CASE DIGEST : Chavez Vs Gonzales

G.R. No. 168338 February 15, 2008 FRANCISCO CHAVEZ, petitioner, vs. RAUL M.
GONZALES, in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Justice; and NATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (NTC), respondents.

Facts : Sometime before 6 June 2005, the radio station dzMM aired the Garci Tapes where the parties to
the conversation discussed "rigging" the results of the 2004 elections to favor President Arroyo. On 6
June 2005, Presidential spokesperson Ignacio Bunye (Bunye) held a press conference in Malacañang
Palace, where he played before the presidential press corps two compact disc recordings of
conversations between a woman and a man. Bunye identified the woman in both recordings as President
Arroyo but claimed that the contents of the second compact disc had been "spliced" to make it appear
that President Arroyo was talking to Garcillano. On 11 June 2005, the NTC issued a press release
warning radio and television stations that airing the Garci Tapes is a "cause for the suspension,
revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or authorizations" issued to them.5 On 14 June 2005, NTC
officers met with officers of the broadcasters group, Kapisanan ng mga Broadcasters sa Pilipinas (KBP),
to dispel fears of censorship. The NTC and KBP issued a joint press statement expressing commitment to
press freedom

Issue : WON the NTC warning embodied in the press release of 11 June 2005 constitutes an
impermissible prior restraint on freedom of expression

Held : When expression may be subject to prior restraint, apply in this jurisdiction to only four categories
of expression, namely: pornography, false or misleading advertisement, advocacy of imminent lawless
action, and danger to national security. All other expression is not subject to prior restrain Expression not
subject to prior restraint is protected expression or high-value expression. Any content-based prior
restraint on protected expression is unconstitutional without exception. A protected expression means
what it says – it is absolutely protected from censorship Prior restraint on expression is content-based if
the restraint is aimed at the message or idea of the expression. Courts will subject to strict scrutiny
content-based restraint. If the prior restraint is not aimed at the message or idea of the expression, it is
content-neutral even if it burdens expression The NTC action restraining the airing of the Garci Tapes is a
content-based prior restraint because it is directed at the message of the Garci Tapes. The NTC’s claim
that the Garci Tapes might contain "false information and/or willful misrepresentation," and thus should
not be publicly aired, is an admission that the restraint is content-based The public airing of the Garci
Tapes is a protected expression because it does not fall under any of the four existing categories of
unprotected expression recognized in this jurisdiction. The airing of the Garci Tapes is essentially a
political expression because it exposes that a presidential candidate had allegedly improper
conversations with a COMELEC Commissioner right after the close of voting in the last presidential
elections. The content of the Garci Tapes affects gravely the sanctity of the ballot. Public discussion on
the sanctity of the ballot is indisputably a protected expression that cannot be subject to prior restraint.
Public discussion on the credibility of the electoral process is one of the highest political expressions of
any electorate, and thus deserves the utmost protection. If ever there is a hierarchy of protected
expressions, political expression would occupy the highest rank. The rule, which recognizes no exception,
is that there can be no content-based prior restraint on protected expression. On this ground alone, the
NTC press release is unconstitutional. Of course, if the courts determine that the subject matter of a
wiretapping, illegal or not, endangers the security of the State, the public airing of the tape becomes
unprotected expression that may be subject to prior restraint. However, there is no claim here by
respondents that the subject matter of the Garci Tapes involves national security and publicly airing the
tapes would endanger the security of the State. The alleged violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law is not in
itself a ground to impose a prior restraint on the airing of the Garci Tapes because the Constitution
expressly prohibits the enactment of any law, and that includes anti-wiretapping laws, curtailing freedom
of expression. The only exceptions to this rule are the four recognized categories of unprotected
expression. However, the content of the Garci Tapes does not fall under any of these categories of
unprotected expression.
Chavez vs. Gonzales (2008) (Political Law)
Francisco Chavez vs. Raul M. Gonzales and NTC | G.R. No. 168338 | February 15, 2008

Facts: As a consequence of the public release of copies of the “Hello Garci” compact disc audiotapes
involving a wiretapped mobile phone conversation between then-President Gloria Arroyo and Comelec
Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano, respondent DOJ Secretary Gonzales warned reporters that those who
had copies of the CD and those broadcasting or publishing its contents could be held liable under the
Anti-Wiretapping Act. He also stated that persons possessing or airing said tapes were committing a
continuing offense, subject to arrest by anybody. Finally, he stated that he had ordered the NBI to go after
media organizations “found to have caused the spread, the playing and the printing of the contents of a
tape.” Meanwhile, respondent NTC warned TV and radio stations that their broadcast/airing of such false
information and/or willful misrepresentation shall be a just cause for the suspension, revocation and/or
cancellation of the licenses or authorizations issued to the said media establishments. Petitioner Chavez
filed a petition under Rule 65 against respondents Secretary Gonzales and the NTC directly with the
Supreme Court.

Issues: (1) Will a purported violation of law such as the Anti-Wiretapping Law justify straitjacketing the
exercise of freedom of speech and of the press? (2) Did the mere press statements of respondents DOJ
Secretary and the NTC constitute a form of content-based prior restraint that has transgressed the
Constitution?

