1

G.R. No. 178906 February 18, 2009
ELVIRA T. ARANGOTE, petitioner,
vs.
SPS. MARTIN MAGLUNOB and LOURDES S. MAGLUNOB, and ROMEO
SALIDO, Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to reverse and set aside the
Decision1 dated 27 October 2006 and Resolution2 dated 29 June 2007 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 64970. In its assailed Decision, the
appellate court affirmed the Decision3dated 12 September 2000 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), 6th Judicial Region, Branch 1, Kalibo, Aklan, in
Civil Case No. 5511, which reversed the Decision4 dated 6 April 1998 of the
7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Ibajay-Nabas, Ibajay, Aklan, in
Civil Case No. 156; and declared5 the herein respondent-Spouses Martin and
Lourdes Maglunob (Spouses Maglunob) and respondent Romeo Salido
(Romeo) as the lawful owners and possessors of Lot 12897 with an area of
982 square meters, more or less, located in Maloco, Ibajay, Aklan (subject
property). In its assailed Resolution, the appellate court denied herein
petitioner Elvira T. Arangote’s Motion for Reconsideration.
Elvira T. Arangote, herein petitioner married to Ray Mars E. Arangote, is the
registered owner of the subject property, as evidenced by Original Certificate
of Title (OCT) No. CLOA-1748.6 Respondents Martin (Martin II) and Romeo
are first cousins and the grandnephews of Esperanza Maglunob-Dailisan
(Esperanza), from whom petitioner acquired the subject property.
Esperanza, respondent Martin II (together with his wife Lourdes), and
respondent Romeo, each holding a one-third pro-indiviso share therein. Thus,
Esperanza could not validly waive her rights and interest over the entire subject
property in favor of the petitioner.
Respondents also asserted in their Counterclaim that petitioner and her
husband, by means of fraud, undue influence and deceit were able to make
Esperanza, who was already old and illiterate, affix her thumbmark to the
Affidavit dated 9 June 1986, wherein she renounced all her rights and interest
over the subject property in favor of petitioner and her husband. Respondents
thus prayed that the OCT issued in petitioner’s name be declared null and void
insofar as their two-thirds shares are concerned.
After trial, the MCTC rendered its Decision dated 6 April 1998 in Civil Case No.
156, declaring petitioner and her husband as the true and lawful owners of the
subject property. The decretal portion of the MCTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
A. Declaring the [herein petitioner and her husband] the true, lawful and
exclusive owners and entitled to the possession of the [subject property]
described and referred to under paragraph 2 of the [C]omplaint and covered by
Tax Declaration No. 16666 in the names of the [petitioner and her husband];
B. Ordering the [herein respondents] and anyone hired by, acting or working for
them, to cease and desist from asserting or claiming any right or interest in, or
exercising any act of ownership or possession over the [subject property];
C. Ordering the [respondents] to pay the [petitioner and her husband] the
amount of ₱10,000.00 as attorney’s fee. With cost against the [respondents].13

The respondents appealed the aforesaid MCTC Decision to the RTC. Their
The Petition stems from a Complaint7 filed by petitioner and her husband
appeal was docketed as Civil Case No. 5511.
against the respondents for Quieting of Title, Declaration of Ownership and
Possession, Damages with Preliminary Injunction, and Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order before the MCTC, docketed as Civil Case No. Respondents argued in their appeal that the MCTC erred in not dismissing the
156. Complaint filed by the petitioner and her husband for failure to identify the
subject property therein. Respondents further faulted the MCTC for not
declaring Esperanza’s Affidavit dated 9 June 1986 -- relinquishing all her rights
The Complaint alleged that Esperanza inherited the subject property from her
and interest over the subject property in favor of petitioner and her husband --
uncle Victorino Sorrosa by virtue of a notarized Partition Agreement8 dated 29
as null and void insofar as respondents’ two-thirds share in the subject property
April 1985, executed by the latter’s heirs. Thereafter, Esperanza declared the
is concerned.
subject property in her name for real property tax purposes, as evidenced by
Tax Declaration No. 16218 (1985).9
On 12 September 2000, the RTC rendered its Decision reversing the MCTC
Decision dated 6 April 1998. The RTC adjudged respondents, as well as the
The Complaint further stated that on 24 June 1985, Esperanza executed a
other heirs of Martin Maglunob, as the lawful owners and possessors of the
Last Will and Testament10 bequeathing the subject property to petitioner and
entire subject property. The RTC decreed:
her husband, but it was never probated. On 9 June 1986, Esperanza
executed another document, an Affidavit,11 in which she renounced,
relinquished, waived and quitclaimed all her rights, share, interest and WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
participation whatsoever in the subject property in favor of petitioner and her
husband. On the basis thereof, Tax Declaration No. 16218 in the name of
1) The appealed [D]ecision is REVERSED;
Esperanza was cancelled and Tax Declaration No. 1666612(1987) was issued
in the name of the petitioner and her husband.
2) [Herein respondents] and the other heirs of Martin Maglunob are declared
the lawful owners and possessors of the whole [subject property] as described
In 1989, petitioner and her husband constructed a house on the subject
in Paragraph 2 of the [C]omplaint, as against the [herein petitioner and her
property. On 26 March 1993, OCT No. CLOA-1748 was issued by the
husband].
Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) in the name of
petitioner, married to Ray Mars E. Arangote. However, respondents, together
with some hired persons, entered the subject property on 3 June 1994 and 3) [Petitioner and her husband] are ordered to immediately turn over
built a hollow block wall behind and in front of petitioner’s house, which possession of the [subject property] to the [respondents] and the other heirs of
effectively blocked the entrance to its main door. Martin Maglunob; and

As a consequence thereof, petitioner and her husband were compelled to
institute Civil Case No. 156.
In their Answer with Counterclaim in Civil Case No. 156, respondents averred
that they co-owned the subject property with Esperanza. Esperanza and her
siblings, Tomas and Inocencia, inherited the subject property, in equal shares,
from their father Martin Maglunob (Martin I). When Tomas and Inocencia
passed away, their shares passed on by inheritance to respondents Martin II
and Romeo, respectively. Hence, the subject property was co-owned by
4) [Petitioner and her husband] are ordered to pay [respondents] attorney’s
fees of ₱5,000.00, other litigation expenses of ₱5,000.00, moral damages of
₱10,000.00 and exemplary damages of P5,000.00.14
Petitioner and her husband filed before the RTC, on 26 September 2000, a
Motion for New Trial or Reconsideration15 on the ground of newly discovered
evidence consisting of a Deed of Acceptance16 dated 23 September 2000, and
notice17 of the same, which were both made by the petitioner, for herself and in
behalf of her husband,18 during the lifetime of Esperanza. In the RTC

Order19 dated 2 May 2001, however, the RTC denied the aforesaid Motion for
New Trial or Reconsideration.
The petitioner and her husband then filed a Petition for Review, under Rule 42
of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, before the Court of Appeals,
where the Petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 64970.
In their Petition before the appellate court, petitioner and her husband raised
the following errors committed by the RTC in its 12 September 2000 Decision:
I. It erred in reversing the [D]ecision of the [MCTC];
II. It erred in declaring the [herein respondents] and the other heirs of Martin
Maglunob as the lawful owners and possessors of the whole [subject
property];
III. It erred in declaring [OCT] No. CLOA-1748 in the name of [herein petitioner]
Elvie T. Arangote as null and void;
IV. It erred in denying [petitioner and her husband’s] [M]otion for [N]ew [T]rial
or [R]econsideration dated [26 September 2000; and
V. It erred in not declaring the [petitioner and her husband] as possessors in
good faith.20
On 27 October 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision denying the
Petition for Review of petitioner and her husband and affirming the RTC
Decision dated 12 September 2000. Petitioner and her husband’s subsequent
Motion for Reconsideration was similarly denied by the Court of Appeals in its
Resolution dated 29 June 2007.
Hence, petitioner21 now comes before this Court raising in her Petition the
following issues:
I. Whether the [RTC] acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction when it declared the [petitioner and her husband’s
title to the subject property] null and void;
II. Whether the [RTC] acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction when it declared the Affidavit of Quitclaim null and void; and
III. Whether the [RTC] and the Honorable Court of Appeals acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it rejected
petitioner’s claim as possessors (sic) in good faith, hence, entitled to the rights
provided in [Article] 448 and [Article] 546 of the Civil Code.22
Petitioner contends that the aforesaid OCT No. CLOA-1748 was issued in her
name on 26 March 1993 and was registered in the Registry of Deeds of Aklan
on 20 April 1993. From 20 April 1993 until the institution of Civil Case No. 156
on 10 June 1994 before the MCTC, more than one year had already elapsed.
Considering that a Torrens title can only be attacked within one year after the
date of the issuance of the decree of registration on the ground of fraud and
that such attack must be through a direct proceeding, it was an error on the
part of the RTC and the Court of Appeals to declare OCT No. CLOA-1748 null
and void.
Petitioner additionally posits that both the RTC and the Court of Appeals
committed a mistake in declaring null and void the Affidavit dated 9 June 1986
executed by Esperanza, waiving all her rights and interest over the subject
property in favor of petitioner and her husband. Esperanza’s Affidavit is a valid
and binding proof of the transfer of ownership of the subject property in
petitioner’s name, as it was also coupled with actual delivery of possession of
the subject property to petitioner and her husband. The Affidavit is also proof
of good faith on the part of petitioner and her husband.
Finally, petitioner argues that, assuming for the sake of argument, that
Esperanza’s Affidavit is null and void, petitioner and her husband had no
knowledge of any flaw in Esperanza’s title when the latter relinquished her
rights to and interest in the subject property in their favor. Hence, petitioner
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and her husband can be considered as possessors in good faith and entitled to
the rights provided under Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code.
This present Petition is devoid of merit.
It is a hornbook doctrine that the findings of fact of the trial court are entitled to
great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed except for strong and valid
reasons, because the trial court is in a better position to examine the demeanor
of the witnesses while testifying. It is not a function of this Court to analyze and
weigh evidence by the parties all over again. This Court’s jurisdiction is, in
principle, limited to reviewing errors of law that might have been committed by
the Court of Appeals.23 This rule, however, is subject to several
exceptions,24 one of which is present in this case, i.e., when the factual findings
of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are contradictory.
In this case, the findings of fact of the MCTC as regards the origin of the subject
property are in conflict with the findings of fact of both the RTC and the Court of
Appeals. Hence, this Court will have to examine the records to determine first
the true origin of the subject property and to settle whether the respondents
have the right over the same for being co-heirs and co-owners, together with
their grand aunt, Esperanza, before this Court can resolve the issues raised by
the petitioner in her Petition.
After a careful scrutiny of the records, this Court affirms the findings of both the
RTC and the Court of Appeals as regards the origin of the subject property and
the fact that respondents, with their grand aunt Esperanza, were co-heirs and
co-owners of the subject property.
The records disclosed that the subject property was part of a parcel of
land25 situated in Maloco, Ibajay, Aklan, consisting of 7,176 square meters and
commonly owned in equal shares by the siblings Pantaleon Maglunob
(Pantaleon) and Placida Maglunob-Sorrosa (Placida). Upon the death of
Pantaleon and Placida, their surviving and legal heirs executed a Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition of Estate in July 1981,26 however, the
Deed was not notarized. Considering that Pantaleon died without issue, his
one-half share in the parcel of land he co-owned with Placida passed on to his
four siblings (or their respective heirs, if already deceased), namely: Placida,
Luis, Martin I, and Victoria, in equal shares.
According to the aforementioned Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition
of Estate, the surviving and legal heirs of Pantaleon and Placida agreed to have
the parcel of land commonly owned by the siblings declared for real property
tax purposes in the name of Victorino Sorrosa (Victorino), Placida’s husband.
Thus, Tax Declarations No. 5988 (1942),27 No. 6200 (1945)28 and No. 7233
(1953)29 were all issued in the name of Victorino.
Since Martin I already passed away when the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement
and Partition of Estate was executed, his heirs30 were represented therein by
Esperanza. By virtue of the said Deed, Martin I received as inheritance a
portion of the parcel of land measuring 897 square meters.
After the death of Victorino, his heirs31 executed another Partition Agreement
on 29 April 1985, which was notarized on the same date. The Partition
Agreement mentioned four parcels of land. The subject property, consisting of
a portion of the consolidated parcels 1, 2, and 3, and measuring around 982
square meters, was allocated to Esperanza. In comparison, the property given
to Esperanza under the Partition Agreement is bigger than the one originally
allocated to her earlier under the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition
of Estate dated July 1981, which had an area of only 897 square meters. It may
be reasonably assumed, however, that the subject property, measuring 982
square meters, allocated to Esperanza under the Partition Agreement dated 29
April 1985, is already inclusive of the smaller parcel of 897 square meters
assigned to her under the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition of
Estate dated July 1981. As explained by the RTC in its 12 September 2000
Decision:
The [subject property] which is claimed by the [herein petitioner and her
husband] and that which is claimed by the [herein respondents] are one and the
same, the difference in area and technical description being due to the
repartition and re-allocation of the parcel of land originally co-owned by
Pantaleon Maglunob and his sister Placida Maglunob and subsequently
declared in the name of [Victorino] under Tax Declaration No. 5988 of 1949.32

It is clear from the records that the subject property was not Esperanza’s
exclusive share, but also that of the other heirs of her father, Martin I.
Esperanza expressly affixed her thumbmark to the Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement of July 1981 not only for herself, but also on behalf of the other
heirs of Martin I. Though in the Partition Agreement dated 29 April 1985
Esperanza affixed her thumbmark without stating that she was doing so not
only for herself, but also on behalf of the other heirs of Martin I, this does not
mean that Esperanza was already the exclusive owner thereof. The evidence
shows that the subject property is the share of the heirs of Martin I. This is
clear from the sketch33 attached to the Partition Agreement dated 29 April
1985, which reveals the proportionate areas given to the heirs of the two
siblings, Pantaleon and Placida, who were the original owners of the whole
parcel of land34 from which the subject property was taken.
Further, it bears emphasis that the Partition Agreement was executed by and
among the son, grandsons, granddaughters and cousins of Victorino.
Esperanza was neither the granddaughter nor the cousin of Victorino, as she
was only Victorino’s grandniece. The cousin of Victorino is Martin I,
Esperanza’s father. In effect, therefore, the subject property allotted to
Esperanza in the Partition Agreement was not her exclusive share, as she
holds the same for and on behalf of the other heirs of Martin I, who was
already deceased at the time the Partition Agreement was made.
To further bolster the truth that the subject property was not exclusively
owned by Esperanza, the Affidavit she executed in favor of petitioner and her
husband on 6 June 1985 was worded as follows:
That I hereby renounce, relinquish, waive and quitclaim all my rights, share,
interest and participation whatsoever in the [subject property] unto the said
Sps. Ray Mars Arangote and Elvira T. Arangote, their heirs, successors, and
assigns including the improvement found thereon;35
Logically, if Esperanza fully owned the subject property, she would have
simply waived her rights to and interest in the subject property, without
mentioning her "share" and "participation" in the same. By including such
words in her Affidavit, Esperanza was aware of and was limiting her waiver,
renunciation, and quitclaim to her one-third share and participation in the
subject property.
Going to the issues raised by the petitioner in this Petition, this Court will
resolve the same concurrently as they are interrelated.
In this case, the petitioner derived her title to the subject property from the
notarized Affidavit executed by Esperanza, wherein the latter relinquished her
rights, share, interest and participation over the same in favor of the petitioner
and her husband.
A careful perusal of the said Affidavit reveals that it is not what it purports to
be. Esperanza’s Affidavit is, in fact, a Donation. Esperanza’s real intent in
executing the said Affidavit was to donate her share in the subject property to
petitioner and her husband.
As no onerous undertaking is required of petitioner and her husband under
the said Affidavit, the donation is regarded as a pure donation of an interest in
a real property covered by Article 749 of the Civil Code.36 Article 749 of the
Civil Code provides:
Art. 749. In order that the donation of an immovable may be valid, it must be
made in a public document, specifying therein the property donated and the
value of the charges which the donee must satisfy.
The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in a separate
public document, but it shall not take effect unless it is done during the lifetime
of the donor.
If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be notified
thereof in an authentic form, and this step shall be noted in both instruments.
From the aforesaid provision, there are three requisites for the validity of a
simple donation of a real property, to wit: (1) it must be made in a public
3
instrument; (2) it must be accepted, which acceptance may be made either in
the same Deed of Donation or in a separate public instrument; and (3) if the
acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor must be notified in an
authentic form, and the same must be noted in both instruments.
This Court agrees with the RTC and the Court of Appeals that the Affidavit
executed by Esperanza relinquishing her rights, share, interest and
participation over the subject property in favor of the petitioner and her husband
suffered from legal infirmities, as it failed to comply with the aforesaid requisites
of the law.
In Sumipat v. Banga,37 this Court declared that title to immovable property does
not pass from the donor to the donee by virtue of a Deed of Donation until and
unless it has been accepted in a public instrument and the donor duly notified
thereof. The acceptance may be made in the very same instrument of donation.
If the acceptance does not appear in the same document, it must be made in
another. Where the Deed of Donation fails to show the acceptance, or where
the formal notice of the acceptance, made in a separate instrument, is either
not given to the donor or else not noted in the Deed of Donation and in the
separate acceptance, the donation is null and void.38
In the present case, the said Affidavit, which is tantamount to a Deed of
Donation, met the first requisite, as it was notarized; thus, it became a public
instrument. Nevertheless, it failed to meet the aforesaid second and third
requisites. The acceptance of the said donation was not made by the petitioner
and her husband either in the same Affidavit or in a separate public instrument.
As there was no acceptance made of the said donation, there was also no
notice of the said acceptance given to the donor, Esperanza. Therefore, the
Affidavit executed by Esperanza in favor of petitioner and her husband is null
and void.
The subsequent notarized Deed of Acceptance39 dated 23 September 2000, as
well as the notice40 of such acceptance, executed by the petitioner did not cure
the defect. Moreover, it was only made by the petitioner several years after the
Complaint was filed in court, or when the RTC had already rendered its
Decision dated 12 September 2000, although it was still during Esperanza’s
lifetime. Evidently, its execution was a mere afterthought, a belated attempt to
cure what was a defective donation.
It is true that the acceptance of a donation may be made at any time during the
lifetime of the donor. And granting arguendo that such acceptance may still be
admitted in evidence on appeal, there is still need for proof that a formal notice
of such acceptance was received by the donor and noted in both the Deed of
Donation and the separate instrument embodying the acceptance.41 At the very
least, this last legal requisite of annotation in both instruments of donation and
acceptance was not fulfilled by the petitioner. Neither the Affidavit nor the Deed
of Acceptance bears the fact that Esperanza received notice of the acceptance
of the donation by petitioner. For this reason, even Esperanza’s one-third share
in the subject property cannot be adjudicated to the petitioner.
With the foregoing, this Court holds that the RTC and the Court of Appeals did
not err in declaring null and void Esperanza’s Affidavit.
The next issue to be resolved then is whether the RTC, as well as the Court of
Appeals, erred in declaring OCT No. CLOA-1748 in the name of petitioner and
her husband null and void.
Again, this Court answers the said issue in the negative.
Section 48 of Presidential decree No. 1529 states:
SEC. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. - A certificate of title shall
not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled
except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.
Such proscription has long been enshrined in Philippine jurisprudence. The
judicial action required to challenge the validity of title is a direct attack, not a
collateral attack.42

The attack is considered direct when the object of an action is to annul or set
aside such proceeding, or enjoin its enforcement. Conversely, an attack is
indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on
the proceeding is nevertheless made as an incident thereof. Such action to
attack a certificate of title may be an original action or a counterclaim, in which
a certificate of title is assailed as void.43
4
Mistake upon a doubtful or difficult question of law may be the basis of good
faith.
Art. 1127. The good faith of the possessor consists in the reasonable belief that
the person from whom he received the thing was the owner thereof, and could
transmit his ownership.

A counterclaim is considered a new suit in which the defendant is the plaintiff

Possession in good faith ceases from the moment defects in the title are made
and the plaintiff in the complaint becomes the defendant. It stands on the
known to the possessor by extraneous evidence or by a suit for recovery of the
same footing as, and is to be tested by the same rules as if it were, an
property by the true owner. Every possessor in good faith becomes a
independent action.44
possessor in bad faith from the moment he becomes aware that what he
believed to be true is not so.46
In their Answer to the Complaint for Quieting of Title filed by the petitioner and
her husband before the MCTC, respondents included therein a Counterclaim
In the present case, when respondents came to know that an OCT over the
wherein they repleaded all the material allegations in their affirmative
subject property was issued and registered in petitioner’s name on 26 March
defenses, the most essential of which was their claim that petitioner and her
1993, respondents brought a Complaint on 7 August 1993 before the Lupon of
husband -- by means of fraud, undue influence and deceit -- were able to
Barangay Maloco, Ibajay, Aklan, challenging the title of petitioner to the subject
make their grand aunt, Esperanza, who was already old and illiterate, affix her
property on the basis that said property constitutes the inheritance of
thumbmark to the Affidavit, wherein she renounced, waived, and quitclaimed
respondent, together with their grandaunt Esperanza, so Esperanza had no
all her rights and interest over the subject property in favor of petitioner and
authority to relinquish the entire subject property to petitioner. From that
her husband. In addition, respondents maintained in their Answer that as
moment, the good faith of the petitioner had ceased.
petitioner and her husband were not tenants either of Esperanza or of the
respondents, the DAR could not have validly issued in favor of petitioner and
her husband OCT No. CLOA-1748. Thus, the respondents prayed, in their Petitioner cannot be entitled to the rights under Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil
counterclaim in Civil Case No. 156 before the MCTC, that OCT No. Code, because the rights mentioned therein are applicable only to builders in
CLOA-1748 issued in the name of petitioner, married to Ray Mars E. good faith and not to possessors in good faith.
Arangote, be declared null and void, insofar as their two-thirds shares in the
subject property are concerned.
Moreover, the petitioner cannot be considered a builder in good faith of the
house on the subject property. In the context that such term is used in particular
It is clear, thus, that respondents’ Answer with Counterclaim was a direct reference to Article 448 of the Civil Code, a builder in good faith is one who, not
attack on petitioner’s certificate of title. Furthermore, since all the essential being the owner of the land, builds on that land, believing himself to be its
facts of the case for the determination of the validity of the title are now before owner and unaware of any defect in his title or mode of acquisition.47
this Court, to require respondents to institute a separate cancellation
proceeding would be pointlessly circuitous and against the best interest of
The various provisions of the Civil Code, pertinent to the subject, read:
justice.

Esperanza’s Affidavit, which was the sole basis of petitioner’s claim to the
subject property, has been declared null and void. Moreover, petitioner and
her husband were not tenants of the subject property. In fact, petitioner
herself admitted in her Complaint filed before the MCTC that her husband is
out of the country, rendering it impossible for him to work on the subject
property as a tenant. Instead of cultivating the subject property, petitioner and
her husband possessed the same by constructing a house thereon. Thus, it is
highly suspicious how the petitioner was able to secure from the DAR a
Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) over the subject property. The
DAR awards such certificates to the grantees only if they fulfill the
requirements of Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).45 Hence, the RTC and
the Court of Appeals did not err in declaring null and void OCT No.
CLOA-1748 in the name of the petitioner, married to Ray Mars E. Arangote.
Considering that Esperanza died without any compulsory heirs and that the
supposed donation of her one-third share in the subject property per her
Affidavit dated 9 June 1985 was already declared null and void, Esperanza’s
one-third share in the subject property passed on to her legal heirs, the
respondents.
As petitioner’s last-ditch effort, she claims that she is a possessor in good faith
and, thus, entitled to the rights provided for under Articles 448 and 546 of the
Civil Code.
This claim is untenable.
The Civil Code describes a possessor in good faith as follows:
Art. 526. He is deemed a possessor in good faith who is not aware that there
exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.
He is deemed a possessor in bad faith who possesses in any case contrary to
the foregoing.
Article 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown, or
planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works,
sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in Articles 546
and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land,
and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot
be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the
building or trees. In such a case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of
the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper
indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of
disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.1avvphi1
Article 449. He who builds, plants, or sows in bad faith on the land of another,
loses what is built, planted or sown without right to indemnity.
Article 450. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, planted or
sown in bad faith may demand the demolition of the work, or that the planting or
sowing be removed, in order to replace things in their former condition at the
expense of the person who built, planted or sowed; or he may compel the
builder or planter to pay the price of the land, and the sower the proper rent.
Under the foregoing provisions, the builder in good faith can compel the
landowner to make a choice between appropriating the building by paying the
proper indemnity or obliging the builder to pay the price of the land. The choice
belongs to the owner of the land, a rule that accords with the principle of
accession, i.e., that the accessory follows the principal and not the other way
around. Even as the option lies with the landowner, the grant to him,
nevertheless, is preclusive. He must choose one. He cannot, for instance,
compel the owner of the building to instead remove it from the land. In order,
however, that the builder can invoke that accruing benefit and enjoy his
corresponding right to demand that a choice be made by the landowner, he
should be able to prove good faith on his part.48
Good faith, here understood, is an intangible and abstract quality with no
technical meaning or statutory definition, and it encompasses, among other
things, an honest belief, the absence of malice and the absence of design to
defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage. An individual’s personal
good faith is a concept of his own mind and, therefore, may not conclusively be

determined by his protestations alone. It implies honesty of intention, and
freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the holder upon
inquiry. The essence of good faith lies in an honest belief in the validity of
one’s right, ignorance of a superior claim, and absence of intention to
overreach another. Applied to possession, one is considered in good faith if
he is not aware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw
which invalidates it.49
In this case, the subject property waived and quitclaimed by Esperanza to the
petitioner and her husband in the Affidavit was only covered by a tax
declaration in the name of Esperanza. Petitioner did not even bother to look
into the origin of the subject property and to probe into the right of Esperanza
to relinquish the same. Thus, when petitioner and her husband built a house
thereon in 1989 they cannot be considered to have acted in good faith as they
were fully aware that when Esperanza executed an Affidavit relinquishing in
their favor the subject property the only proof of Esperanza’s ownership over
the same was a mere tax declaration. This fact or circumstance alone was
enough to put the petitioner and her husband under inquiry. Settled is the rule
that a tax declaration does not prove ownership. It is merely an indicium of a
claim of ownership. Payment of taxes is not proof of ownership; it is, at best,
an indicium of possession in the concept of ownership. Neither tax receipts
nor a declaration of ownership for taxation purposes is evidence of ownership
or of a right to possess realty when not supported by other effective proofs.50
With the foregoing, the petitioner is not entitled to the rights under Article 448
and 546 as the petitioner is not a builder and possessor in good faith.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby DENIED.
The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
64970, dated 27 October 2006 and 29 June 2007, respectively, affirming the
RTC Decision dated 12 September 2000 in Civil Case No. 5511 and declaring
the respondents the lawful owners and possessors of the subject property are
hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 179987 April 29, 2009
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
One main reason why the informal sector has not become formal is that from
Indonesia to Brazil, 90 percent of the informal lands are not titled and
registered. This is a generalized phenomenon in the so-called Third World.
And it has many consequences.
xxx
The question is: How is it that so many governments, from Suharto's in
Indonesia to Fujimori's in Peru, have wanted to title these people and have
not been able to do so effectively? One reason is that none of the state
systems in Asia or Latin America can gather proof of informal titles. In Peru,
the informals have means of proving property ownership to each other which
are not the same means developed by the Spanish legal system. The
informals have their own papers, their own forms of agreements, and their
own systems of registration, all of which are very clearly stated in the maps
which they use for their own informal business transactions.
If you take a walk through the countryside, from Indonesia to Peru, and you
walk by field after field--in each field a different dog is going to bark at you.
Even dogs know what private property is all about. The only one who does not
know it is the government. The issue is that there exists a "common law" and
an "informal law" which the Latin American formal legal system does not know
how to recognize.
5
- Hernando De Soto1
This decision inevitably affects all untitled lands currently in possession of
persons and entities other than the Philippine government. The petition, while
unremarkable as to the facts, was accepted by the Court en banc in order to
provide definitive clarity to the applicability and scope of original registration
proceedings under Sections 14(1) and 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree. In doing so, the Court confronts not only the relevant provisions of the
Public Land Act and the Civil Code, but also the reality on the ground. The
countrywide phenomenon of untitled lands, as well as the problem of informal
settlement it has spawned, has unfortunately been treated with benign neglect.
Yet our current laws are hemmed in by their own circumscriptions in addressing
the phenomenon. Still, the duty on our part is primarily to decide cases before
us in accord with the Constitution and the legal principles that have developed
our public land law, though our social obligations dissuade us from casting a
blind eye on the endemic problems.
I.
On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration
covering a parcel of land identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, Silang
Cadastre,2 situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite, and consisting of 71,324
square meters. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from
Eduardo Velazco,3 and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in
open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land
for more than thirty (30) years.
The application was raffled to the Regional Trial Court of (RTC)
Cavite-Tagaytay City, Branch 18. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
duly designated the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite, Jose Velazco, Jr.,
to appear on behalf of the State.4 Apart from presenting documentary evidence,
Malabanan himself and his witness, Aristedes Velazco, testified at the hearing.
Velazco testified that the property was originally belonged to a twenty-two
hectare property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four
sons– Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Esteban–the fourth being Aristedes’s
grandfather. Upon Lino’s death, his four sons inherited the property and divided
it among themselves. But by 1966, Esteban’s wife, Magdalena, had become
the administrator of all the properties inherited by the Velazco sons from their
father, Lino. After the death of Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio
succeeded them in administering the properties, including Lot 9864-A, which
originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was
sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan.5
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Jose Velazco, Jr. did not cross-examine
Aristedes Velazco. He further manifested that he "also [knew] the property and
I affirm the truth of the testimony given by Mr. Velazco."6 The Republic of the
Philippines likewise did not present any evidence to controvert the application.
Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification
dated 11 June 2001, issued by the Community Environment & Natural
Resources Office, Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(CENRO-DENR), which stated that the subject property was "verified to be
within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013
established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656
on March 15, 1982."7
On 3 December 2002, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Malabanan, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration and
thus places under the operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529,
otherwise known as Property Registration Law, the lands described in Plan
Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and containing an area of Seventy One
Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Four (71,324) Square Meters, as supported
by its technical description now forming part of the record of this case, in
addition to other proofs adduced in the name of MARIO MALABANAN, who is
of legal age, Filipino, widower, and with residence at Munting Ilog, Silang,
Cavite.
Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree of
registration shall forthwith issue.

