G.R. No.
152133 February 9, 2006 hit by the stone, victim Cantre stopped for a moment and held his back.
ROLLIE CALIMUTAN, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL., Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court, petitioner Rollie Calimutan prays for the reversal of the Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 23306, dated 29 August 2001, 1affirming
the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 46, of Masbate,
Masbate, in Criminal Case No. 8184, dated 19 November 1998, 2 finding
petitioner Calimutan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide
under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Information3 filed with the RTC charged petitioner Calimutan with the
crime of homicide, allegedly committed as follows –
That on or about February 4, 1996, in the morning thereof, at sitio Capsay,
Barangay Panique, Municipality of Aroroy, Province of Masbate, Philippines
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with
intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and throw a stone at PHILIP CANTRE, hitting him at the back left
portion of his body, resulting in laceration of spleen due to impact which
caused his death a day after.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Masbate, Masbate, September 11, 1996.
Accordingly, the RTC issued, on 02 December 1996, a warrant 4 for the arrest
of petitioner Calimutan. On 09 January 1997, however, he was provisionally
released5 after posting sufficient bailbond.6 During the arraignment on 21 May
1997, petitioner Calimutan pleaded not guilty to the crime of homicide charged
against him.7
In the course of the trial, the prosecution presented three witnesses, namely:
(1) Dr. Ronaldo B. Mendez, a Senior Medico-Legal Officer of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI); (2) Belen B. Cantre, mother of the victim, Philip
Cantre; and (3) Rene L. Sañano, companion of the victim Cantre when the
alleged crime took place. Their testimonies are collectively summarized below.
On 04 February 1996, at around 10:00 a.m., the victim Cantre and witness
Sañano, together with two other companions, had a drinking spree at a
videoke bar in Crossing Capsay, Panique, Aroroy, Masbate. From the videoke
bar, the victim Cantre and witness Sañano proceeded to go home to their
respective houses, but along the way, they crossed paths with petitioner
Calimutan and a certain Michael Bulalacao. Victim Cantre was harboring a
grudge against Bulalacao, suspecting the latter as the culprit responsible for
throwing stones at the Cantre’s house on a previous night. Thus, upon seeing
Bulalacao, victim Cantre suddenly punched him. While Bulalacao ran away,
petitioner Calimutan dashed towards the backs of victim Cantre and witness
Sañano. Petitioner Calimutan then picked up a stone, as big as a man’s fist,
which he threw at victim Cantre, hitting him at the left side of his back. When
Witness Sañano put himself between the victim Cantre and petitioner
Calimutan, and attempted to pacify the two, even convincing petitioner
Calimutan to put down another stone he was already holding. He also urged
victim Cantre and petitioner Calimutan to just go home. Witness Sañano
accompanied victim Cantre to the latter’s house, and on the way, victim Cantre
complained of the pain in the left side of his back hit by the stone. They arrived
at the Cantre’s house at around 12:00 noon, and witness Sañano left victim
Cantre to the care of the latter’s mother, Belen.8
Victim Cantre immediately told his mother, Belen, of the stoning incident
involving petitioner Calimutan. He again complained of backache and also of
stomachache, and was unable to eat. By nighttime, victim Cantre was
alternately feeling cold and then warm. He was sweating profusely and his
entire body felt numb. His family would have wanted to bring him to a doctor
but they had no vehicle. At around 3:00 a.m. of the following day, 05 February
1996, Belen was wiping his son with a piece of cloth, when victim Cantre asked
for some food. He was able to eat a little, but he also later vomited whatever
he ate. For the last time, he complained of backache and stomachache, and
shortly thereafter, he died.9
Right after his death, victim Cantre was examined by Dr. Conchita S. Ulanday,
the Municipal Health Officer of Aroroy, Masbate. The Post-Mortem
Examination Report10 and Certification of Death,11 issued and signed by Dr.
Ulanday, stated that the cause of death of victim Cantre was cardio-respiratory
arrest due to suspected food poisoning. The body of victim Cantre was
subsequently embalmed and buried on 13 February 1996.
Unsatisfied with the findings of Dr. Ulanday, the Cantre family, with the help of
the Lingkod Bayan-Circulo de Abogadas of the ABS-CBN Foundation,
requested for an exhumation and autopsy of the body of the victim Cantre by
the NBI. The exhumation and autopsy of the body of the victim Cantre was
conducted by Dr. Ronaldo B. Mendez on 15 April 1996,12 after which, he
reported the following findings –
Body; fairly well-preserved with sign of partial autopsy; clad in white Barong
Tagalog and blue pants placed inside a wooden golden-brown coffin and
buried in a concrete niche.
Contused-abrasion, 2.3 x 1.0 cms., posterior chest wall, left side.
Hematoma, 16.0 x 8.0 cms., abdomen, along mid-line.
Hemoperitoneum, massive, clotte [sic].
Laceration, spleen.
Other visceral organ, pale and embalmed.
Stomach contains small amount of whitish fluid and other partially digested
food particles.
xxxx
CAUSE OF DEATH: TRAUMATIC INJURY OF THE ABDOMEN.
In his testimony before the RTC, Dr. Mendez affirmed the contents of his
exhumation and autopsy report. He explained that the victim Cantre suffered
from an internal hemorrhage and there was massive accumulation of blood in
his abdominal cavity due to his lacerated spleen. The laceration of the spleen
can be caused by any blunt instrument, such as a stone. Hence, Dr. Mendez
confirmed the possibility that the victim Cantre was stoned to death by
petitioner Calimutan.13
To counter the evidence of the prosecution, the defense presented the sole
testimony of the accused, herein petitioner, Calimutan.
According to petitioner Calimutan, at about 1:00 p.m. on 04 February 1996, he
was walking with his house helper, Michael Bulalacao, on their way to Crossing
Capsay, Panique, Aroroy, Masbate, when they met with the victim Cantre and
witness Sañano. The victim Cantre took hold of Bulalacao and punched him
several times. Petitioner Calimutan attempted to pacify the victim Cantre but
the latter refused to calm down, pulling out from his waist an eight-inch
Batangas knife and uttering that he was looking for trouble, either "to kill or be
killed." At this point, petitioner Calimutan was about ten meters away from the
victim Cantre and was too frightened to move any closer for fear that the
enraged man would turn on him; he still had a family to take care of. When he
saw that the victim Cantre was about to stab Bulalacao, petitioner Calimutan
picked up a stone, which he described as approximately one-inch in diameter,
and threw it at the victim Cantre. He was able to hit the victim Cantre on his
right buttock. Petitioner Calimutan and Bulalacao then started to run away, and
victim Cantre chased after them, but witness Sañano was able to pacify the
victim Cantre. Petitioner Calimutan allegedly reported the incident to
a kagawad of Barangay Panique and to the police authorities and sought their
help in settling the dispute between Bulalacao and the victim Cantre.
