4th PEOPLE VS.
YPARAGUIRRE Y SEPE -- normal vagina with old laceration found at 2:00
G.R. NO. 124391 (July 5, 2000)
Principle: An offer to compromise does not require that
a criminal complaint be first filed before the offer can be
received in evidence against the offeror. What is required
is that after committing the crime, the accused or his
representative makes an offer to compromise and such
offer is proved.
Facts:
• Accused-appellant Crispin Yparraguirre was charged
with the crime of rape.
• The prosecution established that Rosita Bacaling was a
housemaid of appellant and his wife; that on or about 7:00
in the evening of July 6, 1990 at the spouses' room in
Panabo, Davao, Rosita was cooking porridge for the
spouses' two children, one aged four years old and the
other nine months old. Accused-appellant arrived from
work and found the two children asleep. He approached
Rosita and gave her a small white envelope said to
contain medicine for her skin disease. Rosita was afflicted
with rashes on her thighs and stomach which she allegedly
contracted from one of the children.
• Rosita opened the envelope and counted fifteen (15)
tablets inside. As instructed by appellant, Rosita took all
the tablets. A few minutes later, she felt weak and fell
down. Suddenly, she realized that appellant was
dragging her to the spouses' bed. She tried to get up but
appellant pushed her down the bed and pointed a
hunting knife at her neck. He ordered Rosita not to move
or he would kill her.
• Then he removed her clothes and went on top of
her. He kissed her face, breasts, stomach and private
parts and then entered her. Rosita cried out in pain but
appellant continued entering her. After satisfying his lust,
appellant pulled out and punched Rosita in the
stomach. She lost consciousness.
A few minutes later, Rosita woke up and saw blood in her
private parts. She wiped the blood and changed her
clothes. Seeing her awake, appellant threatened to kill
her should she report the incident to her
parents. Appellant then left the house.
• Rosita did not say a word about the incident. She
continued serving the Yparraguirres for one month before
leaving them to return to her mother's house in Barrio
YYY. Her mother found Rosita in a state of shock. She
could not eat nor talk, neither could she perform ordinary
daily functions such as dressing herself. In short, Rosita
became helpless. She was brought to the Municipal
Health Officer by her mother for examination.
• On August 22, 1990, the Municipal Health Officer, Dr.
Imelda T. Bendijo, interviewed the girl and found her
unresponsive and unable to talk. She conducted a
physical examination and also found that:
[position]; hymen not intact;
Internal examination -- admits one finger;
Advised for pregnancy test and for consultation by [sic]
psychiatrist.
x x x."
• Upon the Municipal Health Officer's advice, Rosita was
confined at the Davao City Mental Hospital for
observation and treatment. After a week of treatment,
Rosita began to talk and revealed that she was raped by
appellant.
•Accused-appellant pled not guilty to the crime
charged. He claimed that on the night of the alleged
rape he was selling fish at the public market. Allegedly, he
was at the market at 4:00 in the morning, and worked
straight until 8:00 in the evening. He never left the fish stall
until after 8:00 in the evening because of his many
customers.
•The trial court found accused-appellant guilty and
sentenced him to reclusion perpetua. It also ordered him
to indemnify Rosita P50,000.00 as moral damages and pay
P5,000.00 as attorney's fees,
Issue:(1) Whether the must first be a complaint filed before
there is an offer to compromise for there to be an implied
admission of guilt.
Ruling:(1) No. An offer to compromise does not require that
a criminal complaint be first filed before the offer can be
received in evidence against the offeror. What is required
is that after committing the crime, the accused or his
representative makes an offer to compromise and such
offer is proved.
The positive identification of accused-appellant as the
rapist prevails over his defense of alibi. It was not physically
impossible for appellant to have been at the scene of the
crime. The public market was merely a ten-minute walk
from their rented room and during work breaks, appellant
would sometimes go home to bring food to his children.
7th PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RONNIE QUITLONG
Facts:
Jonathan Capito (a 19 yr. old Medical Technology student
in Baguio) and others while on their way home bought fish
balls. When Calpito counted the change for his 100-peso
bill, he saw that he had only been handed back thirty five
pesos. Confronted by Calpito, the fish ball vendor did not
admit that he had short-changed the former. Commotions
between group of Capito and group of Fish ball vendors
happened. Capito was stabbed and later died. Police
officers caught the accused on the act of stabbing
Capito. Emelio Senoto, Salvador Quitlong, and Ronnie
Quitlong was charge for murder. But in the original charge
it was not alleged that there was conspiracy.
Issue:
Whether or not conspiracy can be considered even if it
was not alleged in the original complaint.