SO ORDERED.
The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that
Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding
that he had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the
length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title.
6
of 2007, the Court applied Naguit and adopted the same observation that the
preferred interpretation by the OSG of Section 14(1) was patently absurd. For
its part, the OSG remains insistent that for Section 14(1) to apply, the land
should have been classified as alienable and disposable as of 12 June 1945.
Apart from Herbieto, the OSG also cites the subsequent rulings in
Buenaventura v. Republic,15 Fieldman Agricultural Trading v. Republic16 and
Republic v. Imperial Credit Corporation,17 as well as the earlier case of Director
of Lands v. Court of Appeals.18

On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision8 reversing

With respect to Section 14(2), petitioners submit that open, continuous,
the RTC and dismissing the application of Malabanan. The appellate court
exclusive and notorious possession of an alienable land of the public domain
held that under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree any period
for more than 30 years ipso jure converts the land into private property, thus
of possession prior to the classification of the lots as alienable and disposable
placing it under the coverage of Section 14(2). According to them, it would not
was inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the
matter whether the land sought to be registered was previously classified as
period of possession. Thus, the appellate court noted that since the
agricultural land of the public domain so long as, at the time of the application,
CENRO-DENR certification had verified that the property was declared
the property had already been "converted" into private property through
alienable and disposable only on 15 March 1982, the Velazcos’ possession
prescription. To bolster their argument, petitioners cite extensively from our
prior to that date could not be factored in the computation of the period of
2008 ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties.19
possession. This interpretation of the Court of Appeals of Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree was based on the Court’s ruling in Republic v.
Herbieto.9 The arguments submitted by the OSG with respect to Section 14(2) are more
extensive. The OSG notes that under Article 1113 of the Civil Code, the
acquisitive prescription of properties of the State refers to "patrimonial
Malabanan died while the case was pending with the Court of
property," while Section 14(2) speaks of "private lands." It observes that the
Appeals;10 hence, it was his heirs who appealed the decision of the appellate
Court has yet to decide a case that presented Section 14(2) as a ground for
court. Petitioners, before this Court, rely on our ruling in Republic v.
application for registration, and that the 30-year possession period refers to the
Naguit,11 which was handed down just four months prior to Herbieto.
period of possession under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, and not the
Petitioners suggest that the discussion in Herbieto cited by the Court of
concept of prescription under the Civil Code. The OSG further submits that,
Appeals is actually obiter dictum since the Metropolitan Trial Court therein
assuming that the 30-year prescriptive period can run against public lands, said
which had directed the registration of the property had no jurisdiction in the
period should be reckoned from the time the public land was declared alienable
first place since the requisite notice of hearing was published only after the
and disposable.
hearing had already begun. Naguit, petitioners argue, remains the controlling
doctrine, especially when the property in question is agricultural land.
Therefore, with respect to agricultural lands, any possession prior to the Both sides likewise offer special arguments with respect to the particular factual
declaration of the alienable property as disposable may be counted in circumstances surrounding the subject property and the ownership thereof.
reckoning the period of possession to perfect title under the Public Land Act
and the Property Registration Decree.
II.

The petition was referred to the Court en banc,12 and on 11 November 2008,
First, we discuss Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. For a full
the case was heard on oral arguments. The Court formulated the principal
understanding of the provision, reference has to be made to the Public Land
issues for the oral arguments, to wit:
Act.

1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be
A.
registered under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise
known as the Property Registration Decree, should the land be classified as
alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it sufficient that such Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land Act, has, since its
classification occur at any time prior to the filing of the applicant for enactment, governed the classification and disposition of lands of the public
registration provided that it is established that the applicant has been in open, domain. The President is authorized, from time to time, to classify the lands of
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land under a bona fide the public domain into alienable and disposable, timber, or mineral
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier? lands.20 Alienable and disposable lands of the public domain are further
classified according to their uses into (a) agricultural; (b) residential,
commercial, industrial, or for similar productive purposes; (c) educational,
2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree may a
charitable, or other similar purposes; or (d) reservations for town sites and for
parcel of land classified as alienable and disposable be deemed private land
public and quasi-public uses.21
and therefore susceptible to acquisition by prescription in accordance with the
Civil Code?
May a private person validly seek the registration in his/her name of alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain? Section 11 of the Public Land Act
3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either because
acknowledges that public lands suitable for agricultural purposes may be
of its use or because its slope is below that of forest lands be registrable
disposed of "by confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles" through "judicial
under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in relation to the
legalization."22 Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No.
provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive prescription?
1073, supplies the details and unmistakably grants that right, subject to the
requisites stated therein:
4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names
under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of
both?13
the public domain or claiming to own any such land or an interest therein, but
whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of
Based on these issues, the parties formulated their respective positions. First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
With respect to Section 14(1), petitioners reiterate that the analysis of the
Court in Naguit is the correct interpretation of the provision. The seemingly
contradictory pronouncement in Herbieto, it is submitted, should be xxx
considered obiter dictum, since the land registration proceedings therein was
void ab initio due to lack of publication of the notice of initial hearing.
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have
Petitioners further point out that in Republic v. Bibonia,14 promulgated in June
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation

of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall
be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
Section 48(b) of Com. Act No. 141 received its present wording in 1977 when
the law was amended by P.D. No. 1073. Two significant amendments were
introduced by P.D. No. 1073. First, the term "agricultural lands" was changed
to "alienable and disposable lands of the public domain." The OSG submits
that this amendment restricted the scope of the lands that may be
registered.23 This is not actually the case. Under Section 9 of the Public Land
Act, "agricultural lands" are a mere subset of "lands of the public domain
alienable or open to disposition." Evidently, alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain are a larger class than only "agricultural lands."
Second, the length of the requisite possession was changed from possession
for "thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the application" to
possession "since June 12, 1945 or earlier." The Court in Naguit explained:
When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936, the period of
possession deemed necessary to vest the right to register their title to
agricultural lands of the public domain commenced from July 26, 1894.
However, this period was amended by R.A. No. 1942, which provided that
the bona fide claim of ownership must have been for at least thirty (30) years.
Then in 1977, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act was again amended, this
time by P.D. No. 1073, which pegged the reckoning date at June 12, 1945.
xxx
It bears further observation that Section 48(b) of Com. Act No, 141 is virtually
the same as Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Said Decree
codified the various laws relative to the registration of property, including
lands of the public domain. It is Section 14(1) that operationalizes the
registration of such lands of the public domain. The provision reads:
SECTION 14. Who may apply.— The following persons may file in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Notwithstanding the passage of the Property Registration Decree and the
inclusion of Section 14(1) therein, the Public Land Act has remained in effect.
Both laws commonly refer to persons or their predecessors-in-interest who
"have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier." That
circumstance may have led to the impression that one or the other is a
redundancy, or that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act has somehow been
repealed or mooted. That is not the case.
The opening clauses of Section 48 of the Public Land Act and Section 14 of
the Property Registration Decree warrant comparison:
Sec. 48 [of the Public Land Act]. The following described citizens of the
Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such
land or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the
land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate
of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx
Sec. 14 [of the Property Registration Decree]. Who may apply.— The
following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application
for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly
authorized representatives:
7
xxx
It is clear that Section 48 of the Public Land Act is more descriptive of the
nature of the right enjoyed by the possessor than Section 14 of the Property
Registration Decree, which seems to presume the pre-existence of the right,
rather than establishing the right itself for the first time. It is proper to assert that
it is the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073 effective 25 January
1977, that has primarily established the right of a Filipino citizen who has been
"in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945" to perfect or complete his title by
applying with the proper court for the confirmation of his ownership claim and
the issuance of the corresponding certificate of title.
Section 48 can be viewed in conjunction with the afore-quoted Section 11 of the
Public Land Act, which provides that public lands suitable for agricultural
purposes may be disposed of by confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles,
and given the notion that both provisions declare that it is indeed the Public
Land Act that primarily establishes the substantive ownership of the possessor
who has been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945. In turn,
Section 14(a) of the Property Registration Decree recognizes the substantive
right granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as well provides the
corresponding original registration procedure for the judicial confirmation of an
imperfect or incomplete title.
There is another limitation to the right granted under Section 48(b). Section 47
of the Public Land Act limits the period within which one may exercise the right
to seek registration under Section 48. The provision has been amended several
times, most recently by Rep. Act No. 9176 in 2002. It currently reads thus:
Section 47. The persons specified in the next following section are hereby
granted time, not to extend beyond December 31, 2020 within which to avail of
the benefits of this Chapter: Provided, That this period shall apply only where
the area applied for does not exceed twelve (12) hectares: Provided, further,
That the several periods of time designated by the President in accordance
with Section Forty-Five of this Act shall apply also to the lands comprised in the
provisions of this Chapter, but this Section shall not be construed as prohibiting
any said persons from acting under this Chapter at any time prior to the period
fixed by the President.24
Accordingly under the current state of the law, the substantive right granted
under Section 48(b) may be availed of only until 31 December 2020.
B.
Despite the clear text of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended and
Section 14(a) of the Property Registration Decree, the OSG has adopted the
position that for one to acquire the right to seek registration of an alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, it is not enough that the applicant and
his/her predecessors-in-interest be in possession under a bona fide claim of
ownership since 12 June 1945; the alienable and disposable character of the
property must have been declared also as of 12 June 1945. Following the
OSG’s approach, all lands certified as alienable and disposable after 12 June
1945 cannot be registered either under Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree or Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act as amended. The
absurdity of such an implication was discussed in Naguit.
Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable
character of the land should have already been established since June 12,
1945 or earlier. This is not borne out by the plain meaning of Section 14(1).
"Since June 12, 1945," as used in the provision, qualifies its antecedent phrase
"under a bonafide claim of ownership." Generally speaking, qualifying words
restrict or modify only the words or phrases to which they are immediately
associated, and not those distantly or remotely located.25 Ad proximum
antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur sentencia.
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt
petitioner’s position. Absent a legislative amendment, the rule would be,
adopting the OSG’s view, that all lands of the public domain which were not
declared alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be
susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of unchallenged
possession by the occupant. Such interpretation renders paragraph (1) of

Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the government from
giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as
alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation would even
be aggravated considering that before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not
yet even considered an independent state.
Accordingly, the Court in Naguit explained:
[T]he more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires
the property sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at
the time the application for registration of title is filed. If the State, at the time
the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the property
for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is still
reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its
ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if
in good faith. However, if the property has already been classified as alienable
and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on the
part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.
The Court declares that the correct interpretation of Section 14(1) is that
which was adopted in Naguit. The contrary pronouncement in Herbieto, as
pointed out in Naguit, absurdly limits the application of the provision to the
point of virtual inutility since it would only cover lands actually declared
alienable and disposable prior to 12 June 1945, even if the current possessor
is able to establish open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
under a bona fide claim of ownership long before that date.
Moreover, the Naguit interpretation allows more possessors under a bona fide
claim of ownership to avail of judicial confirmation of their imperfect titles than
what would be feasible under Herbieto. This balancing fact is significant,
especially considering our forthcoming discussion on the scope and reach of
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
Petitioners make the salient observation that the contradictory passages from
Herbieto are obiter dicta since the land registration proceedings therein is void
ab initio in the first place due to lack of the requisite publication of the notice of
initial hearing. There is no need to explicitly overturn Herbieto, as it suffices
that the Court’s acknowledgment that the particular line of argument used
therein concerning Section 14(1) is indeed obiter.
It may be noted that in the subsequent case of Buenaventura,26 the Court,
citing Herbieto, again stated that "[a]ny period of possession prior to the date
when the [s]ubject [property was] classified as alienable and disposable is
inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of
possession…" That statement, in the context of Section 14(1), is certainly
erroneous. Nonetheless, the passage as cited in Buenaventura should again
be considered as obiter. The application therein was ultimately granted, citing
Section 14(2). The evidence submitted by petitioners therein did not establish
any mode of possession on their part prior to 1948, thereby precluding the
application of Section 14(1). It is not even apparent from the decision whether
petitioners therein had claimed entitlement to original registration following
Section 14(1), their position being that they had been in exclusive possession
under a bona fide claim of ownership for over fifty (50) years, but not before
12 June 1945.
Thus, neither Herbieto nor its principal discipular ruling Buenaventura has any
precedental value with respect to Section 14(1). On the other hand, the ratio
of Naguit is embedded in Section 14(1), since it precisely involved situation
wherein the applicant had been in exclusive possession under a bona fide
claim of ownership prior to 12 June 1945. The Court’s interpretation of Section
14(1) therein was decisive to the resolution of the case. Any doubt as to which
between Naguit or Herbieto provides the final word of the Court on Section
14(1) is now settled in favor of Naguit.
We noted in Naguit that it should be distinguished from Bracewell v. Court of
Appeals27 since in the latter, the application for registration had been filed
before the land was declared alienable or disposable. The dissent though
pronounces Bracewell as the better rule between the two. Yet two years after
Bracewell, its ponente, the esteemed Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago,
penned the ruling in Republic v. Ceniza,28 which involved a claim of
possession that extended back to 1927 over a public domain land that was
declared alienable and disposable only in 1980. Ceniza cited Bracewell,
8
quoted extensively from it, and following the mindset of the dissent, the attempt
at registration in Ceniza should have failed. Not so.
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an
applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such
as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action;
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a
statute.
In this case, private respondents presented a certification dated November 25,
1994, issued by Eduardo M. Inting, the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Officer in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
Office in Cebu City, stating that the lots involved were "found to be within the
alienable and disposable (sic) Block-I, Land Classification Project No. 32-A, per
map 2962 4-I555 dated December 9, 1980." This is sufficient evidence to show
the real character of the land subject of private respondents’ application.
Further, the certification enjoys a presumption of regularity in the absence of
contradictory evidence, which is true in this case. Worth noting also was the
observation of the Court of Appeals stating that:
[n]o opposition was filed by the Bureaus of Lands and Forestry to contest the
application of appellees on the ground that the property still forms part of the
public domain. Nor is there any showing that the lots in question are forestal
land....
Thus, while the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that mere possession of public
land for the period required by law would entitle its occupant to a confirmation
of imperfect title, it did not err in ruling in favor of private respondents as far as
the first requirement in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is concerned, for
they were able to overcome the burden of proving the alienability of the land
subject of their application.
As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, private respondents were able to
prove their open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject
land even before the year 1927. As a rule, we are bound by the factual findings
of the Court of Appeals. Although there are exceptions, petitioner did not show
that this is one of them.29
Why did the Court in Ceniza, through the same eminent member who authored
Bracewell, sanction the registration under Section 48(b) of public domain lands
declared alienable or disposable thirty-five (35) years and 180 days after 12
June 1945? The telling difference is that in Ceniza, the application for
registration was filed nearly six (6) years after the land had been declared
alienable or disposable, while in Bracewell, the application was filed nine (9)
years before the land was declared alienable or disposable. That crucial
difference was also stressed in Naguit to contradistinguish it from Bracewell, a
difference which the dissent seeks to belittle.
III.
We next ascertain the correct framework of analysis with respect to Section
14(2). The provision reads:
SECTION 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may file in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
xxx
(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription
under the provisions of existing laws.
The Court in Naguit offered the following discussion concerning Section 14(2),
which we did even then recognize, and still do, to be an obiter dictum, but we
nonetheless refer to it as material for further discussion, thus:
Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the amendatory P.D.
No. 1073 preclude the application for registration of alienable lands of the
public domain, possession over which commenced only after June 12, 1945? It
did not, considering Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, which

governs and authorizes the application of "those who have acquired
ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing
laws."
Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil
Code.[30 ] There is a consistent jurisprudential rule that properties classified
as alienable public land may be converted into private property by reason of
open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years.[31 ]
With such conversion, such property may now fall within the contemplation of
"private lands" under Section 14(2), and thus susceptible to registration by
those who have acquired ownership through prescription. Thus, even if
possession of the alienable public land commenced on a date later than June
12, 1945, and such possession being been open, continuous and exclusive,
then the possessor may have the right to register the land by virtue of Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
Naguit did not involve the application of Section 14(2), unlike in this case
where petitioners have based their registration bid primarily on that provision,
and where the evidence definitively establishes their claim of possession only
as far back as 1948. It is in this case that we can properly appreciate the
nuances of the provision.
A.
The obiter in Naguit cited the Civil Code provisions on prescription as the
possible basis for application for original registration under Section 14(2).
Specifically, it is Article 1113 which provides legal foundation for the
application. It reads:
All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of
prescription, unless otherwise provided. Property of the State or any of its
subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of
prescription.
It is clear under the Civil Code that where lands of the public domain are
patrimonial in character, they are susceptible to acquisitive prescription. On
the other hand, among the public domain lands that are not susceptible to
acquisitive prescription are timber lands and mineral lands. The Constitution
itself proscribes private ownership of timber or mineral lands.
There are in fact several provisions in the Civil Code concerning the
acquisition of real property through prescription. Ownership of real property
may be acquired by ordinary prescription of ten (10) years,32 or through
extraordinary prescription of thirty (30) years.33 Ordinary acquisitive
prescription requires possession in good faith,34 as well as just title.35
When Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree explicitly provides
that persons "who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription
under the provisions of existing laws," it unmistakably refers to the Civil Code
as a valid basis for the registration of lands. The Civil Code is the only existing
law that specifically allows the acquisition by prescription of private lands,
including patrimonial property belonging to the State. Thus, the critical
question that needs affirmation is whether Section 14(2) does encompass
original registration proceedings over patrimonial property of the State, which
a private person has acquired through prescription.
The Naguit obiter had adverted to a frequently reiterated jurisprudence
holding that properties classified as alienable public land may be converted
into private property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession
of at least thirty (30) years.36 Yet if we ascertain the source of the "thirty-year"
period, additional complexities relating to Section 14(2) and to how exactly it
operates would emerge. For there are in fact two distinct origins of the thirty
(30)-year rule.
The first source is Rep. Act No. 1942, enacted in 1957, which amended
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act by granting the right to seek original
registration of alienable public lands through possession in the concept of an
owner for at least thirty years.
The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the
public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but
9
whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of
First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
xxxxxxxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition
of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate
of title under the provisions of this Chapter. (emphasis supplied)37
This provision was repealed in 1977 with the enactment of P.D. 1073, which
made the date 12 June 1945 the reckoning point for the first time. Nonetheless,
applications for registration filed prior to 1977 could have invoked the 30-year
rule introduced by Rep. Act No. 1942.
The second source is Section 14(2) of P.D. 1529 itself, at least by implication,
as it applies the rules on prescription under the Civil Code, particularly Article
1113 in relation to Article 1137. Note that there are two kinds of prescription
under the Civil Code–ordinary acquisitive prescription and extraordinary
acquisitive prescription, which, under Article 1137, is completed "through
uninterrupted adverse possession… for thirty years, without need of title or of
good faith."
Obviously, the first source of the thirty (30)-year period rule, Rep. Act No. 1942,
became unavailable after 1977. At present, the only legal basis for the thirty
(30)-year period is the law on prescription under the Civil Code, as mandated
under Section 14(2). However, there is a material difference between how the
thirty (30)-year rule operated under Rep. Act No. 1942 and how it did under the
Civil Code.
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942, did
not refer to or call into application the Civil Code provisions on prescription. It
merely set forth a requisite thirty-year possession period immediately preceding
the application for confirmation of title, without any qualification as to whether
the property should be declared alienable at the beginning of, and continue as
such, throughout the entire thirty-(30) years. There is neither statutory nor
jurisprudential basis to assert Rep. Act No. 1942 had mandated such a
requirement,38 similar to our earlier finding with respect to the present language
of Section 48(b), which now sets 12 June 1945 as the point of reference.
Then, with the repeal of Rep. Act No. 1942, the thirty-year possession period as
basis for original registration became Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree, which entitled those "who have acquired ownership over private lands
by prescription under the provisions of existing laws" to apply for original
registration. Again, the thirty-year period is derived from the rule on
extraordinary prescription under Article 1137 of the Civil Code. At the same
time, Section 14(2) puts into operation the entire regime of prescription under
the Civil Code, a fact which does not hold true with respect to Section 14(1).
B.
Unlike Section 14(1), Section 14(2) explicitly refers to the principles on
prescription under existing laws. Accordingly, we are impelled to apply the civil
law concept of prescription, as set forth in the Civil Code, in our interpretation of
Section 14(2). There is no similar demand on our part in the case of Section
14(1).
The critical qualification under Article 1113 of the Civil Code is thus: "[p]roperty
of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be
the object of prescription." The identification what consists of patrimonial
property is provided by Articles 420 and 421, which we quote in full:
Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
 10
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports more commonly known as the BCDA law. Section 2 of the law authorizes the
and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others sale of certain military reservations and portions of military camps in Metro
of similar character; Manila, including Fort Bonifacio and Villamor Air Base. For purposes of
effecting the sale of the military camps, the law mandates the President to
transfer such military lands to the Bases Conversion Development Authority
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are
(BCDA)40 which in turn is authorized to own, hold and/or administer
intended for some public service or for the development of the national
them.41 The President is authorized to sell portions of the military camps, in
wealth.
whole or in part.42 Accordingly, the BCDA law itself declares that the military
lands subject thereof are "alienable and disposable pursuant to the provisions
Art. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in of existing laws and regulations governing sales of government properties."43
the preceding article, is patrimonial property
From the moment the BCDA law was enacted the subject military lands have
It is clear that property of public dominion, which generally includes property become alienable and disposable. However, said lands did not become
belonging to the State, cannot be the object of prescription or, indeed, be patrimonial, as the BCDA law itself expressly makes the reservation that these
subject of the commerce of man.39 Lands of the public domain, whether lands are to be sold in order to raise funds for the conversion of the former
declared alienable and disposable or not, are property of public dominion and American bases at Clark and Subic.44Such purpose can be tied to either "public
thus insusceptible to acquisition by prescription. service" or "the development of national wealth" under Article 420(2). Thus, at
that time, the lands remained property of the public dominion under Article
420(2), notwithstanding their status as alienable and disposable. It is upon their
Let us now explore the effects under the Civil Code of a declaration by the
sale as authorized under the BCDA law to a private person or entity that such
President or any duly authorized government officer of alienability and
lands become private property and cease to be property of the public dominion.
disposability of lands of the public domain. Would such lands so declared
alienable and disposable be converted, under the Civil Code, from property of
the public dominion into patrimonial property? After all, by connotative C.
definition, alienable and disposable lands may be the object of the commerce
of man; Article 1113 provides that all things within the commerce of man are
Should public domain lands become patrimonial because they are declared as
susceptible to prescription; and the same provision further provides that
such in a duly enacted law or duly promulgated proclamation that they are no
patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by prescription.
longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth,
would the period of possession prior to the conversion of such public dominion
Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that "[p]roperty of public into patrimonial be reckoned in counting the prescriptive period in favor of the
dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall possessors? We rule in the negative.
form part of the patrimonial property of the State." It is this provision that
controls how public dominion property may be converted into patrimonial
The limitation imposed by Article 1113 dissuades us from ruling that the period
property susceptible to acquisition by prescription. After all, Article 420 (2)
of possession before the public domain land becomes patrimonial may be
makes clear that those property "which belong to the State, without being for
counted for the purpose of completing the prescriptive period. Possession of
public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of
public dominion property before it becomes patrimonial cannot be the object of
the national wealth" are public dominion property. For as long as the property
prescription according to the Civil Code. As the application for registration
belongs to the State, although already classified as alienable or disposable, it
under Section 14(2) falls wholly within the framework of prescription under the
remains property of the public dominion if when it is "intended for some public
Civil Code, there is no way that possession during the time that the land was
service or for the development of the national wealth".
still classified as public dominion property can be counted to meet the
requisites of acquisitive prescription and justify registration.
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public
dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the development
Are we being inconsistent in applying divergent rules for Section 14(1) and
of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial.
Section 14(2)? There is no inconsistency. Section 14(1) mandates registration
Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable
on the basis of possession, while Section 14(2) entitles registration on the basis
or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article
of prescription. Registration under Section 14(1) is extended under the aegis of
420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such
the Property Registration Decree and the Public Land Act while registration
alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no
under Section 14(2) is made available both by the Property Registration
longer intended for public service or for the development of the national
Decree and the Civil Code.
wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such
declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a
Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by In the same manner, we can distinguish between the thirty-year period under
law. Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1472, and
the thirty-year period available through Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree in relation to Article 1137 of the Civil Code. The period
It is comprehensible with ease that this reading of Section 14(2) of the
under the former speaks of a thirty-year period of possession, while the period
Property Registration Decree limits its scope and reach and thus affects the
under the latter concerns a thirty-year period of extraordinary prescription.
registrability even of lands already declared alienable and disposable to the
Registration under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act as amended by Rep.
detriment of the bona fide possessors or occupants claiming title to the lands.
Act No. 1472 is based on thirty years of possession alone without regard to the
Yet this interpretation is in accord with the Regalian doctrine and its
Civil Code, while the registration under Section 14(2) of the Property
concomitant assumption that all lands owned by the State, although declared
Registration Decree is founded on extraordinary prescription under the Civil
alienable or disposable, remain as such and ought to be used only by the
Code.
Government.

It may be asked why the principles of prescription under the Civil Code should
Recourse does not lie with this Court in the matter. The duty of the Court is to
not apply as well to Section 14(1). Notwithstanding the vaunted status of the
apply the Constitution and the laws in accordance with their language and
Civil Code, it ultimately is just one of numerous statutes, neither superior nor
intent. The remedy is to change the law, which is the province of the
inferior to other statutes such as the Property Registration Decree. The
legislative branch. Congress can very well be entreated to amend Section
legislative branch is not bound to adhere to the framework set forth by the Civil
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree and pertinent provisions of the Civil
Code when it enacts subsequent legislation. Section 14(2) manifests a clear
Code to liberalize the requirements for judicial confirmation of imperfect or
intent to interrelate the registration allowed under that provision with the Civil
incomplete titles.
Code, but no such intent exists with respect to Section 14(1).

The operation of the foregoing interpretation can be illustrated by an actual

IV.
example. Republic Act No. 7227, entitled "An Act Accelerating The
Conversion Of Military Reservations Into Other Productive Uses, etc.," is
 11
One of the keys to understanding the framework we set forth today is seeing Code, though it arguably did not preclude such registration.50 Still, the gap was
how our land registration procedures correlate with our law on prescription, lamentable, considering that the Civil Code, by itself, establishes ownership
which, under the Civil Code, is one of the modes for acquiring ownership over over the patrimonial property of persons who have completed the prescriptive
property. periods ordained therein. The gap was finally closed with the adoption of the
Property Registration Decree in 1977, with Section 14(2) thereof expressly
authorizing original registration in favor of persons who have acquired
The Civil Code makes it clear that patrimonial property of the State may be
ownership over private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing
acquired by private persons through prescription. This is brought about by
laws, that is, the Civil Code as of now.
Article 1113, which states that "[a]ll things which are within the commerce of
man are susceptible to prescription," and that [p]roperty of the State or any of
its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of V.
prescription."
We synthesize the doctrines laid down in this case, as follows:
There are two modes of prescription through which immovables may be
acquired under the Civil Code. The first is ordinary acquisitive prescription,
(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree,
which, under Article 1117, requires possession in good faith and with just title;
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that "those who
and, under Article 1134, is completed through possession of ten (10) years.
by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
There is nothing in the Civil Code that bars a person from acquiring
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable
patrimonial property of the State through ordinary acquisitive prescription, nor
and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
is there any apparent reason to impose such a rule. At the same time, there
acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945" have acquired ownership of,
are indispensable requisites–good faith and just title. The ascertainment of
and registrable title to, such lands based on the length and quality of their
good faith involves the application of Articles 526, 527, and 528, as well as
possession.
Article 1127 of the Civil Code,45 provisions that more or less speak for
themselves.
(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and
does not require that the lands should have been alienable and disposable
On the other hand, the concept of just title requires some clarification. Under
during the entire period of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure
Article 1129, there is just title for the purposes of prescription "when the
judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and
adverse claimant came into possession of the property through one of the
disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land
modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights,
Act.51
but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right." Dr.
Tolentino explains:
(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is
further confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
Just title is an act which has for its purpose the transmission of ownership,
and which would have actually transferred ownership if the grantor had been
the owner. This vice or defect is the one cured by prescription. Examples: sale (2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree,
with delivery, exchange, donation, succession, and dacion in payment.46 consider that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of
acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain lands
become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are
The OSG submits that the requirement of just title necessarily precludes the
alienable or disposable. There must also be an express government
applicability of ordinary acquisitive prescription to patrimonial property. The
manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for
major premise for the argument is that "the State, as the owner and grantor,
public service or the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the
could not transmit ownership to the possessor before the completion of the
Civil Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the
required period of possession."47 It is evident that the OSG erred when it
prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to
assumed that the grantor referred to in Article 1129 is the State. The grantor is
run.
the one from whom the person invoking ordinary acquisitive prescription
derived the title, whether by sale, exchange, donation, succession or any
other mode of the acquisition of ownership or other real rights. (a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person
acquires ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code
is entitled to secure registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property
Earlier, we made it clear that, whether under ordinary prescription or
Registration Decree.
extraordinary prescription, the period of possession preceding the
classification of public dominion lands as patrimonial cannot be counted for
the purpose of computing prescription. But after the property has been (b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be
become patrimonial, the period of prescription begins to run in favor of the acquired, one ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive
possessor. Once the requisite period has been completed, two legal events prescription, a person acquires ownership of a patrimonial property through
ensue: (1) the patrimonial property is ipso jure converted into private land; and possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title. Under
(2) the person in possession for the periods prescribed under the Civil Code extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a person’s uninterrupted adverse
acquires ownership of the property by operation of the Civil Code. possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of
good faith or just title, ripens into ownership.
It is evident that once the possessor automatically becomes the owner of the
converted patrimonial property, the ideal next step is the registration of the B.
property under the Torrens system. It should be remembered that registration
of property is not a mode of acquisition of ownership, but merely a mode of
We now apply the above-stated doctrines to the case at bar.
confirmation of ownership.48

It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that

Looking back at the registration regime prior to the adoption of the Property
Malabanan has acquired ownership over the subject property under Section
Registration Decree in 1977, it is apparent that the registration system then
48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no substantive evidence to establish that
did not fully accommodate the acquisition of ownership of patrimonial property
Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been in
under the Civil Code. What the system accommodated was the confirmation
possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that
of imperfect title brought about by the completion of a period of possession
petitioners can date back their possession, according to their own
ordained under the Public Land Act (either 30 years following Rep. Act No.
evidence—the Tax Declarations they presented in particular—is to the year
1942, or since 12 June 1945 following P.D. No. 1073).
1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of
the Property Registration Decree.
The Land Registration Act49 was noticeably silent on the requisites for
alienable public lands acquired through ordinary prescription under the Civil

Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration.
While the subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982,
there is no competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use
service or for the development of the national evidence, conformably with
Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of the subject property as
alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change its status
as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus,
it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
VI.
A final word. The Court is comfortable with the correctness of the legal
doctrines established in this decision. Nonetheless, discomfiture over the
implications of today’s ruling cannot be discounted. For, every untitled
property that is occupied in the country will be affected by this ruling. The
social implications cannot be dismissed lightly, and the Court would be
abdicating its social responsibility to the Filipino people if we simply levied the
law without comment.
The informal settlement of public lands, whether declared alienable or not, is a
phenomenon tied to long-standing habit and cultural acquiescence, and is
common among the so-called "Third World" countries. This paradigm
powerfully evokes the disconnect between a legal system and the reality on
the ground. The law so far has been unable to bridge that gap. Alternative
means of acquisition of these public domain lands, such as through
homestead or free patent, have
proven unattractive due to limitations imposed on the grantee in the
encumbrance or alienation of said properties.52Judicial confirmation of
imperfect title has emerged as the most viable, if not the most attractive
means to regularize the informal settlement of alienable or disposable lands
of the public domain, yet even that system, as revealed in this decision, has
considerable limits.
There are millions upon millions of Filipinos who have individually or
exclusively held residential lands on which they have lived and raised their
families. Many more have tilled and made productive idle lands of the State
with their hands. They have been regarded for generation by their families
and their communities as common law owners. There is much to be said
about the virtues of according them legitimate states. Yet such virtues are not
for the Court to translate into positive law, as the law itself considered such
lands as property of the public dominion. It could only be up to Congress to
set forth a new phase of land reform to sensibly regularize and formalize the
settlement of such lands which in legal theory are lands of the public domain
before the problem becomes insoluble. This could be accomplished, to cite
two examples, by liberalizing the standards for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title, or amending the Civil Code itself to ease the requisites for the
conversion of public dominion property into patrimonial.
One’s sense of security over land rights infuses into every aspect of
well-being not only of that individual, but also to the person’s family. Once that
sense of security is deprived, life and livelihood are put on stasis. It is for the
political branches to bring welcome closure to the long pestering problem.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated 23 February 2007 and Resolution dated 2 October 2007 are
AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 144057 January 17, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CORAZON
NAGUIT, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
12
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, seeking to review the Decision1 of the Sixth Division of the
Court of Appeals dated July 12, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 51921. The appellate
court affirmed the decisions of both the Regional Trial Court (RTC),2 Branch 8,
of Kalibo, Aklan dated February 26, 1999, and the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial
Court (MCTC)3 of Ibajay-Nabas, Aklan dated February 18, 1998, which granted
the application for registration of a parcel of land of Corazon Naguit (Naguit),
the respondent herein.
The facts are as follows:
On January 5, 1993, Naguit, a Filipino citizen, of legal age and married to
Manolito S. Naguit, filed with the MCTC of Ibajay-Nabas, Aklan, a petition for
registration of title of a parcel of land situated in Brgy. Union, Nabas, Aklan. The
parcel of land is designated as Lot No. 10049, Cad. 758-D, Nabas Cadastre,
AP – 060414-014779, and contains an area of 31,374 square meters. The
application seeks judicial confirmation of respondent’s imperfect title over the
aforesaid land.
On February 20, 1995, the court held initial hearing on the application. The
public prosecutor, appearing for the government, and Jose Angeles,
representing the heirs of Rustico Angeles, opposed the petition. On a later date,
however, the heirs of Rustico Angeles filed a formal opposition to the petition.
Also on February 20, 1995, the court issued an order of general default against
the whole world except as to the heirs of Rustico Angeles and the government.
The evidence on record reveals that the subject parcel of land was originally
declared for taxation purposes in the name of Ramon Urbano (Urbano) in 1945
under Tax Declaration No. 3888 until 1991.4 On July 9, 1992, Urbano executed
a Deed of Quitclaim in favor of the heirs of Honorato Maming (Maming),
wherein he renounced all his rights to the subject property and confirmed the
sale made by his father to Maming sometime in 1955 or 1956. 5Subsequently,
the heirs of Maming executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of respondent
Naguit who thereupon started occupying the same. She constituted Manuel
Blanco, Jr. as her attorney-in-fact and administrator. The administrator
introduced improvements, planted trees, such as mahogany, coconut and
gemelina trees in addition to existing coconut trees which were then 50 to 60
years old, and paid the corresponding taxes due on the subject land. At present,
there are parcels of land surrounding the subject land which have been issued
titles by virtue of judicial decrees. Naguit and her predecessors-in-interest have
occupied the land openly and in the concept of owner without any objection
from any private person or even the government until she filed her application
for registration.
After the presentation of evidence for Naguit, the public prosecutor manifested
that the government did not intend to present any evidence while oppositor
Jose Angeles, as representative of the heirs of Rustico Angeles, failed to
appear during the trial despite notice. On September 27, 1997, the MCTC
rendered a decision ordering that the subject parcel be brought under the
operation of the Property Registration Decree or Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1529 and that the title thereto registered and confirmed in the name of Naguit.6
The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), filed a motion for reconsideration. The OSG stressed that the
land applied for was declared alienable and disposable only on October 15,
1980, per the certification from Regional Executive Director Raoul T. Geollegue
of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Region
VI.7 However, the court denied the motion for reconsideration in an order dated
February 18, 1998.81awphi1.nét
Thereafter, the Republic appealed the decision and the order of the MCTC to
the RTC, Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 8. On February 26, 1999, the RTC rendered its
decision, dismissing the appeal.9
Undaunted, the Republic elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via Rule 42
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. On July 12, 2000, the appellate court
rendered a decision dismissing the petition filed by the Republic and affirmed in
toto the assailed decision of the RTC.
Hence, the present petition for review raising a pure question of law was filed
by the Republic on September 4, 2000.10

The OSG assails the decision of the Court of Appeals contending that the
appellate court gravely erred in holding that there is no need for the
government’s prior release of the subject lot from the public domain before it
can be considered alienable or disposable within the meaning of P.D. No.
1529, and that Naguit had been in possession of Lot No. 10049 in the concept
of owner for the required period.11
Hence, the central question for resolution is whether is necessary under
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree that the subject land be first
classified as alienable and disposable before the applicant’s possession
under a bona fide claim of ownership could even start.
The OSG invokes our holding in Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate
Court12 in arguing that the property which is in open, continuous and exclusive
possession must first be alienable. Since the subject land was declared
alienable only on October 15, 1980, Naguit could not have maintained a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, as required by Section 14 of the
Property Registration Decree, since prior to 1980, the land was not alienable
or disposable, the OSG argues.
Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, governing original registration
proceedings, bears close examination. It expressly provides:
SECTION 14. Who may apply.— The following persons may file in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription
under the provisions of existing laws.
....
There are three obvious requisites for the filing of an application for
registration of title under Section 14(1) – that the property in question is
alienable and disposable land of the public domain; that the applicants by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation, and; that
such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945
or earlier.
Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable
character of the land should have already been established since June 12,
1945 or earlier. This is not borne out by the plain meaning of Section 14(1).
"Since June 12, 1945," as used in the provision, qualifies its antecedent
phrase "under a bonafide claim of ownership." Generally speaking, qualifying
words restrict or modify only the words or phrases to which they are
immediately associated, and not those distantly or remotely located.13 Ad
proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur sentencia.
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt
petitioner’s position. Absent a legislative amendment, the rule would be,
adopting the OSG’s view, that all lands of the public domain which were not
declared alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be
susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of unchallenged
possession by the occupant. Such interpretation renders paragraph (1) of
Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the government from
giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as
alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation would even
be aggravated considering that before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not
yet even considered an independent state.
Instead, the more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely
requires the property sought to be registered as already alienable and
disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed. If the State,
at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release
the property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the
13
government is still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to
preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse
possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has already been
classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already
an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over
the property.
This reading aligns conformably with our holding in Republic v. Court of
Appeals .14 Therein, the Court noted that "to prove that the land subject of an
application for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the
existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation
reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute."15 In
that case, the subject land had been certified by the DENR as alienable and
disposable in 1980, thus the Court concluded that the alienable status of the
land, compounded by the established fact that therein respondents had
occupied the land even before 1927, sufficed to allow the application for
registration of the said property. In the case at bar, even the petitioner admits
that the subject property was released and certified as within alienable and
disposable zone in 1980 by the DENR.16
This case is distinguishable from Bracewell v. Court of Appeals,17 wherein the
Court noted that while the claimant had been in possession since 1908, it was
only in 1972 that the lands in question were classified as alienable and
disposable. Thus, the bid at registration therein did not succeed. In Bracewell,
the claimant had filed his application in 1963, or nine (9) years before the
property was declared alienable and disposable.1awphi1.nét Thus, in this case,
where the application was made years after the property had been certified as
alienable and disposable, the Bracewell ruling does not apply.
A different rule obtains for forest lands,18 such as those which form part of a
reservation for provincial park purposes19 the possession of which cannot ripen
into ownership.20 It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that
forest land cannot be owned by private persons. As held in Palomo v. Court of
Appeals,21 forest land is not registrable and possession thereof, no matter how
lengthy, cannot convert it into private property, unless such lands are
reclassified and considered disposable and alienable.22 In the case at bar, the
property in question was undisputedly classified as disposable and alienable;
hence, the ruling in Palomo is inapplicable, as correctly held by the Court of
Appeals.23
It must be noted that the present case was decided by the lower courts on the
basis of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, which pertains to
original registration through ordinary registration proceedings. The right to file
the application for registration derives from a bona fide claim of ownership
going back to June 12, 1945 or earlier, by reason of the claimant’s open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain.
A similar right is given under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, which reads:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of
the public domain or claiming to own any such land or an interest therein, but
those titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of
First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition
of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate
of title under the provisions of this chapter.
When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936, the period of
possession deemed necessary to vest the right to register their title to
agricultural lands of the public domain commenced from July 26, 1894.

However, this period was amended by R.A. No. 1942, which provided that
the bona fide claim of ownership must have been for at least thirty (30) years.
Then in 1977, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act was again amended, this
time by P.D. No. 1073, which pegged the reckoning date at June 12, 1945.
This new starting point is concordant with Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree.
Indeed, there are no material differences between Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree and Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as
amended. True, the Public Land Act does refer to "agricultural lands of the
public domain," while the Property Registration Decree uses the term
"alienable and disposable lands of the public domain." It must be noted
though that the Constitution declares that "alienable lands of the public
domain shall be limited to agricultural lands."24 Clearly, the subject lands
under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree are of the same type.
Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the amendatory
P.D. No. 1073 preclude the application for registration of alienable lands of
the public domain, possession over which commenced only after June 12,
1945? It did not, considering Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree, which governs and authorizes the application of "those who have
acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions of
existing laws."
Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil
Code.25 There is a consistent jurisprudential rule that properties classified as
alienable public land may be converted into private property by reason of
open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years.26 With
such conversion, such property may now fall within the contemplation of
"private lands" under Section 14(2), and thus susceptible to registration by
those who have acquired ownership through prescription. Thus, even if
possession of the alienable public land commenced on a date later than June
12, 1945, and such possession being been open, continuous and exclusive,
then the possessor may have the right to register the land by virtue of Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
The land in question was found to be cocal in nature, it having been planted
with coconut trees now over fifty years old.27 The inherent nature of the land
but confirms its certification in 1980 as alienable, hence agricultural. There is
no impediment to the application of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree, as correctly accomplished by the lower courts.l^vvphi1.net
The OSG posits that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Naguit had
been in possession in the concept of owner for the required period. The
argument begs the question. It is again hinged on the assertion—shown
earlier to be unfounded—that there could have been no bona fide claim of
ownership prior to 1980, when the subject land was declared alienable or
disposable.
We find no reason to disturb the conclusion of both the RTC and the Court of
Appeals that Naguit had the right to apply for registration owing to the
continuous possession by her and her predecessors-in-interest of the land
since 1945. The basis of such conclusion is primarily factual, and the Court
generally respects the factual findings made by lower courts. Notably,
possession since 1945 was established through proof of the existence of 50
to 60-year old trees at the time Naguit purchased the property as well as tax
declarations executed by Urbano in 1945. Although tax declarations and
realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership,
nevertheless, they are good indicia of the possession in the concept of owner
for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in
his actual or at least constructive possession. They constitute at least proof
that the holder has a claim of title over the property. The voluntary declaration
of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests not only one’s sincere
and honest desire to obtain title to the property and announces his adverse
claim against the State and all other interested parties, but also the intention
to contribute needed revenues to the Government. Such an act strengthens
one’s bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.28
Considering that the possession of the subject parcel of land by the
respondent can be traced back to that of her predecessors-in-interest which
commenced since 1945 or for almost fifty (50) years, it is indeed beyond any
cloud of doubt that she has acquired title thereto which may be properly
14
brought under the operation of the Torrens system. That she has been in
possession of the land in the concept of an owner, open, continuous, peaceful
and without any opposition from any private person and the government itself
makes her right thereto undoubtedly settled and deserving of protection under
the law.
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated July 12, 2000 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
(back to malabanan case for day 6)
G.R. No. 154953 June 26, 2008
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
T.A.N. PROPERTIES, INC., respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 21 August 2002
Decision2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66658. The Court of
Appeals affirmed in toto the 16 December 1999 Decision3 of the Regional Trial
Court of Tanauan, Batangas, Branch 6 (trial court) in Land Registration Case
No. T-635.
The Antecedent Facts
This case originated from an Application for Original Registration of Title filed
by T.A.N. Properties, Inc. covering Lot 10705-B of the subdivision plan
Csd-04-019741 which is a portion of the consolidated Lot 10705, Cad-424, Sto.
Tomas Cadastre. The land, with an area of 564,007 square meters, or 56.4007
hectares, is located at San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas.
On 31 August 1999, the trial court set the case for initial hearing at 9:30 a.m. on
11 November 1999. The Notice of Initial Hearing was published in the Official
Gazette, 20 September 1999 issue, Volume 95, No. 38, pages 6793 to
6794,4 and in the 18 October 1999 issue of People’s Journal Taliba,5 a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. The Notice of Initial Hearing
was also posted in a conspicuous place on the bulletin board of the Municipal
Building of Sto. Tomas, Batangas, as well as in a conspicuous place on the
land.6 All adjoining owners and all government agencies and offices concerned
were notified of the initial hearing.7
On 11 November 1999, when the trial court called the case for initial hearing,
there was no oppositor other than the Opposition dated 7 October 1999 of the
Republic of the Philippines represented by the Director of Lands (petitioner).
On 15 November 1999, the trial court issued an Order8 of General Default
against the whole world except as against petitioner.
During the hearing on 19 November 1999, Ceferino Carandang (Carandang)
appeared as oppositor. The trial court gave Carandang until 29 November 1999
within which to file his written opposition.9 Carandang failed to file his written
opposition and to appear in the succeeding hearings. In an Order10 dated 13
December 1999, the trial court reinstated the Order of General Default.
During the hearings conducted on 13 and 14 December 1999, respondent
presented three witnesses: Anthony Dimayuga Torres (Torres), respondent’s
Operations Manager and its authorized representative in the case; Primitivo
Evangelista (Evangelista), a 72-year old resident of San Bartolome, Sto.

Tomas, Batangas since birth; and Regalado Marquez, Records Officer II of
the Land Registration Authority (LRA), Quezon City.
The testimonies of respondent’s witnesses showed that Prospero Dimayuga
(Kabesang Puroy) had peaceful, adverse, open, and continuous possession
of the land in the concept of an owner since 1942. Upon his death, Kabesang
Puroy was succeeded by his son Antonio Dimayuga (Antonio). On 27
September 1960, Antonio executed a Deed of Donation covering the land in
favor of one of his children, Fortunato Dimayuga (Fortunato). Later, however,
Antonio gave Fortunato another piece of land. Hence, on 26 April 1961,
Antonio executed a Partial Revocation of Donation, and the land was
adjudicated to one of Antonio’s children, Prospero Dimayuga (Porting).11On 8
August 1997, Porting sold the land to respondent.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In its 16 December 1999 Decision, the trial court adjudicated the land in favor
of respondent.
15
The Court of Appeals further ruled that Torres was a competent witness since
he was only testifying on the fact that he had caused the filing of the application
for registration and that respondent acquired the land from Porting.
Petitioner comes to this Court assailing the Court of Appeals’ Decision.
Petitioner raises the following grounds in its Memorandum:
The Court of Appeals erred on a question of law in allowing the grant of title to
applicant corporation despite the following:
1. Absence of showing that it or its predecessors-in-interest had open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in the concept
of an owner since 12 June 1945 or earlier; and
2. Disqualification of applicant corporation to acquire the subject tract of land. 13
The Issues

The trial court ruled that a juridical person or a corporation could apply for The issues may be summarized as follows:
registration of land provided such entity and its predecessors-in-interest have
possessed the land for 30 years or more. The trial court ruled that the facts
1. Whether the land is alienable and disposable;
showed that respondent’s predecessors-in-interest possessed the land in the
concept of an owner prior to 12 June 1945, which possession converted the
land to private property. 2. Whether respondent or its predecessors-in-interest had open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land in the concept
of an owner since June 1945 or earlier; and
The dispositive portion of the trial court’s Decision reads:

3. Whether respondent is qualified to apply for registration of the land under the
WHEREFORE, and upon previous confirmation of the Order of General
Public Land Act.
Default, the Court hereby adjudicates and decrees Lot 10705-B, identical to
Lot 13637, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre, on plan Csd-04-019741, situated
in Barangay of San Bartolome, Municipality of Sto. Tomas, Province of The Ruling of this Court
Batangas, with an area of 564,007 square meters, in favor of and in the name
of T.A.N. Properties, Inc., a domestic corporation duly organized and existing
The petition has merit.
under Philippine laws with principal office at 19th Floor, PDCP Bank Building,
8737 Paseo de Roxas, Makati City.
Respondent Failed to Prove
that the Land is Alienable and Disposable
Once this Decision shall have become final, let the corresponding decree of
registration be issued.
Petitioner argues that anyone who applies for registration has the burden of
overcoming the presumption that the land forms part of the public domain.
SO ORDERED.12
Petitioner insists that respondent failed to prove that the land is no longer part
of the public domain.
Petitioner appealed from the trial court’s Decision. Petitioner alleged that the
trial court erred in granting the application for registration absent clear
The well-entrenched rule is that all lands not appearing to be clearly of private
evidence that the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest have complied
dominion presumably belong to the State.14 The onus to overturn, by
with the period of possession and occupation as required by law. Petitioner
incontrovertible evidence, the presumption that the land subject of an
alleged that the testimonies of Evangelista and Torres are general in nature.
application for registration is alienable and disposable rests with the
Considering the area involved, petitioner argued that additional witnesses
applicant.15
should have been presented to corroborate Evangelista’s testimony.

In this case, respondent submitted two certifications issued by the Department

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its 21 August 2002 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the trial
court’s Decision.
The Court of Appeals ruled that Evangelista’s knowledge of the possession
and occupation of the land stemmed not only from the fact that he worked
there for three years but also because he and Kabesang Puroy were
practically neighbors. On Evangelista’s failure to mention the name of his
uncle who continuously worked on the land, the Court of Appeals ruled that
Evangelista should not be faulted as he was not asked to name his uncle
when he testified. The Court of Appeals also ruled that at the outset,
Evangelista disclaimed knowledge of Fortunato’s relation to Kabesang Puroy,
but this did not affect Evangelista’s statement that Fortunato took over the
possession and cultivation of the land after Kabesang Puroy’s death. The
Court of Appeals further ruled that the events regarding the acquisition and
disposition of the land became public knowledge because San Bartolome was
a small community. On the matter of additional witnesses, the Court of
Appeals ruled that petitioner failed to cite any law requiring the corroboration
of the sole witness’ testimony.
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). The 3 June 1997 Certification
by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Offices (CENRO),
Batangas City,16 certified that "lot 10705, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre
situated at Barangay San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas with an area of
596,116 square meters falls within the ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE ZONE
under Project No. 30, Land Classification Map No. 582 certified [on] 31
December 1925." The second certification17 in the form of a memorandum to
the trial court, which was issued by the Regional Technical Director, Forest
Management Services of the DENR (FMS-DENR), stated "that the subject area
falls within an alienable and disposable land, Project No. 30 of Sto. Tomas,
Batangas certified on Dec. 31, 1925 per LC No. 582."
The certifications are not sufficient. DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No.
20,18 dated 30 May 1988, delineated the functions and authorities of the offices
within the DENR. Under DAO No. 20, series of 1988, the CENRO issues
certificates of land classification status for areas below 50 hectares. The
Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Offices (PENRO) issues
certificate of land classification status for lands covering over 50 hectares. DAO
No. 38,19 dated 19 April 1990, amended DAO No. 20, series of 1988. DAO No.
38, series of 1990 retained the authority of the CENRO to issue certificates of

land classification status for areas below 50 hectares, as well as the authority
of the PENRO to issue certificates of land classification status for lands
covering over 50 hectares.20 In this case, respondent applied for registration
of Lot 10705-B. The area covered by Lot 10705-B is over 50 hectares
(564,007 square meters). The CENRO certificate covered the entire Lot
10705 with an area of 596,116 square meters which, as per DAO No. 38,
series of 1990, is beyond the authority of the CENRO to certify as alienable
and disposable.
The Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, has no authority under DAO
Nos. 20 and 38 to issue certificates of land classification. Under DAO No. 20,
the Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR:
1. Issues original and renewal of ordinary minor products (OM) permits except
rattan;
2. Approves renewal of resaw/mini-sawmill permits;
3. Approves renewal of special use permits covering over five hectares for
public infrastructure projects; and
4. Issues renewal of certificates of registration for logs, poles, piles, and
lumber dealers.
Under DAO No. 38, the Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR:
1. Issues original and renewal of ordinary minor [products] (OM) permits
except rattan;
2. Issues renewal of certificate of registration for logs, poles, and piles and
lumber dealers;
3. Approves renewal of resaw/mini-sawmill permits;
4. Issues public gratuitous permits for 20 to 50 cubic meters within calamity
declared areas for public infrastructure projects; and
5. Approves original and renewal of special use permits covering over five
hectares for public infrastructure projects.
Hence, the certification issued by the Regional Technical Director,
FMS-DENR, in the form of a memorandum to the trial court, has no probative
value.
Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is
alienable and disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that
the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the
land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land
subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per
verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the
applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original classification
approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal
custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to prove that
the land is alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to do so because the
certifications presented by respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the
land is alienable and disposable.
Only Torres, respondent’s Operations Manager, identified the certifications
submitted by respondent. The government officials who issued the
certifications were not presented before the trial court to testify on their
contents. The trial court should not have accepted the contents of the
certifications as proof of the facts stated therein. Even if the certifications are
presumed duly issued and admissible in evidence, they have no probative
value in establishing that the land is alienable and disposable.
Public documents are defined under Section 19, Rule 132 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence as follows:
16
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign
authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the
Philippines, or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and
testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law
to be entered therein.
Applying Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents referred to in
Section 19(a), when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an
official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having legal
custody of the record, or by his deputy x x x. The CENRO is not the official
repository or legal custodian of the issuances of the DENR Secretary declaring
public lands as alienable and disposable. The CENRO should have attached
an official publication21 of the DENR Secretary’s issuance declaring the land
alienable and disposable.
Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:
Sec. 23. Public documents as evidence. Documents consisting of entries in
public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima
facie evidence of the facts stated therein. All other public documents are
evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their
execution and of the date of the latter.
The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not
fall within the class of public documents contemplated in the first sentence of
Section 23 of Rule 132. The certifications do not reflect "entries in public
records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer," such as entries
made by the Civil Registrar22in the books of registries, or by a ship captain in
the ship’s logbook.23 The certifications are not the certified copies or
authenticated reproductions of original official records in the legal custody of a
government office. The certifications are not even records of public
documents.24 The certifications are conclusions unsupported by adequate
proof, and thus have no probative value.25 Certainly, the certifications cannot
be considered prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not
prove that Lot 10705-B falls within the alienable and disposable land as
proclaimed by the DENR Secretary. Such government certifications do not, by
their mere issuance, prove the facts stated therein.26 Such government
certifications may fall under the class of documents contemplated in the second
sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. As such, the certifications are prima facie
evidence of their due execution and date of issuance but they do not constitute
prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
The Court has also ruled that a document or writing admitted as part of the
testimony of a witness does not constitute proof of the facts stated
therein.27 Here, Torres, a private individual and respondent’s representative,
identified the certifications but the government officials who issued the
certifications did not testify on the contents of the certifications. As such, the
certifications cannot be given probative value.28 The contents of the
certifications are hearsay because Torres was incompetent to testify on the
veracity of the contents of the certifications.29 Torres did not prepare the
certifications, he was not an officer of CENRO or FMS-DENR, and he did not
conduct any verification survey whether the land falls within the area classified
by the DENR Secretary as alienable and disposable.
Petitioner also points out the discrepancy as to when the land allegedly
became alienable and disposable. The DENR Secretary certified that based on
Land Classification Map No. 582, the land became alienable and disposable on
31 December 1925. However, the certificate on the blue print plan states that it
became alienable and disposable on 31 December 1985.
We agree with petitioner that while the certifications submitted by respondent
show that under the Land Classification Map No. 582, the land became
alienable and disposable on 31 December 1925, the blue print plan states that
it became alienable and disposable on 31 December 1985. Respondent
alleged that "the blue print plan merely serves to prove the precise location and

the metes and bounds of the land described therein x x x and does not in any
way certify the nature and classification of the land involved."30 It is true that
the notation by a surveyor-geodetic engineer on the survey plan that the land
formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain is not
sufficient proof of the land’s classification. 31 However, respondent should
have at least presented proof that would explain the discrepancy in the dates
of classification. Marquez, LRA Records Officer II, testified that the
documents submitted to the court consisting of the tracing cloth plan, the
technical description of Lot 10705-B, the approved subdivision plan, and the
Geodetic Engineer’s certification were faithful reproductions of the original
documents in the LRA office. He did not explain the discrepancy in the dates.
Neither was the Geodetic Engineer presented to explain why the date of
classification on the blue print plan was different from the other certifications
submitted by respondent.
There was No Open, Continuous, Exclusive, and Notorious
Possession and Occupation in the Concept of an Owner
Petitioner alleges that the trial court’s reliance on the testimonies of
Evangelista and Torres was misplaced. Petitioner alleges that Evangelista’s
statement that the possession of respondent’s predecessors-in-interest was
open, public, continuous, peaceful, and adverse to the whole world was a
general conclusion of law rather than factual evidence of possession of title.
Petitioner alleges that respondent failed to establish that its
predecessors-in-interest had held the land openly, continuously, and
exclusively for at least 30 years after it was declared alienable and
disposable.
We agree with petitioner.
Evangelista testified that Kabesang Puroy had been in possession of the land
before 1945. Yet, Evangelista only worked on the land for three years.
Evangelista testified that his family owned a lot near Kabesang Puroy’s land.
The Court of Appeals took note of this and ruled that Evangelista’s knowledge
of Kabesang Puroy’s possession of the land stemmed "not only from the fact
that he had worked thereat but more so that they were practically
neighbors."32 The Court of Appeals observed:
In a small community such as that of San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas, it
is not difficult to understand that people in the said community knows each
and everyone. And, because of such familiarity with each other, news or
events regarding the acquisition or disposition for that matter, of a vast tract of
land spreads like wildfire, thus, the reason why such an event became of
public knowledge to them.33
Evangelista testified that Kabesang Puroy was succeeded by Fortunato.
However, he admitted that he did not know the exact relationship between
Kabesang Puroy and Fortunato, which is rather unusual for neighbors in a
small community. He did not also know the relationship between Fortunato
and Porting. In fact, Evangelista’s testimony is contrary to the factual finding
of the trial court that Kabesang Puroy was succeeded by his son Antonio, not
by Fortunato who was one of Antonio’s children. Antonio was not even
mentioned in Evangelista’s testimony.
The Court of Appeals ruled that there is no law that requires that the testimony
of a single witness needs corroboration. However, in this case, we find
Evangelista’s uncorroborated testimony insufficient to prove that respondent’s
predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land in the concept of
an owner for more than 30 years. We cannot consider the testimony of Torres
as sufficient corroboration. Torres testified primarily on the fact of
respondent’s acquisition of the land. While he claimed to be related to the
Dimayugas, his knowledge of their possession of the land was hearsay. He
did not even tell the trial court where he obtained his information.
The tax declarations presented were only for the years starting 1955. While
tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they constitute
proof of claim of ownership.34 Respondent did not present any credible
explanation why the realty taxes were only paid starting 1955 considering the
claim that the Dimayugas were allegedly in possession of the land before
1945. The payment of the realty taxes starting 1955 gives rise to the
presumption that the Dimayugas claimed ownership or possession of the land
only in that year.
17
Land Application by a Corporation
Petitioner asserts that respondent, a private corporation, cannot apply for
registration of the land of the public domain in this case.
We agree with petitioner.
Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or
timber, mineral lands, and national parks. Agricultural lands of the public
domain may be further classified by law according to the uses to which they
may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to
agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such
alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, for a period not exceeding
twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and not to
exceed one thousand hectares in area. Citizens of the Philippines may lease
not more than five hundred hectares, or acquire not more than twelve hectares
thereof by purchase, homestead or grant.
Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and
development, and subject to the requirements of agrarian reform, the Congress
shall determine, by law, the size of lands of the public domain which may be
acquired, developed, held, or leased and the conditions therefor.
The 1987 Constitution absolutely prohibits private corporations from acquiring
any kind of alienable land of the public domain. In Chavez v. Public Estates
Authority,35 the Court traced the law on disposition of lands of the public
domain. Under the 1935 Constitution, there was no prohibition against private
corporations from acquiring agricultural land. The 1973 Constitution limited the
alienation of lands of the public domain to individuals who were citizens of the
Philippines. Under the 1973 Constitution, private corporations, even if wholly
owned by Filipino citizens, were no longer allowed to acquire alienable lands of
the public domain. The present 1987 Constitution continues the prohibition
against private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the
public domain.36 The Court explained in Chavez:
The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy in the 1973 Constitution
banning private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the
public domain. Like the 1973 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution allows
private corporations to hold alienable lands of the public domain only through
lease. x x x x
[I]f the constitutional intent is to prevent huge landholdings, the Constitution
could have simply limited the size of alienable lands of the public domain that
corporations could acquire. The Constitution could have followed the limitations
on individuals, who could acquire not more than 24 hectares of alienable lands
of the public domain under the 1973 Constitution, and not more than 12
hectares under the 1987 Constitution.
If the constitutional intent is to encourage economic family-size farms, placing
the land in the name of a corporation would be more effective in preventing the
break-up of farmlands. If the farmland is registered in the name of a corporation,
upon the death of the owner, his heirs would inherit shares in the corporation
instead of subdivided parcels of the farmland. This would prevent the
continuing break-up of farmlands into smaller and smaller plots from one
generation to the next.
In actual practice, the constitutional ban strengthens the constitutional limitation
on individuals from acquiring more than the allowed area of alienable lands of
the public domain. Without the constitutional ban, individuals who already
acquired the maximum area of alienable lands of the public domain could easily
set up corporations to acquire more alienable public lands. An individual could
own as many corporations as his means would allow him. An individual could
even hide his ownership of a corporation by putting his nominees as
stockholders of the corporation. The corporation is a convenient vehicle to
circumvent the constitutional limitation on acquisition by individuals of alienable
lands of the public domain.
The constitutional intent, under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, is to transfer
ownership of only a limited area of alienable land of the public domain to a
 18
qualified individual. This constitutional intent is safeguarded by the provision latter purchased them in 1979. All that was needed was the confirmation of the
prohibiting corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain, titles of the previous owners or predecessors-in-interest of TCMC.
since the vehicle to circumvent the constitutional intent is removed. The
available alienable public lands are gradually decreasing in the face of an
Being already private land when TCMC bought them in 1979, the prohibition in
ever-growing population. The most effective way to insure faithful adherence
the 1973 Constitution against corporations acquiring alienable lands of the
to this constitutional intent is to grant or sell alienable lands of the public
public domain except through lease (Article XIV, Section 11, 1973 Constitution)
domain only to individuals. This, it would seem, is the practical benefit arising
did not apply to them for they were no longer alienable lands of the public
from the constitutional ban.37
domain but private property.