Bulalacao, meanwhile, refused to seek medical help despite the advice of
petitioner Calimutan and, instead, chose to go back to his hometown.14
Petitioner Calimutan was totally unaware of what had happened to the victim
Cantre after the stoning incident on 04 February 1996. Some of his friends told
him that they still saw the victim Cantre drinking at a videoke bar on the night
of 04 February 1996. As far as he knew, the victim Cantre died the following
day, on 05 February 1996, because of food poisoning. Petitioner Calimutan
maintained that he had no personal grudge against the victim Cantre previous
to the stoning incident.15
On 19 November 1998, the RTC rendered its Decision, 16 essentially adopting
the prosecution’s account of the incident on 04 February 1996, and
pronouncing that –
It cannot be legally contended that the throwing of the stone by the accused
was in defense of his companion, a stranger, because after the boxing Michael
was able to run. While it appears that the victim was the unlawful aggressor at
the beginning, but the aggression already ceased after Michael was able to
run and there was no more need for throwing a stone. The throwing of the
stone to the victim which was a retaliatory act can be considered unlawful,
hence the accused can be held criminally liable under paragraph 1 of Art. 4 of
the Revised Penal Code.
The act of throwing a stone from behind which hit the victim at his back on the
left side was a treacherous one and the accused committed a felony causing
physical injuries to the victim. The physical injury of hematoma as a result of
the impact of the stone resulted in the laceration of the spleen causing the
death of the victim. The accused is criminally liable for all the direct and natural
consequences of this unlawful act even if the ultimate result had not been
intended. (Art. 4, Par. 1, Revised Penal Code; People vs. Narciso, CA-G.R.
No. 03532-CR, Jan. 13, 1964)
One is not relieved from criminal liability for the natural consequences of one’s
illegal acts merely because one does not intend to produce such
consequences (U.S. vs. Brobst, 14 Phil. 310).
The crime committed is Homicide as defined and penalized under Art. 249 of
the Revised Penal Code.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds and so holds that accused ROLLIE
CALIMUTAN is GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide
defined and penalized under Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code with no
mitigating or aggravating circumstance and applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law hereby imposes the penalty of imprisonment from EIGHT (8)
YEARS of Prision Mayor as minimum, to TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1)
DAY of Reclusion Temporal as maximum, and to indemnify the heirs of Philip
Cantre the sum of Fifty Thousand (₱50,000.00) Pesos as compensatory
damages and the sum of Fifty Thousand (₱50,000.00) Pesos as moral
damages, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Petitioner Calimutan appealed the Decision of the RTC to the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals, in its Decision, dated 29 August
2001,17 sustained the conviction of homicide rendered by the RTC against
petitioner Calimutan, ratiocinating thus –
The prosecution has sufficiently established that the serious internal injury
sustained by the victim was caused by the stone thrown at the victim by the
accused which, the accused-appellant does not deny. It was likewise shown
that the internal injury sustained by the victim was the result of the impact of
the stone that hit the victim. It resulted to a traumatic injury of the abdomen
causing the laceration of the victim’s spleen.
This is clearly shown by the autopsy report prepared by Dr. Ronaldo Mendez,
a Senior Medico Legal Officer of the NBI after the exhumation of the victim’s
cadaver…
The Court cannot give credence to the post mortem report prepared by
Municipal Health Officer Dr. Conchita Ulanday stating that the cause of the
victim’s death was food poisoning. Dr. Ulanday was not even presented to
testify in court hence she was not even able to identify and/or affirm the
contents of her report. She was not made available for cross-examination on
the accuracy and correctness of her findings.
Dr. Conchita Ulanday’s post mortem report cannot prevail over the autopsy
report (Exh. "C") of the Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI who testified and was
cross-examined by the defense.
Besides, if accused-appellant was convinced that the victim indeed died of
food poisoning, as reported by Dr. Conchita Ulanday, why did they not present
her as their witness to belie the report of the Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI.
The trial court’s evaluation of the testimony of Dr. Mendez is accorded the
highest respect because it had the opportunity to observe the conduct and
demeanor of said witness.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Masbate, Branch 46, finding accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide is hereby AFFIRMED.
The Court of Appeals, in its Resolution, dated 15 January 2002,18 denied the
Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner Calimutan for lack of merit since
the issues raised therein had already been passed and ruled upon in its
Decision, dated 29 August 2001.
Comes now petitioner Calimutan, by way of the present Petition for Review on
Certiorari, seeking (1) the reversal of the Decisions of the RTC, dated 19
November 1998, and of the Court of Appeals, dated 29 August 2001,
convicting him of the crime of homicide; and, (2) consequently, his acquittal of
the said crime based on reasonable doubt.
Petitioner Calimutan contended that the existence of the two autopsy reports,
with dissimilar findings on the cause of death of the victim Cantre, constituted
reasonable doubt as to the liability of petitioner Calimutan for the said death,
arguing that –
x x x [I]t was Dra. Conchita Ulanday, Municipal Health Officer of Aroroy,
Masbate was the first physician of the government who conducted an
examination on the cadaver of the victim Philip Cantre whose findings was that
the cause of his death was due to food poisoning while the second government
physician NBI Medico Legal Officer Dr. Ronaldo Mendez whose findings was
that the cause of the death was due to a traumatic injury of the abdomen
caused by a lacerated spleen and with these findings of two (2) government
physicians whose findings are at variance with each other materially, it is
humbly contended that the same issue raised a reasonable doubt on the
culpability of the petitioner.
As there are improbabilities and uncertainties of the evidence for the
prosecution in the case at bar, it suffices to reaise [sic] reasonable doubt as to
the petitioner’s guilt and therefore, he is entitled to acquittal (People vs.
Delmendo, G.R. No. 32146, November 23, 1981).19
In this jurisdiction, an accused in a criminal case may only be convicted if his
or her guilt is established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond
reasonable doubt requires only a moral certainty or that degree of proof which
produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind; it does not demand absolute
certainty and the exclusion of all possibility of error.20
In the Petition at bar, this Court finds that there is proof beyond reasonable
doubt to hold petitioner Calimutan liable for the death of the victim Cantre.
Undoubtedly, the exhumation and autopsy report and the personal testimony
before the RTC of prosecution witness, NBI Senior Medico-Legal Officer Dr.
Mendez, are vital pieces of evidence against petitioner Calimutan. Dr. Mendez
determined that the victim Cantre died of internal hemorrhage or bleeding due
to the laceration of his spleen. In his testimony, Dr. Mendez clearly and
consistently explained that the spleen could be lacerated or ruptured when the
abdominal area was hit with a blunt object, such as the stone thrown by
petitioner Calimutan at the victim Cantre.
