WILFRID SELLARS

SENSA OR SENSINGS: REFLECTIONS ON T H E O N T O L O G Y

OF P E R C E P T I O N *

(Received 24 November, 1979)

1. To start right off with an attempt to contrast object-having and objectless

acts of sensing would indeed be to start in the middle of things. There are, of
course, no absolute beginnings; wherever a philosopher begins he is unavoida-
bly in medias res. The most he can hope is that he begins on a note of mutual
understanding - which need not, of course, be agreement. Thus I shall begin
with some reasonably straightforward remarks on visual perception and work
m y way with deliberate speed to the contrasting interpretations of the
sensory component of visual perception which I propose to examine.

2. In standard or paradigm cases we see physical objects from a point of view

in physical space; thus, a red brick over there facing me edgewise. The
conceptual analysis of such a paradigm begins when a distinction is drawn
between the object seen (in this case an opaque object) and what we see o f
the object. We see the brick, but of the brick we see certain of its surfaces.
These surfaces are, in a sense which I shall not attempt to define, dependent
particulars. If one is careful, one can call them 'parts' or 'constituents' of the
brick. They, too, we see from a point of view in physical space.

3. It is important that we think of these perceptible constituents as particu-

lars. But what we see o f an object also includes, as will shortly emerge, what
one is tempted to classify as properties, or, perhaps, states of affairs; and the
latter are in no useful sense constituents of objects.

4. It is customary to distinguish between

seeing a physical object (e.g. a brick)

and

Philosophical Studies 41 (1982) 83-111. 0031-8116/82/0411-0083502.90

Copyright 9 1982 by D. Reidel Publishing Co., Dordrecht, Holland. and Boston. U.S.A.
84 WILFRID SELLARS

seeing that the physical object is a brick

or

seeing that the physical object has a red facing surface.

Taking into account the above distinction between what we see (e.g. a brick)
and what we see o f what we see (e.g. a certain part of its surface), one would
add a distinction between
seeing of a physical object its facing surface

and
seeing that the facing surface of a physical object is (e.g.) red.

5. Schematically, the distinction is between seeing objects, thus

seeing O (where O is a physical object)

or

seeing O' (where O' is a perceptible constituent of O)

and what is often called 'propositional seeing', thus

seeing that 0 (or O') is ~0.

6. These distinctions are reflected in traditional accounts of the conceptual

activity involved in visual perception. I shall limit my remarks to those ac-
counts which speak of perceptual takings, where takings are construed as
occurrent beliefs (in the sense of believings) which (given ones perceptual
set) one is caused to have in visual perceptual situations. In standard condi-
tions the objects seen are, in the legitimate sense (by no means easy to analyze)
the external causes of takings.

7. Occurrent believings are construed as mental acts, the appropriate expres-

sion of which is the tokening of a sentence. Where the
/ sentence is the subject-
predicate sentence, we can speak of the subjecl! and the predicate of the
/
corresponding believing. It is commonly held that perceptual takings have
subject-predicate form and that the subject constituent is appropriately
expressed by a demonstrative. This constituent is itself construed as a demon-
 S E N S A OR S E N S I N G S 85

strative, not because acts of belief are linguistic, but because they are suf-
ficiently analogous, in essential structure and function, to the sentence tokens
which express them (in candid speech) for it to be appropriate to make an
analogical use of semantical terminology is describing them.

8. I hasten to add that a perceptual taking as construed by these philosophers

is in no ordinary sense a believing. Even in the context of perception our oc-
current beliefs are to be distinguished in a way which I propose to examine
from the perceptual takings on which they depend. Yet the latter do belong
to the same family as occurrent beliefs, and like the latter are to be distinguished
from mere propensities to believe.

9. It is often noted that we express at least some of our perceptual experiences

by using sentences, the grammatical subject of which is a complex demon-
strative phrase, thus

This brick with a red and rectangular facing surface is larger than
that one.

This sentence is obviously related to the compound sentence

This is a brick and it has a red and rectangular facing surface and
it is larger than that one.

Those who carefully distinguish between thoughts and their verbal expres-
sion can be tempted to construe the conceptual act which the first of these
sentences expresses in terms of the structure of the second sentence.

10. If this move is made, the result is to construe the subject of the per-
ceptual taking as a bare 'this', all characterizing being put in an explicitly
predicative position; thus
This is a brick with a red and rectangular facing surface.

11. The referent of 'this', in perceptual contexts, is construed as the object

seen. Thus, if the referent is a certain black bush, the perceiver is said to see
the bush. If his taking has the form

This is a bear
86 WILFRID SELLARS

then he is said to take what is in point of fact a bush to be a bear. In our

example, which I shall suppose to be a case of veridical perception, the per-
ceiver sees a certain red brick facing him edgewise and sees that it is a red
brick facing him edgewise, by virtue of the occurrence of a perceptual believ-
ing or taking of the form,

This is a brick with a red and rectangular facing surface.

12. But this division of visual takings into a subject which is a pure demon-
strative and a predicative constituent in an explicitly predicative position sim-
ply won't do as it stands.

13. In the second place a distinction must be drawn between what we see,
and what we see it as. The point is a familiar and important one and part of
its importance lies in the fact that the pure demonstrative model is incapable
of handling it.

14. On the other hand, the complex demonstrative phrase model shows
promise. Thus it is not implausible to suggest that one who sees a bush as a
bear has a perceptual belief of which the subject constituent is the complex
demonstrative

This large black bear ....

15. If the believing of which the demonstrative phrase is the subject can be
said to be a perceptual believing, perhaps

This large black bear is moving toward me

then we might distinguish between

believings that

and

believings to be

and suggest that what one sees an object as concerns that which belongs in
the demonstrative phrase along with 'this'.

16. Indeed, one might go further and say that, properly speaking, perceptual
takings simply are the complex demonstrative constituents of perceptual
 SENSA OR SENSING S 87

beliefs, and that the explicitly predicative constituent of the belief is not part
of what is taken, but simply what is believed about what is taken.

