1. David v.

Agbay
G.R. No. 199113, March 18, 2015

Facts:

Petitioner migrated to Canada where he became a Canadian citizen by naturalization. Upon their retirement,
petitioner and his wife returned to the Philippines. They purchased a parcel of lot where they constructed a
residential house. However, they came to know that the portion where they built their house is public land and
part of the salvage zone.

Petitioner then filed a Miscellaneous Lease Application 3 (MLA) over the subject land with the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) at the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO). In the said application, petitioner indicated that he is a Filipino citizen.

Private respondent Editha A. Agbay opposed the application on the ground that petitioner, a Canadian citizen,
is disqualified to own land. She also filed a criminal complaint for falsification of public documents under Article
172 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) (I.S. No. 08-6463) against the petitioner.

Meanwhile, petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the provisions of Republic Act No. 9225, 4 (R.A.
9225).

In his defense, petitioner averred that at the time he filed his application, he had intended to re-acquire
Philippine citizenship and that he had been assured by a CENRO officer that he could declare himself as a
Filipino. He further alleged that he bought the property from the Agbays who misrepresented to him that the
subject property was titled land and they have the right and authority to convey the same. The dispute had in
fact led to the institution of civil and criminal suits between him and private respondent’s family.

The CENRO, however, issued an order rejecting petitioner’s MLA. It ruled that petitioner’s subsequent re-
acquisition of Philippine citizenship did not cure the defect in his MLA which was void ab initio.8

Issue: Whether or not CENRO was correct in rejecting petitioner’s Miscellaneous Lease Application as it
ruled that petitioner’s subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship did not cure the defect in his MLA.

Ruling: Yes, CENRO was correct in rejecting petitioner’s Miscellaneous Lease Application (MLA) as it ruled
that petitioner’s subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship did not cure the defect in his MLA.

The Supreme Court has held that petitioner made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public document,
that he is a Filipino citizen at the time of the filing of said application, when in fact he was then still a Canadian
citizen. Under CA 63, the governing law at the time he was naturalized as Canadian citizen, naturalization in a
foreign country was among those ways by which a natural-born citizen loses his Philippine citizenship. While he
re-acquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 six months later,  the said law having no retroactive
effect insofar as his dual citizenship status is concerned.

2. Phil. Banking Corp v. Lui She

21 SCRA 52
G.R. No. L-17587 12 (September 1967)

Facts: Justina Santos and Wong Heng, a Chinese, entered into the lease contract for 50 years. Ten days after,
they amended the contract so as to make it cover the entire property of Justina Santos. Less than a month
after, they entered into another contract giving Wong Heng the option to buy the leased premises should his
pending petition for naturalization be granted. Later, after failing to secure naturalization and after finding
that adoption does not confer the citizenship of the adopting parent on the adopted, the parties entered into
two other contracts extending the lease to 99 years and fixing the period of the option to buy at 50 years.

Issue: Whether or not the contracts involving Wong were valid.

Ruling: No, the contracts involving Wong were not valid.

The Supreme Court held that taken singly, the contracts show nothing that is necessarily illegal, but
considered collectively, they reveal an insidious pattern to subvert by indirection what the Constitution directly
prohibits. To be sure, a lease to an alien for a reasonable period is valid. So is an option giving an alien the right
to buy real property on condition that he is granted Philippine citizenship. As this Court said in Krivenko v.
Register of Deeds:20

1
 [A]liens are not completely excluded by the Constitution from the use of lands for residential
purposes. Since their residence in the Philippines is temporary, they may be
granted temporary rights such as a lease contract which is not forbidden by the Constitution.
Should they desire to remain here forever and share our fortunes and misfortunes, Filipino
citizenship is not impossible to acquire.