In Director of Lands v. IAC,38 the Court allowed the land registration

proceeding filed by Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. (Acme) for five parcels
of land with an area of 481,390 square meters, or 48.139 hectares, which
Acme acquired from members of the Dumagat tribe. The issue in that case
was whether the title could be confirmed in favor of Acme when the
proceeding was instituted after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution which
prohibited private corporations or associations from holding alienable lands of
the public domain except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares. The Court
ruled that the land was already private land when Acme acquired it from
its owners in 1962, and thus Acme acquired a registrable title. Under the
1935 Constitution, private corporations could acquire public agricultural lands
not exceeding 1,024 hectares while individuals could acquire not more than
144 hectares.39
In Director of Lands, the Court further ruled that open, exclusive, and
undisputed possession of alienable land for the period prescribed by law
created the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite
period, ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction ceases to
be public land and becomes private property. The Court ruled:
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering
possession of public land which is of the character and duration prescribed by
statute as the equivalent of an express grant from the State than the dictum of
the statute itself that the possessor(s) "x x x shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall
be entitled to a certificate of title x x x." No proof being admissible to overcome
a conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little
more than a formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether the
possession claimed is of the required character and length of time; and
registration thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a title
already vested. The proceedings would not originally convert the land from
public to private land, but only confirm such a conversion already effected by
operation of law from the moment the required period of possession became
complete.
What is determinative for the doctrine in Director of Lands to apply is for the
corporate applicant for land registration to establish that when it acquired the
land, the same was already private land by operation of law because the
statutory acquisitive prescriptive period of 30 years had already lapsed. The
length of possession of the land by the corporation cannot be tacked on to
complete the statutory 30 years acquisitive prescriptive period. Only an
individual can avail of such acquisitive prescription since both the 1973 and
1987 Constitutions prohibit corporations from acquiring lands of the public
domain.
Admittedly, a corporation can at present still apply for original registration of
land under the doctrine in Director of Lands. Republic Act No. 917642 (RA 9176)
further amended the Public Land Act43 and extended the period for the filing of
applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect and incomplete titles to
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain until 31 December 2020.
Thus:
Sec. 2. Section 47, Chapter VIII of the same Act, as amended, is hereby further
amended to read as follows:
Sec. 47. The persons specified in the next following section are hereby granted
time, not to extend beyond December 31, 2020 within which to avail of the
benefits of this Chapter: Provided, That this period shall apply only where the
area applied for does not exceed twelve (12) hectares: Provided, further, That
the several periods of time designated by the President in accordance with
Section Forty-five of this Act shall apply also to the lands comprised in the
provisions of this Chapter, but this Section shall not be construed as prohibiting
any of said persons from acting under this Chapter at any time prior to the
period fixed by the President.
Sec. 3. All pending applications filed before the effectivity of this amendatory
Act shall be treated as having been filed in accordance with the provisions of
this Act.

x x x [A]lienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through his

Under RA 9176, the application for judicial confirmation is limited only to 12
predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for the
hectares, consistent with Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution that a
prescribed statutory period of (30 years under The Public Land Act, as
private individual may only acquire not more than 12 hectares of alienable and
amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of
disposable land. Hence, respondent, as successor-in-interest of an individual
said period, ipso jure. Following that rule and on the basis of the undisputed
owner of the land, cannot apply for registration of land in excess of 12 hectares.
facts, the land subject of this appeal was already private property at the
Since respondent applied for 56.4007 hectares, the application for the excess
time it was acquired from the Infiels by Acme. Acme thereby acquired a
area of 44.4007 hectares is contrary to law, and thus void ab initio. In applying
registrable title, there being at the time no prohibition against said
for land registration, a private corporation cannot have any right higher than its
corporation’s holding or owning private land. x x x.40(Emphasis supplied)
predecessor-in-interest from whom it derived its right. This assumes, of course,
that the corporation acquired the land, not exceeding 12 hectares, when the
Director of Lands is not applicable to the present case. In Director of Lands, land had already become private land by operation of law. In the present case,
the "land x x x was already private property at the time it was acquired x respondent has failed to prove that any portion of the land was already private
x x by Acme." In this case, respondent acquired the land on 8 August 1997 land when respondent acquired it from Porting in 1997.
from Porting, who, along with his predecessors-in-interest, has not shown to
have been, as of that date, in open, continuous, and adverse possession of
WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the 21 August 2002 Decision of the Court of
the land for 30 years since 12 June 1945. In short, when respondent acquired
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66658 and the 16 December 1999 Decision of the
the land from Porting, the land was not yet private property.
Regional Trial Court of Tanauan, Batangas, Branch 6 in Land Registration
Case No. T-635. We DENY the application for registration filed by T.A.N.
For Director of Lands to apply and enable a corporation to file for registration Properties, Inc.
of alienable and disposable land, the corporation must have acquired the land
when its transferor had already a vested right to a judicial confirmation of title
SO ORDERED.
to the land by virtue of his open, continuous and adverse possession of the
land in the concept of an owner for at least 30 years since 12 June 1945. Thus,
in Natividad v. Court of Appeals,41 the Court declared: G.R. No. L-67399 November 19, 1985

Under the facts of this case and pursuant to the above rulings, the parcels of REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (The Director of Lands), petitioner,
land in question had already been converted to private ownership through vs.
acquisitive prescription by the predecessors-in-interest of TCMC when the THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and AVELINO LEYCO,

LEANDRO LEYCO, ZARA LEYCO, JUSTINA LEYCO and FELIPA LEYCO,
represented by LEANDRO LEYCO, respondents.
Solicitor General for petitioner.
Restituto L. Opis for respondents.
MAKASIAR, C.J.:
Petition to review a decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court which
affirmed in toto that of the trial court.
In LRC No. N-173 of the then Court of First Instance of Marinduque, Avelino,
Leandro, Justina, Zara and Felipa all surnamed LEYCO applied for judicial
confirmation of their title to two (2) parcels of land with a combined area of
138.5413 hectares (pp. 1-9, ROA).
The Director of lands for the Republic of the Philippines opposed the petition.
Respondent applicants' alleged possession of Lots 1 and 2 of Psu-133612
(consisting of 138.5413 hectares) from 1962 up to the filing of their application
for registration in 1976 — about 14 years only — does not constitute
possession under claim of ownership so as to entitle them to a State grant
under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act (Com. Act No. 141), as amended.
Respondent applicants failed to establish conclusively that they and their
predecessor-in-interest were in continuous possession and occupancy of the
lots in question under bona fide claim of ownership. Even the alleged
long-time possession by respondent applicants' mother, Fausta de Jesus,
who claimed to have entered into possession of the land in question in 1911
until her death in 1962, does not appear to be indubitable.
The tax declarations presented as evidence by respondent applicants are not
by themselves conclusive proof of their alleged possession under claim of
ownership over the lots in question. The earliest tax declaration is dated 1927
while the others are recent tax declarations.
Respondent applicants presented the following exhibits:
Exh. M-2" — Tax Declaration No. 3431 (1966) in the name of Fausta de Jesus.
Declared as coconut (15.4182 has.) and cogon (40000 has.) lands. Planted
to 1512 coconut bearing trees. Value of land assessed at P3,590.00 and
value of improvements assessed at P9,070.00 or a total value of P12,660.00.
This TD cancelled TD No. 664.
Exh. M-3" — Tax Declaration No. 664 (1966) in the name of Fausta de Jesus.
Declared as coconut (15.4182 has.) and cogon (40000 has.) lands. Planted
to 1512 coconut bearing trees. Value of land assessed at 114,360 and value
of improvements assessed at P11,340 or a total value of P15,700. This TD
cancelled TD No. 4023.
Exh. M-4" — Tax Declaration No. 4023 (1958) in the name of Fausta de Jesus.
Declared as coconut and cogon lands, with a total area of 19.4182 has. .
Planted to 1,012 coconut fruit bearing trees. Total value of land assessed at P
2,900.00 while value of improvements assessed at P 5,570.00 or a total
assessed value of P 8,470.00. This TD cancelled TD No. 3480.
Exh. M-5" — Tax Declaration No. 3480 (1958) in the name of Fausta de Jesus.
Declared as coconut land with a total area of 19.4182 has. . Planted
to 1364 coconut trees (fruit bearing). Value of land assessed at P 3,500.00
and value of improvements thereon assessed at P7,500.00 or a total value of
P11,900.00. This declaration cancelled TD No. 2778.
Exh. M-6" — Tax Declaration No. 2778 (1955) in the name of Fausta de Jesus.
Declared as coconut land with a total area of 19.4182 has. . Planted to 620
coconut trees fruit bearing. Value of land assessed at P2,330.00 and value of
19
improvements assessed at P2,920.00 or a total assessed value of P5,250.00.
This declaration cancelled TD No. 475.
Exh. M-7" — Tax Declaration No. 475 (1949) in the name of Fausta de Jesus.
Declared as coconut (6.0000 has.) and cogon (17.0000 has.) lands. Planted to
500 coconut trees bearing fruits and 120 coconut trees not bearing fruits. Total
value of land assessed at P940.00 and improvements at P1550.00 or a total
value of P2490.00. This TD cancelled TD No. 5319.
Exh. M-8" — Tax Declaration No. 5319 (1928) in the name of Fausta de Jesus.
Declared as "Cogonalos para cocal, cogonalos para paste," with an area of
23.0000 has . . Planted to 150 "ponos de cocos frutales." Value of land
assessed at P690 and improvements thereon at P300 or a total assessed value
of P990.00.
Exh. 0-2" — Tax Declaration No. 3432 (1966) in the name of Fausta de Jesus.
Declared as coconut (19.1231 has.) and cogon (100.0000 has.) lands, or with a
total area of 119.1231. Planted to 1685 coconut trees. Total value of land
assessed at P9210.00 while total value of improvements assessed at
P10,110.00 or a total assessed value of P19,320.00. This declaration cancelled
TD No. 665.
Exh. 0-3" — Tax Declaration No. 665 (1966) in the name of Fausta de Jesus.
Declared as coconut (19.1231 has.) and cogon (100.0000 has.) lands. Planted
to 1,685 coconut fruit bearing trees. Land assessed at P10,120 while
improvements thereon at P12,640 or a total assessed value of P22,760. This
declaration cancelled TD No. 4022.
Exh. 0-4" — Tax Declaration No. 4022 (1958) in the name of Fausta de Jesus.
Declared as coconut (19.1231 has.) and cogon (P100.00 has.) lands. Planted
to 1,685 coconut trees bearing fruits. Land assessed at P5,840.00 and
improvements thereon at P9,270.00. This declaration cancelled TD No. 3543.
Exh. 0-5" — Tax Declaration No. 3543 (1958) in the name of Fausta de Jesus.
Declared as coconut land with a total area of 119.1231 has. . Planted to 1843
coconut trees fruit bearing. Land assessed at P21,440.00 while improvements
thereon at P10,140.00 or a total value of P31,580.00. This declaration
cancelled TD No. 2779.
Exh. 0-6" — Tax Declaration No. 2779 (1955) in the name of Fausta de Jesus.
Declared as coconut land with a total area of 119.1231 has. . Planted to 2,190
coconut trees fruit bearing and 200 coconut trees not bearing fruit (3 years old).
Land assessed at P14,290.00 while improvements thereon at P10,290.00 or a
total value of P24,590.00. This TD cancelled TD No. 4476
Exh. 0-7" — Tax Declaration No. 476 (1949) in the name of Fausta de Jesus.
Declared as coconut (20.8595 has.) and pasture (642042 has.) lands or a total
area of 85.0637 has. . Planted to 2,190 coconut trees fruit bearing. Land
assessed at P3370.00 while improvements thereon valued at P660.00 or a total
assessed value of P10,030.00. This TD cancelled TD No. 5321.
Exh. 0-8" — Tax Declaration No. 5321 (1941) on the name of Fausta de Jesus.
Declared as "Llani cocal" with an area of 88.0637 has. . Planted to "2191 cocos
frutales." Land assessed at P2320 and improvements there at P4380 or a total
assessed value of P6700.00. This declaration cancelled TD No. 3231.
Likewise, respondent applicants herein presented the following tax
declarations:
Exh. L" — Tax Declaration No. 2485 (1974) in the name of Avelino Leandro,
Justina, Zara & Felipe, all surnamed Leyco. Classified as coconut land with an
area of P5.0000 has. . Planted to 140 coconut bearing trees. Value of land
assessed at P5280 and value or improvements therein at P8020 or a total
assessed value of P13,300.00. This declaration cancelled TD No. 4166.
Exh. M" — Tax Declaration No. 4166 (1970) in the name of Avelino, Leandro,
Justina and Felipa Leyco. Declared as coconut (15.4182 has.) and cogon
(4.0000 has,) lands, or with a total area of has. . Planted to 1512 coconut fruit
bearing trees. Value of land is assessed at P3590 while value of improvements

at P9070 or a total assessed value of P12,660. This declaration cancelled TD
No. 3431.
Exh. N" — Tax Declaration No. 2484 (1974) in the name of Avelino, Leandro,
Justina, Zara and Felipa Leyco. Classified as coconut (19.0000 has.) and
cogon (50.0000 has.) lands. Planted to 1425 coconut bearing
trees and 550 coconut not bearing fruits. Land assessed at P13.730 and
improvements thereon assessed at P9,860 or a total assessed value of
P24,590. This declaration cancelled TD No. 4165.
Exh. O" — Tax Declaration No. 4165 (1970) in the name of Avelino Alejandro,
Justina, Zara and Felipa Leyco. Declared as coconut (19.1231 has.) and
cogon (100.0000 has.) lands. Planted to 1685 coconut trees fruit bearing.
Value of land assessed at P9,210 and thereon at P10,111 or a total assessed
value of P19,320. This declaration cancelled TD No. 3432.
A cursory look at the exhibits (tax declarations) presented by respondent
applicants herein reveals a number of discrepancies that cast serious doubts
on respondents' claim over the lots in question:
1. Tax Declaration No. 5319 dated 1928 (Exh. M-8) declared in the name of
Fausta de Jesus with an area of 23.0000 hectares, specifies its boundaries as
follows:
North: Sapa
East: Florencio Corral
South: Fausta de Jesus
West: Mar.
In 1949, Fausta de Jesus filed Tax Declaration No. 475 (Exh. M-7) which
cancelled Tax Declaration 475 (Exh. M-7) which cancelled Tax Declaration
No. 5319 over the same parcel of land. A close examination, however, of Tax
Declaration No. 475 shows that the listing of the adjoining owners therein was
at variance with what was previously stated in Tax Declaration No. 5319, thus:
North. Brook
East: Aurelia de Jesus
South: Seashore (before Fausta de Jesus)
West: Hrs. of Florencio Corral
This anomaly in the listing of adjoining owners in the two aforestated tax
declarations over the same parcel of land only reveals the flaw that apparently
attended the acquisition of the lots in question by respondent applicants and
their predecessor-in-interest.
2. Under Tax Declaration No. 5321 dated 1941 (Exh. 0-8), respondent
applicants' predecessor-in-interest, Fausta de Jesus, declared a parcel of
land in her name with an area of 88.0637 hectares.
Later, in 1949, Fausta de Jesus filed Tax Declaration No. 476 (Exh. 0-7)
which cancelled Tax Declaration No. 5321 over the same parcel of land.
However, under Tax Declaration No. 476, the total area of the land declared
was only 85.0637 hectares (84.0637 as erroneously stated in Tax Declaration
No. 476).
Again, the foregoing disparity in the size of the land as declared in the two tax
declarations is a clear indication that respondent applicants herein and their
predecessor-in-interest were uncertain and contradictory as to the exact or
actual size of the land they purportedly possessed.
20
Likewise, it is noteworthy to mention that six years after Fausta de Jesus filed
Declaration No. 476 in 1949, Tax Declaration No. 2779 was filed — cancelling
Tax Declaration No. 476 — showing this time a whopping land area
of 119.1231 hectares. As to how Fausta de Jesus managed to increase her
landholdings in so short a span of time intrigues one no end, considering that
from 1949 up to her death in 1962, she listed Manila as her place of residence.
3. Tax Declaration No. 3432 (1966), 665 (1966), and 4022 (1958) presented as
Exhibits 0-2, 0-3, and 0-4, respectively, show that of the total declared area of
119.1231 hectares, only about 19.1231 hectares were planted to coconuts and
the remaining 100.000,00 hectares were cogonal or uncultivated lands.
The unjustifiable award of this vast tract of land — which are cogon lands and
therefore pasture lands still forming part of the public domain and released by
the Bureau of Lands for disposition — to the respondent applicants herein, who
are undeserving, is tantamount to putting a premium on absentee landlordism.
The record shows that even the taxes due o the litigated lots were not paid
regularly. As per certification of the municipal treasurer of Buenavista,
Marinduque, it was shown that the taxes due on the land registered in the name
of Fausta de Jesus were paid only from 1949 until 1957 — an indication that
respondent applicants and their predecessor-in-interest did not pay taxes to the
government from 1928 to 1940, and from 1958 until July 6, 1978 when the
respondent applicants closed their evidence — a total of 32 years. The
respondent applicants presented their evidence on April 19, 1977, October 12,
1977, March 29, 1978 and July 6, 1978.
The testimonies of respondent applicants' alleged overseers and hired tenants
should not be accorded weight and significance; because it is only natural for
the overseers and hired tenants to testify as they did in respondent applicants'
favor as they stand to benefit from a decision favorable to their supposed
landlords and benefactors.
But even granting that the witnesses presented by herein respondent
applicants were indeed bona fide overseers and tenants or workers of the land
in question, it appears rather strange why only about 3,000 coconut trees and
some fruit trees were planted (2,000 coconut trees on Lot 1 which is 119
hectares. and 1,000 coconut trees on Lot 2 which is 19 hectares) on the vast
tract of land subject of the instant petition. In a practical and scientific way of
planting, a one- hectare land can be planted to about 144 coconut trees. In the
instant case, if the hired tenants and workers of respondent applicants
managed to plant only 3,000 coconut trees, it could only mean that about only
25 hectares out of the 138 hectares claimed by herein respondent applicants
were cleared, cultivated and planted to coconut trees and fruit trees. Once
planted, a coconut is left to grow and need not be tended or watched. This is
not what the law considers as possession under claim of ownership. On the
contrary, it merely showed casual oroccasional cultivation of portions of the
land in question. In short, possession is not exclusive nor notorious, much less
continuous, so as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the government.
Moreover, respondent applicants herein have not shown nor clearly their right
to inherit from their predecessor-in-interest. The observation of the Solicitor
General on this point is thus well taken:
Even assuming that applicants' deceased mother acquired registerable title
over the parcels in question, applicants cannot be said to have acquired the
same right proper for registration. They have not presented any evidence of
value to prove that they have the right to inherit whatever portion of the
properties left by Fausta de Jesus. They have first to show their right to
succeed Fausta, testate or intestate; to establish who Fausta's legal heirs are
or that applicants. and no other, are Fausta's sole heirs. But all these should be
threshed out in a proper proceeding, certainly not in a land registration case.
Finally, this is a clear case of land-grabbing of over 100 hectares of land, which
could be divided among the landless and the poor to defuse the seething unrest
among the underprivileged. At this point in time in our country's history,
land-grabbing by the powerful, moneyed and influential absentee claimants
should not be tolerated nor condoned if only to avoid fanning further the fires of
discontent, dissidence or subversion which menacingly threaten the very
survival of our nation.

WHEREFORE, THE PETITION IS HEREBY GRANTED. THE DECISION OF
THE RESPONDENT INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT IS HEREBY
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. NO COSTS.
SO ORDERED.
Concepcion Jr., Escolin, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
Aquino (Chairman), J., took no part.
Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J., dissenting:
Petition to review a decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court which
affirmed in toto that of the trial court.
In LRC No. N-173 of the then Court of First Instance of Marinduque, Avelino,
Leandro, Justina, Zara and Felipe all surnamed LEYCO applied for judicial
confirmation of their title to two (2) parcels of land with a combined area of
138.5413 hectares. (Record on Appeal, pp. 1-9.)
The Director of Lands for the Republic of the Philippines opposed the petition,
thus
2. That neither the applicants nor their predecessors- in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
land in question for at least thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of
the present application;
3. That consequently, the applicants may not avail of the provisions of Section
48 of the Public Land Act, as amended, for failure to fulfill the requisites
prescribed therein;
4. That the aforementioned properties are a portion of the public domain
belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, not subject to private
appropriation." (Id., p. 15.)
There were no private oppositors for which reason the trial court issued an
Order of General Default except with respect to the Director of Lands. In a
decision dated December 29, 1978, the court ordered the registration of the
lands in the names of the petitioners.
The Director of Lands appealed to the Court of Appeals. He claimed that the
lower court committed the following substantive errors:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT APPLICANTS-
APPELLEES HAVE SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED THE IdENTITY OF THE
PARCELS OF LAND SOUGHT TO BE REGISTERED.
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONFIRMING THE OF
APPLICANTS-APPELLEES TO LOTS 1 AND 2 DESCRIBED IN PLAN
PSU-133612 AND IN ORDERING REGISTRATION OF SAID TITLE IN THE
NAMES OF APPLICANTS-APPELLEES DESPITE ABSENCE OF
ADEQUATE AND SUBSTANTIAL PROOF THAT THEY AND THEIR
PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST HAVE BEEN IN OPEN CONTINUOUS,
EXCLUSIVE AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION OVER SAID PARCELS OF
LAND FOR AT EAST 30 YEARS PRECEDING THE FILING OF THE
INSTANT APPLICATION. (IAC rollo, p. 97-98.)
21
The Intermediate Appellate Court, which replaced the Court of Appeals,
rejected the appeal. On the first assignment of error the IAC said:
... The submission of this blueprint copy of the plan, plus the technical
descriptions sufficiently Identified the property. (Id., p. 127)
Anent the second assignment of error, the IAC said:
The perimeters of both lands are well defined by living madre cacao tree (tsn,
4-19-77, Castillo, p. 7; Id., 7-6-78, Castillo, p. 13; Id., Leyco, pp. 16-17),
The evidence also shows that applicants are the children of the deceased
spouses Fernando Leyco and Fausta de Jesus. Fernando died on January 13,
1930 while Fausta died sometime in 1962 (tsn, 4-19-77, Castillo, p. 3; 7-6-78, p.
11; Id., Leyco, p. 18). Subject lands were inherited by Fausta de Jesus from her
deceased parents Florentino de Jesus and Justina Tagle (tsn, 7-6-78, Leyco,
pp. 18-19). From at least 1911 up to her death in 1962, Fausta de Jesus was in
continuous physical possession of the lands involved in the present registration
proceedings (tsn, 4-19-77, Castillo, pp. 4-8), which she caused through her
overseer and hired tenants to be cleared and planted to coconuts and fruit trees
(id., pp. 8, 10, Id., 3-29-78, Cha, pp. 6, 8; Id., 10-13-77, Rivero, pp. 8-9, 12).
The coconut trees on Lot 1 number around 2,000 and 1,000 more on Lot 2
ranging in ages from 10 to 60 years (tsn, 7678 Cha, p. 4; Id., Leyco, p. 21).
Fausta's overseer from 1930 to 1942 was Mariano Castillo's father. He was
succeeded by son Mariano and then by Miguel Rivero, whose father and
grandfather were likewise overseers of the bigger parcel (tsn, 4-19-77, Castillo,
p. 6, 8-9; Id., 1012-77, Rivero, pp. 14, 24-26; Id., 7-6-78, Leyco, pp. 33-34).
Among the workers were Ignacio Perlas Alfredo Perlas Jesus Saludes Eusebia
Cha, Romulo Cha, Alipio Rivero, Protacio de los Santos, Alfredo Candelaria
and others (tsn. 10-12-77, Rivero, p. 15; Id., 7-6-78, Leyco, pp. 20-36). Fausta
used to visit these lands about twice a week when she was still alive (tsn,
10-12-77, Rivero, pp. 9-11). She and her family also stayed there during the
Japanese occupation (tsn, 3-29-78, Cha, p. 26; Id., 7-6-78, Leyco, p. 35). She
was in uninterrupted enjoyment of the land during her lifetime and never had a
dispute either with the tenants or the adjoining land owners (tsn, 4-19-77,
Castillo, pp. 8-9, 112; Id., 3-29-78, Cha, pp. 7-8; Id., 10-12-77, Rivero, pp.
12-13; Id., 7-6-78 Cha. pp. 1-2, 4; Id., Castillo, p. 10-11; Leyco, p. 19).
Leandro Leyco used to accompany his mother on her visits and inspection of
the lands but began taking a more active role in administering the land upon the
death of Fausta. As he alone of the Leyco children is living in Marinduque,
Leandro became in 1962 full-time administrator of these properties for himself
and his co-heirs. Though he was residing in he poblacion of Buenavista, he
would be on the land almost every other day to supervise the clearing,
cultivation and copra-making of the workers (tsn, 7-6-78, Leyco, pp. 20, 21).
These visits saw him staying in the house which he caused to be erected inside
one of the lands subject of the registration case (tsn, 7-6-78, Leyco, p. 35). He
has not been molested or interfered with in his peaceful and actual possession
of these lands (tsn, 7-6-78, Leyco, p. 22).
Realty taxes on the lands were religiously paid (Exhs. p, p. 1 to p. 44). No
longer are they subject to the mortgage lien with the PNB (Exh. Q).
The record of to case is bereft of any evidence presented by the government in
support of his opposition. The record discloses that after applicants made their
written offer of evidence, oppositors did nothing more. They did not file any
objection to such exhibits. Not only that. They also did not adduce any evidence
in support of the grounds cited in its written opposition. (Id, pp. 125-126.)
The Director of Lands would have this Court reverse the decision of the IAC.
He claims that:
1. Respondent applicants did not submit the ORIGINAL tracing cloth plan; they
have not sufficiently established the Identity of the two lots applied for. (Rollo, p.
29.)
2. There is no conclusive showing that respondent applicants have
continuously possessed the litigations lots under claim of ownership for at least
30 years. (Id., p. 31.)

Contrary to the claim of the Director of Lands, the original tracing cloth plan
was submitted by the applicants. This is what the trial court said about the
matter:
The written application (Exhs. A to A-3) was supported by the required
documents, to wit: original or tracing cloth plan of (Psu-133612 (the blue print
copy of which is marked Exhibit B); technical descriptions (Exhs. C to C-2);
surveyor's certificate (Exh. D); and certification of the Assistant Provincial
Assessor showing that Lots 1 and 2 had an assessed value of P24,590.00
and P13,300.00, respectively (p. 6 rec.). It was filed in Court on August 2,
1976 and forwarded to the Land registration Commission and the Office of the
Solicitor General on September 17, 1976 (Exhs. E and F)." (Record on Appeal,
p. 20.)
It should also be stated that the alleged non-submission of the tracing cloth
plan was not raised during the trial but only on appeal to the IAC and to this
Court. It is too late to do so at this stage.
The IAC discussed this matter more extensively as follows:
This assignment is without merit because the original tracing cloth plan is kept
by the Land Registration Commission and blueprint copies (or white print
copies), together with the tracing cloth plan, are submitted to the Land
Registration Office precisely for checking. As shown by the application of the
applicants in this case, found on page 6 of Record on Appeal, the original
tracing cloth plan PSU-133612 together with two (2) blueprint copies of the
plan were sent to the Land Registration Commission. We take judicial notice
of the fact that the Land Registration Commission will not order the publication
of the application nor send notice to the Court unless all the Exhibits are
properly submitted. Hence, the blueprint copy which was submitted in
evidence is actually one of the blueprint copies that was submitted to the Land
Registration Commission.
Furthermore, when the blueprint copy was submitted to the Court as Exhibit B,
there was no objection on the part of the Solicitor General. Hence, it was
admitted by the trial court, Therefore, it is too late now for the Solicitor General
to question Exhibit B. The submission of this blueprint copy of the plan, plus
the technical descriptions sufficiently Identified the property. (IAC rollo, p.
127.)
The second ground raises a question of fact which has been discussed
adequately by the IAC and I see no justification to review its findings in this
certiorari proceeding.
WHEREFORE, the petition should be denied for lack of merit.
Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J., dissenting:
Petition to review a decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court which
affirmed in toto that of the trial court.
In LRC No. N-173 of the then Court of First Instance of Marinduque, Avelino,
Leandro, Justina, Zara and Felipe all surnamed LEYCO applied for judicial
confirmation of their title to two (2) parcels of land with a combined area of
138.5413 hectares. (Record on Appeal, pp. 1-9.)
The Director of Lands for the Republic of the Philippines opposed the petition,
thus
22
2. That neither the applicants nor their predecessors- in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
land in question for at least thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of
the present application;
3. That consequently, the applicants may not avail of the provisions of Section
48 of the Public Land Act, as amended, for failure to fulfill the requisites
prescribed therein;
4. That the aforementioned properties are a portion of the public domain
belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, not subject to private
appropriation." (Id., p. 15.)
There were no private oppositors for which reason the trial court issued an
Order of General Default except with respect to the Director of Lands. In a
decision dated December 29, 1978, the court ordered the registration of the
lands in the names of the petitioners.
The Director of Lands appealed to the Court of Appeals. He claimed that the
lower court committed the following substantive errors:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT APPLICANTS-
APPELLEES HAVE SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED THE IdENTITY OF THE
PARCELS OF LAND SOUGHT TO BE REGISTERED.
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONFIRMING THE OF
APPLICANTS-APPELLEES TO LOTS 1 AND 2 DESCRIBED IN PLAN
PSU-133612 AND IN ORDERING REGISTRATION OF SAID TITLE IN THE
NAMES OF APPLICANTS-APPELLEES DESPITE ABSENCE OF ADEQUATE
AND SUBSTANTIAL PROOF THAT THEY AND THEIR
PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST HAVE BEEN IN OPEN CONTINUOUS,
EXCLUSIVE AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION OVER SAID PARCELS OF
LAND FOR AT EAST 30 YEARS PRECEDING THE FILING OF THE INSTANT
APPLICATION. (IAC rollo, p. 97-98.)
The Intermediate Appellate Court, which replaced the Court of Appeals,
rejected the appeal. On the first assignment of error the IAC said:
... The submission of this blueprint copy of the plan, plus the technical
descriptions sufficiently Identified the property. (Id., p. 127)
Anent the second assignment of error, the IAC said:
The perimeters of both lands are well defined by living madre cacao tree (tsn,
4-19-77, Castillo, p. 7; Id., 7-6-78, Castillo, p. 13; Id., Leyco, pp. 16-17),
The evidence also shows that applicants are the children of the deceased
spouses Fernando Leyco and Fausta de Jesus. Fernando died on January 13,
1930 while Fausta died sometime in 1962 (tsn, 4-19-77, Castillo, p. 3; 7-6-78, p.
11; Id., Leyco, p. 18). Subject lands were inherited by Fausta de Jesus from her
deceased parents Florentino de Jesus and Justina Tagle (tsn, 7-6-78, Leyco,
pp. 18-19). From at least 1911 up to her death in 1962, Fausta de Jesus was in
continuous physical possession of the lands involved in the present registration
proceedings (tsn, 4-19-77, Castillo, pp. 4-8), which she caused through her
overseer and hired tenants to be cleared and planted to coconuts and fruit trees
(id., pp. 8, 10, Id., 3-29-78, Cha, pp. 6, 8; Id., 10-13-77, Rivero, pp. 8-9, 12).
The coconut trees on Lot 1 number around 2,000 and 1,000 more on Lot 2
ranging in ages from 10 to 60 years (tsn, 7678 Cha, p. 4; Id., Leyco, p. 21).
Fausta's overseer from 1930 to 1942 was Mariano Castillo's father. He was
succeeded by son Mariano and then by Miguel Rivero, whose father and
grandfather were likewise overseers of the bigger parcel (tsn, 4-19-77, Castillo,
p. 6, 8-9; Id., 1012-77, Rivero, pp. 14, 24-26; Id., 7-6-78, Leyco, pp. 33-34).
Among the workers were Ignacio Perlas Alfredo Perlas Jesus Saludes Eusebia
Cha, Romulo Cha, Alipio Rivero, Protacio de los Santos, Alfredo Candelaria
and others (tsn. 10-12-77, Rivero, p. 15; Id., 7-6-78, Leyco, pp. 20-36). Fausta
used to visit these lands about twice a week when she was still alive (tsn,
10-12-77, Rivero, pp. 9-11). She and her family also stayed there during the
Japanese occupation (tsn, 3-29-78, Cha, p. 26; Id., 7-6-78, Leyco, p. 35). She
was in uninterrupted enjoyment of the land during her lifetime and never had a
dispute either with the tenants or the adjoining land owners (tsn, 4-19-77,
 23
Castillo, pp. 8-9, 112; Id., 3-29-78, Cha, pp. 7-8; Id., 10-12-77, Rivero, pp. Furthermore, when the blueprint copy was submitted to the Court as Exhibit B,
12-13; Id., 7-6-78 Cha. pp. 1-2, 4; Id., Castillo, p. 10-11; Leyco, p. 19). there was no objection on the part of the Solicitor General. Hence, it was
admitted by the trial court, Therefore, it is too late now for the Solicitor General
to question Exhibit B. The submission of this blueprint copy of the plan, plus the
Leandro Leyco used to accompany his mother on her visits and inspection of
technical descriptions sufficiently Identified the property. (IAC rollo, p. 127.)
the lands but began taking a more active role in administering the land upon
the death of Fausta. As he alone of the Leyco children is living in Marinduque,
Leandro became in 1962 full-time administrator of these properties for himself The second ground raises a question of fact which has been discussed
and his co-heirs. Though he was residing in he poblacion of Buenavista, he adequately by the IAC and I see no justification to review its findings in this
would be on the land almost every other day to supervise the clearing, certiorari proceeding.
cultivation and copra-making of the workers (tsn, 7-6-78, Leyco, pp. 20, 21).
These visits saw him staying in the house which he caused to be erected
WHEREFORE, the petition should be denied for lack of merit.
inside one of the lands subject of the registration case (tsn, 7-6-78, Leyco, p.
35). He has not been molested or interfered with in his peaceful and actual
possession of these lands (tsn, 7-6-78, Leyco, p. 22).