Held:
Overwhelming, such as it may have been thought of by
the trial court, evidence of conspiracy is not enough for an
accused to bear and to respond to all its grave legal
consequences; it is equally essential that such accused
has been apprised when the charge is made conformably
with prevailing substantive and procedural
requirements. No. An information, in order to ensure that
the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of
the nature and cause of his accusation is not violated,
must state
the name of the accused;
the designation given to the offense by the statute;
a statement of the acts or omissions so complained of as
constituting the offense;
the name of the offended party; the approximate time
and date of the commission of the offense; and
the place where the offense has been committed.
In embodying the essential elements of the crime
charged, the information must set forth the facts and
circumstances that have a bearing on the culpability and
liability of the accused so that the accused can properly
prepare for and undertake his defense. One such fact
or circumstance in a complaint against two or more
accused persons is that of conspiracy. Quite unlike the
omission of an ordinary recital of fact which, if not
excepted from or objected to during trial, may be
corrected or supplied by competent proof, an allegation,
however, of conspiracy, or one that would impute criminal
liability to an accused for the act of another or others, is
indispensable in order to hold such person, regardless
of the nature and extent of his own participation, equally
guilty with the other or others in the commission of the
crime. Where conspiracy exists and can rightly
be appreciated, the individual acts done to perpetrate
the felony becomes of secondary importance, the act of
one being imputable to all the others. Verily, an accused
must know from the information whether he faces a
criminal responsibility not only for his acts but also for the
acts of his co-accused as well. Appellant Ronnie Quitlong
was a principal by his own act of stabbing Calpito that
caused the latter's death. Appellants Salvador Quitlong
and Emilio Senoto, Jr., were holding the hands of Calpito
at the precise time that Ronnie Quitlong was in the act
of executing his criminal intent. Simultaneity, however,
would not itself demonstrate the concurrence of will or the
unity of action and purpose that could be a basis for
collective responsibility of two or more individuals; indeed,
from all indications, the incident would appear to have
occurred at the spur of moment. Appellants Salvador
Quitlong and Emilio Senoto, Jr., shall therefore be held to
be mere accomplices conformably with Article 18 of the
Revised Penal Code.
WHEREFORE, appellant Ronnie Quitlong is found guilty of
the crime of murder.
19th PEOPLE vs. ZULUETA
G.R. No. L-4017 (August 30, 1951)
FACTS:
On October 15, 1949 an information was filed in said
criminal case charging Jose C. Zulueta with the crime of
malversation of public property. Copy of the information is
appended hereto (App. A.). The substance of the
accusation is that the accused, as Acting Chairman of the
Surplus Property Commission, wilfully or thru abandonment
permitted Beatriz Poblete to take and convert 3,000 kegs
of nails of the aforesaid Commission. It is alleged that he
secured the approval of sale to her of said nails at very low
prices by "astutely" prevailing upon Commissioner Angel
Llanes to approve it on the pretext of urgency to expedite
the liquidation of surplus properties. As an alternative
charge the information states that at least through
abandonment the accused permitted Beatriz Poblete to
carry the hardware away. Arraigned on November 24,
1949, the accused pleaded "not guilty."
On January 14, 1950, the prosecution submitted an
amended information (App. B), which practically
reproducing the original accusation, contained the
additional assertion — among others — that in permitting
the misappropriation the accused Jose C. Zulueta acted
in conspiracy with Commissioner Llanes, who had
subsequently been booked for malversation of the
identical public property (nails) in Criminal Case no. 11727
of the same court.
The accused objected to the admission of the amended
information contending that it introduced allegations
about acts and omission constituting another offense, and
that the amendments were substantial and prejudicial to
his right.
ISSUE:
WHETHER the amendment was purely a matter of form.
RULING: NO.
The amended pleading, with its deletions, transportation
and rephrasing, practically added a full page to the
original seven-page information. Seeing the prosecution's
insistence in its admission, to the extent of appealing to this
Court even at the risk of delaying the proceedings, one
would naturally suppose that its moves are dictated by the
necessities — neither formal nor unsubstantial — of the
case for the People.
Indeed, contrasting the two informations one will perceive
that whereas in the first the accused is charged with
misappropriation, of public property because: (1) he
deceived Angel Llanes into approving the bargain sale of
nails to Beatriz Poblete or (2) at least, by his abandonment
he permitted that woman to obtain information a third
ground responsibility is inserted, namely, that he connived
and conspired with Angel Llanes to consummate the give-
away transaction.