But if an alien is given not only a lease of, but also an option to buy, a piece of land, by virtue of which
the Filipino owner cannot sell or otherwise dispose of his property, 21 this to last for 50 years, then it becomes
clear that the arrangement is a virtual transfer of ownership whereby the owner divests himself in stages not
only of the right to enjoy the land ( jus possidendi, jus utendi, jus fruendi and jus abutendi) but also of the right
to dispose of it ( jus disponendi) — rights the sum total of which make up ownership. It is just as if today the
possession is transferred, tomorrow, the use, the next day, the disposition, and so on, until ultimately all the
rights of which ownership is made up are consolidated in an alien. And yet this is just exactly what the parties
in this case did within the space of one year, with the result that Justina Santos’ ownership of her property was
reduced to a hollow concept. If this can be done, then the Constitutional ban against alien landholding in the
Philippines, as announced in Krivenko v. Register of Deeds,22 is indeed in grave peril.

ACCORDINGLY, the contracts in question (Plff Exhs. 3-7) are annulled and set aside; the land subject-
matter of the contracts is ordered returned to the estate of Justina Santos as represented by the Philippine
Banking Corporation; Wong Heng (as substituted by the defendant-appellant Lui She) is ordered to pay the
Philippine Banking Corporation the sum of P56,564.35, with legal interest from the date of the filing of the
amended complaint; and the amounts consigned in court by Wong Heng shall be applied to the payment of
rental from November 15, 1959 until the premises shall have been vacated by his heirs. Costs against the
defendant-appellant.

3. Borromeo v. Descallar
580 SCRA 175
G.R. No. 159310 (February 24, 2009)

Facts: Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, worked at a project in Mindoro, Philippines. There, he met respondent
Antonietta Opalla-Descallar, a separated mother of two boys who was working as a waitress.

Jambrich and respondent decided to live together. Later, Jambrich bought a real property located at
Mandaue City, Cebu. The title was named after Descallar because Jambrich, as an Austrian, cannot own lands.
Eventually, their relationship turned sour and they separated. However, instead of filing an action in court,
Jambrich simply assigned all his rights over the Mandaue property to petitioner Camilo Borromeo, a Filipino.

Now, when petitioner sought to register the deed of assignment, he discovered that titles to the three
lots have been transferred in the name of respondent, and that the subject property has already been
mortgaged. Petitioner then filed a complaint against respondent for recovery of real property before
the Regional Trial Court. Trial ensued and eventually, the case reached the Supreme Court.

Issue: Having found that the true buyer of the disputed house and lots was the Austrian Wilhelm Jambrich,
what now is the effect of registration of the properties in the name of respondent?

Whether or not the assignment of rights of Jambrich over the real property is valid.

Ruling: Yes, the assignment of rights of Jambrich over the real property is valid.

The Supreme Court emphasized that it is settled that registration is not a mode of acquiring
ownership.[21] It is only a means of confirming the fact of its existence with notice to the world at large.
[22]
Certificates of title are not a source of right. (T)he mere possession of a title does not make one the true
owner of the property. Thus, the mere fact that respondent has the titles of the disputed properties in her
name does not necessarily, conclusively and absolutely make her the owner. The rule on indefeasibility of title
likewise does not apply to respondent. A certificate of title implies that the title is quiet, [23] and that it is perfect,
absolute and indefeasible.[24] However, there are well-defined exceptions to this rule, as when the transferee is
not a holder in good faith and did not acquire the subject properties for a valuable consideration. [25] This is the
situation in the instant case. Respondent did not contribute a single centavo in the acquisition of the
properties. She had no income of her own at that time, nor did she have any savings. She and her two sons
were then fully supported by Jambrich.

Respondent argued that aliens are prohibited from acquiring private land. This is embodied in Section
7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, [26] which is basically a reproduction of Section 5, Article XIII of the 1935

2
Constitution,[27] and Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution. [28] The capacity to acquire private land is
dependent on the capacity to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Private land may be transferred only
to individuals or entities qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Only Filipino citizens or
corporations at least 60% of the capital of which is owned by Filipinos are qualified to acquire or hold lands of
the public domain. Thus, as the rule now stands, the fundamental law explicitly prohibits non-Filipinos from
acquiring or holding title to private lands, except only by way of legal succession or if the acquisition was made
by a former natural-born citizen.[29]

Therefore, in the instant case, the transfer of land from Agro-Macro Development Corporation to
Jambrich, who is an Austrian, would have been declared invalid if challenged, had not Jambrich conveyed the
properties to petitioner who is a Filipino citizen.