17. The model for taking, then, would be presupposition in something like
Strawson's sense. The concept of occurrent belief could be extended to cover
this sense of taking, by distinguishing between believing that and believing in.
A perceptual believing in would be illustrated by the subject component of
the believing expressed by

This brick with a red and rectangular facing surface is too large to
fit that gap.

18. The complex demonstrative constituent could be construed as presup-

posing that the referent of 'this' is a brick with a red and rectangular facing
surface facing one, for example, edgewise, and argue that, by virtue of this
presupposing, the referent of 'this' is perceptually taken by the perceiver as
a brick with a red and rectangular surface facing him edgewise.

19. Note that one can see x as a red brick facing him edgewise, even though
no red brick is there. The verb 'to see' is, in its standard use, an achievement
word. One can't see what isn't there. The same holds true of

seeing x to be ~.

If one sees x to be ~, it is ~. Perhaps we should construe

seeing x as

as the achievement non-committal counterpart of

seeing x to be r

20. Suppose that the referent of 'this' is a brick shaped piece of red modeling
clay. Is the occurrence of the taking sufficient to warrant us in saying that the
perceiver, P, sees a red brick shaped piece of red modeling clay facing him
edgewise as a red brick facing him edgewise? Clearly part of the problem is to
give a clear account of the sense in which the 'this' of

This brick with a red and rectangular facing surface ....

can be construed as having a reference which is independent of the predicates

which accompany it in the complex demonstrative phrase, so that it makes
88 WILFRID SELLARS

sense to say that 'this' refers to something which is not a red brick. The
proper move to make seems to be from the phrase to what it presupposes, the
latter being put in explicitly propositional form, e.g.

This is a brick and this is its red and rectangular facing surface.

and determine the referent of the demonstratives in the latter context.

21. Leaving these subtleties aside, for the present, the question raised above
can be put more accurately as follows: Should we say that P's seeing a certain
physical object as a brick with a red and rectangular facing surface is simply a
matter of his believing in a brick with a red and rectangular facing surface?

22. Before tackling this question we must refine our distinction between the
object seen and what we see of the object. For what we see of an object
includes not just the dependent particulars we called 'parts' or 'constituents'
(e.g. the surface of the brick). But also, as was suggested at the time, certain
properties. That it includes them will be clear enough, though just h o w it
includes them will be highly problematic.

23. Consider, for example, my favorite object, this pink ice cube. Its con-
sisting of ice is largely a matter of its causal properties. It cools tea and is
melted by fire. We see the pink ice cube and, supposing the conditions of
perception to be normal, we see that the transparent pink cube is made of ice.
We even see the pink ice cube as a cube of pink ice. But do we see o f the pink
ice cube the causal properties involved in its being made of ice?

24. Of course in seeing it as a pink ice cube we are seeing it as having the
causal properties characteristic of ice. But do we see of the object these causal
properties? The question is, to be sure, an awkward one. But if we consider
certain other questions of a similar form, the answer seems to be no.

25. Thus, by contrast, we see not only that the ice cube is pink, and see it as
pink, we see the very pinkness of the object; also its very shape - though
from a certain point of view.
 SENSA OR SENSINGS 89

26. Sufficient to this stage of the argument is an analysis of the sense in

which we see of the pink ice cube its very pinkness. Here, I believe, sheer
phenomenology or conceptual analysis takes us part of the way, but finally
lets us down. How far does it take us? Only to the point of assuring us that

Something, somehow a cube of pink in physical space is present

in the perception other than as merely believed in.

In traditional terminology, the somehow presence of a cube of pink does not

consist in its intentional in-existence as the content of a conceptual act. Nor
is its character as a cube of pink in physical space facing me edgewise a matter
of its actually being a cube of pink in physical space. It is somehow a cube of
pink in physical space facing me edgewise without actually being a cube of
pink in physical space facing me edgewise, yet without merely being the con-
tent of a belief in a cube of pink in physical space facing me edgewise.

27. Seeing o f the cube its very pinkness and its cubicity (from a point of
view) would be analyzed in terms of this somehow, other than merely believed
in presence of a cube of pink in physical space facing one edgewise in the
visual experience.

28. I say 'visual experience' because it is time to take into account, at least
provisionally, the fact that we can seem to see a cube of pink from a point of
view in physical space when there is, in point of fact, no cube of pink in the
neighborhood.

29. I propose to use the phrase 'ostensible seeing of a cube of pink facing one
edgewise as a cube of pink facing one edgewise' to refer to a visual experience
which would be a case of seeing a cube of pink facing one edgewise as a cube
of pink facing one edgewise, if there were such a cube of pink and it were (in
a sense requiring analysis) causally responsible for the ostensible seeing. And I
propose that the idea that P ostensibly sees a cube of pink facing him/her
edgewise as a cube of pink facing him/her edgewise is, for our purposes,
identical with the idea that

There appears to P to be a cube of pink facing him/her edgewise.

30. Accordingly, the somehow, other than as believed in, presence of a cube
of pink facing one edgewise would be common to what can provisionally be
90 WILFRID SELLARS

called veridical and non-veridical ostensible seeings of a cube of pink facing

one edgewise.

31. Now the obvious move is to introduce visual sensations as proto-theoretical

states of perceivers to explain these results of conceptual analysis. Thus the
fact that we see (veridical perception) from a point of view, or merely
ostensibly see (unveridical perception) from a point of view, the very pink-
ness and cubicity of a cube of pink ice would be explained by postulating the
occurrence in the perceiver of a sensation of a cube of pink facing one
edgewise. The fact that we don't see its very character of being made of ice
would be explained by the exclusion from the proto-theory of the expres-
sion 'sensation of a cube of ice'.

