the
Comelec the power and function to enforce and
23
administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of election.”
Damasen vs. Tumamao 613 SCRA 49 (2010) – the
discretion of accepting members to a political party is
a right and a privilege, a purely internal matter, which
the Court cannot meddle in. The reason behind the
right given to a political party to nominate a
replacement where a permanent vacancy occurs in
the Sanggunian is to maintain the party
representation as willed by the people in the election
(Sec. 45 (b) of RA 7160 Rule on Succession and as
held in Navarro v. CA 672 SCRA 355 (2010).
Damasen was not a bonafide member. Tumamao
was husband of the VM who died).
PARTY LIST
R.A. 7941, otherwise known as An Act Providing for
the Election of Party-List Representatives through the
Part-List System. The party-list system is a
mechanism of the proportional representation in the
election of representatives to the HR from national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations or
coalitions thereof, registered with the Comelec, to
enable Filipinos belonging to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors to contribute legislation that
would benefit them. (Sec. 2)
Party-list representation shall constitute 20% of the
total number of representatives by selection or
election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural minorities, women, youth and
such other sectors as may be provided by law, except
the religious sector (Sec. 11 and Art. V, Sec. 5(2)
1987 Constitution)
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
NOTE: The party-list system is composed of three (3)
different groups: (1) national parties or organizations;
(2) regional parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral
parties or organization. National and regional parties
or organization are different from sectoral parties or
organizations. The former need not be organized
along sectoral lines and not represent any particular
sectoral nor should they be marginalized and
underrepresented.
Atong Paglaum, Inc. vs. Comelec G.R. Nos._______,
02 April 2013, the Supreme Court ruled – “Sec. 5(1),
Art. VI of the Constitution is crystal clear that there
shall be “a party-list system of registered national,
regional and sectoral parties or organization. “The
commas after the words national, and regional,
separate national and regional parties from sectoral
parties. Had the framers of the 1987 Constitution
intended national and regional parties to be at the
same time sectoral, they would have stated “national
and regional sectoral parties.” They did not, precisely
because it was never their intention to make the
party-list system exclusively sectoral.
What the framers intended, and what they
expressly wrote in Section 5(1), could not be any
clearer: the party-list system is composed of 3-
different groups, and the sectoral parties belong to
only one of the 3 groups.”
COCOFED v. Commission on Elections 703 SCRA
165 – Section 4 and 5 of RA 7941 distinguished.
Section 4 of RA 7941, a party-list group already
registered “need not register anew” for purposes of
every subsequent election, but only needs to file a
manifestation of intent to participate with the
Comelec. Section 5 on the other hand provides, that
an applicant for registration has to file with the
24
Comelec, not later than 90 days before the election, a
verified petition stating its desire to participate in the
party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral
party or organization or a coalition of such parties or
organization. The applicant is required to submit its
constitution, by-laws, platform of government, list of
officers, coalition agreement and other relevant
information as the Comelec may required. Aside from
these, the law requires the publication of the
applicant’s petition in at least 2 national newspapers
of general circulation. The Comelec then resolves
the petition, determining whether the applicant has
complied with all the necessary requirements.
Lokin, Jr. vs. Commission on elections 621 SCRA
385 (June 22, 2010), the SC ruled that Comelec
cannot issue rules and regulations that provide a
ground for the substitution of a party-list nominee
NOT written in R.A.7941.
Sec. 8 provides – “Nomination of Party-List
Representatives. Each registered party, organization
or coalition shall submit to the Comelec not later than
45 days before the election a list of names, not less
than five (5), from which party-list representatives
shall be chosen in case it obtains the required
number of votes.
A person may be nominated in one (1) list
only. Only persons who have given their consent in
writing may be named in the list. The list shall not
include any candidate for any elective office or a
person who has lost his bid for an elective office in
the immediately preceding election. NO change of
names or alteration of the order of nominees shall be
allowed after the same shall have been submitted to
the Comelec except in cases (1) where the nominee
dies, or (2) withdraws in writing his nomination, (3)
becomes incapacitated in which case the name of the
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list.
Incumbent sectoral representatives in the HR who are
nominated in the party-list system shall not be
considered resigned.”
CIBAC (Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption)
thru its President Emmanuel Villanueva manifested
their intent to participate in the May 14, 2007
synchronized national and local elections and
submitted their list of 5 nominees (Villanueva, Lokin
(herein petitioner), Cruz-Gonzales, Tugna and
Galang). The list was later published in the
newspapers of general circulation. Before the
elections, Villanueva filed a certificate of nomination,
substitution and amendment of the list of nominees
whereby it withdrew the nominations of Lokin, Tugna
and Galang and substituted Borje. The amended list
included Villanueva, Cruz-Gonzales and Borje.
Subsequently, Villanueva transmitted to Comelec the
signed petitions of more than 81% if the CIBAC
members in order to confirm the withdrawal of the
nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang.
Based on the Party-List Canvas Report, it
showed that CIBAC was entitled to a second seat,
hence, the counsel of CIBAC filed with the Comelec
sitting as National Board of Canvassers, a request to
proclaim Lokin as the 2nd nominee which was
opposed by Villanueva and Cruz-Gonzales. Since
Comelec failed to act on the filing of the certificate of
nomination, substitution and amendment of the list of
nominees and the petitions of the more than 81% of
CIBAC members, Villanueva filed a petition to confirm
the said certificate with the Comelec which was
docketed as E.M. No. 07-054. In the meantime,
Comelec as NBC partially proclaimed several party
lists as having won which included Cibac.
The Secretary General of CIBAC informed the
Secretary General of the HR to formally swear Lokin
25
into office but which was denied in view of the
pendency of E.M. No. 07-054 which approved the
withdrawal of the nominations of Lokin et. al. and the
substitution of Borje. Cruz-Gonzales was proclaimed
as the official second nominee.
Lokin brought before the SC via Mandamus to
compel respondent Comelec to proclaim him as the
official second nominee of CIBAC. Also, in another
petition, Lokin assailed Sec. 13 of Resolution No.
7804 (Rules and Regulations Governing the filing of
Manifestation of Intent to Participate and submission
of Names of Nominees under the Party-List) and its
resolution in E.M. No. 07-054.
The Comelec asserts that a petition for
certiorari is an inappropriate recourse in law due to
the proclamation of Cruz-Gonzales as representative
and her assumption of that office; that Lokin’s proper
recourse was an electoral protest filed in the HRET,
therefore, the Court has no jurisdiction over the
matter being raised by Lokin. CIBAC posits that
Lokin is guilty of forum shopping for filing a petition for
mandamus and a petition for certiorari, considering
that both petitions ultimately seek to have him
proclaimed as the second nominee of CIBAC.
ISSUES: a) Whether or not the Court has
jurisdiction over the controversy. The Court has
jurisdiction. The controversy involving Lokin is neither
an EP nor an action for QW, for it concerns a very
peculiar situation in which Lokin is seeking to be
seated as second nominee of CIBAC. Although an
EP may properly be available to one part-list
organization seeking to unseat another party-list
organization to determine which between the
defeated and the winning party-list organizations
actually obtained the majority of the legal votes,
Lokin’s case is not one in which a nominee of a
particular party-list organization thereby wants to
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
unseat another nominee of the same party list.
Neither does an action for QW lie, considering that
the case does not involve the ineligibility and
disloyalty of Cruz-Gonzales to the RP, or some other
case of disqualification.
Lokin has correctly brought this special civil
action for certiorari against the Comelec to seek the
review of its resolution in accordance with Section 7
of Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution,
notwithstanding the oath and assumption of office by
Cruz-Gonzales. The constitutional mandate is now
implemented by Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of
Procedure, which provides for the review of the
judgments, final orders or resolution of the Comelec
and the Commission on Audit. As Rule 64 states, the
mode of review is by a petition for certiorari in
accordance with Rule 65 to be filed in the SC within
the limited period of 30 days. The Court has original
and exclusive jurisdiction over Lokins certiorari and
for mandamus.
(b) Both actions, certiorari and mandamus did
not violate the rule against forum shopping even if the
actions involved the same parties, because they were
based on different causes of action and the reliefs
they sought were different.
© Comelec gravely abused its discretion in
promulgating Section 13 of Res. No. 7804 as it
expanded the exceptions under Sec. 8 of RA 7941
Section 8 enumerates only 3 instances in which the
party-list organization can substitute another person
in place of the nominee. The enumeration is
exclusive.
Cocofed Case – As early as February 8, 2012,
Comelec had informed, through its Resolution No.
9359, all registered parties who wished to participate
in the May 2013 party-list elections that they shall file
26
with the Comelec a Manifestation of Intent to
Participate in the party list election together with its
list of at least 5 nominees, no later than May 31,
2012. Under Sec. 6(5) of RA 7941, violation of or
failure to comply with laws, rules and regulations
relating to elections is a ground for the cancellation of
registration. Cocofed failed to submit a list of 5
nominees (submitted only 2 nominees) despite ample
opportunity to do so before the elections, which is a
violation imputable to the party under said provision.
Pursuant to Section 8 of RA 7941, the Court
cannot leave to the party the discretion to determine
the number of nominees it would submit. The
submission of the list is a statutory requirement for
the registration of party-list groups and the
submission of this list is part of a registered party’s
continuing compliance with the law to maintain its
registration.
A party-list group’s previous registration with
the Comelec confers no vested right to the
maintenance of its registration. In order to maintain a
party in a continuing compliance status, the party
must prove not only its continued possession of the
requisite qualifications but, equally, must show its
compliance with the basic requirements of the law.
Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy (ANAD) v.
Comelec 705 SCRA 340 (2013) – the Supreme Court
reiterated. . compliance with Section 8 of RA 7941 is
essential as the said provision is a safeguard against
arbitrariness. Section 8 rids a party-list organization
of the prerogative to substitute and replace its
nominees, or even to swotch the order of the
nominees, after submission of the list to Comelec.
Abayhon vs. HRET et. al 612 SCRA 375/Palparan Jr.
vs. HRET et. al. – These two cases were
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
consolidated and jointly resolved as it both concerns
the authority of the HRET to pass upon the eligibilities
of the nominees of the party-list groups that won
seats in the lower house of Congress.
Abayhon is the 1st nominee of the Aangat
Tayo party-list that won a seat in the HR during the
2007 elections. Palparan on the other hand was the
1st nominee of Bantay party-list. A petition for QW
was filed with HRET against the party-list groups and
its nominee claiming that it was not eligible for a
party-list since it did not represent the marginalized
and underrepresented sectors. Abayhon is the
spouse of an incumbent congressional district
representative and likewise does not belong to the
UR and marginalized. Petitioners also claim that
Abayhon lost her bid as party-list rep called An Waray
in the immediately preceding elections of May 10,
2004. Palparan also was alleged to have committed
various human rights violations against the
marginalized sectors (Bantay represents the victims
of communist rebels, CAFGU, security guards and
former rebels.)
Abayhon and Palparan postures that the
Comelec already confirmed the status of the party list
as a national multi-sectoral party-list organization,
that HRET had no jurisdiction over the petitioner for
QW since the petitioners collaterally attacked the
registration of the party-list organization, a matter that
fell within the jurisdiction of the Comelec. That it was
the party-list that was taking a seat in the HR and not
them, being only its nominees. All questions
involving their eligibility as nominee, were internal
concerns of the organization. The HRET dismissed
the petition against party-list but upheld its jurisdiction
over nominees who both filed an MR which was
denied. Hence, this special civil action for certiorari
alleging that the HRET gravely abused its discretion.
27
The Court made reference to Sec. 5(1) of
Article VI (which identifies who the “members” of that
House are. The HR shall be composed of not more
than 250 members, unless otherwise fixed by law,
who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants, and on the
basis of a uniform and progressive ration, and those
who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a
party-list system of registered national, regional and
sectoral parties or organizations.
Clearly the “members” of the HR are two
kinds. . .1)those who shall be elected from legislative
districts and 2) “those who shall be elected through a
party-list system”. From the point of view of the
Constitution, it is the party-list rep who are “elected”
into office, NOT their parties or organizations. These
representatives are elected, however, through that
peculiar party-list system that the Constitution
authorized and that Congress by law established
where the voters cast their votes for the organizations
or parties to which such party-list reps belong.
Once elected, both the district reps and the
party-list reps are treated in like manners. They have
the same deliberative rights, salaries, and
emoluments. They can participate in the making of
laws that will directly benefit their legislative districts
or sectors. They are also subject to the same term
limitations of 3 years for a max of 3 consecutive
terms. The party list system act itself recognizes
party list nominees as members of the HR (Sec. 2,
RA 7941 Declaration of Policy – The State shall
promote proportional representation in the election of
reps in the HR through a party-list system of
registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
Filipino citizens belonging to the marginalized and UR
sectors x x x x to become members of the HR “.
The Court held that initially, the authority to
determine the qualifications of a party-list nominee
belongs to the organization and to choose five from
among the aspiring nominees to comply with the law.
But where an allegation is made that the party or
organization had chosen and allowed a disqualified
nominee to become its party-list rep in the lower
house and enjoy the secured tenure that goes with
the position, the resolution of the dispute is taken out
of its hand. Hence, pursuant to Section 17 of Article
VI, the HRET being the sole judge of all contests
relating to, among other things, the qualifications of
the members of the HR, the HRET has jurisdiction to
hear and pass upon their qualifications. The HRET
was correct in dismissing the QW and retaining
authority to rule on the qualifications.
Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) v.
Comelec 619 SCRA 585(DELISTING)– The Comelec
may motu propio OR upon verified complaint of any
interested party, remove, or cancel, after due notice
and hearing, the registration of any national, regional
or sectoral party, organization or coalition IF It: (a)
fails to participate in the last 2 preceding elections;
OR (b) fails to obtain at least 2% of the votes casts
under the party-list system in the 2 preceding
elections for the constituency in which it was
registered (Section 6 RA 7941). The word “OR” is a
disjunctive term signifying disassociation and
independence of one thing from the other things
enumerated. A party list group or organization that
failed to garner 2% in a prior election and immediately
thereafter did not participate in the preceding election
– is something that is not covered by Section 6(8) of
RA 7941. From this perspective, it may be an
28
unintended gap in the law and as such is a matter for
Congress to address. This case abandoned the
Minero vs. Comelec G.R. No. 177548 May 10, 2007.
Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. v. Comelec
646 SCRA 63 (2011)
Comelec removed PGBT in the list of qualified parties
vying for a seat under the party-list system of
representation in violation of the status quo order of
the Supreme Court. An equally important aspect of a
democratic electoral exercise is the right of free
choice of the electorates on who shall govern them –
the party-list system affords them this choice, as it
gives the marginalized and underrepresented sectors
the opportunity to participate in governance. Comelec
was cited for contempt by the Court.
Effect of removal by Comelec of PGBI in the list: As it
was the Comelec itself which prevented PGBI from
participating in the 10 May 2010 party-list elections
when it deleted PGBI, with grave abuse of discretion,
from the list of accredited party-list groups or
organizations and, thereafter, refused to return it to
the list despite the Court’s directive, PGBI should, at
the very least, be deemed to have participated in the
10 May 2010
Amores vs. HRET et. al 622 SCRA 593 (2010) –
Amores via a petition for QW with the HRET
questioned the legality of the assumption of office of
Emmanuel Joel Villanueva as rep of CIBAC. It was
alleged among other things, that Villanueva assumed
office without a formal proclamation by the Comelec,
disqualified to be a nominee of the youth sector of
CIBAC since at the time of the filing of his certificates
of nomination and acceptance, he was already 31
years old or beyond the age limit of 30 pursuant to
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
Section 9 of RA 7941 and that his change of affiliation
from CIBAC’s youth sector to its overseas Filipino
workers and their families sector was not effected at
least 6 months prior to the May 14, 2007 elections so
as to be qualified to represent the new sector under
Section 15 of RA 7941.
The HRET dismissed the petition as it found
the petition to be filed beyond the 10 days
reglementary period, that the age qualification for
youth sectoral nominees under Section 9 of RA 7941
applied only to those nominated as such during the
first 3 congressional terms after the ratification of the
Constitution or until 1998, unless a sectoral party is
thereafter registered exclusively as representing the
youth sector, which CIBAC, a multi sectoral
organization, is not. As regards the shift of affiliation,
it was held that Section 15 did not apply as there was
no resultant change in party list affiliation.
ISSUES: (1) whether the petition for QW was
dismissible for having been filed unseasonably; and
(2) whether Section 9 and 15 of RA 7941 apply to
Villanueva. As to the first issue, the SC found grave
abuse of discretion on the part of HRET. The Court
overlooked the technicality of timeliness and rules on
the merits since the challenge goes into Villanueva’s
qualifications, it may be filed at anytime during his
term. Also date of proclamation was not clear. As to
the second and more substantial issue, the Court
made reference to Section 9 of RA 7941 which
provides that in case of a nominee of the youth
sector, he must at least be 25 but not more than 30
years of age on the day of the election. The youth
sectoral rep who attains the age of 30 during his term
shall be allowed to continue in office until the
expiration of his term.
29
The Court did not find any textual support on
the interpretation of HRET that Section 9 applied only
to those nominated during the first 3 congressional
terms after the ratification of the Constitution or until
1998. A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that
when the law is clear and free from any doubt or
ambiguity, there is no room for construction or
interpretation. Only room for application. The
distinction is nowhere found in the law. When the law
does not distinguish, we must not distinguish.
Respecting Section 15 of RA 7941, the Court
likewise found no textual support for HRET’s
ratiocination that the provision did not apply to
Villanueva’s shift of affiliation from CIBAC’s youth
sector to its overseas Filipino workers and their
families sector as there was no resultant change in
party list affiliation. Section 15 reads “ Change of
Affiliation: Effect – Any elected party list rep who
changes his political party or sectoral affiliation during
his term of office shall forfeit his seat; Provided, That
if he changes his political party or sectoral affiliation
within 6 months before an election, he shall not be
eligible for nomination as party-list rep under his new
party or organization.
The wordings of Section 15 is clear as it
covers changes in both political party and sectoral
affiliation and which may occur within the same party
since multi-sectoral party-list org are qualified to
participate in the Philippine party-list system. A
nominee who changes his sectoral affiliation within
the same party will only be eligible for nomination
under the new sectoral affiliation if the change has
been effected at least 6 months before the elections.
Sec. 9 and 15 apply to Villanueva.
As regards the contention that Villanueva is
the 1st nominee of CIBAC, whose victory was later
upheld, is NO moment. A party-list org’s ranking of its
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW 30

nominees is a mere indication of preference , their Veterans Federation Party v. Comelec 342 SCRA
qualifications according to law are a different matter. 244, the SC provided for the four unique parameters
of the Filipino Party-list System which are as follows –
Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. Comelec 618 SCRA 32 –  The 20% allocation – the combined number of
Ladlad is an organization composed of men and all party-list congressmen shall not exceed
women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, 20% of the total membership of the HR,
bisexuals or transgendered individuals. They applied including those under the party-list;
for registration with Comelec in 2006 and its  The 2% threshold – only those parties
accreditation was denied on the ground that the garnering a minimum of 2% of the total valid
organization had no substantial membership. Ladlad votes cast for the party-list system are
in 2009 again filed a petition for registration which “qualified” to have a seat in the HR;
was dismissed by Comelec on moral grounds (Bible  The 3-seat limit – each qualified party,
and Koran). regardless of the number of votes it actually
obtained, is entitled to a maximum three
The SC ruled that moral disapproval is not a sufficient seats, that is, one qualifying and two
governmental interest to justify exclusion of additional seats;
homosexuals from participation to the party list  The proportional representation – the
system. The Constitution provides in Sec. 5, Art. III additional seats which a qualified party is
that “No law shall be made respecting an entitled to shall be computed “in proportion to
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free their total number of votes..
exercise thereof.” At bottom, what our non- In this case, following the May11, 1998 national
establishment clause calls for is “government elections which is the first election for party-list
neutrality in religious matters.” Clearly, representation, the Comelec en banc proclaimed 14
“governmental reliance on religious justification is parties and organizations which had obtained at least
inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.” Hence, the 2% of the total number of votes cast for the party-list
Court finds that it was grave violation of the non- system which constitute a total of 25 nominees short
establishment clause for the Comelec to utilize the of the 52 party-list representatives who should
Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of ang actually sit in the house. The PAG-ASA files with the
Ladlad. Comelec a Petition to proclaim the full number of
In sum, the crucial element is not whether a party-list representative provided by the Constitution.
sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a They alleged that the filling up of the 20%
particular organization complies with the membership of party list representative in the House,
requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941. The as provided under the Constitution, was mandatory.
SC found that Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated Nine other party list organizations filed their
its compliance with the legal requirements for respective motions to intervene seeking the same
accreditation. relief as that sought by PAG-ASA on substantially the
same grounds.
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW 31