4. United Church v. Sebastian

159 SCRA 446
G.R. No. L-34672 (March 30, 1988)

Facts: David Jacobson was an American citizen who had been a resident of the Philippines for more than
thirty years and up to the time of his death in 1970. 1 He left a will in which he “devised and bequeathed” to the
Brokenshire Memorial Hospital 60% of his shares of stocks in the Tagdangua Plantation Co., Inc. which was
incorporated under Philippine law in 1948. 2 This corporation was the registered owner of about 445 hectares
tract of land acquired by virtue of a sales patent.

Respondent Judge Alejandro E. Sebastian disallowed the above-described legacy on the ground that it
was in effect an alienation of private agricultural land in favor of a transferee which was not qualified under the
Constitution of 1935.4 The finding was that the Brokenshire Memorial Hospital was owned by the United
Church Board for World Ministries (UCBWM), the herein petitioner, which was a non-stock corporation
organized in the United States by virtue of a charter granted by the state legislature of Massachussets. 5

The basis of this ruling was Article XII, Sections I and 5 of the 1935 Constitution, which barred
foreigners, including Americans, from acquiring agricultural lands in this country except only by hereditary
succession. The court directed that a copy of its order be sent to the Solicitor General so he could take the
proper action, in view of the invalidity of the transfer, for the escheat of the subject property to the State. 6

Its motion for reconsideration having been denied, the petitioner came to this Court, contending that
the above-cited constitutional provisions were not applicable because the object of the legacy was not land
but shares of stocks. Moreover, even assuming that what was really involved was a transfer of land, the
petitioner was nonetheless qualified to acquire it under the provisions of the Parity Amendment and the
Laurel-Langley Agreement.

The Solicitor General disagreed at first, insisting that the legacy was prohibited by the 1935
Constitution and did not come under any of the allowed exceptions. During the protracted exchange of
pleadings among the parties, however, certain events transpired to considerably change the original situation
and, consequently, also the position of government.

However, (I)t now appears from the voluminous documents submitted in this case that at the time the
will was executed in 1966, the land on which the Brokenshire Memorial Hospital was situated was already
registered in the name of the Mindanao District Conference, an affiliate of the United Church of Christ in the
Philippines (PUCC).7 It was this non-stock corporation, organized in 1949 under Philippine law with a 100%
Filipino membership, that owned and was operating the Hospital at the time of Jacobson’s death. 8 Later, the
Brokenshire Memorial Hospital was itself incorporated as a charitable institution, with Filipinos constituting the
majority of its membership,9 and on December 16,1970, became the successor-in-interest of the UCCP to the
devised parcel of land.10

Issue: Whether or not “devised and bequeathed” to the Brokenshire Memorial Hospital was valid.

Ruling: Yes.

The Supreme Court has held that, parenthetically, it should be observed, in fairness to Judge
Sebastian, that he was unaware of these circumstances when he declared the legacy invalid to enforce the
nationalistic provisions of Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution. For his vigilance in the protection of the national
patrimony, he should be, as he is hereby, commenced.

Even on the assumption that the UCBWN was really the owner of the Hospital at the time of the
effectivity of the will and that the devise was for that reason unenforceable, the defect in the will should be

3
deemed rectified by the subsequent transfer of the property to the Brokenshire Memorial Hospital, Inc. Our
consistent ruling on this matter is that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a
citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the
transferee is rendered valid.

Thus, in Sarsosa vda. de Barsobia v. Cuenco, 13 where a Filipino citizen sold her land to an alien who later
sold it to a Filipino, we held that the invalidity of the initial transfer to the alien was corrected by the
subsequent transfer of the property to a citizen. A similar ruling was made in Godinez v. Fong Pak
Luen,14 involving a similar set of facts, where we also cited Vasquez v. Li Seng Giap,15 and Herrera v. Luy King
Guan.16 In Yap v. Maravillas,17we validated the sale of agricultural land to an alien who, after the purchase, was
naturalized as a Filipino and so became qualified to acquire it. The facts were slightly different in De Castro v.
Teng, 18 where, upon the death of an alien who had purchased a residential lot, his heirs entered into an
extrajudicial partition of his estate and transferred the land to one of his sons who was a naturalized Filipino.
We also sustained the sale.