III

32. What I have been saying up to now is, so to speak, the prologue of the
philosophical drama I wish to present. This drama concerns the nature of
visual sensations, and since many of you may find this very concept a snare
and a delusion, I shall introduce two compliant characters - Jones and Smith
by name - who are persuaded (or at least believe themselves to be persuaded)
by the preceding remarks, and are eager to offer their accounts of what it is
to be a visual sensation. Jones is, roughly speaking, a proponent of classical
sense-datum theory. Smith, who belongs to a somewhat more recent, and still
developing, tradition, is a proponent of what he calls 'objectless' sensings.

33. Let us suppose them to agree that, as they put it, when there appears to
a perceiver, P, to be a physical object in front of him which has a red and rec-
tangular facing surface, he has a visual sensation of a kind which requires for
its specification a special use of the words which formulate what there
appears to P to be in front of him. They both reject an equation of

P has a sensation of a red rectangle

with
There appears to P to be a physical object which is red and rec-
tangular on the facing side.

In other words, they reject the 'another language' account of sensations. They
 SENSA OR SENSINGS 91

agree that sensations are constituents of situations in which there appears to

P to be such and such an object in front of him, and that the introduction of
these items as having this status is a theory to be justified by its explanatory
power.

34. One more point of agreement before hostilities break out. They agree on
a more general thesis - of interest to transformational grammarians and to
ontologlsts alike - that such phrases, involving verbal nouns, as 'a sensation',
' a thought', 'a feeling' are in some way derivative from the corresponding
verbs, thus 'senses', 'thinks', and 'feels'. They therefore immediately concen-
trate their attention on
(1) P senses a red rectangle

where the phrase 'a red rectangle', which normally refers to red and rectangular
surfaces of physical objects, has a special use in which it does not so refer -
nor does it refer to red and rectangular expanses (or rectangular expanses of
red) in physical space amidst the physical objects which make up P's environ-
ment.

35. At this point disagreement begins. Jones construes (1) as having the form

x Vy

where 'V' represents 'senses', which he informally classifies as a transitive

verb, and where 'y' represents 'a red rectangle' whichhe construes as a straight-
forwardly referential expression. Red rectangles, in sensation contexts, are
a special kind of actually existing object. To indicate this special use of the
common noun he puts the phrase in parentheses and precedes this construc-
tion with a superscript 's', thus
(1A) P senses an S(red rectangle).

Jones finds unproblematic (he has arranged it that way) the inference from
(1A) to
(1A-l) (Ex) S(red rectangle) x 9 senses (P, s).

36. Smith retorts by ascribing to (1) the form

PAdv V
92 WILFRID SELLARS

where 'Adv' represents 'a red rectangle' construed as an adverbial phrase, and
'l/" represents 'senses' construed as an intransitive verb.
(I hasten to add that neither Jones nor Smith - nor the author - has any
pretensions at sophistication in linguistics. The linguistic terminology is simply
intended to remind you that the 'linguistic turn' in philosophy antedated
philosophical awareness of this growing giant.)
According to Smith, then, before it is transformed into the agreed text,
the substance of (1) is more perspicuously represented as

(1B) e(a red rectangle) senses.

He adds, with an eye on Jones, existential inference, that strictly speaking the
only object, the existence of which is entailed by (1), is the perceiver, P. Thus

(1B-l) (Ex) x (a red rectangle) senses.

Before he can be pressed as to what he has in mind by 'speaking strictly' of

objects, he hastens to add, "Of course the situation involves an act of sensing
on P's part. But this act of sensing is objectless. The phrase 'a red rectangle'
does not refer to an object of the state of sensing, but rather to the sensing
itself." At this point he introduces his model, a model which makes clear
how superficial it would be to classify his position as an adverbial theory of
sensing. He says, "When a person dances a waltz, the phrase 'a waltz' refers
to the dancing itself and not to an object other than the dancing" 1

37. Now if Smith takes his model seriously, and I assure you that he does, he
is presumably prepared to say that

(2) P dances a waltz

entails

(3) A waltzing is taking place

SO

(1) P senses a red rectangle

entails

(4) A (red rectangle)ing is taking place.

 SENSA OR SENSINGS 93

38. Although it is not at all clear that he is entitled to do so, Smith, in an

irenic mood, allows that there is a sense in which, when a waltzing takes
place, there is or exists a waltz. Thus, when Smith looks back at (1)he finds
an excellent reason to emphasize that in this context 'red rectangle' does not
have its usual sense. Thus he, also, is prepared to agree to the idea that
(1) P senses a red rectangle

entails
(1A-2) There is an S(red rectangle).

39. Jones is annoyed rather than pleased by this agreement, which he takes
to be merely verbal. He hastens to point out that if Smith takes his model
seriously, he should be prepared to say that just as

(2) P dances a waltz

entails
(4) P waltzes

so

(1A) P senses an S(red rectangle)

should entail
(5) P S(red rectangle)s.

40. Smith, unperturbed, says: Why not? So I hold a verb theory of sensing.
To be sure I interpret the phrase "an s (red rectangle)', in the context
P senses an S(red rectangle)

as a verb modifier. But there are all kinds of verb modifiers. The important
point is to see that just as waltzing is a kind of dancing, so, as I see it, ~(red
rectangle)ing is a kind of sensing.

41. Jones' model, on the other hand, is a familiar one. He takes it from the
context

(6) P sees a certain physical object, sees of this object its facing
surface and sees this facing surface to be red and rectangular
94 WILFRID SELLARS

where all the occurrences of 'see' are used in the 'achievement' sense, in
which it is logically impossible to see what isn't so. It is, of course, the latter
part o f this context on which he concentrates. Thus the achievement context

sees ... to be - - -

which contrasts with the achievement-neutral

s e e s ... as - - -

becomes, in his theory,

senses ... to be - - -.

Thus

(7) P senses an S(red rectangle) and senses it to be - - -

to be what? Should he say

- - - to be an S(red rectangle)?

or

- - - to be Sred and Srectangular?

or should he drop the superscripts from the expression which tells us what he
senses the s (red rectangle)to be? Why should he hesitate?