Held: (1) No, a purported violation of law such as the Anti-Wiretapping Law will not justify
straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press. A governmental action that restricts
freedom of speech or of the press based on content is given the strictest scrutiny, with
the government having the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality by the clear and
present danger rule. This rule applies equally to all kinds of media, including broadcast
media. Respondents, who have the burden to show that these acts do not abridge freedom of speech and
of the press, failed to hurdle the clear and present danger test. For this failure of the respondents alone to
offer proof to satisfy the clear and present danger test, the Court has no option but to uphold the exercise
of free speech and free press. There is no showing that the feared violation of the anti-wiretapping law
clearly endangers the national security of the State.

(2) Yes, the mere press statements of respondents DOJ Secretary and the NTC constituted a form of
content-based prior restraint that has transgressed the Constitution. It is not decisive that the press
statements made by respondents were not reduced in or followed up with formal orders or circulars. It is
sufficient that the press statements were made by respondents while in the exercise of their official
functions. Any act done, such as a speech uttered, for and on behalf of the government in an official
capacity is covered by the rule on prior restraint. The concept of an “act” does not limit itself to acts
already converted to a formal order or official circular. Otherwise, the non formalization of an act into an
official order or circular will result in the easy circumvention of the prohibition on prior restraint
Case Digests: Statutory Construction
Socorro Ramirez Vs. CA
248 SCRA 590
Facts:
A civil case for damages was filed by petitioner Socorro Ramirez in the RTC of Quezon City
alleging that the private respondent, Ester Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter’s office,
allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a “hostile and furious mood” and in a
manner offensive to petitioner’s dignity and personality, “contrary to morals, good customs
and public policy.”
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event. The
transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the
confrontation made by petitioner.
As a result of petitioner’s recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly
taping the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the RTC
of Pasay City for violation of RA 4200, entitled “An Act to Prohibit and Penalize
Wiretapping and Other Related Violations of Private Communication, and Other Purposes.”
Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information on
the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense particularly a violation of RA
4200. The trial court granted the Motion to Quash, agreeing with petitioner.
From the trial court’s Order, the private respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari
with this Court, which forthwith referred the case to the CA.
Respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed Decision declaring the trial court’s
order null and void.
Issue:
W/N RA 4200 applies to taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to a
conversation.
Held:
Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the
language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express
terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be
either impossible or absurd or would lead to an injustice.
Section 1 of RA 4200 clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not
authorized by all parties to any private communication, to secretly record such
communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the
party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from
those involved in the private communication. The statute’s intent to penalize all persons
unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of qualifier “any.”
Consequently, as respondent CA correctly concluded, “even a (person) privy to a
communication who records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of
the latter (will) qualify as a violator under this provision of RA 4200.
The unambiguity of the express words of the provision therefore plainly supports the view
held by the respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the
private communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.
Stat Con Principle: Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of the
statute.
Legal Maxims: Verba Legis (the statute must be interpreted literally if the language of the
statute is plain and free from ambiguity)
 ZALDY NUEZ, Complainant, vs.

ELVIRA CRUZ-APAO, Respondent.

A.M. No. CA-05-18-P; April 12, 2005

Facts:

The complaint arose out of respondent’s solicitation of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) from
Zaldy Nuez (Complainant) in exchange for a speedy and favorable decision of the latter’s pending
case in the Court of Appeals.

Complainant earlier sought the assistance of Imbestigador. The crew of the TV program
accompanied him to PAOCCF-SPG where he lodged a complaint against respondent for extortion.
Thereafter, he communicated with respondent again to verify if the latter was still asking for the
money and to set up a meeting with her. Upon learning that respondent’s offer of a favorable
decision in exchange for One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) was still standing, the plan for the
entrapment operation was formulated by Imbestigador in cooperation with the PAOCC.

During the hearing of this case, respondent would like the court to believe that she never had any
intention of committing a crime, that the offer of a million pesos for a favorable decision came from
complainant and that it was complainant and the law enforcers who instigated the whole incident.

When she was asked if she had sent the text messages contained in complainant’s cellphone and
which reflected her cellphone number, respondent admitted those that were not incriminating but
claimed she did not remember those that clearly showed she was transacting with complainant.

Respondent thus stated that she met with complainant only to tell the latter to stop calling and
texting her, not to get the One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as pre-arranged.

Issue:

Whether or not the text messages are admissible as evidence in court?

Held:
Yes. Complainant was able to prove by his testimony in conjunction with the text messages from
respondent duly presented before the Committee that the latter asked for One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00) in exchange for a favorable decision of the former’s pending case with the CA. The
text messages were properly admitted by the Committee since the same are now covered by
Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence65 which provides:

“Ephemeral electronic communication” refers to telephone conversations, text messages . . . and

other electronic forms of communication the evidence of which is not recorded or retained.”

