G.R. No.

193707 December 10, 2014 fourteen (14) year old minor, of financial support legally due him, resulting in economic abuse to the victim. CONTRARY
TO LAW.15
NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minor child RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM, Petitioner,
vs. Upon motion and after notice and hearing, the RTC-Cebu issued a Hold Departure Order against
ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, Respondent. respondent.16Consequently, respondent was arrested and, subsequently, posted bail. 17 Petitioner also filed a
Motion/Application of Permanent Protection Order to which respondent filed his Opposition. 18 Pending the resolution
thereof, respondent was arraigned.19 Subsequently, without the RTC-Cebu having resolved the application of the
DECISION
protection order, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged;
and (2) prescription of the crime charged.20
PERALTA, J.:
On February 19, 2010, the RTC-Cebu issued the herein assailed Order,21 dismissing the instant criminal case against
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside respondent on the ground that the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense with respect to the
the Orders1 dated February 19, 2010 and September 1, 2010, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (RTC- respondent who is an alien, the dispositive part of which states:
Cebu), which dismissed the criminal case entitled People of the Philippines v. Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem,
docketed as Criminal Case No. CBU-85503, for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-
WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense with respect to the
Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004.
accused, he being an alien, and accordingly, orders this case DISMISSED.

The following facts are culled from the records:

The bail bond posted by accused Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem for his provisional liberty is hereby cancelled (sic)
and ordered released.
Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland on
September 25, 1990.2 On January 19, 1994, they were blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem, who at
SO ORDERED.
the time of the filing of the instant petition was sixteen (16) years of age.3

Cebu City, Philippines, February 19, 2010.22

Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court
of Holland.4 At that time, their son was only eighteen (18) months old. 5 Thereafter, petitioner and her son came home to
the Philippines.6
According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide monthly support to their son in the amount of Two Hundred
Fifty (250) Guildene (which is equivalent to Php17,500.00 more or less).7 However, since the arrival of petitioner and her
son in the Philippines, respondent never gave support to the son, Roderigo.8
Not long thereafter, respondent cameto the Philippines and remarried in Pinamungahan, Cebu, and since then, have been
residing thereat.9 Respondent and his new wife established a business known as Paree Catering, located at Barangay
Tajao, Municipality of Pinamungahan, Cebu City.10 To date, all the parties, including their son, Roderigo, are presently
living in Cebu City.11
On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter demanding for support from respondent. However,
respondent refused to receive the letter.12
Thereafter, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration thereto reiterating respondent’s obligation to support their child
under Article 19523 of the Family Code, thus, failure to do so makes him liable under R.A. No. 9262 which "equally applies
to all persons in the Philippines who are obliged to support their minor children regardless of the obligor’s nationality." 24
On September 1, 2010, the lower court issued an Order25 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration and reiterating
its previous ruling. Thus:
x x x The arguments therein presented are basically a rehash of those advanced earlier in the memorandum of the
prosecution. Thus, the court hereby reiterates its ruling that since the accused is a foreign national he is not subject to our
national law (The Family Code) in regard to a parent’s duty and obligation to givesupport to his child. Consequently, he
cannot be charged of violating R.A. 9262 for his alleged failure to support his child. Unless it is conclusively established
that R.A. 9262 applies to a foreigner who fails to give support tohis child, notwithstanding that he is not bound by our
domestic law which mandates a parent to give such support, it is the considered opinion of the court that no prima
faciecase exists against the accused herein, hence, the case should be dismissed.

Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a complaint affidavit with the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
against respondent for violation of Section 5, paragraph E(2) of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to support his
minor child with petitioner.13 Respondent submitted his counter-affidavit thereto, to which petitioner also submitted her
reply-affidavit.14 Thereafter, the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an SO ORDERED.
information for the crime charged against herein respondent.
Cebu City, Philippines, September 1, 2010.26
The information, which was filed with the RTC-Cebu and raffled to Branch 20 thereof, states that:
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari raising the following issues:
That sometime in the year 1995 and up to the present, more or less, in the Municipality of Minglanilla, Province of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully,
1. Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under Philippine law; and
unlawfully and deliberately deprive, refuse and still continue to deprive his son RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM, a
1
 2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified failure
to support his minor child.27
At the outset, let it be emphasized that We are taking cognizance of the instant petition despite the fact that the same was
directly lodged with the Supreme Court, consistent with the ruling in Republic v. Sunvar Realty Development
Corporation,28 which lays down the instances when a ruling of the trial court may be brought on appeal directly to the
Supreme Court without violating the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, to wit:
x x x Nevertheless, the Rules do not prohibit any of the parties from filing a Rule 45 Petition with this Court, in case only
questions of law are raised or involved. This latter situation was one that petitioners found themselves in when they filed
the instant Petition to raise only questions of law. In Republic v. Malabanan, the Court clarified the three modes of appeal
from decisions of the RTC, to wit: (1) by ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error under Rule 41, whereby judgment was
rendered in a civil or criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; (2) by a petition for review under
Rule 42, whereby judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; and (3) by a petition for
review on certiorari before the Supreme Court under Rule 45. "The first mode of appeal is taken to the [Court of Appeals]
on questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. The second mode of appeal is brought to the CA on questions of
fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. The third mode of appealis elevated to the Supreme Court only on
questions of law." (Emphasis supplied)
There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented
or of the truth or falsehood of the facts being admitted, and the doubt concerns the correct application of law and
jurisprudence on the matter. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of
circumstances.29
Indeed, the issues submitted to us for resolution involve questions of law – the response thereto concerns the correct
application of law and jurisprudence on a given set of facts, i.e.,whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to
support his minor child under Philippine law; and whether or not he can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for
his unjustified failure to do so.
It cannot be negated, moreover, that the instant petition highlights a novel question of law concerning the liability of a
foreign national who allegedly commits acts and omissions punishable under special criminal laws, specifically in relation
to family rights and duties. The inimitability of the factual milieu of the present case, therefore, deserves a definitive ruling
by this Court, which will eventually serve as a guidepost for future cases. Furthermore, dismissing the instant petition and
remanding the same to the CA would only waste the time, effort and resources of the courts. Thus, in the present case,
considerations of efficiency and economy in the administration of justice should prevail over the observance of the
hierarchy of courts.
Now, on the matter of the substantive issues, We find the petition meritorious. Nonetheless, we do not fully agree with
petitioner’s contentions.
To determine whether or not a person is criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262, it is imperative that the legal obligation to
support exists.
Petitioner invokes Article 19530 of the Family Code, which provides the parent’s obligation to support his child. Petitioner
contends that notwithstanding the existence of a divorce decree issued in relation to Article 26 of the Family
Code,31 respondent is not excused from complying with his obligation to support his minor child with petitioner.
On the other hand, respondent contends that there is no sufficient and clear basis presented by petitioner that she, as
well as her minor son, are entitled to financial support.32 Respondent also added that by reason of the Divorce Decree, he
is not obligated topetitioner for any financial support.33
2
On this point, we agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on Article 195 34 of the New Civil Code in demanding
support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article 1535 of the New Civil Code stresses the principle of
nationality. In other words, insofar as Philippine laws are concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family Code on
support, the same only applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies to foreigners such that they are
governed by their national law with respect to family rights and duties. 36
The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and duties. Since the respondent is a
citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-Cebu that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to
Philippinelaw, as to whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so. 37
In the case of Vivo v. Cloribel,38 the Court held that –
Furthermore, being still aliens, they are not in position to invoke the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines, for that
Code cleaves to the principle that family rights and duties are governed by their personal law, i.e.,the laws of the nation
to which they belong even when staying in a foreign country (cf. Civil Code, Article 15). 39
It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son under Article195 of the
Family Code as a consequence of the Divorce Covenant obtained in Holland. This does not, however, mean that
respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son altogether.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the
foreign law.40 In the present case, respondent hastily concludes that being a national of the Netherlands, he is governed
by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to support.41 While respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands
in advancing his position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same.
It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands does not impose upon the
parents the obligation to support their child (either before, during or after the issuance of a divorce decree), because
Llorente v. Court of Appeals,42 has already enunciated that:
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to takejudicial notice of
them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.43
In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of processual
presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts
will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal law. 44 Thus, since the law of the
Netherlands as regards the obligation to support has not been properly pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is
presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of parents to support their children and
penalizing the non-compliance therewith.
Moreover, while in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,45 the Court held that a divorce obtained in a foreign land as well as its legal
effects may be recognized in the Philippines in view of the nationality principle on the matter of status of persons, the
Divorce Covenant presented by respondent does not completely show that he is notliable to give support to his son after
the divorce decree was issued. Emphasis is placed on petitioner’s allegation that under the second page of the aforesaid
covenant, respondent’s obligation to support his child is specifically stated,46 which was not disputed by respondent.
We likewise agree with petitioner that notwithstanding that the national law of respondent states that parents have no
obligation to support their children or that such obligation is not punishable by law, said law would still not find
applicability,in light of the ruling in Bank of America, NT and SA v. American Realty Corporation, 47 to wit:
In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter were properly pleaded and proved in
accordance with Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court and the jurisprudence laid down in Yao Kee, et al. vs. Sy-
Gonzales, said foreign law would still not find applicability.
Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established public policy of the forum, the
said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.
Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order,
public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations
or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded in our jurisdiction proscribing the
splitting up of a single cause of action.
Section 4, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is pertinent
—
If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits
in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others. Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its
application would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important
function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of Conflict
of Laws.48
Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s obligation to support his child nor
penalize the noncompliance therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in the Philippines because it would be of
great injustice to the child to be denied of financial support when the latter is entitled thereto.
We emphasize, however, that as to petitioner herself, respondent is no longer liable to support his former wife, in
consonance with the ruling in San Luis v. San Luis,49 to wit:
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longerbe considered marriedto the
alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her marital duties and obligations. It held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private
respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner
should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The
latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated
against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served. (Emphasis added)50
Based on the foregoing legal precepts, we find that respondent may be made liable under Section 5(e) and (i) of R.A. No.
9262 for unjustly refusing or failing to give support topetitioner’s son, to wit:
SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The crime of violence against women and their children
is committed through any of the following acts:
xxxx
3
(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the woman or her child has
the right to desist from or desist from conduct which the woman or her child has the right to engage in, or attempting to
restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or
other harm or threat of physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall include,
butnot limited to, the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the woman's or her
child's movement or conduct:
xxxx
(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally due her or her family, or
deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient financial support; x x x x
(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not limited
to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor childrenof access to the
woman's child/children.51
Under the aforesaid special law, the deprivation or denial of financial support to the child is considered anact of violence
against women and children.
In addition, considering that respondent is currently living in the Philippines, we find strength in petitioner’s claim that the
Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in relation to Article 14 of the New Civil Code, applies to the instant case, which
provides that: "[p]enal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live and sojourn in
Philippine territory, subject to the principle of public international law and to treaty stipulations." On this score, it is
indisputable that the alleged continuing acts of respondent in refusing to support his child with petitioner is committed here
in the Philippines as all of the parties herein are residents of the Province of Cebu City. As such, our courts have territorial
jurisdiction over the offense charged against respondent. It is likewise irrefutable that jurisdiction over the respondent was
acquired upon his arrest.
Finally, we do not agree with respondent’s argument that granting, but not admitting, that there is a legal basis for charging
violation of R.A. No. 9262 in the instant case, the criminal liability has been extinguished on the ground of prescription of
crime52 under Section 24 of R.A. No. 9262, which provides that:
SECTION 24. Prescriptive Period. – Acts falling under Sections 5(a) to 5(f) shall prescribe in twenty (20) years. Acts falling
under Sections 5(g) to 5(I) shall prescribe in ten (10) years.
The act of denying support to a child under Section 5(e)(2) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 is a continuing offense,53 which started
in 1995 but is still ongoing at present. Accordingly, the crime charged in the instant case has clearly not prescribed.
Given, however, that the issue on whether respondent has provided support to petitioner’s child calls for an examination
of the probative value of the evidence presented, and the truth and falsehood of facts being admitted, we hereby remand
the determination of this issue to the RTC-Cebu which has jurisdiction over the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated February 19, 2010 and September 1, 2010, respectively, of
the Regional Trial Court of the City of Cebu are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the
same court to conduct further proceedings based on the merits of the case.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 187240 October 15, 2014
CARLOS A. LORIA, Petitioner,
vs.
LUDOLFO P. MUÑOZ, JR. Respondent.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
No person should unjustly enrich himself or herself at the expense of another.
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 to set aside the Court of Appeals' decision2 and resolution3 in CA-G.R. CV No.
81882. The Court of Appeals ordered petitioner Carlos A. Loria to pay respondent Ludolfo P. Muñoz, Jr. ₱2,000,000.00
in actual damages with 12% interest per year from the filing of the complaint until full payment. 4
The facts of this case are as follows:
Ludolfo P. Muñoz, Jr. (Muñoz) filed a complaint for sum of money and damages with an application for issuance of a writ
of preliminary attachment against Carlos A. Loria (Loria) with the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City. 5
In his complaint, Muñoz alleged that he has been engaged in construction under the name, "Ludolfo P. Muñoz, Jr.
Construction." In August 2000, Loria visited Muñoz in his office in Doña Maria Subdivision in Daraga, Albay. He invited
Muñoz to advance ₱2,000,000.00 for a subcontract of a ₱50,000,000.00 river-dredging project in Guinobatan.6
Loria represented that he would makearrangements such that Elizaldy Co, owner of Sunwest Construction and
Development Corporation, would turn out to be the lowest bidder for the project. Elizaldy Co would pay ₱8,000,000.00 to
ensure the project’s award to Sunwest. After the award to Sunwest, Sunwest would subcontract 20% or ₱10,000,000.00
worth of the project to Muñoz.7
Since Muñoz had known Loria for five years, Muñoz accepted Loria’s proposal. 8
On October 2, 2000, Muñoz requested Allied Bank to release ₱3,000,000.00 from his joint account withhis business
partner, Christopher Co, to a certain Grace delos Santos (delos Santos). Loria then obtained the money from delos
Santos.9
Four days later, ₱1,800,000.00 of the ₱3,000,000.00 was returned to Muñoz. 10
On January 10, 2001, Loria collectedMuñoz’s ₱800,000.00 balance. After deducting Loria’s personal loans from Muñoz,
Muñoz issued a check to Loria for ₱481,800.00. Loria acknowledged receiving this amount from Muñoz.11
The project to dredge the Masarawag and San Francisco Rivers in Guinobatan was subjected to public bidding. The
project was awarded to the lowest bidder, Sunwest Construction and Development Corporation. 12
Sunwest allegedly finished dredging the Masarawag and San Francisco Rivers without subcontracting Muñoz.13With the
project allegedly finished, Muñozdemanded Loria to return his ₱2,000,000.00. Loria, however, did not return the money.14
Muñoz first charged Loria and Elizaldy Co with estafa. This criminal case was dismissed by the Municipal Trial Court of
Daraga, Albay for lack of probable cause.15
4
Muñoz then filed the complaint for sum of money. The case was raffled to Branch 6 and presidedby Judge Vladimir B.
Brusola.16
Loria answered Muñoz’s complaint. He admitted receiving ₱481,800.00 from Muñoz but argued that the complaint did not
state a cause of action against him. According to Loria, he followed up the project’s approval with the Central Office of the
Department of Public Works and Highways as the parties agreed upon. He was, therefore, entitled to his representation
expenses.17
Loria also argued that Muñoz was guilty of forum shopping. Muñoz first filed a criminal complaint for estafa against him
and Elizaldy Co, which complaint the Municipal Trial Court of Daraga, Albay dismissed. The subsequently filed complaint
for sum of money, allegedly a complaint to recover the civil aspect of the estafa case, must, therefore, be dismissed as
argued by Loria.18
During pre-trial, the parties agreed to litigate the sole issue of whether Loria is liable to Muñoz for ₱2,000,000.00. 19
According to the trial court, Muñoz established with preponderant evidence that Loria received ₱2,000,000.00 from Muñoz
for a subcontract of the river-dredging project. Since no part of the project was subcontracted to Muñoz, Loria must return
the ₱2,000,000.00 he received, or he would be "unduly enriching himself at the expense of [Muñoz]."20
On the claim of forum shopping, the trial court ruled that Loria’s obligation to return the 2,000,000.00 did not arise from
criminal liability. Muñoz may, therefore, file a civil action to recover his ₱2,000,000.00. 21
As to the prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment, the trial court denied the prayer for lack of sufficient
basis.22
Thus, in the decision23 dated January 30, 2004, the trial court ordered Loria to return the ₱2,000,000.00 toMuñoz as actual
damages with 12% interest from the filing of the complaint until the amount’s full payment. The trial court likewise ordered
Loria to pay Muñoz ₱100,000.00 in attorney’s fees, ₱25,000.00 in litigation expenses, and ₱25,000.00 in exemplary
damages with costs against Loria.24
Loria appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Muñoz failed to establish his receipt of the ₱2,000,000.00.
Specifically, Muñoz failed to establish that he obtained ₱3,000,000.00from a certain Grace delos Santos. Loria also
appealed the award of attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and exemplary damages for having no basis in fact and in
law.25
The Court of Appeals sustained the trial court’s factual findings. In ruling that Loria received the net amount of
₱2,000,000.00 from Muñoz, the Court of Appeals referred to Muñoz’s testimony that he ordered Allied Bank to release
₱3,000,000.00 from his joint account with Christopher Co to a certain Grace delos Santos.26 Loria then obtained the money
from delos Santos and confirmed with Muñoz his receipt of the money.27 This testimony, according to the appellate court,
was supported by Exhibit "C," a check voucher the trial court admitted inevidence. Loria signed this check voucher and
acknowledged receiving ₱1,200,000.00 on October 2, 2000 and ₱800,000.00 on January 10, 2001, ora total of
₱2,000,000.00.28
Considering that Muñoz did not benefit from paying Loria ₱2,000,000.00, the appellate court ruled that Loria must return
the money to Muñoz under the principle of unjust enrichment.29
The appellate court, however, ruled that Muñoz failed to show his right to exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. 30
Thus, in the decision31 dated October 23, 2008, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision but deleted the
award of exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.32 The appellate court likewise denied Loria’s motion for reconsideration
in the resolution33 dated March 12, 2009.
Loria filed a petition for review on certiorari34 with this court, arguing that the principle of unjust enrichment does not apply
in this case. As the trial and appellate courts found, Muñoz paid Loria ₱2,000,000.00 for a subcontract of a government
project. The parties’ agreement, therefore, was void for being contrary to law, specifically, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, the Revised Penal Code, and Section 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1594. The agreement was likewise
contrary to the public policy of public or open competitive bidding of government contracts. 35
Since the parties’ agreement was void, Loria argues that the parties were in pari delicto, and Muñoz should not be allowed
to recover the money he gave under the contract.36
On the finding that he received a net amount of ₱2,000,000.00 from Muñoz, Loria maintains that Muñoz failed to prove
his receipt of ₱3,000,000.00 through a certain Grace delos Santos.37
In the resolution38 dated June 3, 2009, thiscourt ordered Muñoz to comment on Loria’s petition.
In his comment,39 Muñoz argues that Loria’s petition raises questions of fact and law that the trial and appellate courts
have already passed upon and resolved in his favor. He prays that this court deny Loria’s petition for raising questions of
fact.
Loria replied40 to the comment, arguing thathe raised only questions of law in his petition.41 Even assuming that he raised
questions of fact, Loria argues that this does not warrant the automatic dismissal of his petition since the trial and appellate
courts allegedly erred inruling for Muñoz.42
On October 8, 2010, the parties filed their joint motion to render judgment based on the compromise agreement.43 In their
compromise agreement,44 the parties declared that thiscase "was a product of a mere misunderstanding." 45 To amicably
settle their dispute, the parties agreed to waive all their claims, rights, and interests against each other.46
This court denied the joint motion for lack of merit in the resolution47 dated December 15, 2010.
The issues for our resolution are the following:
I. Whether Loria initially obtained ₱3,000,000.00 from a certain Grace delos Santos
II. Whether Loria is liable for ₱2,000,000.00 to Muñoz
We rule for Muñoz and deny Loria’s petition for review on certiorari.
I basis or justification. Second, the benefit was derived at another person’s expense or damage.56
Whether Loria initially received 3,000,000.00 is a question of fact not proper in a petition for review on certiorari
We first address Loria’s contention that Muñoz failed to prove his initial receipt of ₱3,000,000.00. This is a question of fact
the trial and appellate courts have already resolved. In a Rule 45 petition, we do not address questions of fact, questions
which require us to ruleon "the truth or falsehood of alleged facts." 48 Under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, we
5
only entertain questions of law — questions as to the applicable law given a set of facts 49 — in a petition for review on
certiorari:
Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court.
A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the
Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file withthe Supreme Court a
verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of lawwhich must be distinctly set forth.
(Emphasis supplied)50
We may review questions of fact in a Rule 45 petition:
. . . (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference made
is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is
based on misappreciation of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings, the same
are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8)
when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) the facts set forth in
the petition as well as in petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by respondent; and (10) the findings of fact are
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record. 51 [Emphases omitted]
Loria failed to convince us why we should make an exception in this case.
During trial, Muñoz testified thathe ordered Allied Bank to release ₱3,000,000.00 from his joint account withChristopher
Co to a certain Grace delos Santos.52 Loria then obtained the money from delos Santos and confirmed with Muñoz his
receipt of the amount.53 ₱1,800,000.00 was subsequently returned to Muñoz, leaving a ₱1,200,000.00 balance with Loria.
This testimony was supported by Exhibit "C," the check voucher where Loria acknowledged receiving ₱1,200,000.00 from
Muñoz.54
We agree that these pieces ofevidence duly prove Loria’s initial receipt of ₱3,000,000.00. We will not disturb this finding.
II
Loria must return Munoz’s ₱2,000,000.00 under the principle of unjust enrichment
Under Article 22 of the Civil Codeof the Philippines, "every person who through an act of performance by another, or any
other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground,
shall return the same to him." There is unjust enrichment "when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another,
or when a person retains money orproperty of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good
conscience."55
The principle of unjust enrichment has two conditions. First, a person must have been benefited without a real or valid
In this case, Loria received ₱2,000,000.00 from Muñoz for a subcontract of a government projectto dredge the Masarawag
and San Francisco Rivers in Guinobatan, Albay. However, contrary to the parties’ agreement, Muñoz was not
subcontracted for the project. Nevertheless, Loria retained the ₱2,000,000.00.
Thus, Loria was unjustly enriched. He retained Muñoz’s money without valid basis or justification. Under Article 22 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, Loria must return the ₱2,000,000.00 to Muñoz.
Contrary to Loria’s claim, Section 6 of the Presidential Decree No. 1594 does not prevent Muñoz from recovering his
money.
Under Section 6 of the Presidential Decree No. 1594,57 a contractor shall not subcontract a part or interestin a government
infrastructure project without the approval of the relevant department secretary:
Section 6. Assignment and Contract.The contractor shall not assign, transfer, pledge, subcontract ormake any other
disposition of the contract or any part or interest therein except with the approval of the Minister of Public Works,
Transportation and Communications, the Minister of Public Highways, or the Minister of Energy, as the case may be.
Approval of the subcontract shall not relieve the main contractor from any liability or obligation under his contract with the
Government nor shall it create any contractual relation between the subcontractor and the Government.
A subcontract, therefore, is void only if not approved by the department secretary.
In this case, it is premature to rule on the legality of the parties’ agreement precisely becausethe subcontract did not push
through. No actual agreement was proven in evidence.The Secretary of Public Works and Highways could have approved
the subcontract, which is allowed under Section 6 of the Presidential Decree No. 1594.
At any rate, even assuming that there was a subcontracting arrangement between Sunwest Construction and
Development Corporation and Muñoz, this court has allowed recovery under a void subcontract as an exception to the in
pari delicto doctrine.
In Gonzalo v. Tarnate, Jr.,58 the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) awarded the contractto Dominador
Gonzalo to improve the Sadsadan-Maba-ay section of the Mountain Province Road. Gonzalo then subcontracted the
supply of materials and labor to John Tarnate, Jr. without the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Highways.
The parties agreed to a total subcontract fee of 12% of the project’s contract price. 59
Tarnate, Jr. also rented equipment to Gonzalo. In a deed of assignment, the parties agreed to a retention fee of 10% of
Gonzalo’s total collection from the Department of Public Works and Highways, or 233,526.13, as rent for the equipment.
They then submitted the deed of assignment to the Department for approval. 60
Subsequently, Tarnate, Jr. learned that Gonzalo filed with the Department of Public Works and Highways an affidavit to
unilaterally cancel the deed of assignment. Gonzalo also collected the retention fee from the Department. 61
Tarnate, Jr. demanded payment for the rent of the equipment, but Gonzalo ignored his demand. He thenfiled a complaint
for sum of money and damages with the Regional Trial Court of Mountain Province to collect on the 10% retention fee.62
In his defense, Gonzalo argued thatthe subcontract was void for being contrary to law, specifically, Section 6 of the
Presidential Decree No. 1594. Since the deed of assignment "was a mere product of the subcontract," 63 the deed of
assignment was likewise void. With Tarnate, Jr. "fully aware of the illegality and ineffectuality of the deed of
assignment,"64 Gonzalo contended that Tarnate, Jr. could not collect on the retention fee under the principle of in pari
delicto.65
This court ruled that the subcontract was void for being contrary to law. Under Section 6 of the Presidential Decree No.
1594, a contractor shall not subcontract the implementation of a government infrastructure project without the approval of
the relevant department secretary.66 Since Gonzalo subcontracted the project to Tarnate, Jr. without the approvalof the
Secretary of Public Works and Highways, the subcontract was void, including the deed of assignment, which "sprung from
the subcontract."67
6
Generally, parties to an illegal contract may not recover what they gave under the contract. 68 Under the doctrine of in pari
delicto, "no action arises, in equity or at law, from anillegal contract[.] No suit can be maintained for its specific
performance, or to recover the property agreed to be sold or delivered, or the money agreed to be paid, or damages for
its violation[.]"69 Nevertheless, this court allowed Tarnate, Jr. to recover 10% of the retention fee. According to this
court,"the application of the doctrine of in pari delictois not always rigid."70 An exception to the doctrine is "when its
application contravenes well-established public policy."71 In Gonzalo, this court ruled that "the prevention of unjust
enrichment is a recognized public policy of the State."72 It is, therefore, an exception to the application of the in pari delicto
doctrine. This court explained:
. . . the application of the doctrine of in pari delicto is not always rigid.1âwphi1 An accepted exception arises when its
application contravenes wellestablished public policy. In this jurisdiction, public policy has been defined as "that principle
of the law which holds that no subject or citizen can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public or
against the public good."
Unjust enrichment exists, according to Hulst v. PR Builders, Inc., "when a person unjustly retains a benefit at the loss of
another, or when a person retains money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and
good conscience." The prevention of unjust enrichment is a recognized public policy of the State, for Article 22 of the Civil
Code explicitly provides that "[e]veryperson who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires
or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to
him." It is well to note that Article 22 "is part of the chapter of the Civil Code on Human Relations, the provisions of which
were formulated as basic principles to be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the stability
of the social order; designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain of good conscience;guides for human
conduct that should run as golden threads through society to the end that law may approach its supreme ideal which is
the sway and dominance of justice."73 (Citations omitted)
Given that Tarnate, Jr. performed his obligations under the subcontract and the deed of assignment, this court ruled that
he was entitled to the agreed fee. According to this court, Gonzalo "would be unjustly enriched at the expense of Tarnate
if the latter was tobe barred from recovering because of the rigid application of the doctrine of in pari delicto." 74
In this case, both the trial and appellate courts found that Loria received ₱2,000,000.00 from Muñoz for a subcontract of
the river-dredging project. Loria never denied that hefailed to fulfill his agreement with Muñoz. Throughout the case’s
proceedings, Loria failed to justify why he has the right to retain Muñoz’s ₱2,000,000.00. As the Court of Appeals ruled,
"it was not shown that [Muñoz] benefited from the delivery of the amount of ₱2,000,000.00 to [Loria]." 75
Loria, therefore, is retaining the ₱2,000,000.00 without just or legal ground. This cannot be done. Under Article 22 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, he must return the ₱2,000,000.00 to Muñoz.
This court notes the possible irregularities in these transactions. At the very least, there appears to have been an attempt
to circumvent our procurement laws. If petitioner indeed had the authority of Sunwest Construction and Development
Corporation, it is strange that Loria could have guaranteed a bidding result. If he did not have any true dealing with
Sunwest Construction, then his is an elaborate scheme to cause financiers to lose their hard-earned money for nothing.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Court of Appeals' decision and resolution in CA-GR.
CV No. 81882 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to interest rate. Petitioner Carlos A. Loria shall pay respondent
Ludolfo P. Mufioi, Jr. ₱2,000,000.00 in actual damages, with interest of 12% interest per annum from the filing of the
complaint until June 30, 2013, and 6% interest per annum from July 1, 2013 until full payment. 76
Let a copy of this decision be SERVED on the Office of the Ombudsman and the Department of Justice for their appropriate
actions.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 195549 September 3, 2014
WILLAWARE PRODUCTS CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
JESICHRIS MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the
Decision1 dated November 24, 2010 and Resolution2 dated February 10, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CV No. 86744.
The facts, as found by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), are as follows:
[Respondent] Jesichris Manufacturing Company ([respondent] for short) filed this present complaint for damages for unfair
competition with prayer for permanent injunction to enjoin [petitioner] Willaware Products Corporation ([petitioner] for
short) from manufacturing and distributing plastic-made automotive parts similar to those of [respondent].
[Respondent] alleged that it is a duly registeredpartnership engaged in the manufacture and distribution of plastic and
metal products, with principal office at No. 100 Mithi Street, Sampalukan, Caloocan City. Since its registration in 1992,
[respondent] has been manufacturing in its Caloocan plant and distributing throughout the Philippines plastic-made
automotive parts. [Petitioner], on the other hand, which is engaged in the manufacture and distribution of kitchenware
items made of plastic and metal has its office near that of [respondent]. [Respondent] further alleged that in view of the
physical proximity of [petitioner’s] office to [respondent’s] office, and in view of the fact that some of the [respondent’s]
employeeshad transferred to [petitioner], [petitioner] had developed familiarity with [respondent’s] products, especially its
plastic-made automotive parts.
That sometime in November 2000, [respondent] discovered that [petitioner] had been manufacturing and distributing the
same automotive parts with exactly similar design, same material and colors but was selling these products at a lower
price as [respondent’s] plastic-made automotive parts and to the same customers.
[Respondent] alleged that it had originated the use of plastic in place of rubber in the manufacture ofautomotive
underchassis parts such as spring eye bushing, stabilizer bushing, shock absorberbushing, center bearing cushions,
among others. [Petitioner’s] manufacture of the same automotive parts with plastic materialwas taken from [respondent’s]
idea of using plastic for automotive parts. Also, [petitioner] deliberately copied [respondent’s] products all of which acts
constitute unfair competition, is and are contrary to law, morals, good customs and public policy and have caused
[respondent] damages in terms oflost and unrealizedprofits in the amount of TWO MILLION PESOS as of the date of
[respondent’s] complaint.
Furthermore, [petitioner’s] tortuous conduct compelled [respondent] to institute this action and thereby to incur expenses
in the way of attorney’s fees and other litigation expenses in the amount of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(₱500,000.00).
In its Answer, [petitioner] denies all the allegations of the [respondent] except for the following facts: that it is engaged in
the manufacture and distribution of kitchenware items made of plastic and metal and that there’s physical proximity of
[petitioner’s] office to [respondent]’s office, and that someof [respondent’s] employees had transferred to [petitioner] and
that over the years [petitioner] had developed familiarity with [respondent’s] products, especially its plastic made
automotive parts.
7
As its Affirmative Defenses, [petitioner] claims that there can be no unfair competition as the plastic-made automotive
parts are mere reproductions of original parts and their construction and composition merely conforms to the
specificationsof the original parts of motor vehicles they intend to replace. Thus, [respondent] cannot claim that it
"originated" the use of plastic for these automotive parts. Even assuming for the sake of argument that [respondent] indeed
originated the use of these plastic automotive parts, it still has no exclusive right to use, manufacture and sell these as it
has no patent over these products. Furthermore, [respondent] is not the only exclusive manufacturer of these plastic-
made automotive parts as there are other establishments which were already openly selling them to the public.3
After trial on the merits, the RTC ruled in favor of respondent. It ruled that petitioner clearly invaded the rights or interest
of respondent by deliberately copying and performing acts amounting to unfair competition. The RTC further opined that
under the circumstances, in order for respondent’s property rights to be preserved, petitioner’s acts of manufacturing
similar plastic-made automotive parts such as those of respondent’s and the selling of the sameproducts to respondent’s
customers, which it cultivated over the years, will have to be enjoined. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds the defendant liable to plaintiff Two Million (₱2,000,000.00) Pesos,
as actual damages, One Hundred Thousand (₱100,000.00) Pesos as attorney’s fees and One Hundred Thousand
(₱100,000.00) Pesos for exemplary damages. The court hereby permanently [enjoins] defendant from manufacturing the
plastic-made automotive parts as those manufactured by plaintiffs.
SO ORDERED.4
Thus, petitioner appealed to the CA.
On appeal, petitioner asserts that ifthere is no intellectual property protecting a good belonging to another,the copying
thereof for production and selling does not add up to unfair competition as competition is promoted by law to benefit
consumers. Petitioner further contends that it did not lure away respondent’s employees to get trade secrets. It points out
that the plastic spare parts sold by respondent are traded in the market and the copying of these can be done by
simplybuying a sample for a mold to be made.
Conversely, respondent averred that copyright and patent registrations are immaterial for an unfair competition case to
prosper under Article 28 of the Civil Code. It stresses that the characteristics of unfair competition are present in the instant
case as the parties are trade rivals and petitioner’s acts are contrary to good conscience for deliberately copying its
products and employing its former employees.
In a Decision dated November 24,2010, the CA affirmed with modification the ruling of the RTC. Relevant portions of said
decision read:
Despite the evidence showing thatWillaware took dishonest steps in advancing its business interest against Jesichris,
however, the Court finds no basis for the award by the RTC of actual damages. One is entitled to actual damages as one
has duly proven. The testimony of Quejada, who was engaged by Jesichris in 2001 to audit its business, only revealed
that there was a discrepancy between the sales of Jesichris from 2001 to 2002. No amount was mentioned. As for Exhibit
"Q," which is a copy of the comparative income statement of Jesichris for 1999-2002, it shows the decline of the sales in
2002 in comparison with those made in 2001 but it does not disclose if this pertains to the subject automotive parts or to
the other products of Jesichris like plates.
In any event, it was clearly shown that there was unfair competition on the part of Willaware that prejudiced Jesichris. It is
only proper that nominal damages be awarded in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱200,000.00) in order to
recognize and vindicate Jesichris’ rights. The RTC’s award of attorney’s fees and exemplary damages is also maintained.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated April 15, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City,
Branch 131, in Civil Case No. C-19771 is hereby MODIFIED. The award of Two Million Pesos (₱2,000,000.00) actual
damages is deleted and in its place, Two Hundred Thousand Pesos nominal damages is awarded.
SO ORDERED.5
Dissatisfied, petitioner moved for reconsideration. However, the same was denied for lack of merit by the CA in a
Resolution dated February 10, 2011.
Hence, the present Petition for Review wherein petitioner raises the following issues for our resolution:
(1) Whether or not there is unfair competition under human relations when the parties are not competitors and
there is actually no damage on the part of Jesichris?
(2) Consequently, if there is no unfair competition, should there be moral damages and attorney’s fees?
(3) Whether or not the addition of nominal damages is proper although no rights have been established?
(4) If ever the right of Jesichris refersto its copyright on automotive parts, should it be considered in the light of
the said copyrights were considered to be void by no less than this Honorable Court in SC GR No. 161295?
(5) If the right involved is "goodwill" then the issue is: whether or not Jesichris has established "goodwill?"6
In essence, the issue for our resolution is: whether or not petitioner committed acts amounting to unfair competition under
Article 28 of the Civil Code.
Prefatorily, we would like to stress that the instant case falls under Article 28 of the Civil Code on humanrelations, and not
unfair competition under Republic Act No. 8293,7 as the present suit is a damage suit and the products are not covered
by patent registration. A fortiori, the existence of patent registration is immaterial in the present case.
The concept of "unfair competition"under Article 28 is very much broader than that covered by intellectual property laws.
Under the present article, which follows the extended concept of "unfair competition" in American jurisdictions, the term
coverseven cases of discovery of trade secrets of a competitor, bribery of his employees, misrepresentation of all kinds,
interference with the fulfillment of a competitor’s contracts, or any malicious interference with the latter’s business. 8
With that settled, we now come to the issue of whether or not petitioner committed acts amounting tounfair competition
under Article 28 of the Civil Code.
We find the petition bereft of merit.
Article 28 of the Civil Code provides that "unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial enterprises or in labor
through the use of force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or high-handed method shall
give rise to a right of action by the person who thereby suffers damage."
From the foregoing, it is clear thatwhat is being sought to be prevented is not competitionper sebut the use of unjust,
oppressive or high- handed methods which may deprive others of a fair chance to engage in business or to earn a living.
Plainly,what the law prohibits is unfair competition and not competition where the means usedare fair and legitimate.
8
In order to qualify the competition as "unfair," it must have two characteristics: (1) it must involve an injury to a competitor
or trade rival, and (2) it must involve acts which are characterized as "contrary to good conscience," or "shocking to judicial
sensibilities," or otherwise unlawful; in the language of our law, these include force, intimidation, deceit, machination or
any other unjust, oppressive or high-handed method. The public injury or interest is a minor factor; the essence of the
matter appears to be a private wrong perpetrated by unconscionable means. 9
Here, both characteristics are present.
First, both parties are competitors or trade rivals, both being engaged in the manufacture of plastic-made automotive
parts. Second, the acts of the petitioner were clearly "contrary to good conscience" as petitioner admitted having employed
respondent’s formeremployees, deliberately copied respondent’s products and even went to the extent of selling these
products to respondent’s customers.10
To bolster this point, the CA correctly pointed out that petitioner’s hiring of the former employees of respondent and
petitioner’s act of copying the subject plastic parts of respondent were tantamount to unfair competition, viz.:
The testimonies of the witnesses indicate that [petitioner] was in bad faith in competing with the business of
[respondent].1âwphi1 [Petitioner’s] acts can be characterized as executed with mischievous subtle calculation. To
illustrate, in addition to the findings of the RTC, the Court observes that [petitioner] is engaged in the production of plastic
kitchenware previous to its manufacturing of plasticautomotive spare parts, it engaged the services of the then mold setter
and maintenance operator of [respondent], De Guzman, while he was employed by the latter. De Guzman was hired by
[petitioner] in order to adjust its machinery since quality plastic automotive spare parts were not being made. It baffles the
Court why [petitioner] cannot rely onits own mold setter and maintenance operator to remedy its problem. [Petitioner’s]
engagement of De Guzman indicates that it is banking on his experience gained from working for [respondent].
Another point we observe is that Yabut, who used to be a warehouse and delivery man of [respondent], was fired because
he was blamed of spying in favor of [petitioner]. Despite this accusation, he did not get angry. Later on, he applied for and
was hired by [petitioner] for the same position he occupied with [respondent]. These sequence of events relating to his
employment by [petitioner] is suspect too like the situation with De Guzman. 11
Thus, it is evident that petitioner isengaged in unfair competition as shown by his act of suddenly shifting his business
from manufacturing kitchenware to plastic-made automotive parts; his luring the employees of the respondent to transfer
to his employ and trying to discover the trade secrets of the respondent.12
Moreover, when a person starts an opposing place of business, not for the sake of profit to himself, but regardless of loss
and for the sole purpose of driving his competitor out of business so that later on he can take advantage of the effects of
his malevolent purpose, he is guilty of wanton wrong.13 As aptly observed by the courta quo, the testimony of petitioner’s
witnesses indicate that it acted in bad faith in competing with the business of respondent, to wit: [Petitioner], thru its
General Manager, William Salinas, Jr., admitted that it was never engaged in the business of plastic-made automotive
parts until recently, year 2000:
Atty. Bautista: The business name of Willaware Product Corporation is kitchenware, it is (sic) not? Manufacturer of
kitchenware and distributor ofkitchenware, is it not? Mr. Salinas: Yes, sir. Atty. Bautista: And you said you have known
the [respondent] Jesichris Manufacturing Co., you have known it to be manufacturing plastic automotive products, is it
not? Mr. Salinas: Yes, sir. Atty. Bautista: In fact, you have been (sic) physically become familiar with these products,
plastic automotive products of Jesichris? Mr. Salinas: Yes, sir.
How [petitioner] was able to manufacture the same products, in terms of color, size, shape and composition as those sold
by Jesichris was due largely to the sudden transfer ofJesichris’ employees to Willaware.
Atty. Bautista: Since when have you been familiar with Jesichris Manufacturing Company? A: I know one Jun Molina, sir.

Mr. Salinas: Since they transferred there (sic) our place. Q: And who else was there?

Atty. Bautista: And that was in what year? Mr. Salinas: Maybe four (4) years. I don’t know the exact date. A: William Salinas, sir.