This action has been pending for quite some time now because of the confusion regarding the status
of the Brokenshire Memorial Hospital as the ultimate beneficiary of the challenged legacy. The curious thing is
that this case was mired in factual and legal complications caused by needless misunderstanding among the
parties which, it now appears, were never in any substantial disagreement over the ownership of the Hospital.
Their common concern for its welfare, in line with the charitable spirit and purposes of the testator, should
have avoided all this tedious and acrimonious dispute.

WHEREFORE, the Brokenshire Memorial Hospital, Inc. is hereby substituted for the United Church
Board for World Ministries as petitioner in this case and DECLARED to be qualified to accept the legacy of the
late David Jacobson. The petition as thus modified is GRANTED. The order of the respondent judge dated
December 9, 1971, and his Resolution dated December 9, 1971, are SET ASIDE. This decision is immediately
executory. No costs.

5. Herrera v. Guan
1 SCRA 406
G.R. No. L-17043 (January 31, 1961)

The plaintiff Natividad Herrera is the legitimate daughter of Luis Herrera, now deceased. The said Luis
Herrera in his lifetime was the owner of three (3) parcels of land and their improvements. Before leaving for
China, however, Luis Herrera executed a deed of General Power of Attorney which authorized and empowered
the defendant Kim Guan, among others to administer and sell the properties of said Luis Herrera.

Thereafter, several transaction regarding the three (3) parcels of land ensued.

It is the contention of plaintiff-appellant that all the transactions involving the parcels of land and by
virtue of the power of attorney were fraudulent and were executed after the death of Luis Herrera and,
consequently, when the power of attorney was no longer operative. It is also claimed that the defendants Lino
Bangayan and Luy Kim Guan who now claim to be the owners of the three (3) parcels of land are Chinese by
nationality and, therefore, are disqualified to acquire real properties. Plaintiff-appellant, in addition, questions
the supposed deed of sale allegedly executed by Luis Herrera on the same day that Luis Herrera executed the
power of attorney.

Issue: Whether or not plaintiff-appellant’s contentions are tenable.

Ruling: No, the Court found all the contentions of plaintiff-appellant untenable. Viz,

Appellants also raise the question of the legality of the titles acquired by Luy Chay and Lino Bangayan,
on ground that they are disqualified to acquire real properties in the Philippines. This point is similarly without
merit because there is no evidence to support the claim. In fact, in the deed of sale as well as in TCT No. 3162
issued to Luy Chay, the latter was referred to as a citizen of the Philippines. Nevertheless, the lower court
acknowledged the probability that Luy Chay could have been actually a Chinese citizens. 3 At any rate, the
property was subsequently purchased by Lino Bangayan, as a result which TCT No. 3162 in the name of Luy
Chay was cancelled and another certificate (TCT No. T-2567) was issued in favor of said vendee.

As to Bangayan’s qualification, the lower court held that said defendant had sufficiently established his
Philippine citizenship through Exhibit P, concurred in by the Secretary of Justice. We find no reason to disturb
such ruling.

4
 With respect to Luy Kim Guan, while it is true that he is a Chinese citizen, nevertheless, inasmuch as he
acquired his one-half share in Lot No. 4467 in 1931, long before the Constitution was adopted, his ownership
can not be attacked on account of his citizenship.

6. Barsobia v. Cuenco
199 Phil. 26
G.R. No. L-33048 (April 16, 1982)

Facts: A parcel of coconut land was sold by its Filipino owner, petitioner Epifania, to a Chinese, Ong King Po,
and by the latter to a naturalized Filipino, respondent herein. In the meantime, the Filipino owner had
unilaterally repudiated the sale she had made to the Chinese and had resold the property to another Filipino.

Issue: Who is the rightful owner of the property?

Ruling: Respondent Cuenco is the rightful owner of the property.