The Comelec, contrary to its rules and regulations underrepresented groups identified in
governing the said elections, instead proclaimed the Section 5 of RA 7941. In other words, it must
other 38 party-list organization notwithstanding its not show – through the Constitution, articles of
having garnered the required 2% votes. RULING: incorporation, by-laws, history, platform of
Sec. 5(2) of Article VI which states that the sectoral government and track record – that it
representation shall constitute the 20% is not represents and seeks to uplift marginalized
“mandatory” as it merely provides a ceiling for party- and underrepresented sectors.
list in congress. And, obtaining absolute proportional
representation is restricted by the 3-seat per party  Second, while major political parties are
limit to a maximum of two additional slots. Comelec expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the
was held to have abused its discretion in disregarding Constitution to participate, they must comply
an act of Congress. with the declared statutory policy enabling
Filipino citizens belonging to the M and U to
The 8-point guidelines for screening party-list be elected to the HR.
participants
 Third, religious sector may not be
In Bagong Bayani Labor Party v. Comelec 359 represented in the party-list system. In view
SCRA 698 (2001) (also reiterated the ruling in of the objections directed against the
Veterans), at issue is the Omnibus Resolution of the registration of Ang Buhay Hayaang
Comelec which approved the participation of 154 Humabong, which is allegedly a religious
organizations and parties and which the SC group, the Court notes the express
remanded to the Comelec for the latter to determine constitutional provision that the religious
evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and sector may not be represented in the party-
organizations allowed to participate in the party-list list system. Furthermore, the Constitution
elections complied with the requirements of the law. provides that “religious denominations and
The SC ruled that the party-list organizations or sects shall not be registered.” The
parties must factually and truly represent the prohibition was explained by a member of
marginalized and underrepresented constituencies the Constitutional Commission in this wise
mentioned in Section 5 of RA 7941 and the persons “The prohibition is on any religious
nominated by the party-list candidate-organization organization registering as a political party. I
must be “Filipino citizens belonging to the do not see any prohibition here against a
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, priest running as a candidate. This is not
organizations and parties.” prohibited here; it is the registration of a
In remanding the case to Comelec the SC laid religious sect as a political party.”
down the following guidelines –
 First, the PP, sector or organization must  Fourth, it must not be disqualified under the
represent the marginalized and ground enumerated under Section 6 of RA
ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
7941 (not a religious sect or denomination or
association organized for religious purposes,
advocates violence or unlawful means to
seek its goal; a foreign party or organization;
receives support from any foreign
government, fails to comply with laws rules
or regulations relating to elections, declared
untruthful statement in its petition, it has
ceased to exist for at least one (1) year, it
fails to participate in the last 2 preceding
elections or failed to obtain at least 2% of
the votes cast under the party list system in
the 2 preceding elections for the
constituency in which it was registered)
 Fifth, the party or organization must not be
an adjunct of, or a project organized or an
entity funded or assisted by the government
(referring to MAD of Richard Gomez). It
must be independent of the government.
The participants of the government or it
officials in the affairs of a party-list candidate
is not only illegal and unfair to other parties,
but also deleterious to the objective of the
law; to enable citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors
and organizations to be elected to the House
of Representatives.
 Sixth, the party must not only comply with
the requirements of the law, its nominees
must likewise do so.Section 9 of RA 7941
reads – “qualifications of Party-List
Nominees – No person shall be nominated
as party-list representative unless he is a
natural born citizen of the Philippines, a RV,
a resident of the Philippines for a period of
32
not less than 1 year immediately preceding
the day of the election, able to read and
write, a bona-fide member of the party or
organization which he seeks to represent for
at least 90 days preceding the day of the
elections and is at least 25 years of age on
the day of the election.
 Seventh and Eight not only the candidate
party must represent the M and U sectors,
so also must its nominees must likewise be
able to contribute to the formulation and
enactment of appropriate legislation that will
benefit the nation as a whole.
AKLAT (Assosasyon Para sa Kaunlaran Ng Lipunan
at Adhikain Para sa Tao, Inc.) vs. Comelec, G.R. No.
162203, 14 April 2004, came up with a ruling on the
“Window-Dressing” of party-list participant. In this
case, Comelec found that significantly, Aklat and
A.K.L.A.T. have substantially the same incorporators.
In fact 4 of Aklat’s 6 incorporators are also
incorporators of A.K.L.A.T.. This substantial similarity
is hard to ignore and bolsters the conclusion that the
supposed re-organization undertaken by Aklat is plain
window-dressing as it has not really changed its
character as a business interest of persons in the
book publishing industry.
The Court observed that Aklat’s articles of
incorporation and document entitled The Facts About
Aklat which were attached to its petition for re-
qualification contain general averments that it
supposedly represents marginalized groups such as
the youth, indigenous communities, urban poor and
farmers/fisherfolks. These general statements do not
measure up to the first guideline set by the Bagon
Bayani case for screening party-list participants. Sec.
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
5 of RA 7941 provides that “it must show – through its
constitution, articles of incorporation, bylaws, history,
platform of government and track record – that it
represents and seeks to uplift marginalized and
underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of its
membership should belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented.
Bantay Republic Act or BA-RA 7941 vs. G.R. No.
177271, May 4, 2007, 523 SCRA 1 - Petitioners
reacting on an emerging public perception that the
individuals behind the party-list groups do not, as they
should, actually represent the poor and marginalized
sectors. Petitioners, wrote a letter to the Comelec
requesting that the complete list of the nominees of
all parties who have been accredited pursuant to
Comelec Resolution No. 7804 prescribing rules and
regulations to govern the filing of manifestation of
intent to participate and submission of names of
nominees under the party-list system of
representation in connection with the May 14, 2007
elections be published. The Comelec vehemently did
not accede to the request of the petitioners, it based
its refusal to disclose the names of the nominees of
subject party-list groups on Section 7 of RA 7941
(more specifically the last sentence which states: “the
names of the party-list nominees shall not be shown
on the certified list.”.
The Comelec believe that the party list elections must
not be personality oriented. Abalos said under RA
7941, the people are to vote for sectoral parties,
organizations, or coalitions not for their nominees.
ISSUE: whether or not the disclosure of the names of
the nominees are covered by the Right of Public to
information.
33
HELD: The Comelec has a constitutional duty to
disclose and release the names of the nominees of
the party list groups. No national security or like
concerns is involved in the disclosure of the names of
the nominees of the party-list groups in question. The
last sentence of Section 7 is limited in scope and
duration, meaning, that it extends only to the certified
list which the same provision requires to be posted in
the polling places on election day. To stretch the
coverage of the prohibition to the absolute nothing in
RA 7941 that prohibits the Comelec from disclosing
or even publishing through mediums other than the
“Certified list” the names of the party-list nominees.
The Comelec obviously misread the limited non-
disclosure aspect of the provision as an absolute bar
to public disclosure before the May 2007 elections.
The need for voters to be informed about matters that
have a bearing on their choice. The ideal cannot be
achieved in a system of blind voting, as veritably
advocated in the assailed resolution of the Comelec.
New Formula in the Allocation of Seats for Party-List
Representatives
Banat et. al. vs. Comelec G.R. 178271/12972 21 April
2009 – After the VFP v. Comelec, G.R. No. 136781,
136786 and 136795, 06 October 2000, ruling of the
Supreme Court and the controversial application of
the “Panganiban Formula” by the Abalos
Commission, Party-list participants in Banat et al.,
filed separate complaints against the Comelec on the
proper allocation of seats in the party-list system. On
23 April 2009, the Supreme Court declared the 2%
threshold clause in relation to the distribution of the
additional seats of RA 7941 unconstitutional.
Following Section 5, Article VI, par. 2 of the
1987 Constitution, 20% of all seats in the HR is
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
reserved for sectoral representatives elected in the
party list system. This formula is now called the
“Carpio formula.”
Under the Banat and Bayan Muna cases
(G.R. No. 179271 and G.R. No. 179295, 21 April
2009), the SC laid down the latest formula in the
allocation of seats for party-list participants:
1) The parties, organizations and coalitions shall be
ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the
number of votes they garnered during the elections.
2) The parties, organizations and coalitions receiving
at least 2% of the total votes cast for the party-list
system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
3) Those garnering sufficient number of votes,
according to the ranking above-mentioned
paragraph no. 1 hereof, shall be entitled to additional
seats in proportion to their total number of votes until
all the additional seats are allocated.
4) Each party, organization, or coalition shall be
entitled to not more than 3 seats.
Banat abandoned the matter of computation held in
the Veterans Party case considering that the intention
was to fill the 20% seats in the HR.
ELIGIBILITY OF CANDIDATES
Candidate defined: The term “candidate” refers to any
person aspiring or seeking an elective public office,
who has filed a certificate of candidacy by himself or
through an accredited political party, aggroupment, or
coalition of parties. (Sec. 79, OEC)
The terms “candidate” under the Automated Election
System (AES) in 2010, refers to “any person aspiring
for or seeking an elective public office who has filed
his COC and who has not dies or withdrawn or
otherwise disqualified before the start of
34
campaign period for which he filed his COC.
Provided, that, unlawful acts or omissions applicable
to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of
the aforesaid campaign period.” (Comelec Reso. No.
8678).
As regards a Party-List system, a “candidate” also
refers to “any registered national, regional, or sectoral
party, organization or coalition thereof that has filed a
manifestation to participate under the part-list system
which has not withdrawn or which has not be
disqualified before the start of the campaign period.”
(RA 7941).
in Comelec Reso. No. 9615 adopted a broader
definition of the term “candidate” for the 13 May 2013
Elections to include party-list in include all the above-
definitions.
Qualifications
For President and Vice-President – No person may
be elected President unless he is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to
read and write, at least 40 years of age on the day of
the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at
least 10 years immediately preceding such election.
There shall be a Vice-President who shall
have the same qualifications and term of office and
be elected with, and in the same manner, as the
President. He may be removed from office in the
same manner as the President (Article VII, Section 2
and 3, Constitution)
For Senator – No person shall be a Senator unless he
is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the
the day of election, is at least 35 years of age, able to
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
read and write, a registered voter, and a resident of
the Philippines for not less than 2 years immediately
preceding the elections. (Article VI, Section 3,
Constitution)
For Members of the House of Representatives – No
person shall be a Member of the HR unless he is
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, and, on the day
of election, is at least 25 years of age, able to read
and write, and except the party list representatives, a
registered voter in the district in which he shall
elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less
than on year immediately preceding the election.
(Article VI, Section 6, Constitution)
For Party-List Nominees – No person shall be
nominated as party-list representative unless he is a
natural born-citizen of the Philippines, a registered
voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not
less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day
of the election, able to read to read and write, a bona
fide member of the party or organization which he
seeks to represent for at least 90 days preceding the
day of the election and is at least 25 years of age on
the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he
must at least be 25 but not more than 30 years of age
on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral
representative who attains the age of 30 during his
term shall be allowed to continue in office until the
expiration of his term. (RA 7941).
Bengzon III v. HRET 357 SCRA 545 (2001) –
Repatriation results in the recovery of the original
nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino
who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior
status as a naturalized Filipino citizen.. On the other
35
hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before
he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to
his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
Local Government Officials – An elective local official
must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter
in the barangay, municipality, city or province or, in
the case of a member of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod or
sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to
be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year
immediately preceding the day of the election; able to
read and write Filipino or any other local language or
dialect.
Common to All Offices - Voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall not be considered
as an interruption in the continuity of the service for
the full term for which they were elected.
RA No. 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
of 2002) Section 36(g) provides that “all candidates
for public office whether appointed or elected both in
the national and local government shall undergo
mandatory drug tests. Comelec issued Resolution
No. 6486 on 23 December 2003 implementing 9165.
Publication of the results will be published. But the
resolution does not indicate whether or not
candidates who test positive for drugs will be allowed
to assume office if they win.)
Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board,
G.R. No. 157870, 03 November 2008 – Sec. 36(g) of
RA 965 and Comelec Resolution No. 6486 was
challenged as the same illegally impose an additional
qualification on candidates for senator. Senator
Pimentel point out that, subject to the provision on
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
nuisance candidates, a candidate for senator needs
only to meet the qualification laid down in Section 3,
Art. VI of the Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship; (2)
voter registration; (3) literacy; (4) age and (5)
residency. Beyond these stated qualification
requirements, candidates for senator need not
possess any other qualification to run for senator and
be voted upon and elected as member of the Senate.
As ruled, Sec. 36(h) of RA 9165, as sought to
be implemented by Comelec assailed Resolution,
effectively enlarges the qualification requirements
enumerated in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution. As
couched, said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably requires a
candidate for senator to be certified illegal drug-clean,
obviously a pre-condition to the validity of a certificate
of candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a
condition sine qua non to be voted upon and, if
proper, be proclaimed as senator-elect. Viewed in its
proper context, the implementing Comelec Resolution
add another qualification layer to what the 1987
Constitution, as the minimum, required for
membership in the Senate. Sec. 36(h) infringed the
constitutional provision defining the qualification or
eligibility requirements for one aspiring to run for and
serve as senator. Getting elected would be of little
value if one cannot assume office for non-compliance
with the drug-testing requirement.
CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY
1. Under the Manual Elections – The COC of
candidacy shall be filed on any day from the
commencement of the election period but not later
than the day before the beginning of the campaign
period; Provided, that in cases of postponement or
failure of election under Section 5 and 6 of the OEC,
no additional COC shall be accepted except in cases
36
of substitution of candidates as provided un Section
77. (Section 75, OEC)
COC must be filed not later than the day
before the date for the beginning of the campaign
period. (Sec. 7, RA 7166)
2. Under the AES – Section 11 of RA 8436 provides
“for this purpose, the deadline for filing of
COC/petition for registration/manifestation to
participate in the election shall not be later than 120
days before the elections.
The period has already been amended by RA
9369 which now reads – “For this purpose, the
Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of
COC/petition of registration/manifestation to
participate in the election. Any person who files his
COC within this period shall only be considered as a
candidate at the start of the campaign period for
which he filed his COC; Provided that, unlawful acts
or omissions applicable to a candidate shall effect
only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period.
Xxxx “.
Section 73, BP 881/Omnibus Elections Code (OEC) ,
par. (1) – Certificate of Candidacy – No person shall
be eligible for any elective office unless he files a
sworn certificate of candidacy within the period fixed
therein.Sinaca v. Mula 315 SCRA 266, it is the nature
of a formal manifestation to the whole world of the
candidate’s political creed or lack of political creed.
Coquilla v. Comelec G.R. No. 139801, 31 May 2000 –
A certificate which did not indicate the position for
which the candidate is running may be corrected.
The SC ruling on the effectiveness of the amended
COC filed to correct the defect declared that the filing
of an amended COC even after the deadline but
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
before the election was substantial compliance with
the law which cured the defect.
Section 73 (3) BP 881 (Effect of filing multiple
certificates of candidacy)–No person shall be eligible
for more than one office to be filed in the same
election(requirement to run for elective office), and if
he files his certificate of candidacy for more than one
office, he shall not be eligible for any of them.
Withdrawal of Certificate of Candidacy - However,
before the expiration of the period for the filing of the
certificates of candidacy, the person who has filed
more than one certificate of candidacy may submit a
written declaration under oath the office for which he
desires to be eligible and cancel the certificate of
candidacy for the other office or offices.
Pilar v. Comelec 245 SCRA 759 (1995) – The
withdrawal of a certificate of candidacy does not
extinguish one’s liability for the administrative fine
imposed by Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166, which
requires every candidate to file a true statement of all
contributions and expenditures in connection with the
elections.
Villanueva v. Comelec 122 SCRA 636 (1983) – the
withdrawal of a certificate of candidacy not made
under oath produces no legal effect; for all intents and
purposes, the withdrawing candidate remains a
candidate.
Go v. Comelec 357 SCRA 739 (2001) – Where
affidavit of withdrawal filed. There is nothing that
mandates that the affidavit of withdrawal must be filed
with the same office where the certificate of
candidacy to be withdrawn was filed. Thus, it can be
37
filed directly with the main office of the Comelec, the
office of the regional election supervisor concerned,
the office of the provincial election supervisor of the
province to which the municipality involved belongs,
or the office of the municipal election officer of the
said municipality.
EFFECTS: FILING OF CERTIFICATE OF
CANDIDACY
In Talaga v. Comelec/Alcala 683 SCRA 197 (2012)
The High Court provided for the rationale for the filing
of CoC within a prescribed period – The evident
purposes of the requirement for the filing of CoCs and
in fixing the time limit for filing them are, namely; (a)
to enable the voters to know, at least 60 days prior to
the regular election, the candidates from among
whom they are to make the choice; and (b) to avoid
confusion and inconvenience in the tabulation of the
votes cast. If the law does not confine to the duly-
registered candidates the choice of the voters, there
may be as many persons voted for as there are
voters, and votes may be cast even for unknown or
factitious persons as a mark to identify the votes in
favor of a candidate for another office in the same
election.
Sec. 66 BP 881/OEC.An appointive official is
considered resigned upon the filing of his/her
certificate of candidacy. The forfeiture is automatic
and the operative act is the moment of filing which
shall render the appointive official resigned
(Nicolasora v. CSC 1990 case and PNOC v. NLRC,
May 31, 1993), where the provision of Sec. 66 is
applicable also to GOCC and can constitute as a just
cause for termination of employment in addition to
those set forth in the Labor Code.
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
Section 66 has already been repealed by RA
9369 to wit – “Section 13. Section 11 of RA 8436 is
hereby amended to read as follows: “Any person
holding a public office or position, including active
members of the AFP, and officers and employees in
GOCC, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from
his/her office and must vacate the same at the start of
the day of the filing of his/her certificate of candidacy.
Sec. 67 OEC – An elective official running for a
position other than the one he is holding in a
permanent capacity, except for President and Vice-
President, is deemed resigned upon the filing of his
certificate of candidacy. Section 67 has been
repealed by Section 14 of RA 9006 (The Fair
Elections Law), a candidate holding an elective
position whether national or local running for office
other than the one he is holding in a permanent
capaci is considered resigned only upon the
expiration of his term..
Sinaca v. Mula 315 SCRA 266 (1999) – The provision
of the election law regarding certificates of candidacy,
such as signing and swearing on the same, as well as
the information required to be stated therein, are
considered mandatory prior to the elections.
Thereafter, they are regarded as merely directory.
Quinto v. Comelec G.R. No. 189698, 22 February
2010 –the Court ruled that substantial distinctions
exists between elective official and appointive
officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of
the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an
office for a definite term and may be removed
therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the
other hand, appointive officials hold their office by
virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing
38
authority. Some appointive officials hold their tenure
while other serve at the pleasure of the appointing
authority.
SUBSTITUTION OF CANDIDACY
Section 77 BP 881. Candidates in case of death,
disqualification or withdrawal of another.After the last
day for the filing of certificates of candidacy, an
official candidate of a registered or accredited political
party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause,
only a person belonging to, and certified by, the same
political party may file a certificate of candidacy to
replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was
disqualified. The substitute candidate nominated by
the political party concerned may file his certificate of
candidacy for the office affected in accordance with
the preceding sections not later than mid-day of the
date of the election. If the death, withdrawal or
disqualification should occur between the day before
the election and mid-day of election day, said
certificate may be filed with the board of election
inspectors in the political subdivisions where he is a
candidate or, in the case of candidates to be voted for
by the entire electorate of the country, with the
Commission.
A valid certificate of candidacy is an indispensable
requisite in case of substitution of a disqualified
candidate under Sec. 77. Under said provision, the
candidate who dies, withdraws or is disqualified must
be an official candidate of a registered or accredited
political party and the substitute candidate must be of
the same political party as the original candidate and
must be duly nominated as such by the political party.
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
Rulloda vs. Comelec G.R. No. 154198 January 20,
2003 – The absence of a specific provision governing
substitution of candidates in barangay elections
cannot be inferred as a prohibition against said
substitution. Such a restrictive construction cannot
be read into the law where the same is not written.
Indeed, there is more reason to allow substitution of
candidates where no political parties are involved
than when political considerations or party affiliations
reign, a fact that must have been subsumed by law.
Miranda v. Abaya, G.R. No. 136351 July 28, 1999 –
Substitution is not allowed if certificate of the
candidate to be substituted was cancelled, because
he was running for the 4th consecutive term. A her being regarded by the electorate of Lucena City
person without a valid COC cannot be considered a
candidate in much the same way as any person who
has not filed any COC at all cannot, by any stretch of
the imagination, be a candidate at all.
Talaga v. Comelec & Castillo and Castillo v. Comelec
& Talaga, 683 SCRA 197 (2012)–In this case, Ramon
was disqualified having been found to be ineligible for
the position of Mayor of Lucena City which
disqualification became final prior to the May 10,
2010 elections. Barbara Ruby filed her CoC in
substitution of Ramon. Castillo was the opponent
who filed a disqualification case against Barbara
Ruby on the ground that the substitution was not valid
in view of the ineligibility of Ramon, Ramon did not
voluntarily withdraw his CoC before the elections in
accordance with Section 73 and that she was not an
additional candidate for the position of Mayor
because her filing of her CoC was beyong the period
fixed by law. Comelec declared the substitution of
Barbara Ruby as invalid on May 20, 2011
39
Barbary Ruby garnered the highest number of
votes while Castillo garnered second. Castillo
contends that since the disqualification of Ramon was
final prior to the election he should be declared
winner. Castillo made reference to case of Cayat. In
this case, Rev. Fr. Nardo B. Cayat, the petitioner in
Cayat, was disqualified and his disqualification
became final before the May 10, 20014 elections.
Considering that no substitution of Cayat was made,
Thomas R. Pelileng, Sr. his rival remained the only
candidate for the mayoralty post in Buguias,
Benguet.(Cayat v. Comelec 522 SCRA 23 (2007)).
In contrast, after Barbara Ruby substituted
Ramon, the May 10, 2010 elections proceeded with
as a bona fide candidate. To the electorate, she
became a contender for the same position vied for by
Castillo, such that she stood on the same footing as
Castillo. Such standing as a candidate negated
Castillo’s claim of being the candidate who obtained
the highest number of votes, and being consequently
entitled to assume the office of Mayor.The Court
stressed that the existence of a valid CoC is a
condition sine qua non for a valid substitution.
Effect of Substitution of Candidates after Official
Ballots Have Been Printed in AES- in case of valid
substitution after the official ballots have been printed,
the votes cast for the substituted candidates shall be
considered votes for the substitutes.” (Sec. 12 RA
8436, 22 December 1997)
Under Section 12 of RA 9006, 12 February
2001 it provides – in case of valid substitutions after
the official ballot have been printed, the votes cast for
the substituted candidates shall be considered as
stray votes but shall not invalidate the whole ballot.
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
For this purpose, the official ballot shall provide