Atty. Bautista: And some of the employees of Jesichris Manufacturing Co. have transferred to your company, is it not? Q: And will you kindly inform us what happened when you spotted upon them drinking?

Mr. Salinas: Yes, sir. A: Jun Molina called me, sir.

Atty. Bautista: How many, more or less? Q: And what happened after that?

Mr. Salinas: More or less, three (3). A: At that time, he offered mea glass of wine and before I was able to drink the wine, Mr. Salinas uttered something, sir.

Atty. Bautista: And when, in what year or month did they transfer to you? Q: And what were those words uttered by Mr. Salinas to you?

Mr. Salinas: First, November 1. A: "O, ano naapektuhan na kayo sa ginaya (sic) ko sa inyo?"

Atty. Bautista: Year 2000? Q: And what did you do after that, after hearing those words?

Mr. Salinas: Yes sir. And then the other maybe February, this year. And the other one, just one month ago. A: And he added these words, sir. "sabihin mo sa amo mo, dalawang taon na lang pababagsakin ko na siya."

That [petitioner] was clearly outto take [respondent] out of business was buttressed by the testimony of [petitioner’s] Q: Alright, hearing those words, will you kindly tell this court whom did you gather to be referred to as your "amo"?
witness, Joel Torres:
A: Mr. Jessie Ching, sir.14
Q: Are you familiar with the [petitioner], Willaware Product Corporation?
In sum, petitioner is guilty of unfair competition under Article 28 of the Civil Code.
A: Yes, sir.
However, since the award of Two Million Pesos (₱2,000,000.00) in actual damages had been deleted and in its place Two
Q: Will you kindly inform this court where is the office of this Willaware Product Corporation (sic)? Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱200,000.00) in nominal damages is awarded, the attorney's fees should concomitantly be
modified and lowered to Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00).
A: At Mithi Street, Caloocan City, sir.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November 24, 2010 and Resolution dated February
10, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86744 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the award
Q: And Mr. Witness, sometime second Saturday of January 2001, will you kindly inform this court what unusual even (sic)
of attorney's fees be lowered to Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00).
transpired between you and Mr. Salinas on said date?

SO ORDERED.
A: There was, sir.

G.R. Nos. 159561-62 October 3, 2012

Q: What is that?

R.V. SANTOS COMPANY, INC., Petitioner,

A: Sir, I was walking at that time together with my wife going to the market and then I passed by the place where they
vs.
were having a drinking spree, sir.
BELLE CORPORATION, Respondent.

Q: You mentioned they, who were they who were drinking at that time?
DECISION

9
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
For disposition of the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, assailing the Court of Appeals' Decision1 dated March 7,
2003 and Resolution2 dated August 20, 2003 in the consolidated cases docketed as CA-G.R. SP Nos. 60217 and 60224.
In its Decision dated March 7, 2003, the Court of Appeals affirmed the July 28, 2000 Decision3 in CIAC Case No. 45-99
of the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC), which, among others, (a) ordered RV Santos Company, Inc.
(RVSCI) to refund the amount of P4,940,108.58 to Belle Corporation (Belle), and (b) denied Belle’s claim for liquidated
damages and RVSCI’s counterclaims for unpaid billings and attorney’s fees. In the assailed August 20, 2003 Resolution,
the Court of Appeals denied the parties’ respective motions for reconsideration of its March 7, 2003 Decision.
On August 10, 1998, RVSCI submitted its Progress Billing12 to Belle, claiming 53.3% accomplishment of the project,
including the work done for Additional Order No. 1, as set forth above. RVSCI claimed that the value of the work
accomplished under the August 10, 1998 Progress Billing was P7,159,216.63 on the main project and P1,768,000.00 on
the additional work order. After deducting 50% of the Progress Billing on the main project, the total amount billed by RVSCI
was P5,347,608.03. Purportedly relying on RVSCI’s representations, Belle’s project engineer recommended approval of
the Progress Billing.
Subsequently, however, Belle reputedly made its own assessment of the work accomplished by RVSCI and determined
that it was only worth P4,676,724.64. Belle supposedly relayed its findings to RVSCI. 13

The present controversy arose from a Request for Adjudication4 filed by Belle with the CIAC on November 3, 1999.
According to the Complaint5 attached to said Request, Belle and RVSCI entered into a Construction Contract on July 14,
1997. As stipulated therein, RVSCI undertook to construct a detailed underground electrical network for Belle’s Tagaytay
Woodlands Condominium Project located in Tagaytay City6 with a project cost that shall not be more than Twenty-Two
Million Pesos (P22,000,000.00), inclusive of all taxes, government fees and the service fee under the Contract. 7 Likewise
under said contract, Belle advanced to RVSCI fifty percent (50%) of the contract price in the amount of Eleven Million
Pesos (P11,000,000.00)8 for which RVSCI issued to Belle an official receipt9 dated August 8, 1997.
On September 30, 1998, while negotiations were allegedly on-going between the parties regarding the payment of the
Progress Billing, Belle claimed that RVSCI unceremoniously abandoned the project without prior notice and forced Belle
to take over the construction work therein. Belle purportedly sent a Memorandum 14 dated December 15, 1998 to RVSCI
to convey its "extreme disappointment" over the latter’s abandonment of the project.
On January 11, 1999, the parties’ representatives met and during that meeting RVSCI allegedly advised Belle that it will
not return to the site until the outstanding balance due to it is paid.15

Some time thereafter, RVSCI commenced work on the project. Under Article VII(A) of the Construction Contract, the
Meanwhile, on January 22, 1999, Belle made an additional payment for electrical works to RVSCI in the amount of
project was supposed to be completed and ready for operation within 180 calendar days from receipt by RVSCI of the
P476,503.30. This payment was evidenced by an official receipt16 issued by RVSCI. Belle likewise remitted the amount of
notice to commence from Belle, provided that all civil related works necessary for the execution of the project works were
P122,491.14 to the Bureau of Internal Revenue representing the withholding tax due from RVSCI.
in place. However, the project was allegedly not completed within the stipulated time frame.

In February 1999, Belle engaged the services of an assessor, R.A. Mojica and Partners (R.A. Mojica), to determine the
On March 17, 1998, Belle’s Woodlands General Committee supposedly set April 21, 1998 as the target date for completion
value of the work done by RVSCI. After it conducted an electrical works audit, R.A. Mojica reported to Belle that the work
of the Log Home Units in Woodlands. In a Memorandum 10 dated April 14, 1998, Belle purportedly informed RVSCI of the
accomplished by RVSCI on the main project only amounted to P4,868,443.59 and not P7,159,216.05 as billed by RVSCI.17
target date and urged the latter to complete the project on or before said deadline. Still the project was not completed on
April 21, 1998.
In Belle’s view, it had overpaid RVSCI, based on the following computation:
Subsequently, in June 1998, Belle placed additional work orders with RVSCI, who in turn made the following cost
estimates for the additional work:
Downpayment P11,000,000.00
Withholding Tax Payable 122,491.14
Additional Order No. 1 P3,854,400.00
Additional Payment for electrical works
Installation of 7 units of Load break
switch, 102 units of kw-hrs. meters (Billing #01) 476,503.33
and fabrication of 21 sets of Bus ducts
===============
Additional Order No. 2 541,528.54 P11,598,994.44

Supply and installation of one (1) unit

MDP-DTIA LESS:
Additional Order No. 3 158,612.00
Various work orders issued to RVSCI ---------------------- Actual Value of Work Accomplished 4,868,443.59

P4,554,540.5411 Approved Change of Specifications and

Additional Work Orders 1,790,442.70
Belle admittedly approved RVSCI’s cost estimates for Additional Order Nos. 1 and 2 but the former allegedly did not -------------------
approve the cost estimate for Additional Order No. 3 which Belle estimated should only cost P22,442.47. Nonetheless, NET DUE TO BELLE P 4,940,108.15 18

RVSCI proceeded to implement Additional Order Nos. 1 and 3 while Belle itself accomplished Additional Order No. 2.

10
RVSCI allegedly refused to return the excess payment despite repeated demands. Thus, relying on the arbitration clause 3. Article IV, Section 4.2 of the Construction Contract which provide (sic) that the "Contractor RVSCI guarantees
in the Construction Contract, Belle brought the matter before the CIAC and prayed that RVSCI be directed to (a) reimburse and warrants that the total project cost shall not be more than P22,000,000.00, inclusive of all taxes and
Belle the amount of P4,940,108.15, and (b) pay Belle the amount of P2,200,000.00 as liquidated damages.19 government fees and the service fee under the Contract."

By way of defense, RVSCI claimed that its August 10, 1998 Progress Billing was a result of a "bilateral assessment" by
the representatives of both parties and was, in fact, approved/recommended for payment by Belle’s representatives.
RVSCI complained that Belle segregated the project into two phases (Phase 1 and Phase 2) with Phase 1 comprising the
area already worked on by RVSCI and Phase 2 comprising the "unworked" area. It was Belle which advised RVSCI in a
meeting on January 11, 1999 that the former was suspending Phase 2 of the project due to economic difficulties. RVSCI
allegedly made several demands for payment of its Progress Billing but Belle ignored said demands. Thus, in view of
Belle’s suspension of the work and the nonpayment of the progress billing, RVSCI was purportedly forced to stop work on
the project, despite being fully prepared to comply with its obligations under the contract. RVSCI further asserted that it
was not notified of, nor made privy to, the audit work conducted by R.A. Mojica and therefore RVSCI was not bound by
such audit. Insisting on the accuracy of its Progress Billing, RVSCI interposed a counterclaim against Belle for the payment
of the amount of P4,312,170.95, computed thus:
4. Sec. 6.2(a), Art. VI of the Construction Contract which provides that: "Owner Belle shall advance to Contractor
an amount equivalent to 50% of the Contract Price or the amount of P11,000,000.00, as down payment for the
construction, upon execution of the Contract, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged by Contractor. Progress
payments to be made by Owner to Contractor, proportionate to the percentage of accomplishment of the Project,
shall be deducted from the balance of the Contract Price. The same proportion of the down payment shall also
be deducted from billing progress payments."
5. The payment made by Claimant to Respondent in the amount of P11,000,000.00 as acknowledged to have
been received under Official Receipt No. 0706 issued by the latter on 8 August 1997 (attached as Annex B of
the Complaint).

6. The following proposed cost estimate of the Respondent on Claimant’s additional work orders in June 1998:
Progress Billing P 7,159,216.05
Remaining MDPs for delivery Additional Order No. 1 Installation of 7 units of Load break
Under original contract (11 sets @ switch, 102 units of kw-hrs. meters and
P327,128.54) P 3,598,413.94 fabrication of 21 sets of Bus ducts. P3,854,400.00
Approved Change of Additional Order No. 2 Supply and installation of one (1) unit
Specifications and Additional MDP-DTIA 541,528.54
Work Order/s (dated August 10, 1998
and September 30, 1998) P 4,554,540.95 Additional Order No. 3 Various work orders issued to RVSCI 158,612.00
P --------------------
Total
15,312,170.95 P4,554,540.54
=============
P
Less: Advance Payment
11,000,000.00
Net Due to RVSCI P 4,312,170.95 20 7. Claimant approved Respondent’s proposed estimates on Additional Orders Nos. 1 and 2, but disputed the
cost estimate of Additional Order No. 3. Thereafter, Respondent proceeded to implement additional Orders Nos.
1 and 3.
RVSCI prayed for the dismissal of the Complaint and for the CIAC to order Belle to pay the following amounts: (a)
P4,312,170.95 as balance of RVSCI’s progress billing(s), (b) P500,000.00 as moral damages, and (c) P500,000.00 as 8. Progress Billing No. 1 (attached as Annex D of the Complaint) which Claimant received on 10 August 1998.
attorney’s fees and costs of suit.21
9. On 11 January 1999, the parties’ representatives met to discuss the reasons for Respondent’s failure/refusal
At the preliminary conference, the parties agreed on the Terms of Reference for the arbitration of their respective claims. to return to the Site. These representatives were Fernando R. Santico, Edgardo F. Villarino & Rudy P. Aninipot,
According to the Terms of Reference, the admitted facts and the issues to be resolved by the arbitration panel were as for the Claimant, and Renato V. Santos & Joey C. Caldeo, for the Respondent.
follows:
10. Claimant made additional payment to Respondent for electrical works on 22 January 1999 amounting to
II. ADMITTED FACTS P476,503.30 as per Official Receipt No. 0717 issued by Respondent (attached as Annex G of the Complaint).