The Supreme Court held that there should be no question that the sale of the land in question in 1936
by Epifania to Ong King Po was inexistent and void from the beginning (Art. 1409 [7], Civil Code) 6 because it
was a contract executed against the mandatory provision of the 1935 Constitution, which is an expression of
public policy to conserve lands for the Filipinos. Said provision reads:

Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or

assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations, qualified to acquire or hold lands
of the public domain.7
Had this been a suit between Epifania and Ong King Po, she could have been declared entitled to the
litigated land on the basis, as claimed, of the ruling in Philippine Banking Corporation v. Lui She,8 reading:

 For another thing, and this is not only cogent but also important. Article 1416 of the
Civil Code provides as an exception to the rule on pari delicto that when the agreement is not
illegal per se but is merely prohibited, and the prohibition by the law is designed for the
protection of the plaintiff, he may, if public policy is thereby enhanced, recover what he has
sold or delivered 

But the factual set-up has changed. The litigated property is now in the hands of a naturalized Filipino.
It is no longer owned by a disqualified vendee. Respondent, as a naturalized citizen, was constitutionally
qualified to own the subject property. There would be no more public policy to be served in allowing petitioner
Epifania to recover the land as it is already in the hands of a qualified person. Applying by analogy the ruling of
this Court in Vasquez v. Giap and Li Seng Giap & Sons: 9
 if the ban on aliens from acquiring not only agricultural but also urban lands, as
construed by this Court in the Krivenko case, is to preserve the nation’s lands for future
generations of Filipinos, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but achieved by making
lawful the acquisition of real estate by aliens who became Filipino citizens by naturalization.

While, strictly speaking, Ong King Po, private respondent’s vendor, had no rights of ownership to
transmit, it is likewise inescapable that petitioner Epifania had slept on her rights for 26 years from 1936 to
1962. By her long inaction or inexcusable neglect, she should be held barred from asserting her claim to the
litigated property (Sotto v. Teves, 86 SCRA 157 [1978]).

Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have
been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or
declined to assert it. (Tijam, et al. v. Sibonghanoy, et al., No. L-21450, April 15, 1968, 23 SCRA 29,
35). (cited in Sotto v. Teves, 86 SCRA 154 [1978]).

Respondent, therefore, must be declared to be the rightful owner of the property.

7. Cheesman v. IAC
193 SCRA 93
G.R. No. 74833 (January 21, 1991)

Facts: Thomas Cheesman and Criselda P. Cheesman were married on December 4, 1970 but have been
separated since February 15, 1981.1

5
 On June 4, 1974, a “Deed of Sale and Transfer of Possessory Rights” was executed by Armando Altares
conveying a parcel of unregistered land and the house thereon (at No. 7 Neptune Street, Gordon Heights,
Olongapo City) in favor of “Criselda P. Cheesman, of legal age, Filipino citizen, married to Thomas Cheesman,
and residing at Lot No. 1, Blk. 8, Filtration Road, Sta. Rita, Olongapo City ”2 Thomas Cheesman, although
aware of the deed, did not object to the transfer being made only to his wife. 3

Thereafter—and again with the knowledge of Thomas Cheesman and also without any protest by him
—tax declarations for the property purchased were issued in the name only of Criselda Cheesman and Criselda
assumed exclusive management and administration of said property, leasing it to tenants. 4

On July 1, 1981, Criselda Cheesman sold the property to Estelita M. Padilla, without the knowledge or consent
of Thomas Cheesman.5 The deed described Criselda as being “ of legal age, married to an American citizen,
”6

Thirty days later, or on July 31, 1981, Thomas Cheesman brought suit in the Court of First Instance at
Olongapo City against his wife, Criselda, and Estelita Padilla, praying for the annulment of the sale on the
ground that the transaction had been executed without his knowledge and consent. 7 An answer was filed in
the names of both defendants, alleging that (1) the property sold was paraphernal, having been purchased by
Criselda with funds exclusively belonging to her (“her own separate money”); (2) Thomas Cheesman, being an
American, was disqualified to have any interest or right of ownership in the land; and (3) Estelita Padilla was a
buyer in good faith.8

Issue: Whether or not the suit is meritorious.

Ruling: No, Cheesman’s suit against his wife, Criselda, and Estelita Padilla, praying for the annulment of the
sale on the ground that the transaction had been executed without his knowledge and consent is not
meritorious.

