CHAPTER ONE

Makers of Foreign Policy

Here we focus upon how, rvherc ald foreigl polic]r is constrtctcd

by i{,hom
in India. our investigation begim with an cxposition ofhow hdia's Political
system frnctiorE, and ortlines the keygoi,erDing stru.tures iboth legislative
ard execrtive) critical to the decision-making process. An aralvsis ofthe ce1l
tral features of India's parliamentary-stylc s].stem is noled. as wcll as some
ofthe Illajor car€als concerning the funclio[ing oflndian domestic politics.
The chapter then discusses India's major foreigr policy making bodies, espe
cially the role ofindia's bureaucrats in the Millistl] of [xternal Afla irs li!llA).
the Prime lt'linister's Oflice {PNIO) and the National Securiry CouDcil (NSC).
Ili hrrn, it evaluates the grordng and diversiiying non-gover11nieDtal in{l _

cnces upon loreign policy nraking, in particlrlar oflndia's expiinding sccurity

comnunil! (made up of for-mer-leading menbers oflndia's bureatiracy and
armed sen'ices, thinLtank heads, acadenics. journalists and others), as well
as oflndia's nyriad political parties and the nilitary. l'inally, critical dolncs-
tic deLemrinants ranging liom modernizalion and dcvelopnent pressul-lls
to internal in:itability and nationalism - are also highlighted to underscore
the heightening complcxitj, that is slowly becoming thc hallmark offoreign
policy meking in cootenporary lrdia.

1.1 Cenerational differences in forcign policy slylc

India's foreign policyrlaking appaEtus, and the govcrnmental and non-

gor.ernmcntal bodics, miiristries and influcnces inherelt to jt, havc devel
oped alrd mimicked the broader evolution oflDdia security as a wholc in the
nrodcrn period. Hence, in the decades loilowing ildependen.e. Jar{airar]al
Nehu - India's llrst primc nnister but also her f,rsl ,rinister of txte, n:11
affnirs - resolulelv donlinated thc conccption and delivery oflbreigll policv.
Tirrough thcse positioDs, it was NehN's vision of tha ilrternalional systeDl
(and his perception ol Irdin's place vithin itl lhat dictatcd nlany of tile core
pdnciples underscoring the uatiomlapproach to foreign policy.These prirci
plcs plimadly concerled notions ofidealislic internationalism, sell'reliance,
non-alignnlent, snodesh, and ron<logmatic socialism. Critically, Nehru's doin-
inan.e linited tllc rolc ofothcl influences upon loreign policy making. botlr
witbin and outside the ruling government, effectivcly delimiting broader
brucaucr atic voiaes- Nehru's centrality prodllccd whaLmanyhlve regarded as
12
:-:,.i :a*:rat&1ffi*a&sat:t,;:i;:t.r.:j::r&].,1]}r1r&r:1. Mak/s oJForcigil Poliqr i*ia: 13

Profile l.l Jawaharlal Nehru (1889-1964)

The dominant leader of the lndian independlnae movement,

JawaharlalNehr! was the keynr.hitect of ihe modern lndiair
state that emerged in 1947. Edu(ated at Harrow and the
Universitv of Cambridge, and trained at a barrister, Nehtu
led the antl coionial struggle againsl Brittsh rule and cralted
the prinaipes of socialism, secu arism and d€mocracy upon
wh ch the lndian Constrtutlon is ba5ed. A prod qious wrrier
and rnteLlectual, he wrote noroerous volu.nes, most notably
Ihe Dis.avery ol tndia \1946) whlch outlrned lnd ah history,
culture and philosophy, as wellas the pafoamic 6lmp5e.5 ol Wotld Hbtary \2404
prisons
{19341), based upon lett€rs he wrote to his daughter lndira wh le in varous
protesting against aolonia|sm. ljpon iakifg office on 15 Augult 1947 25 British rule
.
ended, he famously noted India's'tryst wth destiny. lwhereby]at the stroke of
the midnight hour, when the wolld sleep5, hrdia will awake to life and fleedonr'.1
A much respected international slatesnef who fought for a more equ table
world order thit reprcsented the developing worLd a5 mu,:h a5 the developed'
Nehnr was a towerinq I oba llglrre in the 1940s,nd 1950s, filost cLeary pe6on
f ed by h s leadership wiihl. the NA[4. The lim]ts of hrs idea snl Geen by Nehru
as 'global influence wrthout miltary power'':J would be severely undermined by
China's 1962 invasion, whrch at the time was considered to be an unl kely possibil_
rty. ln .etrospect, Nelru drd not always a.t urth the practtal necesslties ol pourer
a! h s centra focus, and hrs romanticisfit and moral sri on occilsron led 10 lndia
lorinll a .ange of critiaal tlrategic possib lities durrnq t)rs tenurc. Despile thcs. I mi-
tatrons, hls domlnanae of foreign pol cy mak ng in 1nd a 'created lwo qerleratlons
of Indian polticians and buleau(Ials (ommtted to Nehruvraf sm',r a legilq that
persrsts to thrs day.

a unanimous'Nehruvian coDscnsus' within Indian foreignpoliq, altltough it1

recent yea$ such notions have been compellingly questioned.l Nevefiheless,
Nehru undoubtedly remaifls hdiar foleign policy's key follilding fathcr (see
Proflle 1.1).
broad terms. NchN's attitude towards botll the princiPles alrd the ilrrple-
Ir
nentation of foreign poli.y continued after his dcath iD 196'+. Thus, under
botll lris daughter Indira Gandhi and grandson Rajiv Gandhi, key forei!'n
policy dccisiolrs wcre largely foltrlrlated via snall groups oftrusted advisors
and corflda0ts. Ho\ cver, with a nove towards greater rcalPolllik in the late
1970s and 1980s, as weli as an empilasis that focused rpoll the traje.tory and
projection oflndia[ l1ational interests rather than the ixake-up ofthe iDter
national system as a whole (as tyPified by the NAM), the foleign policY making
proccss gradually came to include inore disparate influcnces. in Paflicular
from the MEA. A greater emphasis upon heightening lrldia's Proactive, rather
thaD reactive, ctgagement with the international system further unde colcd
this broadening invotvemclt. Critically though, the institutior ofthe PMC (as
initiated byNehru's immediate successor.l.al Balladur Shastli) ensh rined the
14 M&: Mok€ri o/Foreiglr lolio, {ar,{$*..':ii:;l@aa;i:,i-:!:.:tt a&E t&&t-ai..., ;1.1