It bears to emphasize that Dr. Mendez was presented by the prosecution as
an expert witness, whose "competency and academic qualification and
background" was admitted by the defense itself.21 As a Senior Medico-Legal
Officer of the NBI, Dr. Mendez is presumed to possess sufficient knowledge
of pathology, surgery, gynecology, toxicology, and such other branches of
medicine germane to the issues involved in a case.22
Dr. Mendez’s testimony as an expert witness is evidence,23 and although it
does not necessarily bind the courts, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals
had properly accorded it great weight and probative value. Having testified as
to matters undeniably within his area of expertise, and having performed a
thorough autopsy on the body of the victim Cantre, his findings as to the cause
of death of the victim Cantre are more than just the mere speculations of an
ordinary person. They may sufficiently establish the causal relationship
between the stone thrown by the petitioner Calimutan and the lacerated spleen
of the victim Cantre which, subsequently, resulted in the latter’s death. With no
apparent mistake or irregularity, whether in the manner by which Dr. Mendez
performed the autopsy on the body of the victim Cantre or in his findings, then
his report and testimony must be seriously considered by this Court.
Moreover, reference to other resource materials on abdominal injuries would
also support the conclusion of Dr. Mendez that the stone thrown by petitioner
Calimutan caused the death of the victim Cantre.
One source explains the nature of abdominal injuries24 in the following manner
–
The skin may remain unmarked inspite of extensive internal injuries with
bleeding and disruption of the internal organs. The areas most vulnerable are
the point of attachment of internal organs, especially at the source of its blood
supply and at the point where blood vessels change direction.
The area in the middle superior half of the abdomen, forming a triangle
bounded by the ribs on the two sides and a line drawn horizontally through the
umbilicus forming its base is vulnerable to trauma applied from any
direction. In this triangle are found several blood vessels changing direction,
particularly the celiac trunk, its branches (the hepatic, splenic and gastric
arteries) as well as the accompanying veins. The loop of the duodenum, the
ligament of Treitz and the pancreas are in the retroperitoneal space, and the
stomach and transverse colon are in the triangle, located in the peritoneal
cavity. Compression or blow on the area may cause detachment, laceration,
stretch-stress, contusion of the organs (Legal Medicine 1980, Cyril H. Wecht
et., p. 41).
As to injuries to the spleen, in particular,25 the same source expounds that –
The spleen usually suffers traumatic rupture resulting from the impact of a fall
or blow from the crushing and grinding effects of wheels of motor vehicles.
Although the organ is protected at its upper portion by the ribs and also by the
air-containing visceral organs, yet on account of its superficiality and
fragility, it is usually affected by trauma. x x x.
Certainly, there are some terms in the above-quoted paragraphs difficult to
comprehend for people without medical backgrounds. Nevertheless, there are
some points that can be plainly derived therefrom: (1) Contrary to common
perception, the abdominal area is more than just the waist area. The entire
abdominal area is divided into different triangles, and the spleen is located in
the upper triangle, bounded by the rib cage; (2) The spleen and all internal
organs in the same triangle are vulnerable to trauma from all
directions. Therefore, the stone need not hit the victim Cantre from the front.
Even impact from a stone hitting the back of the victim Cantre, in the area of
the afore-mentioned triangle, could rupture the spleen; and (3) Although the
spleen had already been ruptured or lacerated, there may not always be a
perceptible external injury to the victim. Injury to the spleen cannot, at all times,
be attributed to an obvious, external injury such as a cut or bruise. The
laceration of the victim Cantre’s spleen can be caused by a stone thrown hard
enough, which qualifies as a nonpenetrating trauma26 –
Nonpenetrating Trauma. The spleen, alone or in combination with other
viscera, is the most frequently injured organ following blunt trauma to the
abdomen or the lower thoracic cage. Automobile accidents provide the
predominating cause, while falls, sledding and bicycle injuries, and blows
incurred during contact sports are frequently implicated in children. x x x
The sheer impact of the stone thrown by petitioner Calimutan at the back of
the victim Cantre could rupture or lacerate the spleen – an organ described as
vulnerable, superficial, and fragile – even without causing any other external
physical injury. Accordingly, the findings of Dr. Mendez that the victim Cantre
died of internal hemorrhage from his lacerated spleen, and the cause of the
laceration of the spleen was the stone thrown by petitioner Calimutan at the
back of the victim Cantre, does not necessarily contradict his testimony before
the RTC that none of the external injuries of the victim Cantre were fatal.
Based on the foregoing discussion, the prosecution was able to establish that
the proximate cause of the death of the victim Cantre was the stone thrown at
him by petitioner Calimutan. Proximate cause has been defined as "that cause,
which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not
have occurred."27
The two other witnesses presented by the prosecution, namely Sañano and
Belen Cantre, had adequately recounted the events that transpired on 04
February 1996 to 05 February 1996. Between the two of them, the said
witnesses accounted for the whereabouts, actions, and physical condition of
the victim Cantre during the said period. Before the encounter with petitioner
Calimutan and Bulalacao, the victim Cantre seemed to be physically fine.
However, after being hit at the back by the stone thrown at him by petitioner
Calimutan, the victim Cantre had continuously complained of backache.
Subsequently, his physical condition rapidly deteriorated, until finally, he died.
Other than being stoned by petitioner Calimutan, there was no other instance
when the victim Cantre may have been hit by another blunt instrument which
could have caused the laceration of his spleen.
Hence, this Court is morally persuaded that the victim Cantre died from a
lacerated spleen, an injury sustained after being hit by a stone thrown at him
by petitioner Calimutan. Not even the post-mortem report of Dr. Ulanday, the
Municipal Health Officer who first examined the body of the victim Cantre, can
raise reasonable doubt as to the cause of death of the victim Cantre. Invoking
Dr. Ulanday’s post-mortem report, the defense insisted on the possibility that
the victim Cantre died of food poisoning. The post-mortem report, though,
cannot be given much weight and probative value for the following reasons –
First, a closer scrutiny of the words used by Dr. Ulanday in her post-mortem
report, as well as in the death certificate of the victim Cantre, reveals that
although she suspected food poisoning as the cause of death, she held back
from making a categorical statement that it was so. In the post-mortem
report, 28 she found that "x x x the provable (sic) cause of death was due to
cardio-respiratory arrest. Food poisoning must be confirm (sic) by laboratory
e(x)am." In the death certificate of the victim Cantre, 29 she wrote that the
immediate cause of death was "Cardio-Respiratory Arrest" and the antecedent
cause was "Food Poisoning Suspect." There was no showing that further
laboratory tests were indeed conducted to confirm Dr. Ulanday’s suspicion that
the victim Cantre suffered from food poisoning, and without such confirmation,
her suspicion as to the cause of death remains just that – a suspicion.