Realty taxes on the lands were religiously paid (Exhs. p, p. 1 to p. 44). No Separate Opinions
longer are they subject to the mortgage lien with the PNB (Exh. Q).
ABAD SANTOS, J., dissenting:
The record of to case is bereft of any evidence presented by the government
in support of his opposition. The record discloses that after applicants made
Petition to review a decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court which
their written offer of evidence, oppositors did nothing more. They did not file
affirmed in toto that of the trial court.
any objection to such exhibits. Not only that. They also did not adduce any
evidence in support of the grounds cited in its written opposition. (Id, pp.
125-126.) In LRC No. N-173 of the then Court of First Instance of Marinduque, Avelino,
Leandro, Justina, Zara and Felipe all surnamed LEYCO applied for judicial
confirmation of their title to two (2) parcels of land with a combined area of
The Director of Lands would have this Court reverse the decision of the IAC.
138.5413 hectares. (Record on Appeal, pp. 1-9.)
He claims that:

The Director of Lands for the Republic of the Philippines opposed the petition,
1. Respondent applicants did not submit the ORIGINAL tracing cloth plan;
thus
they have not sufficiently established the Identity of the two lots applied for.
(Rollo, p. 29.)
2. That neither the applicants nor their predecessors- in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
2. There is no conclusive showing that respondent applicants have
land in question for at least thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of
continuously possessed the litigations lots under claim of ownership for at
the present application;
least 30 years. (Id., p. 31.)

3. That consequently, the applicants may not avail of the provisions of Section
Contrary to the claim of the Director of Lands, the original tracing cloth plan
48 of the Public Land Act, as amended, for failure to fulfill the requisites
was submitted by the applicants. This is what the trial court said about the
prescribed therein;
matter:

4. That the aforementioned properties are a portion of the public domain

The written application (Exhs. A to A-3) was supported by the required
documents, to wit: original or tracing cloth plan of (Psu-133612 (the blue print
copy of which is marked Exhibit B); technical descriptions (Exhs. C to C-2);
surveyor's certificate (Exh. D); and certification of the Assistant Provincial
Assessor showing that Lots 1 and 2 had an assessed value of P24,590.00
and P13,300.00, respectively (p. 6 rec.). It was filed in Court on August 2,
1976 and forwarded to the Land registration Commission and the Office of the
Solicitor General on September 17, 1976 (Exhs. E and F)." (Record on Appeal,
p. 20.)
It should also be stated that the alleged non-submission of the tracing cloth
plan was not raised during the trial but only on appeal to the IAC and to this
Court. It is too late to do so at this stage.
The IAC discussed this matter more extensively as follows:
belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, not subject to private
appropriation." (Id., p. 15.)
There were no private oppositors for which reason the trial court issued an
Order of General Default except with respect to the Director of Lands. In a
decision dated December 29, 1978, the court ordered the registration of the
lands in the names of the petitioners.
The Director of Lands appealed to the Court of Appeals. He claimed that the
lower court committed the following substantive errors:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT APPLICANTS-
APPELLEES HAVE SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED THE IdENTITY OF THE
PARCELS OF LAND SOUGHT TO BE REGISTERED.

This assignment is without merit because the original tracing cloth plan is kept
by the Land Registration Commission and blueprint copies (or white print
copies), together with the tracing cloth plan, are submitted to the Land
Registration Office precisely for checking. As shown by the application of the
applicants in this case, found on page 6 of Record on Appeal, the original
tracing cloth plan PSU-133612 together with two (2) blueprint copies of the
plan were sent to the Land Registration Commission. We take judicial notice
of the fact that the Land Registration Commission will not order the publication
of the application nor send notice to the Court unless all the Exhibits are
properly submitted. Hence, the blueprint copy which was submitted in
evidence is actually one of the blueprint copies that was submitted to the Land
Registration Commission.
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONFIRMING THE OF
APPLICANTS-APPELLEES TO LOTS 1 AND 2 DESCRIBED IN PLAN
PSU-133612 AND IN ORDERING REGISTRATION OF SAID TITLE IN THE
NAMES OF APPLICANTS-APPELLEES DESPITE ABSENCE OF ADEQUATE
AND SUBSTANTIAL PROOF THAT THEY AND THEIR
PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST HAVE BEEN IN OPEN CONTINUOUS,
EXCLUSIVE AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION OVER SAID PARCELS OF
LAND FOR AT EAST 30 YEARS PRECEDING THE FILING OF THE INSTANT
APPLICATION. (IAC rollo, p. 97-98.)
The Intermediate Appellate Court, which replaced the Court of Appeals,
rejected the appeal. On the first assignment of error the IAC said:
 24
... The submission of this blueprint copy of the plan, plus the technical Contrary to the claim of the Director of Lands, the original tracing cloth plan was
descriptions sufficiently Identified the property. (Id., p. 127) submitted by the applicants. This is what the trial court said about the matter:

Anent the second assignment of error, the IAC said: The written application (Exhs. A to A-3) was supported by the required
documents, to wit: original or tracing cloth plan of (Psu-133612 (the blue print
copy of which is marked Exhibit B); technical descriptions (Exhs. C to C-2);
The perimeters of both lands are well defined by living madre cacao tree (tsn,
surveyor's certificate (Exh. D); and certification of the Assistant Provincial
4-19-77, Castillo, p. 7; Id., 7-6-78, Castillo, p. 13; Id., Leyco, pp. 16-17),
Assessor showing that Lots 1 and 2 had an assessed value of P24,590.00 and
P13,300.00, respectively (p. 6 rec.). It was filed in Court on August 2, 1976 and
The evidence also shows that applicants are the children of the deceased forwarded to the Land registration Commission and the Office of the Solicitor
spouses Fernando Leyco and Fausta de Jesus. Fernando died on January 13, General on September 17, 1976 (Exhs. E and F)." (Record on Appeal, p. 20.)
1930 while Fausta died sometime in 1962 (tsn, 4-19-77, Castillo, p. 3; 7-6-78,
p. 11; Id., Leyco, p. 18). Subject lands were inherited by Fausta de Jesus from
It should also be stated that the alleged non-submission of the tracing cloth
her deceased parents Florentino de Jesus and Justina Tagle (tsn, 7-6-78,
plan was not raised during the trial but only on appeal to the IAC and to this
Leyco, pp. 18-19). From at least 1911 up to her death in 1962, Fausta de
Court. It is too late to do so at this stage.
Jesus was in continuous physical possession of the lands involved in the
present registration proceedings (tsn, 4-19-77, Castillo, pp. 4-8), which she
caused through her overseer and hired tenants to be cleared and planted to The IAC discussed this matter more extensively as follows:
coconuts and fruit trees (id., pp. 8, 10, Id., 3-29-78, Cha, pp. 6, 8;
Id., 10-13-77, Rivero, pp. 8-9, 12). The coconut trees on Lot 1 number around
This assignment is without merit because the original tracing cloth plan is kept
2,000 and 1,000 more on Lot 2 ranging in ages from 10 to 60 years (tsn, 7678
by the Land Registration Commission and blueprint copies (or white print
Cha, p. 4; Id., Leyco, p. 21). Fausta's overseer from 1930 to 1942 was
copies), together with the tracing cloth plan, are submitted to the Land
Mariano Castillo's father. He was succeeded by son Mariano and then by
Registration Office precisely for checking. As shown by the application of the
Miguel Rivero, whose father and grandfather were likewise overseers of the
applicants in this case, found on page 6 of Record on Appeal, the original
bigger parcel (tsn, 4-19-77, Castillo, p. 6, 8-9; Id., 1012-77, Rivero, pp. 14,
tracing cloth plan PSU-133612 together with two (2) blueprint copies of the plan
24-26; Id., 7-6-78, Leyco, pp. 33-34). Among the workers were Ignacio Perlas
were sent to the Land Registration Commission. We take judicial notice of the
Alfredo Perlas Jesus Saludes Eusebia Cha, Romulo Cha, Alipio Rivero,
fact that the Land Registration Commission will not order the publication of the
Protacio de los Santos, Alfredo Candelaria and others (tsn. 10-12-77, Rivero,
application nor send notice to the Court unless all the Exhibits are properly
p. 15; Id., 7-6-78, Leyco, pp. 20-36). Fausta used to visit these lands about
submitted. Hence, the blueprint copy which was submitted in evidence is
twice a week when she was still alive (tsn, 10-12-77, Rivero, pp. 9-11). She
actually one of the blueprint copies that was submitted to the Land Registration
and her family also stayed there during the Japanese occupation (tsn,
Commission.
3-29-78, Cha, p. 26; Id., 7-6-78, Leyco, p. 35). She was in uninterrupted
enjoyment of the land during her lifetime and never had a dispute either with
the tenants or the adjoining land owners (tsn, 4-19-77, Castillo, pp. 8-9, 112; Furthermore, when the blueprint copy was submitted to the Court as Exhibit B,
Id., 3-29-78, Cha, pp. 7-8; Id., 10-12-77, Rivero, pp. 12-13; Id., 7-6-78 Cha. pp. there was no objection on the part of the Solicitor General. Hence, it was
1-2, 4; Id., Castillo, p. 10-11; Leyco, p. 19). admitted by the trial court, Therefore, it is too late now for the Solicitor General
to question Exhibit B. The submission of this blueprint copy of the plan, plus the
technical descriptions sufficiently Identified the property. (IAC rollo, p. 127.)
Leandro Leyco used to accompany his mother on her visits and inspection of
the lands but began taking a more active role in administering the land upon
the death of Fausta. As he alone of the Leyco children is living in Marinduque, The second ground raises a question of fact which has been discussed
Leandro became in 1962 full-time administrator of these properties for himself adequately by the IAC and I see no justification to review its findings in this
and his co-heirs. Though he was residing in he poblacion of Buenavista, he certiorari proceeding.
would be on the land almost every other day to supervise the clearing,
cultivation and copra-making of the workers (tsn, 7-6-78, Leyco, pp. 20, 21).
WHEREFORE, the petition should be denied for lack of merit.
These visits saw him staying in the house which he caused to be erected
inside one of the lands subject of the registration case (tsn, 7-6-78, Leyco, p.
35). He has not been molested or interfered with in his peaceful and actual
possession of these lands (tsn, 7-6-78, Leyco, p. 22).

Realty taxes on the lands were religiously paid (Exhs. p, p. 1 to p. 44). No

longer are they subject to the mortgage lien with the PNB (Exh. Q). G.R. No. L-17652 June 30, 1962

The record of to case is bereft of any evidence presented by the government IGNACIO GRANDE, ET AL., petitioners,
in support of his opposition. The record discloses that after applicants made vs.
their written offer of evidence, oppositors did nothing more. They did not file HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DOMINGO CALALUNG, and ESTEBAN
any objection to such exhibits. Not only that. They also did not adduce any CALALUNG, respondents.
evidence in support of the grounds cited in its written opposition. (Id, pp.
125-126.)
Bartolome Guirao and Antonio M. Orara for petitioners.
Gonzales and Fernandez for respondents.
The Director of Lands would have this Court reverse the decision of the IAC.
He claims that:
BARRERA, J.:

1. Respondent applicants did not submit the ORIGINAL tracing cloth plan;
they have not sufficiently established the Identity of the two lots applied for.
(Rollo, p. 29.)
2. There is no conclusive showing that respondent applicants have
continuously possessed the litigations lots under claim of ownership for at
least 30 years. (Id., p. 31.)
This is an appeal taken by petitioners Ignacio, Eulogia, Alfonso, Eulalia, and
Sofia Grande, from the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 25169-R)
reversing that of the Court of First Instance of Isabela (Civil Case No. 1171),
and dismissing petitioners' action against respondents Domingo and Esteban
Calalung, to quiet title to and recover possession of a parcel of land allegedly
occupied by the latter without petitioners' consent.
The facts of the case, which are undisputed, briefly are: Petitioners are the
owners of a parcel of land, with an area of 3.5032 hectares, located at barrio
Ragan, municipality of Magsaysay (formerly Tumauini), province of Isabela, by

inheritance from their deceased mother Patricia Angui (who inherited it from
her parents Isidro Angui and Ana Lopez, in whose name said land appears
registered, as shown by Original Certificate of Title No. 2982, issued on June
9, 1934). Said property is identified as Lot No. 1, Plan PSU-83342. When it
was surveyed for purposes of registration sometime in 1930, its northeastern
boundary was the Cagayan River (the same boundary stated in the title).
Since then, and for many years thereafter, a gradual accretion on the
northeastern side took place, by action of the current of the Cagayan River, so
much so, that by 1958, the bank thereof had receded to a distance of about
105 meters from its original site, and an alluvial deposit of 19,964 square
meters (1.9964 hectares), more or less, had been added to the registered
area (Exh. C-1).
On January 25, 1958, petitioners instituted the present action in the Court of
First Instance of Isabela against respondents, to quiet title to said portion
(19,964 square meters) formed by accretion, alleging in their complaint
(docketed as Civil Case No. 1171) that they and their predecessors-in-interest,
were formerly in peaceful and continuous possession thereof, until September,
1948, when respondents entered upon the land under claim of ownership.
Petitioners also asked for damages corresponding to the value of the fruits of
the land as well as attorney's fees and costs. In their answer (dated February
18, 1958), respondents claim ownership in themselves, asserting that they
have been in continuous, open, and undisturbed possession of said portion,
since prior to the year 1933 to the present.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Isabela, on May 4, 1959, rendered a
decision adjudging the ownership of the portion in question to petitioners, and
ordering respondents to vacate the premises and deliver possession thereof
to petitioners, and to pay to the latter P250.00 as damages and costs. Said
decision, in part, reads:
It is admitted by the parties that the land involved in this action was formed by
the gradual deposit of alluvium brought about by the action of the Cagayan
River, a navigable river. We are inclined to believe that the accretion was
formed on the northeastern side of the land covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. 2982 after the survey of the registered land in 1931, because the
surveyors found out that the northeastern boundary of the land surveyed by
them was the Cagayan River, and not the land in question. Which is indicative
of the fact that the accretion has not yet started or begun in 1931. And, as
declared by Pedro Laman, defendant witness and the boundary owner on the
northwest of the registered land of the plaintiffs, the accretion was a little more
than one hectare, including the stony portion, in 1940 or 1941. Therefore, the
declarations of the defendant Domingo Calalung and his witness, Vicente C.
Bacani, to the effect that the land in question was formed by accretion since
1933 do not only contradict the testimony of defendants' witness Pedro
Laman, but could not overthrow the incontestable fact that the accretion with
an area of 4 hectare more or less, was formed in 1948, reason for which, it
was only declared in that same year for taxation purposes by the defendants
under Tax Dec. No. 257 (Exh. "2") when they entered upon the land. We
could not give credence to defendants' assertion that Tax Dec. No. 257 (Exh.
"2") cancelled Tax Dee. No. 28226 (Exh. "1"), because Exh. "2" says that "tax
under this declaration begins with the year 1948. But, the fact that defendants
declared the land for taxation purposes since 1948, does not mean that they
become the owner of the land by mere occupancy, for it is a new provision of
the New Civil Code that ownership of a piece of land cannot be acquired by
occupation (Art. 714, New Civil Code). The land in question being an
accretion to the mother or registered land of the plaintiffs, the accretion
belongs to the plaintiffs (Art. 457, New Civil Code; Art. 366, Old Civil Code).
Assuming arguendo, that the accretion has been occupied by the defendants
since 1948, or earlier, is of no moment, because the law does not require any
act of possession on the part of the owner of the riparian owner, from the
moment the deposit becomes manifest (Roxas v. Tuason, 9 Phil. 408; Cortez
v. City of Manila, 10 Phil. 567). Further, no act of appropriation on the part of
the reparian owner is necessary, in order to acquire ownership of the alluvial
formation, as the law does not require the same (3 Manresa, C.C., pp.
321-326).
This brings us now to the determination of whether the defendants, granting
that they have been in possession of the alluvium since 1948, could have
acquired the property by prescription. Assuming that they occupied the land in
September, 1948, but considering that the action was commenced on
January 25, 1958, they have not been in possession of the land for ten (10)
years; hence, they could not have acquired the land by ordinary prescription
(Arts. 1134 and 1138, New Civil Code). Moreover, as the alluvium is, by law,
25
part and parcel of the registered property, the same may be considered as
registered property, within the meaning of Section 46 of Act No. 496: and,
therefore, it could not be acquired by prescription or adverse possession by
another person.
Unsatisfied, respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, which rendered, on
September 14, 1960, the decision adverted to at the beginning of this opinion,
partly stating:
That the area in controversy has been formed through a gradual process of
alluvium, which started in the early thirties, is a fact conclusively established by
the evidence for both parties. By law, therefore, unless some superior title has
supervened, it should properly belong to the riparian owners, specifically in
accordance with the rule of natural accession in Article 366 of the old Civil
Code (now Article 457), which provides that "to the owner of lands adjoining the
banks of rivers, belongs the accretion which they gradually receive from the
effects of the current of the waters." The defendants, however, contend that
they have acquired ownership through prescription. This contention poses the
real issue in this case. The Court a quo, has resolved it in favor of the plaintiffs,
on two grounds: First, since by accession, the land in question pertains to the
original estate, and since in this instance the original estate is registered, the
accretion, consequently, falls within the purview of Section 46 of Act No. 496,
which states that "no title to registered land in derogation to that of the
registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession"; and,
second, the adverse possession of the defendant began only in the month of
September, 1948, or less than the 10-year period required for prescription
before the present action was instituted.
As a legal proposition, the first ground relied upon by the trial court, is not quite
correct. An accretion to registered land, while declared by specific provision of
the Civil Code to belong to the owner of the land as a natural accession thereof,
does not ipso jure become entitled to the protection of the rule of
imprescriptibility of title established by the Land Registration Act. Such
protection does not extend beyond the area given and described in the
certificate. To hold otherwise, would be productive of confusion. It would
virtually deprive the title, and the technical description of the land given therein,
of their character of conclusiveness as to the identity and area of the land that
is registered. Just as the Supreme Court, albeit in a negative manner, has
stated that registration does not protect the riparian owner against the erosion
of the area of his land through gradual changes in the course of the adjoining
stream (Payatas Estate Development Co. v. Tuason, 53 Phil. 55), so
registration does not entitle him to all the rights conferred by Land Registration
Act, in so far as the area added by accretion is concerned. What rights he has,
are declared not by said Act, but by the provisions of the Civil Code on
accession: and these provisions do not preclude acquisition of the addition area
by another person through prescription. This Court has held as much in the
case of Galindez, et al. v. Baguisa, et al., CA-G.R. No. 19249-R, July 17, 1959.
We now proposed to review the second ground relied upon by the trial court,
regarding the length of time that the defendants have been in possession.
Domingo Calalung testified that he occupied the land in question for the first
time in 1934, not in 1948 as claimed by the plaintiffs. The area under
occupancy gradually increased as the years went by. In 1946, he declared the
land for purposes of taxation (Exhibit 1). This tax declaration was superseded
in 1948 by another (Exhibit 2), after the name of the municipality wherein it is
located was changed from Tumauini to Magsaysay. Calalung's testimony is
corroborated by two witnesses, both owners of properties nearby. Pedro
Laman, 72 years of age, who was Municipal president of Tumauini for three
terms, said that the land in question adjoins his own on the south, and that
since 1940 or 1951, he has always known it to be in the peaceful possession of
the defendants. Vicente C. Bacani testified to the same effect, although, he
said that the defendants' possession started sometime in 1933 or 1934. The
area thereof, he said, was then less than one hectare.
We find the testimony of the said witnesses entitled to much greater weight and
credence than that of the plaintiff Pedro Grande and his lone witness, Laureana
Rodriguez. The first stated that the defendants occupied the land in question
only in 1948; that he called the latter's attention to the fact that the land was his,
but the defendants, in turn, claimed that they were the owners, that the plaintiffs
did not file an action until 1958, because it was only then that they were able to
obtain the certificate of title from the surveyor, Domingo Parlan; and that they
never declared the land in question for taxation purposes or paid the taxes
thereon. Pedro Grande admitted that the defendants had the said land
surveyed in April, 1958, and that he tried to stop it, not because he claimed the
 26
accretion for himself and his co-plaintiffs, but because the survey included a the Court of Appeals that the respondents acquired alluvial lot in question by
portion of the property covered by their title. This last fact is conceded by the acquisitive prescription is in accordance with law.
defendants who, accordingly, relinquished their possession to the part thus
included, containing an area of some 458 square meters.1äwphï1.ñët
The decision of the Court of Appeals under review is hereby affirmed, with
costs against the petitioners. So ordered.
The oral evidence for the defendants concerning the period of their
possession — from 1933 to 1958 — is not only preponderant in itself, but is,
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Paredes and
moreover, supported by the fact that it is they and not the plaintiffs who
Dizon, JJ., concur.
declared the disputed property for taxation, and by the additional
Reyes, J.B.L., Regala and Makalintal, JJ., took no part.
circumstance that if the plaintiff had really been in prior possession and were
deprived thereof in 1948, they would have immediately taken steps to recover
the same. The excuse they gave for not doing so, namely, that they did not G.R. No. L-40912 September 30, 1976
receive their copy of the certificate of title to their property until 1958 for lack of
funds to pay the fees of the surveyor Domingo Parlan, is too flimsy to merit
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the MINDANAO
any serious consideration. The payment of the surveyor's fees had nothing to
MEDICAL CENTER, petioner,
do with their right to obtain a copy of the certificate. Besides, it was not
vs.
necessary for them to have it in their hands, in order to file an action to
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ALEJANDRO Y DE JESUS, respondents.
recover the land which was legally theirs by accession and of which, as they
allege, they had been illegally deprived by the defendants. We are convinced,
upon consideration of the evidence, that the latter, were really in possession Office of the Solicitor for petitioner.
since 1934, immediately after the process of alluvion started, and that the
plaintiffs woke up to their rights only when they received their copy of the title
Ananias C. Ona for private respondent.
in 1958. By then, however, prescription had already supervened in favor of
the defendants.

It is this decision of the Court of Appeals which petitioners seek to be

reviewed by us. MARTIN, J.:têñ.£îhqwâ£

The sole issue for resolution in this case is whether respondents have This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Apiwals in its
acquired the alluvial property in question through prescription. CA-G.R. No. 39577-R, raising the question of whether or not petitioner
Mindanao Medical Center has registerable title over a full 12.8081-hectare land
by virtue of an executive proclamation in 1956 reserving the area for medical
There can be no dispute that both under Article 457 of the New Civil Code and
center site purposes.
Article 366 of the old, petitioners are the lawful owners of said alluvial property,
as they are the registered owners of the land which it adjoins. The question is
whether the accretion becomes automatically registered land just because the On January 22, 1921, Eugenio de Jesus, the father of respondent Alejandro de
lot which receives it is covered by a Torrens title thereby making the alluvial Jesus, applied with the Bureau of Lands for Sales Patent (Sales Application No.
property imprescriptible. We agree with the Court of Appeals that it does not, 5436) of a 33-hectare situated in barrio Libaron, Municipality of Davao (now
just as an unregistered land purchased by the registered owner of the Davao City). 1 The property applied for was a portion of what was then known
adjoining land does not, by extension, become ipso facto registered land. as Lot 522 of the Davao Cadastre.
Ownership of a piece of land is one thing, and registration under the Torrens
system of that ownership is quite another. Ownership over the accretion
On January 23, 1934, the Bureau of Lands, through its Davao District Land
received by the land adjoining a river is governed by the Civil Code.
Officer, accepted sealed bids for the purchase of the subject land. One Irineo
Imprescriptibility of registered land is provided in the registration law.
Jose bidded for P20.00 per hectare, while a certain Dr. Josc Ebro submitted a
Registration under the Land Registration and Cadastral Acts does not vest or
bid of P100.50 per hectare The Director of Lands, however, annulled the
give title to the land, but merely confirms and thereafter protects the title
auction sale for the reason that the sales applicant, Eugenio de Jesus, failed to
already possessed by the owner, making it imprescriptible by occupation of
participate in the bidding for non-service of notice on him of the scheduled
third parties. But to obtain this protection, the land must be placed under the
bidding.
operation of the registration laws wherein certain judicial procedures have
been provided. The fact remain, however, that petitioners never sought
registration of said alluvial property (which was formed sometime after In lieu of that sale, another bidding was held on October 4, 1934. Sales
petitioners' property covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 2982 was applicant Eugenio de Jesus was the lone bidder. He equalled the bid previously
registered on June 9, 1934) up to the time they instituted the present action in submitted by Dr. Jose Ebro and made a deposit of P221.00 representing 10%
the Court of First Instance of Isabela in 1958. The increment, therefore, never of the price of the land at P100.50 per hectare.
became registered property, and hence is not entitled or subject to the
protection of imprescriptibility enjoyed by registered property under the
Torrens system. Consequently, it was subject to acquisition through On November 23, 1934, the Director of Lands issued to Eugenio de Jesus an
Order of Award, the dispositive portion of which reads: 2ñé+.£ªwph!1
prescription by third persons.

In view of the foregoing, and it appearing that the proceedings had in

The next issue is, did respondents acquire said alluvial property through
connection with the Sales Application No. 5436 were in accordance with law
acquisitive prescription? This is a question which requires determination of
facts: physical possession and dates or duration of such possession. The and existing regulations, the land covered thereby is herebyawarded to the said
applicant, Eugenio de jesus, at P100.50 per hectare or P2,211.00 for thewhole
Court of Appeals, after analyzing the evidence, found that
respondents-appellees were in possession of the alluvial lot since 1933 or tract.
1934, openly, continuously and adversely, under a claim of ownership up to
the filing of the action in 1958. This finding of the existence of these facts, This application should be entered in the records of this office as Sales
arrived at by the Court of Appeals after an examination of the evidence Application No. 3231, covering the tract herein awarded, which is more
presented by the parties, is conclusive as to them and can not be reviewed by particularly described as follows:
us.
Location: Central, Davao,ñé+.£ªwph!1
The law on prescription applicable to the case is that provided in Act 190 and
not the provisions of the Civil Code, since the possession started in 1933 or
1934 when the pertinent articles of the old Civil Code were not in force and Davao
before the effectivity of the new Civil Code in 1950. Hence, the conclusion of