Finally, the fundamental law prohibits the sale to aliens of residential land. Section 14, Article XIV of the
1973 Constitution ordains that, “Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private land shall be transferred or
conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain.”30 Petitioner Thomas Cheesman was, of course, charged with knowledge of this prohibition. Thus,
assuming that it was his intention that the lot in question be purchased by him and his wife, he acquired no
right whatever over the property by virtue of that purchase; and in attempting to acquire a right or interest in
land, vicariously and clandestinely, he knowingly violated the Constitution; the sale as to him was null and
void.31 In any event, he had and has no capacity or personality to question the subsequent sale of the same
property by his wife on the theory that in so doing he is merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in
respect of conjugal property. To sustain such a theory would permit indirect controversion of the constitutional
prohibition. If the property were to be declared conjugal, this would accord to the alien husband a not
insubstantial interest and right over land, as he would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition.
This is a right that the Constitution does not permit him to have.

As already observed, the finding that his wife had used her own money to purchase the property
cannot, and will not, at this stage of the proceedings be reviewed and overturned. But even if it were a fact
that said wife had used conjugal funds to make the acquisition, the considerations just set out militate, on high
constitutional grounds, against his recovering and holding the property so acquired or any part thereof. And
whether in such an event, he may recover from his wife any share of the money used for the purchase or
charge her with unauthorized disposition or expenditure of conjugal funds is not now inquired into; that would
be, in the premises, a purely academic exercise. An equally decisive consideration is that Estelita Padilla is a
purchaser in good faith, both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court having found that Cheesman’s own
conduct had led her to believe the property to be exclusive property of the latter’s wife, freely disposable by
her without his consent or intervention. An innocent buyer for value, she is entitled to the protection of the
law in her purchase, particularly as against Cheesman, who would assert rights to the property denied him by
both letter and spirit of the Constitution itself.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED, with costs against petitioner.

8. Ting H0 v. Teng Gui

G.R. No. 130115 (July 16, 2008)

Facts: [T]he plaintiffs and the defendant are all brothers and sisters, the defendant being the oldest. They are
the only legitimate children of the deceased Spouses Felix Ting Ho and Leonila Cabasal.

6
 The controversy revolves around a parcel of land, and the improvements which should form part of
the estate of their deceased father, and should be partitioned equally among each of the siblings. Petitioners
alleged that their father died intestate and left upon his death an estate. According to petitioners, the said lot
and properties were titled and tax declared under trust in the name of respondent Vicente Teng Gui for the
benefit of the deceased who, being a Chinese citizen, was then disqualified to own public lands in the
Philippines; and that upon the death of their father, the respondent took possession of the same for his own
exclusive use and benefit to their exclusion and prejudice.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners’ contention is meritorious.

Ruling: No, petitioners’ contention is not meritorious.

The Supreme Court held that, here, the father of petitioners and respondent was a Chinese citizen;
therefore, he was disqualified from acquiring and owning real property in the Philippines. In fact, he was only
occupying the subject lot by virtue of the permission granted him by the then U.S. Naval Reservation Office of
Olongapo, Zambales. As correctly found by the CA, the deceased Felix Ting Ho was never the owner of the
subject lot in light of the constitutional proscription and the respondent did not at any instance act as the
dummy of his father.

On the other hand, the respondent became the owner of Lot No. 418, Ts-308 when he was granted
Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. 7457 on January 3, 1978, by the Secretary of Natural Resources By Authority of
the President of the Philippines, and when Original Certificate of Title No. P-1064 was correspondingly issued in
his name. The grant of the miscellaneous sales patent by the Secretary of Natural Resources, and the
corresponding issuance of the original certificate of title in his name, show that the respondent possesses all
the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to acquire alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain. These issuances bear the presumption of regularity in their performance in the absence of evidence to
the contrary.