dominanl role ofthe .ulilg teader within thc overall fbreign policy making
process - a situation \r,hich continues. fu such, any new inllue.rtial bodies
continue to bc subsumed urder fhe prime minister's aegis.
This interylay beni€en the .ole of individual leaders ard thc pursuit ot'
national iDterests also begau to be influenced by the rature of thc i[tcma-
tional system. Thus, in the early 1990s, a trade and energy fdcus began to char
aclerize lndia diploma(y as her leaders emphasized the necd lbr ccoloDric
growth. Su.h a focus necessitated a gradual embrace of tllc globaljzatioD
lorces that had begun to typiE the international system. bot which appcared
to be largely inimical to the self-reliance and socialist principles that lvere
the hallmark ofthe Cold War era. ID rcaction. lndianforeign policy making
slo\r,ly becf,Dc morejoiled up betweeo diferentlndian ministries, and more
il.lusive of non-governmental voiccs and opinions, especiatly in the lields
ofbusiness, academia and the military. A burgeonilg middle class, cou(csy
ofa rapidly expanding Indian ecolomy, coupled with a commensuratc blos
soming ofthe IndiaD [ledia in its priDt. visral ard interactivc foNrs, cteated
ncw fbrums and intcaesL groups concemed with the conduct and naturc of
iDternational a{IaiN.
India's global interaction coDrilrued to increase through thc 2000s as
her leaders focused upon restoring India's great-power sratus vin cconoltlic
gtu\\lh. Ilr order to fu1lil this niltr, N,IEA oflicials began to ovcrconc l[dia s
r"!ion.rl llrarorr rhror,Ih J pnli.) ul turrldil\lon.Jcf'\'irhdllsrJrc\r5:r\^J)
togarner new trade rclatioN, enhance Indja's encrgysecurity aDd project her
influcnce \arithin the inter[ational system. Cotltitrlled defence growth and
modeurization, as well as a lrrore assctivc rolc in multilateral institlitions.
underpinncd this inleraction and ful1hcr broadened the spectrum oflndia's
internatioDal engagenent. Oflicial rltetoric .oncerning h{iia's'rxtcndcd
strategic neighbourhood' and her enlarging 'stmtegic fbotprint' bolstered
these intcractions, and again l.cquired {and inculcatedl all inclcasiruly aorn
plex and dive.sifyirg range offbreign policy making inputs. ln rhis period, a
new unked hierarchy appeared in Indian diplonacy, with greater aftenLion
beirg given to the P5 powers (those with lermanenttetoes ir the IJNSC) and
second-tier poweri such asJapan, Australia, France, Gerlnalryand tirc EU. Suah
pragmatismwas a Dcwform ofhrdian diplonacy atld adhered to 'a rend that
most of the great po$ers have adopted ... (atrd which has since become) a
pernancrrt imperative -6

1.2 Central features oflndia's political system

A functional democratic process is crucial to Ifldia's political
systc[and rcsfs
upon a flrs+ast-thepost electoral legime that results in a parliamcntary
form of cabi[et government. Centred upon secular principles (defined as
being inclusive arld tolerant ofall religiolrs rather than being ron-religiousr),
India's najor democratic institutions comprise an uppcr (Rajya Sabha) and a
 .t:&&ag&t ,]ra,:.',r"!s..'.1**a r: .:. , ll;:*61:lj,i,tt?tt:l Molers ojForeign Polir- l:Lai' 1s

lower house (Lok Sabha), currently with 245 and 545 members respectively.
'flre hidian prcsident noninates twelve membcrs of the Rajya Sabha. with the
lcnuildcr chosen by state and te[itodal legislatures. All membersscrve a six-
year tenn. Members ofthe lok \ia national elections cvcry
Sabha are elected
five years (although these can be called earlier. such as in 200,1). In alditiolr,
in both par+soflEdia's bicamcral natioDal legislature, state reprcsentatioD is
based upon rclative sizc, aod ceotral government institutions are replicatcd
at the state lcvel. Reflcctive of hdia's gigaltic and gro$,itlg poPulation, in
lhe 2009 clections tlicrc rvas a[ elc.torate of714 millioil, which represented
rhc \aorld. ldrgesr d, mocrJri, elecrion lo ddl" If 2009. volct lurlloul \{a\
jusl Inder 60 per ,'enl dnd lrrs rarripd olrl cnlir'cty u\in8 clFclronlc volillt,
machines.
The Indian Constitution promulgated inJanuary 1950 declared India to be
a sovereign democratic republic that was federal aud rofl-moflarchical, with
an independent judiciary, a single electorate and guaranteed rights. lvhile
the presidcnt acts as thc l1ominal head ofstate. executivc powerrestswith thc
primc miDistcr aDd his/hcr CabiDct who colle.tively undcftake allde{ision
makiDg. After a gcncral clection, thc prcsident asks lhe leaderofthe majority
partyloforn a govcrnrncnt,and theprime miDistercan be an eleatedmeiDbar
ol-eithcr thc 1.o1. Sabha or thc Rajya Sabha (such as Malnlohan Singh). Thus,
thc p nc niDistcr bccoules head of government via t[c legislature mlller
than i,ia a direct (presid entii{l) vote. and aliygo\,ernment has to rcsigD ifit loses
a i'otc on a lrrai or policy issue or ifd]erc is a vole ofno conndence.ln tum, tlle

prilnc lnirister selects the Cabinet and can k in charge ofothcr govemment
milistries ifhe or she so rvishes; lor iustance, all oflndia s rulers have been
chaimren of the Planning Comr ssion due to its critical rcspoDsibilities for
dete.mining nalional five-year plans. In Le [s offorcign policy makiDg, the
Cabinetwas an influentif,l gloupiug under Nehru but. fronl Shastrionwatds,
the IMO (and its secrcradat) cnlergcd as the mostcritical base ofadvice, irflu-
ence aDd powcr cou.cr lrg the dcliDeation ofsecurity policy.
As a federal repllblic. India is cllrrently split into twelty-nine states and
seven u on territories as listed in Table 1-1. three ofwhich lattcrare offshore.
The number, bordels and areas ofthese states and tcrlitories have fluctuatcd
since 19,{7 as a rcsult of policy and electoral refofil, alrd in July 2013 the

'j
TamilNadu;
.16 al.'?r Mdkn ojFofei8n Policl Eg'igllxl lr'r 9ltr- . :ax: !*t; }"i Lt':xrx€* :!*"

]-evrls
new state ofTela[gana was carved out of sodthcrn A'!ldhra Pradesh
of alevelopnent, life €xpectancy. literacy and economic pe ormancc
valy
in 2012
significantly from state to state, as do their populations, the largcst
beil1g Uttar Pladesh with 20o nillioD citizens and the smallest
being Sikkin

numbering just over 600.000.

As with her parliamentary system, Indiat federal Ysteol
is Iargely a legary
diveNity
of British impcrial role whereby 'll1{lia's shecr territorial size and
precluded a unitary state structure where all power resided in tlc
cenhal

lcgislature'.s Powcr is thus divided by the ConstituLioo betweeD

lhc cenhe
aDd states. I Iowever, is undcrscored by 9 ccntralizing prefcrencc
tiis division
al threats tu
due to the nqiative expedences of Partition and ongoing territo
ccn
such.lndia's Constitution contains l1alional securityfunctions to reilssert
prime
ffal control via the emergency Po\{c$ ofPrcsident's Rule whereby the
and
miDister can subordinate all state functions to direct nlle (Articles 356
357). While Articles 356 and 357 Protcct against any threats
to hldia's secular

andunilied political basis, their PreseDce points to authoritalian possibilitics

on more
in India. Presidcot's Rllle has bcen invoked against iodividual states
ten
thar 120 occasions (pafticularly in (ashmir), and rosc iI1 irtcidcnie from
times bch{,eeo 1947 and 1966 to seveDty tinles betwecn 1967 and 19B6'
hdir
has also u,iLntssed the ftlll evocation ofPresialent's Rulc du ring
critical fore ign
policyjunctures, nolt notably alDidst the 1962 war $rith CIlina and tlle 1971
lihcration of East Pakista[.
The cxtent oltlrese powe$ nost iBfamously shown by the Emcrgenq
1!,as
coilvic-
oI 1975 7- The origins of the Emergellcy canle from Indira Gandhi's
tior it 1975 for electoml 6a(d committed during her 1971 constittency
campaign a jttdgement that neant That she i{as balTed lrom Politics for
six lir responsc, she iovoked Articlc 352 oftlre Constitution to declarc
1,ears.
a state crgen(y, giving hcrselfcxtraordinary powers whefeby civil iiber
ofe
dAs, thc legislature al1d the Constitutiofl \'ere s[spended, Press
censoNhil)
wcre jailed'
was iDtroduccd, tens ofthousands of Politicians and Protesto$
la\ s wcr-e letqtitten and variotls politjcal grorpings baflned The Emergcn(y
came to lcpresent 'a twcnfy-t\rro mo[th ecljpse'' ol lndial de rocmcy bY