Area: 22 hectares
Boundaries:ñé+.£ªwph!1
N—Maria Villa Abrille and Arenio Suazo;
SE—Provincial Road and Mary Gohn;
SW—Public Land;
W—Municipal Road;
Because the area conveyed had not been actually surveyed at the time
Eugenio de Jesus filed his Sales Application, the Bureau of Lands conducted
a survey under Plan Bsd-1514. On July 29, 1936, the plan was approved and
the land awarded to Eugenio de Jesus was designated as Lot Nos. 1176-A,
1176-B-1-A and 1176-B-1-B with an aggregate area of 20.6400 hectares,
Bsd-10153, City of Davao.
On August 28, 1936, the Director of Lands ordered an amendment of the
Sales Application of Eugenio de Jesus stating that "a portion of the land
covered by Sales Application No. 5436 (E-3231) of Eugenio de Jesus is
needed by the Philippine Army for military camp site purposes, the said
application is amended so as to exclude therefrom portion "A" as shown in the
sketch on the back thereof, and as thus amended, it will continue to be given
due course." The area excluded was Identified as Lot 1176-B-2, the very land
in question, consisting of 12.8081 hectares.
On September 7, 1936, President Manuel L. Quezon issued Proclaimation No.
85 withdrawing Lot No. 1176-B-2 from sale and settlement and reserving the
same for military purposes, under the administration of the Chief of Staff,
Philippine Army.
On November 29, 1939, Eugenio de Jesus paid P660.45 covering the 8th and
10th installment for 20.6400 hectares, the remaining area after his Sales
Application was amended. This payment did not include the military camp site
(Lot No. 1176-B-2) as the same had already been excluded from the Sales
Application at the time the payment was made. 3 Thereafter, or on May 15,
1948, then Director of Lands Jose P. Dans ordered the issuance of patent to
Eugenio de Jesus, pursuant to his Sales Application for "a tract of land having
an area of 20.6400 hectares, situated in the barrio of Poblacion, City of
Davao. 4 On the same date, then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources Mariano Garchitorena granted a Sales Patent to Eugenio de Jesus
for "a tract of agricultural public land situated in the City of Davao, Island of
Mindanao, Philippines, containing an area of 20 hectares, 64 ares, and 00
centares. 5
On August 11, 1956, President Ramon Magsaysay revoked Proclamation No.
85 and declared the disputed Lot 1176-B-2 open to disposition under the
provisions of the Public land Act for resettlement of the squatters in the Piapi
Beach, Davao City. 6 In the following October 9, President Magsaysay
revoked this Proclamation No. 328 and reserved the same Lot No. 1176-B-2
for medical center site purposes under the administration of the Director of
Hospital. 7
Whereupon, on December 6, 1969, petitioner Mindanao Medical Center
applied for the Torrens registration of the 12.8081-hectare Lot 1176-B-2 with
the Court of First Instance of Davao. The Medical Center claimed "fee simple"
title to the land on the strength of proclamation No. 350 reserving the area for
medical center site purposes.
Respondent Alejandro de Jesus, the son and successor-in-interest of sale
applicant Eugenio de Jesus, opposed the registration oil the ground that his
father, Eugenio de Jesus, had aquired a vested right on the subject lot by
virtue of the Order of Award issued to him by the Director of Lands.
A certain Arsenio Suazo likewise filed his opposition to the registration on the
claim that the 2-hectare portion on the northeastern part of Lot 1176-B-2
belongs to him.
27
After due hearing, the Court of First Instance of Davao rendered judgment on
September 2, 1966, directing "the registration of the title to Lot No. 1176-B-2 of
Subdivision Plan Bsd-5134, shown on Plan Ap-6512, situated in the Barrio of
Central, City of Davao, and containing an area of 128,081 square meters in the
name of the Mindanao Medical Center, Bureau of Medical Services,
Department of Health.
The two oppositors, Alejandro de Jesus and Arsenio Suazo, excepted from this
judgment of the trial court and appealed the case to the respondent Court of
Appeals.
On July 2, 1974, the Appellate Court held: ñé+.£ªwph!1
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby modified insofar as it denies
the claim of appellant Arsenio Suazo, the same is hereby affirmed, in regard
the appeal of appellant Alejandro Y. de Jesus, registration Lot 1176-B-2,
situated in Barrio Central, Davao City, and containing an area of 12.8081
square meters, is hereby decreed in the name of said appellants, but said
appellant is hereby ordered to relinquish to the appellee that portion of Lot
1176-B-2 which is occupied by the medical center and nervous disease pavilion
and their reasonable appartenances, no costs.
On July 5, 1974, petitioner Mindanao Medical Center moved for
reconsideration, maintaining ownership over the entire area of 12.8081
hectares, but the Appellate Court in a Special Division of Five denied the
motion on June 17, 1975. 8
Forthwith, petitioner Mindanao Medical Center elevated the matter to Us thru
the present appeal.
We find petitioner's appeal to b meritorious.
1. Petitioner Mindanao Medical Center has registerable title over the whole
contested area of 12.8081 hectares, designated Lot No. 1176-B-2, and not only
on a portion thereof occupied by the Medical Center, its nervous disease
pavilion and their reasonable appurtenances. Proclamation No. 350, dated
October 9, 1956, of President Magsaysay legally effected a land grant to the
Mindanao Medical Center, Bureau of Medical Services, Department of Health,
of the whole lot, validity sufficient for initial registration under the Land
Registration Act. Such land grant is constitutive of a "fee simple" tile or absolute
title in favor of petitioner Mindanao Medical Center. Thus, Section 122 of the
Act, which governs the registration of grants or patents involving public lands,
provides that "Whenever public lands in the Philippine Islands belonging to the
Government of the Philippines are alienated, granted, or conveyed to persons
or to public or private corporations, the same shall be brought forthwith under
the operation of this Act [Land Registration Act, Act 496] and shall become
registered lands." 9 It would be completely absurd to rule that, on the basis of
Proclamation No. 350, the Medical Center has registerable title on the portion
occupied by it, its nervous disease pavilion and the reasonable appurtenances,
and not on the full extent of the reservation, when the proclamation explicitly
reserved the entire Lot 1176-B-2 of 12.8081 hectares to the Center.
Certainly, proclamation no. 350 is free of any legal infirmity. It proceeds from
the recognized competence of the president to reserve by executive
proclamation alienable lands of the public domain for a specific public use or
service. 10 section 64 (e) of the Revised Administrative Code empowers the
president "(t)o reserve from sale oe other disposition and for specific public
uses for service, any land belonging to the private domain of the Government of
the Philippines, the use of which is not otherwise directed by law. the land
reserved "shall be used for the specific purposes directed by such executive
order until otherwise provided by law." Similarly, Section 83 of the Public Land
Act (CA 141) authorizes the President to "designate by proclamation any tract
or tracts of land of the public domain as reservations for the use ofthe
commonwealth of the Philippines or of any of its branches, or of the inhabitants
thereof, ... or for quasi-public uses or purposes when the public interest
requires it, including reservations for ... other improvements for the public
benefit.
2. Respondent Appellate Court erroneously ruled that Alejabdro's father,
Eugenio de jesus, had acquired ownership over the whole 12.8081-hectare Lot
1176-B-2 because the Sales Award issued to him on November 23, 1934 by
then Director of Lands Simeon Ramos covered the 33 hectares applied for,
 28
including the 12.8081 hectares. We fail to see any reasonable basis on record patent and determine the tract and quantity of land apart from the patent
for the Appellate Court to draw such conclusion. On the contrary, the very itself. 21
Sales Award describes the tract awarded as located in Central, Davao, Davao,
with an area of 22 hectares, and bounded on the north by Maria Villa Abrille
4. We cannot share the view of respondent Appellate Court that eugenio de
and Arsenio Suazo; on the southeast by a provincial road and Mary Gohn; on
jesus's alleged occupation, cultivation and improvement of the 33-hectare land
the southwest by a public land; and on the west by a municipal road. 11 This
(including the 12-hectare camp site) since 1916 vested in him a right of
area of 22 hectares was even reduced to 20.6400 hectares upon actual
preference or pre-empive right in the acquisition of the land, which right was
survey made by the Bureau of Lands. The same area was reckoned with by
controverted into "a special propriety right" when the Sales Award was issued
then Lands Director Jose P. Dans when he directed the issuance of a patent
to him in 1934. Not only for the earlier reasons that the Sales Award was only
to Eugenio de Jesus on May 15, 1948 for his application filed on January 22,
for 22 hectares (later found to be 20,6400 fectares upon actual survey) and not
1921 covering "a tract of land having an area of 20.6400 hectares, situated in
for 33 hectares, the privilege of occupying public lands a view to preemption
the barrio of Poblacion, City of Davao." 12 In like manner, the Sales
confers np contractual or vested right in the lands occupied and the authority of
Patent issued to Eugenio de Jesus on the same date, May 15, 1948, by then
the President to withdraw suchlands for sale or acquisition by the public, or to
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Mariano Garchitorena
reserve them for public use, prior to the divesting by the government of title
indicated therein the sale to Eugenio de Jesus of "a tract of agricultural public
threof stands, even though this may defeat the imperfect right of a
land situated in the City of Davao, Island of Mindanao, Philippines, containing
settler. 22 Lands covered by reservation are not subject to entry, and no lawful
an area of 20 hectares 64, ares 00 centares." Seen in the light of Patent, and
settlement on them can be acquired. 23 The claims o0f persons who have
Sales Order for Issuance of Patent, and Sales Patent, invariably bearing the
settled on occupied, and improved a parcel of public land which is later
area awarded to sales applicant Eugenio de Jesusas 20.6400 hectares, it
included in a reservation are considered worthy of protection and are usually
becomes imperative to conclude that what was really awarded to Eugenio de
respected, but where the President, as authorized by law, issuesa proclamation
jesus was only 20.6400 hectares and not 33 hectares as applied for by him.
reserving certain lands and warning all persons to depart therefrom, this
terminates any rights previously avquired in such lands by a person who was
However, We observe that in the public bidding of october 4, 1934, the settled thereon in order to obtain a preferential right of purchase. 24 And patents
succesful bidder, submitted a bid of 100.50 per hectare and made a cash for lands which have been previously granted, reserved from sale, or
deposit of only P221.00, which amount represents 10% of the purchase price appropriate, are void. 25
of the land. 13 At P100.50 per hectare, the purchase would be P2,221.00 for
22 hectares, 10% deposit of which amounts to P221.00. For 33 hectares, the
It is true that Proclamation No. 350 states that the same is subject to "privilege
total purchase price would be P3,316.50 at P100.50 per hectare and the 10%
rights, if any there be," but Eugenio de Jesus or his son Alejandro de Jesus
deposit would be P331.65, not P221.00, as what was actually deposited by
failed to prove any private rights over the property reserved. Wee-settled is the
sales applicant Eugenio de Jesus. Withal, if Eugenio de Jesus was really
rule that unless the applicant has shown by clear and convincing evidence that
awarded 33 hectares in that public bidding, he should have made the required
a certain portion of the public domain was acquired by him or his ancestors
10% deposit of P331.65. That he merely deposited P221.00 strongly suggests
either by composition title from the Spanish Government or by possessory
that what was bidden for and awarded to him was only 22 hectares and not 33
information title, or any other means for the acquisition of public lands, such as
hectares as applied for. As a matter of fact, his last payment of P660.45 on
grants or patents, the property must be held to be part of the public
November 29, 1939 for the 8th te 10th installment intended only to cover
domain. 26 Nor could respondent Alejandro de Jesus legetimately claim to have
20.6400 hectares, the remaining area after the amendment of the Sales
obtained title by prescription over the disputed 12.8081 hectares, inasmuch as
Application on August 28, 1936, excluding "the military camp site [Lot
by applying for the sale thereof (assuming hypothetically that the
1176B-2 of 12.8081 hectares] for the reason that the said site, at the time of
12.8081-hectare lot was included in the original sales application for 33
last installment was already excluded from Sale Application SA-5436 of
hectares), his father, Eugenio de Jesus, necessarily admits that the portions
Eugenio de Jesus, as ordered ... by the Director of Lands." 14
applied for are part of the public domain, against which no acquisitive
prescription may lie 27 except as provided in Section 48(b) of C.A. 141, as
But, respondent Appellate Court reasons out that if the area bidden for and amended.
awarded in 1934 ws only 22 hectares and since two years thereafter the
Director of Lands ordered an amendment excluding the military camp site of
5. Respondent Appellate Court mistakenly sustained Eugenio de Jesus's
12.8081 hectares, then only 10 hectares, then would have been left to
pretense that the military "camp site" (Lot 176-B-2) had been donated by him to
applicant Eugenio de Jesus and not 20.6400 hectares would have been left in
the Philippine Army, thru Secretary Serafin Marabut of the Department of
the Sales Patent. The Appellate Court's reasoning is premised on wrong
National Defense, sometime in 1936 subject to the condition that it would be
assumption. What was ordered amended was the Sales Application for 33
returned to him when the Philippine Army would no longer need it. As found by
hectares and not the Order of 22 hectares or 20.6400 hectares. The Order
the trial court in 1936, the Department of National Defense was not yet in
states: "Order: Amendment of Application." Necessarily so, because the
existence, so that no Defense Secretary by the name of Serafin Marabut could
amendment was already reflected in the Order of Award, since only an area of
have entered into a deed of donation with Eugenio de Jesus over Lot 1176-B-2
22 hectares was awarded.
consisting of 12.8081 hectares. The Department of National Defense was only
organized in 1939. Nonetheless, respondent Alejandro de Jesus, would prove
3. The phrase "whole tract" in the Sales Award 15 cannot be licitly seized upon by secondary evidence the existence of such donation thru the testimony of
as basis for the conclusion that the area awarded to applicant Eugenio de persons who supposedly saw it. In this regard, the Rules provides that before
Jesus was the applied area of 33 hectares. Such general description of the terms of a transaction in realty may be established by secondary evidence,
"whole tract" cannot prevail over the specific description delineating the area it is n that the due execution and subsequent loss of the original instrument
in quantity and in boundaries. Thus, the Sales Award specifies the area evidencing the transaction be proved. For it is the due execution of the
awarded as 22 hectares, located at Central, Davao, Davao, and bounded on document and its subsequent loss that would constitute the foundation for the
the north by the property of Maria Villa Abrille and Arsenio Suazo; on the introduction of secondary evidence to prove the contents of such document.
southwest by a provincial road and the property by Mary Gohn on the And the due of the execution of the document would be proved through the
southwest by a public land; and on the west by a municipal road. 16 Specific testimony of (1) the person or persons who executed it; (2) the person before
description is ordinarily preferred to general description, or that which is more whom its execution was acknowledged, or (3) any who was present and saw it
certain to what which is less certain. 17More so, when it is considered that the executed and delivered, or who, after its execution and delivery, saw it and
series of executive proclamations (Proclamation Nos. 85, 328, 350) recognized the signatures, or by a person to whom the parties to the instrument
continuously maintained the intent of the Government to reserve the subject had previously confessed the execution thereof. 28 None of these modes of
land for a specific purpose or service. proof was ever followed by respondent Alejandro de Jesus. His predecessor-
in-interest, Eugenio de Jesus, merely made a broad statement that he
executed a deed f donation in 1936 with Defense Secretary Marabut when at
Besides, patents and land grants are construed favorably to the Governement,
hat time the Defense Department was not yet in existence. The notary public
and most strongly against the grantee. 18 Any doubt as to the intention or
who presumptively acknowledged the donation or the witnesses to the
extent of the grant, or the intention of the Government, is to be resolved in its
instrument were never presented. It has been ruled that the failure of the party
favor. 19 In general, the quantity of the land granted must be ascertained from
to present the notary Public and thore s who must have seen the signing of the
the description in the patent is exclusive evidence of the land
document as witnesses to testify on its execution interdicts the admission of a
conveyed. 20 And courts do not usually go beyond a description of a tract in a
secondary evidence of the terms of the deed. 29 This is especially true in realty
 29
donations where Art. 748 of the new Civil Code requires the accomplishment contagious diseas pavilion; (b) hospital motorpool; and (c) physician's quarters,
thereof in a public document in order to be valid. The testimony of Marcelo is hereby granted. With costs against private respondent.
Belendres that Sesinando de jesus, brother of Eugenio de Jesus showed him
a copy of the "paper" signed by Secretary Marabut and Eugenio de Jesus; of
SO ORDERED.
Jose Tinio, Acting Register of Deeds of Davao, that in May or June 1937, Col.
Simeon de jesus went to his office to register a document" executed by
Eugenio de Jesus and Secretary Marabut; of former Secretary Brigido G.R. No. 73002 December 29, 1986
Valencia that Col. Simeon de Jesus showed him a deed of donation signed by
Eugenio de Jesus and Serafin Marabut. hardly suffer to satisfy the requisites
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,
of the Rules, as to which very strict compliance is imposed because of the
vs.
importance of the document involved. 30 First none of these persons was a
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ACME PLYWOOD & VENEER
witness to the instrument, nor any of them saw the document after its
CO. INC., ETC., respondents.
execution and delivery ind recognized the signatures of the parties nor to
whom the parties to the instrument had previously confessed the execution;
second, the reference to a "paper" or "document" ambigous as to be D. Nacion Law Office for private respondent.
synonymous with a "deed of donation;" and third, the persons who showed
the deed, Sesinando de Jesus and Col. Simeon de Jesus were not parties to
the instrument. Respondent Alejandro de Jesus's narration of the existence
and loss of the document equally deserves no credence. As found by the trial
court, he testified that the copy of the deed which his father kept was sent to NARVASA, J.:
him in Manila thru his uncle, Sesinando de Jesus in July 1942, while his father
himself, Eugenio de Jesus, declared that his copy of the deed was burned in
The Director of Lands has brought this appeal by certiorari from a judgment of
Davao during the Japanese occupation. The replies of the Undersecretary of
the Intermediate Appellate Court affirming a decision of the Court of First
Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Acting Executive Secretary that
Instance of Isabela, which ordered registration in favor of Acme Plywood &
the property was "still needed for military purposes" and may not therefore be
Veneer Co., Inc. of five parcels of land measuring 481, 390 square meters,
released from the reservation cannot substitute the proof so required. These
more or less, acquired by it from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the
replies are not confirmatory of the existence of such donation much less
Dumagat tribe.
official admissions thereof.

The registration proceedings were for confirmation of title under Section 48 of

Even on the gratuitous assumption that a donation of the military "camp site"
was executed between Eugenior de jesus and Serafin Marabut, such
donation would anyway be void, because Eugenior de jesus held no
dominical rights over the site when it was allegedly donated by him in 1936. In
that year, proclamation No. 85 of President Quezon already withrew the area
from sale or settlement and reserved it for military purposes. Respondent
Appellate Court, however, rationalizes that the subject of the donation was not
the land itself but "the possessory and special proprietary rights" of Eugenio
de jesus over it. We disagree. It is true that the gratiuitous disposal in donation
may consist of a thing or right. 31 But the term "right" must be understood in a
"propriety" sense, over which the processor has the jus disponendi. 32 This is
because, in true donations, there results a consequent impoverishment of the
donor or diminution of his assets. 33 Eugenio de Jesus cannot be said to be
possessed of that "proprietary " right over the whole 33 hectares in 1936
including the disputed 12.8081 hectares for at that time this 12.8081-hectare
lot had already been severed from the mass of disposable public lands by
Proclamation No. 85 and excluded in the Sales Award. Impoverishment of
Eugenio's assets as a consequence of such donation is therefore farfetehed.
In fact, even if We were to assume in gratia argumenti that the
12.8081-hectare lot was included in the Sales Award, still the same may not
be the subject of donation. In Sales Award, what is conferred on the applicant
is merely the right "to take possession of the land so that he could comply with
the requirements prescribed by law." 34In other words, the right granted to the
sales awardee is only "possessory right" as distinguished from "proprietary
right," for the fundamental reason that prior to the issuance of the sales patent
and registration thereof, title to the land is retained by the State. 35 Admittedly,
the land applied for may be considered "disposed of by the Government"
upon the issuance of the Sales Award, but this has the singular effect of
withdrawing the land from the public domian that is "disposable" by the
Director of Lands under the Public Land Act. Moreover, the dsiposition is
merely provisional because the applicant has still to comply with the
requirements of the law before any patent is issued. It is only after compliance
with such requirements to the satisfaction of the Director of Lands, that the
patent is issued and the land applied for considered "permanently disposed of
by the Government." This again is a circumstance that demeans the
irrevocable nature donation, because the mere desistance of the sales
applicant to pursue the requirements called for would cause the virtual
revocation of the donation.
ACCORDINGLY, the appealed judgement of the Court of Appeals,
promulgated on July 2, 1974, and its resolution of Jane 17, 1975, denying
petitioner's motion for reconsiderations, are hereby reversed and set aside.
The disputed Lot 1176-B-2, Plan Bsd-1514 of Davao Cadastre and containing
an area of 12.8081 hectares, is hereby adjudicated in favor of petitioner
Mindanao Medical Center. The urgent motion of the petitioner for leave to
construct essential hospitawl buildings, namely: (a) communicable and
Commonwealth Act No. 141 (The Public Land Act). as amended: and the
appealed judgment sums up the findings of the trial court in said proceedings in
this wise:
1. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario
is a corporation duly organized in accordance with the laws of the Republic of
the Philippines and registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission
on December 23, 1959;
2. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario
can acquire real properties pursuant to the provisions of the Articles of
Incorporation particularly on the provision of its secondary purposes (paragraph
(9), Exhibit 'M-l');
3. That the land subject of the Land Registration proceeding was ancestrally
acquired by Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., on October 29, 1962, from
Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel, both members of the Dumagat tribe and as such
are cultural minorities;
4. That the constitution of the Republic of the Philippines of 1935 is applicable
as the sale took place on October 29, 1962;
5. That the possession of the Infiels over the land relinquished or sold to Acme
Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., dates back before the Philippines was discovered
by Magellan as the ancestors of the Infiels have possessed and occupied the
land from generation to generation until the same came into the possession of
Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel;
6. That the possession of the applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., is
continuous, adverse and public from 1962 to the present and tacking the
possession of the Infiels who were granted from whom the applicant bought
said land on October 29, 1962, hence the possession is already considered
from time immemorial.
7. That the land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to the
provisions of Republic Act No. 3872 granting absolute ownership to members
of the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or their ancestral lands,
whether with the alienable or disposable public land or within the public
domain;
8. That applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than
Forty-Five Million (P45,000,000.00) Pesos worth of improvements, said

improvements were seen by the Court during its ocular investigation of the
land sought to be registered on September 18, 1982;
9. That the ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered by
the applicant was duly recognized by the government when the Municipal
Officials of Maconacon, Isabela, have negotiated for the donation of the
townsite from Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., and this negotiation came to
reality when the Board of Directors of the Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc.,
had donated a part of the land bought by the Company from the Infiels for the
townsite of Maconacon Isabela (Exh. 'N') on November 15, 1979, and which
donation was accepted by the Municipal Government of Maconacon, Isabela
(Exh. 'N-l'), during their special session on November 22, 1979.
The Director of Lands takes no issue with any of these findings except as to
the applicability of the 1935 Constitution to the matter at hand. Concerning
this, he asserts that, the registration proceedings have been commenced only
on July 17, 1981, or long after the 1973 Constitution had gone into effect, the
latter is the correctly applicable law; and since section 11 of its Article XIV
prohibits private corporations or associations from holding alienable lands of
the public domain, except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares (a prohibition
not found in the 1935 Constitution which was in force in 1962 when Acme
purchased the lands in question from the Infiels), it was reversible error to
decree registration in favor of Acme Section 48, paragraphs (b) and (c), of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, reads:
SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands
of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein,
but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the
Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims, and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor,
under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim
of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the
filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war
or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all
the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
(c) Members of the National Cultural minorities who by themselves or through
their predecessors-in-interest have been in open. continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to
agriculture, whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership
for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b)
hereof.
The Petition for Review does not dispute-indeed, in view of the quoted
findings of the trial court which were cited and affirmed by the Intermediate
Appellate Court, it can no longer controvert before this Court-the fact that
Mariano and Acer Infiel, from whom Acme purchased the lands in question on
October 29, 1962, are members of the national cultural minorities who had, by
themselves and through their progenitors, possessed and occupied those
lands since time immemorial, or for more than the required 30-year period and
were, by reason thereof, entitled to exercise the right granted in Section 48 of
the Public Land Act to have their title judicially confirmed. Nor is there any
pretension that Acme, as the successor-in-interest of the Infiels, is disqualified
to acquire and register ownership of said lands under any provisions of the
1973 Constitution other than Section 11 of its Article XIV already referred to.
Given the foregoing, the question before this Court is whether or not the title
that the Infiels had transferred to Acme in 1962 could be confirmed in favor of
the latter in proceedings instituted by it in 1981 when the 1973 Constitution
was already in effect, having in mind the prohibition therein against private
corporations holding lands of the public domain except in lease not exceeding
1,000 hectares.
The question turns upon a determination of the character of the lands at the
time of institution of the registration proceedings in 1981. If they were then still
30
part of the public domain, it must be answered in the negative. If, on the other
hand, they were then already private lands, the constitutional prohibition
against their acquisition by private corporations or associations obviously does
not apply.
In this regard, attention has been invited to Manila Electric Company vs.
Castro-Bartolome, et al, 1 where a similar set of facts prevailed. In that case,
Manila Electric Company, a domestic corporation more than 60% of the capital
stock of which is Filipino-owned, had purchased in 1947 two lots in Tanay,
Rizal from the Piguing spouses. The lots had been possessed by the vendors
and, before them, by their predecessor-in-interest, Olimpia Ramos, since prior
to the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941. On December 1, 1976, Meralco
applied to the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Makati Branch, for confirmation of
title to said lots. The court, assuming that the lots were public land, dismissed
the application on the ground that Meralco, a juridical person, was not qualified
to apply for registration under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act which allows
only Filipino citizens or natural persons to apply for judicial confirmation of
imperfect titles to public land. Meralco appealed, and a majority of this Court
upheld the dismissal. It was held that:
..., the said land is still public land. It would cease to be public land only upon
the issuance of the certificate of title to any Filipino citizen claiming it under
section 48(b). Because it is still public land and the Meralco, as a juridical
person, is disqualified to apply for its registration under section 48(b), Meralco's
application cannot be given due course or has to be dismissed.
Finally, it may be observed that the constitutional prohibition makes no
distinction between (on the one hand) alienable agricultural public lands as to
which no occupant has an imperfect title and (on the other hand) alienable
lands of the public domain as to which an occupant has on imperfect title
subject to judicial confirmation.
Since section 11 of Article XIV does not distinguish, we should not make any
distinction or qualification. The prohibition applies to alienable public lands as to
which a Torrens title may be secured under section 48(b). The proceeding
under section 48(b) 'presupposes that the land is public' (Mindanao vs. Director
of Lands, L-19535, July 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 641, 644).
The present Chief Justice entered a vigorous dissent, tracing the line of cases
beginning with Carino in 1909 2 thru Susi in 1925 3 down to Herico in
1980, 4 which developed, affirmed and reaffirmed the doctrine that open,
exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period
prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of
the requisite period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction,
ceases to be public land and becomes private property. That said dissent
expressed what is the better — and, indeed, the correct, view-becomes evident
from a consideration of some of the principal rulings cited therein,
The main theme was given birth, so to speak, in Carino involving the
Decree/Regulations of June 25, 1880 for adjustment of royal lands wrongfully
occupied by private individuals in the Philippine Islands. It was ruled that:
It is true that the language of articles 4 and 5 5 attributes title to those 'who may
prove' possession for the necessary time and we do not overlook the argument
that this means may prove in registration proceedings. It may be that an
English conveyancer would have recommended an application under the
foregoing decree, but certainly it was not calculated to convey to the mind of an
Igorot chief the notion that ancient family possessions were in danger, if he had
read every word of it. The words 'may prove' (acrediten) as well or better, in
view of the other provisions, might be taken to mean when called upon to do so
in any litigation. There are indications that registration was expected from all
but none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would
be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but
simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law. ...
That ruling assumed a more doctrinal character because expressed in more
categorical language, in Susi:
.... In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris et de
jure established in paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act
No. 926, that all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government
were complied with, for he has been in actual and physical possession,

personally and through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public
domain openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1984,
with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter
VIII of said Act. So that when Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor,
Valentin Susi had already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a
grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of
title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts,
an application therefore is sufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of Act
No. 2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question
by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be of the public domain and
had become private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi,
beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the land
in question of Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over
which he had no longer any title or control, and the sale thus made was void
and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right. 6
Succeeding cases, of which only some need be mentioned, likeof Lacaste vs.
Director of Lands, 7 Mesina vs. Vda. de Sonza, 8 Manarpac vs.
Cabanatuan, 9 Miguel vs. Court of Appeals 10 and Herico vs. Dar, supra, by
invoking and affirming the Susi doctrine have firmly rooted it in jurisprudence.
Herico, in particular, appears to be squarely affirmative: 11
.... Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 1942, which the
respondent Court held to be inapplicable to the petitioner's case, with the
latter's proven occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years since 1914,
by himself and by his predecessors-in-interest, title over the land has vested
on petitioner so as to segregate the land from the mass of public
land. Thereafter, it is no longer disposable under the Public Land Act as by
free patent. ....
xxx xxx xxx
As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as specified in the
foregoing provision are complied with, the possessor is deemed to have
acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a government grant, without
the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land, therefore, ceases
to be of the public domain and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to
dispose of. The application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of
which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced
by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said
patent. 12
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering
possession of public land which is of the character and duration prescribed by
statute as the equivalent of an express grant from the State than the dictum of
the statute itself 13 that the possessor(s) "... shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall
be entitled to a certificate of title .... " No proof being admissible to overcome a
conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little
more than a formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether the
possession claimed is of the required character and length of time; and
registration thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a title
already vested. The proceedings would not originally convert the land from
public to private land, but only confirm such a conversion already affected by
operation of law from the moment the required period of possession became
complete. As was so well put in Carino, "... (T)here are indications that
registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want of
it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever
made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred
by the decree, if not by earlier law."
If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which
the Infiels had a legally sufficient and transferable title on October 29, 1962
when Acme acquired it from said owners, it must also be conceded that Acme
had a perfect right to make such acquisition, there being nothing in the 1935
Constitution then in force (or, for that matter, in the 1973 Constitution which
came into effect later) prohibiting corporations from acquiring and owning
private lands.
Even on the proposition that the land remained technically "public" land,
despite immemorial possession of the Infiels and their ancestors, until title in
31
their favor was actually confirmed in appropriate proceedings under the Public
Land Act, there can be no serious question of Acmes right to acquire the land at
the time it did, there also being nothing in the 1935 Constitution that might be
construed to prohibit corporations from purchasing or acquiring interests in
public land to which the vendor had already acquired that type of so-called
"incomplete" or "imperfect" title. The only limitation then extant was that
corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public agricultural lands in excess
of 1,024 hectares. The purely accidental circumstance that confirmation
proceedings were brought under the aegis of the 1973 Constitution which
forbids corporations from owning lands of the public domain cannot defeat a
right already vested before that law came into effect, or invalidate transactions
then perfectly valid and proper. This Court has already held, in analogous
circumstances, that the Constitution cannot impair vested rights.
We hold that the said constitutional prohibition 14 has no retroactive application
to the sales application of Binan Development Co., Inc. because it had already
acquired a vested right to the land applied for at the time the 1973 Constitution
took effect.
That vested right has to be respected. It could not be abrogated by the new
Constitution. Section 2, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution allows private
corporations to purchase public agricultural lands not exceeding one thousand
and twenty-four hectares. Petitioner' prohibition action is barred by the doctrine
of vested rights in constitutional law.
xxx xxx xxx
The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights. 'A state may
not impair vested rights by legislative enactment, by the enactment or by the
subsequent repeal of a municipal ordinance, or by a change in the constitution
of the State, except in a legitimate exercise of the police power'(16 C.J.S.
1177-78).
xxx xxx xxx
In the instant case, it is incontestable that prior to the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution the right of the corporation to purchase the land in question had
become fixed and established and was no longer open to doubt or controversy.
Its compliance with the requirements of the Public Land Law for the issuance of
a patent had the effect of segregating the said land from the public domain. The
corporation's right to obtain a patent for the land is protected by law. It cannot
be deprived of that right without due process (Director of Lands vs. CA, 123
Phil. 919).<äre||anº•1àw> 15
The fact, therefore, that the confirmation proceedings were instituted by Acme
in its own name must be regarded as simply another accidental circumstance,
productive of a defect hardly more than procedural and in nowise affecting the
substance and merits of the right of ownership sought to be confirmed in said
proceedings, there being no doubt of Acme's entitlement to the land. As it is
unquestionable that in the light of the undisputed facts, the Infiels, under either
the 1935 or the 1973 Constitution, could have had title in themselves confirmed
and registered, only a rigid subservience to the letter of the law would deny the
same benefit to their lawful successor-in-interest by valid conveyance which
violates no constitutional mandate.
The Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the view, and so holds, that the
majority ruling in Meralco must be reconsidered and no longer deemed to be
binding precedent. The correct rule, as enunciated in the line of cases already
referred to, is that alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or
through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for
the prescribed statutory period (30 years under The Public Land Act, as
amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of
said period, ipso jure. Following that rule and on the basis of the undisputed
facts, the land subject of this appeal was already private property at the time it
was acquired from the Infiels by Acme. Acme thereby acquired a registrable
title, there being at the time no prohibition against said corporation's holding or
owning private land. The objection that, as a juridical person, Acme is not
qualified to apply for judicial confirmation of title under section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act is technical, rather than substantial and, again, finds its answer
in the dissent in Meralco:

6. To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the
technicality that the Public Land Act allows only citizens of the Philippines who
are natural persons to apply for confirmation of their title would be impractical
and would just give rise to multiplicity of court actions. Assuming that there
was a technical error not having filed the application for registration in the
name of the Piguing spouses as the original owners and vendors, still it is
conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of the land to the
applicant Meralco and neither is there any prohibition against the application
being refiled with retroactive effect in the name of the original owners and
vendors (as such natural persons) with the end result of their application
being granted, because of their indisputable acquisition of ownership by
operation of law and the conclusive presumption therein provided in their
favor. It should not be necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost
of refiling of all such applications in their names and adding to the
overcrowded court dockets when the Court can after all these years dispose
of it here and now. (See Francisco vs. City of Davao)
The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by considering the
applications for confirmation as amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as
filed in the names of the original persons who as natural persons are duly
qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the title that they had acquired by
conclusive presumption and mandate of the Public Land Act and who
thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations (both admittedly Filipino
corporations duly qualified to hold and own private lands) and granting the
applications for confirmation of title to the private lands so acquired and sold
or exchanged.
There is also nothing to prevent Acme from reconveying the lands to the
Infiels and the latter from themselves applying for confirmation of title and,
after issuance of the certificate/s of title in their names, deeding the lands
back to Acme. But this would be merely indulging in empty charades, whereas
the same result is more efficaciously and speedily obtained, with no prejudice
to anyone, by a liberal application of the rule on amendment to conform to the
evidence suggested in the dissent in Meralco.
While this opinion seemingly reverses an earlier ruling of comparatively recent
vintage, in a real sense, it breaks no precedent, but only reaffirms and
re-established, as it were, doctrines the soundness of which has passed the
test of searching examination and inquiry in many past cases. Indeed, it is
worth noting that the majority opinion, as well as the concurring opinions of
Chief Justice Fernando and Justice Abad Santos, in Meralco rested chiefly on
the proposition that the petitioner therein, a juridical person, was disqualified
from applying for confirmation of an imperfect title to public land under Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act. Reference to the 1973 Constitution and its
Article XIV, Section 11, was only tangential limited to a brief paragraph in the
main opinion, and may, in that context, be considered as essentially obiter.
Meralco, in short, decided no constitutional question.
WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the appealed judgment of
the Intermediate Appellate Court, the same is hereby affirmed, without costs
in this instance.
SO ORDERED.
Feria, Yap, Fernan, Alampay, Cruz, Paras and Feliciano, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I reiterate my concurrence in Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome, and, therefore,
dissent here.
TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:
32
I am honored by my brethren's judgment at bar that my dissenting opinion in
the June, 1982 Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases, 1 which is herein upheld,
"expressed what is the better. . . . and indeed the correct view." My dissent was
anchored on the landmark 1909 case of Carino 2 through the 1925 case
of Susi 3 and the long line of cases cited therein to the latest 1980 case
of Herico 4 that "it is established doctrine....... that an open, continuous,
adverse and public possession of a land of the public domain for the period
provided in the Public Land Act provision in force at the time (from July 26,
1894 in Susi under the old law [this period was reduced to 'at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title' by
amendment of Commonwealth Act No. 141, equivalent to the period of
acquisitive prescription 5 ]) by a private individual personally and through his
predecessors confers an effective title on said possessor, whereby the land
ceases to be land of the public domain and becomes private property." I hereby
reproduce the same by reference for brevity's sake. But since we are reverting
to the old above-cited established doctrine and precedents and discarding
the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristocases which departed therefrom in the recent
past, I feel constrained to write this concurrence in amplification of my views
and ratio decidendi.
Under the express text and mandate of the cited Act, such possessors "shall
be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter. "
The Court thus held in Susi that under the presumption juris et de jure
established in the Act, the rightful possessor of the public land for the statutory
period "already acquired, by operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but
a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title should
be issued an order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an
application therefore is sufficient . . . . If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi
had acquiredthe land in question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased
to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by
presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands [and
beyond his authority to sell to any other person]. " 6
The root of the doctrine goes back to the pronouncement of Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes for the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1909 case of Carino (the
Igorot chief who would have been deprived of ancestral family lands by the
dismissal of his application for registration) which reversed the dismissal of the
registration court (as affirmed by the Supreme Court) and adopted the liberal
view that under the decree and regulations of June 25, 1880, "The words 'may
prove' (acrediten), as well, or better, in view of the other provisions, might be
taken to mean when called upon to do so in any litigation. There are indications
that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for
want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the
proof, whenever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as
already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law."
The Court's decision at bar now expressly overturns the Meralco and related
cases subsequent thereto which failed to adhere to the aforecited established
doctrine dating back to 1909 and was consistently applied up to June 29, 1982
(when the Meralco decision was promulgated). We reaffirm the established
doctrine that such acquisitive prescription of alienable public lands takes place
ipso jure or by operation of law without the necessity of a prior issuance of a
certificate of title. The land ipso jure ceases to be of the public domain and
becomes private property, which may be lawfully sold to and acquired by
qualified corporations such as respondent corporation. (As stressed in Herico
supra, "the application for confirmation is a mere formality, the lack of which
does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title.")
Such ipso jure conversion into private property of public lands publicly held
under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership is the public policy of the
Act and is so expressly stated therein. By virtue of such conversion into private
property, qualified corporations may lawfully acquire them and there is no
"alteration or defeating" of the 1973 Constitution's prohibition against
corporations holding or acquiring title to lands of the public domain, as claimed
in the dissenting opinion, for the simple reason that no public lands are
involved.
It should be noted that respondent corporation purchased the land from the
Infiels on October 16, 1962 under the aegis of the 1935 Constitution which
contained no prohibition against corporations holding public lands (except a

limit of 1,024 hectares) unlike the later 1973 Constitution which imposed an
absolute prohibition. Even on the erroneous assumption that the land
remained public land despite the Infiels' open possession thereof as owners
from time immemorial, respondent corporation's lawful purchase from them of
the land in 1962 and P 45million investments redounding presumably to the
welfare and progress of the community, particularly the municipality of
Maconacon, Isabela to which it donated part of the land for the townsite
created a vested right which could not be impaired by the prohibition adopted
eleven years later. But as sufficiently stressed, the land of the Infiels had
been ipso jure converted into private land and they had a legally sufficient and
transferable title conferred by the conclusive presumption of the Public Land
Act (which needed only to be established in confirmation of title proceedings
for formalization and issuance of the certificate of title) which they lawfully and
validly transferred to respondent corporation.
33
already private lands because of acquisitive prescription by the corporation's
predecessors and the realistic solution would be to consider the application for
confirmation as filed by the natural persons-transferors, and in accordance with
the evidence, confirm their title to the private lands so converted by operation of
law and lawfully transferred by them to the corporation. The law, after all,
recognizes the validity of the transfer and sale of the private land to the
corporation. It should not be necessary to go in a round-about way and have
the corporation reassign its rights to the private land to natural persons-(as I
understand), was done after the decision in the Meralco and Iglesia ni
Cristo cases) just for the purpose of complying on paper with the technicality of
having natural persons file the application for confirmation of title to
the private land.