spaces where the voters may write the name of the
substitute candidates if they are voting for the latter;
Provided, however, that if the substitute candidate
has the same family name, this provision shall not
apply.
Since Section 12 of RA 8436 has not been
amended nor repealed by RA 9369, it can be
assumed that the votes cast for the substituted
candidates shall be considered votes for the
substitutes in an AES for the reason that the counting
machine will not read any unwarranted marks on the
official ballot such as writing the name of the
substitute candidate.
RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT
Svetlana P. Jalosjos vs. Comelec/Tupag/Estrellada
699 SCRA 507 (2013)– The SC stressed that to be
an actual and physical resident of a locality, one must
have a dwelling place where one resides no matter
how modest and regardless of ownership. The fact
that the residential structure where petitioner intends
to reside was still under construction on the lot she
purchased means that she has not yet established
actual and physical residence in the barangay,
contrary to the declaration of her witnesses that she
has been an actual and physical resident of Brgy.
Tugas since 2008.
Meynard Sabili v. Comelec/Florencio Librea 670
SCRA 664 (2012).It is not required that a candidate
should have his own house in order to establish his
residence or domicile in a place. It is enough that he
should live in the locality even in a rented house or
that of a friend or relative. What is of central concern
then is that the person identified and established a
40
place in the said City where he intended to live in and
return to for an indefinite period of time.
Jalosjos v. Comelec 683 SCRA 1 24 April 2012 –
Jalosjos came to the Philippines in November 2008 to
live with his brother in Zamboanga Sibugay. It is
evident that Jalosjos did so with intent to change his
domicile for good. He left Australia, give up his
Australian citizenship, and renounced his allegiance
to that country. In addition, he reacquired his old
itizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines, resulting in his being
issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine
Citizenship by the BID. By his acts, Jalosjos forfeited
his legal right to live in Australia, clearly proving that
he gave up his domicile there. And he has since lived
nowhere else except in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
Mitra vs. Commission on Elections, Antonio Gonzales
and Orlando Balbon, Jr. 622 SCRA 744 (July 2010).
In considering the residency issue, the dwelling
where a person permanently intends to return to and
to remain – his or her capacity or inclination to
decorate the place, or the lack of it, IS IMMATERIAL.
Comelec gravely abused its discretion when it
determined the fitness of a dwellingas a person’s
residence based solely on very personal and
subjective assessment standards when the law is
replete with standards that can be used. Comelec
used wrong considerations in arriving at the
conclusion that Mitra’s residence is not the residence
contemplated by law.
Asistio v. Trindad Pe-Aguirre, G.R. No. 191124, 27
April 2010–the High Court said – “Domicile is not
easily lost. To successfully effect a transfer thereof,
one must demonstrate: (1) an actual removal or
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
change of domicile; (2) a bona fide intention of
abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one; and (3) acts which
corresponding with that purpose. There must be
animus manendi coupled with animus non revetendi.
This purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice
must for for an indefinite period of time; the change of
residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the
place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.
Limbona v. Comelec, G.r. No. 181970, June 25,
2008– There is no hard and fast rule to determine a
candidate’s compliance with residency requirement
since the question of residence is a question of
intention.
Coquilla vs. Comelec 385 SCRA 607 – A former
Filipino citizen cannot be considered a resident of the
Philippines and in the locality he intends to be elected
prior to his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
The “term residence” is to be understood NOT
in its common acceptation as referring to “dwelling” or
“habitation”, but rather to “domicile” or legal
residence, that is, “the place where the party actually
or constructively has his permanent home, where he,
no matter where he may be found at any given time,
eventually intends to return and remain (animus
manendi)”. A domicile of origin is acquired by every
person at birth. It is usually the place where the
child’s parents reside and continues until the same is
abandoned by acquisition of a new domicile (by
choice.)
Romualdez-Marcos v. Comelec 248 SCRA 30 (1995).
“it is the fact of residence, not a statement in the
certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in
determining whether or not an individual has satisfied
41
the constitutions residency qualification requirement.
The said statement becomes material only when
there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to
mislead, misinform or hide a fact which would
otherwise render the candidate ineligible.
Perez v. Comelec 317 SCRA 640, the qualifications
of Rodolfo Aguinaldo former governor of Cagayan
was at issue when he filed his certificate of candidacy
as member of the HR for the 3rd district of Cagayan in
the 11 May 1998 elections. The Court reiterated the
meaning of residence as “the place where the party
actually or constructively has his permanent home”
where he, no matter where he may be found at any
given time, eventually intends to return and remain,
while domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers
when it speaks of residence for the purpose of
election law. And, the fact that a person is a RV in
one district is not proof that he is not domiciled in
another district.
Torayno Sr., vs. Comelec 337 SCRA 574, the issue in
this case is the residence qualification of Vicente
Emano who filed his certificate of candidacy for Mayor
of Cagayan de Oro.Court explained that the purpose
of the residence as required by Constitution and the
law as a qualification for seeking and holding public
office, is to give candidates the opportunity to be
familiar with the needs, difficulties and aspiration,
potentials for growth and all matters vital to the
welfare of their constituencies. On the part of the
electorate, to evaluate the candidate’s qualification s
and fitness for the job they aspire for. In this case
Emano, cannot be deemed to be a stranger or
newcomer when he ran for and was overwhelmingly
voted as city mayor having garnered a margin of 30K
votes.
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
Papandayan, Jr. vs. Comelec 381 SCRA 133.
Domicile connotes a fixed permanent residence to
which when absent for business or pleasure, or for
like reasons, one intends to return. The requirements
in order to acquire a new domicile by choice are: (a)
an intention to remain there; (b) residence or bodily
presence in the new locality; and (c) an intention to
abandon the old domicile.
ACTIONS TO CHALLENGE CANDIDACY OF A
CANDIDATE OR DISQUALIFY CANDIDATE
1) Sec. 12 of the 0EC –
 any person who has been declared by
competent authority insane or incompetent
(when we say incompetence, the same
may refer not only to mental illness,
disease or physical disability but also to
other causes which may include minority
or lack of residence requirement)
 any person who has been sentenced by
final judgment for subversion, insurrection,
rebellion
 for any offense for which carries a penalty
of more than 18 months
 for a crime involving moral turpitude
The disqualification is removed by
 plenary pardon or granted amnesty
 upon declaration by a competent
authority that said insanity or
incompetence had been removed
 expiration of a period of 5 years from
his service of sentence unless of
course within the same period he
again becomes disqualified.
42
2) Sec. 68 of the OEC
 those guilty of giving money or material
consideration to influence, induce or corrupt
voters or public official performing electoral
functions;
 those who have committed terrorism to
enhance his candidacy
 those who have spend in the election
campaign more than that required by law
(Php10/RV/Php5.00)
NOTE: Section 68 deals with a petition to disqualify a
candidate for other violations of the election code as
specified in said section, and against a candidate who
is a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign
country. That section does not specify a period within
which to file the petition.
In Codilla vs. De Venecia 393 SCRA 634, it was held
that the power of Comelec to disqualify candidates is
limited to the enumerations mentioned in Section 68
of the OEC. Elements to be proved are as follows:
 the candidate, personally or through his
instructions, must have given money or other
material consideration and
 the act of giving material consideration or
money should be for the purpose of
influencing, inducing or corrupting the voters
or public officials performing electoral
functions.
3) Sec. 69 – Petition to Abate a Nuisance Candidate
– the Comelec, may motu propio or upon verified
petition of an interested party, refuse to give due
course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy if it is
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
shown that it is filed in contemplation of a nuisance
candidate or cancel the same if already filed. This is
an exception to the ministerial duty of the Comelec
and its officers to receive a certificate of candidacy
under Section 76 of the OEC.
WHO IS A NUISANCE CANDIDATE
 one who files his certificate to put the election
process in mockery or disrepute
 contemplates the likelihood of confusion which
the similarity of surnames of two (2)
candidates may generate. (in the appreciation
of ballots, when two candidates with the same
name or surname and only the name or
surname is written, will be considered stray
vote and will not be counted for either of the
candidate unless one of the candidate with the
same name or surname is an incumbent –
equity of the incumbent rule)
 by other circumstances or acts which clearly
demonstrate that the candidate has no
bonafide intention to run for office, thus would
prevent the faithful determination of the true
will of the people.
(Bautista vs. Comelec 298 SCRA 480)
Who can file – a petition to declare a candidate a
nuisance candidate shall be filed by any registered
candidate for the same officewithin 5 days from the
last day of the filing of the certificate of candidacy. (As
amended by Section 5 of RA 6646
Rev. Elly Chavez Pumatong v. Comelec, G.R. No.
161872 13 April 2004 – The rationale behind the
prohibition against nuisance candidates and the
disqualification of candidates who have not evinced a
43
bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine.
The State has a compelling interest to ensure that its
electoral exercises are rational;, objective and
orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into
account the practical considerations in conducting
elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of
candidates, the greater the opportunities for logistical
confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of
time and resources in preparation for the election.
These practical difficulties should, of course, never
attempt the State from the conduct of a mandated
electoral exercise. At the same time, remedial
actions should be available to alleviate these
logistical hardships, whenever necessary and proper.
Ultimately, a disorderly election is not merely a
textbook example of inefficiency, but a rot that erodes
faith in our democratic institutions.
Martinez III vs. HRET 610 SCRA 53 (January 2010) –
Proceedings in cases of nuisance candidates require
prompt disposition. The declaration of a duly
registered candidate as nuisance candidate results in
the cancellation of his COC.
Dela Cruz v. Comelec G.R. No. 192221, 13
November 2012 - (Should the votes cast for such
nuisance candidate be considered stray or counted in
favor of the bona fide candidate?) – In an automated
election, the Supreme Court, likewise ruled not to
consider the votes cast for a nuisance candidate as
stray but to count them in favor of the bona fide
candidate.
“As far as Comelec is concerned, the
confusion caused by similarity of surnames of
candidates for the same position and putting the
electoral process in mockery or disrepute, had
already been rectified by the new voting system
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
where the voter simply shades the oval
corresponding to the name of their chosen candidate.
However, as shown in this case, Comelec issued
Resolution No. 8844 on May 1, 2010, 9 days before
the elections, with sufficient time to delete the names
of disqualified candidates not just from the Certified
List of Candidates, but also from the Official Ballot.
Indeed, what use will it serve if Comelec orders the
names of disqualified candidates to be deleted from
list of official candidates if the official ballots still carry
their name?
The Court holds that the rule in Resolution No.
4116 considering the votes cast for a nuisance
candidate declared as such in a final judgment,
particularly where such nuisance candidate has the
same surname as that of the legitimate candidate, not
stray but counted in favor of the latter, remains a
good law. As earlier discuss, a petition to cancel or
deny a CoC under Section 69 of the OEC should be
distinguished from a petition to disqualify under
Section 68. Hence, the legal effect of such
cancellation of a CoC of a nuisance candidate cannot
be equated with a candidate disqualified on grounds
provided in the OEC and the Local Government
Code.
The possibility of confusion in names of
candidates if the names of nuisance candidates
remained in the ballot on election day, cannot be
discounted or eliminated, even under the automated
voting system especially considering that voters who
mistakenly shaded the oval beside the name of the
nuisance candidate instead of the bonafide candidate
they intended to vote for could no longer ask for
replacement ballots to correct the same.
4) Sec. 78 OEC – Petition to Deny due Course or to
Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. “A verified
44
petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person
exclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained therein as required under
Section 74 (contents of the COC) of the OEC is false.
The petition may be filed at any time not later than 25
days from the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and
hearing, not later than 15 days before election.”
Who may file – by any person through a verified
petition
On What Grounds – the candidate made material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy.
Section 78 deals “exclusively” with a petition to deny
due course to a COC on the ground that a material
representation in the contents of the certificate under
Sec. 74, is false. (pertains to a candidate’s eligibility
or qualification such as citizenship, residence or
status as a registered voter Maruhom vs. Comelec
594 SCRA 108)
Period to File – Within 25 days from the last day for
the filing of the certificate of candidacy.
Jurisdiction – Comelec sitting in a division.
Juliette Dano case
mitra vs comelec
Jaodini vs comelec
Romuladez marcos vs comelec
Sergio G. Amora, Jr. vs. Comelec and Arnielo S.
Olandria 640 SCRA 473 (2011) - To emphasize, a
petition for disqualification on the one hand, can be
premised on Section 12 and 68 of the OEC, or
Section 40 of the LGC. On the other hand, a petition
to deny due course to or cancel a CoC can only be
grounded on a statement of a material representation
in the said certificate that is false. The petitions also
have different effects. While a person who is
disqualified under Section 68 is merely prohibited to
continue as a candidate, the person whose certificate
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is
not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never
filed a CoC. Thus in Miranda v. Abaya, this Court
made the distinction that a candidate who is
disqualified under Section 68 can validly
substituted under Section 77, but a person whose
CoC has been denied due course or cancelled under
Section 78 cannot be substituted because he/she is
never considered a candidate.” (also ruled in Fermin
v. Comelec 574 SCRA 782)
Mayor Barbara Ruby Talaga vs. Comele/Alcala 683
SCRA 197 (2012) – The High Court reiterated, that a
Section 78 petition should not be interchanged or
confused with a Section 68 petition. The remedies
under the two sections are different eventualities. A
person who is disqualified under Sectin 68 is
prohibited to continue as a candidate, but a person
whose CoC is cancelled or denied due course under
Section 78 is not considered as a candidate at all
because his status is that of a person who has not
filed a CoC. Miranda v. Abaya 311 SCRA 617
(1999), has clarified that candidate who is disqualified
under Section 68 can be validly substituted pursuant
to Section 77 because he remains a candidate until
disqualified; but a person whose CoC has been
denied due course or cancelled under Section
78cannot be substituted because he is
considered a candidate.
Munder vs. Comelec 659 SCRA 254 (2011) -
“Jurisprudence has clearly established the doctrine
that a petition for disqualification and a petition to
deny due course to or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy, are two distinct remedies to prevent a
candidate from entering an electoral race.
remedies prescribe distinct period to file
45
corresponding petition, on which the jurisdiction of the
Commission on Elections over the case is
dependent.”
be Fernando V. Gonzalez vs. Comelec, et. al. 644 SCRA
761 (2011) - “In order to justify the cancellation of
CoC, it is essential that the false representation
mentioned therein pertain to a material matter for the
sanction imposed by Section 78 would affect the
substantive rights of the candidate – the right to run
for the elective post for which he filed the CoC.
Material representation refers to qualifications for
elective office (interpreted to refer to statements
regarding age, residence and citizenship or non-
possession of natural-born Filipino status); Aside from
the requirement of materiality, the false
representation must consist of a deliberate attempt to
mislead, misinform or hide a fact which would
otherwise render a candidate ineligible; it must be
made with the intention to deceive the electorate as
to one’s qualification for public office.” (also ruled in
Salcedo II v. Comelec 312 SCRA 447 (1999))
Two remedies available for questioning the
qualifications of the candidate: Distinction between
the two proceedings under Section 78 and Section
253 under B.P. 881, thereof (1) Before elections
not under Section 78 and (2) After elections under
Section 253. The only difference between the two
proceedings is that, under Section 78, the
qualifications for elective office are misrepresented in
the certificate of candidacy and the proceedings must
be initiated before the elections, whereas a petition
for QW under Section 253 may be brought on the
basis of two grounds – (1) ineligibility or (2) disloyalty
Both to the Republic of the Philippines, and must be
the initiated within 10 days after proclamation of the
 Marcelina engle vs comelec
ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
election results. Under Section 253, a candidate is
ineligible if he is disqualified to be elected to office,
and he is disqualified if he lacks any of the
qualification for election office.
Clearly, the ONLY INSTANCE where a
petition questioning the qualifications of a candidate
for elective office can be filed before election is when
the petition is filed under Section 78 of the OEC.
Period for filing a petition under Section 78 –
In Loong v. Comelec 216 SCRA 760 (1992), the
Court categorically declared that the period for filing a
petition for cancellation of candidacy based on false
representation is covered by Rule 23 and NOT Rule
25 allowing the filing of a petition at any time after the
last day for filing of CoC’s but not later than the date
of proclamation, is merely a procedural rule that
cannot supercede Section 78 of the OEC.
A petition filed under Section 78 must not be
interchanged or confused with one filed under Section
68 – In Fermin v. Comelec 574 SCRA 782 (2008),
the Court stressed that a petition which is properly a
“Section 78 petition” must therefore be filed within the
period prescribed therein, and a procedural rules
subsequently issue by Comelec cannot supplant this
statutory period under Section 78.
Jurisdiction – Once a winning candidate has been
proclaimed, taken his oath and assumed office as a
member of the House of Representatives, the
jurisdiction of the Comelec over election contests
relating to his election, returns and qualifications
ENDS and the HRET own jurisdiction BEGINS.
In Perez v. Comelec 317 SCRA 641 (1999) the Court
does not have jurisdiction to pass upon the eligibility
of the private respondent who was already a Member
of the HR at the time of the filing of the petition for
46
certiorari – considering that by statutory provision
(Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution, the
HRET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the members of
the HR.
Procedure in filing Motion to Suspend Proclamation:
The suspension of proclamation of a winning
candidate is not a matter which theComelec Second
Division can dispose of motu propio. Section 6 of RA
No. 6646 requires that the suspension must be upon
motion by the complainant or any intervenor.
Second Placer Rule- It is well-settled that the
ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes
does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the
next highest number of votes to be declared elected.
Exceptions to the Second Placer Rule – The
exception to the second placer rule is predicated on
the concurrence of the following (1) the one who
obtained the highest number of votes is disqualified;
and (2) the electorate is FULLY AWARE in fact and in
law of a candidate’s disqualification so as to bring
such awareness within the realm of notoriety but
would nonetheless case their votes in favor of the
ineligible candidate. These facts warranting the
exception to the rules are not present in the case at
bar.
Ashary M. Alauya (Clerk of Court, Shari’a District
Court, Marawi City vs. Judge Casan Ali L. Limbona
646 SCRA 1 (2011) - Partisan political activity – The
filing of a certificate of candidacy is a partisan political
activity as the candidate thereby offers himself to the
electorate for an elective post. “No officer or
employee in the civil service shall engage directly or
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
indirectly, in any electioneering or partisan political
campaign.” The act of the Judge in filing a certificate
of candidacy as a party-list representative in the May
1998 elections without giving up his judicial post
violated not only the law, but also the constitutional
mandate.
Teodora Sobejana-Condon v. Comelec/Luis
Bautista/Robelito Picar/Wilma Pagaduan 678 SCRA
267 (2012) - Remedy of a person who fails to file the
petition to disqualify a certain candidate within the
twenty-five (25)-day period prescribed by Section 78
of the OEC is to file a petition for QW within 10 days
from proclamation of the results of the election as
provided under Section 253 of the OEC.
Renunciation of foreign citizenship to be valid under
Section 5(2) of RA 9225 – The language of Section
5(2) of RA 9225 is free from any ambiguity. In Lopez
v. Comelec 559 SCRA 696 (2008), the Court
declared it ‘s categorical and single meaning: a
Filipino American or any dual citizen cannot run fo
any elective public position in the Philippines unless
he or she personally swears to a renunciation of all
foreign citizenship at the time of filing the CoC. The
Court also expounded on the form of the renunciation
and held that to be valid, the renunciation must be
contained in an affidavit duly executed before an
officer of the law who is authorized to administer an
oath stating in clear and unequivocal terms that
affiant is renouncing foreign citizenship.
Casan Macode Maquiling v. Comelec et. al. 700
SCRA 367 (2013) –the declared policy of RA 9225 is
that “all Philippine citizens who become citizens of
another country shall be deemed not to have lost their
Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act”.
47
This policy pertains to the reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship. Section 5(2) requires those who have re-
acquired Philippine citizenship and who seek elective
public office, to renounce any and all foreign
citizenship. This requirement of renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenship, when read together with
Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code which
disqualifies those with dual citizenship from running
for any elective local position, indicates a policy that
anyone who seeks to run for public office must be
solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen. To allow a
former Filipino who reacquires Philippine citizenship
to continue using a foreign passport – which indicates
the recognition of a foreign state of the individual as
its national – even after the Filipino has renounced his
foreign citizenship, is to allow a complete disregard of
this policy.
Panlaqui v. Comelec 613 SCRA 573 – Voters’
inclusion/exclusion proceedings essentially involve
the issue of whether a petition shall be included in or
excluded from the list of voters based on the
qualifications required by law and the facts presented
to show possession of these qualifications. On the
other hand, the COC denial/cancellation proceedings
involve the issue of whether there is a false
representation of a material fact. The false
representation must necessarily pertain not to a mere
innocuous mistake but to a material fact or those that
refer to a candidate’s qualification for elective office.
NOTE: In Fermin v. Comelec G.R. No. 179695 and
G.R. No. 182369, December 18, 2008, the SC
clarified that Section 5 (Procedure in cases of
Nuisance candidates) and Section 7 (Petition to Deny
Due Course To or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy
under RA 6646, did not in any way amend the period
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
for filing “Section 78” petitions. While Section 7 of the
said law makes reference to Section 5 on the
procedure in the conduct of cases for the denial of
due course to the COC’s of nuisance candidates
(then chief Justice Davide in his dissenting opinion in
Aquino v. Comelec, G.R. No. 120265, September 18,
1995 248 SCRA 400, explains that “the procedure
hereinabove provided mentioned in Section 7 cannot
be construed to refer to Section 6 which does not
provide for a procedure but to the effects of
disqualification cases, (but) can only refer to the
procedure provided in Section 5 of the said Act on
nuisance candidates, “ the same cannot be taken to
mean that the25-day period for filing Section 78
petitions is changed to 5 days counted from the last
day for the filing of COC’s.
The clear language of Section 78 cannot be
amended or modified b y a mere reference in a
subsequent statute to the use of a procedure
specifically intended for another type of action.
Cardinal is the rule in statutory construction that
repeals by implication are disfavored and will not be
so declared by the Court unless the intent of the
legislators is manifest. Noteworthy in Loong v.
Comelec 216 SCRA 760 (1992),which upheld the 25-
day period for filing Section 78 petitions, was decided
long after the enactment of RA 6646. Hence, Section
23, Section 2 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure is
contrary to the unequivocal mandate of the law.
Following the ruling in Fermin, the Court declared that
“as the law stands, the petition to deny due course to
or cancel a COC may be filed at anytime not later
than 25-days from the time of the filing of the COC.
In Justimbaste v. Comelec 572 SCRA 736 (2008) –
Material misrepresentation as a ground to deny due
course or cancel a certificate of candidacy refers to
48
the falsity of a statement required to be entered
therein as enumerated in Section 74 of the OEC.
Concurrent with materiality is a deliberate intention to
deceive the electorate as to one qualification making
reference to Salcedo II that in order to justify the
cancellation of the COC under Section 78, it is
essential that the false representation mentioned
therein pertained to a material matter for the sanction
imposed by this provision would affect the substantive
rights of a candidate – the right to run for the elective
post for which he filed the COC. There is also no
showing that there was an intent to deceive the
electorate as to the identity of the private respondent,
nor that by using his Filipino name the voting public
was thereby deceived.
DISQUALIFICATION UNDER THE LOCAL
GOVERNMENT CODE R.A. 7160
A candidate for an elective office may likewise
be disqualified on the following grounds –
 those sentenced by final judgment for an
offense involving moral turpitude or for an
offense punishable by one (1) year or more
imprisonment, within 2 years after serving
sentence. (Sec. 40) (Qualifications of local
elective candidates under the LGC was asked
 in the 1999 Bar)
NOTE:The 1st ground for disqualification consists of
two (2) parts, namely: (1) those sentenced by final
judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude,
regardless of the period of imprisonment; and (2)
those sentenced by final judgment for an offense,
OTHER THAN one involving moral turpitude,
punishable by one (1) year or more imprisonment,
within 2 years after serving sentence.