state authodtarianism and was symptomatia ofthe cor-rttptioo' paranoia and

disharmony within Congress and govemmcnl-
the
Despitc having been amendcal more than nioety times sincc 1950
Indian Constitutiofl still rests upon the salne basi' fcat les (as weil as al1
divcr-
underlying socialist preferelcc). At its core there is asearchfor'unityin
sity' articulated through 'a multinational vision of nationhood
ill which
non-
region. language, social status are combined',10 and which is nominally
h
religious, anti-elitist and based uPon equality and social rohesion Henccfo
the C.nstitution includes Article 15(1) - Ito state disc mination on thc
grounds ofreligion and protects the customs, laws alrd Pnctices ofhdia'!
Niuority ireligious) commu[ities- Additionaliy, a propoition of govemmelt
jobs and education are resewcd for lower castes {1hose in the lower strata of
 ,*i!:i.1r1l3€t*&*g&?i,i$!:ltl!:',:,i1i*{t}r-:l*ai::" Matel5 oJFore8r loiiry ltt&ri 17

Iodia IIindu socieM through positive discrimination under Articles 330(1)

s
and 332U), as are a set nunber ofseats in thc lok Sabha- These p nciples
arc deemed necessary in a society where tllc vast lnaiority ofthe population
(80.5%) is Hindu.ln turn, 13.4i1, ofthe population is N,luslim. 2.3% Christiar,
and 1.9% Sikh, in addition to many other religious deDominations and group
ings-ll The plescnce oi at Ieast thirty national and regional languages and
n1ore than 2,000 dialccts filrthcr highlights the complex heterogeneity of
Indian sociefy. lbr these reasons, Ilrdia's secula. basis is itselfa counte ncns
ure agaiNt potential instability and divisiveness between difiarent cullural
alld r.ligious groupings, and enshdnes thc scBalatioD of statc alld rcligion.
Accordingly, Article 25(1)oftlre Indian Constitutio[ graDts individual fice
dom of religion - reflectilg sa,l,o dhdr d ih.i?idhdvd {equal treaftDent ofall
religions). However, often-extreme levels of disc mination (ard violencel still
regularlyoccur against the lowcr c:$tes afld !\/omen.

Rulers of modem Indio

As showo by Table 1.2, the Indian National Congress icongrcss) party reso
iutelydoNinated the governance oflndia siDcc I947 uDtil the late 1980s.l(ritll
thc exceptior of the briefBJP governnrc0t in 1996, as weli as the 1998-2004
NllA. ill priiIle mioisters ha\,ebeen oneLirnc Cougress nriDistcls oI legislators.

Tmuie in of{ice i .; il

G. L 'ta r,t,
Nanda*:
.IalB. StEstri '1:ll
a.G. LNand.a+
lndian N?tonal

28.07.79-14.0 rSq 'i

i 4.o I .80,3 r . r;.8ii ll
31.I0.S4-{2.12,89:.
0? r2a9-10.:11110

t:_

i
l8 l&.; Mdier o/foreiBrr lnhry y), 'i ... . !:.. ...- 'r r,'

Futhermore. and again with the exception ofthe 1996 BJP govemment, all
non{oogress gorrernments have beefl coalitions.
Theelections of 1989, 1991 and l996sawanincreaseil1conrmunal(religious
or eahnically based ) politics. This increase hadmuch to do $dth Lheemergence
of lowercaste political parties. aided by the 1990 MaDdat Commission's
rccomDc[datioos to reserve 27 per cent of govemmeDt jobs {or the lorver
castes. Such phcnomena, in conjunctiot] with the rise ofcoalition governance,
for example theJanata Dal who won thc 1989 election, appeared to threalen
the Congress'inspired secular collceptualizatiolr ofthc IDdiar state.The right-
wingHindu nationalist tsJP t ?ified this trend, as didjthe energence ofsNallcr'
regional- state and castebased pafties. such as Mayawati's Bahujafl Samaj
Party that largely politically mobilizes loweKaste Dalits. The long-starding
presence ofvarious Conmunist parties continues to complement this prolif-
eration. Aithough they elected a fenale prime minister in 1966. both holrses
01'the Indiau parliament are predoDina[tly Dale, with only 10.7 per cent of
those clccted to the Lok Sabha iD 2009 beilrg fcmalcithe highest<ver percent'
$4rich has dsen each clcction fiom a low of3.8 per cent in 1977).
-age,

Majt)f caleats

There are some majoi cavtats to bear in nind $,ith regaid to hrdian politics,
$'hich often appcar coltradicto+ to the desired worldview oftire nationai
Constitlrtion. Primarjly, ascriptive and heredita4 criteda in hdian socicly
(such as caste and upbriruing) can encourage a hierarchical, stratificd aud
nepotistic system based upon kinship and inherited positions ofirflucncc. in
Iedian politics, thcsc cntrenched lactors oftefl taanslate as ifltergencratiollal
political dyllasties. The most prominent of these dynNties is the Nehrti-
C rndhr fJIrily. uhi.h hJ\ produ.cd lndian pliru. llrni'lcr\ nvnr su.('c\.rvr
familial gcllemtions - firstJawaliarlal Nchru, followed byhis daughter Itrdira
Candhi and then her son Rajiv Gandhi. Rajiv's $,ife Sonia is cunently presi-
dentofthe Irdian Conglcss Party, and her son Rahul Gandhi is tipped to be a
futurc Congress ieadcr (and thus potential luture prime minister:see P.ofiie
8.1). Various other Nehru-Gandhis havc also assuned leadil1g political roles
in the last ccntury. As Case Study 1.1 shows, tlfs phelonenon cxtends across
the landscapc oflndian politics, resoltiDg irl something akin to semi-ftudal
pdlrundLe.
Issues also rcvolve around the structute of lndial governancc and lndiafl
bureaucracy. Cdtical to thcse structures is the ftequently personalized [ature
oflndian politics, based uporl unqlrestioning loyalty and the willingness to
subordinate ministry interests to those of an individual political leader.l,
Srch a sl tcln can foster both comuption and nepotism,t3 especially in arl
atmosphere of aapid eco[omic gaowth. Focusing upon cote sets of advisors
can also make then rcliant upon a politician's patronage - somethiog that
deforms objectivitv in policy making. Such negative impacts can be apparent
ai.::tr:,.:;:...i.-:rls':irini1ii}*rtlit!;;-*irx|xex&l; tr{dkrs oJIor.Et Poiiry :::r,:i::: 19

Case Study 1.1 lnter-Generational Political Dynasties

ln some ways harking back to monarchjc and imperial rule, dyna(rc polrtrcs are a
Qmmonplace occurren.e in lndlan politj€s. RestLng upon natronal, Iegional. ca(e
and religious domains, lndia has multlple political fami|es handing down positons
of influence from generation to generaton via widespread 'political inheriianc€'.
A growing trend, and often centred upon powerful dyna c patriarchs, the mo't
promrnent oi these larnilies (besrdes the pre eminent Nehru-Gandhis) are the
Abdullah5 of Kashmir, the Tha.kerays in I\,4aharashtra, the Pawars of Baramaii, the
Gowdat in Karnataka, the Badals ol Punjab and thefhautalas in Haryana ln Bihal,
when Laloo Prasad Yadav was barred from po|tict due io charget of coruption
and tent to prison, hi5 wife Rabr took over control
Accordlng to Patrick Fren(h,]a in 2011 28.6% of all lndian members of par|a
ment (N4Ps) (ome from a famlly with a polltical background. ln lurn, all MPs aged
below thirty have inherited their seat5 fro$ a family member, as have 65% ofthore
aged below {orty, and 36.8% ol those aged below fifry. Of MPs ln Congres5, a
totalof 37.5% come from a po itlcallamily, with 86.4% of tho5eaged belowforty
having hereditary tie5 to the prevlour incumbeni. Congress's helr apparerrl, Rahul
Gandhi, s frequently referred to as yuvral ('son of the kinE'), a5 were h s father
Rajiv and un(le Sanjay. I!,,{emberr of both the 8lP and the Commufiit parties are
exceptions to this rule, wth the former often renowned for their celibacy Oth'"r
polrt.a dyna{es exisl across South Asia, such as Nepalt Koira as and Pakistan s
Blrultos.