Second, Dr. Ulanday executed before the NBI a sworn statement30 in which
she had explained her findings in the post-mortem report, to wit –
05. Q: Did you conduct an autopsy on his cadaver?
A: I did sir, but not as exhaustive as that done by the NBI Medico-legal.
06. Q: Now, what do you want to state regarding your certification on the death
of PHILIP B. CANTRE?
A: I stated in the certification and even in the Death Certificate about "Food
Poisoning". What I stated in the Death Certificate was that CANTRE was a
SUSPECTED victim of food poisoning. I didn’t state that he was a case of food
poisoning. And in the Certification, I even recommended that an examination
be done to confirm that suspicion.
07. Q: What gave you that suspicion of poisoning?
A: As there were no external signs of fatal injuries except that of the contusion
or abrasion, measuring as that size of a 25 centavo coin, I based my suspicion
from the history of the victim and from the police investigation.
08. Q: You also mentioned in your Certification that there was no internal
hemorrhage in the cadaver. Did you open the body of the cadaver?
A: As I have already stated sir, I did not conduct an exhaustive autopsy. I made
an incision on the abdomen and I explored the internal organs of the cadaver
with my hand in search for any clotting inside. But I found none. I did not open
the body of the cadaver.
09. Q: You mentioned about a contusion you have observed on the cadaver.
Where was it located?
A: On the left portion of his back, sir.
10. Q: Now, is it possible that if somebody be hit by a hard object on that part
of his body, his SPLEEN could be injured?
A: Yes, sir. But that would depend on how strong or forceful the impact was.
In contrast, Dr. Mendez described in his testimony before the RTC 31 how he
conducted the autopsy of the body of the victim Cantre, as follows –
Q What specific procedure did you do in connection with the exhumation of
the body of the victim in this case?
A We opened the head, chest and the abdomen.
Q That was part of the autopsy you have conducted?
A Yes, sir.
Q Aside from opening the head as well as the body of the victim Philip Cantre,
what other matters did you do in connection therewith?
A We examined the internal organs.
Q What in particular internal organs you have examined?
A The brain, the heart, the lungs, the liver, the kidneys, the pancreas plus the
intestines.
xxxx
Q The cause of death as you have listed here in your findings is listed as
traumatic injury of the abdomen, will you kindly tell us Doctor what is the
significance of this medical term traumatic injury of the abdomen?
A We, medico-legal officers of the NBI don’t do what other doctors do as they
make causes of death as internal hemorrhage we particularly point to the injury
of the body like this particular case the injury was at the abdomen of the victim.
Q Will you tell as Doctor what particular portion of the abdomen of the victim
this traumatic injury is located?
A Along the midline but the damaged organ was at the left.
Q What particular organ are you referring to?
A The spleen, sir.
The difference in the extent of the examinations conducted by the two doctors
of the body of the victim Cantre provides an adequate explanation for their
apparent inconsistent findings as to the cause of death. Comparing the limited
autopsy conducted by Dr. Ulanday and her unconfirmed suspicion of food
poisoning of the victim Cantre, as opposed to the exhaustive autopsy
performed by Dr. Mendez and his definitive finding of a ruptured spleen as the
cause of death of the victim Cantre, then the latter, without doubt, deserves to
be given credence by the courts.
Third, that the prosecution no longer presented Dr. Ulanday before the RTC
despite being included in its list of witnesses did not amount to a willful
suppression of evidence that would give rise to the presumption that her
testimony would be adverse to the prosecution if produced.32 As this Court
already expounded in the case of People v. Jumamoy33 –
The prosecution's failure to present the other witnesses listed in the
information did not constitute, contrary to the contention of the accused,
suppression of evidence. The prosecutor has the exclusive prerogative to
determine the witnesses to be presented for the prosecution. If the prosecution
has several eyewitnesses, as in the instant case, the prosecutor need not
present all of them but only as many as may be needed to meet the quantum
of proof necessary to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt. The testimonies of the other witnesses may, therefore, be dispensed
with for being merely corroborative in nature. This Court has ruled that the non-
presentation of corroborative witnesses would not constitute suppression of
evidence and would not be fatal to the prosecution's case. Besides, there is
no showing that the eyewitnesses who were not presented in court as
witnesses were not available to the accused. We reiterate the rule that the
adverse presumption from a suppression of evidence is not applicable when
(1) the suppression is not willful; (2) the evidence suppressed or withheld is
merely corroborative or cumulative; (3) the evidence is at the disposal of both
parties; and (4) the suppression is an exercise of a privilege. Moreover, if the
accused believed that the failure to present the other witnesses was because
their testimonies would be unfavorable to the prosecution, he should have
compelled their appearance, by compulsory process, to testify as his own
witnesses or even as hostile witnesses.
It was a judgment call for the prosecution to no longer present Dr. Ulanday
before the RTC, perhaps believing that it had already presented sufficient
evidence to merit the conviction of petitioner Calimutan even without her
testimony. There was nothing, however, preventing the defense from calling
on, or even compelling, with the appropriate court processes, Dr. Ulanday to
testify in court as its witness if it truly believed that her testimony would be
adverse to the case presented by the prosecution.
While this Court is in accord with the factual findings of the RTC and the Court
of Appeals and affirms that there is ample evidence proving that the death of
the victim Cantre was caused by his lacerated spleen, an injury which resulted
from being hit by the stone thrown at him by petitioner Calimutan, this Court,
nonetheless, is at variance with the RTC and the Court of Appeals as to the
determination of the appropriate crime or offense for which the petitioner
should have been convicted for.
Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code classifies felonies according to the means
by which they are committed, in particular: (1) intentional felonies, and (2)
culpable felonies. These two types of felonies are distinguished from each
other by the existence or absence of malicious intent of the offender –
In intentional felonies, the act or omission of the offender is malicious. In the
language of Art. 3, the act is performed with deliberate intent (with malice).
The offender, in performing the act or in incurring the omission, has the
intention to cause an injury to another. In culpable felonies, the act or omission
of the offender is not malicious. The injury caused by the offender to another
person is "unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act
performed without malice." (People vs. Sara, 55 Phil. 939). As stated in Art. 3,
the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack
of skill.34
In the Petition at bar, this Court cannot, in good conscience, attribute to
petitioner Calimutan any malicious intent to injure, much less to kill, the victim
Cantre; and in the absence of such intent, this Court cannot sustain the
conviction of petitioner Calimutan for the intentional crime of homicide, as
rendered by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Instead, this Court
finds petitioner Calimutan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the culpable
felony of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide under Article 365 of
the Revised Penal Code.
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code expressly provides for the definition of
reckless imprudence –
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or
failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of
inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing
to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation,
degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding
persons, time and place.