Again it will be observed that the third ground of action in
effect contradicts the original theory of the information: if
the accused conspired with Llanes, he did
not deceive the latter, and did not by
mere negligence permit the sale
In this connection it must be recalled that under the rules
of criminal procedure there is further limitation to formal
amendments, namely, that the amendment "can be done
without prejudice to the rights of the defendant." Surely the
preparation made by herein accused to face to meet the
new situation. For undoubtedly the allegations of
conspiracy enables the prosecution to attribute and
ascribe to the accused Zulueta all the facts, knowledge,
admission and even omissions of his co-conspirator Angel
Llanes in furtherance of the conspiracy. The amendments
thereby widen the battlefront to allow the use by the
prosecution of newly discovered weapons, to the evident
discomfiture of the opposite camp. Thus it would seem
inequitable to sanction the tactical movement at this
stage of the controversy, bearing in mind that the accused
is only guaranteed two-days' preparation for trial. Needless
to emphasize, as in criminal cases the liberty, even the life,
of the accused is at stake, it is always wise and proper that
he be fully apprised of the charges, to avoid any possible
surprise that may lead to injustice. The prosecution has too
many facilities to covet the added advantage of meeting
unprepared adversaries.
20th DANILO BUHAT v. COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 119601 (December 17, 1996)
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.
FACTS:
Danilo Buhat was charged with Homicide in an information
which alleged that petitioner Danilo Buhat, armed with a
knife, unlawfully attacked and killed one Ramon George
Yu while the said two unknown assailants held his arms,
"using superior strength, inflicting x x x mortal wounds which
were x x x the direct x x x cause of his death."
Even before petitioner could be arraigned, the
prosecution moved for the deferment of the arraignment
on the ground that the private complainant in the case,
one Betty Yu, moved for the reconsideration of the
resolution of the City Prosecutor which ordered the filing of
the aforementioned information for homicide.
Petitioner however, invoking his right to a speedy trial,
opposed the motion. Thus, petitioner was arraigned and,
since petitioner pleaded "not guilty", trial ensued.
The City Prosecutor of Roxas City was ordered "to amend
the information by upgrading the offense charged to
MURDER.”
ISSUE:
Whether the upgrading of the crime charged from
homicide to the more serious offense of murder is such a
substantial amendment or a formal amendment.
HELD:
It is FORMAL because the allegation of superior
strength is already there. In other words, from the very start
it was really meant to be murder.
“The real nature of the criminal charge is
determined not from the caption or preamble of the
information nor from the specification of the provision of
the law alleged to have been violated, they being
conclusions of law which in no way affect the legal
aspects of the information, but from the actual recital of
facts as alleged in the body of the information.”
Petitioner in this case maintains that, having
already pleaded "not guilty" to the crime of homicide, the
amendment of the crime charged in the information from
homicide to murder is a substantial amendment
prejudicial to his right to be informed of the nature of the
accusation against him. He utterly fails to dispute,
however, that the original information did allege that
petitioner stabbed his victim "using superior strength". And
this particular allegation qualifies a killing to murder,
regardless of how such a killing is technically designated in
the information filed by the public prosecutor.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of
merit. The City Prosecutor of Roxas City is HEREBY ORDERED
to file the correct Amended Information fully in
accordance with the findings of fact set forth in the
Resolution of the Secretary of Justice.
SO ORDERED.
24th PEOPLE V. ZAFRA
G.R. NO. 110079 (October 19, 1994)
FACTS: On November 21, 1991 at 10:30 in the evening,
appellant Francisco Zafra, with appellants Feliciano
Braganza Cresencio Velasco and three (3) other
unidentified male companions on board, was driving a
passenger jeep (owned by Efren Cardinal) along Turbina,
Calamba going in the direction of Batangas.
Upon reaching the bridge in Turbina, Calamba, appellant
Zafra was stopped by SPO1 Reynaldo Siman and PO3
Mario Villa of the Calamba Police as the passenger jeep
had no lights and was being driven in an erratic manner .
When asked by the police about his destination, Zafra
replied that he was going to Batangas. Then, as the police
approached to search the vehicle which was unlighted,
the three (3) unidentified companions of Zafra ran away.
The passenger jeep and the appellants were then taken
into custody.
Appellants were investigated on the same evening by
SPO3 Rolando Alcalde during which they revealed having
killed the driver of the jeepney and threw his body in
Barangay Real, Calamba. As a result, on November 24,
1991, SPO4 Feliciano Masongsong, SPO2 Elly Villa, SPO1
Rodolfo Hizon and other civilian agents accompanied the
appellants to Barangay Real where they found the body
of Candido Diongco, the jeepney driver, on a grassy
portion near the end of the South Expressway.
Zafra, Braganza, Velasco together with three (3)
unidentified men were charged with the crime of
carnapping.
Only Zafra, Braganza, and Velasco were arraigned and
tried, the other accused having remained at large. The
trial court found the accused guilty.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC of Fourth Judicial District stationed
in Calamba, Laguna has jurisdiction over the case even
the killing took place in Alabang, Muntinlupa.