The parties admit the following: 11. Existence of Respondent’s letter to Claimant dated 4 May 1999 re: Underground Electrical Utilities (attached
as Annex A of the Reply).
1. Their respective identity/juridical existence and circumstances.
xxxx
2. The genuineness and due execution of the Contract (attached as Annex A of the Complaint) for the
construction of a detailed underground electrical network for the Tagaytay Woodlands Condominium Project in IV. ISSUES TO BE DETERMINED
Tagaytay City entered into by the parties on 14 July 1997 for a contract price of P22,000,000.00.
11
 1. Is Claimant entitled to its claims for overpayment? If so, how much should be returned to the Claimant?
1.1 How much was the work accomplished by Respondent in the project?
1.2 Whether or not Respondent has manufactured/produced and/or installed 11 sets of Main
Distribution Panels? If so, is Claimant liable and for how much should it be liable to pay Respondent
for their cost/value?
1.3 Whether or not Respondent is entitled to its claim for unpaid billings?
2. Is Claimant entitled to its claim for liquidated damages? If so, how much by way of liquidated damages should
be awarded to it?
2.1 Was Respondent justified in suspending its work?
2.2 Is Respondent justified in declining to return to work?
3. Is Respondent entitled to its counterclaim for attorney’s fees? If so, how much is Claimant liable to
Respondent for such claim?22
The Terms of Reference further indicated the parties’ agreement that the presentation of their testimonial evidence shall
be by way of affidavits of witnesses. Hearings were held on March 24 and 28, 2000. Thereafter, the parties submitted their
draft Decisions to the arbitral tribunal.
In a Decision dated July 28, 2000, the CIAC found that, under the Construction Contract 23 and industry practice, Belle had
the right to the true value of the work performed by RVSCI upon termination. Further, the CIAC ruled that according to the
Uniform General Conditions of Contract for Private Construction (CIAP Document 102), approval of a progress billing is
provisional24 and is subject to final review and approval before acceptance of the completed work and prior to final
payment.25 Hence, Belle was within its rights to make a reevaluation of the work accomplishment of RVSCI. Finding that
Engr. Raladin A. Mojica qualified as an expert witness, the CIAC gave weight to the results of the re-survey done by R.A.
Mojica and held that Belle indeed made an overpayment to RVSCI. Since the date when RVSCI commenced work on the
Project and the supposed completion date cannot be determined, the CIAC found no basis to award liquidated damages
in favor of Belle. The arbitral tribunal likewise denied RVSCI’s counterclaims. Thus, the dispositive portion of the CIAC
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, award is hereby made as follows:
1. Claimant’s Belle’s claim for refund of P4,940,108.58, representing overpayment to the Respondent is hereby
granted. Respondent is, therefore, ordered to pay this amount to Claimant with interest at the rate of 6% per
annum from the date of this Award.
2. Claimant’s claim for liquidated damages and Respondent’s counterclaims for an alleged balance due and
unpaid on progress billings and for attorney’s fees are denied.
3. Arbitration fees and expenses shall be shared by the parties pro rata on the basis of the amount of their
claims and counterclaims.
12
4. The amount of P4,940,108.58 found in paragraph 1 of this Award to be due the Claimant plus interest at 6%
per annum shall further earn interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the time this decision becomes final
and executory and the total amount found to be due remains unpaid. 26
Both Belle and RVSCI filed petitions for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court to assail the foregoing CIAC Decision
with the Court of Appeals, which were docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 60217 and CA-G.R. SP No. 60224, respectively.
Upon motion by the parties, the cases were consolidated and after due proceedings, the Court of Appeals issued a
Decision dated March 7, 2003, dismissing the petitions and affirming the CIAC Decision. The separate motions for
reconsideration of the parties were likewise denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated August 20, 2003.
RVSCI elevated the matter to this Court and questioned the Court of Appeals’ March 7, 2003 Decision and August 20,
2003 Resolution through the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. The grounds relied upon by RVSCI
were:
I. THE APPELLATE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE SURVEYOR’S ELECTRICAL WORK
AUDIT WAS COMPETENT AND MUST BE GIVEN WEIGHT.
II. THE APPELLATE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT BELLE MAY WITHDRAW ITS APPROVAL
OF THE PROGRESS BILLING PURSUANT TO ARTICLES VI(2)(C) AND XIII(4) OF THE CONTRACT.
III. THE APPELLATE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT RVSCI IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN AWARD
FOR DAMAGES.27
Anent the first ground, RVSCI argued that R.A. Mojica’s electrical work audit that was unilaterally commissioned by Belle
was not binding on the former since (a) it was not authorized by the Contract and was done without the consent or
participation of RVSCI; (b) assuming that the Contract allowed Belle to commission such audit, it was incomplete as it
failed to cover the entire work performed by RVSCI as shown by its Progress Billing and Bill of Quantities, allegedly
approved by Belle; and (c) the audit was tainted by obvious partiality since R.A. Mojica was a regular contractor of Belle
and a competitor of RVSCI.
With respect to the second ground, it is RVSCI’s contention that Article VI, Section 6.2(c) of the Construction Contract
merely differentiate acceptance by Belle of RVSCI’s work accomplishment from time to time from Belle’s final acceptance
of work upon completion of the entire project. Also RVSCI claims that Article XIII, Section 13.4 only allows Belle to
determine the true value of the works in cases of termination of the Contract upon occurrence of any of the events of
default enumerated under Article XIII, Section 13.1 and said provision has no application in instances of justified
suspension of works due to Belle’s breach of the Contract. In any event, it is RVSCI’s view that neither Article VI, Section
6.2(c) nor Article XIII, Section 13.4 allows Belle to withdraw its previous approval of RVSCI’s Progress Billing, contrary to
the rulings of both the CIAC and the Court of Appeals. Assuming without conceding that Article XIII, Section 13.4 of the
Contract applies in this instance, RVSCI believes that the final determination of the value of the works should be made by
(a) both parties or (b) an independent third party mutually commissioned by them.
As for the last ground, RVSCI asserts that the CIAC and the Court of Appeals erred in denying RVSCI’s claim for damages
in view of Belle’s breach of the Contract by its unjustified refusal or failure to pay the Progress Billing.
On the other hand, Belle claims that the Petition should be dismissed for raising questions of fact, which are improper in
a petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, without showing that this case fell under the recognized exceptions under
jurisprudence. On the merits of the Petition, Belle argued that it had the right to determine the true value of work done and
nothing in the Contract limited that right. According to Belle, the CIAC and the Court of Appeals properly relied on Article
VI, Section 6.2(c) and Article XIII, 13.4 of the Contract and on industry practice in upholding Belle’s right for a re-evaluation
of RVSCI’s actual work accomplishment. Thus, the CIAC and the appellate court allegedly were correct in giving weight
to the electrical audit report made by R.A. Mojica. Belle further propounds that the lower tribunals correctly did not grant
RVSCI any award for damages considering that RVSCI did not prove such damages as it had, in fact, been overpaid. As
for RVSCI’s claim for the value of materials and equipment purportedly left at the site, the same was not included in the
Terms of Reference and RVSCI was not allowed by the CIAC to present evidence on the same. Thus, this matter cannot
be raised for the first time on appeal.
After a thorough review of the issues raised by the parties, the Court finds no merit in the Petition.
On the procedural issue:
It must be stressed that in petitions for review under Rule 45 only questions of law may be raised, unless the petitioner
shows that the case falls under the recognized exceptions. In Makati Sports Club, Inc. v. Cheng, 28 we explained, thus:
At the outset, we note that this recourse is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Under
Section 1 of the Rule, such a petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly alleged in the appropriate
pleading. In a case involving a question of law, the resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides for a
given set of facts drawn from the evidence presented. Stated differently, there should be nothing in dispute as to the state
of facts; the issue to be resolved is merely the correctness of the conclusion drawn from the said facts. Once it is clear
that the issue invites a review of the probative value of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact. If the
query requires a reevaluation of the credibility of witnesses, or the existence or relevance of surrounding circumstances
and their relation to each other, then the issue is necessarily factual.29(Emphases supplied, citation omitted.)
In cases decided by the CIAC, the above rule finds even more stringent application. As we previously observed in one
case:
Executive Order No. 1008, as amended, provides, in its Section 19, as follows:
"Sec. 19. Finality of Awards. — The arbitral award shall be binding upon the parties. It shall be final and inappealable
except on questions of law which shall be appealable to the Supreme Court."
Section 19 makes it crystal clear that questions of fact cannot be raised in proceedings before the Supreme Court - which
is not a trier of facts - in respect of an arbitral award rendered under the aegis of the CIAC. Consideration of the animating
purpose of voluntary arbitration in general, and arbitration under the aegis of the CIAC in particular, requires us to apply
rigorously the above principle embodied in Section 19 that the Arbitral Tribunal’s findings of fact shall be final and
unappealable.
xxxx
Aware of the objective of voluntary arbitration in the labor field, in the construction industry, and in any other area for that
matter, the Court will not assist one or the other or even both parties in any effort to subvert or defeat that objective for
their private purposes. The Court will not review the factual findings of an arbitral tribunal upon the artful allegation that
such body had "misapprehended the facts" and will not pass upon issues which are, at bottom, issues of fact, no matter
how cleverly disguised they might be as "legal questions." The parties here had recourse to arbitration and chose the
arbitrators themselves; they must have had confidence in such arbitrators. The Court will not, therefore, permit the parties
to relitigate before it the issues of facts previously presented and argued before the Arbitral Tribunal, save only where a
very clear showing is made that, in reaching its factual conclusions, the Arbitral Tribunal committed an error so egregious
and hurtful to one party as to constitute a grave abuse of discretion resulting in lack or loss of jurisdiction. Prototypical
examples would be factual conclusions of the Tribunal which resulted in deprivation of one or the other party of a fair
opportunity to present its position before the Arbitral Tribunal, and an award obtained through fraud or the corruption of
arbitrators. Any other, more relaxed, rule would result in setting at naught the basic objective of a voluntary arbitration and
would reduce arbitration to a largely inutile institution.30 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted.)
13
In another case, we have also held that:
It is settled that findings of fact of quasi-judicial bodies, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined
to specific matters, are generally accorded not only respect, but also finality, especially when affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. In particular, factual findings of construction arbitrators are final and conclusive and not reviewable by this Court
on appeal.
This rule, however, admits of certain exceptions. In Uniwide Sales Realty and Resources Corporation v. Titan-Ikeda
Construction and Development Corporation, we said:
In David v. Construction Industry and Arbitration Commission, we ruled that, as exceptions, factual findings of construction
arbitrators may be reviewed by this Court when the petitioner proves affirmatively that: (1) the award was procured by
corruption, fraud or other undue means;
(2) there was evident partiality or corruption of the arbitrators or any of them; (3) the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct
in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; (4) one or more of the arbitrators were disqualified
to act as such under Section nine of Republic Act No. 876 and willfully refrained from disclosing such disqualifications or
of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been materially prejudiced; or (5) the arbitrators exceeded
their powers, or so imperfectly executed them, that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted
to them was not made.
Other recognized exceptions are as follows: (1) when there is a very clear showing of grave abuse of discretion resulting
in lack or loss of jurisdiction as when a party was deprived of a fair opportunity to present its position before the Arbitral
Tribunal or when an award is obtained through fraud or the corruption of arbitrators, (2) when the findings of the Court of
Appeals are contrary to those of the CIAC, and (3) when a party is deprived of administrative due process. 31 (Citations
omitted.)
In the case at bar, petitioner indeed raises factual matters in the present controversy which this Court may not look into
under a petition for review on certiorari. We likewise find that this case is not among the exceptions to this settled rule.
Nevertheless, even if we were to excuse this procedural infirmity of the petition, we are still not inclined to reverse the
lower tribunals’ findings on the merits of the case.
On the substantive matters:
Whether the third party audit report
commissioned by Belle is admissible and
may be given weight
To recapitulate, petitioner assailed R.A. Mojica’s audit report on the following grounds: (a) that there was no provision in
the Construction Contract allowing Belle to unilaterally conduct an audit of petitioner’s work; (b) assuming the Contract
allows such an audit, it nonetheless failed to include all the work done by petitioner; and (c) it was tainted by bias and
partiality since R.A. Mojica was a regular, long time contractor of Belle.
On this issue, we uphold the CIAC and the Court of Appeals in their allowance of the third party audit report done by R.A.
Mojica.
First, while there was no provision in the Construction Contract expressly authorizing Belle to secure the services of a
third party auditor to determine the value of the work accomplished by petitioner RVSCI, there is likewise no provision
prohibiting the same. Certainly, RVSCI failed to point to any contractual stipulation preventing RVSCI to seek expert
opinion regarding the value of RVSCI’s accomplishment or the accuracy of the Progress Billing, whether prior or
subsequent to the approval of such billing.
Second, the mere fact that the audit was unilateral, or was not participated in by petitioner, did not render the same
objectionable. There is nothing in the Construction Contract which obligates Belle to inform RVSCI or to secure the latter’s
participation should the former decide to commission an audit of the work accomplished. On the contrary, in case of
termination due to default of the contractor, Article XIII, Section 13.4 of the Construction Contract explicitly allows Belle to
unilaterally evaluate the value of the work and the only condition is that it be done in good faith. Even assuming arguendo
we accept RVSCI’s contentions that it justifiably suspended work and that Article XIII, Section 13.4 merely covers
instances of default and not situations of justified suspension of works, we see no reason why the procedure for cessation
of work due to default cannot be applied to other instances of cessation of work, particularly in the absence of a contractual
provision governing termination or suspension of works in situations not involving a default.
Verily, the fact that the parties agreed to a unilateral valuation of the work by the owner in the event of a termination of the
contract due to default signifies that the parties, including RVSCI, did not find anything abhorrent in a one-sided valuation
at the time of the execution of the contract. If RVSCI believed that this was unfair or that its participation should be required
in a review or audit of its work, then it should not have acquiesced to such a provision in the first place and instead insisted
on a stipulation prohibiting a unilateral audit of its work.
Third, bias on the part of a witness cannot be presumed. It is a basic rule that good faith is always presumed and bad faith
must be proved.32 In a previous case, we have held that the witness’ employment relationship with, or financial
dependence on, the party presenting his testimony would not be sufficient reason to discredit said witness and label his
testimony as biased and unworthy of credence. 33 Analogously, that Belle and R.A. Mojica had a long standing business
relationship does not necessarily mean that the latter’s report was tainted with irregularity, especially in the absence of
evidence that the audit report was indeed inaccurate or erroneous. It must be emphasized as well that RVSCI had ample
opportunity to cross-examine Engr. Mojica with respect to the particulars of his company’s audit report.
To be sure, RVSCI is not precluded from proffering evidence to rebut the findings of R.A. Mojica. However, RVSCI did not
present or point to documents, invoices, and receipts to show that the amounts and quantities in the audit report were not
correct, nor did RVSCI convincingly substantiate its assertion that it had completed work in other areas of the project that
was not included in said report. RVSCI merely relied on its own Progress Billing as supposedly signed by Belle’s
representatives. However, it is that Progress Billing which was later questioned by Belle on the suspicion that the same
was bloated and inaccurate. Thus, Belle had a third party conduct an audit of RVSCI’s actual work accomplishment. As
the CIAC noted, there was nothing to prevent RVSCI to secure the services of its own expert witness to contest the
findings of R.A. Mojica and buttress the accuracy of its Progress Billing with supporting documents other than such billing
but RVSCI did not.
Hence, we find no error on the part of the CIAC and the Court of Appeals in relying on the third party audit report and
giving it due weight in the resolution of the present case.
Whether Belle’s approval of the Progress
Billing is final and binding and may no
longer be withdrawn
After careful consideration of the contentions of the parties, we agree with the CIAC’s finding, as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, that the owner’s approval of progress billing is merely provisional. This much can be gleaned from Article VI,
Section 6.2(c) of the Construction Contract which states that "[t]he acceptance of work from time to time for the purpose
of making progress payment shall not be considered as final acceptance of the work under the Contract." There can be
no other interpretation of the said provision but that progress billings are but preliminary estimates of the value of the
periodic accomplishments of the contractor. Otherwise, there would be no need to include Article VI, Section 6.2(c) in the
Contract since final acceptance of the contractor’s work would come as a matter of course if progress billings were, as
RVSCI contends, final and binding upon the owner. On the contrary, progress billings and final acceptance of the work
were clearly still subject to review by the owner.
14
Moreover, we see no reason to disturb the CIAC ruling that the foregoing contractual provision is consistent with industry
practice, as can be deduced from Articles 22.02, 22.04 and 22.09 of CIAP Document 102 which pertinently state:
22.02 REQUESTS FOR PAYMENT: The Contractor may submit periodically but not more than once each month a
Request for Payment for work done. The Contractor shall furnish the Owner all reasonable facilities required for obtaining
the necessary information relative to the progress and execution of the Work. x x x.
xxxx
22.04 CONDITIONS RELATIVE TO PAYMENTS: The Owner shall estimate the value of work accomplished by the
Contractor using as basis the schedule stipulated in the Breakdown of Work and Corresponding Value. Such estimate of
the Owner of the amount of work performed shall be taken as the basis for the compensation to be received by the
Contractor. While such preliminary estimates of amount and quantity shall not be required to be made by strict
measurement or with exactness, they must be made as close as possible to the actual percentage of work
accomplishment.
xxxx
22.09 ACCEPTANCE AND FINAL PAYMENT: Whenever the Contractor notifies the Owner that the Work under the
Contract has been completely performed by the Contractor, the Owner shall proceed to verify the work, shall make the
final estimates, certify to the completion of the work, and accept the same.
From the above-quoted provisions, it is readily apparent that, whether in the case of progress billings or of turn-over of
completed work, the owner has the right to verify the contractor’s actual work accomplishment prior to payment.
In all, we approve the CIAC’s pronouncement that "[t]he owner is, therefore, not estopped from questioning a prior
evaluation of the percentage of accomplishment of the contractor and to downgrade such accomplishment after re-
evaluation. It is the right of every owner to re-evaluate or re-measure the work of its contractor during the progress of the
work."34
Whether Belle should be made liable to RVSCI for damages
Anent the third issue, it is apropos to state here that the rationale underlying the owner’s right to seek an evaluation of the
contractor’s work is the right to pay only the true value of the work as may be reasonably determined under the
circumstances.
This is consistent with the law against unjust enrichment under Article 22 of the Civil Code which states that "every person
who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at
the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him." Expounding on this provision in a
recent case, we have held that "the principle of unjust enrichment essentially contemplates payment when there is no duty
to pay, and the person who receives the payment has no right to receive it." 35
In the case at bar, we uphold the CIAC’s factual finding that the value of the total work accomplished by RVSCI on the
main project was P4,868,443.59 while the cost of the additional work amounted to P1,768,000.00 plus P22,442.27, for a
total of P6,658,885.86. On the other hand, Belle had made payments in the total amount of P11,598,994.44. 36 It is thus
undeniable that RVSCI had received payments from Belle in excess of the value of its work accomplishment. In light of
this overpayment, it seems specious for RVSCI to claim that it has suffered damages from Belle’s refusal to pay its
Progress Billing, which had been proven to be excessive and inaccurate. Bearing in mind the law and jurisprudence on
unjust enrichment, we hold that RVSCI is indeed liable to return what it had received beyond the actual value of the work
it had done for Belle.1âwphi1
On a related note, this Court cannot grant RVSCI’s claim for the value of materials and equipment allegedly left at the site.
As observed by the CIAC, this particular claim was not included in the Terms of Reference and, hence, could not be
litigated upon or proved during the CIAC proceedings.
In conclusion, the CIAC rightly dismissed RVSCI's counterclaims for lack of merit.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The Decision dated March 7, 2003 and the Resolution dated
August 20, 2003 of the Court 'of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 60224 and 60217 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 167459 : January 26, 2011]
JOSE REYNALDO B. OCHOSA, PETITIONER, VS. BONA J. ALANO
AND REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court seeking to set aside the Decision[1] dated October 11, 2004 as
well as the Resolution[2] dated March 10, 2005 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 65120, which reversed and set aside the
Decision[3] dated January 11, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, Branch 140 in Civil Case No. 97-2903. In the said January 11,
1999 Decision, the trial court granted petitioner Jose Reynaldo
Ochosa's (Jose) petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage
between him and private respondent Bona J. Alano (Bona).cralaw
The relevant facts of this case, as outlined by the Court of Appeals, are
as follows:
It appears that Jose met Bona in August 1973 when he was a young
lieutenant in the AFP while the latter was a seventeen-year-old first
year college drop-out. They had a whirlwind romance that culminated
into sexual intimacy and eventual marriage on 27 October 1973 before
the Honorable Judge Cesar S. Principe in Basilan. The couple did not
acquire any property. Neither did they incur any debts. Their union
produced no offspring. In 1976, however, they found an abandoned
and neglected one-year-old baby girl whom they later registered as
their daughter, naming her Ramona Celeste Alano Ochosa.
During their marriage, Jose was often assigned to various parts of the
Philippine archipelago as an officer in the AFP. Bona did not cohabit
with him in his posts, preferring to stay in her hometown of Basilan.
Neither did Bona visit him in his areas of assignment, except in one (1)
occasion when Bona stayed with him for four (4) days.
15
Sometime in 1985, Jose was appointed as the Battalion Commander of
the Security Escort Group. He and Bona, along with Ramona, were
given living quarters at Fort Bonifacio, Makati City where they resided
with their military aides.
In 1987, Jose was charged with rebellion for his alleged participation in
the failed coup d'etat. He was incarcerated in Camp Crame.
It appears that Bona was an unfaithful spouse. Even at the onset of
their marriage when Jose was assigned in various parts of the country,
she had illicit relations with other men. Bona apparently did not change
her ways when they lived together at Fort Bonifacio; she entertained
male visitors in her bedroom whenever Jose was out of their living
quarters. On one occasion, Bona was caught by Demetrio Bajet y Lita,
a security aide, having sex with Jose's driver, Corporal Gagarin.
Rumors of Bona's sexual infidelity circulated in the military community.
When Jose could no longer bear these rumors, he got a military pass
from his jail warden and confronted Bona.
During their confrontation, Bona admitted her relationship with
Corporal Gagarin who also made a similar admission to Jose. Jose drove
Bona away from their living quarters. Bona left with Ramona and went
to Basilan.
In 1994, Ramona left Bona and came to live with Jose. It is Jose who
is currently supporting the needs of Ramona.
Jose filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, docketed as
Civil Case No. 97-2903 with the RTC of Makati City, Branch 140,
seeking to nullify his marriage to Bona on the ground of the latter's
psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential obligations of marriage.
Summons with a copy of the petition and its annexes were duly served
upon Bona who failed to file any responsive pleading during the
reglementary period.
Pursuant to the order of the trial court, the Public Prosecutor conducted
an investigation to determine whether there was collusion between the
parties. Said prosecutor submitted a report that she issued a subpoena
to both parties but only Jose appeared; hence, it can not be reasonably
determined whether or not there was collusion between them.
Trial on the merits of the case ensued. Petitioner along with his two
military aides, Gertrudes Himpayan Padernal and Demetrio Bajet y Lita,
testified about respondent's marital infidelity during the marriage.
The fourth and final witness was Elizabeth E. Rondain, a psychiatrist,
who testified that after conducting several tests, she reached the
conclusion that respondent was suffering from histrionic personality
disorder which she described as follows:
"Her personality is that she has an excessive emotion and attention
seeking behavior. So therefore they don't develop sympathy in feelings
and they have difficulty in maintaining emotional intimacy. In the case
of Mr. Ochosa he has been a military man. It is his duty to be
transferred in different areas in the Philippines. And while he is being
transferred from one place to another because of his assignments as a
military man, Mrs. Bona Alano refused to follow him in all his
assignments. There were only few occasions in which she followed him.
And during those times that they were not living together, because of
the assignments of Mr. Ochosa she developed extra marital affair with
other man of which she denied in the beginning but in the latter part
of their relationship she admitted it to Mr. Ochosa that she had
relationship with respondent's driver. I believe with this extra marital
affair that is her way of seeking attention and seeking emotions from
other person and not from the husband. And of course, this is not
fulfilling the basic responsibility in a marriage."
According to Rondain, respondent's psychological disorder was
traceable to her family history, having for a father a gambler and a
womanizer and a mother who was a battered wife. There was no
possibility of a cure since respondent does not have an insight of what
is happening to her and refused to acknowledge the reality.
With the conclusion of the witnesses' testimonies, petitioner formally
offered his evidence and rested his case.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submitted its opposition to
the petition on the ground that "the factual settings in the case at
bench, in no measure at all, can come close to the standards required
to decree a nullity of marriage (Santos v. CA, 240 SCRA 20 [1995])."
In a Decision dated 11 January 1999, the trial court granted the
petition and nullified the parties' marriage on the following
findings, viz:
x x x x
Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, provides as follows:
`A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.'
Such a ground to be invalidative (sic) of marriage, the degree of
incapacity must exhibit GRAVITY, ANTECEDENCE and INCURABILITY.
From the evidence presented, the Court finds that the psychological
incapacity of the respondent exhibited GRAVITY, ANTECEDENCE and
INCURABILITY.
16
It is grave because the respondent did not carry out the normal and
ordinary duties of marriage and family shouldered by any average
couple existing under everyday circumstances of life and work. The
gravity was manifested in respondent's infidelity as testified to by the
petitioner and his witnesses.
The psychological incapacity of the respondent could be traced back to
respondent's history as testified to by the expert witness when she said
that respondent's bad experience during her childhood resulted in her
difficulty in achieving emotional intimacy, hence, her continuous illicit
relations with several men before and during the marriage.
Considering that persons suffering from this kind of personality
disorder have no insight of their condition, they will not submit to
treatment at all. As in the case at bar, respondent's psychological
incapacity clinically identified as Histrionic Personality Disorder will
remain incurable.[4] (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the dispositive portion of the trial court Decision dated January
11, 1999 read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
DECLARING the marriage of JOSE REYNALDO B. OCHOSA and BONA J.
ALANO on October 27, 1973 at Basilan City VOID AB INITIO on ground
of psychological incapacity of the respondent under Article 36 of the
Family Code as amended with all the effects and consequences
provided for by all applicable provisions of existing pertinent laws.
After this Decision becomes final, let copies thereof be sent to the Local
Civil Registrar of Basilan City who is directed to cancel the said
marriage from its Civil Registry, and the Local Civil Registrar of Makati
City for its information and guidance.[5]
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the said ruling to
the Court of Appeals which sided with the OSG's contention that the
trial court erred in granting the petition despite Jose's abject failure to
discharge the burden of proving the alleged psychological incapacity of
his wife, Bona, to comply with the essential marital obligations.
Thus, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the trial court
Decision in its assailed Decision dated October 11, 2004, the dispositive
portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED, the appealed Decision dated 11
January 1999 in Civil Case No. 97-2903 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati City, Branch 140, is accordingly REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, and another is entered DISMISSING the petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage.[6]
Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration but this was denied by the Court
of Appeals for lack of merit in its assailed Resolution dated March 10,
2005.
Hence, this Petition.
The only issue before this Court is whether or not Bona should be
deemed psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations.
The petition is without merit.
The petition for declaration of nullity of marriage which Jose filed in the
trial court hinges on Article 36 of the Family Code, to wit:
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
In the landmark case of Santos v. Court of Appeals,[7] we observed that
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be
grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out
the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the
history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after marriage; and it must be
incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the
means of the party involved.
Soon after, incorporating the three basic requirements of psychological
incapacity as mandated in Santos, we laid down in Republic v. Court of
Appeals and Molina[8] the following guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Article 36 of the Family Code:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to
the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This
is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution
devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the
foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable,"
thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both
the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the
family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
17
psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that
the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an
extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so
as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as
a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained.
Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness
was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but
the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must
be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily
to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them
but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise
his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of
the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outburst" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be
shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element
in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person
from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Article
68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well
as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents
and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also
be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text
of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling
or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that
Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from
Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in
1983 and which provides:
"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are
unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes
of psychological nature."
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to
harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands
to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight
should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally - subject
to our law on evidence - what is decreed as canonically invalid should
also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose
of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation
is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church - while
remaining independent, separate and apart from each other - shall
walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting
and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the
nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall
be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification,
which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons
for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.
The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit
to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the
case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor
General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculicontemplated under Canon 1095.[9] (Citations omitted.)
In Marcos v. Marcos,[10] we previously held that the foregoing
guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be
declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be
"medically or clinically identified." What is important is the presence
of evidence that can adequately establish the
party's psychological condition. For, indeed, if the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity,
then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be
resorted to.
It is also established in jurisprudence that from these requirements
arise the concept that Article 36 of the Family Code does not really
dissolve a marriage; it simply recognizes that there never was any
marriage in the first place because the affliction - already then existing
- was so grave and permanent as to deprive the afflicted party of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond
he or she was to assume or had assumed.[11]
18
A little over a decade since the promulgation of the Molina guidelines,
we made a critical assessment of the same in Ngo Te v. Yu-Te,[12] to
wit:
In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a
rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of
psychological incapacity. Understandably, the Court was then alarmed
by the deluge of petitions for the dissolution of marital bonds, and was
sensitive to the OSG's exaggeration of Article 36 as the "most liberal
divorce procedure in the world." The unintended consequences
of Molina, however, has taken its toll on people who have to live with
deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly,
which, like termites, consume little by little the very foundation of their
families, our basic social institutions. Far from what was intended by
the Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into
and be bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently
applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics,
nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously debase and
pervert the sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has
annulled marriages on account of the personality disorders of the said
individuals.[13]
However, our critique did not mean that we had declared an
abandonment of the Molina doctrine. On the contrary, we simply
declared and, thus, clarified in the same Te case that there is a need
to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the
disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36.
Furthermore, we reiterated in the same case the principle that each
case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. And, to
repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a case-
to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church
tribunals.[14]
In the case at bar, the trial court granted the petition for the declaration
of nullity of marriage on the basis of Dr. Elizabeth Rondain's
testimony[15] and her psychiatric evaluation report[16] as well as the
individual testimonies of Jose[17] and his military aides - Mrs. Gertrudes
Himpayan Padernal[18] and Corporal Demetrio Bajet.[19]
We are sufficiently convinced, after a careful perusal of the evidence
presented in this case, that Bona had been, on several occasions with
several other men, sexually disloyal to her spouse, Jose. Likewise, we
are persuaded that Bona had indeed abandoned Jose. However, we
cannot apply the same conviction to Jose's thesis that the totality of
Bona's acts constituted psychological incapacity as determined by
Article 36 of the Family Code. There is inadequate credible evidence
that her "defects" were already present at the inception of, or prior to,
the marriage. In other words, her alleged psychological incapacity did
not satisfy the jurisprudential requisite of "juridical antecedence."
With regard to Bona's sexual promiscuity prior to her marriage to Jose, with Jose and his witness, Mrs. Padernal, as well as the court record of
we have only the uncorroborated testimony of Jose made in open court the testimonies of other witnesses, to wit:
to support this allegation. To quote the pertinent portion of the
transcript: Q: And you said you did interviews. Who did the interview?
A: I interviewed Mr. Ochosa and their witness Padernal, ma'am.
Q: So, what was the reason why you have broken with your wife
after several years - Q: When you say Padernal are you referring to Gertrudes
A: Well, I finally broke up with my wife because I can no longer Himpayan Padernal who testified in this court?
bear the torture because of the gossips that she had an affair A: Yes, ma'am.
with other men, and finally, when I have a chance to confront
her she admitted that she had an affair with other men.
xxxx