i! lorcign policy, which ir the postNchru era largely rcsrs upon a unslcd
inlrcr circle in the PMO rather than the Cabinet (as detailcd bclow). Paul Blass
has pertifleatly noted how 'the mechanisnls, ties afld attachnents that makc
the systen u,ork are based upon personal aDd social obligitioDs to patrons
and clients, kin and castc fcllows, in informal coDnectiorls and on iilcgal iee
Ior-sewicc cash arrangcNcrrts'.ls lhe presence ofvoteianks (a loyal bloc of
votc$ ftom a single co11rm rity). as wcll as assertioDs that a Lhird oflDdian
politicians face crimirlal charges ranging lrom electoral fiaud to rllurdcr,'6
ody serves to unde$core the severiqr of thesc problems aDd their socictal
iIl1plications.
hdian politics also experierccs high levels of volatility as exemplifiird
l)y couimunal violence and political assassinatiofl. This volatility add! irli
elcmcnt of rlncertainty wirhin the poljtical process, imp:t.ting uporl poliry
makng aDd its implemerLation. Most cleari], penonificd by the Hilldu
Mtslim violence that accompanied Partition in 1947, su.h tensions have
contin[ed torcgularly punctuale Indian politics.ln Decembcr 1992, the BJP'S
ethncreligious mobilizations at Ayodhya and their deitrtiction of the Bab
Masjid sparked Ilildu Muslill1 ots that left 1,200 dead across lndia- In 2002,
while governing the state ofCujarat, the BJP was furthercomplicit in violeuce
that led to around 2,000 deaths.17 The dangers of ethncnationalism (and its
extemal 1ilkages) are also shownbylndira Gandhi's assassiration by her Sikh
trl

20 Egixl Matrl5 ojForeigx Polict {*tt:.i?*$i3it&t'f::l':.tt*r*}xt.:8:ii'r*xt}t,.l,gf

bodyguards on 31 October 1984 after she ordered troops to stolrn the Colden
Temple in Amritsar to flush out Sikh rnilitants Prcssing for selFrulc. In tum
hdian attempts to balance Tamil and Sinhalese denands in Sd Lanka 1ed to
Rajiv Galldhi's assassination bya suicide bonber on 21 N'lay 1991 Con1n1lliral
violence accompanied both cases (often aided by olicial coNPlicity), with at
least 3.000 deaths ir the fbrmer during which Raj iv Gandhi stated that 'once
a nighty tree falls, it is oDly nattral that the earth around it shakcs"l3

1.3 Key foreign policy making bodies and irfluences

Prior ro 1947, lndiJns sldfled hall ol (hc Brir islr Rrj ]lndian <ir il scrvi'' . Ilre"c
bureaucrati werc able to influeDce liscal progranmes (includi[g thc deleflce
budget), as well as the inftoductiol ofPolicy. Thlough the 1935 Goverrnent
oflndiaAct, theExternal AIIairs Dcpartme[twas setup underthe auspices of
the Govemor{eneral, while the ncwly formcd Legislative Assembly becarDe
a forum lor foreign poiicy discussion, and includcd Nehnt and Mohanmed
Jirnah among its cont butors. ln Scptembtr 19'16. thc lndian lbreigrl
Selyice IIFS)vr'as crcated to calry out diplonatic alld commercial repltseDla
tions abroad. Aftcr British rule ended, the External Affairs DePdrtllenl $'as
renamecl thc Ministry ol llrlernal AffaiN and Coolmonu'ealth Relations, and
becaEe the Ministry olExtemal Affairs in 1949- lt rcmains thc major burcau'
cratic lbreign policy body. and is sti{ffed by the iIS. l'hus, upon independcnce
India had 'an expe enacd commrlnily of.ivil srlvants, soldicrs and polili
cians to imple ent its policics',r1 althotigi) u,ith a limitcd interiralional Pres-
encc. Thc long-sLanding Depaltrtlent ofDefence similnrly became tire Mi stry
ofDefence (MoD)ir Augtst 1947. India also inhedled ar internal jnteliigerce
agcncy. thc Intelligerce Bureau, but did not create an extemal intclligence
agen.y, the Rescarch & Analysis \\riDg (R&AW), uiltil September 1968.

Ca\tfififiLntnl

As already highlighted, fbreign policy making in India highly

has remained
prime ministerrentric. Nehru begnn thjs tradition, andwas'aoneman policy
plarnitlg staffand coordinatot, as well as the sourcc ofmajor ilritiaLivcs that
put lndia on the $,orld's diplomatic Dlap'.?0 Olteu rclying on rclativcs and
close fiicDds (such as K. M. Panikler in Beijing, Itishna Menon iD Ne\'\' York
arld Ml.s Pandit iD Moscow), Nehru's pc6oDal dofiIil]ance, expe isil and powei
stultilicd thc dcvelopment (and colrfidel1ce) of India's lireigt policy illstitu
tion\. ll dl\o creatcd a , crrJin myopir u'h, r^hv l, rli.y itIcJ. nol oi t.lrjot inreF
est to Nchm (such as South-East Asia, Latin Aneri.a and Aflica) were widely
iglored.']l These factors variously led to a very impronPtu and sPontaneous
style that was often skewed ('Palditji (nows Best'). and prejudiced, and
eDcourr.ged groupthinkwithiIr an {a]beit $ell-informed)Cabiflet sustained by
Nchru's personal pafforage. Only after the debacle of thc 1962 war against
Chiua did Nehu's oear-monopoly begiD to ftacture as rcalism bcgal slowly
to rcplace idealism in India's foreign poliq thinking. From 1962 to 4, weak
political leadcNhip allowed thc MEA space to develop morc fully a situation
replicated uDder the Janata rcgime of1977-9.
Thc Pfime Minister's )ffce dfld the Ndfiondl Securify Cor il
AIter Nehru'sl
death, greatqr emphasislas put on thc PMO as the fulcrum oiforeign policy
making,leading to thc flirther centralization ofpower away ftomparliament.
Institutioflalized undcr Shast , the PMO has gradually assumed many fun.,
tions previously ulidertaken by othcr lninist es, givirg any Indian prime
I inislargredrrTconrrolovct l\orll jorcign and d.,mcstic fnli.l. A5lho.oordi
naling bod\ oi rll lnJia's ntinisr rics. thi ll\r0 enifrrincs lhc po.ilion ofpriln.
ninisteras hcad ofthelndian executive and notjust their Cabioet.ln contrast
to the Nehr-u cra, this alrallgement allows for a more haDds{ff approaeh to
administration, and fon1cllts greater bureaucratic complcxity, creativity and
relative iDdcpeldence. The PMO is currently staffed via a secretadat ofnore
than 300 seniorcivil scrvarIts, alongwith appointed policyadvisors.The major
ministcdal and iDstitutional influenccs upon foreign policy making in the
PMO cali be seen in ligur€ 1.1, and are morc ftllly explicated ir} the sections