42. Before we press these questions, let us note for the record that Jones
refers to such items as S(red rectangle)s as 'phenomenal individuals' and con-
strues the predicates ~red' and arectangular' as standing for 'phenomenal
properties'. James Cornman, who is well acquainted with Jones, though he
disapproves of his views, writes
A sensum is a p h e n o m e n a l individual, that is, an individual that exists w h e n and only
w h e n experienced, and that h a s a m o n g its properties at least one p h e n o m e n a l property.
By ' p h e n o m e n a l p r o p e r t y ' I mean, roughly, a non-physical property something has when
and only when it is experienced to have t h a t property (PCSS,pp. 5 - 6 . )

I must confess that I have so developed m y character Jones as to capture

some, at least, o f the ingredients which go to make up what Cornman has in
mind by a sensum. Similarly, Smith's views are intended to capture some, at
least, of the ingredients which go to make up what Comman means (or, per-
haps, shouM mean) by an objectless sensing.
 SENSA OR SENSINGS 95

43. I return to press the questions raised above. What does P sense his sensum
to be? If he answers

to be an S(red rectangle)

he faces a familiar problem. How could there be intelligent philosophers who

reject his views. We often find it almost incredible that someone disagrees
with one of our favorite philosophical arguments, but we allow that it is an
argument and that a rational person can disagree. Indeed we are convinced
that if we worked hard enough we could account for the disagreement and
even persuade the philosopher in question of the soundness of our views. But
if in sensing an S(red rectangle) and sensing it to be Sred and Srectangular
we were necessarily aware that the properties in question were phenomenal
properties of a phenomenal individual, how could we begin to account for the
existence of Smith?

44. Notice that the opening phrase

P senses an S(red rectangle)

does not, by itself, raise this problem. After all, we may see (in the achieve-
ment sense) a bush, but not see it to be a bush. Thus, with an eye on this
opening phrase Jones can say that whereas from the standpoint of his theory
what P senses is a sensum, P need not, indeed does not, sense it as a sensum,
let alone to be a sensum. But the latter part of the context is not so pliable.
If P senses the item in question to be Sred and Srectangular, must he not be
aware that the properties in question are 'phenomenal properties?' Can
Jones escape with the answer that it is only from the standpoint of the theory
that the properties are 'phenomenal'? Can he claim that neither the indi-
viduals we sense nor the properties we sense them to have present or classify
themselves as 'phenomenal'; and insist that it is we, as philosophers, who
conclude that they have this status by lengthy and fallible arguments; that
this idea is part of a complex explanation?

45. Jones would like to say

P senses an S(red rectangle) and senses it to be a red rectangle (or

red and rectangular)
96 WILFRID SELLARS

where the superscripts have been omitted from the latter occurrences of 'red'
and 'rectangular'. Can we find a justification for his doing so? I think we can,
but it involves a return to the prologue. Once again I must speak directly for
myself instead of manipulating puppets.

46. It will be, I hope, remembered that I argued that whereas we may see the
cube of pink ice as a cube of ice, and, indeed, (achievement) see it to be a
cube of ice, we do not see of it the causal properties involved in its being
made of ice. I reminded you that it is essential to something's being a piece of
ice that it have certain causal properties. (I do not wish to tie the sense of the
term 'ice' too closely to any particular set of causal properties, but if it had
none of the familiar causal properties, it would not be ice.)

47. But this fact, if it is a fact, has important implications for our problem.
For what is it to be a physical object, and, for that matter, what is it to be in
physical space? Do not these concepts involve an essential reference to causal
properties? I shall assume that the answer to both these questions is affirmative.
But if so, do we see of the cube of pink ice its physical object-hood? its being
in physical space? To be sure we see it as a physical object in physical space,
indeed, (achievement) to be a physical object in physical space. But of it we
see its character asa cube of pink. I hasten to add that we see of it its relative
location with respect to other items which can properly be said to be what we
see of what we see - for example, a sphere of blue. The operative words in
the above remarks were 'physical' and 'in physical space',

48. Similarly, while we see of our red brick its facing surface, we do not see
of the facing surface its character as the surface of a physical object in
physical space. We see of it its character as a rectangle of red. We see what
we see, indeed, as the red and rectangular facing surface of a brick. And, if
our perception is successful, we see it to be the red and rectangular facing
surface of a brick. But this fact simply calls attention to the conceptual
richness of perceptual takings.

49. Of course, we must balance this move by the admission that if what we
see of what we see should turn out in some appropriate sense to be 'phenomenal',
and to have in some appropriate sense 'phenomenal properties', we do not see
 SENSA OR SENSlNGS 97

of what we see its character as phenomenal, its character as having

phenomenal properties.

50. What is the value of all this to Jones? In essence this; he can argue that
whereas the model for his sensa is, for example, the red and rectangular facing
surface of a physical object in physical space, and the model for his sensing
the achievement sense of 'see', there is place even within this model for items
which do not carry their ultimate status on their sleeves. But if, even within
the model, we can distinguish items which, though naturally taken to be
facing surfaces of physical objects are, with respect to what is seen of them,
simply rectangles of red and cubes of pink, then phenomenological analysis
has made available a neutral sense of 'red ~ectangle' which is available for use
in his theory.

51. With these resources, and I would be the first to acknowledge that they
have been acquired from classical sense-datum theory by a judicious mixture
of theft and honest toil, Jones can claim that, according to his theory, when P
ostensibly sees a physical object to be red and rectangular on the facing side,
he is sensing a rectangle of red which is in point of fact a 'phenomenal object'
and has properties appropriate to this status, but that
(a) he takes it to be the red and rectangular facing surface of a physical
object (perhaps a brick)

and

(b) he senses it to be a rectangle of red.