There are several circumstances, discussed in the succeeding paragraphs,
that demonstrate petitioner Calimutan’s lack of intent to kill the victim Cantre,
and conversely, that substantiate the view of this Court that the death of victim
Cantre was a result of petitioner Calimutan’s reckless imprudence. The RTC
and the Court of Appeals may have failed to appreciate, or had completely
overlooked, the significance of such circumstances.
It should be remembered that the meeting of the victim Cantre and witness
Sañano, on the one hand, and petitioner Calimutan and his helper Bulalacao,
on the other, was a chance encounter as the two parties were on their way to
different destinations. The victim Cantre and witness Sañano were on their
way home from a drinking spree in Crossing Capsay, while petitioner
Calimutan and his helper Bulalacao were walking from the market to Crossing
Capsay. While the evidence on record suggests that a running grudge existed
between the victim Cantre and Bulalacao, it did not establish that there was
likewise an existing animosity between the victim Cantre and petitioner
Calimutan.1avvphil.net
In both versions of the events of 04 February 1996 submitted by the
prosecution and the defense, it was the victim Cantre who was the initial
aggressor. He suddenly punched Bulalacao, the helper and companion of
petitioner Calimutan, when they met on the road. The attack of the victim
Cantre was swift and unprovoked, which spurred petitioner Calimutan into
responsive action. Given that this Court dismisses the claim of petitioner
Calimutan that the victim Cantre was holding a knife, it does take into account
that the victim Cantre was considerably older and bigger, at 26 years of age
and with a height of five feet and nine inches, compared to Bulalacao, the boy
he attacked, who was only 15 years old and stood at about five feet. Even with
his bare hands, the victim Cantre could have hurt Bulalacao. Petitioner
Calimutan sought only to protect Bulalacao and to stop the assault of the victim
Cantre against the latter when he picked up a stone and threw it at the victim
Cantre. The stone was readily available as a weapon to petitioner Calimutan
since the incident took place on a road. That he threw the stone at the back of
the victim Cantre does not automatically imply treachery on the part of
petitioner Calimutan as it is highly probable that in the midst of the fray, he
threw the stone rashly and impulsively, with no regard as to the position of the
victim Cantre. When the victim Cantre stopped his aggression after being hit
by the stone thrown by petitioner Calimutan, the latter also desisted from any
other act of violence against the victim Cantre.
The above-described incident could not have taken more than just a few
minutes. It was a very brief scuffle, in which the parties involved would hardly
have the time to ponder upon the most appropriate course of action to take.
With this in mind, this Court cannot concur in the declaration made by the Court
of Appeals that petitioner Calimutan threw the stone at the victim Cantre as a
retaliatory act. It was evidently a swift and spontaneous reaction to an
unexpected and unprovoked attack by the victim Cantre on Bulalacao. That
Bulalacao was already able to run away from the victim Cantre may have
escaped the notice of the petitioner Calimutan who, under the pressure of the
circumstances, was forced to act as quickly as possible.
The prosecution did not establish that petitioner Calimutan threw the stone at
the victim Cantre with the specific intent of killing, or at the very least, of
harming the victim Cantre. What is obvious to this Court was petitioner
Calimutan’s intention to drive away the attacker who was, at that point, the
victim Cantre, and to protect his helper Bulalacao who was, as earlier
described, much younger and smaller in built than the victim Cantre.35
Granting that petitioner Calimutan was impelled by a lawful objective when he
threw the stone at the victim Cantre, his act was committed with inexcusable
lack of precaution. He failed to consider that a stone the size of a man’s fist
could inflict substantial injury on someone. He also miscalculated his own
strength, perhaps unaware, or even completely disbelieving, that he could
throw a stone with such force as to seriously injure, or worse, kill someone, at
a quite lengthy distance of ten meters.
Since it is irrefragable that the stone thrown by petitioner Calimutan at the
victim Cantre was the proximate cause of the latter’s death, despite being done
with reckless imprudence rather than with malicious intent, petitioner
Calimutan remains civilly liable for such death. This Court, therefore, retains
the reward made by the RTC and the Court of Appeals to the heirs of the victim
Cantre of the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity for his death and
another ₱50,000.00 as moral damages.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
No. 23306, dated 29 August 2001, affirming the Decision of the RTC in
Criminal Case No. 8184, dated 19 November 1998, is hereby MODIFIED.
Petitioner Calimutan is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide, under Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code, and is accordingly sentenced to imprisonment for a minimum period of
4 months of arresto mayor to a maximum period of two years and one day
of prision correccional. Petitioner Calimutan is further ORDERED to pay the
heirs of the victim Cantre the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the
latter’s death and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

EDUARDO P. MANUEL, G.R. No. 165842
Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, J., Chairman,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, - versus - CALLEJO, SR.,
TINGA, and
CHICO-NAZARIO,* JJ.
' to Baguio City to meet Tina's parents, and was assured by them that their son
Promulgated:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.November 29, 2005
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision [1] of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 26877, affirming the Decision [2] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City, Branch 3, convicting Eduardo P.
Manuel of bigamy in Criminal Case No. 19562-R.
Eduardo was charged with bigamy in an Information filed on November 7,
2001, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 22nd day of April, 1996, in the City of
Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused EDUARDO P.
MANUEL, being then previously and legally married to
RUBYLUS [GAA] and without the said marriage having been
legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously contract a second marriage with TINA
GANDALERA-MANUEL, herein complainant, who does not
know the existence of the first marriage of said EDUARDO P.
MANUEL to Rubylus [Gaa].
CONTRARY TO LAW. [3]
The prosecution adduced evidence that on July 28, 1975, Eduardo was
married to Rubylus Gaa before Msgr. Feliciano Santos in Makati, which was
then still a municipality of the Province of Rizal. [4] He met the private
complainant Tina B. Gandalera in Dagupan City sometime in January 1996.
She stayed in Bonuan, Dagupan City for two days looking for a friend. Tina
was then 21 years old, a Computer Secretarial student, while Eduardo was 39.
Afterwards, Eduardo went to Baguio City to visit her. Eventually, as one thing
led to another, they went to a motel where, despite Tina's resistance, Eduardo
succeeded in having his way with her. Eduardo proposed marriage on several
occasions, assuring her that he was single. Eduardo even brought his parents
was still single.
Tina finally agreed to marry Eduardo sometime in the first week of March 1996.
They were married on April 22, 1996 before Judge Antonio C. Reyes, the
Presiding Judge of the RTC of Baguio City, Branch 61. [5] It appeared in their
marriage contract that Eduardo was 'single.