RULING: Yes.
Accused-appellants contend that the Regional Trial Court
of the Fourth Judicial District stationed in Calamba,
Laguna has no jurisdiction over the case as the killing took
place in Alabang, Muntinlupa. The contention clearly runs
counter to Paragraph (b). Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules
of Court which reads:
(b) Where an offense is committed on a railroad train, in
an aircraft, or in any other public or private vehicle while
in the course of its trip, the criminal action may be instituted
and tried in the court of any municipality or province
through which such train, aircraft or other vehicle passed
during such trip.
As accused-appellants were apprehended in Calamba
while they were in the carnapped jeepney, the
information was validly filed in Calamba.
25th CALME V. CA
G.R. NO. 78447 August 17, 1989
FACTS: Petitioner Wenefredo Calme and four other
persons were accused of killing Edgardo Bernal by
allegedly throwing him overboard the M/V "Cebu City," an
interisland passenger ship owned and operated by William
Lines, Inc., while the vessel was sailing from Ozamis City to
Cebu City on the night of 12 May 1991. Petitioner
impugned the Oroquieta RTC’s jurisdiction over the
offense charged through a motion to quash which,
however, was denied by RTC, Oroquieta City. Petitioner
Calme’s petition for certiorari and prohibition was denied
due course and dismissed by the CA.
ISSUE: Whether Oroquieta court has jurisdiction over the
offense charged against petitioner.
RULING: Yes.
Petitioner asserts that, although the alleged crime took
place while the vessel was in transit, the general rule laid
down in par. (a) of Sec. 15 (now Section 14), Rule 110 of
the Revised Rules of Court is the applicable provision in
determining the proper venue and jurisdiction and not
Sec. 15(c) (now Section 14) thereof since the exact
location where the alleged crime occurred was known.
Petitioner thus claims that the proper venue is Siquijor
because, according to the Marine Protest filed by the
vessel’s captain, Elmer Magallanes, the ship was 8.0 miles
off Minalonan Point, Siquijor Island, when he (Capt.
Magallanes) received the report that "a passenger
jumped overboard."
Petitioner’s contention is unmeritorious. The exact location
where the alleged offense was committed was not duly
established. The Marine protest simply adverted that the
vessel was within the waters of Siquijor Island when the
captain was informed of the incident, which does not
necessarily prove that the alleged murder took place in
the same area. In any case, where the crime was actually
committed is immaterial since it is undisputed that it
occurred while the vessel was in transit. "In transit" simply
means "on the way or passage; while passing from one
person or place to another. In the course of
transportation." Hence, undoubtedly, the applicable
provision is par. (c) of Sec. 15 (now Section 14), Rule 100
which provides that" (w)here an offense is committed on
board a vessel in the course of its voyage, the criminal
action may be instituted and tried in the proper court of
the first port of entry of any municipality or territory through
which the vessel passed during such voyage subject to the
generally accepted principles of international law."
Petitioner further contends that even if Sec. 15(c), Rule 110
governs, Oroquieta City would still be excluded as a
proper venue because the reckoning point for
determining the venue under the aforementioned
paragraph is the first port of entry or the
municipalities/territories through which the ship passed
after the discovery of the crime, relying on Act No. 400.
We disagree. Obviously, Act No. 400 was amended by
Sec. 15(c), Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court in that
under the former law, jurisdiction was conferred to the CFI
of any province into which the ship or water craft upon
which the crime or offense was committed shall come
after the commission thereof, while the present rule
provides that jurisdiction is vested "in the proper court of
the first port of entry or of any municipality or territory
through which the vessel passed during such voyage . . ."
This is the applicable provision and since it does not
contain any qualification, we do not qualify the same. We
fully concur with the finding of the Court of Appeals, thus:

To support his arguments, petitioner relies on Act 400,

which according to him is the spirit behind the present Sec.
15(c), Rule 110. The said Act specifically provides, among
other things, that for crimes committed within the
navigable waters of the Philippine Archipelago, on board
a ship or water craft of Philippine registry, jurisdiction may
be exercised by the Court of First Instance in any province
in which the vessel shall come after the commission of the
crime.

Petitioner’s reliance on Act 400 is erroneous. The provision

of said Act vesting jurisdiction in the province where the
vessel shall come after the commission of the crime is not
carried in the present Rule.

The words of Sec. 15(c) being clear, there is no reason to

rely on Act 400 in determining its true meaning, regardless
of whether said Act was indeed the moving spirit behind it.
In fact, it does not seem that the provision of Act 400 was
carried into the present rule, as it is now worded.