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
Sec. 40 of RA 7160 limits the disqualification to two
(2) years after service of sentence. This should now
be read in relation to Sec. 11 of RA 8189 which
enumerates those who are disqualified to register as
a voter. The 2 year disqualification period under Sec.
40 is now deemed amended to last 5 years from
service of sentence after which period the voter will
be eligible to register as a voter and to run for an
elective public office.
 Those convicted by final judgment for violating
the oath of allegiance to the Republic
 Fugitives from justice in criminal and non-
political cases.
In Marquez, jr. vs. Comelec and Rodriguez 259
SCRA, it was held that fugitives from justice refer to a
person who has been convicted by final judgment.
The SC ruled that when a person leaves the territory
of a state not his own, homeward bound and
subsequently learns of the charges filed against him
while he is in his own country, does not outrightly
qualify him as a fugitive from justice if he does not
subject himself to the jurisdiction of the former state.
When Rodriguez left the US, there was yet no
complaint filed and warrant of arrest, hence there is
no basis in saying that he is running away from any
prosecution or punishment.
 Those removed from office as a result of an
administrative charge
In Rodolfo Aguinaldo vs. Comelec, it was held that a
public elective official cannot be removed for
administrative conduct committed during a prior term
49
as his re-election to office operates as a condonation
of the officers previous misconduct to the extent of
cutting of the right to remove him therefore.
Grego v. Comelec 274 SCRA 481, the Court ruled
that Sec. 40 of RA 7160 does not have any
retroactive effect. In this case a Deputy Sheriff was
removed for serious misconduct in 1981. He run in
1992 & 1995. His removal in 1981 cannot serve as
basis for his disqualification. Laws have prospective
effect.
Those with dual citizenship. The relevant cases
under this provision are the cases of –
 Mercado v. Manzano & Comelec G.R. No.
135083 May 25, 1999
 Aznar v. Comelec 185 SCRA 703
 Cirilo Valles v. Comelec & Lopez G.R. #138000
August 9, 2000
In Aznar, it was ruled that the mere fact that
respondent Osmeña was holder of a certificate stating
that he is an American citizen did not mean that he is
no longer a Filipino & that an application for an ACR
was not tantamount to renunciation of his Philippine
Citizenship.
Mercado v. Manzano & Comelec, it was held that the
fact that respondent Manzano was registered as an
American citizen in the BID & was holding an
American passport on April 22, 1997, only a year
before he filed a certificate of candidacy for Vice-
Mayor of Makati, were just assertions of his
nationality before the termination of his American
citizenship.
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
Valles v. Lopez, the Court held that the mere fact that
Lopez was a holder of an Australian passport and
had an ACR are not act constituting an effective
renunciation of citizenship and do not militate against
her claim of Filipino citizenship. For renunciation to
effectively result in the lost of citizenship, the same
must be express (Com. Act 63, Sec. 1). Referring to
the case of Aznar, an ACR does not amount to an
express renunciation or repudiation of one’s
citizenship. Similarly, her holding of an Australian
passport as in the Manzano case, were likewise mere
acts of assertions before she effectively renounced
the same. Thus, at the most, Lopez had dual
citizenship – she was an Australian and a Filipino, as
well.
In reconciling the disqualification under Sec. 40 of RA
7160. The Court clarified and as ruled in the
Manzano case “dual citizenship” as used in the LGC
and reconciled with Article IV Section 5 of the 1987
Constitution on dual allegiance (Dual allegiance of
citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be
dealt with by law.”) In recognizing situation in which a
Filipino citizen may, without performing any act, as an
involuntary consequence of the conflicting laws of
different countries, be also a citizen of another state
(jus sanguinis for the Philippines where the child
follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents
regardless of his/her place of birth as opposed to jus
soli which determines nationality or citizenship on the
basis of place of birth), the Court explained that dual
citizenship as a disqualification must refer to citizens
with dual allegiance.
The fact that Lopez had dual citizenship did not
automatically disqualify her from running for public
office. For candidates with dual citizenship, it is
50
enough that they elect Phil. Citizenship upon the filing
of their certificate of candidacy, to terminate their
status as persons with dual citizenship. The filing of
the certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce
foreign citizenship effectively removing any
disqualification as a dual citizen.
In the Certificate of Candidacy, one declare that
he/she is a Filipino citizen and that he/she will support
and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto. Such
declaration, which is under oath, operates as an
effective renunciation of foreign citizenship.
Lopez v. Comelec 559 SCRA 696 (2008)–The ruling
in Valles in 2000 has been superseded by the
enactment of RA 9225 in 2003. RA 9225 expressly
provides for the condition before those who re-
acquired Filipino citizenship may run for a public
office in the Philippines. Section 5 of the said law
states: “Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. –
Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine Citizenship
under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights
and be subject to all attendant liabilities and
responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines
and the following conditions xxx (2) Those seeking
elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the
qualifications for holding such public office as
required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at
the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy,
make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and
all foreign citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath.
AASJS Member-hector G. Calilung vs. Secretary of
Justice G.R. No. 160869, may 11, 2007, the SC took
the opportunity to set parameters of what constitutes
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
dual allegiance considering that it only made a
distinction between dual allegiance and dual
citizenship in Mercado vs. Manzano.
FACTS: Following the implementation of RA 9225
“An Act Making the Citizenship of Philippine Citizens
Who Acquire foreign Citizenship Permanent,
amending for the purpose CA 63, as amended,
petitioner filed a petition against respondent DOJ
Secretary Simeon Datumanong who was tasked to
implement laws governing citizenship. He prayed for
a writ of prohibition to stop respondent from
implementing RA 9225. he avers that RA 9225 is
unconstitutional as it violates Section 5, Article IV of
the 1987 Constitution that states “ Dual allegiance of
citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be
dealt with by law”. He contends that the Act
cheapens the Philippine citizenship since the Act
allows all Filipinos, either natural-born or naturalized,
who become foreign citizens, to retain their Philippine
citizenship without losing their foreign citizenship.
Section 3 permits dual allegiance because said law
allows natural-born citizens to regain their Philippine
by simply taking an oath of allegiance without
forfeiting their foreign allegiance. The Constitution
however, is categorical that dual allegiance is inimical
to the national interest.
HELD: The intent of the legislature in drafting RA
9225 is to do away with the provision in CA 63, which
takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born
Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other
countries. RA 9225 allows dual citizenship to natural-
born Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens
of a foreign country. On its face, it does not
recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to the
51
supreme authority of the Republic, the person
implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship.
Plainly,Section 3, RA 9225 stayed clear out of the
problem of dual allegiance and shifted the burden of
confronting the issue of whether or not there is dual
allegiance to the concerned foreign country. What
happens to the other citizenship was not made a
concern of RA 9225. (Note: Section 5, Article IV of
the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it is
not a self-executing provision. The legislature still
has to enact the law on dual allegiance.)
In De Guzman v. Comelec, G.R. No. 180048 June
19, 2009, it was held that “where the Oath of
allegiance and certificate of candidacy did not comply
with Section 5(2) of RA 9225 which further requires
those seeking elective public office in the Philippines
to make a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign
citizenship as where the candidate for VM of Guimba,
Nueva Ecija failed to renounce his American
citizenship, it was held that he was disqualified from
running for VM in the May 14, 2007 elections.
Teodora Sobejana-Condon v. Comelec/Luis Bautista
et. al. 678 SCRA 267 (2012) - Renunciation of foreign
citizenship to be valid under Section 5(2) of RA 9225
– The language of Section 5(2) of RA 9225 is free
from any ambiguity. In Lopez v. Comelec 559 SCRA
696 (2008), the Court declared it ‘s categorical and
single meaning: a Filipino American or any dual
citizen cannot run fo any elective public position in the
Philippines unless he or she personally swears to a
renunciation of all foreign citizenship at the time of
filing the CoC. The Court also expounded on the
form of the renunciation and held that to be valid, the
renunciation must be contained in an affidavit duly
executed before an officer of the law who is
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
authorized to administer an oath stating in clear and
unequivocal terms that affiant is renouncing foreign
citizenship.
Maquiling vs. Comelec 700 SCRA 367 (2013) – If we
allow dual citizens who wish to run for public office to
renounce their foreign citizenship and afterwards
continue using their foreign passports, we are
creating a special privilege for these dual citizens,
thereby effectively junking the prohibition in Section
40(d) of the Local Government Code. It must be
stressed that what is at stake here is the principle that
only those who are exclusively Filipinos are qualified
to run for public office.
Frivaldo v. Comelec 174 SCRA 245 (1989). Frivaldo
was proclaimed governor elect of the Province of
Sorsogon and subsequently assumed office. A the citizenship requirement in the local government
disqualification was filed against him by the League
of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter on the ground
that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been
naturalized in the US in 1983, which he admitted but
which he undertook only to protect himself against
then President Marcos. The SC found Frivaldo
disqualified for not having possessed the requirement
of citizenship which cannot be cured by the
electorate, especially if they mistakenly believed, as
in this case, that the candidate was qualified.
Republic v. dela Rosa 232 SCRA 785. The
disqualification of Frivaldo was again at issue.
Frivaldo opted to reacquire his Philippine citizenship
thru naturalization but however failed to comply with
the jurisdictional requirement of publication, thus, the
Court never acquired jurisdiction to hear the
naturalization of Frivaldo. He was again disqualified.
52
In Frivaldo v. Comelec 257 SCRA 72 (1996), Frivaldo
later reacquired Philippines citizenship and obtained
the highest number of votes in 3 consecutive
elections but was twice declared by the SC to be
unqualified to hold office due to his lack of citizenship
requirement. He claimed to have re-acquired his
Filipino citizenship thru repatriation. It was
established that he took his oath of allegiance under
the provision of PD 725 at 2pm on 30 June 1995,
much later than the time he filed his certificate of
candidacy.
The Court held that the “the law does not specify any
particular date or time when the candidate must
possess citizenship unlike that of residence and age,
as Sec. 39 of RA 7160 specifically speaks of
“qualification of elective officials, not candidates” thus,
code to be possessed by an elective official at the
latest as of the time he is proclaimed and at the start
of the term of office to which he has been elected.
But to remove all doubts on this important issue, the
Court held that the repatriation of Frivaldo retroacted
to the date of the filing of his application on 17 August
1994 and being a former Filipino who has served the
people repeatedly and at the age of 81, Frivaldo
deserves liberal interpretation of the Philippine laws
and whatever defects there were in his nationality
should now be deemed mooted by his repatriation.
 3 term limit or having served 3 consecutive
terms.
Article X, Section 8, 1987 Constitution and
Section 43(b) of RA 7160provides “No local elective
official shall serve for more than 3 consecutive terms
in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of office
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of service for the full term
for which the elective official concerned was elected.
In Laceda Sr., vs. Limena & Comelec 571 SCRA 603
– the Court held that the rationale behind Section 2 of
RA 9164, like Section 43 of RA 7190 (Local
Government Code) from which the 3-term rule was
taken, is primarily intended to broaden the choices of
the electorate of the candidates who will run for office,
and to infuse new blood in the political arena by
disqualifying officials from running for the same office
after a term of 9 years.
The case of Laceda Sr. involved a similar question in
Latasa vs. Comelec 417 SCRA 601 where the Court
held that where a person has been elected for 3
consecutive terms as municipal mayor and prior to
the end or termination of such 3-year term the
municipality has been converted by law into a city,
without the city charter interrupting his term until the
end of the 3-year term, the prohibition applied to
prevent him from running for the 4th time as city
mayor thereof, there being no break in the continuity
of the terms. Comelec did not err nor commit any
abuse of discretion when it declared Laceda
disqualified and cancelled his COC.
Adormeo v. Comelec & Talaga, Jr. G.R. No. 147927
04 February 2002 and citing Borja v. Comelec 295
SCRA 157 and Lonzanida v. Comelec 311 SCRA
602, it was ruled that the term limit for elective local
officals must be taken to refer to the “right to be
elected” as well as the “right to serve in the same
elective position.” Thus, two (2) conditions for the
application of the disqualification must concur:
53
 that the official concerned has been elected
for three (3) consecutive terms in the same
local government post; and
 that the has fully served the three (3)
consecutive terms.
In this case, respondent Talaga, Jr., was elected
mayor of Lucena City in May 1992. He served the full
term, was re-elected in 1995-98 but lost in the 1998
election to Tagarao. In the recall elections of May
2000, Talaga, Jr. won and served the unexpired term
of Tagarao until 30 June 2001. Talaga Jr. filed his
certificate of candidacy for the same position in the
2001 elections which candidacy was challenged by
petition Adormeo on the ground that Talaga, Jr. is
already barred by the 3-term limit rule.
Adormeo contends that Talaga’s candidacy violated
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution which states
that the term of office of local elective officials shall be
three (3) years and no such official shall serve for
more than three (3) consecutive terms citing the case
of Lonzanida v. Comelec To further support his case,
he adverts to the comment of Fr. Joaquin Bernas who
stated that in interpreting said provision that “if one is
elected representative to serve the unexpired term of
another, that unexpired term, no matter how short,
will be considered one term for the purpose of
computing the number of successive terms allowed.”
The Comelec en banc ruled in favor of Talaga which
reversed the ruling of the 1st division and held that –
1) Talaga was not elected for 3 consecutive terms
because he did not win the 11 May 1998 elections;
2) that he was installed only as mayor by reason of
his victory in the recall elections; 3) that his victory in
the recall elections was not considered a term of
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
office and is not included in the 3-term disqualification
rule and finally 4) that he did not fully serve the 3
consecutive term. His loss in the 11 May 1998
elections is considered an interruption in the
continuity of his service as Mayor of Lucena City.
ISSUE: Was Talaga disqualified to run for Mayor of
Lucena City in the 14 May 2001 elections?
In holding the qualifications of Talaga, the Court
reiterated its ruling in Borja that the term limit for
elective local officials must be taken to refer to the
right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the
same elective position considering that the continuity
of his mayorship was disrupted by the defeat in the
1998 elections which is considered as an interruption
in the continuity of service. The Court further held
that the comment of Fr. Bernas is pertinent only to
member of the HR there being no recall elections
provided for members of Congress.
In Lonzanida v. Comelec and Lu 28 311 SCRA 602
(July 1998), Lonzanida was elected and served 2
consecutive terms as municipal mayor of San
Antonio, Zambales, prior to the 08 May 1995
elections. In the May 1995 elections, Lonzanida ran
for the same elective post and was again proclaimed
winner. He assumed office and discharged the duties
thereof. His proclamation in 1995 was contested by
his then opponent Juan Alvez who filed an election
protest before the RTC of Zambales which rendered
a decision declaring a failure of elections rendering
the result for the office as null and void. The office of
the mayor was then declared vacant. Both parties
appealed to the Comelec and on 13 Nov. 1997, it
resolved the election protest filed by Alvez in his favor
after determining that Alvez garnered the plurality of
votes. The Comelec issued a writ of execution
54
ordering Lonzanida to vacate the post to which he
obeyed and Alvez assumed for the remainder of the
term.
Lonzanida again filed his certificate of candidacy for
Mayor in the 11 May 1998 and his opponent timely
filed a petition to disqualify him for the same post.
ISSUE: Whether Lonzanida’s assumption of office
from May 1995 to March 1998 may be considered as
service of one full term for the purpose of applying the
3-term limit for elective local government officials. It
was held that Lonzanida is still qualified to run for
mayor and held that the 2-rquisites for the application
of the 3-term limit is wanting. First, petitioner cannot
be considered as having been elected to the post in
the May 1995 elections, and second, the petitioner
did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoralty term by
reason of involuntary relinquishment of office.
As repeatedly ruled by the SC, a “proclamation
subsequently declared void is no proclamation at all
and while a proclaimed candidate may assume office
on the strength of the proclamation of the BOC, he is
only a presumptive winner who assumes the office
subject of the final outcome of the election protest.”
Another issue raised in Lonzanida is that the
Comelec already lost jurisdiction over the
disqualification case when he was proclaimed as
winner and that jurisdiction is already with the RTC
for QW. The SC reiterated its ruling in Trinidad v.
Comelec 288 SCRA 76 (1998) that pursuant to Sec. 6
of RA 6646, the proclamation nor assumption of office
of a candidate against whom a petition for
disqualification is pending before the Comelec does
not divest the Comelec of jurisdiction to continue
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
hearing the case and resolve it on the merits.(Also
ruling in Dizon v. Comelec 577 SCRA 589).
Borja v. Comelec 295 SCRA 157 (1998), the SC ruled
on the issue on whether a VM who succeeds to the
office of mayor by operation of law and serves the
remainder of the term is considered to have served a
term in that office for the purpose of the 3-term limit.
The SC upheld the decision of the Comelec that
succession for the expired term is not the service
contemplated as would disqualify the elective official
from running for the same elective post. The purpose
of this provision is to prevent a circumvention of the
limitation on the number of terms an elective local
official may serve. Conversely, if he is not serving a
term for which he was elected as he was simply
continuing the service of the official he succeeds,
such official cannot be considered to have fully
served the term notwithstanding his voluntary
renunciation of office prior to his expiration. (Asked in
the 2001 BAR)
In applying said policy, the following situations
(tenures in office) are NOT considered service of term
for purpose of applying the 3-term limit –
 officer fills up a higher office
succession/operation of law
 officer is suspended from office (failed to
serve full term/involuntary)
 officer unseated, ordered to vacate by reason
of an election protest case
 officer serving unexpired term after winning in
the recall elections;
In Ong vs. Alegre 479 SCRA 473 – A petition for
disqualification was filed against Francis Ong for
55
having violated the 3-term limit rule for having served
as mayor of San Vicente Camarines Norte in the May
1995, 1998 & 2001 elections. The controversy
revolves around the 1998-2001 mayoral term wherein
the election protest filed by Alegre was promulgated
after the term of the contested office has expired.
The question for consideration is whether or not the
assumption of Francis Ong as Mayor from July 1,
1998 to June 30, 2001, may be considered as one full
term service in the context of the consecutive term
limit rule. The Court declared that such assumption
of office constitutes, for Francis, “service for the full
term” and should be counted as a full term served in
contemplation of the 3-term limit prescribed by the
constitutional and statutory provisions, barring
elective officials from being elected and serving for
more than 3-consecutive terms.
The Court debunked the claim of Francis Ong that he
was only a presumptive winner in view of the ruling of
the RTC that Alegre was the real winning candidate in
the light of his being proclaimed by the MBOC
coupled by his assumption of office and his
continuous exercise of the functions thereof from start
to finish of the term, should legally be taken as
by service for a full term in contemplation of the 3-term
rule. Lonzanida from which Ong sought refuge is not
applicable in view of the involuntary relinquishment of
office before the expiration of his term. (Same ruling
in Rivera III vs. Comelec 523 SCRA )
Aldovino Jr., vs. Comelec 609 SCRA 234 (2009) –
Article X, Section 8 – both by structure and substance
– fixes an elective official’s term of office and limits his
stay in office to 3 consecutive terms as an inflexible
rule that is stressed, no less, by citing voluntary
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
renunciation as an example of a circumvention. The
provision should be read in the context of interruption
of term, NOT in the context of interrupting the full
continuity of the exercise of the power of the elective
position. The “voluntary renunciation” it speaks of
refers only to the elective official’s involuntary
relinquishment of office and loss of title to this office.
It does not speak of the temporary “cessation of the
exercise of power or authority” that may occur for
various reasons, with preventive suspension being
only one of them. Quoting Latasa – the law
contemplates a rest period during which the local
elective official steps down from office and ceases to
exercise power or authority over the inhabitants of the
territorial jurisdiction of a particular government unit.”
DISQUALIFICATION CASES (EFFECTS)
Sec. 72 of the OEC and Section 6 of 6646 states:
“any candidate who been declared by final judgment
to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes
cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and is voted for and
received the winning number of votes in such
election, the Comelec shall continue with the trial and
hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon
motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may
during the pendency thereof order the suspension of
the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of guilt is strong.”
CAMPAIGN AND ELECTION PROPAGANDA
Election period is 120 days- 90 days before the date
of the election and 30 days thereafter. Campaign
period for Pres., VP and Senators starts 90 days
56
before the date of the election, 45 days for members
of the HR and local candidate and 15 days for
barangay official, which excludes the day before and
the day of the elections.
Prohibited Activities – Section 80 BP881 – Election
campaign or partisan political activity outside
campaign period. It shall be unlawful for any person
whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any party
or association of persons, to engage in an election
campaign or partisan political activity except during
the campaign period: Provided, That political parties
may hold political convention or meetings to nominate
their official candidates within 30 days before the
commencement of the campaign period and 45 days
for President and Vice-President.
RA 9006 (Fair Election Law), Section 3.Election
propaganda whether on television, cable television,
radio, newspapers or any other medium is hereby
allowed for all registered political parties, national,
regional, sectoral parties or organizations
participating under the party-list elections and for all
bona fide candidates seeking national and local
positions subject to the limitation on authorized
expenses of candidates and political parties,
observance of truth in advertising and to the
supervision and regulation by the Comelec.
Requirements for Published or Printed Broadcast
Election Propaganda.RA 9006 now allows paid
political advertisements for print and broadcast media
provided the said advertisement shall bear and be
identified by reasonably legible or audible words “
Political advertisement paid for” followed by the true
and correct name and address of the candidate or
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
party for whose benefit the election propaganda was
printed or aired.
Free of charge – if broadcast is given free of charge
the radio and television station, it shall be identified
by the words “airtime for this broadcast was provided
free of charge by” followed by the true and correct
name and address of the broadcast entity. Provided
that said print, broadcast donated shall not be
published or printed without the written acceptance of
the candidate or political party which acceptance shall
be attached to the advertising contract and submitted
to the Comelec.
Guidelines whether by purchase or donation – Print
advertisements shall not exceed ¼ page in
broadsheet and ½ page in tabloids 3 x a week per
newspaper, magazine or other publications during the
campaign period. (Section 6, RA 9006).
Television/Radio Advertisements – nation
candidates/registered political party shall be entitled
to not more than 120 minutes of TV advertisement
and 180 minutes of radio. Local candidates not more
than 60 minutes of TV advertisement and 90 minutes
of radio.
Comelec Time and space – print space, Comelec
shall pay just compensation (PPI ruling) in at least 3
newspapers of general circulation which Comelec
shall allocate free of charge to the national
candidates. Broadcast network (radio and TV) free of
charge to Comelec.(Section 8, RA 9006)
Limitations In Broadcasting of Election Accounts –
Comelec shall ensure that radio and television or
cable television broadcasting entities shall not allow
57
the scheduling of any program or permit any sponsor
to manifestly favor or oppose any candidate or
political party or unduly or repeatedly referring to or
including said candidate and/or political party in such
program respecting, however, in all instances the
right of said broadcast entities to air accounts of
significant news or news worthy events and views on
matter of public interest.
Restrictions on Media Practitioners – any mass media
columnist, commentator, reporter or non-air
correspondent or personality who is a candidate for
any elective office or is a campaign volunteer for or
employed or retained in any capacity by any
candidate or political party shall be deemed resigned,
if so required by their employer, or shall take a leave
of absence from his/her work as such during the
campaign period. Any media practitioner who is an
official of a political party or member of the campaign
staff of a candidate or political party shall not use
his/her time or space to favor any candidate or
political party
No movie, cinematography or documentary
portraying the life or biography of a candidate shall be
publicly exhibited in a theater, television stations or
any public forum during the campaign period or those
portrayed by an actor or media personality who is
himself a candidate.
RA 9006, Section 5 Election surveys – refers to the
measurements of opinions and perceptions of the
voters as regards a candidate’s popularity,
qualifications, platforms or matter of public discussion
in relation the election, including voters’ preference or
candidates or publicly discussed issues during the
campaign period. The person or entity who publishes
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW 58