In fact, the many amendments to the Act extending the period for the filing of
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
such applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect and incomplete titles to
alienable and disposable public lands expressly reiterate that it has always
been the "policy of the State to hasten the settlement, adjudication and Section 48 of the Public Land Act, in part, provides:
quieting of titles to [such] unregistered lands," i.e. to recognize that such lands
publicly and notoriously occupied and cultivated under bona fide claim of
SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of
acquisition or ownership have ipso jure been converted into private property
the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but
and grant the possessors the opportunity to establish and record such fact.
whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of
Thus, the deadline for the filing of such application which would have
First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
originally expired first on December 31, 1938 was successively extended to
claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
December 31, 1941, then extended to December 31, 1957, then to December
Registration Act, to wit:
31, 1968, further extended to December 31, 1976 and lastly extended to
December 31, 1987. 7
(a) ...
The cited Act's provision that only natural persons may apply thereunder for
confirmation of title is in effect a technicality of procedure and not of (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have
substance. My submittal in Meralco, mutatis mutandis, is properly applicable: been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
"The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by considering the of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition
applications for confirmation as amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
filed in the names of the original persons who as natural persons are duly application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force
qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the title that they had acquired by majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed are the
conclusive presumption and mandate of the Public Land Act and who conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate
thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations (both admittedly Filipino of title under the provisions of this chapter.
corporations duly qualified to hold and own private lands) and granting the
applications for confirmation of title to the private lands so acquired and sold
(c) ...
or exchanged." 8 Indeed, then Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando likewise
dissented along the same line from the majority ruling therein and held: "I
dissent insofar as the opinion of the Court would characterize such Article XIV, Section 11, of the 1973 Constitution, in part, provides:
jurisdictional defect that the applicant was Meralco, a juridical person rather
than the natural persons-transferors, under the particular circumstances of
SEC. 11. .... No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of
this case, as an insurmountable obstacle to the relief sought. I would apply by
the public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area;
analogy, although the facts could be distinguished, the approach followed by
nor may any citizen hold such lands by lease in excess of five hundred
us in Francisco v. City of Davao, where the legal question raised, instead of
hectares ....
being deferred and possibly taken up in another case, was resolved. By legal
fiction and in the exercise of our equitable jurisdiction, I feel that the realistic
solution would be to decide the matter as if the application under Section 48(b) It has to be conceded that, literally, statutory law and constitutional provision
were filed by the Piguing spouses, who I assume suffer from no such prevent a corporation from directly applying to the Courts for the issuance of
disability." 9 Justice Vicente Abad Santos, now retired, while concurring in the Original Certificates of Title to lands of the public domain (Manila Electric
procedural result, likewise, in effect dissented from the therein majority ruling Company vs. Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799; Republic vs. Villanueva, 114
on the question of substance, and stated his opinion that "the lots which are SCRA 875; Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 119 SCRA 449; Iglesia ni Cristo vs.
sought to be registered have ceased to be lands of the public domain at the Hon. Judge, CFI of Nueva Ecija, Br. 1). It is my opinion that the literalism should
time they were acquired by the petitioner corporation. They are already be adhered to in this case.
private lands because of acquisitive prescription by the predecessors of the
petitioner and all that is needed is the confirmation of the title. Accordingly, the
The reasoning of the majority can be restated in simple terms as follows:
constitutional provision that no private corporation or association may hold
alienable lands of the public domain is inapplicable. " 10
(a) The INFIELS can successfully file an application for a certificate of title over
the land involved in the case.
To my mind, the reason why the Act limits the filing of such applications to
natural citizens who may prove their undisputed and open possession of
public lands for the required statutory thirty-year period, tacking on their (b) After the INFIELS secure a certificate of title, they can sell the land to
predecessors'-in-interest possession is that only natural persons, to the ACME.
exclusion of juridical persons such as corporations, can actually, physically
and in reality possess public lands for the required statutory 30-year period.
(c) As ACME can eventually own the certificate of title, it should be allowed to
That juridical persons or corporations cannot do so is obvious. But when the
directly apply to the Courts for the Certificate of Title, thus avoiding the
natural persons have fulfilled the required statutory period of possession, the
circuituous "literal" requirement that the INFIELS should first apply to the courts
Act confers on them a legally sufficient and transferable title. It is preferable to
for the titles, and afterwards transfer the title to ACME.
follow the letter of the law that they file the applications for confirmation of
their title, although they have lawfully transferred their title to the land. But
such procedural failure cannot and should not defeat the substance of the law, The majority opinion, in effect, adopted the following excerpt from a dissent
as stressed in the above-cited opinions, that the lands are in Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome (114 SCRA 799, 823 [1982]).

To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the
technicality that the Public Land Act allows only citizens of the Philippines who
are natural persons to apply for confirmation of their title would be impractical
and would just give rise to multiplicity of court actions. Assuming that there
was a technical error in not having filed the application for registration in the
name of the Piguing spouses as the original owners and vendors,
still it is conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of the land to
the applicant Meralco
and neither is there any prohibition against the application being refiled with
retroactive effect in the name of the original owners and vendors (as such
natural persons) with the end result of their application being granted,
because of their indisputable acquisition of ownership by operation of law and
the conclusive presumption therein provided in their favor.
It should not be necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost of
refiling of all such applications in their names and adding to the overcrowded
court dockets when the Court can after all these years dispose of it here and
now." (Paragraphing supplied)
The effect is that the majority opinion now nullifies the statutory provision that
only citizens (natural persons) can apply for certificates of title under Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act, as well as the constitutional provision (Article XIV,
Section 11) which prohibits corporations from acquiring title to lands of the
public domain. That interpretation or construction adopted by the majority
cannot be justified. "A construction adopted should not be such as to nullify,
destroy or defeat the intention of the legislature" (New York State Dept. of
Social Services v. Dublino [UST 37 L. Ed 2d 688, 93 S Ct 2507; United States
v. Alpers 338 US 680, 94 L Ed 457, 70 S Ct 352; cited in 73 Am Jur. 2nd., p.
351).
It has also been said that:
In the construction of statutes, the courts start with the assumption that the
legislature intended to enact an effective law, and the legislature is not to be
presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute. Hence, it is
a general principle that the courts should, if reasonably possible to do so
interpret the statute, or the provision being construed, so as to give it efficient
operation and effect as a whole. An interpretation should, if possible, be
avoided, under which the statute or provision being construed is defeated, or
as otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed,
explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative, or
nugatory. If a statute is fairly susceptible of two constructions, one of which
will give effect to the act, while the other will defeat it, the former construction
is preferred. One part of a statute may not be construed so as to render
another part nugatory or of no effect. Moreover, notwithstanding the general
rule against the enlargement of extension of a statute by construction, the
meaning of a statute may be extended beyond the precise words used in the
law, and words or phrases may be altered or supplied, where this is
necessary to prevent a law from becoming a nullity. Wherever the provision of
a statute is general everything which is necessary to make such provision
effectual is supplied by implication. (Pliakos vs. Illinois Liquor Control Com. 11
III 2d 456, 143 NE2d 47; cited in 73 AM Jur. 2d pp. 422-423)
The statutory provision and the constitutional prohibition express a public
policy. The proper course for the Court to take is to promote in the fullest
manner the policy thus laid down and to avoid a construction which would
alter or defeat that policy.
In fine, I confirm my adherence to the ruling of this Court in Meralco vs.
Hon. Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799 [1982] and related cases.
Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
34
I reiterate my concurrence in Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome, and, therefore,
dissent here.
TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:
I am honored by my brethren's judgment at bar that my dissenting opinion in
the June, 1982 Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases, 1 which is herein upheld,
"expressed what is the better. . . . and indeed the correct view." My dissent was
anchored on the landmark 1909 case of Carino 2 through the 1925 case
of Susi 3 and the long line of cases cited therein to the latest 1980 case
of Herico 4 that "it is established doctrine....... that an open, continuous,
adverse and public possession of a land of the public domain for the period
provided in the Public Land Act provision in force at the time (from July 26,
1894 in Susi under the old law [this period was reduced to 'at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title' by
amendment of Commonwealth Act No. 141, equivalent to the period of
acquisitive prescription 5 ]) by a private individual personally and through his
predecessors confers an effective title on said possessor, whereby the land
ceases to be land of the public domain and becomes private property." I hereby
reproduce the same by reference for brevity's sake. But since we are reverting
to the old above-cited established doctrine and precedents and discarding
the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristocases which departed therefrom in the recent
past, I feel constrained to write this concurrence in amplification of my views
and ratio decidendi.
Under the express text and mandate of the cited Act, such possessors "shall
be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter. "
The Court thus held in Susi that under the presumption juris et de jure
established in the Act, the rightful possessor of the public land for the statutory
period "already acquired, by operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but
a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title should
be issued an order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an
application therefore is sufficient . . . . If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi
had acquiredthe land in question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased
to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by
presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands [and
beyond his authority to sell to any other person]. " 6
The root of the doctrine goes back to the pronouncement of Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes for the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1909 case of Carino (the
Igorot chief who would have been deprived of ancestral family lands by the
dismissal of his application for registration) which reversed the dismissal of the
registration court (as affirmed by the Supreme Court) and adopted the liberal
view that under the decree and regulations of June 25, 1880, "The words 'may
prove' (acrediten), as well, or better, in view of the other provisions, might be
taken to mean when called upon to do so in any litigation. There are indications
that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for
want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the
proof, whenever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as
already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law."
The Court's decision at bar now expressly overturns the Meralco and related
cases subsequent thereto which failed to adhere to the aforecited established
doctrine dating back to 1909 and was consistently applied up to June 29, 1982
(when the Meralco decision was promulgated).<äre||anº•1àw> We reaffirm the
established doctrine that such acquisitive prescription of alienable public lands
takes place ipso jure or by operation of law without the necessity of a prior
issuance of a certificate of title. The land ipso jure ceases to be of the public
domain and becomes private property, which may be lawfully sold to and
acquired by qualified corporations such as respondent corporation. (As
stressed in Herico supra, "the application for confirmation is a mere
formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title.")
Such ipso jure conversion into private property of public lands publicly held
under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership is the public policy of the
Act and is so expressly stated therein. By virtue of such conversion into private
property, qualified corporations may lawfully acquire them and there is no
 35
"alteration or defeating" of the 1973 Constitution's prohibition against exclusion of juridical persons such as corporations, can actually, physically and
corporations holding or acquiring title to lands of the public domain, as in reality possess public lands for the required statutory 30-year period. That
claimed in the dissenting opinion, for the simple reason that no public lands juridical persons or corporations cannot do so is obvious. But when the natural
are involved. persons have fulfilled the required statutory period of possession, the Act
confers on them a legally sufficient and transferable title. It is preferable to
follow the letter of the law that they file the applications for confirmation of their
It should be noted that respondent corporation purchased the land from the
title, although they have lawfully transferred their title to the land. But
Infiels on October 16, 1962 under the aegis of the 1935 Constitution which
such procedural failure cannot and should not defeat the substance of the law,
contained no prohibition against corporations holding public lands (except a
as stressed in the above-cited opinions, that the lands are already private lands
limit of 1,024 hectares) unlike the later 1973 Constitution which imposed an
because of acquisitive prescription by the corporation's predecessors and the
absolute prohibition. Even on the erroneous assumption that the land
realistic solution would be to consider the application for confirmation as filed
remained public land despite the Infiels' open possession thereof as owners
by the natural persons-transferors, and in accordance with the evidence,
from time immemorial, respondent corporation's lawful purchase from them of
confirm their title to the private lands so converted by operation of law and
the land in 1962 and P 45million investments redounding presumably to the
lawfully transferred by them to the corporation. The law, after all, recognizes
welfare and progress of the community, particularly the municipality of
the validity of the transfer and sale of the private land to the corporation. It
Maconacon, Isabela to which it donated part of the land for the townsite
should not be necessary to go in a round-about way and have the corporation
created a vested right which could not be impaired by the prohibition adopted
reassign its rights to the private land to natural persons-(as I understand), was
eleven years later. But as sufficiently stressed, the land of the Infiels had
done after the decision in the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases) just for the
been ipso jure converted into private land and they had a legally sufficient and
purpose of complying on paper with the technicality of having natural persons
transferable title conferred by the conclusive presumption of the Public Land
file the application for confirmation of title to the private land.
Act (which needed only to be established in confirmation of title proceedings
for formalization and issuance of the certificate of title) which they lawfully and
validly transferred to respondent corporation.

In fact, the many amendments to the Act extending the period for the filing of
such applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect and incomplete titles to
alienable and disposable public lands expressly reiterate that it has always
been the "policy of the State to hasten the settlement, adjudication and
quieting of titles to [such] unregistered lands," i.e. to recognize that such lands
publicly and notoriously occupied and cultivated under bona fide claim of
acquisition or ownership have ipso jure been converted into private property
and grant the possessors the opportunity to establish and record such fact.
Thus, the deadline for the filing of such application which would have
originally expired first on December 31, 1938 was successively extended to
December 31, 1941, then extended to December 31, 1957, then to December
31, 1968, further extended to December 31, 1976 and lastly extended to
December 31, 1987. 7
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
Section 48 of the Public Land Act, in part, provides:
SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of
the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but
whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of
First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
(a) ...

The cited Act's provision that only natural persons may apply thereunder for
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have
confirmation of title is in effect a technicality of procedure and not of
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
substance. My submittal in Meralco, mutatis mutandis, is properly applicable:
of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition
"The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by considering the
of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
applications for confirmation as amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as
application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force
filed in the names of the original persons who as natural persons are duly
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed are the
qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the title that they had acquired by
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate
conclusive presumption and mandate of the Public Land Act and who
of title under the provisions of this chapter.
thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations (both admittedly Filipino
corporations duly qualified to hold and own private lands) and granting the
applications for confirmation of title to the private lands so acquired and sold (c) ...
or exchanged." 8 Indeed, then Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando likewise
dissented along the same line from the majority ruling therein and held: "I
Article XIV, Section 11, of the 1973 Constitution, in part, provides:
dissent insofar as the opinion of the Court would characterize such
jurisdictional defect that the applicant was Meralco, a juridical person rather
than the natural persons-transferors, under the particular circumstances of SEC. 11. .... No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of
this case, as an insurmountable obstacle to the relief sought. I would apply by the public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area;
analogy, although the facts could be distinguished, the approach followed by nor may any citizen hold such lands by lease in excess of five hundred
us in Francisco v. City of Davao, where the legal question raised, instead of hectares ....
being deferred and possibly taken up in another case, was resolved. By legal
fiction and in the exercise of our equitable jurisdiction, I feel that the realistic
It has to be conceded that, literally, statutory law and constitutional provision
solution would be to decide the matter as if the application under Section 48(b)
prevent a corporation from directly applying to the Courts for the issuance of
were filed by the Piguing spouses, who I assume suffer from no such
Original Certificates of Title to lands of the public domain (Manila Electric
disability." 9 Justice Vicente Abad Santos, now retired, while concurring in the
Company vs. Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799; Republic vs. Villanueva, 114
procedural result, likewise, in effect dissented from the therein majority ruling
SCRA 875; Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 119 SCRA 449; Iglesia ni Cristo vs.
on the question of substance, and stated his opinion that "the lots which are
Hon. Judge, CFI of Nueva Ecija, Br. 1). It is my opinion that the literalism should
sought to be registered have ceased to be lands of the public domain at the
be adhered to in this case.
time they were acquired by the petitioner corporation. They are already
private lands because of acquisitive prescription by the predecessors of the
petitioner and all that is needed is the confirmation of the title. Accordingly, the The reasoning of the majority can be restated in simple terms as follows:
constitutional provision that no private corporation or association may hold
alienable lands of the public domain is inapplicable. " 10
(a) The INFIELS can successfully file an application for a certificate of title over
the land involved in the case.
To my mind, the reason why the Act limits the filing of such applications to
natural citizens who may prove their undisputed and open possession of
(b) After the INFIELS secure a certificate of title, they can sell the land to
public lands for the required statutory thirty-year period, tacking on their
ACME.
predecessors'-in-interest possession is that only natural persons, to the

(c) As ACME can eventually own the certificate of title, it should be allowed to
directly apply to the Courts for the Certificate of Title, thus avoiding the
circuituous "literal" requirement that the INFIELS should first apply to the
courts for the titles, and afterwards transfer the title to ACME.
The majority opinion, in effect, adopted the following excerpt from a dissent
in Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome (114 SCRA 799, 823
[1982]).
To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the
technicality that the Public Land Act allows only citizens of the Philippines who
are natural persons to apply for confirmation of their title would be impractical
and would just give rise to multiplicity of court actions. Assuming that there
was a technical error in not having filed the application for registration in the
name of the Piguing spouses as the original owners and vendors,
still it is conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of the land to
the applicant Meralco
and neither is there any prohibition against the application being refiled with
retroactive effect in the name of the original owners and vendors (as such
natural persons) with the end result of their application being granted,
because of their indisputable acquisition of ownership by operation of law and
the conclusive presumption therein provided in their favor.
It should not be necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost of
refiling of all such applications in their names and adding to the overcrowded
court dockets when the Court can after all these years dispose of it here and
now." (Emphasis supplied)
The effect is that the majority opinion now nullifies the statutory provision that
only citizens (natural persons) can apply for certificates of title under Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act, as well as the constitutional provision (Article XIV,
Section 11) which prohibits corporations from acquiring title to lands of the
public domain. That interpretation or construction adopted by the majority
cannot be justified. "A construction adopted should not be such as to nullify,
destroy or defeat the intention of the legislature" (New York State Dept. of
Social Services v. Dublino [UST 37 L. Ed 2d 688, 93 S Ct 2507; United States
v. Alpers 338 US 680, 94 L Ed 457, 70 S Ct 352; cited in 73 Am Jur. 2nd., p.
351).
It has also been said that:
In the construction of statutes, the courts start with the assumption that the
legislature intended to enact an effective law, and the legislature is not to be
presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute. Hence, it is
a general principle that the courts should, if reasonably possible to do so
interpret the statute, or the provision being construed, so as to give it efficient
operation and effect as a whole. An interpretation should, if possible, be
avoided, under which the statute or provision being construed is defeated, or
as otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed,
explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative, or
nugatory. If a statute is fairly susceptible of two constructions, one of which
will give effect to the act, while the other will defeat it, the former construction
is preferred. One part of a statute may not be construed so as to render
another part nugatory or of no effect. Moreover, notwithstanding the general
rule against the enlargement of extension of a statute by construction, the
meaning of a statute may be extended beyond the precise words used in the
law, and words or phrases may be altered or supplied, where this is
necessary to prevent a law from becoming a nullity. Wherever the provision of
a statute is general everything which is necessary to make such provision
effectual is supplied by implication. (Pliakos vs. Illinois Liquor Control Com. 11
III 2d 456, 143 NE2d 47; cited in 73 AM Jur. 2d pp. 422-423)
The statutory provision and the constitutional prohibition express a public
policy. The proper course for the Court to take is to promote in the fullest
manner the policy thus laid down and to avoid a construction which would
alter or defeat that policy.
In fine, I confirm my adherence to the ruling of this Court in Meralco vs.
Hon. Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799 [1982] and related cases.
36
Footnotes
G.R. No. L-46145 November 26, 1986
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (BUREAU OF LANDS), petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF DOMINGO P. BALOY,
represented by RICARDO BALOY, ET AL., respondents.
Pelaez, Jalondoni, Adriano and Associates for respondents.
PARAS, J.:p
This case originally emanated from a decision of the then Court of First
Instance of Zambales in LRC Case No. 11-0, LRC Record No. N-29355,
denying respondents' application for registration. From said order of denial the
applicants, heirs of Domingo Baloy, represented by Ricardo P. Baloy, (herein
private respondents) interposed on appeal to the Court of Appeals which was
docketed as CA-G.R. No. 52039-R. The appellate court, thru its Fifth Division
with the Hon. Justice Magno Gatmaitan as ponente, rendered a decision dated
February 3, 1977 reversing the decision appealed from and thus approving the
application for registration. Oppositors (petitioners herein) filed their Motion for
Reconsideration alleging among other things that applicants' possessory
information title can no longer be invoked and that they were not able to prove a
registerable title over the land. Said Motion for Reconsideration was denied,
hence this petition for review on certiorari.
Applicants' claim is anchored on their possessory information title (Exhibit F
which had been translated in Exhibit F-1) coupled with their continuous,
adverse and public possession over the land in question. An examination of the
possessory information title shows that the description and the area of the land
stated therein substantially coincides with the land applied for and that said
possessory information title had been regularly issued having been acquired by
applicants' predecessor, Domingo Baloy, under the provisions of the Spanish
Mortgage Law. Applicants presented their tax declaration on said lands on April
8, 1965.
The Director of Lands opposed the registration alleging that this land had
become public land thru the operation of Act 627 of the Philippine Commission.
On November 26, 1902 pursuant to the executive order of the President of the
U.S., the area was declared within the U.S. Naval Reservation. Under Act 627
as amended by Act 1138, a period was fixed within which persons affected
thereby could file their application, (that is within 6 months from July 8, 1905)
otherwise "the said lands or interest therein will be conclusively adjudged to be
public lands and all claims on the part of private individuals for such lands or
interests therein not to presented will be forever barred." Petitioner argues that
since Domingo Baloy failed to file his claim within the prescribed period, the
land had become irrevocably public and could not be the subject of a valid
registration for private ownership.
Considering the foregoing facts respondents Court of Appeals ruled as follows:
... perhaps, the consequence was that upon failure of Domingo Baloy to have
filed his application within that period the land had become irrevocably public;
but perhaps also, for the reason that warning was from the Clerk of the Court of
Land Registration, named J.R. Wilson and there has not been presented a
formal order or decision of the said Court of Land Registration so declaring the
land public because of that failure, it can with plausibility be said that after all,
there was no judicial declaration to that effect, it is true that the U.S. Navy did
occupy it apparently for some time, as a recreation area, as this Court
understands from the communication of the Department of Foreign Affairs to
the U.S. Embassy exhibited in the record, but the very tenor of the
communication apparently seeks to justify the title of herein applicants, in other
words, what this Court has taken from the occupation by the U.S. Navy is that
during the interim, the title of applicants was in a state of suspended animation
so to speak but it had not died either; and the fact being that this land was really
originally private from and after the issuance and inscription of the possessory
information Exh. F during the Spanish times, it would be most difficult to sustain
position of Director of Lands that it was land of no private owner; open to public

disposition, and over which he has control; and since immediately after U.S.
Navy had abandoned the area, applicant came in and asserted title once
again, only to be troubled by first Crispiniano Blanco who however in due time,
quitclaimed in favor of applicants, and then by private oppositors now,
apparently originally tenants of Blanco, but that entry of private oppositors
sought to be given color of ownership when they sought to and did file tax
declaration in 1965, should not prejudice the original rights of applicants thru
their possessory information secured regularly so long ago, the conclusion
must have to be that after all, applicants had succeeded in bringing
themselves within the provisions of Sec. 19 of Act 496, the land should be
registered in their favor;
IN VIEW WHEREOF, this Court is constrained to reverse, as it now reverses,
judgment appealed from the application is approved, and once this decision
shall have become final, if ever it would be, let decree issue in favor of
applicants with the personal circumstances outlined in the application, costs
against private oppositors.
Petitioner now comes to Us with the following:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS:
1. Respondent court erred in holding that to bar private respondents from
asserting any right under their possessory information title there is need for a
court order to that effect.
2. Respondent court erred in not holding that private respondents' rights by
virtue of their possessory information title was lost by prescription.
3. Respondent court erred in concluding that applicants have registerable title.
A cursory reading of Sec. 3, Act 627 reveals that several steps are to be
followed before any affected land can "be conclusively adjudged to be public
land." Sec. 3, Act 627 reads as follows:
SEC. 3. Immediately upon receipt of the notice from the civil Governor in the
preceeding section mentioned it shall be the duty of the judge of the Court of
Land Registration to issue a notice, stating that the lands within the limits
aforesaid have been reserved for military purposes, and announced and
declared to be military reservations, and that claims for all private lands,
buildings, and interests therein, within the limits aforesaid, must be presented
for registration under the Land Registration Act within six calendar months
from the date of issuing the notice, and that all lands, buildings, and interests
therein within the limits aforesaid not so presented within the time therein
limited will be conclusively adjudged to be public lands and all claims on the
part of private individuals for such lands, buildings, or an interest therein not
so presented will be forever barred. The clerk of the Court of Land
Registration shall immediately upon the issuing of such notice by the judge
cause the same to be published once a week for three successive weeks in
two newspapers, one of which newspapers shall be in the English Language,
and one in the Spanish language in the city or province where the land lies, if
there be no such Spanish or English newspapers having a general circulation
in the city or province wherein the land lies, then it shall be a sufficient
compliance with this section if the notice be published as herein provided, in a
daily newspaper in the Spanish language and one in the English language, in
the City of Manila, having a general circulation. The clerk shall also cause a
duly attested copy of the notice in the Spanish language to be posted in
conspicuous place at each angle formed by the lines of the limits of the land
reserved. The clerk shall also issue and cause to be personally served the
notice in the Spanish language upon every person living upon or in visible
possession of any part of the military reservation. If the person in possession
is the head of the family living upon the hand, it shall be sufficient to serve the
notice upon him, and if he is absent it shall be sufficient to leave a copy at his
usual place of residence. The clerk shall certify the manner in which the
notices have been published, posted, and served, and his certificate shall be
conclusive proof of such publication, posting, and service, but the court shall
have the power to cause such further notice to be given as in its opinion may
be necessary.
Clearly under said provisions, private land could be deemed to have become
public land only by virtue of a judicial declaration after due notice and hearing.
It runs contrary therefore to the contention of petitioners that failure to present
37
claims set forth under Sec. 2 of Act 627 made the land ipso facto public without
any deed of judicial pronouncement. Petitioner in making such declaration
relied on Sec. 4 of Act 627 alone. But in construing a statute the entire
provisions of the law must be considered in order to establish the correct
interpretation as intended by the law-making body. Act 627 by its terms is not
self-executory and requires implementation by the Court of Land Registration.
Act 627, to the extent that it creates a forfeiture, is a penal statute in derogation
of private rights, so it must be strictly construed so as to safeguard private
respondents' rights. Significantly, petitioner does not even allege the existence
of any judgment of the Land Registration court with respect to the land in
question. Without a judgment or order declaring the land to be public, its private
character and the possessory information title over it must be respected. Since
no such order has been rendered by the Land Registration Court it necessarily
follows that it never became public land thru the operation of Act 627. To
assume otherwise is to deprive private respondents of their property without
due process of law. In fact it can be presumed that the notice required by law to
be given by publication and by personal service did not include the name of
Domingo Baloy and the subject land, and hence he and his lane were never
brought within the operation of Act 627 as amended. The procedure laid down
in Sec. 3 is a requirement of due process. "Due process requires that the
statutes which under it is attempted to deprive a citizen of private property
without or against his consent must, as in expropriation cases, be strictly
complied with, because such statutes are in derogation of general rights."
(Arriete vs. Director of Public Works, 58 Phil. 507, 508, 511).
We also find with favor private respondents' views that court judgments are not
to be presumed. It would be absurd to speak of a judgment by presumption. If it
could be contended that such a judgment may be presumed, it could equally be
contended that applicants' predecessor Domingo Baloy presumably
seasonably filed a claim, in accordance with the legal presumption that a
person takes ordinary care of his concerns, and that a judgment in his favor
was rendered.
The finding of respondent court that during the interim of 57 years from
November 26, 1902 to December 17, 1959 (when the U.S. Navy possessed the
area) the possessory rights of Baloy or heirs were merely suspended and not
lost by prescription, is supported by Exhibit "U," a communication or letter No.
1108-63, dated June 24, 1963, which contains an official statement of the
position of the Republic of the Philippines with regard to the status of the land in
question. Said letter recognizes the fact that Domingo Baloy and/or his heirs
have been in continuous possession of said land since 1894 as attested by an
"Informacion Possessoria" Title, which was granted by the Spanish
Government. Hence, the disputed property is private land and this possession
was interrupted only by the occupation of the land by the U.S. Navy in 1945 for
recreational purposes. The U.S. Navy eventually abandoned the premises. The
heirs of the late Domingo P. Baloy, are now in actual possession, and this has
been so since the abandonment by the U.S. Navy. A new recreation area is
now being used by the U.S. Navy personnel and this place is remote from the
land in question.
Clearly, the occupancy of the U.S. Navy was not in the concept of owner. It
partakes of the character of a commodatum. It cannot therefore militate against
the title of Domingo Baloy and his successors-in-interest. One's ownership of a
thing may be lost by prescription by reason of another's possession if such
possession be under claim of ownership, not where the possession is only
intended to be transient, as in the case of the U.S. Navy's occupation of the
land concerned, in which case the owner is not divested of his title, although it
cannot be exercised in the meantime.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding no merit in the petition the
appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-19535 July 10, 1967
HEIRS OF PELAGIO ZARA; PIO, CLEMENTE, SERAFIA, PORFIRIO and
ESTEBAN, all surnamed MINDANAO; MARIA and GLICERIA, both
surnamed SEDARIA; DULCE CORDERO, VICTORIA DE LOS REYES and
JOSE GARCIA, applicants-appellants,
vs.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, Government
oppositor-appellees.