Registration of grants and patents involving public lands is governed by Section 122 of Act No. 496,
which was subsequently amended by Section 103 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, viz:

Sec. 103. Certificate of title pursuant to patents.Whenever public land is by the Government
alienated, granted or conveyed to any person, the same shall be brought forthwith under the
operation of this Decree. It shall be the duty of the official issuing the instrument of alienation,
grant, patent or conveyance in behalf of the Government to cause such instrument to be filed
with the Register of Deeds of the province or city where the land lies, and to be there
registered like other deeds and conveyance, whereupon a certificate of title shall be entered
as in other cases of registered land, and an owners duplicate issued to the grantee. The
deeds, grant, patent or instrument of conveyance from the Government to the grantee shall
not take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract between
the Government and the grantee and as evidence of authority to the Register of Deeds to
make registration. It is the act of registration that shall be the operative act to affect and
convey the land, and in all cases under this Decree registration shall be made in the office of
the Register of Deeds of the province or city where the land lies. The fees for registration shall
be paid by the grantee. After due registration and issuance of the certificate of title, such
land shall be deemed to be registered land to all intents and purposes under this Decree.
[16]
(Emphasis supplied)

Under the law, a certificate of title issued pursuant to any grant or patent involving public land is as
conclusive and indefeasible as any other certificate of title issued to private lands in the ordinary or cadastral
registration proceeding. The effect of the registration of a patent and the issuance of a certificate of title to the
patentee is to vest in him an incontestable title to the land, in the same manner as if ownership had been
determined by final decree of the court, and the title so issued is absolutely conclusive and indisputable, and is
not subject to collateral attack.[17]

Nonetheless, petitioners invoke equity considerations and claim that the ruling of the RTC that an
implied trust was created between respondent and their father with respect to the subject lot should be
upheld.

This contention must fail because the prohibition against an alien from owning lands of the public
domain is absolute and not even an implied trust can be permitted to arise on equity considerations.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

7
 Coming now to the issue of ownership of the properties erected on the subject lot, the Court agrees
with the finding of the trial court, as affirmed by the appellate court, that the series of transactions resorted to
by the deceased were simulated in order to preserve the properties in the hands of the family. The records
show that during all the time that the properties were allegedly sold to the spouses Victoria Cabasal and
Gregorio Fontela in 1958 and the subsequent sale of the same to respondent in 1961, the petitioners and
respondent, along with their parents, remained in possession and continued to live in said properties.

The Court holds that the reliance of the trial court on the provisions of Article 1471 of the Civil Code to
conclude that the simulated sales were a valid donation to the respondent is misplaced because its finding was
based on a mere assumption when the law requires positive proof.

However, the respondent was unable to show, and the records are bereft of any evidence, that the
simulated sales of the properties were intended by the deceased to be a donation to him. Thus, the Court holds
that the two-storey residential house, two-storey residential building and sari-sari store form part of the estate
of the late spouses Felix Ting Ho and Leonila Cabasal, entitling the petitioners to a four-fifths (4/5) share
thereof.

9. Muller v. Muller
G.R. No. 149615 (August 29, 2006)

Facts: Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut Muller were married in Hamburg,
Germany on September 22, 1989. The couple resided in Germany at a house owned by respondent’s parents
but decided later to move and reside permanently in the Philippines in 1992. By this time, respondent had
inherited the house in Germany from his parents which he sold and used the proceeds for the purchase of a
parcel of land in Antipolo, Rizal at the cost of P528,000.00 and the construction of a house amounting to
P2,300,000.00. The Antipolo property was registered in the name of petitioner under Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 219438 5 of the Register of Deeds of Marikina, Metro Manila.

Due to incompatibilities and respondent’s alleged womanizing, drinking, and maltreatment, the
spouses eventually separated. On September 26, 1994, respondent filed a petition 6 for separation of
properties before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.

On August 12, 1996, the trial court rendered a decision which terminated the regime of absolute
community of property between the petitioner and respondent. It also decreed the separation of properties
between them and ordered the equal partition of personal properties located within the country, excluding
those acquired by gratuitous title during the marriage. With regard to the Antipolo property, the court held
that it was acquired using paraphernal funds of the respondent. However, it ruled that respondent cannot
recover his funds because the property was purchased in violation of Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution.

Respondent now seeks for reimbursement of funds claimed by him to be given in trust to his
petitioner wife, a Philippine citizen, for the purchase of a property in Antipolo.

Issue: Whether or not respondent’s claim is tenable.

Ruling: No, respondent’s claim is not tenable.