52. You may well ask, among other things, what is the relation between the
taking and the sensing? I shall return to this question after another look at
much neglected Smith. What would he answer, if asked

When and if we are aware of an S(red rectangle)ing need we be

aware of it as an S(red rectangle)ing?

Since Smith has not been stressing our awareness of acts of sensing, we should
not be surprised to get the following answer,

We need not be aware of our objectless sensings

98 WILFRID SELLARS

to which he adds

If we are aware of an S(red rectangle)ing we need not be aware of

it as an S(red rectangle)ing.

If Smith is a Cartesian, his conscience may bother him, but on the whole he is
inclined to say that the idea that there are such items as S(red rectangle)ings
is part of a philosophical package, not a simple deliverance of introspective
awareness.

53. Yet is it so easy for Smith to downplay the awareness of objectless

sensings? After all, he, like Jones, is attempting to give an account of the
fact that when there appears to P to be a physical object which is red and
rectangular on the facing surface, something somehow the red and rectangular
facing surface of a physical object is present in P's experience other than as
merely believed in (with a suitable commentary on the relevant sense of
'belief'). It is this 'something somehow' which they have been attempting to
flesh out by a theory of visual sensations.

54. Jones emphasizes the phrase 'is present in P's experience other than as
merely believed in'. He construes the phrase 'something somehow the red and
rectangular facing surface of a physical object' as referring to a particular
which belongs to a special category, and which, though not literally the red
and rectangular facing surface of a physical object, has properties which are
sufficiently analogous to the redness and rectangularity of the surface of
physical objects to warrant describing them as Sred and Srectangular.~ What
he wishes to stress is that P is aware o f this particular and, above all, that he is
aware of it as red and rectangular.

55. Smith, on the other hand, concentrates on the phrase 'something some-
how' and, duly stressing the 'transcendental' character of 'something' - i.e. the
fact that items belonging to radically different categories can be 'somethings',
- argues that the something in question is a sensing. The sensing is somehow
the red and rectangular facing surface of a physical object, because the verb
'to ~(red rectangle)' ha~ been introduced in such a way that kinds of visual
sensing belong to a family of families with logical properties modeled on the
family of families of the visible properties of physical objects.
 SENSA OR SENSlNGS 99

56. But what, we ask, of the dimension of awareness of something as

something on which Jones' account of sensing lays such stress? Does the verb
'to S(red rectangle)' stand for a variety of being aware? of being aware of
something? of being aware of something as something?

IV

57. It is at this point that two Smiths loom on the horizon. Let me
distinguish between m y puppet Smith and an independent character S m i t h -
Cornman. ~ Leaving the former aside for later development, I shall explore
briefly the views of the latter on the topic under consideration.
S m i t h - C o r n m a n : An objectless sensing is as such an awareness or experience of, for
example, a red rectangle in physical space. The words 'awareness' and 'experience' are
here used in an intensional sense such that what P is said to be aware o f or experience
need n o t actually exist.

Thus, according to Smith-Cornman - I do not say Comman simpliciter, be-

cause I found his views on this topic, if not inscrutable, at least most difficult
to scrute - when

P S(red rectangle)s

P has an awareness or an experience, in an intensional sense, of a physical red

rectangle,

P experiences i a red rectangle.

58. One is naturally tempted to assimilate Smith-Cornman's objectless

sensings to occurrent believings of belief tendencies, or to say that they
contain the latter as constituents. This would account for their non-extension-
ality. But such an interpretation would run into a serious roadblock in the
fact that Cornman rejects out of hand any attempt to explicate the experience
involved in visual perception in terms of beliefs or belief tendencies. Certainly
he rejects the equation of the experiences in question with believings or belief
tendencies. 4 And it seems equally clear that he would reject the view that
sensings include a doxastic constituent.

59. Comman does not explicitly discuss the explanatory role of the idea that
100 WILFRID SELLARS

there are objectless sensings. Yet he does tie them closely to appearings. Thus
he would, I take it, agree that
P red rectangle senses

or, as Smith-Cornman would put it

P S(red rectangie)s

is closely tied to

There appears to P to be a physical object which is red and

rectangular on the facing surface.

60. And since, as I understand it, he holds that

P red rectangle senses

entails

P experiences i a physical red rectangle.

I am almost tempted to ascribe to him an 'another language' approach to ob-

jectless sensings. Cornman never explicitly examines the merits of such an
account, though much of what he says is compatible with it, and it would
make his thesis that in optimal conditions, to use his example,
a red table sensing

takes on the 'supervenient' character of being the perception (in the achieve-
ment sense) of a red table, 5 an intelligible, if not entirely satisfying one. After
all, the claim that it is a conceptual truth that if in standard conditions there
appears to P to be a physical object with a red and rectangular facing surface,
then P sees a physical object with a red and rectangular facing surface is not
only familiar but plausible.

61. As it is, Cornman resorts to ~unanalyzable supervenient properties' and

appeals briefly to analogies with ethical properties and successful performances
of marriage rites. 6

62. Cornman, of course, could scarcely take the 'another language' approach
if he agreed with m y account of what it is for there to appear to Jones to be a
red table in front of him, for
 SENSA OR SENSINGS 101

(a) I equate this with an ostensible seeing of a red table

(b) I build a doxastic element (a taking) into the analysis of such
ostensible seeings as ostensibly seeing there to be a red table over
there.

It is clear, however, that Comman's sensings do not include a doxastic com-

ponent.

63. I assume, then, that when Cornman refers to

a red table sensing

as an

experience i of a red table

he does not conceive it to be an experience i of a red table as a red table

though he does refer to it as an experience o f a table as red - a fact which
reinforces m y uneasy feeling that Cornman does, after all, think of his object-
less sensings as experiences i of what they are of as what they are of.

64. Cornman's sensings are indeed objectless - but if one means by 'object'
an actually existing individual as Cornman seems to do, then a sensing could
lack such an object and nevertheless have an object in the sense in which a
belief has an object whether or not the belief is true.