The prine minister and theCabinet arc i[ charge of foreign poli.J, courtes-y
of electoral majolity, and do not need to coDsult parliamenL on decisions.
trcaties or even tltc conduct ofwar. [t) praatice. however, Lhe widerCabiflet is
not ccDtral to lbrciglr poli(y naking, wlri(h instead resLs pon a small group
certrcd on the plirte rninisLer, the cxtcrnal affairs minister, the home millis-
teraDd the finance minister.As such. hdiaaGandhiwas noLed forher'kitchen
cabjnet' oI trustcd advisors, Rajiv Gandhi for a'policy ofsecrecy and nondis-
clostre'']: - especially concerning thc llofbrs dcft[ce scandal (see Case Study
2.1) alrd Vajpayce fbr only infbrming a handlul oI confidirnrs of the 1998
nuclear tesls. Importantly, ho$/evcr, from lndira Candhi onwards, hldian
Priuc ,inisters have regarded thc burcaucracy as d 'partner ralier than a

IiSurt 1.1 Min,rP/idl d,ld Instttutiaadl Forcign Poliq lfiflueficcs lrpon tll. PL,tl)
22 l&wi Mdfrrs ofForsigfl Poli4, &a!&1.-: j.,i: ..i-::]-=t";i:;18!5:i.i-;'...;:it:sj:grtlfgaJ{*rt.-it:*

servant',r3 especially in light of its increasingly significanr knowledge base.

Regardless, decision-makinll power resting in su.h a linited domain does
ulderscoae an often incrementai, case-byrase approach to issues, rather than
an overarching, all inclusivc tbreigl policy ftamcwolk. lD the last dccade,
though. a conccrted effort has been made to introdlucc a greater degree of
jlnchronization between differcnt ministries, especially tltrough heightcncd
ecolomic dip]omacy-
tu an adjunct to the PMO. and as the apex natioflal security body. the NSC
represerts a condensed vc$ion of the key governmental (and some llon
goverlrnrefltal) in{iuenccs central to foreign policy making. Resuscilating a
process introduced by V. P. Singh, the tsJP institufed the NSC to centralize
and oversee the running of India's security policy. As shown in Figurc 1.2, it
(onsists of a small group olcentral ministers (and a natioral security advi-
sor, the prine milister's key security coofldant) rcportcd to by the Stratcgic
Poli.v Groul. rllL Narional Spcrrriry Advi\ory BoJrd iNSA-tsI ilnd a socrprJriar
represcnted bytieJoint Intclligence Committee. Broadly, the Sffategic Policy
Croup undeftakes periodic Strategic Delence Reviews ofshort, arld lotg term
security thrcats. and thc secrctariat aflalyses iltelligenae data froln thc lU,
the R&AW and all oflndiat arDred foftes. Meeting o11ce a Dlonth. the NSAB
consists of ron govemment cxperts ihand-picked by the prilne ninis(ct oD
a Lwo-year rotation, uith obvious caveatsJ and provicles long-term piognosis
and aralysis. The first National Secu ty Advisor was Brajesh Mishra, a highi),
Rnowned career diplonlat, ils \!as his successor]- N- DixiL, and the present

Prime Minisler
Home Minister
Defence Minister
Finance lvlinister
External Affairs Ministe.

National Security Advisor

Secretarial National Security

(Joint Advisory Board
lnlelligence
Principal Ministerial Secretaries j Commitlee)
Sewice Chielsi Relred Mililary Ofl icers;
Heads ol Department of Alomlc Energy,
Deiensiv€ Resea.ch Developmenl
Organizauon,
lnlelligence Servlcesi
Besetue Bank Governor

Figure 1.2 irdir\ Notioa al SetuiE Cowcil

1,{ith reJercnd In'felli\,It dio's rnrrglng N!.Lor Drlnnir' I L
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^\ou
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r)8.nrl srrurt du[i] ot,qur,Mt punoJp sr Iaouosrad rrlBuroldrp IEtoj s.aJrA.r.rS 11.

utrrroj SO aqt'ulnl ul ,{ueuuo,.y.ro uropSury prttun aqt raqtraJo rllg B pull S,

'llzBl8 lo rufllJ ]o asoqt-llErJ tnoq, i.lp {rurrostrd a^nre s.v!r{ aqt zz.€l Zl0Z q,
ut sttrtioldrp S'8,{luo tl}rM Z00Z Jo uodJu qDquel piuorss[uuo] /(llEuratlIi
Jrl) trr LtlSurl t! pnlrlJp srnsst 'sJir\od ieuorJBtl.tr]tll ]ofuuI laqto qtr.\\ uos
-uedurol ut ,{lprJ.dsa padola Jp.rJpun Flleitu t-qrs $ \,?W aqt .JJBJn O ]-
'srnoqqSrau aterpiurwr Jaq qlr,,!r s.rip.roq ]r
s.prpul SurJpp8rts siutdno:B trugla snolre,r;rit qtrrlr tJL,Jatu,{llnJ J.toru ol 's

plIP ar]r[ro s,stpul aspiJJut o] .silDuottRr p[l] suorsoap

.,beuloldlp Iptrlrp, t.
,$rlod ll8t oJ rreldxa o] 's.tiellr lruorttuJatilr ut Jtlqnil uBrptll Jrlt r8eille
ralaq ol pJJnpoJlur sllii\ uorshrp slqJ.900Z ul pJte l sLu (OOd) uotslaro
iJeliroldr61 rllqnd arlt '(Vdn) e)uuJTV i tssJrSord petrug eqt rapun .{llplruts
'stlrJu i dolr ap altttsoal sB paplpBJl aJa,{\ qr[i^\ ,trr
lod uitetoJ rBt pul ur suou
'JtJrp r!\JU trrl}ar ot JJpJo ur t(xJJ s.VAr\i aq] rlt (ErsV Frtua] puE rutJed,Ersv
iqt iuriunlror) suorlD.rluatuoJ i\au pJln]llsut o.[ EqurtsrltN s0661 ail] ur
-Jo sll]te aqt uodn turpuadep r. a^\oq s a)unnuur
'snqt - pa^[o^ul riptJl Jrl]
sqt io luatxa a rte8au rqJ qJJBilsJJ pltr Suruupld . rt)eoJd aJorr sll,lrdsJp
'fruouotnt s,vEn aql stnJJipun,{la l}lJ:Ue puu BuDIEurlJrlod u8r olilururD
lloJ uortrsod tueuurop slr utelrtru ot ol lal aqt s^lolp JarJloSol slsod Jsaql t
qloq 3urp1o11 9667:aqotJo o] 900Z.rJqur oN uro{ prp dltuaJal tsottI q8uis
ueqotuupll sB'sueJ3? IeuJalxnJo rrtsrullrrJo uoutsod aql Sulploq r(lt[Jrlnr I
-rrorJo,{)rHal uet nrr{aN e ol asJnoral qgDotql d[irrurrd ,yXy1aq1;o 1o:1uor
I
r.rrc.f ol Jurllluor stalsrrrrfu rruud uErptrl ,JloulaqtlnJ sue nlpult5 pup
nrq.N aql SurJnptuaJDddr ssal atualn::o ue,(rqod tuaraqorur pue qurlsrs
-rrorut aJ!1poJd ,{luanbJ.g ot sanuluoJ ..lr^rMoq .saluangu rbriod lo J5utj
8IIr,{JtsJJ rp e llllr\ trorlruuluoJ Ur ,rua:]sr(s ler0{od Srnlenpng s,erpul

luortrradoo] puoiSaU loj uortBDosry uel utaJo uBrprl)