Q: With other men. And, of course this - her life with other men of
Q: Other than the interviews what else did you do in order to
course before the marriage you have already known -
evaluate members of the parties?
A: Yes, your honor.
A: I also interviewed (sic) the transcript of stenographic notes of
the testimonies of other witnesses, ma'am.
Q: So, that this gossips - because you said that you thought that xxxx
this affair would go to end after your marriage? Q: Was there also a psychological test conducted on the
A: Yes, I was thinking about that. respondent?
A: Yes, your honor.
Q: So, that after several years she will not change so that's why
you can't bear it anymore? Q: It was on the basis of the psychological test in which you based
A: Yes, ma'am.[20] your evaluation report?
A: It was based on the psychological test conducted and clinical
Dr. Rondain's testimony and psychiatric evaluation report do not interview with the other witnesses, your Honor.[22]
provide evidentiary support to cure the doubtful veracity of Jose's one-
sided assertion. Even if we take into account the psychiatrist's
conclusion that Bona harbors a Histrionic Personality Disorder that Verily, Dr. Rondain evaluated Bona's psychological condition indirectly
existed prior to her marriage with Jose and this mental condition from the information gathered solely from Jose and his witnesses. This
purportedly made her helplessly prone to promiscuity and sexual factual circumstance evokes the possibility that the information fed to
infidelity, the same cannot be taken as credible proof of antecedence the psychiatrist is tainted with bias for Jose's cause, in the absence of
since the method by which such an inference was reached leaves much sufficient corroboration.
to be desired in terms of meeting the standard of evidence required in
determining psychological incapacity. Even if we give the benefit of the doubt to the testimonies at issue
since the trial court judge had found them to be credible enough after
The psychiatrist's findings on Bona's personality profile did not personally witnessing Jose and the witnesses testify in court, we cannot
emanate from a personal interview with the subject herself as admitted lower the evidentiary benchmark with regard to information on Bona's
by Dr. Rondain in court, as follows: pre-marital history which is crucial to the issue of antecedence in this
case because we have only the word of Jose to rely on. In fact, Bona's
dysfunctional family portrait which brought about her Histrionic
Q: How about, you mentioned that the petitioner came for
Personality Disorder as painted by Dr. Rondain was based solely on the
psychological test, how about the respondent, did she come for
assumed truthful knowledge of Jose, the spouse who has the most to
interview and test?
gain if his wife is found to be indeed psychologically incapacitated. No
A: No, ma'am.
other witness testified to Bona's family history or her behavior prior to
or at the beginning of the marriage. Both Mrs. Padernal and Corporal
Q: Did you try to take her for such? Bajet came to know Bona only during their employment in petitioner's
A: Yes, ma'am. household during the marriage. It is undisputed that Jose and Bona
were married in 1973 while Mrs. Padernal and Corporal Bajet started
Q: And what did she tell you, did she come for an interview? to live with petitioner's family only in 1980 and 1986, respectively.
A: There was no response, ma'am.[21]
We have previously held that, in employing a rigid and stringent level
As a consequence thereof, Dr. Rondain merely relied on her interview of evidentiary scrutiny to cases like this, we do not suggest that a
19
personal examination of the party alleged to be psychologically A:
incapacitated is mandatory; jurisprudence holds that this type of
examination is not a mandatory requirement. While such examination
is desirable, we recognize that it may not be practical in all instances Q:
given the oftentimes estranged relations between the parties. For a
determination though of a party's complete personality profile, A:
information coming from persons with personal knowledge of the
juridical antecedents may be helpful. This is an approach in the
application of Article 36 that allows flexibility, at the same time that it GERTRUDES PADERNAL'S TESTIMONY:
avoids, if not totally obliterate, the credibility gaps spawned by
supposedly expert opinion based entirely on doubtful sources of
Q:
information.[23]
A:
However, we have also ruled in past decisions that to make conclusions
and generalizations on a spouse's psychological condition based on the
information fed by only one side, similar to what we have pointed out Q:
in the case at bar, is, to the Court's mind, not different from admitting
hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such
evidence.[24]
A:
Anent the accusation that, even at the inception of their marriage, Bona
did not wish to be with Jose as a further manifestation of her Q:
psychological incapacity, we need only to look at the testimonial A:
records of Jose and his witnesses to be convinced otherwise, to wit:
Q:
JOSE OCHOSA'S TESTIMONY: A:
I have a chanced also to go home because we were allowed to
at least three (3) days every other month.
So, if you start from the marriage up to 1988 so that is 16 years
you were supposed to have been living together?
No, actually in 19 - middle of 1987 because in 1987 I was in x
x x.[25]
Now, do you know when they lived together as husband and
wife?
1979.
And you said that you have known the petitioner and the
respondent in this case because in fact, you lived with them
together in the same quarters. Does the quarters have different
rooms?
Yes, ma'am.
But very near each other?
Yes, ma'am.
You know them because of the proximity of the quarters?
Yes, ma'am.

Q: How long did you stay with your wife? Q: It was only during this 1980 to 1983, three (3) years that you
A: We were married in 1973 and we separated in 1988 but in all lived together that you have a chance to be with the spouses?
those years there were only few occasions that we were staying
together because most of the time I'm in the field. xxxx

Q: div align="JUSTIFY">Now, you said most of the time you were A: Since 1980 to 1983 we lived together in the same house.
in the field, did you not - your wife come with you in any of your
assignments?
A: Never, but sometimes she really visited me and stayed for one xxxx
(1) day and then -
Q: Now, Madam Witness, after 1983, where did you reside together
Q: And, where did your wife stayed when she leaves you? with your husband?
A: She was staying with her mother in Basilan. A: In Cagayan de Oro and in 1986 we came back to Manila, in Fort
Bonifacio.
Q: Where were you assigned most of the time?
A: I was assigned in Davao, Zamboanga, Cotabato, Basilan. Q: You mean, in the same house where petitioner and the
respondent lived together?
A: Yes. Ma'am.
Q: And, of course she would come to your place every now and
then because it is not very far -
A: No, ma'am, once in a while only. Q: How long did you live in the house where the petitioner and the
respondent stay?
A: Twelve years now since 1983 to 1995.
Q: Did you not go home to your conjugal home?

20
Q: Where was the petitioner working at that time, from 1982 to A: I think, sometime in 1983, ma'am. She did not follow
1995? immediately. She stayed with him only for four (4) months,
A: He is a soldier, a Colonel. ma'am.

Q: Do you know where he was assigned during this time? Q: Now, do you know if the petitioner and the respondent were
A: Yes, ma'am, G-3. living together as husband and wife for this period of time during
the relationship?
Q: May we know where this G-3 is? A: Yes, ma'am. After their marriage I believe their relationship was
A: Fort Bonifacio, ma'am. good for a few months until he was transferred to Julu. I believe
during that time when they were together the husband was
giving an attention to her. The husband was always there and
Q: What about the wife, where does she stay?
when the husband transferred to Basilan, the attention was not
A: At Fort Bonifacio, in their house.[26]
there anymore, ma'am.[27]
DR. ELIZABETH E. RONDAIN'S TESTIMONY:
It is apparent from the above-cited testimonies that Bona, contrary to
Q: Now, they got married in 1973, am I correct? Jose's assertion, had no manifest desire to abandon Jose at the
A: Yes, ma'am. beginning of their marriage and was, in fact, living with him for the
most part of their relationship from 1973 up to the time when Jose
drove her away from their conjugal home in 1988. On the contrary,
Q: But the matter of the work or assignment of the petitioner, he
the record shows that it was Jose who was constantly away from Bona
was assigned in different Provinces or Barangays in the
by reason of his military duties and his later incarceration. A
Philippines?
reasonable explanation for Bona's refusal to accompany Jose in his
A: Yes, ma'am.
military assignments in other parts of Mindanao may be simply that
those locations were known conflict areas in the seventies. Any doubt
Q: Now, when the wife or the respondent in this case did not go as to Bona's desire to live with Jose would later be erased by the fact
with the husband in different places of his assignment did you that Bona lived with Jose in their conjugal home in Fort Bonifacio during
ask her why what was the reason why she did not like to go the following decade.
those places?
A: She just did not want to. The wife did not go with him because... In view of the foregoing, the badges of Bona's alleged psychological
by transferring from one place to another, she just don't want incapacity, i.e., her sexual infidelity and abandonment, can only be
to go, she just wanted to stay in Basilan where her hometown convincingly traced to the period of time after her marriage to Jose and
is, ma'am. not to the inception of the said marriage.

Q: Did the petitioner herein tell you why the respondent don't want
to go with him?
A: Yes, I asked, the answer of the petitioner was she simply did
not want to go with him because she did not want him to be
appointed to far away places.
Q: And would it be that since she did not like to go with the husband
in some far away different assignments she also assumed that
the assignments were in this war regions they were always
fighting considering the place in Basilan they were in fighting
atmosphere?
A: It is possible but he was transferred to Manila and she also
refused to stay in Manila, ma'am.
Q: When was that that she refused to come to Manila?
We have stressed time and again that Article 36 of the Family Code is
not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the
time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the
marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one
of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond
one is about to assume. These marital obligations are those provided
under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code.[28]
While we are not insensitive to petitioner's suffering in view of the truly
appalling and shocking behavior of his wife, still, we are bound by
judicial precedents regarding the evidentiary requirements in
psychological incapacity cases that must be applied to the present
case.cralaw
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.