The Court, in rejecting the claim, ruled that:

Respondent was aware of the constitutional prohibition and expressly admitted his
knowledge thereof to this Court. He declared that he had the Antipolo property titled in the
name of the petitioner because of the said prohibition. His attempt at subsequently asserting
or claiming a right on the said property cannot be sustained.

The Court of Appeals erred in holding that an implied trust was created and resulted
by operation of law in view of petitioner’s marriage to respondent. Save for the exception
provided in cases of hereditary succession, respondent's disqualification from owning lands
in the Philippines is absolute. Not even an ownership in trust is allowed. Besides, where the
purchase is made in violation of an existing statute and in evasion of its express provision, no
trust can result in favor of the party who is guilty of the fraud. To hold otherwise would allow
circumvention of the constitutional prohibition.

Invoking the principle that a court is not only a court of law but also a court of equity,
is likewise misplaced. It has been held that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not

8
 permit that to be done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly
[19]

10. Matthews v. Taylor

G.R. 164584 June 22, 2009

Facts: On June 30, 1988, (r)espondent Benjamin A. Taylor (Benjamin), a British subject, married Joselyn C.
Taylor (Joselyn), a 17-year old Filipina. 4 On June 9, 1989, (w)hile their marriage was subsisting, Joselyn bought
from Diosa M. Martin a 1,294 square-meter lot (Boracay property) situated at Manoc-Manoc, Boracay Island,
Malay, Aklan, for and in consideration of ₱129,000.00.5 The sale was allegedly financed by Benjamin. 6 Joselyn
and Benjamin, also using the latter’s funds, constructed improvements thereon and eventually converted the
property to a vacation and tourist resort known as the Admiral Ben Bow Inn.7 All required permits and licenses
for the operation of the resort were obtained in the name of Ginna Celestino, Joselyn’s sister. 8

However, Benjamin and Joselyn had a falling out, and Joselyn ran away with Kim Philippsen. On June
8, 1992 (Later), Joselyn executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of Benjamin, authorizing the latter
to maintain, sell, lease, and sub-lease and otherwise enter into contract with third parties with respect to their
Boracay property.9

On July 20, 1992 (However), Joselyn as lessor and petitioner Philip Matthews as lessee, entered into an
Agreement of Lease10 (Agreement) involving the Boracay property for a period of 25 years, with an annual
rental of ₱12,000.00. The agreement was signed by the parties and executed before a Notary Public. Petitioner
thereafter took possession of the property and renamed the resort as Music Garden Resort.

Claiming that the Agreement was null and void since it was entered into by Joselyn without his
(Benjamin’s) consent, Benjamin instituted an action for Declaration of Nullity of Agreement of Lease with
Damages11 against Joselyn and the petitioner. Benjamin claimed that his funds were used in the acquisition and
improvement of the Boracay property, and coupled with the fact that he was Joselyn’s husband, any
transaction involving said property required his consent.

Issue: Whether or not an Agreement of Lease of a parcel of land entered into by a Filipino wife without the
consent of her British husband is valid.

Ruling: Yes, an Agreement of Lease of a parcel of land entered into by a Filipino wife without the consent of
her British husband is valid.

The Supreme Court held that Benjamin has no right to nullify the Agreement of Lease between Joselyn
and petitioner. Benjamin, being an alien, is absolutely prohibited from acquiring private and public lands in the
Philippines. Considering that Joselyn appeared to be the designated “vendee” in the Deed of Sale of said
property, she acquired sole ownership thereto. This is true even if we sustain Benjamin’s claim that he provided
the funds for such acquisition. By entering into such contract knowing that it was illegal, no implied trust was
created in his favor; no reimbursement for his expenses can be allowed; and no declaration can be made that
the subject property was part of the conjugal/community property of the spouses. In any event, he had and has
no capacity or personality to question the subsequent lease of the Boracay property by his wife on the theory
that in so doing, he was merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property. To
sustain such a theory would countenance indirect controversion of the constitutional prohibition. If the
property were to be declared conjugal, this would accord the alien husband a substantial interest and right
over the land, as he would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right that the
Constitution does not permit him to have. 34