.Erpul)
)XV"XOI rrll pue SurdnoJ8 leJLqV qlnos pup IrzEJfl VS$l JLlt sE qJns
'sr\rtPrtlur uotlrr.dooJ IDrotBer ,{u!tu pateBusut osp seq )r .{0g61 ur paBJaru
rl)rq^r uorst/rro ,,!\euaX pue turuupld Flrlod arlt pur uors rG lElrrotstH aqt sr
qrns) satpoq q)rBrsal uiirrloj snorJB slt q8norqJ uotulJo]ur ,{)rlod
3o a:urlsqns pue aJ,fis aql }}Blndru u - tuitxo oruos ol ue) pup
^Jrloal .Jna.l] pue

cz urjoJ Liru.rnJJo sr4Dr! n yU a ,rma . . .SE'

 f
{: : i.,,irrrr r,..:A,.:}:i.:;i{*t :ttai,ral}'::r :.::,::g1r;i.:, I,tdksrs ofFore8n poliq ir{,.i.27
i

i
:,
')e ulde$cores a historic.l fear amongst India's leaders that the n}iljtary maybe
inspired by the sevcral coups canied out iu pakisrar since iDdepcndeoce.
It also rellects the non-polilicized nature of India s bureauclacy and police
services as a \rhole. $hereby oflicers are taughr to be a ncutral arm of the
state. Although the president is tlte Dominal commander-inrhiefl givcn
1i- their over ditu domi[ance dFthc ioreign poliry making process, this rolc
NL hrs uhinatelybecome tlnt oFthc pd, e minister. As such. all thrce militrry
cy bmnches are subordiDnted to thc cii,ilian delence n]inister. and the chicfs ol
Jt thc arned sefliaes nrr not routilely consulted about foreign policy. Among
.li, .ndjur powcr" lhrs i) anon).,1r. wilh Cohel no,rtng thilr 'lroldbl) no fililt-
"n
fh tary ofequivalent importa[ce orsize has less ilflucnce'.]5lD [ecentyears, thc
.-nt military is exeftitg greater iflfluencc as the arned forccs nodernize as part
:n of India's rise to international prcminence, resultilg it1 grou,ing budgct
ed demands {Iol costly weapons purchascs and inareased (rages). Theenergcnce
:ln ofncwassertive think tanks manDed byretired military oificials has providcd
-ry a lu her voice.
d.
t0
Adler inf,uefices
' le.
As India Drodernizcs ald bcgills b dsscrt ifrlf on thc inLernatjonal stige_
tal a ranlle of othcr influcnccs can also bc identified which signal n gro\rinll
7C complexity in foreign policy naking. Aiol1g wirh the poiiricil and bureau-
Ils .,alr. \,,i,c dcr.riled.rl.ore. thts.c .rrortp,n;. tepr,\,.trt .. ltn,.cnt \.,.drir)
comlnunity. which transcends diffcrc[t politi.al gencratiolls and represents
!v, comDounded kio\,\,]cdge as per lrrdia's security pl.aaticc. Consisting of thc
gn heads and sfaff of think tanks, nlemberu ol lcadilg lrarional universitjcs,
us business icade.s, jo!rnalists and the hdian diaspora, thcse ioflueDces aan
th bc collectively lcgarded as a chal]cngc to lndia's'Lraditional foreign policy
ef- bubble'.36 This uetwork is inlormal al)d slffting,r'yet ir js tegarded as one of
idi the world's 'bcst-inlormed aDd l1lost active unoflicial securigr commtnities,.ss
1al Slowly divelsifying and erparditrg. the groupings detailed belou, iodjcatc thc
gtl emergenl pluraiity of thougirt concerDilg india's foreign policy iraerests.
-nd
bchavioUr and futurc direction.

du Tfiink tntks afid d.oddrlias

Initially fundcd by the central go!,crnt]1cltt alrd
nd thc ltdian Council of Social Science Rcscarch, several inlbmral grolipings
llrt make up the basis of India s contelnpotary think tanlcs and instituics dcdj
to cated to tlle srudy of fbreigr policy. ln the 19S0s, non-govcl.nmenral debare
as took pla.e through the lndiar Council of World Afibirs (tOdA) in Ne$r Delhi,
o11 wirilc in 1955 the School oflntcrrlational Studics (S!S]was cstnblished which
i .,ect
merged with the pre<minenr Jawaharlal Nehru University in 1970. The SIS
would remain the lcadirg place of internatioMl scholafilip over 1ie next
liwdecades.In 1965, the Institute oFDefelrce Studies arld Analyses {IDSA)was
,'ng
'lirt instiluted and cclo.ated in the ICWA al1d SIS. Iunded by the MoD, thc IDSA
28 i".:.?'t tr{dkers olF0r.ign Poli0

Profile 1.2 K. Subrahmanyam (1929 2011)

Regarded as one of hdla's rnost experienced and rnfiilt'

prpora0 \o, ".. . ' lbl.n'"1 r'm '/vd' d l'Ll '
:
Con r

,nrcrno"ona' ,'"'"q' nl'd.l, dndl qL, joJ I J ' 11 r'

civil servant. Twrce Jirectorof ihe Instltute of Defence sN'
anrl Analvses (lDsA) (from I96810 1975, and
1980 n' i;'
nt i'
he chalenqec [onqress's intellectual dorninance
lpo t1n \'
oolav In',;,rq . llo,o oo'lLtr ho
lore'qn po r.,- r,"c.'e l" 1"9t''nmPL14rh'
-
the dea of bri6{Lng and lmentrr
tlon, inslilLrted
institLrte
'o
the notion of explair
external affairs in the lndlan medla, and introduced
ld:a' publ" ' a proool'r
'o''a
."r",*a"i ,r.a'""r, oe,"iol.. lo I_"
1"" "" "a^-rn or hdid's 1Lr.'""' der, 'rpr' ,d1o "" lldo LS \ lL
helq_'Flinolroa'ropill\" OR \Lb"h d'
"n,""r"r,,, v\,olld.olfo'eron
d r, Ioundcr oI lro d'\ oolc'v p lao'l+'no1l 'no \F' LI ' om!'
6,"6 6r , Fcbru"r, /01 I

I)ighl\r i1)fluentiii rj'

remail1s lndia's ieaaling think tank and bccalre
strategic rh'''
stenardslliP ofK. SubrallInan)'a[I' lhe doyen o[lndiatl
Centre's 'saturd a]' Club' and fc r'i
l'rolilc i.2).The ltldia lDternational
since the 1970s' Holvr ' '
Grcup hitvc aiso provided forulns fbr discussion
suflercd du'i'
instiurtiou, reputation and foreign des oltliink tanks
war alter it-w;s revealed that the Llnitcd States' Central
lntelligtli'
uP uniil l
(CIA) had funded the hdian branch oI the Asia lotlndation
and speecli_lri' '
The MIIA contilues to outsour'e many aDalJ'dcal
to the IDSA. althoilgh interactioD is lill}ited' due to
hdia's l
'hT
Secrets ,^'ct and a high scDsitivity to potefli,rl
lerks"l\is issue is i'
.r,nccrn. ilnJ ll dii'thinf_lenl ' lr' k 'lllli'icnl 'rc5'loLh'in;ulrr'"
policy relcvant s'h'l
r-esources required to coniluct hjghnMlity'
also make il
Limited resouracs and lack ofcorporate sponso$hiP 'l'
ranlc to attmct the best grnduilr
India's new gcnemtion oI think
such many alc unalerdeveloPed in to their (wesleln r"
'omparison ofthink tai]ir
collnterparts- According to McCann's cxhnustive iankil1g
India had i'r'
upoil l+utatioD and standing ill the fieid' although
wilh 1 r'
thirdlargcst Ilumbcr ofthink taoks in 2011 (292 compared
Laturcd ir th(r '
United States and 425 in Cllina), only iivc ofthesc
ilrl'
ir Asia afld none in thc top lllty worldwjde lbr sccuiit' and
and iDstitutes i
afairs.io Norletheless' the influencc olthink tanks
growi[g doDestically. as thcv prodtcc research briels
with $'1tiu]'
New Deliti
i"ngly to-influeuce govemment and opposition parties in
Research A"
lniia's leadingthink tark can be found ir thisvolume's
A sir lar lack of fundiflg. in the form of state
inveslmcnt' is nl-
regarditr!' l
aftlict India's universities, which have a limited focus
i ;., ti;*"L;I"3:rg*tt::a"Ltla!aralti .**f!&,t3ffi*liliilr*t Mokers olliore8a loliq/ ii*r&t 29