21

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997
CHI MING TSOI, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI, respondents.
TORRES, JR., J.:
Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to steer a marriage in its journey over troubled waters. Laws are
seemingly inadequate. Over time, much reliance has been placed in the works of the unseen hand of Him who created all
things.
Who is to blame when a marriage fails?
This case was originally commenced by a distraught wife against her uncaring husband in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City (Branch 89) which decreed the annulment of the marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Petitioner appealed the decision of the trial court to respondent Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 42758) which affirmed
the Trial Court's decision November 29, 1994 and correspondingly denied the motion for reconsideration in a resolution
dated February 14, 1995.
The statement of the case and of the facts made by the trial court and reproduced by the Court of Appeals 1 its decision
are as follows:
From the evidence adduced, the following acts were preponderantly established:
Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant at the Manila Cathedral, . . . Intramuros Manila,
as evidenced by their Marriage Contract. (Exh. "A")
After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at the South Villa, Makati, they went and
proceeded to the house of defendant's mother.
There, they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first night of their married life.
It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her expectations, that as newlyweds they were supposed to enjoy
making love, or having sexual intercourse, with each other, the defendant just went to bed, slept on one side
thereof, then turned his back and went to sleep . There was no sexual intercourse between them during the first
night. The same thing happened on the second, third and fourth nights.
In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they can enjoy together during their first week as
husband and wife, they went to Baguio City. But, they did so together with her mother, an uncle, his mother and
his nephew. They were all invited by the defendant to join them. [T]hey stayed in Baguio City for four (4) days.
But, during this period, there was no sexual intercourse between them, since the defendant avoided her by
taking a long walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on a rocking chair located at the living room. They slept
22
together in the same room and on the same bed since May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989. But during this
period, there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. [S]he claims, that she did not: even see her
husband's private parts nor did he see hers.
Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag, a urologist at
the Chinese General Hospital, on January 20, 1989.
The results of their physical examinations were that she is healthy, normal and still a virgin, while that of her
husband's examination was kept confidential up to this time. While no medicine was prescribed for her, the
doctor prescribed medications for her husband which was also kept confidential. No treatment was given to her.
For her husband, he was asked by the doctor to return but he never did.
The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show his penis. She said,
that she had observed the defendant using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes the cleansing cream of his
mother. And that, according to her, the defendant married her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire or maintain his
residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man.
The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband.
On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if their marriage shall be annulled by reason of
psychological incapacity, the fault lies with his wife.
But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his wife annulled for several reasons, viz: (1) that he loves
her very much; (2) that he has no defect on his part and he is physically and psychologically capable; and, (3)
since the relationship is still very young and if there is any differences between the two of them, it can still be
reconciled and that, according to him, if either one of them has some incapabilities, there is no certainty that
this will not be cured. He further claims, that if there is any defect, it can be cured by the intervention of medical
technology or science.
The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989,
there was no sexual contact between them. But, the reason for this, according to the defendant, was that
everytime he wants to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always avoided him and whenever he caresses
her private parts, she always removed his hands. The defendant claims, that he forced his wife to have sex with
him only once but he did not continue because she was shaking and she did not like it. So he stopped.
There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant , why the plaintiff filed this case against him, and these
are: (1) that she is afraid that she will be forced to return the pieces of jewelry of his mother, and, (2) that her
husband, the defendant, will consummate their marriage.
The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain valid because they are still very young and there is still a
chance to overcome their differences.
The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination. His penis was examined by Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr.,
for the purpose of finding out whether he is impotent . As a result thereof, Dr. Alteza submitted his Doctor's
Medical Report. (Exh. "2"). It is stated there, that there is no evidence of impotency (Exh. "2-B"), and he is
capable of erection. (Exh. "2-C")
The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate to find out whether or not he has an erection and
he found out that from the original size of two (2) inches, or five (5) centimeters, the penis of the defendant
lengthened by one (1) inch and one centimeter. Dr. Alteza said, that the defendant had only a soft erection
 which is why his penis is not in its full length. But, still is capable of further erection, in that with his soft erection,
the defendant is capable of having sexual intercourse with a woman.
In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no collusion between the parties and that the
evidence is not fabricated."2
After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as VOID the marriage entered into by the plaintiff with
the defendant on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral, Basilica of the Immaculate Conception, Intramuros,
Manila, before the Rt. Rev. Msgr. Melencio de Vera. Without costs. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the
Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City. Let another copy be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Manila.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals erred:
I The case has reached this Court because petitioner does not want their marriage to be annulled. This only shows that
in affirming the conclusions of the lower court that there was no sexual intercourse between the parties without
making any findings of fact.
II
in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion with petitioner is a psychological
incapacity inasmuch as proof thereof is totally absent.
III
in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private respondent to have sex with each other
constitutes psychological incapacity of both.
IV
in affirming the annulment of the marriage between the parties decreed by the lower court without fully satisfying
itself that there was no collusion between them.
We find the petition to be bereft of merit.
Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-89-3141, private respondent has the burden of proving the
allegations in her complaint; that since there was no independent evidence to prove the alleged non-coitus between the
parties, there remains no other basis for the court's conclusion except the admission of petitioner; that public policy should
23
aid acts intended to validate marriage and should retard acts intended to invalidate them; that the conclusion drawn by
the trial court on the admissions and confessions of the parties in their pleadings and in the course of the trial is misplaced
since it could have been a product of collusion; and that in actions for annulment of marriage, the material facts alleged
in the complaint shall always be proved.3
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:
Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. — Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the
material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on
such pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation the material facts alleged in the
complaint shall always be proved.
The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on the pleadings. What said provision seeks to prevent is annulment of
marriage without trial. The assailed decision was not based on such a judgment on the pleadings. When private
respondent testified under oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by oath before the trial court and was cross-
examined by the adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in form of a testimony. After such evidence was
presented, it be came incumbent upon petitioner to present his side. He admitted that since their marriage on May 22,
1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual intercourse between them.
To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason why, as stated by the petitioner, the Civil Code provides that no
judgment annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment (Arts. 88 and
101[par. 2]) and the Rules of Court prohibit such annulment without trial (Sec. 1, Rule 19).
there is no collusion between the parties. When petitioner admitted that he and his wife (private respondent) have never
had sexual contact with each other, he must have been only telling the truth. We are reproducing the relevant portion of
the challenged resolution denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, penned with magisterial lucidity by Associate
Justice Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes, viz:
The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by this Court is not based on a stipulation of facts. The issue
of whether or not the appellant is psychologically incapacitated to discharge a basic marital obligation was
resolved upon a review of both the documentary and testimonial evidence on record. Appellant admitted that
he did not have sexual relations with his wife after almost ten months of cohabitation, and it appears that he is
not suffering from any physical disability. Such abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his
marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder which to the mind of this Court clearly
demonstrates an 'utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage' within the
meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code (See Santos vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995). 4
Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the
private respondent to have sex with each other constitutes psychological incapacity of both. He points out as error the
failure of the trial court to make "a categorical finding about the alleged psychological incapacity and an in-depth analysis
of the reasons for such refusal which may not be necessarily due to physchological disorders" because there might have
been other reasons, — i.e., physical disorders, such as aches, pains or other discomforts, — why private respondent
would not want to have sexual intercourse from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989, in a short span of 10 months.
First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the respondent court made a finding on who between petitioner and
private respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the other. The fact remains, however, that there has never been
coitus between them. At any rate, since the action to declare the marriage void may be filed by either party, i.e., even the
psychologically incapacitated, the question of who refuses to have sex with the other becomes immaterial.
Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence on record to show that any of the parties is suffering from
phychological incapacity. Petitioner also claims that he wanted to have sex with private respondent; that the reason for
private respondent's refusal may not be psychological but physical disorder as stated above.
We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner could have discussed with private respondent or asked her what is ailing
her, and why she balks and avoids him everytime he wanted to have sexual intercourse with her. He never did. At least,
there is nothing in the record to show that he had tried to find out or discover what the problem with his wife could be.
What he presented in evidence is his doctor's Medical Report that there is no evidence of his impotency and he is capable
of erection.5 Since it is petitioner's claim that the reason is not psychological but perhaps physical disorder on the part of
private respondent, it became incumbent upon him to prove such a claim.
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage obligations,
and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological
incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign
of psychological incapacity.6
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate children based on the universal
principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage." Constant non- fulfillment of
this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted
refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
As aptly stated by the respondent court,
An examination of the evidence convinces Us that the husband's plea that the wife did not want carnal
intercourse with him does not inspire belief. Since he was not physically impotent, but he refrained from sexual
intercourse during the entire time (from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989) that he occupied the same bed with
his wife, purely out of symphaty for her feelings, he deserves to be doubted for not having asserted his right
seven though she balked (Tompkins vs. Tompkins, 111 Atl. 599, cited in I Paras, Civil Code, at p. 330). Besides,
if it were true that it is the wife was suffering from incapacity, the fact that defendant did not go to court and seek
the declaration of nullity weakens his claim. This case was instituted by the wife whose normal expectations of
her marriage were frustrated by her husband's inadequacy. Considering the innate modesty of the Filipino
woman, it is hard to believe that she would expose her private life to public scrutiny and fabricate testimony
against her husband if it were not necessary to put her life in order and put to rest her marital status.
We are not impressed by defendant's claim that what the evidence proved is the unwillingness or lack of
intention to perform the sexual act, which is not phychological incapacity, and which can be achieved "through
proper motivation." After almost ten months of cohabitation, the admission that the husband is reluctant or
unwilling to perform the sexual act with his wife whom he professes to love very dearly, and who has not posed
any insurmountable resistance to his alleged approaches, is indicative of a hopeless situation, and of a serious
personality disorder that constitutes psychological incapacity to discharge the basic marital covenants within
the contemplation of the Family Code.7
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity
(Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the "spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and
not any legal mandate or court order" (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is shared with
another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say "I could not have cared less." This
is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is sexual
intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of
creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations.
24
It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private respondent. That is — a shared feeling which
between husband and wife must be experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of
spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process. An expressive interest in each other's feelings at a time it is
needed by the other can go a long way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children but for
two consenting adults who view the relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice and a continuing
commitment to compromise, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves trapped in its mire of
unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the studied judgment of respondent
appellate court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES , the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 29, 1994 is
hereby AFFIRMED in all respects and the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 175581 March 28, 2008
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 179474
FELISA TECSON-DAYOT, Petitioner,
vs.
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before us are two consolidated petitions. G.R. No. 175581 and G.R. No. 179474 are Petitions for Review under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court filed by the Republic of the Philippines and Felisa Tecson-Dayot (Felisa), respectively, both
challenging the Amended Decision1 of the Court of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, which
declared the marriage between Jose Dayot (Jose) and Felisa void ab initio.
The records disclose that on 24 November 1986, Jose and Felisa were married at the Pasay City Hall. The marriage was
solemnized by Rev. Tomas V. Atienza.2 In lieu of a marriage license, Jose and Felisa executed a sworn affidavit, 3 also
dated 24 November 1986, attesting that both of them had attained the age of maturity, and that being unmarried, they had
lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.
On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint4 for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Biñan, Laguna, Branch 25. He contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham, as no marriage
ceremony was celebrated between the parties; that he did not execute the sworn affidavit stating that he and Felisa had
lived as husband and wife for at least five years; and that his consent to the marriage was secured through fraud.
In his Complaint, Jose gave his version of the events which led to his filing of the same. According to Jose, he was
introduced to Felisa in 1986. Immediately thereafter, he came to live as a boarder in Felisa’s house, the latter being his
landlady. Some three weeks later, Felisa requested him to accompany her to the Pasay City Hall, ostensibly so she could
claim a package sent to her by her brother from Saudi Arabia. At the Pasay City Hall, upon a pre-arranged signal from
Felisa, a man bearing three folded pieces of paper approached them. They were told that Jose needed to sign the papers
so that the package could be released to Felisa. He initially refused to do so. However, Felisa cajoled him, and told him
that his refusal could get both of them killed by her brother who had learned about their relationship. Reluctantly, he signed
the pieces of paper, and gave them to the man who immediately left. It was in February 1987 when he discovered that he
had contracted marriage with Felisa. He alleged that he saw a piece of paper lying on top of the table at the sala of Felisa’s
house. When he perused the same, he discovered that it was a copy of his marriage contract with Felisa. When he
confronted Felisa, the latter feigned ignorance.
In opposing the Complaint, Felisa denied Jose’s allegations and defended the validity of their marriage. She declared that
they had maintained their relationship as man and wife absent the legality of marriage in the early part of 1980, but that
she had deferred contracting marriage with him on account of their age difference.5 In her pre-trial brief, Felisa expounded
that while her marriage to Jose was subsisting, the latter contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual (Rufina) on
31 August 1990. On 3 June 1993, Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose. Subsequently, she filed an administrative
complaint against Jose with the Office of the Ombudsman, since Jose and Rufina were both employees of the National
Statistics and Coordinating Board.6 The Ombudsman found Jose administratively liable for disgraceful and immoral
conduct, and meted out to him the penalty of suspension from service for one year without emolument.7
On 26 July 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision8 dismissing the Complaint. It disposed:
WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation and analysis of the evidence presented by both parties, this Court finds and so
holds that the [C]omplaint does not deserve a favorable consideration. Accordingly, the above-entitled case is hereby
ordered DISMISSED with costs against [Jose]. 9
The RTC ruled that from the testimonies and evidence presented, the marriage celebrated between Jose and Felisa on
24 November 1986 was valid. It dismissed Jose’s version of the story as implausible, and rationalized that:
Any person in his right frame of mind would easily suspect any attempt to make him or her sign a blank sheet of paper.
[Jose] could have already detected that something was amiss, unusual, as they were at Pasay City Hall to get a package
for [Felisa] but it [was] he who was made to sign the pieces of paper for the release of the said package. Another indirect
suggestion that could have put him on guard was the fact that, by his own admission, [Felisa] told him that her brother
would kill them if he will not sign the papers. And yet it took him, more or less, three months to "discover" that the pieces
of paper that he signed was [sic] purportedly the marriage contract. [Jose] does not seem to be that ignorant, as perceived
by this Court, to be "taken in for a ride" by [Felisa.]
[Jose’s] claim that he did not consent to the marriage was belied by the fact that he acknowledged Felisa Tecson as his
wife when he wrote [Felisa’s] name in the duly notarized statement of assets and liabilities he filled up on May 12, 1988,
one year after he discovered the marriage contract he is now claiming to be sham and false. [Jose], again, in his company
I.D., wrote the name of [Felisa] as the person to be contacted in case of emergency. This Court does not believe that the
only reason why her name was written in his company I.D. was because he was residing there then. This is just but a
lame excuse because if he really considers her not his lawfully wedded wife, he would have written instead the name of
his sister.
When [Jose’s] sister was put into the witness stand, under oath, she testified that she signed her name voluntarily as a
witness to the marriage in the marriage certificate (T.S.N., page 25, November 29, 1996) and she further testified that the
signature appearing over the name of Jose Dayot was the signature of his [sic] brother that he voluntarily affixed in the
marriage contract (page 26 of T.S.N. taken on November 29, 1996), and when she was asked by the Honorable Court if
indeed she believed that Felisa Tecson was really chosen by her brother she answered yes. The testimony of his sister
all the more belied his claim that his consent was procured through fraud. 10
25
Moreover, on the matter of fraud, the RTC ruled that Jose’s action had prescribed. It cited Article 8711 of the New Civil
Code which requires that the action for annulment of marriage must be commenced by the injured party within four years
after the discovery of the fraud. Thus:
That granting even for the sake of argument that his consent was obtained by [Felisa] through fraud, trickery and
machinations, he could have filed an annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage at the earliest possible opportunity,
the time when he discovered the alleged sham and false marriage contract. [Jose] did not take any action to void the
marriage at the earliest instance. x x x.12
Undeterred, Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated 11 August
2005, the Court of Appeals found the appeal to be without merit. The dispositive portion of the appellate court’s Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.13
The Court of Appeals applied the Civil Code to the marriage between Jose and Felisa as it was solemnized prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code. The appellate court observed that the circumstances constituting fraud as a ground for
annulment of marriage under Article 8614 of the Civil Code did not exist in the marriage between the parties. Further, it
ruled that the action for annulment of marriage on the ground of fraud was filed beyond the prescriptive period provided
by law. The Court of Appeals struck down Jose’s appeal in the following manner:
Nonetheless, even if we consider that fraud or intimidation was employed on Jose in giving his consent to the marriage,
the action for the annulment thereof had already prescribed. Article 87 (4) and (5) of the Civil Code provides that the action
for annulment of marriage on the ground that the consent of a party was obtained by fraud, force or intimidation must be
commenced by said party within four (4) years after the discovery of the fraud and within four (4) years from the time the
force or intimidation ceased. Inasmuch as the fraud was allegedly discovered by Jose in February, 1987 then he had only
until February, 1991 within which to file an action for annulment of marriage. However, it was only on July 7, 1993 that
Jose filed the complaint for annulment of his marriage to Felisa. 15
Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not accept Jose’s assertion that his marriage to Felisa was void ab initio for lack of a
marriage license. It ruled that the marriage was solemnized under Article 76 16 of the Civil Code as one of exceptional
character, with the parties executing an affidavit of marriage between man and woman who have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years. The Court of Appeals concluded that the falsity in the affidavit to the effect that
Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband and wife for the period required by Article 76 did not affect the validity of
the marriage, seeing that the solemnizing officer was misled by the statements contained therein. In this manner, the
Court of Appeals gave credence to the good-faith reliance of the solemnizing officer over the falsity of the affidavit. The
appellate court further noted that on the dorsal side of said affidavit of marriage, Rev. Tomas V. Atienza, the solemnizing
officer, stated that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal
impediment to their marriage. Finally, the Court of Appeals dismissed Jose’s argument that neither he nor Felisa was a
member of the sect to which Rev. Tomas V. Atienza belonged. According to the Court of Appeals, Article 5617 of the Civil
Code did not require that either one of the contracting parties to the marriage must belong to the solemnizing officer’s
church or religious sect. The prescription was established only in Article 718 of the Family Code which does not govern the
parties’ marriage.
Differing with the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof.1avvphi1 His central
opposition was that the requisites for the proper application of the exemption from a marriage license under Article 76 of
the Civil Code were not fully attendant in the case at bar. In particular, Jose cited the legal condition that the man and the
woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage. Essentially, he
maintained that the affidavit of marital cohabitation executed by him and Felisa was false.
The Court of Appeals granted Jose’s Motion for Reconsideration and reversed itself. Accordingly, it rendered an Amended
Decision, dated 7 November 2006, the fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 11, 2005 is RECALLED and SET ASIDE and another one entered declaring
the marriage between Jose A. Dayot and Felisa C. Tecson void ab initio.
Furnish a copy of this Amended Decision to the Local Civil Registrar of Pasay City.19
In its Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals relied on the ruling of this Court in Niñal v. Bayadog, 20 and reasoned that:
In Niñal v. Bayadog, where the contracting parties to a marriage solemnized without a marriage license on the basis of
their affidavit that they had attained the age of majority, that being unmarried, they had lived together for at least five (5)
years and that they desired to marry each other, the Supreme Court ruled as follows:
"x x x In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration
of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should
be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by
exclusivity – meaning no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity – that is unbroken.
Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were
capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging
parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their
spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as such and its requirements must be strictly observed.
The presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the approximation of
the requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every single requirement
and later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no
exemption from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It
should be noted that a license is required in order to notify the public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony
and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to the
local civil registrar.
Article 80(3) of the Civil Code provides that a marriage solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of
exceptional character, shall be void from the beginning. Inasmuch as the marriage between Jose and Felisa is not covered
by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is, therefore, void ab initio because of the absence of a
marriage license.21
Felisa sought reconsideration of the Amended Decision, but to no avail. The appellate court rendered a Resolution22 dated
10 May 2007, denying Felisa’s motion.
Meanwhile, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Petition for Review
before this Court in G.R. No. 175581, praying that the Court of Appeals’ Amended Decision dated 7 November 2006 be
reversed and set aside for lack of merit, and that the marriage between Jose and Felisa be declared valid and subsisting.
Felisa filed a separate Petition for Review, docketed as G.R. No. 179474, similarly assailing the appellate court’s Amended
Decision. On 1 August 2007, this Court resolved to consolidate the two Petitions in the interest of uniformity of the Court
rulings in similar cases brought before it for resolution.23
The Republic of the Philippines propounds the following arguments for the allowance of its Petition, to wit:
I
26
RESPONDENT FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE PRESUMPTION OF THE VALIDITY OF HIS MARRIAGE TO
FELISA.
II
RESPONDENT DID NOT COME TO THE COURT WITH CLEAN HANDS AND SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED
TO PROFIT FROM HIS OWN FRAUDULENT CONDUCT.
III
RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE LEGALITY OF HIS MARRIAGE FOR LACK OF
MARRIAGE LICEN[S]E.24
Correlative to the above, Felisa submits that the Court of Appeals misapplied Niñal. 25 She differentiates the case at bar
from Niñal by reasoning that one of the parties therein had an existing prior marriage, a circumstance which does not
obtain in her cohabitation with Jose. Finally, Felisa adduces that Jose only sought the annulment of their marriage after a
criminal case for bigamy and an administrative case had been filed against him in order to avoid liability. Felisa surmises
that the declaration of nullity of their marriage would exonerate Jose from any liability.
For our resolution is the validity of the marriage between Jose and Felisa. To reach a considered ruling on the issue, we
shall jointly tackle the related arguments vented by petitioners Republic of the Philippines and Felisa.
The Republic of the Philippines asserts that several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid marriage exists
between Jose and Felisa. For her part, Felisa echoes the claim that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity
of the marriage by citing this Court’s ruling in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals.26 To buttress its assertion, the Republic
points to the affidavit executed by Jose and Felisa, dated 24 November 1986, attesting that they have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years, which they used in lieu of a marriage license. It is the Republic’s position that the
falsity of the statements in the affidavit does not affect the validity of the marriage, as the essential and formal requisites
were complied with; and the solemnizing officer was not required to investigate as to whether the said affidavit was legally
obtained. The Republic opines that as a marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was
wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by the fact that the parties incorporated a fabricated statement
in their affidavit that they cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years. In addition, the Republic posits that the
parties’ marriage contract states that their marriage was solemnized under Article 76 of the Civil Code. It also bears the
signature of the parties and their witnesses, and must be considered a primary evidence of marriage. To further fortify its
Petition, the Republic adduces the following documents: (1) Jose’s notarized Statement of Assets and Liabilities, dated
12 May 1988 wherein he wrote Felisa’s name as his wife; (2) Certification dated 25 July 1993 issued by the Barangay
Chairman 192, Zone ZZ, District 24 of Pasay City, attesting that Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband and wife
in said barangay; and (3) Jose’s company ID card, dated 2 May 1988, indicating Felisa’s name as his wife.
The first assignment of error compels this Court to rule on the issue of the effect of a false affidavit under Article 76 of the
Civil Code. A survey of the prevailing rules is in order.
It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was celebrated on 24 November 1986, prior to the effectivity of
the Family Code. Accordingly, the Civil Code governs their union. Article 53 of the Civil Code spells out the essential
requisites of marriage as a contract:
ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
 (2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character. (Emphasis ours.)
Article 5827 makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being issued by the local civil
registrar of the municipality where either contracting party habitually resides, save marriages of an exceptional character
authorized by the Civil Code, but not those under Article 75.28 Article 80(3)29 of the Civil Code makes it clear that a marriage
performed without the corresponding marriage license is void, this being nothing more than the legitimate consequence
flowing from the fact that the license is the essence of the marriage contract.30 This is in stark contrast to the old Marriage
Law,31 whereby the absence of a marriage license did not make the marriage void. The rationale for the compulsory
character of a marriage license under the Civil Code is that it is the authority granted by the State to the contracting parties,
after the proper government official has inquired into their capacity to contract marriage. 32
Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2, Title III, comprising Articles 72 to 79.
To wit, these marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis or at the point of death during peace or war, (2) marriages in
remote places, (2) consular marriages,33 (3) ratification of marital cohabitation, (4) religious ratification of a civil marriage,
(5) Mohammedan or pagan marriages, and (6) mixed marriages.34
The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital cohabitation under Article 76 of the Civil Code, which provides:
ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have attained the age of majority and
who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, desire to marry each other. The
contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths.
The official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain
the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.
The reason for the law,35 as espoused by the Code Commission, is that the publicity attending a marriage license may
discourage such persons who have lived in a state of cohabitation from legalizing their status. 36
It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was performed without a marriage license. In lieu thereof,
they executed an affidavit declaring that "they have attained the age of maturity; that being unmarried, they have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years; and that because of this union, they desire to marry each other."37 One
of the central issues in the Petition at bar is thus: whether the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the
parties have in truth fallen short of the minimum five-year requirement, effectively renders the marriage void ab initio for
lack of a marriage license.
We answer in the affirmative.
Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the indispensability of the formal requisite
of a marriage license. Under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions, as a general rule, should be strictly 38 but
reasonably construed.39 They extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in
favor of the general provisions rather than the exception.40 Where a general rule is established by statute with exceptions,
the court will not curtail the former or add to the latter by implication.41 For the exception in Article 76 to apply, it is a sine
qua non thereto that the man and the woman must have attained the age of majority, and that, being unmarried, they have
lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.
A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us with no other expediency but to read the law as it is plainly
written. The exception of a marriage license under Article 76 applies only to those who have lived together as husband
27
and wife for at least five years and desire to marry each other. The Civil Code, in no ambiguous terms, places a minimum
period requirement of five years of cohabitation. No other reading of the law can be had, since the language of Article 76
is precise. The minimum requisite of five years of cohabitation is an indispensability carved in the language of the law. For
a marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid, this material fact cannot be dispensed with. It is embodied in the law
not as a directory requirement, but as one that partakes of a mandatory character. It is worthy to mention that Article 76
also prescribes that the contracting parties shall state the requisite facts42 in an affidavit before any person authorized by
law to administer oaths; and that the official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit
that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal
impediment to the marriage.
It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time they executed their sworn
affidavit and contracted marriage. The Republic admitted that Jose and Felisa started living together only in June 1986,
or barely five months before the celebration of their marriage. 43 The Court of Appeals also noted Felisa’s testimony that
Jose was introduced to her by her neighbor, Teresita Perwel, sometime in February or March 1986 after the EDSA
Revolution.44 The appellate court also cited Felisa’s own testimony that it was only in June 1986 when Jose commenced
to live in her house.45
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question as to whether they satisfied the minimum five-year requisite is factual in nature.
A question of fact arises when there is a need to decide on the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts.46Under Rule 45,
factual findings are ordinarily not subject to this Court’s review.47 It is already well-settled that:
The general rule is that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding on this Court. A recognized exception to
this rule is when the Court of Appeals and the trial court, or in this case the administrative body, make contradictory
findings. However, the exception does not apply in every instance that the Court of Appeals and the trial court or
administrative body disagree. The factual findings of the Court of Appeals remain conclusive on this Court if such findings
are supported by the record or based on substantial evidence.48
Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24 November 1986, executed by Jose and Felisa to exempt them from the
requirement of a marriage license, is beyond question.
We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the statements in the parties’ affidavit will not affect the
validity of marriage, since all the essential and formal requisites were complied with. The argument deserves scant merit.
Patently, it cannot be denied that the marriage between Jose and Felisa was celebrated without the formal requisite of a
marriage license. Neither did Jose and Felisa meet the explicit legal requirement in Article 76, that they should have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years, so as to be excepted from the requirement of a marriage license.
Anent petitioners’ reliance on the presumption of marriage, this Court holds that the same finds no applicability to the case
at bar. Essentially, when we speak of a presumption of marriage, it is with reference to the prima facie presumption that
a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. 49 Restated
more explicitly, persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-
presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. 50 The present case does not involve an apparent
marriage to which the presumption still needs to be applied. There is no question that Jose and Felisa actually entered
into a contract of marriage on 24 November 1986, hence, compelling Jose to institute a Complaint for Annulment and/or
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, which spawned the instant consolidated Petitions.
In the same vein, the declaration of the Civil Code51 that every intendment of law or fact leans towards the validity of
marriage will not salvage the parties’ marriage, and extricate them from the effect of a violation of the law. The marriage
of Jose and Felisa was entered into without the requisite marriage license or compliance with the stringent requirements
of a marriage under exceptional circumstance. The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of
the law and would lead or could be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud against innocent and unwary parties, which
was one of the evils that the law sought to prevent by making a prior license a prerequisite for a valid marriage. 52 The
protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure
of an invalid one as well.53 To permit a false affidavit to take the place of a marriage license is to allow an abject
circumvention of the law. If this Court is to protect the fabric of the institution of marriage, we must be wary of deceptive
schemes that violate the legal measures set forth in our laws.
Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic that as a marriage under a license is not invalidated
by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by a fabricated statement that
the parties have cohabited for at least five years as required by law. The contrast is flagrant. The former is with reference
to an irregularity of the marriage license, and not to the absence of one. Here, there is no marriage license at all.
Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisa’s cohabitation,
which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere
irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties
under oath. If the essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of paper, without force and
effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all.
In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth the argument that based on equity, Jose should be denied relief
because he perpetrated the fabrication, and cannot thereby profit from his wrongdoing. This is a misplaced invocation. It
must be stated that equity finds no room for application where there is a law. 54 There is a law on the ratification of marital
cohabitation, which is set in precise terms under Article 76 of the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the authorities are consistent
that the declaration of nullity of the parties’ marriage is without prejudice to their criminal liability. 55
The Republic further avers in its third assignment of error that Jose is deemed estopped from assailing the legality of his
marriage for lack of a marriage license. It is claimed that Jose and Felisa had lived together from 1986 to 1990,
notwithstanding Jose’s subsequent marriage to Rufina Pascual on 31 August 1990, and that it took Jose seven years
before he sought the declaration of nullity; hence, estoppel had set in.
This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible.56 Jose and Felisa’s marriage was celebrated sans a
marriage license. No other conclusion can be reached except that it is void ab initio. In this case, the right to impugn a
void marriage does not prescribe, and may be raised any time.
Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the five-year common-law cohabitation period under
Article 76 means a five-year period computed back from the date of celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal
union had it not been for the absence of a marriage.57 It covers the years immediately preceding the day of the marriage,
characterized by exclusivity - meaning no third party was involved at any time within the five years - and continuity that is
unbroken.58
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006 in
CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, declaring the marriage of Jose Dayot to Felisa Tecson-Dayot void ab initio, is AFFIRMED, without
prejudice to their criminal liability, if any. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 179620 August 26, 2008
MANUEL G. ALMELOR, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF LAS PIÑAS CITY, BRANCH 254, and LEONIDA T. ALMELOR, respondents.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
28
MARRIAGE, in its totality, involves the spouses' right to the community of their whole lives. It likewise involves a true
intertwining of personalities.1
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) denying the petition for annulment
of judgment and affirming in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Las Piñas, Branch 254. The CA dismissed
outright the Rule 47 petition for being the wrong remedy.
The Facts
Petitioner Manuel G. Almelor (Manuel) and respondent Leonida Trinidad (Leonida) were married on January 29, 1989 at
the Manila Cathedral.3 Their union bore three children: (1) Maria Paulina Corinne, born on October 20, 1989; (2) Napoleon
Manuel, born on August 9, 1991; and (3) Manuel Homer, born on July 4, 1994. 4 Manuel and Leonida are both medical
practitioners, an anesthesiologist and a pediatrician, respectively.5
After eleven (11) years of marriage, Leonida filed a petition with the RTC in Las Piñas City to annul their marriage on the
ground that Manuel was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations. The case, docketed as LP-00-
0132 was raffled off to Branch 254.
During the trial, Leonida testified that she first met Manuel in 1981 at the San Lazaro Hospital where they worked as
medical student clerks. At that time, she regarded Manuel as a very thoughtful person who got along well with other
people. They soon became sweethearts. Three years after, they got married. 6
Leonida averred that Manuel's kind and gentle demeanor did not last long. In the public eye, Manuel was the picture of a
perfect husband and father. This was not the case in his private life. At home, Leonida described Manuel as a harsh
disciplinarian, unreasonably meticulous, easily angered. Manuel's unreasonable way of imposing discipline on their
children was the cause of their frequent fights as a couple. 7 Leonida complained that this was in stark contrast to the
alleged lavish affection Manuel has for his mother. Manuel's deep attachment to his mother and his dependence on her
decision-making were incomprehensible to Leonida.8
Further adding to her woes was his concealment to her of his homosexuality. Her suspicions were first aroused when she
noticed Manuel's peculiar closeness to his male companions. For instance, she caught him in an indiscreet telephone
conversation manifesting his affection for a male caller. 9 She also found several pornographic homosexual materials in
his possession.10 Her worse fears were confirmed when she saw Manuel kissed another man on the lips. The man was a
certain Dr. Nogales.11 When she confronted Manuel, he denied everything. At this point, Leonida took her children and
left their conjugal abode. Since then, Manuel stopped giving support to their children.12
Dr. Valentina del Fonso Garcia, a clinical psychologist, was presented to prove Leonida's claim. Dr. del Fonso Garcia
testified that she conducted evaluative interviews and a battery of psychiatric tests on Leonida. She also had a one-time
interview with Manuel and face-to-face interviews with Ma. Paulina Corrinne (the eldest child). 13 She concluded that
Manuel is psychologically incapacitated.14 Such incapacity is marked by antecedence; it existed even before the marriage
and appeared to be incurable.
Manuel, for his part, admitted that he and Leonida had some petty arguments here and there. He, however, maintained
that their marital relationship was generally harmonious. The petition for annulment filed by Leonida came as a surprise
to him.
Manuel countered that the true cause of Leonida's hostility against him was their professional rivalry. It began when he
refused to heed the memorandum15 released by Christ the King Hospital. The memorandum ordered him to desist from
converting his own lying-in clinic to a primary or secondary hospital.16 Leonida's family owns Christ the King Hospital which
is situated in the same subdivision as Manuel's clinic and residence. 17 In other words, he and her family have competing b. Directing the Local Civil Registrars of Las Piñas City and Manila City to cause the registration of
or rival hospitals in the same vicinity. the said Entry of Judgment in their respective Books of Marriages.