The couple was happy during the first three years of their married life. Through
their joint efforts, they were able to build their home in Cypress Point, Irisan,
Baguio City. However, starting 1999, Manuel started making himself scarce
and went to their house only twice or thrice a year. Tina was jobless, and
whenever she asked money from Eduardo, he would slap her. [6] Sometime
in January 2001, Eduardo took all his clothes, left, and did not return. Worse,
he stopped giving financial support.
Sometime in August 2001, Tina became curious and made inquiries from the
National Statistics Office (NSO) in Manila where she learned that Eduardo had
been previously married. She secured an NSO-certified copy of the marriage
contract. [7] She was so embarrassed and humiliated when she learned that
Eduardo was in fact already married when they exchanged their own vows. [8]
For his part, Eduardo testified that he met Tina sometime in 1995 in a bar
where she worked as a Guest Relations Officer (GRO). He fell in love with her
and married her. He informed Tina of his previous marriage to Rubylus Gaa,
but she nevertheless agreed to marry him. Their marital relationship was in
order until this one time when he noticed that she had a 'love-bite on her neck.
He then abandoned her. Eduardo further testified that he declared he was
'single in his marriage contract with Tina because he believed in good faith that
his first marriage was invalid. He did not know that he had to go to court to
seek for the nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina.
Eduardo further claimed that he was only forced to marry his first wife because
she threatened to commit suicide unless he did so. Rubylus was charged
with estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned. He visited her in jail after three
months and never saw her again. He insisted that he married Tina believing
that his first marriage was no longer valid because he had not heard from
Rubylus for more than 20 years.
After trial, the court rendered judgment on July 2, 2002 finding Eduardo guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy. He was sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of from six (6) years and ten (10) months, as minimum, to ten (10)
years, as maximum, and directed to indemnify the private complainant Tina
Gandalera the amount of P200,000.00 by way of moral damages, plus costs
of suit. [9]
The trial court ruled that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable
doubt all the elements of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
It declared that Eduardo's belief, that his first marriage had been dissolved
because of his first wife's 20-year absence, even if true, did not exculpate him
from liability for bigamy. Citing the ruling of this Court in People v.
Bitdu, [10]the trial court further ruled that even if the private complainant had
known that Eduardo had been previously married, the latter would still be
criminally liable for bigamy.
Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA. He alleged that he was not criminally
liable for bigamy because when he married the private complainant, he did so
in good faith and without any malicious intent. He maintained that at the time
that he married the private complainant, he was of the honest belief that his
first marriage no longer subsisted. He insisted that conformably to Article 3 of
the Revised Penal Code, there must be malice for one to be criminally liable
for a felony. He was not motivated by malice in marrying the private
complainant because he did so only out of his overwhelming desire to have a
fruitful marriage. He posited that the trial court should have taken into account
Article 390 of the New Civil Code. To support his view, the appellant cited the
rulings of this Court in United States v. Pealosa [11] and Manahan, Jr. v. Court
of Appeals.[12]
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) averred that Eduardo's defense of
good faith and reliance on the Court's ruling in United States v.
Enriquez [13] were misplaced; what is applicable is Article 41 of the Family
Code, which amended Article 390 of the Civil Code. Citing the ruling of this
Court in Republic v. Nolasco, [14] the OSG further posited that as provided in
Article 41 of the Family Code, there is a need for a judicial declaration of
presumptive death of the absent spouse to enable the present spouse to
marry. Even assuming that the first marriage was void, the parties thereto
should not be permitted to judge for themselves the nullity of the marriage;
the matter should be submitted to the proper court for resolution. Moreover,
the OSG maintained, the private complainant's knowledge of the first marriage
would not afford any relief since bigamy is an offense against the State and
not just against the private complainant.
However, the OSG agreed with the appellant that the penalty imposed by the
trial court was erroneous and sought the affirmance of the decision appealed
from with modification.
On June 18, 2004, the CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of
the RTCwith modification as to the penalty of the accused. It ruled that the
prosecution was able to prove all the elements of bigamy. Contrary to the
contention of the appellant, Article 41 of the Family Code should apply. Before
Manuel could lawfully marry the private complainant, there should have been
a judicial declaration of Gaa's presumptive death as the absent spouse. The
appellate court cited the rulings of this Court in Mercado v.
Tan [15] and Domingo v. Court of Appeals [16] to support its ruling. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Decision
promulgated on July 31, 2002 is hereby MODIFIED to reflect,
as it hereby reflects, that accused-appellant is sentenced to
an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and
one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10)
years of prision mayor as maximum. Said Decision
is AFFIRMED in all other respects.
SO ORDERED. [17]
Eduardo, now the petitioner, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari,
insisting that:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONER'S
FIRST WIFE CANNOT BE LEGALLY PRESUMED DEAD
UNDER ARTICLE 390 OF THE CIVIL CODE AS THERE
WAS NO JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF PRESUMPTIVE
DEATH AS PROVIDED FOR UNDER ARTICLE 41 OF THE
FAMILY CODE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE AWARD OF
PHP200,000.00 AS MORAL DAMAGES AS IT HAS NO
BASIS IN FACT AND IN LAW. [18]
The petitioner maintains that the prosecution failed to prove the second
element of the felony, i.e., that the marriage has not been legally dissolved or,
in case his/her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed
dead under the Civil Code. He avers that when he married Gandalera in 1996,
Gaa had been 'absent for 21 years since 1975; under Article 390 of the Civil
Code, she was presumed dead as a matter of law. He points out that, under
the first paragraph of Article 390 of the Civil Code, one who has been absent
for seven years, whether or not he/she is still alive, shall be presumed dead for
all purposes except for succession, while the second paragraph refers to the
rule on legal presumption of death with respect to succession.
The petitioner asserts that the presumptive death of the absent spouse arises
by operation of law upon the satisfaction of two requirements: the
specified period and the present spouse's reasonable belief that the absentee
is dead. He insists that he was able to prove that he had not heard from his
first wife since 1975 and that he had no knowledge of her whereabouts or
whether she was still alive; hence, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the
presumptive death of Gaa had arisen by operation of law, as the two
requirements of Article 390 of the Civil Code are present. The petitioner
concludes that he should thus be acquitted of the crime of bigamy.
The petitioner insists that except for the period of absences provided for in
Article 390 of the Civil Code, the rule therein on legal presumptions remains
valid and effective. Nowhere under Article 390 of the Civil Code does it require
that there must first be a judicial declaration of death before the rule on
presumptive death would apply. He further asserts that contrary to the rulings
of the trial and appellate courts, the requirement of a judicial declaration of
presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is only a requirement
for the validity of the subsequent or second marriage.
The petitioner, likewise, avers that the trial court and the CA erred in awarding
moral damages in favor of the private complainant. The private complainant
was a 'GRO before he married her, and even knew that he was already
married. He genuinely loved and took care of her and gave her financial
support. He also pointed out that she had an illicit relationship with a lover
whom she brought to their house.