a survey is required to include the following the limits on campaign spending shall be governed b
information: the laws and regulations applicable to the Philippines.

 Name of the person, candidate, party or BP881, Section 95 – Prohibited Contributions. No

organization who commissioned or paid the contribution for purposes of partisan political activity
survey; shall be made directly or indirectly by any of the
 Name and address of the person or polling following:
firm from who conducted the survey (a) Public or private financial institutions:
 Period during which the survey was Provided, however, That nothing herein
conducted, methodology used, including the shall prevent the making of any loan to a
number or individual respondents and the candidate or political party by any such
areas from which they were selected and the public or private financial institutions
specific questions asked legally in the business of lending money,
 Margin of error of the survey. and that the loan is made in accordance
with laws and regulations and in the
The survey together with the raw data gathered to ordinary course of the business;
support the conclusions shall be available for (b) Natural and juridical persons operating a
inspection, copying and verification by the Comelec, public utility or in possession of or
or by the registered political party or any Comelec exploiting any natural resources of the
accredited citizen arm. nation;
(c) Natural and juridical persons who hold
Posting of Campaign Materials – political parties and contract or sub-contract to supply the
party-list groups may be authorized by the Comelec government or any of its divisions,
common poster areas for their candidates in not more subdivisions or instrumentalities, with
than 10 public places such as plazas, markets, goods or services or to perform
barangay centers and the like, wherein, candidates construction or other works;
can post, display or exhibit election propaganda. The (d) Natural and juridical persons who have
size of the poster areas shall not exceed 12 x 16 feet been granted franchises, incentives,
or it equivalent. With respect to independent exemptions, allocations or similar
candidates, may likewise avail of this but the privileges or concessions by the
difference is merely on the size which shall not government or any of its divisions,
exceed 4 x 6 feet or its equivalent.(Section 9, RA subdivisions or instrumentalities, including
9006) government-owned or controlled
corporations.
RA 9189, Section 15 – Regulation of Campaign (e) Natural and juridical persons who, within
Abroad – The use of campaign materials, as well as the one year prior to the date of the
election, have been granted loans or
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW 59

other accommodations in excess of 100K  pollsters shall not conduct their survey within
by the government or any of its divisions, 50 meters from the polling place whether said
subdivisions or instrumentalities including survey is taken in a home, dwelling place and
government owned or controlled other places;
corporations.  pollsters shall wear distinctive clothing;
(f) Educational institutions which have  pollsters shall inform the voters that they may
received grants of public funds to no less refuse to answer; and
than 100K;  the result of the exit polls may be announced
(g) Officials or employees in the Civil Service, after the closing of the polls on election day,
or members of the Armed Forces of the and must clearly identify the total number of
Philippines; respondents, and the places where they were
(h) Foreigners and foreign corporations. taken.. Said announcement shall state that the
same is unofficial and does not represent a
It shall be unlawful for any person to solicit or trend.
receive any contribution from any of the persons or
entities enumerated herein. SOCIAL WEATHER STATION vs. COMELEC 357
SCRA 496 – This case involved the issue on election
ABS-CBN 323 SCRA 811, the SC defined exit polls surveys. SWS is a private non-stock, non-profit social
as a specie of electoral survey conducted by qualified research institution conducting surveys in various
individuals or groups of individuals for the purpose of fields, including economics, politics, demography and
determining the probable result of an election by social development, and thereafter, processing,
confidentially asking randomly selected voters whom analyzing and publicly reporting the results thereof.
they have voted for, immediately after they have On the other hand, Kamahalan Publishing
officially cast their ballots. An absolute prohibition is Corporation publishes the Manila Standard, a
unreasonably restrictive because it effectively newspaper of general circulation, which features
prevents the use of exit poll data not only for election newsworthy items of information including election
days of the elections, but also for long term research. surveys.
The concern of Comelec of a non-communicative
effect of the exit polls which is disorder and confusion
in the voting centers does not justify a total ban of the
exist polls. Comelec should instead set safeguards in
place for those who intends to conduct exit polls.

Section 5.5 of RA 9006 (Fair Elections Law)

provides for the requirements for the taking of an exit
polls:
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
Petitioners brought this action for prohibition to
enjoin the Comelec from enforcing par. 5.4 of RA
9006 which provides, “Surveys affecting national
candidates shall not be published fifteen (15) days
before an election and surveys affecting local
candidates shall not be published seven (7) days
before an election”.
The term “election surveys” is defined in par.
5.1 of the law as follows ”Election surveys refer to the
measurement of opinions and perception of the
voters as regards a candidate’s popularity,
qualification, platforms or a matter of public
discussion in relation to the election, including voters’
preference for candidates or publicly discussed
issues during the campaign period”.
Petitioner SWS states that it wishes to
conduct an election survey throughout the period of
the elections both at the national and local levels and
release to the media the results of such survey as
well as publish them directly. Kamahalan also states
that it intends to publish election survey results up to
the last day of the elections on May 14, 2001. HELD:
Par. 5.4 constitutes an unconstitutional abridgement
of freedom of speech, expression and the press. It is
invalid because it imposes a prior restraint on the
freedom of expression and it is a direct and total
suppression of a category of expression even though
such suppression is only for a limited period, and the
governmental interest sought to be promoted can be
achieved by means other than the suppression of
freedom of expression.
PREMATURE CAMPAIGNING
60
In Francisco Chavez v. Comelec et. al. G.R. No.
162777 31 August 2004, Chavez brought before the
SC a Petition for Prohibition with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction as
taxpayer and citizen asking the Court to enjoin the
Comelec from enforcing Section 21 of its Resolution
No. 6520 dated 06 January 2004. (Sec. 32 provides:
All propaganda materials such as posters, streamers,
stickers or paintings on walls and other materials
showing the picture or name of a person and all
advertisements on print, in radio or on television
showing the image or mentioning the name of a
person, who subsequent to the placement or display
thereof becomes a candidate for public office shall be
immediately removed by said candidate and radio
station, print media or television station within 3 days
after the effectivity of these implementing rules;
otherwise, he and the said radio station, print media
or television station shall be presumed to have
conducted premature campaigning in violation of Sec.
80 of the OEC)
Chavez on various dates entered in formal
agreement with certain establishment to endorse their
products and pursuant thereto, 3 bill boards were set
up on some strategic areas in Metro Manila.
Subsequently on 30 December 2003, Chavez filed his
certificate of candidacy for the position of Senator.
On 06 January 2004, Comelec issued Resolution No.
6520 which contained Section 32. Comelec directed
Chavez to comply with the said provision and replied
how he may have violated the assailed provision.
Another letter was sent seeking exemption from the
application of Section 32, considering that the
billboard adverted to are mere product endorsements
and cannot be construed as paraphernalia for
premature campaigning under the rules.
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
Comelec replied by informing him to remove
or cover the said billboards pending the resolution of
the Comelec on his request for
Aggrieved, Chavez sent to the SC via a petition for
prohibition seeking the said provision
unconstitutional based on the following grounds –
 It was a gross violation of the non-
impairment clause
 An invalid exercise of police power
 In the nature of an ex post facto law
 Contrary to the Fair Elections Act
 Invalid due to overbreadth
As to the 1st issue – is Section 32 of Comelec
Resolution No. 6520 an invalid exercise of police
power? Petitioner argues: the billboards (even if it
bears his name) do not at all announce his candidacy
for any public office nor solicit for such candidacy
from the electorate; they are mere
endorsements and not election
Prohibition is not within the scope of power of the
Comelec.
RULING – police power is an inherent attribute of
sovereignty, is the power to prescribe regulations to
promote the health, morale, peace, education, good
order or safety of the general welfare of the people.
The primary objective of the provision is to prohibit
premature campaigning and to level the playing field
for candidates of public office, to equalize the
situation between popular or rich candidates, on one
hand and lesser-known or poorer candidates, on the
other, by preventing the former from enjoying undue
advantage in exposure and publicity on account of
their resources and popularity. This is a valid reason
61
for the exercise of police power as held in the
Philippines Press Institute v. Comelec case.
exemption. It is true that when petitioner entered into the contract
or agreements to endorse certain products, he acted
as as a private individual and had all the right to lend his
name and image to these products. However, when
he filed his COC for senator, the billboards featuring
his name and image assumed partisan political
character because the same directly promoted his
candidacy. If subject billboards were to be allowed,
candidates for public office whose name and image
are used to advertise commercial products would
have more opportunity to make themselves known to
the electorate, to the disadvantage of other
candidates who do not have the same chance of
lending their faces and names to endorse popular
commercial products as image models. Similarly, an
individual intending to run for public office within the
product next few months, could pay private corporations to
propaganda. use him as their image model with the intention of
familiarizing the public with his name and image even
before the start of the campaign period. This, without
doubt, would be a circumvention of the rule against
premature campaigning..
Section 32 neither violated the non-impairment clause
as this must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by
the Government. Equal opportunity to proffer oneself
for public office, without regard to the level of financial
resources one may have at his disposal, is a vital
interest to the public. The SC has stressed that
contracts affecting public interest contain an implied
reservation of the police power as a postulate of the
existing legal order. This power can be activated at
anytime to change the provisions of the contract, or
even abrogate it entirely, for the promotion or
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
protection of the genera; welfare. Such an act will not
militate against the impairment clause. Which is
subject to and limited by the paramount police power.
On the issue that Sec. 32 of the Comelec Resolution
is in the nature of an ex post facto law. Not ex post
facto – the offense as expressly prescribed in Section
32, is the non-removal of the described propaganda
materials three (3) days after the effectivity of the said
Resolution. If the candidate for public office fails to
remove such propaganda materials after the given
period, he shall be liable under Section 80 of the OEC
for premature campaigning. Nowhere is it indicated
in the said provision that it shall operate retroactively.
On the issue that the provision was a violation of the
Fair Elections Act as billboards are already permitted
as lawful election propaganda. It was ruled that the
provision does not prohibit billboards as lawful
election propaganda. It only regulates their use to
prevent premature campaigning and to equalize, as
much as practicable, the situation of all candidates by
preventing popular and rich candidates from gaining
undue advantage in exposure and publicity on
account of their resources and popularity. Comelec
was only doing its duty under the law (Sec. 3 and 13
of the Fair Elections Act on lawful propaganda)
Section 80 of the OEC provides “it shall be unlawful
for any person, whether or not a voter or candidate or
for any party, or association of persons, to engage in
an election campaign or partisan political activity,
except during the campaign period.”
Penera v. Comelec 599 SCRA 609. The issue on
premature campaigning was raised. Facts show that
Penera and Andanar were mayoralty candidates in
62
Sta. Monica in the last May 14, 2007 elections.
Andanar filed before the Office of the Regional
Election Director, Caraga Region, Region XIII, a
petition for disqualification against Penera for
unlawfully engaging in election campaigning and
partisan political activity prior to the commencement
of the campaign period.
The Petition alleged that on 29 March 2007, a day
before the start of the authorized campaign period on
30 March 2007, Penera and her partymates went
around the different barangays in Sta. Monica,
announcing their candidacies and requesting the
people to vote for them on the day of the elections.
Penera alleged that the charge was not true although
having admitted that a motorcade did take place
which was simply in accordance with the usual
practice in nearby cities and provinces, where the
filing of COC was preceded by a motorcade, which
dispersed soon after the completion of such filing.
Penera in her defense cited Barroso v. Ampig (385
Phil 2237; 328 SCRA 530) wherein the Court ruled
that a motorcade held by candidates during the filing
of their COC’s was not a form of political
campaigning. Pending the disqualification case,
Penera was proclaimed as winner and assumed
office.
Comelec ruled that Penera engaged in premature
campaigning in violation of Section 80 and
disqualified Penera from continuing as a mayoralty
candidate. The SC ruled no abuse of discretion on
the part of the Comelec and held that the conduct of a
motorcade is a form of election campaign or partisan
political activity which fall squarely under of Section
79 of the OEC.
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
Penera moved for reconsideration arguing that she
was not yet a candidate at the time of the supposed
premature campaigning, since under Section 15 of
RA 8436 (the law authorizing the Comelec to use an
automated election system for the process of voting,
counting of votes, and canvasing/consolidating the
results of the national and local elections), as
amended by RA 9369, is not officially a candidate
until the start of the campaign period.
In granting Penera’s MR, the SC En Banc held that
Penera did not engage in premature campaigning
and should thus, not be disqualified as a mayoralty
candidate. The Court said-
(a) The Court’s 11 September 2009
Decision (or the assailed Decision) considered a
person who files a certificate of candidacy already a
“candidate” even before the start of the campaign
period. This is contrary to the clear intent and letter
of Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended, which stated
that a person who files his certificate of candidacy will
only be considered a candidate at the start of the
campaign period, and unlawful acts or omission
applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon
the start of such campaign period. In applying the
said law –
(1) The effective date when
partisan political acts become
unlawful
as to a candidate is when the
campaign period starts. Before the
start of the campaign period, the same
partisan political acts are lawful.
63
(2) Accordingly, a candidate is
liable for an election offense
only
for acts done during the campaign
period, not before. In other words,
election offenses can be committed by
a candidate only upon the start of the
campaign period. Before the start of
the campaign period, such election
offenses cannot be committed.
Since the law is clear, the Court has no
recourse but to apply it. The forum for examining the
wisdom of the law, and enacting remedial measures,
is not the Court but the Legislature.
(b) Contrary to the assailed Decision,
Section 15, of RA 8436, as amended, does not
provide that partisan political acts done by a
candidate before the campaign period are unlawful,
but may be prosecuted only upon the start of the
campaign period. Neither does the law state that
partisan political acts done by a candidate before the
campaign period are temporarily lawful, but becomes
unlawful upon the start of the campaign period.
Besides, such a law as envisioned in the Decision,
which defines a criminal act and curtails freedom of
expression and speech, would be void for vagueness.
© That Section 15 of RA 8436 does not
expressly state that campaigning before the start of
the campaign period is lawful, as the assailed
decision asserted, is no moment. It is a basic
principle of law that any act is lawful unless expressly
declared unlawful by law. The mere fact that the law
does not declare an act unlawful ipso facto means
that the act is lawful. Thus, there is no need for
Congress to declare in Section 15 of RA 8436 that
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
partisan political activities before the start of the
campaign period is lawful. It is sufficient for Congress
to state that “any unlawful act or omission applicable
to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of
the campaign period.” The only inescapable and
logical result is that the same acts, if done before the
start of the campaign period, are lawful.
(d) The Court’s 11 September 2009
Decision also reversed Lanot v. Comelec (G.R. No.
164858, 16 November 2006). Lanot was decided on
the ground that one who files a certificate of
candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the
campaign period. This ground was based on the
deliberations of the legislators who explained that the
early deadline for filing COC under RA 8436 was set
only to afford time to prepare the machine readable
ballots, and they intended to preserve the existing
election period, such that one who files his COC to
meet the early deadline will still not be considered as
a candidate.
When Congress amended RA 8436, Congress
decided to expressly incorporate the Lanot doctrine
into law, thus, the provision in Section 15, of RA 8436
that a person who files his certificate of candidacy
shall be considered a candidate only at the start of
the campaign period. Congress wanted to insure
that no person filing a certificate of candidacy under
the early deadline required by the automated election
system would be disqualified or penalized for any
partisan political act done before the start of the
campaign period. This provision cannot be annulled
by the Court except on the sole ground of its
unconstitutionality. The assailed Decision, however,
did not claim that this provision is unconstitutional. In
fact, the assailed Decision considered the entire
64
Section 15 good law. Thus, the Decision was self-
contradictory – reversing Lanot but maintaining the
constitutionality of the said provision.
In Lanot vs. Comelec 507 SCRA 114, the Court ruled
that there are two aspects of a disqualification case:
1) Electoral aspect determines whether the
offender should be disqualified from being a
candidate or from holding office. Proceedings
are summary in character and require only
clear preponderance of evidence. An erring
candidate may be disqualified even without
prior determination of probable cause in a PI.
The electoral aspect may proceed
independently of the criminal aspect and vice-
versa.
2) Criminal aspect determines whether there is
probable cause to charge a candidate for an
election offense. If there is probable cause,
the Comelec through its Law Department, files
the criminal information before the proper
court. Proceedings before the proper court
demand a full-blown hearing and require proof
beyond reasonable doubt to convict. A
criminal conviction shall result in the
disqualification of the offender, which may
even include disqualification from holding a
future public office.
CANVASSING BODIES
Section 221, BP 881/RA 6646, Section 20 - Boards of
Canvassers (Local Boards). There shall be a board
of canvassers for each province, city and municipality
as follows:
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
(a) Provincial Board of Canvassers – The
provincial board of canvassers shall be
composed of the provincial election
supervisor or a lawyer in the regional
office of the Commission, as chairman, the
provincial fiscal, as vice-chairman, and the
provincial superintendent of schools as
member.
(b) City Board of Canvassers – The city board
of canvassers shall be composed of the
city election registrar or a lawyer of the
Commission, as chairman, the city fiscal,
as vice-chairman, and the city
superintendent of schools, as member. In
cities with more than one election
registrar, the Commission shall designate
the election registrar as chairman.
(c) Municipal Board of Canvassers. – The
municipal board of canvassers shall be
composed of the election registrar or a
representative of the Commission, as
chairman, the municipal treasurer, as vice-
chairman and the most senior district
school supervisor or in his absence a
principal of the school district or the
elementary school, as member.
The proceedings of the board of canvassers shall
be open and public.
BP881, Section 222. Relationship with Candidates
and other members of the Board.The chairman and
the members of the boards of canvassers shall not be
related within the 4th civil degree of consanguinity or
affinity to any of the candidates whose votes will be
canvassed by the said board, or to any member of
the same board.
65
BP881, Section 224. Feigned Illness. Any member of
the board of canvassers feigning illness in order to be
substituted on election day until the proclamation of
the winning candidates shall be guilty of an election
offense.
RA 8436, Section 23 – National Board of Canvassers
for Senators – The chairman and members of the
Commission on Elections sitting en banc, shall
compose the national board of canvassers for
senators. It shall canvass the results for senators by
consolidating the results contained in the data
storage devices submitted by the district, provincial
and city boards of canvassers, of those cities which
comprise one or more legislative districts. Thereafter,
the national board shall proclaim the winning
candidates.
Section 30, RA 7166 – Congress as the National
Board of Canvassers for the election of President and
Vice-President: Determination of Authenticity and
Due Execution of Certificates of Canvass. –
1) Congress for Pres. & VP (Sec. 4, Article VII)
2) Comelec – Senators and Regional Officials –
3) PBC – Members of the HR and provincial
officials (composed of the PES, Provincial
Prosecutor and provincial official of the DepEd
4) District BOC in each legislative district in MM –
members of the HR and municipal officials
5) City and MBOC – member of the HR, city and
municipal officials composed of the city or
municipal EO, City Prosecutor and DepEd
Superintendent
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
RA 9189, Section 18(4) – A Special Board of
Canvassers composed of a lawyer preferably of the
Commission as chairman, a senior career office from
any of the government agencies maintaining a post
abroad and, in the absence of another government
officer, a citizen of the Philippines qualified to vote
under this Act deputized by the Commission, as vice-
chairman and member secretary, respectively, shall
be constituted to canvass election returns submitted
to it by the Special Boards of Elections Inspectors.
Xxx xxx “The Certificates of Canvass and the
accompanying Statements of Votes as transmitted via
facsimile, electronic mail and any other means of
transmission equally safe, secure and reliable shall
be the primary basis for the national canvass.
CERTIFICATE OF VOTES, STATEMENT OF
VOTES, ELECTION RETURNS AND DISTRIBUTION
Certificate of Votes – is an election document issued
by the BEI’s after the counting and announcement of
the results and before leaving the polling place upon
request of the accredited watcher. It shall contain the
number of votes obtain by each candidate written in
words and figures, precinct #, name of the city or
municipality signed and thumb marked by each
member of the board.
Typoco vs. Comelec 614 SCRA 391 – In Garay v.
Comelec 261 SCRA 222 (1996) the Court held that
“(a) certificate of votes does not constitute sufficient
evidence of the true and genuine results of the
election; only election returns are, pursuant to
Sections 231, 233-236 and 238 of BP881.” Again in
De Guzman v. Comelec 426 SCRA 698 (2004) the
Court stated that, in an election contest where the
correctness of the number of votes is involved, the
66
best and most conclusive evidence are the ballots
themselves; where the ballots can nor be produced or
are not available, the election returns would be the
best evidence.”
Doromal vs. Biron/Comelec 613 SCRA 160 (2010) –
the certificate of votes, which contains the number of
votes obtained by each candidate, is issued by the
BEI upon the request of the duly accredited watcher
pursuant to Section 16 of RA 6646. Relative to its
evidentiary value, Section 17 of RA 6646 provides
that Sections 235 and 236 of BP 881 notwithstanding,
the Certificate of Votes shall be admissible in
evidence to prove tampering, alteration, falsification
or any anomaly committed in the preparation of the
election returns concerned, when duly authenticated
by at least two members of the BEI who issued the
certificate. Failure to present the CV shall however
not bar the presentation of other evidence to impugn
the authenticity of the ER. It cannot be a valid basis
of canvass.
Purpose of requiring authentication of at least 2
members of the BOC – to safeguard the integrity of
the certificate from the time it is issued by the BEI to
the watcher after the counting of votes at the precinct
level up to the time that it is presented to the board of
canvassers to proved tampering.
FUNCTIONS OF THE CERTIFICATE OF VOTES
 Prevent or deter the members of the BEI or
other official from altering the statement
because they know of the existence of such
certificate
 To advise the candidate definitely of the
number of his votes so that in case the
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
election statement submitted to the BOC does
not tally with the certificate in his hands, he
may ask that the other authentic copies of the
same be used for the canvass
 To serve as evidence of fraud in election
protest cases and in subsequent prosecution
of the election offenses against those liable
therefore.
Statement of Votes – is a tabulation per precinct of
the votes obtained by the candidates or reflected in
the ER.
Certificate of Canvass – is based on the SV and
which serves as basis for proclamation.
DISPOSITION OF ELECTION RETURNS
Election Returns and Distribution – RA 8173
amending Section 27 of RA 7166, provides that in the
election for Pres., VP, Senators and members of the
HR, the ER shall be distributed as follows -
 1st CBO or MBOC
 2nd congress, directed to the Pres. of the
Senate
 3rd Comelec
 4th Dominant majority party as may be
determined by the Comelec in accordance
with law
 5th Dominant minority party as may be
determined by Comelec in accordance with
law
 6th Citizens Arms authorized by the Comelec
to conduct an unofficial count to be deposited
inside the ballot box.
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For Local officials – (1) CBOB or MBOC (2) Comelec
(3) PBOC (4) DMP (5) DMP (6) Citizen’s Arms for
unofficial count (7) inside ballot box.
Petition to Declare a postponement, failure or
annulment of elections and call for a special elections
in accordance with Sections 5,6, & 7 of the OEC as
amended by Sec. 4 of RA 7166.
Sec. 5 of the OEC provides for the grounds for
declaring a postponement of elections that is when
for -
 any serious cause such as violence,
 terrorism,
 loss or destruction of election paraphernalia
or records,
 FM and other analoguous circumstances of
such a nature that the holding of a HOPE-
FRECRE should become impossible in any
political subdivision.
Jurisdiction - the Commission en banc may “motu
propio or upon a verified petition by any interested
party, and after due notice and hearing, whereby all
interested parties are afforded equal opportunity to be
heard, shall postpone the election to a date which is
reasonably close to the date of the election not held,
suspended or which resulted to a failure to elect but
not later than 30 days after the cessation of the cause
for such postponement or suspension of the election
or failure to elect.
Sec. 6 on the other hand, prescribes the
conditions for the exercise of the power to declare a
Failure of Elections. As reiterated in Dibaratun vs.
Comelec 611 SCRA 367, citing Banaga Jr. v.
Comelec 336 SCRA 701 (2000) also in Canicosa v.
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
Comelec 282 SCRA 517- to declare a failure of
elections, either of these three (3) instances should
be present conformably with Section 6 of the OEC –
 the election in any polling place has not been
held on the date fixed on account of force
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other
analogous causes;
 the election in any polling place has been
suspended before the hour fixed by law for the
closing of voting on account of FM, terrorism,
fraud or other analogous causes
 after the voting and during the preparation and
transmission of the ER or in the custody of
canvass thereof, such election results in a
failure to elect on the same grounds.
Based on the foregoing provisions, two (2)
conditions must concur to declare a failure of
elections –
 no voting has taken place in the precincts
concerned on the date fixed by law or, even if
there was voting the election nevertheless
resulted in a failure to elect and
 the votes not cast would affect the results of
the elections (Carlos. V. Angeles)
In the same case of Coquilla v. Comelec, the SC
stressed that “what is common in these three
instances is the resulting failure to elect. In the first
instance, no election was held, while in the second,
the election is suspended. In the third instance,
circumstances attending the preparation,
transmission, custody or canvas of the election
returns cause a failure to elect. And, the term failure
to elect means nobody emerged as a winner.”
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Procedural Rules - On the basis of a verified petition
by any interested party and after due notice and
hearing, the Comelec may call for the holding or
continuation of the election not held, suspended or
which resulted in a failure to elect on a date
reasonably close to the date of the election not held,
suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but
not later than 30 days after the cessation of the cause
of such postponement or suspension of the election
or failure to elect.
Sec. 4 of RA 7166 (An Act Providing for the
Synchronized National and Local Elections) provides
that any declaration of postponement, failure of
election and calling for a special elections as provided
in Section 5,6, & 7 shall be decided by the
Commission sitting en banc by a majority vote of its
members. This power is exclusively vested in the
Comelec as ruled in the case of Sanchez v. Comelec
193 SCRA 849.
Loong v. Comelec 257 SCRA 1, a petition to declare
failure of elections/annulment of elections on the
ground of massive fraud in some municipalities was
filed before proclamation.. Comelec dismissed the
petition for having been filed out of time since it was
filed only after petitioners realized that the annulment
of election will wipe out their lead. HELD: It was ruled
that the Comelec Resolution dismissing the petition
was arbitrary as no law provided for a reglementary
period within which to file a petition for annulment of
elections if there is no proclamation yet.
Canicosa v. Comelec 282 SCRA 512, Canicosa filed
with the Comelec a Petition to declare failure of
elections and to declare null and void the canvass
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
and proclamation based on the following grounds
(names of the RV did not appear on the list, padlocks
were not self locking among other) which was
dismissed by the Comelec en banc on the ground
that the allegations therein did not justify the
declaration of failure of elections.
Canicosa insists that itswas error on the part
of Comelec sitting en banc to rule on his petition as it
should have first been heard by a division. The SC
held that the matter relating to the declaration of
failure of elections or the allegations raised by
Canicosa did not involve an exercise of QJ or
adjudicatory functions. It involves an administrative
function which pertains to the enforcement and
administration of all laws and regulations relative to
the conduct of elections.
Pasandalan vs. Comelec, et. al., G.R. No. 150312
July 18, 2002, the SC held that a petition for
declaration of failure of elections is an “extraordinary
remedy” and therefore the petition must specifically
allege the essential grounds that would justify the
same. Otherwise, the Comelec can dismiss the
petition outright for lack of merit and no grave abuse
of discretion can be attributed to it. The Comelec is
mandated to exercise this power with utmost
circumspect to prevent disenfranchising voters and
frustrating the electorate’s well.”
In this case, Pasandalan filed a petition for
declaration of failure of election on the ground that
while voting was going on Cafgu’s indiscriminately
fired their firearms causing the voters to panic and
leave the polling places without casting their votes
and taking advantage of the situation, the supporters
of his opponent took the official ballots and filled them
69
up with his name, the BEI’s failed to affix their initials
at the back of several official ballots. Pasandalan , on
the basis of the affidavits of his own poll watchers,
insists that a technical examination of the official
ballots in the contested precincts be made which
would show that only a few persons wrote the entries,
citing the case ofTypoco v. Comelec 319 SCRA 498
and Basher v. Comelec 330 SCRA 736.
The SC held that the Comelec is not mandated to
conduct a technical examination before it dismisses a
petition for nullification of election when the petition is,
on its face, without merit. In the case of Typoco,
petitioner buttressed his petition with independent
evidence that compelled the Comelec to conduct a
technical examination of the questioned returns.
Typoco filed a Motion to Admit Evidence to prove that
a substantial number of election returns were
manufactured and claimed that the returns were
prepared by only one person based on the report of a
licensed examiner of questioned documents who
examined copies of the election returns. Pasandalan
failed to attach independent and objective evidence
other than the self-serving affidavits of his own poll
watchers.
In Basher, the fact that an election is actually held
prevents as a rule, a declaration of failure of
elections, the Court, however, can annul an election if
it finds that the election is attended with patent and
massive irregularities and illegalities.In this case, after
a series of failed elections in Brgy. Maidan,
Municipality of Tugaya, Lanao del Sur during the
1997 Brgy. Elections, the election was reset to 30
August 1997. Due to the prevailing tension in the
locality, the voting started only at around 9 p.m. and
lasted until the early morning of the following day.
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW 70