65. Instead o f attributing such views to Cornman, I shall ascribe them to the
construct Smith--Cornman and return to Smith proper who definitely does
n o t think o f his objectless sensings as experiences of, for example, a red rec-
tangle as a red rectangle, though he is prepared to call them experiences. For
Smith, to say that an experience is, in the relevant sense

an experience i of a red rectangle

is simply to say what kind o f experience it is; as to say that a dancing is

a dancing o f a waltz

is to say what kind of dancing it is.

66. Thus the Smith I have in mind - and in this respect he differs from
102 WILFRID SELLARS

S m i t h - C o m m a n - answers no to the third question raised in paragraph 56

above and, as far as the first two questions are concerned, says that from the
fact that PS(red rectangle)s it follows only that he is conscious in the sense in
which someone who has been knocked out is not conscious, and that he is
conscious o f something only in the sense in which a dancing, on a certain
occasion, is a dancing of a waltz.

67. But is there, then, O Smith! nothing to what Jones is saying? After all,
even when there merely appears to P to be a physical object which is red
and rectangular on its facing side, surely there is an awareness on P's part of
something as red and rectangular. And what can this something be on your
account but the objectless sensing itself?. Must we not have

P S(red rectangle)s and is aware of this sensing as ....

As what? As a red rectangle? As a rectangle of red? As the red and rectangular

facing surface of a physical object? Clearly not the latter, at least not in any
achievement sense, for ex hypothesi there is no such facing surface of a
physical object. And Smith does not wish to claim that P is aware of an S(red
rectangle)ing as an S(red rectangle)ing, any more than Jones wished to claim
that P is aware of a sensum as a sensum.

68. Suppose, now, that under this pressure Smith agrees that in the circum-
stance in question P is aware of what is in point o f fact (according to his
theory) as S(red rectangle)ing, but is aware of it as the red and rectangular
facing surface of a physical object. He is aware of an objectless sensing, but
takes it - indeed mistakes it - to be the red and rectangular facing surface of
a physical object. We may now well ask what is the difference between Jones
and Smith?

69. There is a straightforward but superficial answer which, in appearance at

least, is largely a matter of terminology. In his explanatory framework, Jones
uses the verb 'to sense' for an awareness of something as something. On the
other hand Smith uses the verb 'to sense' for the 'object' of an awareness of
something as something. Schematically

Jones: sensing
awareness ~s x (sensum) an S(red rectangle)
a red rectangle
 SENSA OR SENSINGS 103

Smith: awareness ~s x (a sensing) an S(red rectangle)ing

a red rectangle

70. Yet surely, we are tempted to say, whatever the structural similarity
between the two packages, there is a radical difference in ontological status
between
an S(red rectangle)

construed as a particular or individual, and

an S(red rectangle)ing

construed as analogous to a waltzing.

71. At this point we must appeal to a whole new set of intuitions. For, some-
one might ask, is it so obvious that waltzings are not particulars? And if they
are, might not objectless sensings be particulars - even phenomenal particulars?
And if so, what would the supposed ontological difference between the two
theories really amount to?

72. Still sticking to the surface, we might note that Smith, unlike Jones,
finds it unproblematic to say that there are no unsensed S(red rectangle)s.
He must be careful about this, however, for as choreographers know, there
are undanced dances, dances planned on the drawing board, but never
executed. He rephrases his point by saying that there are no S(red rectangle)s
which actually occur, but occur unsensed. He avails himself of a familiar
slogan: The esse of S(red rectangle) is percipi O.e. sentiri, being sensed). On
the other hand, he admits, indeed insists, that a sensing can occur without
being an object of awareness, let alone awareness as.

73. Jones, on the other hand, can be easily puzzled by the question 'are there
any unsensed sensa?' In his model this corresponds to the question: Are there
any unseen physical objects? And to this the answer is, obviously, "yes'. It
would be logically odd to say of an item that its existence depends on some-
ones being aware of it as something. Yet Jones has a ready reply. After all, he
has introduced sensa for their explanatory power with respect to the context
104 WILFRID SELLARS

There appears to P to be a physical object which is red and

rectangular on the facing side

It is with respect to such contexts that he postulates a sensum (an S(red

rectangle)) and a sensing of it as a red rectangle. Is he committed to the view
that apart from such contexts there are no unsensed sensa? He now answers:
Certainly not !

74. But if there are unsensed sensa what might their status be? Jones has
already agreed with Smith that sensa do not exist in physical space in the per-
ceivers environment. He now adds that they depend for their existence on the
perceiver - not, of course, by virtue of being sensed (i.e. objects of awareness
as), but in some other way. He suggests that they are causally dependent on
states of the perceiver, P, which states can occur without there appearing to
P to be, for example, a physical object which is red and rectangular on its
facing side.

75. We reformulate our question: What, exactly, is the difference between

an S(red rectangle)

which is causally dependent on a certain state of the perceiver, and an S(red

rectangle) the esse of which is to be an objectless sensing? Perhaps it is simply
that sensa are not states o f perceivers, whereas objectless sensings are. And
with this reformulation we come to the ontological crunch. After all, what
makes it true that an objectless sensing occurs is, for example, the fact expres-
sed by
P S(red rectangles)s

which has the straightforward form, subject-verb. On the other hand, in spite
of all the sophistication Jones has introduced, he remains committed to the
relational form
(Ex) S(red rectangle) x 9 R(P, x ) .

76. I suggested a moment ago that an objectless sensing might be a particular,

hoping to bridge the gap between the two positions. But it is by no means
obvious how this maneuver might be carried out. To say that an object is in a
certain state looks very much like saying that it has a certain property.
 SENSA OR SENSINGS 105

Properties are surely abstract entities. Is not the same true of states? Does
not

P S(red rectangle)s

ascribe the property ofS(red rectangle)ing to P - as

Socrates runs

ascribes the property of running to Socrates? Of course! This, however, is

not the end but the beginning of the story. Can we rest content with the idea
that only one individual is logically involved in each of these situations?
Socrates, of course, is a whole of parts - but it is the whole that runs. If there
is a running, it is a running by Socrates, and not a part of Socrates.