sludv and rcsearch ol lndia\ internilional affairs. Only oncr .rr, h fi nancial
constrailts arc eased through increascd iDvestinelt will the role ofacadem-
icr inclease. Consideriflg India's relative stagc of developmenr (especial]y
coDpa.ed with developed srater, this silotfall is only to be expected, wirh her
coltinued economic growth providing aviable long-rem so]ution. Moreover.
the intellectual dominance of Neluu immediately post-indcpendc[ce - as
much a thiDker as a potitician - also'shaped rhe nentality ofscvelnl gencra
tions of political scientis ts al al1d has traditional ly overshadowed the poren tial
input ofacadenics to the formation offbreign poli(y. Again. few universities
ilr lndid,Jn cu ct)lly b, ionridercd ., world-Frding tp\pe,'ially rn inrcrtH.
tiolal relations), but this should not detract from their expandiug influclce
and impact upon foreign policy makng in India. Academics lrow participate
i[ the NSAB (including the drafting of India's nuclear doctrine at the end
of the 1990s), as well as Track Two diplon1acy linfo nai dialogue between
states) on behalf of lndia, and some have au iucreasilglyvisible roie as publi.
intcllectuals.

Bxsircss, sdid drd fie di.rspord I[ the context oflndia\ ialobal ccononic risc
- thc aDd gradual enbrace of giobalizatiot, the ilfluence of busiress groupings,
tilc nledia and thc Indian diaspora have all become impor-tant
stinluli for how
ain fbreign policy is conceivcd and delivcred. As her diplomats cngagc in multi
the Iateral negotiations and regio[al tradc blocs, ccoi)olui( links and investrEent
.old (both internal and extc rlral) have beconle the lodcstoocofllldia's intcmational
ncy interactioD. requiring improved intcractioD bctlveen tl'ie variorls [ational
, ministries and lodia's business conllr]unity.4z These relationships are a con-
rsks tinuarion ofclosc links forged in thc 1970s and of the personal diplonlacy of
i.ial prestigious business figxrcs such as the Hindujas, Mittals,'latas and Alubanis.
'l lre Hindujas in particular negotiated in thc 1970s on behalfoflndira Gandhi
''l'rg
- oor with tie Sliah oflran, and with British Primc MiuisterTo[y Blair in the after
math ofthc May 1998 nuciear tesLs. Mukesh Arubari's Reliance Industries is
-fbr also thc main funder ofthe ObseNer Rcsearch !-ourdation think tank-
das IDdia s b$iness community has been active reprcsentirg lldia, \l,ith thc
iar) Confederatioi of Indian lndustry (CII) lobbyiry abroad. conducting trade
rnissions, signing Menorandums of Uodcrstanding (MoUs), opering se\en
fld s internatioml olliccs (byJuly 20i3) alrd runnilg Track Two diplomacy. Since
. tht' the Doha Developmeflt Round commenced in 2001, both the CII and the
rirty Fedcration oflndjall Chambers ofCommerce and Industry have been cralting
)nel theirown trade policies outsideofgovemlnent.ln May2005, ihcgovernmenr
)idly set up thc Trade and llcolomic Relations Con]mittee to pull thcse group
feas ings irto the policy-n1al1ng process and collectively to run lndia's ecoDomic
st oi diplomary, often usurping MLA influence. Reflccting these closerties, in 2005
rdix. Maflmohan Singh observed how 'the relatioltsirip bctween govemtnelts is
rD to increasingly mediated through and iDflueDccd by the relatiolsirip betweeir
:ope, civil socicty and tlle business community.'a3 nusiness groups are thus ably
30 a;rr** Mdke/s oJForeiSn Poliry $aiireiK.:i&a.ii$tira ).:' **s:r.i.,. :,ta::.r'j.ti

contributing to lndia's intemational Profllc and soft-Power depositoli'i

ticularly thlough the IT, software aird entertainment scclors: see (laii
5.1). Sone obserye$ are c tical of tliis influcDce holvcl'cl- (ith ore i" " '"
j

thJr 'ill,r^)cni tr.rrdr hotd, llldia\ worlJr.c\^ wr I be plru,ltirl t''.'

land
increa'ingly dornitr.rred by busine* illrere'ls I'alher I Ildn by st nrrtr' ' '
political conccrDs.'4{ -
Frolll thc latc 1980s onwards, an elcctronic nledia revolution has gril'
India and provjdcd a critical public spncc uiithin which to firfther distr"
and circulate forcign policy perspectives. Tht ough a llrolilerntion oft.i''
(hannels, daily [e\{spape$ and the iflterIr(t lndii s nascent midtl'
(courtesy oftndia's rapidly increasing econo ic growth)h.{s enlerled i'
rrajor consumet of mass nedia and incleasiirg infotainlrirnt'. lbthi!l
ftrl blend can be added the intellectual influeDce of Englishlangualle r'-
wheo uscdbypoliticalanalystsandelitcs.Su.haproliferationgivesthE'
a different role to that of thc Cold Wal era typilied by Coni{ess's lir:
dominince, whcn the media were regarded as a nlarilinal influenca l'i '
iDtrinsical\, an illstrunent of th e ,iovernmcn t. In aontrast, the cLrllteii! I
emergence of Pivately owned nen'spapem alld k'lcr'ision ch.innal
than jusl thc state{rwned Doordoshan) has Propagaied new, indelltr:
autonomoils aod asscrtive voiccs lvithitl Indiall Poiitics. l\4itigatinii '

influence, India cu[ent]y has, hol!'ever, only a sllall nunlbcr ol Pli'

televiion foreign (orresfondents, $Ihich lilnits Lhe dcfth and scope oi L

coverage of inteLoatioltal allairs. Signilicaotly Lhe nllmber of l-'h('ril!

.Ilition in Indi, rosc tionl 5 millioo in 1999 to 672 nlillioo in 2010,
tltc proliferation of nobile technology ljrlhing grcaler sc.tiofls ofthe i'
populatiol to media sonrccs.
\\rith the Tcrsistence' of the media via 24hourne$5 cYcles an.l the i: '
the need to contrcl information flow is palanount, with illfbrr[al:
being the 'central conlmodiLy of interEad(nral relations .a6 l,rUuen(ijr,'
Nedia has thus become vitallyimpoltant lbr nllgovernnlcnts iI} ordcr I
(and manipulate) iflforniation concerninil Poljcy and the rralional i.
lincluding pat otic and nationalist sentiments). l lie MEA s I'DD and
i,
Publicity Dit isioll iXP Divisionlnre cdrical in this regaid for thc nan;r:i
'sr,rjl'
ofNhat has been variously referretl to as India's 'n]edia dilrorllacy'.
diplomacy', 'inslart diploDacy' and rcal-time diPlomary'.i) Ovc.rl.
bodics lrc inleg.al to the haDdling ol ally doili{'sri( polifi(al colrtr'
disagreemc[t on foreign policy issues, as $/c]1 as to generill relationi rir'r
media. They arc also crucial iDlianling iorcign policl decisions (fioril
aid)to thepubli.(as iD thepracticc in the UDitedSulcs), magnilyi gibr:-
achievements and coDrmunicatillg the government's'nlessage'.
The influeflce ofthe Dledia contilues Lo bc appalent when it cofires :
deliberation ofinternational affails in India. lhis in1pact dafcs fiom tli'
Chirese rhetoric rhat suuounded the APril 1960 Zhou Enlai Nehnl Ir
(which ellictively prevented any Indian compromise on thejr shalrl
 ':ttt*: -:n &aa:'i';ti: i:i,14....::t :l:ii. .:r..ll.]]trr:,, Mat rs oJfoleign poli+, rlair* 31