Basher filed a petition for the nullification of the failure of elections citing several rulings that an
election which was dismissed by the Comelec on the election protest is the proper remedy for a losing
ground that actual voting had taken place. The SC candidate after the proclamation of the winning
overturned the Comelec ruling because the election candidates.
was unauthorized and invalid. The electorate was not
given sufficient notice that the election would push ISSUE: whether the Comelec was divested of its
through after 9pm of the same day. Moreover, the jurisdiction to hear and decide a petition for
voting did not comply with the procedure laid down by declaration of failure of elections after the winners
the Comelec in its Resolution. have already been proclaimed. HELD: It was ruled
that the fact that the a candidate proclaimed has
Banaga Jr. vs. Comelec 336 SCRA 701, the fact that assumed office does not deprive the Comelec of its
a verified petition has been filed does not mean that a authority to annul any canvass and illegal
hearing on the case should first be held before proclamation. In this case, it cannot be assumed that
Comelec can act on it. The petition must show on its the proclamation of petitioners was legal precisely
face that the conditions necessary to declare a failure because the conduct by which the elections were
of elections are present. held was put in issue by respondents in their petition
for annulment of election results and/or declaration of
Ampatuan et. al. v. Comelec/Candao, et. al., G.R. No. failure of elections. The cases relied upon by
149803, January 31, 2002, private respondents filed petitioners that an election protest is the proper
a petition for declaration of failure of elections in remedy for a losing candidate after proclamation of
several municipalities in Maguindanao. During the the winning candidate involved pre-proclamation
pendency of the hearing of said petition, the Comelec controversies.
proclaimed petitioners as winners for the position of
governor, vice-governor and board members. The SC made reference to its ruling in Loong v.
Comelec that “ a pre-proclamation controversy is not
Thereafter, the Comelec issued an order the same as an action for annulment of election
directing the continuation of the hearing on the failure results, or failure of elections”. In pre-proclamation
of elections and issued an order outlining the cases, the Comelec is restricted to an examination of
procedure to be followed in the technical examination. the election returns on their face and is without
Petitioners, relying on the case of Typoco, Jr. v. jurisdiction to go beyond or behind them and
Comelec, contended that by virtue of their investigate election irregularities. The Comelec is
proclamation, the only remedy left for private duty-bound to investigate allegations of fraud,
respondents is to file an election protest, in which terrorism, violence and other analogous causes in
case, original jurisdiction lies with the regular courts actions for annulment of election results or for
and that Comelec no longer has jurisdiction to declaration of failure of elections conformably with the
conduct a technical examination as it would defeat OEC. Accordingly, the Comelec, in the case of
the summary nature of a petition for declaration of actions for annulment of election results or
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
declaration of failure of elections, may conduct
technical examination of election documents and
compare and analyze voters’ signatures and
thumbprints in order to determine whether or not the
elections had indeed been free, honest and clean.
Borja, Jr. v. Comelec 260 SCRA 604, a petition for
declaration of failure of elections and to nullify the
canvass and proclamation was filed by Borja wherein
he alleged that there was lack of notice of the date
and time of canvass, there was fraud in the conduct
of the elections as several voters were
disenfranchised, presence of flying voters and
unqualified members of the BEI. The Comelec
dismissed the petition ruling that the grounds relied
upon by Borja were ground proper only in an election
contest. SC upheld the decision of the Comelec.
PRE-PROCLAMATION CONTROVERSY
BP 881, Section 242 – The Commission shall have
exclusive jurisdiction of all pre=proclamation
controversies. It may motu propio and after due
notice and hearing, order the partial or total
suspension of the proclamation of any candidate-
elect or annual partially or totally any proclamation, if
one has been made, as the evidence shall warrant in
accordance with the succeeding sections.
Matalam v. Comelec 271 SCRA 733/BP 881 – a pre-
proclamation controversy is defined, as a general
rule, any question pertaining to or affecting the
proceedings of the BOC which may be raised by any
candidate or any registered political party or coalition
of political before the board or directly with the
Comelec, on any matter raised under Sections 233
(when ER are delayed, lost or destroyed), 234
71
(material defects in the ER), 235 (when ER appear to
be tampered with or falsified) and 236 (discrepancies
in the ER) of the OEC in relation to the preparation,
transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the
ER and Certificate of Canvass.
Section 17, RA 6646, questions affecting the
composition or proceedings of the BOC may be
initiated with the board or directly with the Comelec.
However, matters raised under Sec. 233 to 236 shall
be brought in the first instance before the BOC only.
EXCEPTIONS: Section 15 of RA 7166 provides that
for purposes of the elections for Pres. and VP,
Senators and members of the HR, no Ppcases shall
be allowed on matters relating the P,T,R,C, and A of
the ER or the certificate of canvass, as the case may
be. HOWEVER, this does not preclude the authority
of the appropriate canvassing body motu proprio or
upon written complaint of an interested person to
correct manifest error in the certificate of canvass or
ER before it.
Sano Jr. vs. Comelec 611 SCRA 475 – It is settled
that a pre-proclamation controversy is summary in
character; indeed, it is a policy of the law that pre-
proclamation be promptly decided, so as not to delay
canvass and proclamation. The board of canvassers
will not look into allegations of irregularity that are not
apparent on the face of ER’s that appear otherwise
authentic and duly accomplished.
Authority of the Comelec in PPC – the Commission
exercises authority to decide PPC in two instances –
 in appeals from the ruling of the BOC which is
generally of two types first type are n
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
questions contesting its composition
proceedings and appeal therefrom must be
taken by the contestant adversely affected
within 3 days from such ruling .and the second
type refers to ruling on questions contesting
ER. The party adversely affected must
immediately inform the board that he intends
to appeal from the ruling and the board shall
enter said information in the minutes of the
canvass and within 48 hours from the ruling,
the adverse party must file with the board a
written and verified notice of appeal, and
within an unextendible period of 5 days
thereafter, he has to take the appeal to the
Comelec
 in petitions directly filed with it.
Macabago v. Comelec 392 SCRA 178 – it was held
that issues in a PPC is properly limited to challenges
aimed against the BOC and proceedings before said
board relative to particular ER to which respondent
should have made particular verbal objections
subsequently reduced in writing.
BP 881 Section 243.Comelec Rules of Procedure
Rule 27 (4) - SCOPE/ISSUES that may be raised in a
PRE-PROCLAMATION CONTROVERSY
 Illegal composition or proceedings of the BOC
 The canvassed ER are incomplete, contain
material defects, appear to be tampered with,
or falsified or contain discrepancies in the
same returns or in other authentic copies as
mentioned in Sec. 233-236
 The ER were prepared under duress, threats,
coercion or intimidation or they are obviously
manufactures or not authentic – in Ocampo v.
72
or Comelec 235 SCRA 436, it was held that this
fact must be evident from the face of the said
document. In the absence of a strong
evidence establishing spuriousness of the
returns, the basic rule is that the ER shall be
accorded prima facie status as bona fide
reports of the results of the count of the votes
which shall prevail for purposes of canvassing
and proclamation.
 When substitute or fraudulent returns in
controverted polling places are canvassed, the
result of which materially affect the standing of
the aggrieved candidate. (Sec. 243)
PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS IN A Pre-
PROCLAMATION CONTROVERSY
Sec. 20 of RA 7166 (repealing Sec. 245 OEC)
provides for the mandatory two-step rule or
requirement of verbal objection to the inclusion of the
ER and to be formalized in writing within 24 hours.
Failure to observe such rule is fatal to a candidate’s
cause, leaving him with no other remedy except an
EP. This cannot be cured by instituting a petition
directly filed with the Comelec under Sec. 241
Sandoval v. Comelec 323 SCRA 407, it was stressed
that Comelec exercises exclusive jurisdiction and may
motu propio or upon verified petition, and after due
notice and hearing, order the partial or total
suspension of the proclamation of the candidate elect
or annul partially or totally any proclamation, if one
has been made, as the evidence shall warrant in
accordance with Sec. 242 of the OEC.
Velayo v. Comelec 327 SCRA 713 – a PPC is
summary in nature, administrative in character and
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
which is filed before the BOC. It was ruled that while
it is true that RA 7166 provides for summary
proceedings in PP cases and does not require a trial
type hearing, nevertheless, summary proceedings
cannot be stretched as to mean ex-parte
proceedings.
In Velayo case, respondent objected to the inclusion
of two (2)ER’s which did not contain a vote for
respondent being statistically improbable which was
overruled by the BOC. It was ruled that it is possible
for a candidate to get zero votes in one or few
precincts. The bare fact that a candidate receive zero
votes in 1 or 2 precincts can not support a finding that
the ER are statistically improbable. (Exception to the
Lagumbay Doctrine)
Lagumbay v. Comelec 16 SCRA 175 (1966) -
The Lagumbay doctrine isthe prevailing case
on statistical improbability which states that where
there exists uniformity of tallies in favor of candidates
belonging to one party and the systematic blanking
out of the opposing candidates as when all the
candidates of one party received all the votes, each
of whom exactly the same number, and the opposing
candidates got zero votes, the election returns are
obviously manufactures, contrary to al statistical
improbabilities and utterly improbable and clearly
incredible.
In Ocampo v. Comelec 325 SCRA 636, it was
reiterated that if only one candidate obtained all the
votes in some precincts, this is not sufficient to make
the election returns statistically improbable.
Imelda Dimaporo vs. Comelec/Vicente Belmonte 544
SCRA 381- (Sec. 15 of RA 7166)provides that for the
73
purpose of the elections for president, VP, senator &
member of the HR, no pre-proclamation cases shall
be allowed on matters relating to the preparation,
transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of ER
or the certificate of canvass, as the case may be,
except as provided for in Sec. 30 hereof. However,
this does not preclude the authority of the appropriate
canvassing body motu propio or upon written
complaint of an interested person to correct manifest
errors in the certificate of canvass or ER before it).
Rommel Munoz vs. Comelec, Carlos Balido Jr. 495
SCRA 407 - “Results of the Elections” Defined – the
phrase “results of the election” is not statutorily
defined. However, as explained in Lucero v.
Comelec it means “the net result of the election the
rest of the precincts in a given constituency, such that
if the margin of a leading candidate over that of his
closest rival in the latter precincts is less than the total
number of votes in the precinct where there was
failure of election, than such failure would certainly
affect “the results of the elections.”
EFFECT OF ASSUMPTION OF OFFICE OF
CANDIDATE ELECT/WHEN PPC IS NOT DEEMED
TERMINATED – A pre-proclamation controversy is no
longer viable after the proclamation of the winning
candidates as the issues raised therein may be more
closely examined and better resolved in an EP.(RA
7166, Section 16 (2)).
However, this is only true where the proclamation is
based on a complete canvass and on the assumption
that the proclamation is valid where a proclamation is
null and void, the proclamation is no proclamation at
all and the proclaimed candidate’s assumption of
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
office cannot deprive the Comelec of the power to
declare such nullity and annul the proclamation.
Section 16 of RA 7166 provides that all-pre-
proclamation cases pending before the Commission
shall be deemed terminated at the beginning of the
term of office involved and the rulings of the boards of
canvassers concerned shall be deemed affirmed,
without prejudice to the filing of a regular election
protest by the aggrieved party. HOWEVER,
proceedings may continue when on the basis of the
evidence thus far presented, the Commission
determines that the petition appears meritorious and
accordingly issued an order for the proceedings to
continue or when appropriate order has been issued
by the SC in a petition for certiorari
ELECTION PROTEST
An EP is a special statutory proceedings
designed to contest the right of a person, declared
elected to enter upon and hold office. It is strictly a
contest between the defeated and winning candidates
as to who actually obtained the majority of the legal
votes and therefore, is entitled to hold office.
NATURE OF PROCEEDING - It is a formal judicial
proceedings that goes into the correctness of the
counting and appreciation of ballots at the precinct
level were the parties are allowed to present and
examine evidence in detail.
WHO CAN FILE – can only be filed by a candidate
who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has
been voted for.
PERIOD TO FILE – within 10 days from proclamation
74
GROUNDS – fraud, vote-buying, terrorism, presence
of flying voters, misreading and misappreciation of
the ballots, disenfranchisement of voters, other
election irregularities.
Lucy Marie Torres-Gomez v. Eufrocino C. Codilla/
668 SCRA 600 (2012)
Verification – (Defective verification) The verification
of a pleading is only a formal, not jurisdictional
requirement. The purpose of requiring the verification
is to secure an assurance that the allegations in the
petition are true and correct, not merely speculative.
This requirements is simply a condition affecting the
form of pleadings, and non compliance therewith
does not necessarily render the pleading fatally
defective.
Nature of Election controversy – An election
controversy, by its nature, touches upon the
ascertainment of the people’s choice as gleaned from
the medium of the ballot. For this reason, an election
protest should jibe resolved with utmost dispatch,
precedence and regard of due process. Obstacles
and technicalities that fetter the people’s will should
not stand in the way of a prompt determination of
election contests. Thus, rules on the verification of
protests should be liberally construed.
Court upheld the jurisdiction of HRET as the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of the member of the HRET.
Salvador D. Viologo, Sr., v. Comelec 658 SCRA 516
(2011)
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
Facts: Motion for reconsideration was denied by
Comelec en banc for lack of verification as required
by Section 3, Rule 20 of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure on Disputes in an Automated Election
System and Section 3, Rule 19 of CRP.
Comelec Rules of Procedure are subject liberal
construction. In Quintos v. Comelec (440 Phil. 1045;
392 SCRA 489 (2002)), this Court held that “the lack
of verification of private respondent’s Manifestation
and Motion for Partial Reconsideration is merely a
technicality that should not defeat the will of the
electorate. The Comelec may liberally construe or
even suspend its rules of procedure in the interest of
justice, including obtaining a speedy disposition of all
matter pending before the Comelec.”
Nature of Election Protest: In Pacanan v. Comelec
597 SCRA 189 (2009), the Court, in clarifying the
mandated liberal construction of election laws held:
An election contest, unlike an ordinary civil action, is
clothed with a public interest. The purpose of an
election protest is to ascertain that the candidate
proclaimed by the board of canvassers is the lawful
choice of the people. What is sought is the correction
of the canvass of votes, which was the basis of
proclamation of the winning candidate. An election
contest therefore involves not only the adjudication of
private and pecuniary interests of rival candidates but
paramount to their claims is the deep public concern
involved and the need of dispelling the uncertainty
over the real choice of the electorate. And the court
has the corresponding duty to ascertain, by all means
within its command, who is the real candidate elected
by the people.
75
Moreover, the CRP are subject to a liberal
construction. This liberality is for the purpose of
promoting the effective and efficient implementation
of the objectives of ensuring the holding of free,
orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections and
for achieving just, expeditious and inexpensive
determination and disposition of every action and
proceeding brought before the Comelec.
This principle was reiterated in the more recent
consolidated cases of Tolentino v. Comelec 617
SCRA 575 (2010) and De Castro vs. Comelec 617
SCRA 575, where the Court held that in exercising its
powers and jurisdiction, as defined by its mandate to
ptoetect the integrity of elections, the Comelec “must
not be straijackedted by procedural rules in resolving
election disputes.”
Douglas R. Cagas v. Comelec/Bautista 663 SCRA
644 (2012) - The Court has no power to review on
certiorari an interlocutory order or even a final
resolution issued by a Division of the Comelec. The
governing provision is Section 7, Article IX of the
1987 Constitution, which provides: Section 7. Each
Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its
Members any case or matter brought before it within
sixty days from the date of its submission for decision
or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted
for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last
pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules
of the Commission or by the Commission itself.
Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by
law, any decision, order, or ruling of each
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court
on certiorari by the aggrieved party within 30 days
from receipt of a copy thereof. This provision,
although it confers on the Court the power to review
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
any decision, order or ruling of the Comelec, limits
such power to a final decision or resolution of the
Comelec en banc and does not extend to an
interlocutory order issued by a Division of the
Comelec. Otherwise stated, the Court has no power
to review on certiorari an interlocutory order or even a
final resolution issued by a Division of the Comelec.
Maria Laarni L. Cayetano v. Comelec/Dante Tinga
648 SCRA 561 (2011) – The Supreme Court has no
jurisdiction to review an order, whether final or
interlocutory even a final resolution of a division of the
Comelec – the Court can only review via certiorari a
decision, order, or ruling of the Comelec en banc in
accordance with Section 7, Article IX-A of the
Constitution, a rule which admits of exceptions as
when the issuance of the assailed interlocutory order
is a patent nullity because of the absence of
jurisdiction to issue the same. (Court made reference
to the case of Repol v. Comelec 428 SCRA 321
(2004) which was affirmed in Soriano Jr. v. Comelec
520 SCRA 88 (2007) and Blanco v. Comelec 554
SCRA 755. Ruling in Soriano. . .“In the 2004 case of
Repol v. Comelec, the Court cited Ambil and held that
this Court has no power to review via certiorari an
interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a
division of the Comelec. However, the Court held
that an exception to this rule applies where the
commission of grave abuse of discretion is apparent
on its face. In Repol, what was assailed was a status
quo ante Order without any time limit, and more than
20 days had lapsed since its issuance without the
Comelec First Division issuing a writ of preliminary
injunction. The Court held that the status quo ante
Order of the Comelec First Division was actually a
temporary restraining order because it ordered Repol
to cease and desist from assuming the position of
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municipal mayor of Pagsanghan, Samar and directed
Ceracas to assume the post in the meantime. Since
the status quo ante Order, which was qualified by the
phrase “until further orders from this Commission.”
Had a lifespan of more than 20 days, this Order
clearly violates the rule that a temporary restraining
Order has an effective period of only 20 days and
automatically expires upon the Comelec’s denial of
preliminary injunction.”
Ceriaco Bulilis v. Victorino Nuez, Presiding Judge of
MCTC, Ubay Bohol, Presiding Judge of RTC Branch
52, Talibon, Bohol 655 SCRA 241 (2011) -Facts:
Bulilis was proclaimed winner for the elections for
punong barangay. Opponent Victorino Nuez filed an
EP (for judicial recount and annulment of
proclamation) with MCTC. The counsel of Bulilis filed
his brief at 1:45pm on the date of preliminary
conference and when the case was heard at 2pm,
Nuez moved in open court to be allowed to present
evidence ex parte since Bulilis only filed his brief on
the date of the preliminary conference which is
contrary to Section 4, Rule 9 of A.M. No. 08-4-15-SC
which provides that the brief should be filed at least
one (1) day before the date of the preliminary
conference. Judge Garces granted the motion.
Bulilis filed MR which was denied by MCTC. Bulilis
filed certiorari with RTC which was dismissed on the
ground that it is Comelec that has exclusive
jurisdiction in election cases involving municipal and
barangay officials. Hence, the petition for certiorari
with the SC.
(Rule 28, Sections 1 and 2 of CRP/Section 12
Amendments to Rules 41, 45, 58 and 65 of the Rules
of Court/Section 8, Rule 14 of Comelec CRP ).
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
Based on these rules, the Court recognizes the
Comelec’s appellate jurisdiction over petitions for
certiorari against all acts or omissions of courts in
election cases. Indeed, in the recent case of Galang,
Jr. v. Geronimo 643 SCRA 631 (2011), the Court had
the opportunity to rule that a petition for certiorari
questioning an interlocutory order of a trial court in an
electoral protest was within the appellate jurisdiction
of the Comelec.
Since it is the Comelec which has jurisdiction to take
cognizance of an appeal from the decision of the RTC
in election contests involving elective municipal
officials (Sec. 8 Rule 14 CRP), then it is also the
Comelec which has jurisdiction to issue a writ of
certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
Although Galang involved a petition for certiorari of an
interlocutory order of the RTC in a municipal election
contest, the rationale for the above ruling applied to
an interlocutory order issued by a municipal trial court
in a barangay election case. Under Rule 14, Section
8 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC, decisions of municipal trial
courts in election contests involving barangay officials
are appealed to the Comelec. Following the Galang
doctrine, it is the Comelec which has jurisdiction over
petitions for certiorari involving acts of the municipal
trial courts in such election contests.
ROMEO M. JALOSJOS, JR v. COMELEC AND DAN
ERASMO, SR. 674 SCRA 530 (2012)
Demarcation line between the jurisdiction of the
Comelec and the House of Representatives:Facts: In
May 2007 Jalosjos ran for Mayor of Tampilisan,
Zamboanga del Norte and won. While serving as
Tampilisan Mayor, he bought a residential house and
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lot in Barangay Veterans Village, Ipil, Zamboanga
Sibugay and occupied it in September 2008. Eight
months after, he applied with the ERB of Ipil,
Zamboanga Sibugay for the transfer of his voters
registration record which application was opposed by
Erasmo in a petition for exclusion before the MCTC of
Ipil-Tungawan. RTC ruled to exclude Jalosjos on the
ground that Jalosjos did not abandon his domicile im
Tampilisan since he continue even then to serve as
its Mayor. Jalosjos appealed his case to the RTC of
Pagadian City which affirmed the MCTC decision on
September 11, 2009. Jalosjos elevated the matter to
the CA through a petition for certiorari with an
application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction which was granted and enjoined the courts
below from enforcing their decisions, with the result
that his name was reinstated in the Barangay
Veterans Village’s list pending the resolution of the
petition.
On November 28, 2009, Jalosjos filed his CoC for the
position of representative of the Second District of
Zamboanga Sibugay for the May 10, 2010 elections.
Erasmo filed a Petition to deny due course to or
cancel his CoC before the Comelec, claiming that
Jalosjos made material misrepresentations in his CoC
when he indicated in it that he resided in Ipil,
Zamboanga Sibugay. The Second Division of the
Comelec issued a joint reso dismissing the petition of
Erasmo for insufficiency in form and substance.
While Erasmo’s MR was pending before the Comelec
En Banc, the May 10, 2010 elections took place
resulting in Jalosjos winning the elections and was
proclaimed on May 13, 2010.
In June 2, 2010, the CA rendered judgment in the
voter’s exclusion case before it holding that the lower
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
courts erred in excluding Jalosjos since he was
qualified under the Constitution and RA 8189.
Erasmo filed a petition for review of the CA decision
before the SC. On the other hand, Comelec en banc
granted the MR of Erasmo and declared Jalosjos
ineligible as he did not satisfy the residency
requirement since, by continuing to hold the position
of Mayor in Tampilisan, he should be deemed not to
have transferred his residence form that place to Ipil,
Zamboanga Sibugay.
While the Constitution vests in the Comelec the
power to decide all questions affecting elections, such
power is not without limitation. It does not extend to
contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of members of the HR and the Senate.
The Constitution vests the resolution of these
contests solely upon the appropriate Electoral
Tribunal of the Senate or the HR.
The Court has already settled the question of when
the jurisdiction of the Comelec ends and when that of
the HRET begins. The proclamation of a resolved. An action for QW cannot be converted into
congressional candidates following the election
divests Comelec of jurisdiction over disputes relating
to the election, returns and qualifications of the
proclaimed Representative in favor of HRET.
QUO WARRANTO
A petition for Quo Warranto refers to questions of
disloyalty or ineligibility of the winning candidate. It
has the effect of disqualifying a candidate to hold
office towhich he is elected. Its primordial objective is
to prevent an elective official from assuming office
grounded on ineligibility. (Sec. 253 OEC)
78
NATURE OF PROCEEDING – it is a proceeding to
unseat the ineligible person from office, but not to
install the protestant in his place.
WHO CAN FILE –any voter.
PERIOD TO FILE- within 10 days from proclamation
Republic v. dela Rosa 232 SCRA 785, a QW
assailing the public official’s title and seeking to
prevent him from holding office for alienage is not
covered by the 10-days period for appeal prescribed
in Section 253 of the OEC.
The distinction been an EP and QW as a
remedy is not the label given to it but the allegations
therein stated. If a petition alleges fraud and
irregularity which vitiated the conduct of the election,
although entitled QW, is an EP and vice versa. In
view of these fundamental differences, an EP and
QW cannot be availed of jointly in the same
proceeding. They may be filed separately with the
second and later case suspended until the earlier is
an EP.
Penera vs. Comelec 599 SCRA 609, is the well-
established principle that the ineligibility of a
candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the
candidate receiving the next highest number of votes
to be declared elected. In this case, the rules on
succession under Section 44 of the Local
Government Code shall apply which states that” if a
permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the Mayor,
the Vice-Mayor concerned shall become the mayor.
A permanent vacancy arises when an elective local
official fills a higher vacant office, refuses to assume
office, fails to qualify or is removed from office,
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
voluntarily resigned, or is otherwise permanently
incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office.”
(Virgnio Villamor vs. Comelec & Amytis de Dios-
Batao 496 SCRA 334) As a general rule, the proper
remedy after the proclamation of the winning
candidate for the position contested would be to file a
regular election protest or a petition for QW. The
filing of an EP or a petition for QW precludes the
subsequent filing of a pre-proclamation controversy or
amounts to the abandonment of one earlier filed,
thus, depriving the Comelec of the authority to inquire
into and pass upon the title of the protestee or the
validity of his proclamation. The reason is that once
the competent tribunal has acquired jurisdiction of an
EP or a petition for QW, all questions relative thereto
will have to be decided in the case itself and not in
another proceedings. This procedure is to prevent
confusion and conflict of authority.
Basarte vs. Comelec 523 SCRA 76 – The prevailing
rule that as long as the returns appear to be authentic
and duly accomplished on their face, the BOC cannot
look beyond or behind them to verify allegations of
irregularities in the casting or the counting of the
votes as it presupposes that the returns “appear to be
authentic and duly accomplished on their face”. This
principle does not apply in cases like the one at bar
where there is a prima facie showing that the return is