VICENTE V. DE VILLA, JR., and VICENTE S. DE VILLA, SR.,
private oppositors-appellees.
Jose L. Matias and H. A. Jambora for applicants-appellants.
Francisco Villanueva, Jr. and Gregorio L. Oquitania for private
oppositors-appellees.
Manuel Reyes Castro for oppositor-appellee Director of Forestry.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Batangas (Lipa City)
dismissing appellants' "application for registration of the parcel of land
consisting of 107 hectares, more or less, situated in the barrio of Sampiro,
Municipality of San Juan, Province of Batangas, and designated in amended
plan PSU-103696 as Lot A."
The proceedings in the court a quo are not disputed.
On August 4, 1960 appellants filed an application for registration of the land
above described pursuant to the provisions of Act 496. They alleged that the
land had been inherited by them from their grandfather, Pelagio Zara, who in
turn acquired the same under a Spanish grant known as "Composicion de
Terrenos Realengos" issued in 1888. Alternatively, should the provisions of
the Land Registration Act be not applicable, applicants invoke the benefits of
the provisions of Chapter VIII, Section 48, subsection (b) of C.A. 141 as
amended, on the ground that they and their predecessor-in-interest had been
in continuous and adverse possession of the land in concept of owner for
more than 30 years immediately preceding the application.
Oppositions were filed by the Director of Lands, the Director of Forestry and
by Vicente V. de Villa, Jr. The latter's opposition recites:
x x x that the parcel of land sought to be registered by the applicants
consisting of 107 hectares, more or less, was included in the area of the
parcel of land applied for registration by Vicente S. de Villa, Sr. in Civil Case
No. 26, L.R. Case No. 601 in this Court, which was decided by this same
Court through the then incumbent Judge, the Honorable Juan P. Enriquez, on
September 30, 1949; that the parcel sought to be registered by the applicants
was declared public land in said decision; that they (the oppositors Vicente V.
de Villa, Jr. and Vicente S. de Villa, Sr.) have an interest over the land in
question because for a period more than sixty (60) years, the de Villas have
been in possession, and which possession, according to them, was open
continuous, notorious and under the claim of ownership; that the proceeding
being in rem, the failure of the applicants to appear at the case No. 26, L.R.
Case No. 601 to prove their imperfect and incomplete title over the property,
barred them from raising the same issue in another case; and that as far as
the decision in Civil Case No. 26, L.R. Case No. 601 which was affirmed in the
appellate court in CA-G.R. No. 5847-R is concerned, there is already
"res-adjudicata" — in other words, the cause of action of the applicant is now
barred by prior judgment; and that this Court has no more jurisdiction over the
subject matter, the decision of the Court in said case having transferred to the
Director of Lands.
On November 15, 1960 the De Villas (De Villa, Sr. was subsequently included
as oppositor) filed a motion to dismiss, invoking the same grounds alleged in
its opposition, but principally the fact that the land applied for had already
been declared public land by the judgment in the former registration case.
The trial court, over the objection of the applicants, granted the motion to
dismiss by order dated January 27, 1961, holding, inter alia, that "once a
parcel of land is declared or adjudged public land by the court having
jurisdiction x x x it cannot be the subject anymore of another land registration
proceeding x x x (that) it is only the Director of Lands who can dispose of the
same by sale, by lease, by free patent or by homestead."
In the present appeal from the order of dismissal neither the Director of Lands
nor the Director of Forestry filed a brief as appellee. The decisive issue posed
by applicants-appellants is whether the 1949 judgment in the previous case,
denying the application of Vicente S. de Villa, Sr., and declaring the 107
hectares in question to be public land, precludes a subsequent application by
an alleged possessor for judicial confirmation of title on the basis of
38
continuous possession for at least thirty years, pursuant to Section 48,
subsection (b) of the Public Land Law, C.A. 141, as amended. This provision
reads as follows:
The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the
public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but
whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of
First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition
of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate
of title under the provisions of this Chapter.1äwphï1.ñët
The right to file an application under the foregoing provision has been extended
by Republic Act No. 2061 to December 31, 1968.
It should be noted that appellants' application is in the alternative: for
registration of their title of ownership under Act 496 or for judicial confirmation
of their "imperfect" title or claim based on adverse and continuous possession
for at least thirty years. It may be that although they were not actual parties in
that previous case the judgment therein is a bar to their claim as owners under
the first alternative, since the proceeding was in rem, of which they and their
predecessor had constructive notice by publication. Even so this is a defense
that properly pertains to the Government, in view of the fact that the judgment
declared the land in question to be public land. In any case, appellants'
imperfect possessory title was not disturbed or foreclosed by such declaration,
for precisely the proceeding contemplated in the aforecited provision of
Commonwealth Act 141 presupposes that the land is public. The basis of the
decree of judicial confirmation authorized therein is not that the land is already
privately owned and hence no longer part of the public domain, but rather that
by reason of the claimant's possession for thirty years he is conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government
grant.
On the question of whether or not the private oppositors-appellees have the
necessary personality to file an opposition, we find in their favor, considering
that they also claim to be in possession of the land, and have furthermore
applied for its purchase from the Bureau of Lands.1äwphï1.ñët
Wherefore, the order appealed from is set aside and the case is remanded to
the Court a quo for trial and judgment on the merits, with costs against the
private oppositors-appellees.
Reyes, J.B.L., Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ.,
concur.
Concepcion, C.J. and Dizon, J., took no part.
G.R. No. 181502 February 2, 2010
FLORENCIA G. DIAZ, Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC of the PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
This is a letter-motion praying for reconsideration (for the third time) of the June
16, 2008 resolution of this Court denying the petition for review filed by
petitioner Florencia G. Diaz.

Petitioner’s late mother, Flora Garcia (Garcia), filed an application for
registration of a vast tract of land1 located in Laur, Nueva Ecija and Palayan
City in the then Court of First Instance (CFI), Branch 1, Nueva Ecija on August
12, 1976.2 She alleged that she possessed the land as owner and worked,
developed and harvested the agricultural products and benefits of the same
continuously, publicly and adversely for more or less 26 years.
39
On April 16, 2007, the CA issued an amended resolution (amended
resolution)13 annulling the compromise agreement entered into between the
parties. The relevant part of the dispositive portion of the resolution read:
ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolves to:

(1) x x x x x x
The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), opposed the application because the land in question was
within the Fort Magsaysay Military Reservation (FMMR), established by virtue (2) x x x x x x
of Proclamation No. 237 (Proclamation 237)3 in 1955. Thus, it was inalienable
as it formed part of the public domain.
(3) x x x x x x

Significantly, on November 28, 1975, this Court already ruled in Director of

(4) x x x x x x
Lands v. Reyes4 that the property subject of Garcia’s application was
inalienable as it formed part of a military reservation. Moreover, the existence
of Possessory Information Title No. 216 (allegedly registered in the name of a (5) x x x x x x
certain Melecio Padilla on March 5, 1895), on which therein respondent
Parañaque Investment and Development Corporation anchored its claim on
(6) REVERSE the Resolution dated June 30, 1999 of this Court approving the
the land, was not proven. Accordingly, the decree of registration issued in its
Amicable Settlement dated May 18, 1999 executed between the Office of the
favor was declared null and void.
Solicitor General and Florencia Garcia Diaz[;]

Reyes notwithstanding, the CFI ruled in Garcia’s favor in a decision5 dated

(7) ANNUL and SET ASIDE the Amicable Settlement dated May 18, 1999
July 1, 1981.
executed between the Office of the Solicitor General and Florencia Garcia Diaz;
the said Amicable Settlement is hereby DECLARED to be without force and
The Republic eventually appealed the decision of the CFI to the Court of effect;
Appeals (CA). In its decision6 dated February 26, 1992, penned by Justice
Vicente V. Mendoza (Mendoza decision),7 the appellate court reversed and
(8) GRANT the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Office of the Solicitor
set aside the decision of the CFI. The CA found that Reyes was applicable to
General and, consequently, SET ASIDE the Resolution dated January 12,
petitioner’s case as it involved the same property.
2000 which ordered, among other matters, that a certificate of title be issued in
the name of plaintiff-appellee Florencia Garcia Diaz over the portion of the
The CA observed that Garcia also traced her ownership of the land in subject property in consonance with the Amicable Settlement dated May 18,
question to Possessory Information Title No. 216. As Garcia’s right to the 1999 approved by the Court in its Resolution dated June 30, 1999;
property was largely dependent on the existence and validity of the
possessory information title the probative value of which had already been
(9) SET ASIDE the Resolution dated June 30, 1999 approving the May 18,
passed upon by this Court in Reyes, and inasmuch as the land was situated
1999 Amicable Settlement and the Resolution dated September 20, 1999
inside a military reservation, the CA concluded that she did not validly acquire
amending the aforesaid June 30, 1999 Resolution; and
title thereto.

(10) REINSTATE the Decision dated February 26, 1992 dismissing

During the pendency of the case in the CA, Garcia passed away and was
applicant-appellee Diaz’ registration herein.
substituted by her heirs, one of whom was petitioner Florencia G.
Diaz.81avvphi1
SO ORDERED.
(Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Mendoza decision. While
the motion was pending in the CA, petitioner also filed a motion for recall of
the records from the former CFI. Without acting on the motion for Petitioner moved for reconsideration. For the first time, she assailed the validity
reconsideration, the appellate court, with Justice Mendoza as ponente, issued of the Mendoza decision – the February 26, 1992 decision adverted to in the
a resolution9 upholding petitioner’s right to recall the records of the case. CA’s amended resolution. She alleged that Justice Mendoza was the assistant
solicitor general during the initial stages of the land registration proceedings in
the trial court and therefore should have inhibited himself when the case
Subsequently, however, the CA encouraged the parties to reach an amicable
reached the CA. His failure to do so, she laments, worked an injustice against
settlement on the matter and even gave the parties sufficient time to draft and
her constitutional right to due process. Thus, the Mendoza decision should be
finalize the same.
declared null and void. The motion was denied.14

The parties ultimately entered into a compromise agreement with the

Republic withdrawing its claim on the more or less 4,689 hectares supposedly
outside the FMMR. For her part, petitioner withdrew her application for the
portion of the property inside the military reservation. They filed a motion for
approval of the amicable settlement in the CA.10
On June 30, 1999, the appellate court approved the compromise
agreement.11 On January 12, 2000, it directed the Land Registration
Administration to issue the corresponding decree of registration in petitioner’s
favor.12
However, acting on a letter written by a certain Atty. Restituto S. Lazaro, the
OSG filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA resolution ordering the
issuance of the decree of registration. The OSG informed the appellate court
that the tract of land subject of the amicable settlement was still within the
military reservation.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari15 in this Court. It
was denied for raising factual issues.16She moved for reconsideration.17 This
motion was denied with finality on the ground that there was no substantial
argument warranting a modification of the Court’s resolution. The Court then
ordered that no further pleadings would be entertained. Accordingly, we
ordered entry of judgment to be made in due course.18
Petitioner, however, insisted on filing a motion to lift entry of judgment and
motion for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration and to refer the
case to the Supreme Court en banc.19 The Court denied20 it considering that a
second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading.21 Furthermore, the
motion to refer the case to the bancwas likewise denied as the banc is not an
appellate court to which decisions or resolutions of the divisions may be
appealed.22 We reiterated our directive that no further pleadings would be
entertained and that entry of judgment be made in due course.

Not one to be easily deterred, petitioner wrote identical letters, first addressed
to Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing (then Acting Chief Justice) and then to
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno himself.23 The body of the letter, undoubtedly
in the nature of a third motion for reconsideration, is hereby reproduced in its
entirety:
This is in response to your call for "Moral Forces" in order to "redirect the
destiny of our country which is suffering from moral decadence," that to your
mind, is the problem which confronts us. (Inquirer, January 15, 2009, page
1)[.]
I recently lost my case with the Supreme Court, G.R. N[o]. 181502, and my
lawyer has done all that is humanly possible to convince the court to take a
second look at the miscarriage of justice that will result from the
implementation of the DISMISSAL in a MINUTE RESOLUTION of our Petition
for Review.
Pending before your Division (First Division) is a last plea for justice so
that the case may be elevated to the Supreme Court en banc. I hope the
Court exercises utmost prudence in resolving the last plea. For ready
reference, a copy of the Motion is hereto attached as Annex "A".
The issue that was brought before the Honorable Supreme Court involves the
Decision of then Justice Vicente Mendoza of the Court of Appeals, which is
NULL and VOID, ab initio.
It is null and void because destiny placed Hon. Justice Vicente Mendoza in a
position in which it became possible for him to discharge the minimum
requirement of due process, [i.e.] the ability of the court to render "impartial
justice," because Mr. Justice Mendoza became the ponente of the Court of
Appeals Decision, reversing the findings of the trial court, notwithstanding the
fact that he, as Assistant Solicitor General, was the very person who
appeared on behalf of the Republic, as the oppositor in the very same land
registration proceedings in which he lost.
In other words, he discharged the duties of prosecutor and judge in the very
same case.
In the case of the "Alabang Boys[,]" the public was outraged by the actions of
Atty. Verano who admitted having prepared a simple resolution to be signed
by the Secretary of Justice.
In my case, the act complained of is the worst kind of violation of my
constitutional right. It is simply immoral, illegal and unconstitutional, for the
prosecutor to eventually act as the judge, and reverse the very decision in
which he had lost.
If leaked to the tri-media[,] my case will certainly evoke even greater spite
from the public, and put the Supreme Court in bad light. I must confess that I
was tempted to pursue such course of action. I however believe that such an
action will do more harm than good, and even destroy the good name of Hon.
Justice Mendoza.
I fully support your call for "moral force" that will slowly and eventually lead our
country to redirect its destiny and escape from this moral decadence, in which
we all find ourselves.
I am content with the fact that at least, the Chief Justice continues to fight the
dark forces that surround us everyday.
I only ask that the Supreme Court endeavor to ensure that cases such as
mine do not happen again, so that the next person who seeks justice will not
experience the pain and frustration that I suffered under our judicial system.
Thank you, and more power to you, SIR. (Emphasis in the original).
The language of petitioner’s letter/motion is unmistakable. It is a thinly veiled
threat precisely worded and calculated to intimidate this Court into giving in to
40
her demands to honor an otherwise legally infirm compromise agreement, at
the risk of being vilified in the media and by the public.
This Court will not be cowed into submission. We deny petitioner’s letter/third
motion for reconsideration.
APPLICABILITY OF REYES
The Court agrees with the Republic’s position that Reyes is applicable to this
case.
To constitute res judicata, the following elements must concur:
(1) the former judgment or order must be final;
(2) the judgment or order must be on the merits;
(3) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and parties; and
(4) there must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of
subject matter, and of causes of action. 24
The first three requisites have undoubtedly been complied with. However,
petitioner takes exception to the fourth requisite, particularly on the issue of
identity of parties. In her petition for review filed in this Court, she contends that
since the applicants in the two cases are different, the merits of the two cases
should, accordingly, be determined independently of each other.25
This contention is erroneous.
The facts obtaining in this case closely resemble those in Aquino v. Director of
Lands.26 In that case, Quintin Tañedo endeavored to secure title to a
considerable tract of land by virtue of his possession thereof under CA 141.
When the case eventually reached this Court, we affirmed the trial court’s
decision to dismiss the proceedings as the property in question was part of the
public domain. Quintin’s successor-in-interest, Florencia Tañedo, who despite
knowledge of the proceedings did not participate therein, thereafter sold the
same property to Benigno S. Aquino. The latter sought to have it registered in
his name. The question in that case, as well as in this one, was whether our
decision in the case in which another person was the applicant constituted res
judicata as against his successors-in-interest.
We ruled there, and we so rule now, that in registration cases filed under the
provisions of the Public Land Act for the judicial confirmation of an incomplete
and imperfect title, an order dismissing an application for registration and
declaring the land as part of the public domain constitutes res judicata, not only
against the adverse claimant, but also against all persons.27
We also declared in Aquino that:
From another point of view, the decision in the first action has become the "law
of the case" or at least falls within the rule of stare decisis. That adjudication
should be followed unless manifestly erroneous. It was taken and should be
taken as the authoritative view of the highest tribunal in the Philippines. It is
indispensable to the due administration of justice especially by a court of last
resort that a question once deliberately examined and decided should be
considered as settled and closed to further argument. x x x28
Be that as it may, the fact is that, even before the CFI came out with its decision
in favor of petitioner on July 1, 1981, this Court, in Reyes, already made an
earlier ruling on November 28, 1975 that the disputed realty was inalienable as
it formed part of a military reservation. Thus, petitioner’s argument that the
findings of fact of the trial court on her registrable title are binding on us – on the
principle that findings of fact of lower courts are accorded great respect and
bind even this Court – is untenable. Rather, it was incumbent upon the court a
quo to respect this Court’s ruling in Reyes, and not the other way around.
 41
However, despite having been apprised of the Court's findings Therefore, even if possession was for more than 30 years, it could never ripen
in Reyes (which should have been a matter of judicial notice in the first place), to ownership.
the trial court still insisted on its divergent finding and disregarded the Court's
decision in Reyes, declaring the subject land as forming part of a military
But even assuming that the land in question was alienable land before it was
reservation, and thus outside the commerce of man.
established as a military reservation, there was nevertheless still a dearth of
evidence with respect to its occupation by petitioner and her
By not applying our ruling in Reyes, the trial judge virtually nullified the predecessors-in-interest for more than 30 years. In Reyes, we noted:
decision of this Court and therefore acted with grave abuse of
discretion.29 Notably, a judgment rendered with grave abuse of discretion is
Evidently, Melecio Padilla, having died on February 9, 1900, barely five (5)
void and does not exist in legal contemplation.30
years after the inscription of the informacion possessoria, could not have
converted the same into a record of ownership twenty (20) years after such
All lower courts, especially the trial court concerned in this case, ought to be inscription, pursuant to Article 393 of the Spanish Mortgage Law.
reminded that it is their duty to obey the decisions of the Supreme Court. A
conduct becoming of inferior courts demands a conscious awareness of the
xxx
position they occupy in the interrelation and operation of our judicial system.
As eloquently declared by Justice J.B. L. Reyes, "There is only one Supreme
Court from whose decision all other courts should take their bearings."31 During the lifetime of Melecio Padilla, only a small portion thereof was cleared
and cultivated under the ‘kaingin’ system, while some portions were used as
grazing land. After his death, his daughter, Maria Padilla, caused the planting of
ACQUISITION OF PRIVATE RIGHTS
vegetables and had about forty (40) tenants for the purpose. During the
Japanese occupation, Maria Padilla died. x x x
Petitioner, however, argues that Proclamation 237 itself recognizes that its
effectivity is "subject to private rights, if any there be."
xxx

By way of a background, we recognized in Reyes that the property where the

A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant, and the raising
military reservation is situated is forest land. Thus:
thereon of cattle, do not constitute possession under claim of ownership. In that
sense, possession is not exclusive and notorious as to give rise to a
Before the military reservation was established, the evidence is inconclusive presumptive grant from the State. While grazing livestock over land is of course
as to possession, for it is shown by the evidence that the land involved is to be considered with other acts of dominion to show possession, the mere
largely mountainous and forested. As a matter of fact, at the time of the occupancy of land by grazing livestock upon it, without substantial inclosures,
hearing, it was conceded that approximately 13,957 hectares of said land or other permanent improvements, is not sufficient to support a claim of title
consist of public forest. x x x (Emphasis supplied)32 thru acquisitive prescription. The possession of public land, however long the
period may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor
because the statute of limitations with regard to public land does not operate
Concomitantly, we stated therein, and we remind petitioner now, that forest
against the State unless the occupant can prove possession and occupation of
lands are not registrable under CA 141.
the same under claim of ownership for the required number of years to
constitute a grant from the State.38
[E]ven more important, Section 48[b] of CA No. 141, as amended, applies
exclusively to public agricultural land. Forest lands or area covered with forest
xxx
are excluded. It is well-settled that forest land is incapable of registration;
and its inclusion in a title, whether such title be one issued using the
Spanish sovereignty or under the present Torrens system of registration, Furthermore, the fact that the possessory information title on which petitioner
nullifies the title. (Emphasis supplied).33 also bases her claim of ownership was found to be inexistent in Reyes,39 thus
rendering its probative value suspect, further militates against granting her
application for registration.
However, it is true that forest lands may be registered when they have been
reclassified as alienable by the President in a clear and categorical manner
(upon the recommendation of the proper department head who has the NULLITY OF COMPROMISE AGREEMENT
authority to classify the lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable,
timber and mineral lands)34 coupled with possession by the claimant as well
On the compromise agreement between the parties, we agree with the CA that
as that of her predecessors-in-interest. Unfortunately for petitioner, she was
the same was null and void.
not able to produce such evidence. Accordingly, her occupation thereof, and
that of her predecessors-in-interest, could not have ripened into ownership of
the subject land. This is because prior to the conversion of forest land as An amicable settlement or a compromise agreement is in the nature of a
alienable land, any occupation or possession thereof cannot be counted in contract and must necessarily comply with the provisions of Article 1318 of the
reckoning compliance with the thirty-year possession requirement under New Civil Code which provides:
Commonwealth Act 141 (CA 141) or the Public Land Act.35 This was our
ruling in Almeda v. CA.36 The rules on the confirmation of imperfect titles do
Art. 1318. There is no contract unless the following requisites concur:
not apply unless and until the land classified as forest land is released through
an official proclamation to that effect. Then and only then will it form part of the
disposable agricultural lands of the public domain.37 (1) Consent of the contracting parties;

Coming now to petitioner’s contention that her "private rights" to the property, (2) Object certain which is the subject matter of the contract;
meaning her and her predecessors’ possession thereof prior to the
establishment of the FMMR, must be respected, the same is untenable. As
(3) Cause of the obligation which is established.
earlier stated, we had already recognized the same land to be public forest
even before the FMMR was established. To reiterate:
Petitioner was not able to provide any proof that the consent of the Republic,
through the appropriate government agencies, i.e. the Department of
Before the military reservation was established, the evidence is inconclusive
Environment and Natural Resources, Land Management Bureau, Land
as to possession, for it is shown by the evidence that the land involved is
Registration Authority, and the Office of the President, was secured by the
largely mountainous and forested. As a matter of fact, at the time of the
OSG when it executed the agreement with her.40 The lack of authority on the
hearing, it was conceded that approximately 13,957 hectares of said land
part of the OSG rendered the compromise agreement between the parties null
consist of public forest. x x x
and void because although it is the duty of the OSG to represent the State in

cases involving land registration proceedings, it must do so only within the
scope of the authority granted to it by its principal, the Republic of the
Philippines.41
In this case, although the OSG was authorized to appear as counsel for
respondent, it was never given the specific or special authority to enter into a
compromise agreement with petitioner. This is in violation of the provisions of
Rule 138 Section 23, of the Rules of Court which requires "special authority"
for attorneys to bind their clients.
Section 23. Authority of attorneys to bind clients. – Attorneys have authority to
bind their clients in any case by any agreement in relation thereto made in
writing, and in taking appeals, and in all matters of ordinary judicial
procedure. But they cannot, without special authority, compromise their
client’s litigation, or receive anything in discharge of a client’s claim but the
full amount in cash. (Emphasis supplied).
Moreover, the land in question could not have been a valid subject matter of a
contract because, being forest land, it was inalienable. Article 1347 of the Civil
Code provides:
Art. 1347. All things which are not outside the commerce of men,
including future things, may be the object of a contract. All rights which
are not intransmissible may also be the object of contracts.
No contract may be entered into upon future inheritance except in cases
expressly authorized by law.
All services which are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order
or public policy may likewise be the object of a contract. (Emphasis supplied)
Finally, the Court finds the cause or consideration of the obligation contrary to
law and against public policy. The agreement provided that, in consideration
of petitioner’s withdrawal of her application for registration of title from that
portion of the property located within the military reservation, respondent was
withdrawing its claim on that part of the land situated outside said reservation.
The Republic could not validly enter into such undertaking as the subject
matter of the agreement was outside the commerce of man.
PETITIONER’S CONTEMPT OF COURT
This Court, being the very institution that dispenses justice, cannot reasonably
be expected to just sit by and do nothing when it comes under attack.
That petitioner’s letter-motion constitutes an attack against the integrity of this
Court cannot be denied. Petitioner started her letter innocently enough by
stating:
This is in response to your call for "Moral Forces" in order to "redirect the
destiny of our country which is suffering from moral decadence," that to your
mind, is the problem which confronts us. (Inquirer, January 15, 2009, page
1)[.]
It, however, quickly progressed into a barely concealed resentment for what
she perceived as this Court’s failure to exercise "utmost prudence" in
rendering "impartial justice" in deciding her case. Petitioner recounted:
I recently lost my case with the Supreme Court, G.R. N[o]. 181502, and my
lawyer has done all that is humanly possible to convince the court to take a
second look at the miscarriage of justice that will result from the
implementation of the DISMISSAL in a MINUTE RESOLUTION of our
Petition for Review.
Pending before your Division (First Division) is a last plea for justice so
that the case may be elevated to the Supreme Court en banc. I hope the
Court exercises utmost prudence in resolving the last plea. For ready
reference, a copy of the Motion is hereto attached as Annex "A".
42
The issue that was brought before the Honorable Supreme Court involves the
Decision of then Justice Vicente Mendoza of the Court of Appeals, which is
NULL and VOID, ab initio.
It is null and void because destiny placed Hon. Justice Vicente Mendoza in a
position in which it became possible for him to discharge the minimum
requirement of due process, [i.e.] the ability of the court to render "impartial
justice," because Mr. Justice Mendoza became the ponente of the Court of
Appeals Decision, reversing the findings of the trial court, notwithstanding the
fact that he, as Assistant Solicitor General, was the very person who appeared
on behalf of the Republic, as the oppositor in the very same land registration
proceedings in which he lost. (Emphasis supplied).
Petitioner then indirectly hints that, when push comes to shove, she has no
choice but to expose the irregularity concerning the Mendoza decision to the
media. This is evident in her arrogant declaration that:
If leaked to the tri-media[,] my case will certainly evoke even greater spite from
the public, and put the Supreme Court in bad light.
But she hastens to add in the same breath that:
I must confess that I was tempted to pursue such course of action. I however
believe that such an action will do more harm than good, and even destroy the
good name of Hon. Justice Mendoza.
Petitioner ends her letter by taking this Court to task:
. . . endeavor to ensure that cases such as mine do not happen again, so that
the next person who seeks justice will not experience the pain and frustration
that I suffered under our judicial system.
When required to show cause why she should not be cited for contempt for her
baseless charges and veiled threats, petitioner answered:
xxx
The Letter of January 26, 2009 is not a "veiled threat[.] It was written in
response to the call of the Chief Justice for a moral revolution. Juxtaposed
against the factual backdrop of the "Alabang Boys" case and the Meralco [c]ase,
involving Mr. Justice Jose L. Sabio which also enjoyed wide publicity over the
tri-media, petitioner felt that the facts of the said cases pale in comparison to
the facts of her case where the lawyer of her opponent eventually became
justice of the appellate court and ended up reversing the very decision in which
he lost, in clear violation of her [c]onstitutional [r]ight to fundamental fair play –
for no contestant in any litigation can ever serve as a judge without
transgression of the due process clause. This is basic.
Petitioner confesses that she may have been emotional in the delivery of her
piece, because correctly or incorrectly[,] she believes they are irrefutable. If in
the course of that emotional delivery, she has offended your honors’
sensibilities, she is ready for the punishment, and only prays that his Court
temper its strike with compassion – as her letter to the Chief Justice was never
written with a view of threatening the Court.
xxx
Petitioner wrote the Chief Justice in order to obtain redress and correction of
the inequity bestowed upon her by destiny. It was never meant as a threat.
The Court now puts an end to petitioner’s irresponsible insinuations and threats
of "going public" with this case. We are not blind to petitioner’s clever and foxy
interplay of threats alternating with false concern for the reputation of this
Court.
It is well to remind petitioner that the Court has consistently rendered justice
with neither fear nor favor. The disposition in this case was arrived at after a
careful and thorough deliberation of the facts of this case and all the matters
pertaining thereto. The records of the case, in fact, show that all the pertinent
 43
issues raised by petitioner were passed upon and sufficiently addressed by SO ORDERED.
the appellate court and this Court in their respective resolutions.

As to petitioner’s complaint regarding this Court’s denial of her petition

through a mere minute resolution (which allegedly deprived her of due
process as the Court did not issue a full-blown decision stating the facts and
applicable jurisprudence), suffice it to say that the Court is not duty-bound to
issue decisions or resolutions signed by the justices all the time. It has ample
discretion to formulate ponencias, extended resolutions or even minute
resolutions issued by or upon its authority, depending on its evaluation of a
case, as long as a legal basis exists. When a minute resolution (signed by the
Clerk of Court upon orders of the Court) denies or dismisses a petition or
motion for reconsideration for lack of merit, it is understood that the assailed
decision or order, together with all its findings of fact and legal conclusions,
are deemed sustained.42

Furthermore, petitioner has doggedly pursued her case in this Court by filing
three successive motions for reconsideration, including the letter-motion
subject of this resolution. This, despite our repeated warnings that "no further
pleadings shall be entertained in this case." Her unreasonable persistence
constitutes utter defiance of this Court’s orders and an abuse of the rules of
procedure. This, alongside her thinly veiled threats to leak her case to the
media to gain public sympathy – although the tone of petitioner’s compliance
with our show-cause resolution was decidedly subdued compared to her
earlier letters – constitutes contempt of court.

In Republic v. Unimex,43 we held:

A statement of this Court that no further pleadings would be entertained is a

declaration that the Court has already considered all issues presented by the
parties and that it has adjudicated the case with finality. It is a directive to the
parties to desist from filing any further pleadings or motions. Like all orders of
this Court, it must be strictly observed by the parties. It should not be
circumvented by filing motions ill-disguised as requests for clarification.

A FEW OBSERVATIONS

If petitioner was, as she adamantly insists, only guarding her constitutional

right to due process, then why did she question the validity of the Mendoza
decision late in the proceedings, that is, only after her motion for
reconsideration in the CA (for its subsequent annulment of the compromise
agreement) was denied? It is obvious that it was only when her case became
hopeless that her present counsel frantically searched for some ground, any
ground to resuscitate his client’s lost cause, subsequently raising the issue.
This is evident from a statement in her petition to this Court that:

It is this fresh discovery by the undersigned counsel of the nullity of the

proceedings of the Court of Appeals that places in doubt the entire
proceedings it previously conducted, which led to the rendition of the
February 26, 1992 Decision, a fact that escaped the scrutiny of applicant
for registration Flora L. Garcia, as well as her lawyer, Atty. Cayetano
Dante Diaz, who died in 1993, and the late Justice Fernando A. Santiago,
who stood as counsel for Flora L. Garcia’s successor-in-interest, herein
petitioner, Florencia G. Garcia.44(Emphasis supplied).

The above cited statement does not help petitioner’s cause at all. If anything,
it only proves how desperate the case has become for petitioner and her
counsel.

WHEREFORE, the letter-motion dated January 26, 2009 of petitioner

is NOTED and is hereby treated as a third motion for reconsideration. The
motion is DENIED considering that a third motion for reconsideration is a
prohibited pleading and the plea utterly lacks merit.

Petitioner is found GUILTY of contempt of court. Accordingly, a FINE of Five

Thousand Pesos is hereby imposed on her, payable within ten days from
receipt of this resolution. She is hereby WARNED that any repetition hereof
shall be dealt with more severely.

Treble costs against petitioner.