In its comment on the petition, the OSG maintains that the decision of the CA
affirming the petitioner's conviction is in accord with the law, jurisprudence and
the evidence on record. To bolster its claim, the OSG cited the ruling of this
Court in Republic v. Nolasco. [19]
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which defines and penalizes bigamy,
reads:
Art. 349. Bigamy. ' The penalty of prision mayor shall be
imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been
legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in the proper proceedings.
The provision was taken from Article 486 of the Spanish Penal Code, to wit:
El que contrajere Segundo o ulterior matrimonio sin hallarse
legtimamente disuelto el anterior, ser castigado con la pena
de prision mayor. xxx
The reason why bigamy is considered a felony is to preserve and ensure the
juridical tie of marriage established by law. [20] The phrase 'or before the
absent spouse had been declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment rendered in the proper proceedings' was incorporated in the Revised
Penal Code because the drafters of the law were of the impression that in
consonance with the civil law which provides for the presumption of death after
an absence of a number of years, the judicial declaration of presumed
death like annulment of marriage should be a justification for bigamy. [21]
For the accused to be held guilty of bigamy, the prosecution is burdened to
prove the felony: (a) he/she has been legally married; and (b) he/she contracts
a subsequent marriage without the former marriage having been lawfully
dissolved. The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second
marriage or subsequent marriage. [22] It is essential in the prosecution for
bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential
requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first
marriage. [23] Viada avers that a third element of the crime is that the second
marriage must be entered into with fraudulent intent ( intencion fraudulente)
which is an essential element of a felony by dolo. [24] On the other hand,
Cuello Calon is of the view that there are only two elements of bigamy: (1) the
existence of a marriage that has not been lawfully dissolved; and (2) the
celebration of a second marriage. It does not matter whether the first marriage
is void or voidable because such marriages have juridical effects until lawfully
dissolved by a court of competent jurisdiction.[25] As the Court ruled
in Domingo v. Court of Appeals [26] and Mercado v. Tan,[27] under the Family
Code of the Philippines, the judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage
is a defense.
In his commentary on the Revised Penal Code, Albert is of the same view as
Viada and declared that there are three (3) elements of bigamy: (1) an
undissolved marriage; (2) a new marriage; and (3) fraudulent intention
constituting the felony of the act. [28] He explained that:
' This last element is not stated in Article 349, because it is
undoubtedly incorporated in the principle antedating all codes,
and, constituting one of the landmarks of our Penal Code,
that, where there is no willfulness there is no crime. There is
 no willfulness if the subject
believes that the former marriage has been dissolved; and this
must be supported by very strong evidence, and if this be
produced, the act shall be deemed not to constitute a crime.
Thus, a person who contracts a second marriage in the
reasonable and well-founded belief that his first wife is dead,
because of the many years that have elapsed since he has
had any news of her whereabouts, in spite of his endeavors
to find her, cannot be deemed guilty of the crime of bigamy,
because there is no fraudulent intent which is one of the
essential elements of the crime. [29]
As gleaned from the Information in the RTC, the petitioner is charged with
bigamy, a felony by dolo (deceit). Article 3, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal
Code provides that there is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate
intent. Indeed, a felony cannot exist without intent. Since a felony by dolo is
classified as an intentional felony, it is deemed voluntary. [30] Although the
words 'with malice do not appear in Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, such
phrase is included in the word 'voluntary. [31]
Malice is a mental state or condition prompting the doing of an overt act without
legal excuse or justification from which another suffers injury. [32] When the
act or omission defined by law as a felony is proved to have been done or
committed by the accused, the law presumes it to have been
intentional. [33]Indeed, it is a legal presumption of law that every man intends
the natural or probable consequence of his voluntary act in the absence of
proof to the contrary, and such presumption must prevail unless a reasonable
doubt exists from a consideration of the whole evidence. [34]
For one to be criminally liable for a felony by dolo, there must be a confluence
of both an evil act and an evil intent. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit
rea. [35]
In the present case, the prosecution proved that the petitioner was married to
Gaa in 1975, and such marriage was not judicially declared a nullity; hence,
the marriage is presumed to subsist. [36] The prosecution also proved that the
petitioner married the private complainant in 1996, long after the effectivity of
the Family Code.
The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when he
married the private complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact or good
faith of the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo;
such defense negates malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law
is not an excuse because everyone is presumed to know the law. Ignorantia
legis neminem excusat.
It was the burden of the petitioner to prove his defense that when he married
the private complainant in 1996, he was of the well-grounded belief
that his first wife was already dead, as he had not heard from her for more than
20 years since 1975. He should have adduced in evidence a decision of a
competent court declaring the presumptive death of his first wife as required
by Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 41 of the Family
Code. Such judicial declaration also constitutes proof that the petitioner acted
in good faith, and would negate criminal intent on his part when he married the
private complainant and, as a consequence, he could not be held guilty of
bigamy in such case. The petitioner, however, failed to discharge his burden.
The phrase 'or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively
dead by means of a judgment rendered on the proceedings' in Article 349 of
the Revised Penal Code was not an aggroupment of empty or useless words.
The requirement for a judgment of the presumptive death of the absent spouse
is for the benefit of the spouse present, as protection from the pains and the
consequences of a second marriage, precisely because he/she could be
charged and convicted of bigamy if the defense of good faith based on mere
testimony is found incredible.
The requirement of judicial declaration is also for the benefit of the State.
Under Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution, the 'State shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. Marriage is a
social institution of the highest importance. Public policy, good morals and the
interest of society require that the marital relation should be surrounded with
every safeguard and its severance only in the manner prescribed and the
causes specified by law. [37] The laws regulating civil marriages are
necessary to serve the interest, safety, good order, comfort or general welfare
of the community and the parties can waive nothing essential to the validity of
the proceedings. A civil marriage anchors an ordered society by encouraging
stable relationships over transient ones; it enhances the welfare of the
community.
In a real sense, there are three parties to every civil marriage; two willing
spouses and an approving State. On marriage, the parties assume new
relations to each other and the State touching nearly on every aspect of life
and death. The consequences of an invalid marriage to the parties, to innocent
parties and to society, are so serious that the law may well take means
calculated to ensure the procurement of the most positive evidence of death
of the first spouse or of the presumptive death of the absent spouse [38] after
the lapse of the period provided for under the law. One such means is the
requirement of the declaration by a competent court of the presumptive death
of an absent spouse as proof that the present spouse contracts a subsequent
marriage on a well-grounded belief of the death of the first spouse. Indeed,
'men readily believe what they wish to be true, is a maxim of the old jurists. To
sustain a second marriage and to vacate a first because one of the parties
believed the other to be dead would make the existence of the marital relation
determinable, not by certain extrinsic facts, easily capable of forensic
ascertainment and proof, but by the subjective condition of
individuals. [39] Only with such proof can marriage be treated as so dissolved
as to permit second marriages. [40] Thus, Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code has made the dissolution of marriage dependent not only upon the
personal belief of parties, but upon certain objective facts easily capable of
accurate judicial cognizance, [41] namely, a judgment of the presumptive
death of the absent spouse.