not genuine, several entries having been omitted in
the assailed return.
JURSIDCITON OVER ELECTION PROTESTS AND
QUO WARRANTO
1) SUPREME COURT – sitting en banc as
Presidential Electoral Tribunal as sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and
79
qualification of Pres. and VP. Protest to be filed 30
days from proclamation. Not subject to judicial review
(1987 Constitution). Joke on Supreme Court body.
2) SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL – for members
of senate as sole judge over all contest relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of its own
members. Filed within 15 days from date of
proclamation. Not subject to judicial review except on
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. (1987 Constitution)
3) HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL – for members of HR to be filed within 10
days from proclamation.
Composition - Each electoral tribunal shall be
composed of nine members, three of whom shall be
justices of the SC to be designated by the CJ and the
remaining 6 members of the senate or HR, as the
case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of
their proportional representation from the political
parties and the parties or organizations registered
under the party list system,. Senior justice shall be
chairman (Art. VI, Sec. 17, 1987 Constitution) .
4) COMELEC – for regional, provincial and city
officials filed in 10 days. Subject to judicial review
within 30 days from date of receipt of decision by
aggrieved party.
Article IX-C, Section 2(2) 1987 Constitution,
Comelec shall “Exercise exclusive jurisdiction over all
contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of all elective, regional, provincial and
city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all
contests involving municipal officials decided by trial
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective
barangay officials decided by courts of limited
jurisdictions. Decisions, final order, or rulings of the
Commission, on election contests involving elective
municipal and barangay offices shall be final,
executory and not appealable.”
Mendoza v. Comelec 616 SCRA 443 – There is a
difference in the result of the exercise of jurisdiction
by the Comelec over election contests. The
difference inheres in the kind of jurisdiction invoked,
which in turn, is determined by the case brought
before the Comelec. When a decision of a trial court
is brought before the Comelec for it to exercise
appellate jurisdiction, the division decides the appeal
but, if there is a motion for reconsideration, the
appeal proceeds to the banc where the majority is
needed for a decision. If the process ends without
the required majority at the banc, the appealed
decision stands affirmed.
Upon the other hand, and this is what happened in
the instant case, if what is brought before the
Comelec is an original protest involving the original
jurisdiction of the Commission, the protest, as one
whole process, is first decided by the division, which
process is continued in the banc if there is a motion
for reconsideration of the division ruling. If no
majority decision is reach in the banc, the protest,
which is an original, shall be dismissed. There is no
first instance decision that can be deemed affirmed.
Hence, if no decision is reached after the case is
reheard, there are two different remedies available to
the Comelec, to wit (1) dismiss the action or
proceeding, if the case was originally commenced in
the Comelec; or (2) consider as affirmed the judgment
80
or order appealed from, in appealed cases. This rule
adheres to the constitutional provision that the
Comelec must decide by a majority of all its
members.
Relampagos v. Cumba 243 SCRA 690 (1995) and in
Carlos v. Angeles 346 SCRA 571 (2000), Comelec is
vested with the power to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus only in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction consistent with Section 50 of BP 881 and
Article 2(1) of the Constitution. These ruling
abandoned the earlier ruling in Garcia vs. de Jesus
206 SCRA 779. It was also declared that both the SC
and Comelec has concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs
of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus over decision
of trial courts of general jurisdiction (RTC) in election
cases involving elective municipal officials. The Court
that takes jurisdiction first shall exercise exclusive
jurisdiction over the case. (Art. VIII 5(1) 1987
Constitution, Rule 65, Sec. 1)
Section 7, Article IX-A and Rule 3 of the Comelec
Rules of Procedure.The Comelec in the exercise of
its QJ functions to transact business “may sit en banc
or in two divisions, and shall promulgate rules and
procedures” in order to expedite the disposition of
elections cases, including pre-proclamation
controversies and summon parties to a controversy
pending before it.”
The authority to hear and decide election cases,
including pre-proclamations controversies is vested
with a division and the Comelec sitting en banc does
not have the authority over it in the first instance. The
Comelec en banc can exercise jurisdiction only on
Motions for Reconsideration of the resolution or
decision of the Comelec in division as a requirement
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
for the filing of a petition for certiorari by the
aggrieved party with the SC within 30 days from
receipt of a copy thereof (Sec. 3 Art. IX-C).
Sec. 2 Rule 19 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure a
motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or
ruling of a Division shall be filed within five (5) days
from the promulgation thereof. Such motion, if not
pro-forma, suspends the execution for
implementation of the decision, resolution, order or
ruling and would in effect, suspend the running of the
period to elevate the matter to the SC (Sec.4).
5) REGIONAL TRIAL COURT – exclusive jurisdiction
over all contests relating to the election, qualifications
and returns for municipal officials. Protest to be filed
10 days from date of proclamation. Subject to appeal
with Comelec within five (5) days from receipt of
decision. Decisions of the Comeledc en banc on
contest on appeal involving municipal and barangay
officials are final and executory except on grounds of
grave abuse of discretion within 30 days.
6) MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT – exclusive
jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications for barangay officials.
Protest to be filed within 10 days from proclamation.
Appeal to the Comelec within 5 days from receipt of
the decision.
Calo v. Comelec 610 SCRA 342/Pecson v. Comelec
575 SCRA 634 – decisions of the courts in election
protest cases, resulting as they do from a judicial
evaluation of the ballots and afull blown adversarial
proceedings. Should at least be given similar worth
and recognition as decisions of the board of
canvassers. This is especially true when attended by
81
other equally weighty circumstances of the case,
such as the shortness of the term of the contested
elective office, of the case.
Mananzala vs. Comelec and Julie Monton 523 SCRA
31. - Decisions, final orders or rulings of the
Commission on Election contests involving elective
municipal and barangay offices shall be final,
executory and not appealable; All such election
cases shall be heard and decided in division,
provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions
shall be decided by the Commission en banc.
A decision of the RTC was raised on appeal which
was heard by the 2nd division which reversed the
decision of the RTC. In his MR petitioner argues that
the MR filed with the former 2nd division “has thrown
the whole case wide open for review as in a trial de
novo in a criminal case” yet Comelec en banc failed
to conduct a thorough review of the contested ballots.
Election cases cannot be treated in a similar manner
as criminal cases where, upon appeal from a
conviction by the trial court, the whole case is thrown
open for review and the appellate court can resolve
issues which are not even set forth in the pleadings.
Coquilla vs. Comelec, et. al. G.R. No. 151914, July
31, 2002, the SC resolved the issue on whether the
30-day period for appealing the resolution of the
Comelec was suspended by the filing of a motion for
reconsideration by petitioner. Private respondent in
this case contends that the petition should be
dismissed because it was filed late considering that
the Comelec en banc denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration for being pro-forma and conformably
with Sec. 4 of Rule 19 of the CRP, the said motion did
not suspend the running of the 30-day period for the
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
filing of the petition for certiorari under Sec. 7 Art. IX-
A of the Constitution.
The Comelec en banc ruled that the motion for
reconsideration was pro-forma on the ground that the
motion was a mere rehash of petitioners averments
contained in his Verified Answer and Memorandum,
neither were new matters raised that would
sufficiently warrant a reversal of the assailed
resolution of the Second Division.
The SC ruled however that the mere reiteration in a
motion for reconsideration of the issues raised by the
parties and passed upon by the court does not make
a motion pro-forma; otherwise, the movant’s remedy
would not be a reconsideration of the decision but a
new trial or some other remedy.
In explaining the purpose/objective of a motion
for reconsideration , the SC referred to its decision in
Guerra Enterprises Company Inc., v. CFI of Lanao del
Sur 32 SCRA 314 (1970), where it held that the ends
sought to be achieved in the filing of a motion for
reconsideration is “precisely to convince the court that
its ruling is erroneous and improper, contrary to the
law or the evidence, and in doing so, the movant has
to dwell of necessity upon the issues passed upon by
the court. If a motion for reconsideration may not
discuss these issues, the consequence would be that
after a decision is rendered, the losing party would be
confined to filing only motions for reopening and new
trial.
The SC further enumerated cases where a
motion for reconsideration was held to be pro forma:
 it was a second motion for reconsideration;
82
 it did not comply with the rule that the motion
must specify the findings and conclusions
alleged to be contrary to law or not supported
by the evidence;
 it failed to substantiate the alleged errors;
 it merely alleged that the decision in question
was contrary to law
 or the adverse party was not given due notice
thereof.
Under Rule 13, (1) of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure, a Motion for Reconsideration of an En
Banc Resolution is a prohibited pleading, except in
election offense cases (Sec. 261 of the OEC).
Angelia v. Comelec 332 SCRA 757, the SC
addressed the issue on whether a party can go to the
SC via a Petition on Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court during the pendency of the MR filed
with the Comelec en banc. Angelia filed before the
SC a Petition for Certiorari to set aside the resolution
of the Comelec en banc annulling his proclamation
alleging that he was not given due notice and
hearing. Without waiting for the resolution on his
motion, Angelia filed the instant petition on the sole
assignment of error that Comelec violated his
constitutional right to due process. Comelec raised
that the petition should be dismissed for being
premature considering that the MR of petitioner was
still pending with the Comelec en banc and that he
should have first withdrawn the MR before raising the
said resolution with the SC.
SC held that petitioner acted correctly in filing the
petition because the resolution of the Comelec en
banc is not subject to reconsideration, and therefore,
any party who disagrees with it had only one
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
recourse, that was to file a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The filing of
the petition would in effect constitute as an
abandonment of his MR with the Comelec.
What is contemplated by the term “final orders,
rulings and decisions of the Comelec that may be
reviewable by the SC on Certiorari? The SC in
Garces v. Court of Appeals 259 SCRA 99 (1996) and
Filipinas Engineering & Machine Shop v. Ferrer 135
SCRA 25 (1985), the interpreted the term ”final
orders, rulings and decisions of the Comelec
reviewable by the SC on certiorari as provided by law
are those rendered in actions or proceedings before
the Comelec and taken cognizance of by the said
body in the exercise of its quasi-judicial powers.
PRINCIPLES COMMON TO ALL ELECTION
CONTESTS
1) WHO MAY FILE – a candidate who has duly
filed a COC and has been voted for.
2) Jurisdiction Allegations – (1) protestant was a
candidate who had duly filed a COC and had
been voted for the same office (2) that the
protestee has been proclaimed (3) that the
petition was filed within 10 days after
proclamation (4) that fraud and election
irregularities vitiated the conduct of the
elections and affected the legality thereof.
Miguel v. Comelec 335 SCRA 172, the SC ruled that
it is the ministerial duty of the trial court to order the
opening of the ballot boxes, examination and
83
counting of ballots deposited thereunder whenever
there is averment in an election protest that requires
the examination, scrutiny or counting of ballots as
evidence. The purpose of opening the BB is to
determine, with the minimum amount of protracted
delay, the truthfulness of the allegations of fraud and
anomalies in the conduct of electoral exercise.
CERTIFICATE OF FORUM SHOPPING
The SC in Loyola v. CA 245 SCRA 477 (1995) and
Lomarong v. Dubguban 269 SCRA 624 (1997), it was
ruled that the SC Circular requiring that any
complaint, petition or other initiatory pleading must
contain a non-forum certification applies to election
cases. The requirement is mandatory, not
jurisdictional, non-compliance therewith may warrant
the dismissal of the election case.
PAYMENT OF APPEAL/FILING FEES
Pacanan, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, 597
SCRA 189
Aguilar v. Comelec 591 SCRA 491 - Petitioner
Pacanan, Jr. and private respondent Langi Sr., were
candidates for mayor in the municipality of Motiong,
Samar during the May 14, 2007 elections. Petitioner
was proclaimed having garnered a total of 3,069
votes against private respondent’s 3,066 votes.
On May 25, 2007, private respondent filed an
election protest with the RTC which rendered a
Decision on January 7, 2008 RTC declaring private
respondent as winner with a plurality of 6 votes. 3
days after or on January 10, 2008 petitioner filed a
notice of appeal and paid 3K appeal fee before the
RTC and also appealed the RTC decision to the
Comelec. Out of the 3K appeal fee required under
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
Sec. 3, Rule 40 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure,
petitioner only paid 1K plus 200 to cover the legal
research/bailiff fees. On March 17, 2008 Comelec
1st division issued on Order dismissing the appeal on
the ground that petitioner failed to pay the correct
appeal fee within the 5-days reglementary period
which is a ground for the dismissal of the appeal
under Section 9(a), Rule 22 of the CRP. On March
28, 2008 petitioner filed a MR with the Comelec En
Banc which denied the resolution declaring that the
appeal was not perfected on time for non-payment of
the complete amount of appeal and for late payment
as well, hence, did not acquire jurisdiction over the
appeal.
Before the SC is a petition for Certiorari
raising that 1) Comelec committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in holding that the correct appeal fee was not paid on
time; 2) In failing to consider, that assuming that the
correct appeal fee was not paid on time, the alleged
non-payment is not in anyway attributable to
petitioner; 3) that assuming the correct appeal fee
was not paid on time, there are highly justifiable and
compelling reasons to resolve the subject case on the
merit in the interest of justice and public interest.
The SC noted that two (2) different tribunals
earlier require the payment of two different appeal
fees for the perfection of the appeals of election
cases.
Sec. 3, Rule 22 of the CRP ( Appeals form
decisions of Courts in election Protest Cases),
mandates that the notice of appeal must be filed with
5-days after the promulgation of the decision. On the
other hand, Section 3 & 4 Rule 40 of the CRP
84
amended the amount of the appeal fees to 3.2K
which should be paid with the cash division of the
Comelec.
On the other hand, Section 8 & 9, Rule 14 of
A.M. No. 07-4-15 SC (Rules of procedure in Election
Contests before the Court Involving Elective
Municipal and Barangay Officials effective May 15,
2007) also provide the procedure of instituting an
appeal and the required appeal fees to be paid for the
appeal to be given due course.
This requirement in the payment of appeal
fees had caused much confusion, which the Comelec
addressed through the issuance of Comelec Res. No.
8486 on July 15, 2008. The salient feature of the said
resolution provide that “the appeal to the Comelec of
the trial court’s decision in election contests involving
municipal and barangay officials is perfected upon the
filing of the notice of appeal and payment of the 1K
appeal fee to the court that rendered the decision
within the 5-day reglementary period. The non-
payment or the insufficient payment of the addition
appeal fee of 3.2K to the Comelec Cash Division in
accordance with Rule 40, Section 3 of the CRP, as
amended, does not affect the perfection of the appeal
and does not result in outright or ipso facto dismissal
of the appeal.
Comelec 1st division gravely abused its
discretion in issuing the order dismissing the appeal
taking notice that the notice of appeal and the 1K
appeal fee were, respectively filed and paid with the
MTC on April 21, 2008 which date the appeal was
perfected. Comelec Res. 8486 clarifying the rule on
the payment of appeal fees was issued only on July
15, 2008, or almost 3-months after the appeal was
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
perfected. Yet on July 31, 2008 or barely two weeks
after the issuance of Comelec Res. 8486, the
Comelec 1st division dismissed the appeal for non-
payment of the 3.2K appeal fee.
Considering that petitioner filed his appeal
months before the clarificatory resolution on appeal
fees, the appeal should not be unjustly prejudiced by
Comelec Res. No. 8486. Fairness and prudence
dictate the 1st division should have first directed
petitioner to pay the additional appeal fee in
accordance with the clarificatory resolution. Instead it
hastily dismissed the appeal on the strength of the
clarificatory resolution which had taken effect only a
few days earlier. (This unseemly haste is an invitation
to outrage.) Court further stressed the liberal
construction policy.
Villagracia v. Comelec 513 SCRA 655 (2007), while it
is true that a court acquires jurisdiction over a case
upon complete payment of the prescribed filing fee,
the rule admits of exceptions, as when a party never
raised the issue of jurisdiction in the trial court.
Gomez-Castillo v. Comelec 621 SCRA 499 – The
period of appeal and the perfection of appeal are not
mere technicalities to be so lightly regarded, for they
are essential to the finality of judgments, a notion
underlying the stability of our judicial system. The
short period of 5-days as the period to appeal
recognizes the essentiality of time in election
protests, in order that the will of the electorate is
ascertained as soon as possible so that the winning
candidate is not deprived of the right to assume
office, and so that any doubt that can cloud the
incumbent of the truly deserving winning candidate is
quickly removed.
85
Zanoras v. Comelec G.R. No. 158610 November 12,
2004, the mere filing of the notice of appeal was not
enough. It should be accompanied by the payment of
the correct amount of appeal fee. The payment of the
full amount of the docket fee is an indispensable step
for the perfection of an appeal. (Rulloda v. Comelec
245 SCRA 702)
Loyola v. Comelec 337 SCRA 134 (1997), the Court
stressed that there is no longer any excuse for
shortcoming in the payment of filing fees. The Court
held that in the case at bar “any claim of good faith,
excusable negligence or mistake in any failure to pay
the full amount of filing fees in election cases which
may be filed after the promulgation of this decision is
no longer acceptable (March 25, 1977). The Loyola
doctrine was reiterated in the subsequent cases of
Miranda v. Castillo 274 SCRA 503, Soller v. Comelec
339 SCRA 684 hold that a court acquires jurisdiction
over any case only upon the payment of the
prescribed docket fees and errors in the payment of
the filing fee is no longer allowed.
EXECUTIONS PENDING APPEAL
TEODORA SOBEJANA-CONDON V.
COMELEC/LUIS BAUTISTA/ROBELITO V.
PICAR/WILMA P. PAGADUAN 678 SCRA 267
(2012)
Executions Pending Appeal - There is no reason to
dispute the Comelec’s authority to order discretionary
execution of judgment in view of the fact that the
suppletory application of the Rules of Court is
expressly sanctioned by Section 1, Rule 41 of the
Comelec Rules of Procedure. Under Section 2, Rule
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
39 of the Rules of Court, execution pending appeal
may be issued by an appellate court after the trial
court has lost jurisdiction. In Batul v. Bayron 424
SCRA 26 (2004), the Court stressed the import of the
provision vis-à-vis election cases when we held that
judgments in election cases which may be executed
pending appeal includes those decided by trial courts
and those rendered by the Comelec whether in the
exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction.
Saludaga vs. Comelec 617 SCRA 601 – The
discretion to allow execution pending reconsideration
belongs to the division that rendered the assailed
decision, order or resolution, or the Comelec en banc,
as the case may be – not to the presiding
Commissioner. A writ of execution pending resolution
of the MR of a decision of the division is not granted
as a matter of right such that its issuance becomes a
ministerial duty that may be dispensed even just by
the Presiding Commission.
Calo v. Comelec 610 SCRA 342 – The relevant rule
provides that a motion for execution pending appeal
filed by the prevailing party shall contain a 3-day
notice to the adverse party and execution pending
appeal shall not issue without prior notice and
hearing. The purpose of these requirements is to
avoid surprises that may sprung upon the adverse
party who must be given time to study and meet the
arguments in the motion before a resolution by the
court. Where a party had the opportunity to be heard,
then the purpose has been served and the
requirement substantially complied with. In this case,
even the Comelec admitted that respondent was
heard and afforded his day in court; hence, it should
not have annulled the RTC special order on said
ground.
86
San Miguel vs. Comelec 609 SCRA 424 – The law
provides that the court “may” issue execution pending
appeal. Evident from the usage of the word “may”, the
language of the subject provision denotes that it is
merely directory, not mandatory, for the trial court to
issue the special order before the expiration of the
period to appeal. The trial court may still thereafter
resolve a motion for execution pending appeal,
provided: (i) the motion is filed within the 5-day
reglementary period; and (ii) the special order is
issued prior to the transmittal of the records of the
Comelec.
Malaluan v. Comelec 254 SCRA 397, this was the
first case where a judge, acting without a precedent,
granted the motion for execution of its decision in an
election protest case, pending appeal. It was ruled
that Sec. 2 Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which
allowed the RTC to order execution pending appeal
upon good reasons stated in a special order, may be
made to apply by analogy or suppletorily to election
contest decided by it. The posting of the supersedeas
bond was considered good reasons by the judge.
Camlian v. Comelec 271 SCRA, executions pending
appeal must be strictly construed against the movant
as it is an exception to the general rule on execution
of judgments.
Ramas v. Comelec 286 SCRA 189, what may
constitute “good reasons’ for execution pending
appeal
 The public interest involved or the will of the
electorate
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 The shortness of the remaining period of the
term of the contested office
 The length of time that the election contest
has been pending.
The filing of a bond alone does not constitute
good reasons. Nevertheless, the trial court may
require the filing of a bond as condition for the
issuance of the corresponding writ of execution to
answer for the payment of damages which the
aggrieved party may suffer by reason of the execution
pending appeal.
Fernando U. Batul v. Lucilo Bayron, et. al. 424 SCRA
26, execution pending appeal in the discretion of the
courts applies suppletorily in election cases including
those involving city and provincial officials to obviate
a hollow victory for the duly elected candidate as
determined either by the Court or by Comelec. The
Comelec resolution granting execution pending
appeal (by virtue of its original exclusive jurisdiction
over all contest relating to the E, R and Q of
provincial and city officials) was raised before the SC
arguing that Sec. 2 Rule 39 cannot be applied and
the only ground that will validly sustain execution of a
decision by a Comelec division pending
reconsideration is when the MR is not pro forma.
Case of Ramas did not declare that such remedy is
exclusive only to election contests involving elective
municipal and barangay officials. Sec. 1 of Rule 41of
the Comelec Rules of Procedure expressly provides
that pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court shall be
applicable by analogy or in a suppletory character.
Navarosa v. Comelec 411 SCRA, the RTC in an
election protest case granted execution pending
87
appeal by Esto after finding that Esto won in the said
election. In the same order the judge allowed
protestee Navaroza to stay the execution of the
decision pending appeal by filing a supersedeas bond
in double the amount posted by the protestant.. A
Petition for Ceriorari was filed by Esto with the
Comelec where the Comelec 2nd division affirmed the
trial court’s order granting execution pending appeal
and nullified the stay of the execution. The Comelec
did not gravely abuse its discretion as it is for
Comelec in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction to
issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition
mandamus and injunction over all contest involving
elective municipal officials decided by the trial court of
general jurisdiction elevate on appeal, and NOT the
trial court, that may order the stay or restrain the
immediate execution of the decision pending appeal
granted by the trail court of general jurisdiction in an
election contest.
Except when the trial court reversed itself in a
MR of its order granting immediate execution, it
cannot later on stay or restrain the execution thereof
in the guise of allowing the losing party to file a
supersedeas bond. The issue before the trial court
where a motion for execution pending appeal is filed
is to determine whether or not there are “good
reasons” to justify the immediate execution pending
appeal. The issue is not whether there are good
reasons to stay the immediate execution of the
decision pending appeal.
LIM VS.COMELEC ET.AL. G.R. NO. 171952 March
08, 2007; Torres vs. Abundo, Sr. 512 SCRA 556; -
Before granting a motion for execution pending
appeal in election cases, the SC laid down the
following requisites –
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
(1) there must be motion by the prevailing party
with notice to the adverse party
(2) there must be good reasons for the execution
pending appeal
(3) the order granting execution pending appeal
must state the good reasons.
Good reasons (Fermo v. Comelec)
1) public interest involved or will of the electorate
2) shortness of the remaining term of the
contested office
3) length of time that the election contest has
been pending
Istarul vs. Comelec 491 SCRA 300 (2006) – the
length of time that the election protest has been
pending, thus, leaving petitioner only 21 months as
the remaining portion of the term to serve as mayor,
does not constitute “good reasons” to justify
execution pending appeal. Referring to Fermo, the
SC held that “shortness of term”: alone and by itself
cannot justify premature execution. It must be
manifest in the decision sought to be executed that
the defeat of the protestee and the victory of the
protestant has been clearly established.”
Trillanes IV. Vs. Pimentel, Sr. 556 SCRA 471 (relate
to Rodolfo Aguinaldo on the condonation issue) – The
case against Trillanes is not administrative in nature.
And there is no “prior term’ to speak of. In a plethora
of cases, the Court categorically held that the doctrine
of condonation does not apply to criminal cases.
Election, or more precisely, election to office, does
not obliterate a criminal charge. Petitioners electoral
victory only signifies pertinently that when the voters
elected him to the Senate, “they did so with full
awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action
and with the knowledge that he could achieve only
88
such legislative results which he could accomplish
within the confines of prison.
CAN DAMAGES BE AWARDED IN ELECTION
PROTEST CASES
Malaluan vs. Comelec, the Court ruled that damages
cannot be granted in an election protest case
ratiocinating that the provision of law allowing
damages under specific circumstances, more
particularly compensatory and actual damages is
provided under Article 2176 of the Civil Code which is
appropriate only in breaches of obligations in
contracts and QC and on the occasion of crimes and
QD where the defendant may be held liable for
damages the proximate cause of which is the act or
omission complained of.
Therefore, the monetary claim of a party in an
election case must necessarily be anchored in
contract, QC, or a tortiuos act or omission of a crime
in order to effectively recover actual or compensatory
damages. In the absence of any or all of these, the
claimant must be able to point out a specific provision
of law authorizing a money claim for election protest
expenses against the losing party.
The bonds or cash deposits required by the
Comelec Rules of Procedure are in the nature of filing
fees not damages
SUBSTITUTION OF PARTIES IN AN ELECTION
PROTESTCASE
Fernando Poe v. Arroyo March 29, 2005, the Court
resolved the issue on whether the widow may
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW 89