77. Many are tempted to say that in addition to Socrates and to the property
o f running, there is an individual which is a running. One refers to Socrates'
instance of running. But if there is an individual which is a running, why is
it logically necessary that it belong to a person or animal? Might there not be,
so to speak, a detached running? The obvious move is to reply that there can
no more be a running without a runner than there can be a master without a
slave - and for the same reason. These are 'correlative concepts'. But while
nothing can be a master by itself, it can be a person. What, then, might a run-
ning be in its own right?

78. For reasons which transcend the scope of this paper, I do not think that
the search for individuals which are instances of running, nor by analogy,
o f S(red rectangle)ing is promising. There is, of course, the fact that Socrates
runs and the state of affairs of Socrates running. But the verbs in question
are so closely tied to persons as subjects of which the verbs are predicated
that it is difficult to see how the gap between Jones' sensa which are tied
to perceivers by causal ties and Smith's objectless sensings, which are logically
tied to perceivers, can be bridged.

79. It is worth noting that David Hume found himself confronted by a

related problem in attempting to defend a bundle theory of the self. The
words 'perception' and 'thought' are so tied to the context '(person)
perceivers', '(person) thinks' that to say that persons consist of perceptions
106 WILFRID SELLARS

and thoughts has an inescapable air of vicious circularity. What is a perception

if it is not a person perceiving? a thought but a person thinking?

vi

80. Smith has put at the center of his theory the verb

to S(red rectangle)

which he construes as a verb which takes a genuine subject. But if we want a

verb, there is another model; and since both Jones and Smith agree that the
idea that there are sensations is a theory, they can be wide ranging in their
choice of models. Perhaps what is misleading Smith is not the verb character
of his model, but its subject bound character.

81. Many philosophers have attempted to use another category of verbs as

their model, namely those verbs which have no subjects - or, better, take
such strange subjects as 'it'. Consider the verb 'to thunder'. Except in a
metaphorical sense nothing thunders. Consider

It thunders.
There was thunder, it thundered.
There is a flash over there; it flashes over there.

As the last example suggests there are verbal nouns to correspond to the
verbs. C. D. Broad 7 has asked us to consider a sound. The sound is produced
by a vibrating string. And, indeed, the verb 'to sound' can be used with a
genuine subject, thus

The trumpets sounded.

Soundings by trumpets are, in this sense, analogous to dancings by a dancer.

But there are sounds in a more basic sense than that in which there are
soundings by trumpets. There are sounds in physical space which, produced
by physical objects, are not themselves 'physical objects' as specified by
philosophical paradigms.

82. Consider a case where there appears to P to be a sound coming from a

 SENSA OR SENSINGS 107

certain place in his physical environment. Smith says that what there appears
to be is a middle C#ing.
It appears to P to middle C # over there

Suppose there is no middle C#ing over there; well, Smith and Jones agree that
P has an auditory sensation of a middle C #. This time Smith takes the
initative. He introduces the verb 'to S(middle 6'#) '. But this time, instead of
tying this verb to perceivers as subjects

e S(middle C#)s

he simply follows his model by saying that

It S(middle C#)s.

Thus even when it is false that there is a physical middle C#ing in physical
space, there can be an S(middle C#)ing. Smith denies that the S(middle C#) -
ing is a state of the perceiver P and claims rather, wrapping himself in the
banner of revisionary metaphysics, a revision within the manifest image -
that it is a constituent of P as seen b y a revisionary eye.

83. Indeed, his mood is contagious, and David Hume from Santayana's
Limbo echoes - yes! that is what I shoud have said:
An S(middle C#)ing is a constituent of the bundle which is P

To which he adds; awarenesses of S(middle C#)ings and even awarenesses

of S(middle C#)ings as middle C#ings can also be constituents of the bundle.

84. Smith now claims that it is this model which he should have used and,
perhaps, was implicitly using, when considering visual sensations. Thus,
when P has a sensation of a red rectangle, it is because
It S(red rectangle)s

and this S(red rectangle)ing is a constituent of P. To which, he adds, the esse

of S(red rectangle)s is being S(red rectangle)ed, just as the esse of claps of
thunder is being thundered.

85. Notice that Smith can still treat S(red rectangle)ing as a kind of sensing,
108 WILFRID SELLARS

provided that he treats the verb 'to sense' in a similar way, thus

It sensed

and compares

It sensed a S(middle C#)ing

to

It thundered a dull rumble

86. Of course, he can introduce in his revisionary metaphysics the locution

P has a sensation of a red rectangle

P has a sensation of a middle C#ing

but they would be explicated in terms of the context

An S(red rectangle)ing is a constituent of P

An ~(middle C#)ing is a constituent o f P .

87. I hope that this strategy gives at least the appearance of bridging the gap
between Jones and Smith. Each gives a little and takes a little. The crucial
point is that Smith's objectless sensings now have a reasonable claim to being
individuals or particulars, but this time in the way in which flashes and claps
of thunder are individuals or particulars.

88. Of course, the difference in terminology remains - Jones using the verb
'to sense' for a form of awareness as, Smith using it as a generic verb under
which 'to S(red rectangle)' and 'to S(middle C#) ' fall as more specific verbs.
But an olive branch is possible even here. For once Smith rids himself of any
temptation to think of his sensings as a form of awareness as, he can be
tempted to hold that the essential fact about sensations is their role in percep-
tual experience. This role is, in part, a causal one involving the sensory
apparatus of the perceiver. He notes that he can preserve the point that
sensations are not objects in a sense which apes physical ob]ecthood and, by
aping the latter generates familiar puzzles. Indeed he can grant that to be a
sensing is a relational character of an S(middle C#)ing. We would then have:

Jones: awarenessa~ x an S(red rectangle)

a red rectangle
 SENSA OR SENSINGS 109

to which he adds

An S(red rectangle) is a sensum by virtue of its specific causal

dependence on the perceiver and not by virtue of its being an
object of awareness as.