Under Section 2, Rule 11 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, “Ephemeral electronic

communications shall be proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or who
has personal knowledge thereof . . . .” In this case, complainant who was the recipient of said
messages and therefore had personal knowledge thereof testified on their contents and import.
Respondent herself admitted that the cellphone number reflected in complainant’s cellphone from
which the messages originated was hers. Moreover, any doubt respondent may have had as to the
admissibility of the text messages had been laid to rest when she and her counsel signed and
attested to the veracity of the text messages between her and complainant. It is also well to
remember that in administrative cases, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly
applied.

The Court has no doubt as to the probative value of the text messages as evidence in determining
the guilt or lack thereof of respondent in this case.
GANAAN V IAC

7 NOV

G.R. No. L-69809 | October 16, 1986 | J. Gutierrez Jr.

Facts:
Complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon were in the living room of
complainant’s residence discussing the terms for the withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault
which they filed with the Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu against Leonardo Laconico. After they had
decided on the proposed conditions, complainant made a telephone call to Laconico. That same
morning, Laconico telephoned appellant, who is a lawyer, to come to his office and advise him on the
settlement of the direct assault case because his regular lawyer, Atty. Leon Gonzaga, went on a
business trip.

When complainant called, Laconico requested appellant to secretly listen to the telephone
conversation through a telephone extension so as to hear personally the proposed conditions for the
settlement. Twenty minutes later, complainant called again to ask Laconico if he was agreeable to the
conditions. Laconico answered ‘Yes’. Complainant then told Laconico to wait for instructions on
where to deliver the money.

Complainant called again and instructed Laconico to give the money to his wife at the office of the
then Department of Public Highways. Laconico who earlier alerted his friend Colonel Zulueta of the
Criminal Investigation Service of the Philippine Constabulary, insisted that complainant himself
should receive the money. When he received the money at the Igloo Restaurant, complainant was
arrested by agents of the Philippine Constabulary.

Appellant executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he heard complainant demand
P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the case for direct assault. Laconico attached the affidavit of
appellant to the complainant for robbery/extortion which he filed against complainant. Since
appellant listened to the telephone conversation without complainant’s consent, complainant
charged appellant and Laconico with violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act.

The lower court found both Gaanan and Laconico guilty of violating Section 1 of Republic Act No.
4200, which prompted petitioner to appeal. The IAC affirmed with modification hence the present
petition for certiorari.

Issue:
W/N an extension telephone is covered by the term “device or arrangement” under Rep. Act No.
4200

Held:
No. The law refers to a “tap” of a wire or cable or the use of a “device or arrangement” for the
purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communication. There must be either
a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in
order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words.
An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the
other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as
“tapping” the wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in this case was not installed
for that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use.
Zulueta vs Court of Appeals
Caption:
Cecilia Zulueta vs Court of Appeals and Alfredo Martin
(253 SCRA 699)
GR no. 107383 February 20, 1996

Facts:
Cecilia Zulueta is the Petitioner who offset the private papers of his husband Dr. Alfredo Martin. Dr. Martin
is a doctor of medicine while he is not in his house His wife took the 157 documents consisting of diaries,
cancelled check, greeting cards, passport and photograph, private respondents between her Wife and his
alleged paramours, by means of forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet. Cecilia Zulueta filed the papers
for the evidence of her case of legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of
medicine against her husband.
Dr. Martin brought the action for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages against Zulueta,
with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch X. the trial court rendered judgment for Martin, declaring
him the capital/exclusive owner of the properties described in paragraph 3 ofMartin’s Complaint or those
further described in the Motion to Return and Suppress and ordering Zulueta and any person acting in her
behalf to a immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him P5,000.00, as nominal
damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages and attorney’s fees; and to pay the costs of the suit. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Zulueta filed the petition for review
with the Supreme Court.

Issue:
The papers and other materials obtained from forcible entrusion and from unlawful means are admissible
as evidence in court regarding marital separation and disqualification from medical practice.

Ruling/Held:
The documents and papers are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring “the
privacy of communication and correspondence to be inviolable is no less applicable simply because it is
the wife who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband’s infidelity, who is the party against whom the
constitutional provision is to be enforced.
The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a lawful order from a court or when
public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law. Any violation of this provision renders the
evidence obtained inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The intimacies between husband and
wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking
them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed
his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to
him or to her. The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it
privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the
affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other
as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for
specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each
one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each
owes to the other.
ULUETA VS. CA
ZULUETA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 107383, February 20, 1996

Petitioner: Cecilia Zulueta

Respondents: Court of Appeals and Alfredo Martin

Ponente: J. Mendoza

Facts:

This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch X) which ordered
petitioner to return documents and papers taken by her from private respondent's
clinic without the latter's knowledge and consent.

Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On

March 26, 1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine,
and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private respondent's secretary,
forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband's clinic and took 157
documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his
alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's
passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in
evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of
medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.

Issue:

(1) Whether or not the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in
evidence;
Held:

(1) No. Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence.
The constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and
correspondence [to be] inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it is the
wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is the party
against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to
the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from a] court or
when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any
violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any
purpose in any proceeding."

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in
breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any
telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not
shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional
protection is ever available to him or to her.

The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by

making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other
without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither
may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication
received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for
specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is
a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has
nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.

The review for petition is DENIED for lack of merit.