issues),to India's rejection of the Cornprehensive Nucicar Test-BaD lreaty

(CTBT) h the 1990s. ard the IndeUS nuclear agreemcnt iD 2008. Such an
eilect can, horycver, be tlegativc. biased as it is towards ccrtain aonstituents
.-c
(th. middle class or aCverriscr profits) and.an.cscalilte thetoric r.cgardless
-I of the intcrnational repercussions'_{3 One case in point is that of Defcnce
MinisterCeorge Fcrnandes ilr 1998 bci[gnfsqrorcd as naming Chilra .eDc]riy
d No. 1'\\,hen he had in lact stated'potclitial e[emy No. 1,. Such an example
shows how'the glolrill urcdia ... can trigger uncalled for intcrnationa]
isunderstandings, which can hate gtilve consequenccs .{e As lndia,s ntcdia
.rctor erplrrd' and p|oli[eratri. \\c.an crpe'.t .y, ll
;s
[rrp. .,rrp, dDd cv.nl ali.
tir's to incrense. In lDdia, Lhere can also be thc alnrost religiols beiief thal
every foreign visit oftlie PM . . . is a resoundilg success,,so adding a dcgree of
a I] ationalistic bias aDd s!bje.tiviry to reports. IheIndian ncdia also provide
aD
.a inrportant fomm witlr which to iDteract witli hdia's largc diaspora (scc Case
-. rl Study 7.2), whi.h is aD important source ofrcmittances, lobbying an{l lcpre-
S santati\e po!r'er, with succcssive Indial governments attcnpting to harness
I' its influence in host sLatcs.
-{
_1. 1.4 Conclusions: select but br.oadening
is
d lorciglr poliry in lndia is cnrrenLly nrade by a selc(t fiw throruh thcdoxlinant
-tl porver base of the Pl\40 and the prcvailinlj influcnce oI the primr rninistcr
I. (especially ovct institufiols such as the N4EAI. At the same timc, the scope
:h of fbreign policy naking influenccs is undoubtedly broadening, as hdia s
_r) expanding internatiollal ittei.action demands tire involvctlcnt of moLc
disparatc voices and opinions. 'l hereIorc, while the process nray IIoL be fu]lv
tlansParent, i{c cnlr no longcr considcr the fbrmatioD offbreign poliq, to be
,J,
dominated byany one indii,id(1al leaderor indeed aDysiflgle political part]'. as
'te thc lange oflbreign po]icy rnaking stimuli has lnultiplied in.ecent decades.
'jc A globalizi[g geopolitical environnlent crucially p]ays into tiis cxpansion,
.st particularly conceming the growing impact of lndia's businers conmunita,
al uredia and diaspora. Tlis grcater complexity also underlines the importancc
nl ofanalysing different politi.al stanccs and persuasiotls withir inteurational
relations, aswellas thecritical r.olc played by polic_vand historical ptccedents.
l\4oreover, the making of foreign policy (in India) shows how the process is
f,I often actolipecific aud ieadership{riven, witli persoDelity atd charisna
continujng to play a ccntral, dcliberative role.
As critics have highlighted, however, n]orc is needed actoss tlie spectr-un
ol iodia's lorcigo policy nakiug bodics fbr thcm Lo achievc parity wiLh orhct
.1g
nrajor powers. and for lndia to becoule truly a great power in the inlcrna
tional si/stcnr. Notable intelligcnce failur€s (such as Pakistan's Kargil invasiol1
. -ti' in 1999 and the Mumbai tenorist attacks of 2003) underscorc these r,!.cak
1g rlesses-51 Improvenents p nadly rest upon increasing India's indigenors
et capacities in temrs oiexpanding her diplonratic abilities, as well ar iD!,esting
32:ia* Moli€rs ojForeign Poli..I ..'1}a]|",.:..11.,::" '-!x :':ittr:'1'lg:;'':
t:i:l: l.::{t *'

morc to moderrize hcr think tanks an'l universities in order to

incrcase
enirane
their (ar1d thus hdia's overall) global inpact and influcnce' such
ments 1\,ould result i[ a worldrlass intematioDal lelations
inliastructure'"
buL lndia5 capabilitrPs !t'ill necd lo bc mol
jojred uP dlJn l'r"y (urrellrlr
?rc ro fully realize lheir Polcnli.,l. only b1 being more mrtl'ifacel"d
and

multi{imensional in temls of nalion:1] intelests (bureaucratic' ecollolnic'

diplomatic aDd acadenlic)wilt hdia bc ablc to nobilize a stloDg
prepatcd
antlcr-
and clhciellt foreign policy network with which to bcttel stru'ture'
a great Pol{ci
pate atld maximize its engagemeot with thc world' l's sucb'
just rcspolld to it"5l
leeds 'the ability to actively shape i1s en\iro1lment' ]ot
is centrat to fullillirg
aDd it is India's foreigi Policy making apparatus that
a]low India to
such an ability. Certainly a larger and bettcr-fuDded MIAwil1
truly possess omnidirectional (aDd nor-myoPic) diplonatic citpabilities
aDd
lncrcased invcst'
to increase the bandrvidth ofher interlatioDal interaction
lvill be
meDt, primarily via the frlLits oflndia's mountil]g economic Slowlh'
an cssential Pal.t ofany inprovemcnt ovcr-llrc next decades'

questions fbr discllssior

t]rdia?
1 llow do {1iflelcllt political parties inlbr]n lbreign policv making in
xnd
2 \^/hich minislrics arre imporant sourccs of informatiofl' e)iperlise
irliplementation concerlring foreign Polic]? lD what \ays?
\ llatis thc inllucnce ofnon goverlllncntal actors on lfldianlbreign policy?
.1 Ts nationalism a tacLor i11 how foreigrl policy is made
in lndia?
posd
5 Wliat issucs do Neu'Delili's relativel! Neal( diflomatic caPabilitics

Suggestiols for furthel reading

Llajpai, (anti (2003) 'lndien Conceptions of ofier and Justicei

Nehruvi:rD'

tandhian, Hindrtva. aDil Nco-libcral', ir Rosemary Foot el al

(eds)' 0rder drd
I Iniversiq Press' pp' 236 61'
Islict iflIttcfldli0aol Rel4tio16. Oxford: oxlord
Univcrsity lress'
Cohen, Stcphen P. (2002) Irt{iidr Erler.Eflg lolitr' oxford: Oxford
pp.66 91.
0JIndio'-\ l;or?isn Poliry' Delhi: Harpercollin!'
oixit,l-tt.1zoO,rl lntroauction. Mdkvi
lnilia\ Forcign i'olicy "Software " 'Aria Poliry 8:
N'larke),, DaDiel (2009) 'ilcvcloPing
73 96.
2004 Nrtional
ogden, Chris (2010) Nr)rns lndian Foreign i\)licy and thc 1998
Democratic Allian(e.?r. R0lnd Tnbld 99(408):303 15'