Manuel belied her allegation that he was a cruel father to their children. He denied maltreating them. At most, he only Upon compliance, a decree of nullity of marriage shall be issued.
imposed the necessary discipline on the children.
SO ORDERED.24 (Emphasis supplied)
He also defended his show of affection for his mother. He said there was nothing wrong for him to return the love and
affection of the person who reared and looked after him and his siblings. This is especially apt now that his mother is in
The trial court nullified the marriage, not on the ground of Article 36, but Article 45 of the Family Code. It ratiocinated:
her twilight years.18 Manuel pointed out that Leonida found fault in this otherwise healthy relationship because of her very
jealous and possessive nature.19
x x x a careful evaluation and in-depth analysis of the surrounding circumstances of the allegations in the
complaint and of the evidence presented in support thereof (sic) reveals that in this case (sic) there is more than
This same overly jealous behavior of Leonida drove Manuel to avoid the company of female friends. He wanted to avoid
meets the eyes (sic).
any further misunderstanding with his wife. But, Leonida instead conjured up stories about his sexual preference. She
also fabricated tales about pornographic materials found in his possession to cast doubt on his masculinity. 20
Both legally and biologically, homosexuality x x x is, indeed, generally incompatible with hetero sexual marriage.
This is reason enough that in this jurisdiction (sic) the law recognizes marriage as a special contract exclusively
To corroborate his version, he presented his brother, Jesus G. Almelor. Jesus narrated that he usually stayed at Manuel's
only between a man and a woman x x x and thus when homosexuality has trespassed into marriage, the same
house during his weekly trips to Manila from Iriga City. He was a witness to the generally harmonious relationship between
law provides ample remedies to correct the situation [Article 45(3) in relation to Article 46(4) or Article 55, par.
his brother Manuel and sister-in-law, Leonida. True, they had some quarrels typical of a husband and wife relationship.
6, Family Code]. This is of course in recognition of the biological fact that no matter how a man cheats himself
But there was nothing similar to what Leonida described in her testimony.21
that he is not a homosexual and forces himself to live a normal heterosexual life, there will surely come a time
when his true sexual preference as a homosexual shall prevail in haunting him and thus jeopardizing the solidity,
Jesus further testified that he was with his brother on the day Leonida allegedly saw Manuel kissed another man. He honor, and welfare of his own family.25
denied that such an incident occurred. On that particular date,22 he and Manuel went straight home from a trip to Bicol.
There was no other person with them at that time, except their driver. 23
Manuel filed a notice of appeal which was, however, denied due course. Undaunted, he filed a petition for annulment of
judgment with the CA.26
Manuel expressed his intention to refute Dr. del Fonso Garcia's findings by presenting his own expert witness. However,
no psychiatrist was presented.
Manuel contended that the assailed decision was issued in excess of the lower court's jurisdiction; that it had no jurisdiction
to dissolve the absolute community of property and forfeit his conjugal share in favor of his children.
RTC Disposition
CA Disposition
By decision dated November 25, 2005, the RTC granted the petition for annulment, with the following disposition:
On July 31, 2007, the CA denied the petition, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premised on the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
WHEREFORE, the present Petition for Annulment of Judgment is hereby DENIED. The Court AFFIRMS in
1. Declaring the marriage contracted by herein parties on 29 January 1989 and all its effects under the law null toto the Decision (dated November 25, 2005) of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 254), in Las Piñas City, in
and void from the beginning; Civil Case No. LP-00-0132. No costs.27

2. Dissolving the regime of community property between the same parties with forfeiture of defendant's share
thereon in favor of the same parties' children whose legal custody is awarded to plaintiff with visitorial right
afforded to defendant;
3. Ordering the defendant to give monthly financial support to all the children; and
4. Pursuant to the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC:
a. Directing the Branch Clerk of this Court to enter this Judgment upon its finality in the Book of Entry
of Judgment and to issue an Entry of Judgment in accordance thereto; and
The CA stated that petitioner pursued the wrong remedy by filing the extraordinary remedy of petition for annulment of
judgment. Said the appellate court:
It is obvious that the petitioner is questioning the propriety of the decision rendered by the lower Court. But the
remedy assuming there was a mistake is not a Petition for Annulment of Judgment but an ordinary appeal. An
error of judgment may be reversed or corrected only by appeal.
What petitioner is ascribing is an error of judgment, not of jurisdiction, which is properly the subject of an ordinary
appeal.

29
 In short, petitioner admits the jurisdiction of the lower court but he claims excess in the exercise thereof.
"Excess" assuming there was is not covered by Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The Rule refers
the lack of jurisdiction and not the exercise thereof.28
Issues
Petitioner Manuel takes the present recourse via Rule 45, assigning to the CA the following errors:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT TREATING THE PETITION FOR ANNULMENT
OF JUDGMENT AS A PETITION FOR REVIEW IN VIEW OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUES INVOLVED
AND IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE;
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT
AS REGARDS THE ORDER DECLARING THE MARRIAGE AS NULL AND VOID ON THE GROUND OF
PETITIONER'S PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY;
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT
AS REGARDS THE ORDER TO FORFEIT THE SHARE OF PETITIONER IN HIS SHARE OF THE CONJUGAL
ASSETS.29
Our Ruling
I. The stringent rules of procedures may be relaxed to serve the demands of substantial justice and in the Court's
exercise of equity jurisdiction.
Generally, an appeal taken either to the Supreme Court or the CA by the wrong or inappropriate mode shall be
dismissed.30This is to prevent the party from benefiting from one's neglect and mistakes. However, like most rules, it
carries certain exceptions. After all, the ultimate purpose of all rules of procedures is to achieve substantial justice as
expeditiously as possible.31
Annulment of judgment under Rule 47 is a last remedy. It can not be resorted to if the ordinary remedies are available or
no longer available through no fault of petitioner.32 However, in Buenaflor v. Court of Appeals,33 this Court clarified the
proper appreciation for technical rules of procedure, in this wise:
Rules of procedures are intended to promote, not to defeat, substantial justice and, therefore, they
should not be applied in a very rigid and technical sense. The exception is that while the Rules are
liberally construed, the provisions with respect to the rules on the manner and periods for perfecting
appeals are strictly applied. As an exception to the exception, these rules have sometimes been relaxed
on equitable considerations. Also, in some cases the Supreme Court has given due course to an appeal
perfected out of time where a stringent application of the rules would have denied it, but only when to do so
would serve the demands of substantial justice and in the exercise of equity jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court.34 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
30
For reasons of justice and equity, this Court has allowed exceptions to the stringent rules governing appeals.35 It has, in
the past, refused to sacrifice justice for technicality.36
After discovering the palpable error of his petition, Manuel seeks the indulgence of this Court to consider his petition before
the CA instead as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
A perusal of the said petition reveals that Manuel imputed grave abuse of discretion to the lower court for annulling his
marriage on account of his alleged homosexuality. This is not the first time that this Court is faced with a similar situation.
In Nerves v. Civil Service Commission,37 petitioner Delia R. Nerves elevated to the CA a Civil Service Commission (CSC)
decision suspending her for six (6) months. The CSC ruled Nerves, a public school teacher, is deemed to have already
served her six-month suspension during the pendency of the case. Nevertheless, she is ordered reinstated without back
wages. On appeal, Nerves stated in her petition, inter alia:
1. This is a petition for certiorari filed pursuant to Article IX-A, Section 7 of the Constitution of the Philippines
and under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
2. But per Supreme Court Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 (Revised Circular No. 1-91) petitioner is
filing the instant petition with this Honorable Court instead of the Supreme Court. 38 (Underscoring supplied)
The CA dismissed Nerves' petition for certiorari for being the wrong remedy or the inappropriate mode of appeal. 39 The
CA opined that "under the Supreme Court Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 x x x appeals from judgments or final
orders or resolutions of CSC is by a petition for review."40
This Court granted Nerves petition and held that she had substantially complied with the Administrative Circular. The
Court stated:
That it was erroneously labeled as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is only a minor
procedural lapse, not fatal to the appeal. x x x
More importantly, the appeal on its face appears to be impressed with merit. Hence, the Court of Appeals should
have overlooked the insubstantial defects of the petition x x x in order to do justice to the parties
concerned. There is, indeed, nothing sacrosanct about procedural rules, which should be liberally construed in
order to promote their object and assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action or proceeding. As it has been said, where the rigid application of the rules would frustrate
substantial justice, or bar the vindication of a legitimate grievance, the courts are justified in exempting a
particular case from the operation of the rules.41(Underscoring supplied)
Similarly, in the more recent case of Tan v. Dumarpa,42 petitioner Joy G. Tan availed of a wrong remedy by filing a petition
for review on certiorari instead of a motion for new trial or an ordinary appeal. In the interest of justice, this Court
considered the petition, pro hac vice, as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
This Court found that based on Tan's allegations, the trial court prima facie committed grave abuse of discretion in
rendering a judgment by default. If uncorrected, it will cause petitioner great injustice. The Court elucidated in this wise:
Indeed, where as here, there is a strong showing that grave miscarriage of justice would result from the strict
application of the Rules, we will not hesitate to relax the same in the interest of substantial
justice.43 (Underscoring supplied)
Measured by the foregoing yardstick, justice will be better served by giving due course to the present petition and treating
petitioner's CA petition as one for certiorari under Rule 65, considering that what is at stake is the validity or non-validity
of a marriage.
In Salazar v. Court of Appeals,44 citing Labad v. University of Southeastern Philippines, this Court reiterated:
x x x The dismissal of appeals on purely technical grounds is frowned upon. While the right to appeal is a
statutory, not a natural right, nonetheless it is an essential part of our judicial system and courts should proceed
with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to appeal, but rather, ensure that every party-litigant has
the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, free from the constraints of
technicalities.45
Indeed, it is far better and more prudent for a court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case
on the merits to attain the ends of justice.46
Furthermore, it was the negligence and incompetence of Manuel's counsel that prejudiced his right to appeal. His counsel,
Atty. Christine Dugenio, repeatedly availed of inappropriate remedies. After the denial of her notice of appeal, she failed
to move for reconsideration or new trial at the first instance. She also erroneously filed a petition for annulment of judgment
rather than pursue an ordinary appeal.
These manifest errors were clearly indicative of counsel's incompetence. These gravely worked to the detriment of
Manuel's appeal. True it is that the negligence of counsel binds the client. Still, this Court has recognized certain
exceptions: (1) where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law; (2) when its
application will result in outright deprivation of the client's liberty and property; or (3) where the interest of justice so
require.47
The negligence of Manuel's counsel falls under the exceptions. Ultimately, the reckless or gross negligence of petitioner's
former counsel led to the loss of his right to appeal. He should not be made to suffer for his counsel's grave mistakes.
Higher interests of justice and equity demand that he be allowed to ventilate his case in a higher court.
In Apex Mining, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,48 this Court explained thus:
It is settled that the negligence of counsel binds the client. This is based on the rule that any act performed by
a counsel within the scope of his general or implied authority is regarded as an act of his client. However, where
counsel is guilty of gross ignorance, negligence and dereliction of duty, which resulted in the client's being held
liable for damages in a damage suit, the client is deprived of his day in court and the judgment may be set aside
on such ground. In the instant case, higher interests of justice and equity demand that petitioners be allowed to
present evidence on their defense. Petitioners may not be made to suffer for the lawyer's mistakes. This Court
will always be disposed to grant relief to parties aggrieved by perfidy, fraud, reckless inattention and
downright incompetence of lawyers, which has the consequence of depriving their clients, of their day
in court.49(Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, this Court has the power to except a particular case from the operation of the rule whenever the demands of
justice require it. With more conviction should it wield such power in a case involving the sacrosanct institution of marriage.
This Court is guided with the thrust of giving a party the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of one's action. 50
The client was likewise spared from counsel's negligence in Government Service Insurance System v. Bengson
Commercial Buildings, Inc.51 and Ancheta v. Guersey-Dalaygon.52 Said the Court in Bengson:
31
But if under the circumstances of the case, the rule deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes a
great hindrance and chief enemy, its rigors must be relaxed to admit exceptions thereto and to prevent a
miscarriage of justice. In other words, the court has the power to except a particular case from the operation of
the rule whenever the purposes of justice require it.53
II. Concealment of homosexuality is the proper ground to annul a marriage, not homosexuality per se.
Manuel is a desperate man determined to salvage what remains of his marriage. Persistent in his quest, he fought back
all the heavy accusations of incapacity, cruelty, and doubted masculinity thrown at him.
The trial court declared that Leonida's petition for nullity had "no basis at all because the supporting grounds relied
upon can not legally make a case under Article 36 of the Family Code." It went further by citing Republic v. Molina:54
Indeed, mere allegations of conflicting personalities, irreconcilable differences, incessant quarrels and/or
beatings, unpredictable mood swings, infidelities, vices, abandonment, and difficulty, neglect, or failure in the
performance of some marital obligations do not suffice to establish psychological incapacity. 55
If so, the lower court should have dismissed outright the petition for not meeting the guidelines set in Molina. What Leonida
attempted to demonstrate were Manuel's homosexual tendencies by citing overt acts generally predominant among
homosexual individuals.56 She wanted to prove that the perceived homosexuality rendered Manuel incapable of fulfilling
the essential marital obligations.
But instead of dismissing the petition, the trial court nullified the marriage between Manuel and Leonida on the ground of
vitiated consent by virtue of fraud. In support of its conclusion, the lower court reasoned out:
As insinuated by the State (p. 75, TSN, 15 December 2003), when there is smoke surely there is fire. Although
vehemently denied by defendant, there is preponderant evidence enough to establish with certainty that
defendant is really a homosexual. This is the fact that can be deduced from the totality of the marriage life
scenario of herein parties.
Before his marriage, defendant knew very well that people around him even including his own close
friends doubtedhis true sexual preference (TSN, pp. 35-36, 13 December 2000; pp. 73-75, 15 December 2003).
After receiving many forewarnings, plaintiff told defendant about the rumor she heard but defendant did not do
anything to prove to the whole world once and for all the truth of all his denials. Defendant threatened to sue
those people but nothing happened after that. There may have been more important matters to attend to than
to waste time and effort filing cases against and be effected by these people and so, putting more premiums on
defendant's denials, plaintiff just the same married him. Reasons upon reasons may be advanced to either
exculpate or nail to the cross defendant for his act of initially concealing his homosexuality to plaintiff, but in the
end, only one thing is certain - even during his marriage with plaintiff, the smoke of doubt about his real
preference continued and even got thicker, reason why obviously defendant failed to establish a happy and
solid family; and in so failing, plaintiff and their children became his innocent and unwilling victims.
Yes, there is nothing untoward of a man if, like herein defendant, he is meticulous over even small details in the
house (sic) like wrongly folded bed sheets, etc. or if a man is more authoritative in knowing what clothes or
jewelry shall fit his wife (pp. 77-81, TSN, 15 December 2003); but these admissions of defendant taken in the
light of evidence presented apparently showing that he had extra fondness of his male friends (sic) to the extent
that twice on separate occasions (pp. 4-7, TSN, 14 February 2001) he was allegedly seen by plaintiff kissing
another man lips-to-lips plus the homosexual magazines and tapes likewise allegedly discovered underneath
his bed (Exhibits "L" and "M"), the doubt as to his real sex identity becomes stronger. The accusation of plaintiff
versus thereof of defendant may be the name of the game in this case; but the simple reason of professional
rivalry advanced by the defendant is certainly not enough to justify and obscure the question why plaintiff should
 accuse him of such a very untoward infidelity at the expense and humiliation of their children and family as a
whole.57
Evidently, no sufficient proof was presented to substantiate the allegations that Manuel is a homosexual and that he
concealed this to Leonida at the time of their marriage. The lower court considered the public perception of Manuel's
sexual preference without the corroboration of witnesses. Also, it took cognizance of Manuel's peculiarities and interpreted
it against his sexuality.
What was proven in the hearings a quo was a relatively blissful marital union for more than eleven (11) years, which
produced three (3) children. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage rests on Leonida. Sadly, she failed to
discharge this onus.
The same failure to prove fraud which purportedly resulted to a vitiated marital consent was found in Villanueva v. Court
of Appeals.68 In Villanueva, instead of proving vitiation of consent, appellant resorted to baseless portrayals of his wife as
a perpetrator of fraudulent schemes. Said the Court:

Even assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that Manuel is a homosexual, the lower court cannot appreciate it as a ground to
annul his marriage with Leonida. The law is clear - a marriage may be annulled when the consent of either party was
obtained by fraud,58 such as concealment of homosexuality.59 Nowhere in the said decision was it proven by
preponderance of evidence that Manuel was a homosexual at the onset of his marriage and that he deliberately hid such
fact to his wife.60 It is the concealment of homosexuality, and not homosexuality per se, that vitiates the consent of the
innocent party. Such concealment presupposes bad faith and intent to defraud the other party in giving consent to the
marriage.
Consent is an essential requisite of a valid marriage. To be valid, it must be freely given by both parties. An allegation of
vitiated consent must be proven by preponderance of evidence. The Family Code has enumerated an exclusive list of
circumstances61 constituting fraud. Homosexuality per se is not among those cited, but its concealment.
This distinction becomes more apparent when we go over the deliberations 62 of the Committees on the Civil Code and
Family Law, to wit:
Justice Caguioa remarked that this ground should be eliminated in the provision on the grounds for legal
separation. Dean Gupit, however, pointed out that in Article 46, they are talking only of "concealment," while in
the article on legal separation, there is actuality. Judge Diy added that in legal separation, the ground existed
after the marriage, while in Article 46, the ground existed at the time of the marriage. Justice Reyes suggested
that, for clarity, they add the phrase "existing at the time of the marriage" at the end of subparagraph (4). The
Committee approved the suggestion.63
Factual findings of the Court of Appeals, especially if they coincide with those of the trial court, as in the instant
case, are generally binding on this Court. We affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals that petitioner freely
and voluntarily married private respondent and that no threats or intimidation, duress or violence compelled him
to do so, thus -
Appellant anchored his prayer for the annulment of his marriage on the ground that he did not freely consent to
be married to the appellee. He cited several incidents that created on his mind a reasonable and well-grounded
fear of an imminent and grave danger to his life and safety. x x x
The Court is not convinced that appellant's apprehension of danger to his person is so overwhelming as to
deprive him of the will to enter voluntarily to a contract of marriage. It is not disputed that at the time he was
allegedly being harassed, appellant worked as a security guard in a bank. Given the rudiments of self-defense,
or, at the very least, the proper way to keep himself out of harm's way. x x x
Appellant also invoked fraud to annul his marriage, as he was made to believe by appellee that the latter was
pregnant with his child when they were married. Appellant's excuse that he could not have impregnated the
appellee because he did not have an erection during their tryst is flimsy at best, and an outright lie at worst. The
complaint is bereft of any reference to his inability to copulate with the appellee. x x x
xxxx

x x x The failure to cohabit becomes relevant only if it arises as a result of the perpetration of any of the grounds
To reiterate, homosexuality per se is only a ground for legal separation. It is its concealment that serves as a valid ground
for annulling the marriage, such as lack of parental consent, insanity, fraud, intimidation, or undue influence x x
to annul a marriage.64 Concealment in this case is not simply a blanket denial, but one that is constitutive of fraud. It is this
x. Since the appellant failed to justify his failure to cohabit with the appellee on any of these grounds, the validity
fundamental element that respondent failed to prove.
of his marriage must be upheld.69

In the United States, homosexuality has been considered as a basis for divorce. It indicates that questions of sexual
Verily, the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion, not only by solely taking into account petitioner's
identity strike so deeply at one of the basic elements of marriage, which is the exclusive sexual bond between the
homosexuality per se and not its concealment, but by declaring the marriage void from its existence.
spouses.65 In Crutcher v. Crutcher,66 the Court held:

This Court is mindful of the constitutional policy to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social
Unnatural practices of the kind charged here are an infamous indignity to the wife, and which would make the
institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.70 The State and the public have vital interest in the maintenance
marriage relation so revolting to her that it would become impossible for her to discharge the duties of a wife,
and preservation of these social institutions against desecration by fabricated evidence. 71 Thus, any doubt should be
and would defeat the whole purpose of the relation. In the natural course of things, they would cause mental
resolved in favor of the validity of marriage.
suffering to the extent of affecting her health.67

III. In a valid marriage, the husband and wife jointly administer and enjoy their community or conjugal property.
However, although there may be similar sentiments here in the Philippines, the legal overtones are significantly different.
Divorce is not recognized in the country. Homosexuality and its alleged incompatibility to a healthy heterosexual life are
not sanctioned as grounds to sever the marriage bond in our jurisdiction. At most, it is only a ground to separate from bed Article 96 of the Family Code, on regimes of absolute community property, provides:
and board.
Art. 96. The administration and enjoyment of the community property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In
case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for a

32
 proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such Lynnette and Martini, a seaman working overseas, became pen pals in 1995.
decision.
In 1996, the two met in person during Martini’s vacation after the expiration of his contract on board an ocean-going vessel.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the
common properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include
On August 12, 1997, Martini, then 32, and Lynnette, then 34, contracted marriage, 7 following which they moved to the
the powers of disposition or encumbrance without the authority of the court or the written consent of the other
house of Lynnette’s parents at 33-B La Guardia Extension, Lahug, Cebu City. Martini, however, stayed there only on
spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However,
weekends, and during weekdays he stayed with his parents in Looc, Lapu-lapu City. While Lynnette suggested that the
the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third
two of them stay in the house of Martini’s parents, Martini disagreed, claiming that there were many already living with his
person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization
parents.
by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.

Lynnette noticed that every time she conversed with Martini, he always mentioned his mother and his family, and she
A similar provision, Article 12472 prescribes joint administration and enjoyment in a regime of conjugal partnership. In a
soon realized that he was a "mama’s boy." And she noticed too that when she would call up Martini at his parent’s house
valid marriage, both spouses exercise administration and enjoyment of the property regime, jointly.
and his mother was the one who answered the call, she would deny that he was around.

In the case under review, the RTC decreed a dissolution of the community property of Manuel and Leonida. In the same
In 1998, after Martini again returned following an almost 10-month contract overseas,8 he stayed with Lynnette. When in
breath, the trial court forfeited Manuel's share in favor of the children. Considering that the marriage is upheld valid and
1999 Martini again disembarked, he stayed with his parents.
subsisting, the dissolution and forfeiture of Manuel's share in the property regime is unwarranted. They remain the joint
administrators of the community property.
On the insistence of his mother, Martini’s monetary allotment was shared equally between her and Lynnette.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The appealed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the petition in the
trial court to annul the marriage is DISMISSED. Lynnette had since January 1999 not heard from Martini. And since April 1999, Lynnette stopped receiving her share of
the allotment, drawing her to inquire from Martini’s employer who informed her that he had already disembarked on even
month. She soon found out that Martini was in Alabang, Muntinlupa.
SO ORDERED.

When Lynnette and Martini finally met in Cebu City, he told her that they are not compatible and should just part ways.
G.R. No. 171042 June 30, 2008

The last time the couple talked was on October 14, 1999 when Martini was at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA)
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
about to depart for abroad. Since then, Martini never communicated with Lynnette. On investigation, Lynnette learned that
vs.
Martini declared in his employment records that he was "single" and named his mother as principal allottee. 9
LYNNETTE CABANTUG-BAGUIO, respondent.

Hence, Lynnette’s filing of the complaint for declaration of nullification of marriage.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:
From the Decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed that of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 24 nullifying
the marriage of respondent, Lynnette Cabantug-Baguio (Lynnette), to Martini Dico Baguio (Martini), the Republic through
the Office of the Solicitor General filed the present petition for review.
Aside from her deposition,10 Lynnette presented her Certificate of Marriage,11 Martini’s undated Seafarer Information
Sheet,12 the letter of clinical psychologist Dr. Andres S. Gerong (Dr. Gerong) to Martini requesting for a personal
interview,13 Dr. Gerong’s testimony,14 and the Psychological Evaluation Report15 prepared by Dr. Gerong after his
interview of Lynnette and her sister Dr. Rosemarie Sistoza.16
In the Psychological Evaluation Report, Dr. Gerong noted as follows:

Lynnette and Martini contracted marriage on August 12, 1997. Less than three years later or on October 12, 2000, Lynnette
1. The couples [sic] were married on August 12, 1997 in Danao City, Cebu[;]
filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City a complaint1 for declaration of nullity of marriage, docketed as
Civil Case No. CEB 25700, on the ground of Martini’s psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital duties
and obligations under Articles 68-702 of the Family Code. 2. After the wedding the couple stayed at the petitioner’s residence, but the defendant would always go home
to his parents in Looc, Lapu-lapu City;
Despite service of summons upon Martini, he never filed any responsive pleading to the complaint.3 No collusion was
established between the parties.4 Upon the authority of the Solicitor General, the provincial prosecutor of Cebu City 3. Defendant did not show any directions to establish their home, [is] happy-go-lucky, and would just see the
appeared in the case under the former’s supervision and control. 5 plaintiff for his physical and sexual needs;

From the deposition of Lynnette taken before Branch Clerk of Court Atty. Monalila S. Tecson on January 10, 2001, 6the 4. Plaintiff felt being used, exploited, uncared for, taken for granted, abandoned;
following are gathered:
33
 5. Defendant’s parents appeared to control the son to the extent of meddling [with] the finances coming from A: Being, I would say in our popular parlance, "mama’s boy" as alleged, that will endanger the integrity of the
the income as a seaman; marriage because instead of establishing a permanent conjugal relationship with the wife the husband-
defendant would remain dependent on his family.
6. Defendant never showed respect for his parents-in-law;
xxxx
7. Parents of the defendant insisted [on] a co-allot[ment without] any protestations from the plaintiff who has
been generous all the time; ATTY. SINGCO: (To witness)

8. Defendant remained immature, could not stand by his wife and would still depend upon the decisions of his Q: Okay, in terms of the chances that this incapacity will be cured, what are the chances, if any?
parents and without any personal directions as to what to do with his family;
A: As to curability, since I am using a clinical term ["]personality or character disorder or dysfunction["] and as I
9. Strictly speaking, the couple never really live[d] together as husband and wife like any ordinary have said many times that the personality is stable and pervasive over time. And if it is established as early as
couple17(underscoring supplied), adolescent period and up to the present it has remained persistent thru the years and therefore it’s a permanent
trait of the defendant-husband, therefore it’s incurable.19 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
and concluded that
By Decision20 of January 2, 2002, Branch 24 of the Cebu City RTC found Martini psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage, and that the same incapacity existed "at the time the couple exchanged
Defendant shows immature personality disorder, dependency patterns, and self-centered motives. Th[ese are]
their marriage vows."
the core personality dysfunctions noted and have been exaggeratedly expressed which are detrimental to the
familial well-being;
The Solicitor General, via appeal,21 challenged before the Court of Appeals the trial court’s decision
The situation is serious, grave, existing already during the adolescent period, and incurable because personality
and character are stable whether or not it is normal and adaptive. . . . DECLARING THE PARTIES’ MARRIAGE NULL AND VOID, DEFENDANTS MARTINI DICO BAGUIO’S
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY NOT HAVING BEEN PROVEN TO EXIST.22
xxxx
By Decision23 of January 13, 2005, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision. Addressing the Solicitor
General’s argument that Dr. Gerong’s testimony failed to establish the cause of Martini’s psychological incapacity and to
The defendant is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations in marriage and
show that it existed at the inception of the marriage,24 the Court of Appeals held:
family.18 (Underscoring supplied)

x x x [I]n contradiction of the Republic’s contention and its supporting above-cited doctrine, this Court cites the
Expounding on his findings, Dr. Gerong testified, thus:
more recent jurisprudence laid down in the case of Marcos v. Marcos,25 in which the High Tribunal has foregone
with the requirement that the defendant should be examined by a physician or psychologist as a conditio sine
ATTY. SINGCO: (To witness) qua non for declaration of nullity of marriage. It held thus:

Q: In gist, what were your findings as to the psychological capacity or incapacity of defendant Martini Dico "The x x x guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared
Baguio? psychologically incapacitated x x x – [w]hat is important is the presence of evidence that can
adequately establish the party’s psychological condition, [f]or indeed, if the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination
A: x x x [T]o sum it up, the synopsis of the findings, the defendant husband appeared to be [a] dependent person for the person concerned need not be resorted to."26
to his family and unable to [sever . . .] the connection being a married man and to establish a domicile for his
family and to support his family.
Therefore, the oral deposition [of Lynette] and the Psychological Evaluation Report by Dr. Andres S.
Gerong, Ph.D. as Clinical Psychologist declaring the defendant psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
xxxx essential obligations in marriage and family life was sufficient for US to believe that undeniably the defendant
suffers psychological incapacity.27 (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
ATTY. SINGCO: (To witness)
On the Solicitor General’s contention that Martini’s abandonment of Lynnette is a ground for legal separation and not for
Q: Dr. Gerong, how grave or serious is the psychological incapacity of the defendant? declaration of nullity of marriage,28 and that Martini’s alleged personality traits are not of the nature contemplated by Article
36 of the Family Code,29 the Court of Appeals declared:

34
 x x x WE note that it was not the abandonment which was the ground relied upon by the plaintiff-appellee but
the defendant’s being a mama’s boy.30
xxxx
Being a Mama’s Boy, his uncaring attitude towards his wife, declaring himself single and naming his
mother as the beneficiary, spending more time with his family and less with his wife and ultimately,
abandoning her manifested defendant’s psychological incapacity. These, to sum it all, to US are manifestations
of severe psychological disorder rather than a mere obstinate refusal to comply with his marital
obligations.31 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Solicitor General’s Motion for Reconsideration32 having been denied by the Court of Appeals,33 the present
petition34 was filed, faulting the appellate court to have gravely erred:
I
. . . IN RULING THAT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION AND TESTIMONY OF DR. ANDRES GERONG
THAT DEFENDANT IS PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED HAVE LEGAL BASIS.
II
. . . IN FAILING TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THAT ABANDONMENT BY ONE’S SPOUSE IS ONLY A
GROUND FOR LEGAL SEPARATION AND NOT FOR THE DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.
III
. . . IN RULING THAT DEFENDANT’S BEING A MAMA’S BOY IS A MANIFESTATION OF A
PSYCHOLOGICAL DISORDER.35 (Italics in the original)
The Solicitor General’s arguments persuade.
The Solicitor General argued as follows:
Dr. Gerong merely testified that defendant’s alleged psychological incapacity (being a mama’s boy) began in his
adolescent stage and has remained persistent through the years (p. 20, Brief). Dr. Gerong did not detail this finding. He
made no effort to look into and testify on defendant’s past life, attitudes, habits and character to explain defendant’s alleged
psychological incapacity as required by this Honorable Court in the case of Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina,
268 SCRA 198 (1998).
Again, while it is true that Dr. Gerong testified that defendant’s alleged defect is incurable, he failed to explain why it is
clinically or medically permanent. His only basis for saying that it is incurable is his finding that defendant has been a
mama’s boy since his adolescence (p. 7, TSN, June 19, 2001). During the trial, Dr. Gerong also failed to explain in detail
why the defendant’s alleged psychological incapacity is grave and to discuss what kind of disorder defendant is suffering
from.36 (Emphasis in the original; italics and underscoring supplied)
On the doctor’s findings in his Report, the Solicitor General argued:
35
The said findings reveal nothing in defendant’s past life and acts that shows a behavior pattern that would prove
his alleged psychological incapacity. Dr. Gerong’s finding that defendant’s parents are too controlling because
they were made co-allottees of the remittances sent by their son does not prove the alleged psychological
incapacity of defendant. The report likewise failed to explain the gravity of the alleged psychological incapacity
of defendant and state whether or not it incapacitates defendant from carrying out the normal and ordinary
duties of marriage and family. There is likewise no explanation by Dr. Gerong why he found defendant’s
incapacity to be incurable. This Honorable Court has held that such illness must be shown to be grave enough
to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligation of the marriage. Such incapacity must
also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable and grave [Republic vs. Court of Appeals
and Molina, supra]. These Dr. Gerong failed to do.
Even when the rules have been relaxed and the personal examination of the defendant by a psychiatrist
or psychologist is no longer mandatory for the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code, the totality of evidence presented during trial by private respondent must still provethe gravity, juridical
antecedence, and incurability of the alleged psychological incapacity (Marcos v. Marcos, 343 SCRA 755
[2000]; Santos v. Court of Appeals, 240 SCRA 20 [1995]). (Emphasis in the original; italics and underscoring
supplied)
In fine, the Solicitor General concluded that there was no showing that Martini’s alleged personality traits are of the nature
contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code and the rulings of this Court in the cited cases, 37 and that Martini’s
abandonment of Lynnette constitutes only a ground for legal separation but not for declaration of nullity of marriage. 38
Article 36 of the Family Code on which Lynnette anchors her complaint provides that "[a] marriage contracted by any party
who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization."
Article 36 must be read in conjunction with the other articles in the Family Code, specifically Articles 35, 37, 38, and 41
which provide different grounds to render a marriage void ab initio, as well as Article 45 which dwell on voidable marriages,
and Article 55 on legal separation.39 Care must be observed so that these various circumstances are not to be applied
indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter.40
And Article 36 should not be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest
themselves, nor with legal separation in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical
violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity,
abandonment, and the like.41
"Psychological incapacity" has been elucidated on as follows:
The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It
is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume. As all people may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated
characteristics associated with certain personality disorders, there is hardly a doubt that the intendment of the
law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. x x x [T]he root cause must be identified as a psychological illness, and its incapacitating nature must
be fully explained x x x.42 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The mere showing of "irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities" does not constitute psychological
incapacity.43 Nor does failure of the parties to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons.
It is essential that the parties to a marriage must be shown to be insensitive to or incapable of meeting their duties and WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 13, 2005
responsibilities due to some psychological (not physical) illness, 44 which insensitivity or incapacity should have is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. CEB 25700 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 24,
been existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage even if it becomes manifest only after its solemnization.45 is DISMISSED.

In fine, for psychological incapacity to render a marriage void ab initio, it must be characterized by SO ORDERED.

(a) Gravity – It must be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary
duties required in a marriage;

(b) Juridical Antecedence – It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the
overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and

(c) Incurability – It must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the
party involved. 46

Dr. Gerong found that Martini’s "personality disorders" including his being a "mama’s boy" are "serious, grave, existing
already during the adolescent period and incurable" and concluded that Martini "appeared" to be dependent upon his
family and unable "to establish a domicile for his family and to support his family."

The doctor’s findings and conclusion were derived from his interview of Lynnette and her sister and Lynnette’s deposition.
From Lynnette’s deposition, however, it is gathered that Martini’s failure to establish a common life with her stems from
his refusal, not incapacity, to do so. It is downright incapacity, not refusal or neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, 47 which
renders a marriage void on the ground of psychological incapacity. In another vein, how the doctor arrived at the
conclusion, after interviewing Lynnette and considering her deposition, that any such personality disorders of Martini have
been existing since Martini’s adolescent years has not been explained. It bears recalling that Martini and Lynnette became
pen pals in 1995 and contracted marriage in 1997 when Martini was already 32 years old, far removed from adolescent
years.

Dr. Gerong’s citing of Martini’s appointment of his mother as a beneficiary and his representing himself as single in his
Seafarer Information Sheet, without more, as indications of Martini’s dependence on his family amounting to his incapacity
to fulfill his duties as a married man does not logically follow, especially given that the Seafarer’s Information Sheet is not
even dated48 and, therefore, there is no certainty that it was prepared after Martini contracted marriage.

While the examination by a physician of a person in order to declare him/her psychological incapacitated is not required,
the root cause thereof must be "medically or clinically identified." There must thus be evidence to adequately establish the
same. There is none such in the case at bar, however.

The Constitution sets out a policy of protecting and strengthening the family as the basic social institution and marriage
as the foundation of the family.49 Marriage, an inviolable institution protected by the State, 50 cannot be dissolved at the
whim of the parties.51 In petitions for the declaration of nullity of marriage, the burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage
lies on the plaintiff.52 Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against
its dissolution and nullity.53

As reflected above, Lynnette failed to discharge the onus probandi. While the Court sympathizes with her predicament,
its first and foremost duty is to apply the law.54 Dura lex sed lex.

Lynnette’s marriage with Martini may have failed then, but it cannot be declared void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity in light of the insufficient evidence presented.55

36