Smith: awareness a~ x an S(red rectangle)ing

a red rectangle

to which he adds
An S(red rectangle)ing is a sensing by virtue of its specific causal
dependence on the perceiver and not by virtue of its being an
object of awareness as.

VII

89. I shall conclude with some further reflections on the awareness as which
Jones and Smith have built into their accounts of ostensible perceptions. How
is it related to what I have called the taking? I f one thing is clear, it is that in
perception we do not take what in point o f fact,according to the new Jonesean
and Smithian theories, are sensa (or sensing) to be such. But might we not
take them to be, for example, the red and rectangular facing surface of a
physical object, or a middle C#ing in the corner? Might we not, so to speak
mis-categorize them as items in the physical environment. Of course, such a
taking would be a mis-taking. But, after all, we were given our perceptual
abilities not for the purpose of ontological insight, but to enable us to find
our way around iaa a hostile environment - just as we were given pain to get
our hands quickly off hot stoves.

90. It can be argued that what we are aware of in perception is what we per-
ceptually take there to be, what, as I put it, we perceptually believe in. But
if what we are aware of is what we take there to be, what remains of the idea
that what we are aware of is a sensum or an objectless sensing? The auditory
example is relatively unproblematic. After all, is the idea that we mistake a
sensory process for a process in the physical environment, an S(middle C#) -
ing for a middle Cging over there in physical space so paradoxical? Might
not the referent of the mental 'this' be the S(middle C~)ing? After all, when P
110 WILFRID SELLARS

mistakes a bush for a dangerous bear, would we hesitate to say that he makes
a mental reference to the bush? I will immediately be reminded that some
account is necessary of sensory over-there-ness and relative sensory location.
It will be remembered, however, that whereas I denied (in w47) that we see
or hear of what we see or hear their character as being located in physical
space, I did not deny that we see or hear of them their relative spatial
location. The operative word was physical.

91. What of the sensed red rectangle? Suppose we perceptually take there to
be a physical object which is red and rectangular on its facing side.

This red and rectangular on its facing side physical object...

Why should we single out a red rectangle to be the object of a privileged

awareness of something as something? There appears to P to be a physical
object which is red and rectangular on its facing side. Reflection has assured
us that what P sees of the object is at most its facing side, and in the case of
mere appearance, he only ostensibly sees such a facing side. The perceptual
taking indeed contains not only a reference to a physical object (e.g. a brick),
but to a facing side,

This red brick with this red and rectangular facing side.

92. When we ask what is (ostensibly) seen o f the brick one naturally answers
- its red and rectangular facing side. And it is the red and rectangular facing
side which is - even in cases of mere appearance - somehow present in the
experience other than as merely believed in - which cannot be said of the
brick as a whole. And it was by reflecting on this fact that the theories of
Jones and Smith got under way.

93. I, therefore, suggest that even when a visual taking is conceptually rich,
as in the example of

This red brick with a red and rectangular facing side...

it includes as a proper part

this red and rectangular facing side

and it is the referent of this conceptual 'this' which is taken to be the red and
 S E N S A OR S E N S I N G S 111

rectangular facing side o f a physical object, thus c o n s t i t u t i n g an awareness o f

the referent o f 'this' as the red and rectangular facing side o f a physical object,
in this case a brick.

94. I can see no m o r e in J o n e s ' c o n c e p t o f 'sensing as' in the c o n t e x t 'P

senses a sensum and senses it as red and rectangular' than this e l e m e n t o f the
perceptual taking. A n d the same holds true o f what S m i t h has c o m e to h o l d
during the course o f the dialogue. During this course, the phrase 'sensing as'
has disappeared, to be replaced by the m o r e familiar epistemic c o n c e p t o f
'awareness as'. I f this is correct, then, w h e n there appears to P to be a
physical object with a red and rectangular facing surface:

(a) There is a sensum or obfectless sensing which is an S(red rectan-

gle) or an S(red rectangle)ing;
(b) P is aware o f ( c o n c e p t u a l l y refers to) this sensum or sensing;
(c) P mistakes this sensum or sensing to be the red and rectangular
facing surface o f a physical object.

University o f Pittsburgh
NOTES

* This paper was read at the University of North Carolina Colloquium, October 1976.
Research for this paper was supported by a grant from the National Endowment for the
Humanities in connection with a Fellowship at the Center for Advanced Studies in the
Behavioral Sciences. Many of the ideas in this essay have since been developed in other
contexts. See, in particular, my Carus lectures, 'Foundations for a metaphysics of pure
process', The Monist 64 (1981).
1 Following the tradition I use the verb 'to waltz' as though, unlike 'to Tango', one
person could waltz. (The sensitive reader can substitute 'hornpipe'.)
2 I assume that the reader is, by this time, thoroughly aware that I am working within
the 'Manifest Image', according to which physical objects have color in the occurrent,
aesthetically interesting sense, as contrasted with Lockean powers, grounded in the
properties of micro-physical objects. That there really are no such things as the colored
objects of the Manifest Image so construed - i.e. construed as physical objects in the
physical environment in which perceivers find themselves, and that the above mentioned
'analogy' is really an identity of content to be transposed from one categorial frame-
work to another is the end result of an argument of which the present essay is but the
beginning.
3 The Comman component is based on an interpretation of the views expressed by
James Cornman in Perception, Common Sense, and Science [PCSS] (New Haven, 1974).
4 PCSS, p. 345.
s PCSS, pp. 341-3.
6 Ibid.
7 Examination ofMcTaggart's Philosophy, Vol. I, Cambridge, 193-.