substitute/intervene for the protestant who die during

the pendency of the latter’s protest case.
The fundamental rule applicable in
presidential election protest is Rule 14 of the PET
Rules which provides “only the registered candidate
for Pres. or VP of the Philippines who received the 2nd
and 3rd highest number of votes may contest the
election of the P and VP, as the case may be, by
filing a verified petition with the Clerk of the PET
within 30 days after the proclamation of the winner.
The Court made reference in its ruling in Vda
de Mesa v. Mencias where it rejected substitution by
the widow or the heirs in election contest where the
protestant dies during the pendency of the protest on
the grounds that the heirs are not real parties in
interest and that a public office is personal to the
public officer and not a property transmissible to the
heirs upon death. The Court pursuant to Rule 3,
Section 15 of the rules of Court, however, allowed
substitution and intervention upon the death of the
protestee but by a real party in interest, one who
would be benefited or injured by the judgment and
entitled to avail of the suit. In the Mencias and
Lumogdnag v. Javier cases, the Court permitted
substitution by the VM since the VM is the real party
in interest considering that if the protest succeeds
and the protestee is unseated, the VM succeeds to
the office of the mayor that becomes vacant if the one
duly elected cannot assume office.
The Court further held, that nobility of intentions is not
the point in reference in determining whether a
person may intervene in an election protest case.
Article IX-C Section 2(6) of the Constitution vests in
the Comelec the power and function to investigate
a and where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations
of election laws, including acts or omissions
constituting election frauds, offenses and
malpractices. This prosecutorial power of the
Comelec is reflected in Section 265 of BP 881. It is
well settled that the finding of probable cause in the
prosecution of election offenses rests in the
Comelec’s sound discretion. (Garcia v. Comelec 611
SCRA 55 Jan. 2010)
Comelec v. Noynay, July 9, 1998, the Comelec
resolved to file an Information for violation of Section
261(i) of the OEC against certain public school
officials for having engaged in partisan political
activities which was filed by its Regional Director with
Branch 23 of RTC of Allen Northern Samar presided
by Judge Tomas B. Noynay. The judge ordered the
records of the cases to be withdrawn and directed the
Comelec to file the cases with the MTC on the ground
that pursuant to Section 32 of BP 129 as amended by
RA 7691, the RTC has no jurisdiction over the cases
since the maximum imposable penalty in each of the
cases does not exceed 6 years imprisonment. The
SC ruled that RA 7691 did not divest the RTC of
jurisdiction over election offenses which are
punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding 6
years. The opening sentence of Section 32, provides
that the exclusive original jurisdiction of Metropolitan
Trial Courts, MTC and MCTC does not cover those
criminal cases which by specific provisions of law fall
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC and of the
SB, regardless of the penalty prescribed therefore.

PROSECUTION OF ELECTION CASES

 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
Comelec vs. Espanol 417 SCRA 554, it was ruled
that the Comelec, thru its duly authorized legal
officers, under Section 265 of the OEC, has the
exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation
of all election offenses punishable under the OEC
and to prosecute the same. The acts of these
deputies within the lawful scope of their delegated
authority are the acts of the Comelec.
Garcia v. Commission on Elections 611 SCRA 55 –
Generally, the Court will not interfere with the finding
of probable cause by the Comelec absent a clear
showing of grave abuse of discretion.
Pp. v. Inting July 25, 1990, Comelec is given
exclusive authority to investigate and conduct
preliminary investigations relative to commission of
election offenses and prosecute the same. A a Motion for Reconsideration of an En Banc
preliminary investigation conducted by the Provincial
Election Supervisor involving an election offense
does not have to be coursed through the Provincial
Prosecutor before the RTC may take cognizance of
the investigation and determine whether or not
probable cause exist to issue a warrant of arrest. If
the Provincial Prosecutor performs any role at all as
regards the prosecution of an election case, it is by
delegation or that he was deputized by the Comelec.
Faelnar v. People 331 SCRA 429, (a) where the State
Prosecutor, or Provincial or City Prosecutor exercises
the power to conduct preliminary investigation of
election offense cases and after the investigation
submits its recommendation to the Comelec, the
issue of probable cause is already resolved. The
proper remedy to question the said resolution is to file
an appeal with the COMELEC and the ruling of the
90
Comelec on the appeal would be immediately final
and executory.
(b) If the preliminary investigation of the complaint for
an election offence is conducted by the Comelec, the
investigation officer prepares its recommendation to
the Law Department which department in turn makes
its recommendation to the Comelec en banc on
whether there is probable cause to prosecute. It is
the Comelec en banc which determines the existence
of probable cause. The proper remedy of the
aggrieved party is to file a Motion for Reconsideration
of such resolution. This effectively allows for a review
of the original resolution, in the same manner that the
Comelec on appeal, or motu propio, may review the
resolution of the State prosecutor, or Provincial or city
fiscal. (Take note that since this is an election offense
resolution is allowed.)
Herman Tiu Laurel vs. RTC Judge of Manila Br. 10
and Comelec, the SC upheld the power of Comelec
to prosecute cases of violations of election laws and
further explained that there are two (2) ways through
which a complaint for election offenses may be
initiated.
(1) it may be filed by the Comelec motu propio
or
(2) it may be filed via written complaint by any
citizen of the Philippines, candidate, registered
political party, coalition of political parties or
organizations under the party-list system or any
accredited citizen arms of the commission.
Motu propio complaints may be signed by the
Chairman of the Comelec and need not be verified.
But those complaints filed by parties other than the
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW
Comelec must be verified and supported by affidavits
and other evidence.
The complaint shall be filed with the Comelec
Law Department or with the offices of the EO, PES or
RED, or the State Prosecutors, provincial or city
prosecutors. Whether initiated motu propio or filed
with the Comelec by any party, the complaint shall be
referred to the Comelec Law Department for
investigation. Upon the direction of the Chairman, the
PI may be delegated to any lawyer of the
Department, any RED or PES, or any Comelec
lawyer.
Comelec v. Silva Feb. 10, 1998, the SC settled the
issue as to whether the Chief State Prosecutor, who
was designated by the Comelec to prosecute election
cases, has the authority to decide whether or not to
appeal from the orders of dismissal of the RTC. It
was held that the authority belongs to the Comelec
and not the prosecutor as the latter derive its
authority from the Comelec and not from their offices.
Propriety dictates, that if the prosecutor believes,
after the conduct of the PI, that no probable cause
warrants the prosecution of the accused who have
allegedly violated Sec. 27 of RA 6646 (tampering of
certificate of canvass), the matter would have been
discussed with the Comelec and if the latter
disagrees, seek permission to withdraw from the
case.
Dino vs. Olivares 607 SCRA 251 (2009). The SC
held that being mere deputies or agents of the
Comelec (with continuing authority), provincial or city
prosecutors deputized by it are expected to act in
accord with and NOT contrary to or in derogation of
its resolutions, directives or orders in relation to
91
election cases that such prosecutors are deputized to
investigate and prosecute. They must proceed within
the lawful scope of their delegated authority.
Such authority may be revoked or withdrawn anytime
by the Comelec, either expressly or impliedly, when in
its judgment such revocation or withdrawal is
necessary to protect the integrity of the process to
promote the common good, or where it believes that
successful prosecution of the case can be done by
the Comelec.
When the Comelec en banc directed the City
Prosecutor of Paranaque to transmit the entire
records of the election offense case, it had the effect
of SUSPENDING THE AUTHORITY of the City
Prosecutor. Hence, the filing of the amended
information and the amended information themselves,
is declared void and of no effect.
Kilosbayan vs. Comelec 280 SCRA 892, Kilosbayan
filed a letter-complaint with the Comelec against
incumbent officials running for public elective office
for violation of Sec. 261 of the OEC alleging illegal
disbursement of public funds and submitting as
evidence to support the complaint, published writings
in newspapers without any additional evidence to
support the newspaper articles on the argument that
it was the Comelec’s constitutional duty to prosecute
election offenses upon any information of alleged
commission of election offenses. The Comelec
dismissed the complaint there being on probable
cause found. The SC rued that it is not the duty of
the Comelec to search for evidence to prove an
election complaint filed before it. The task of
Comelec as investigator and prosecutor is not the
physical searching and gathering of proof in support
 ELECTION LAWS REVIEW 92

of the alleged commission of an election offense.

The complainant still has the burden to prove his
complaint.