The petitioner's sole reliance on Article 390 of the Civil Code as basis for his
acquittal for bigamy is misplaced.
Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code provide '
Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown
whether or not, the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed
dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of
opening his succession till after an absence of ten years. If he
disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence
of five years shall be sufficient in order that his succession
may be opened.
Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all
purposes, including the division of the estate among the heirs:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea
voyage, or an aeroplane which is missing, who
has not been heard of for four years since the
loss of the vessel or aeroplane;
(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken
part in war, and has been missing for four years;
(3) A person who has been in danger of death
under other circumstances and his existence
has not been known for four years.
The presumption of death of the spouse who had been absent for seven years,
it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, is created by law and
arises without any necessity of judicial declaration. [42] However, Article 41 of
the Family Code, which amended the foregoing rules on presumptive death,
reads:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the
subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void,
unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the
prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and
the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where
there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in
the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of
only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under
the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a
summary proceeding as provided in this Court for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent
spouse . [43]
With the effectivity of the Family Code, [44] the period of seven years under
the first paragraph of Article 390 of the Civil Code was reduced to four
consecutive years. Thus, before the spouse present may contract a
subsequent marriage, he or she must institute summary proceedings for the
declaration of the presumptive death of the absentee spouse, [45] without
prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the absentee spouse. As
explained by this Court in Armas v. Calisterio: [46]
In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a
subsequent bigamous marriage may exceptionally be
considered valid, the following conditions must concur, viz.:
(a) The prior spouse of the contracting party must have been
absent for four consecutive years, or two years where there is
danger of death under the circumstances stated in Article 391
of the Civil Code at the time of disappearance; (b) the spouse
present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is
already dead; and (c) there is, unlike the old rule, a judicial
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee for which
purpose the spouse present can institute a summary
proceeding in court to ask for that declaration. The last
condition is consistent and in consonance with the
requirement of judicial intervention in subsequent marriages
as so provided in Article 41, in relation to Article 40, of the
Family Code.
The Court rejects petitioner's contention that the requirement of instituting a
petition for declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family
Code is designed merely to enable the spouse present to contract a valid
second marriage and not for the acquittal of one charged with bigamy. Such
provision was designed to harmonize civil law and Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code, and put to rest the confusion spawned by the rulings of this Court
and comments of eminent authorities on Criminal Law.
As early as March 6, 1937, this Court ruled in Jones v. Hortiguela [47] that, for
purposes of the marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse
judicially declared an absentee before the spouse present may contract a
subsequent marriage. It held that the declaration of absence made in
accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose the
taking of the necessary precautions for the administration of the estate of the
absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only requires
that the former spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the
time of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or her
former spouse to be living, that such former spouse is generally reputed to be
dead and the spouse present so believes at the time of the celebration of the
marriage.[48] In In Re Szatraw, [49] the Court declared that a judicial
declaration that a person is presumptively dead, because he or she had been
unheard from in seven years, being a presumption juris tantum only, subject
to contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of finality or become final; and that
proof of actual death of the person presumed dead being unheard from in
seven years, would have to be made in another proceeding to have such
particular fact finally determined. The Court ruled that if a judicial decree
declaring a person presumptively dead because he or she had not been heard
from in seven years cannot become final and executory even after the lapse
of the reglementary period within which an appeal may be taken, for such
presumption is still disputable and remains subject to contrary proof, then a
petition for such a declaration is useless, unnecessary, superfluous and of no
benefit to the petitioner. The Court stated that it should not waste its valuable
time and be made to perform a superfluous and meaningless act. [50] The
Court also took note that a petition for a declaration of the presumptive death
of an absent spouse may even be made in collusion with the other spouse.
In Lukban v. Republic of the Philippines, [51] the Court declared that the words
'proper proceedings' in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code can only refer
to those authorized by law such as Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code which
refer to the administration or settlement of the estate of a deceased person.
In Gue v. Republic of the Philippines, [52] the Court rejected the contention of
the petitioner therein that, under Article 390 of the Civil Code, the courts are
authorized to declare the presumptive death of a person after an absence of
seven years. The Court reiterated its rulings in Szatraw, Lukban and Jones.
Former Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino was of the view that 'the provision of
Article 349 or 'before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively
dead by means of a judgment reached in the proper proceedings' is erroneous
and should be considered as not written. He opined that such provision
presupposes that, if the prior marriage has not been legally dissolved and the
absent first spouse has not been declared presumptively dead in a proper
court proceedings, the subsequent marriage is bigamous. He maintains that
the supposition is not true. [53] A second marriage is bigamous only when the
circumstances in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 83 of the Civil Code are not
present. [54] Former Senator Ambrosio Padilla was, likewise, of the view that
Article 349 seems to require judicial decree of dissolution or judicial declaration
of absence but even with such decree, a second marriage in good faith will not
constitute bigamy. He posits that a second marriage, if not illegal, even if it be
annullable, should not give rise to bigamy. [55] Former Justice Luis B. Reyes,
on the other hand, was of the view that in the case of an absent spouse who
could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code, the spouse
present cannot be charged and convicted of bigamy in case he/she contracts
a second marriage. [56]
The Committee tasked to prepare the Family Code proposed the amendments
of Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code to conform to Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code, in that, in a case where a spouse is absent for the
requisite period, the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage only
after securing a judgment declaring the presumptive death of the absent
spouse to avoid being charged and convicted of bigamy; the present spouse
will have to adduce evidence that he had a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead. [57] Such judgment is proof of the good faith of the
present spouse who contracted a subsequent marriage; thus, even if the
present spouse is later charged with bigamy if the absentee spouse reappears,
he cannot be convicted of the crime. As explained by former Justice Alicia
Sempio-Diy:
' Such rulings, however, conflict with Art. 349 of the Revised
Penal Code providing that the present spouse must first ask
for a declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse
in order not to be guilty of bigamy in case he or she marries
again.
The above Article of the Family Code now clearly provides
that for the purpose of the present spouse contracting a
second marriage, he or she must file a summary proceeding
as provided in the Code for the declaration of the presumptive
death of the absentee, without prejudice to the latter's
reappearance. This provision is intended to protect the
present spouse from a criminal prosecution for bigamy under
Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Code because with the judicial
declaration that the missing spouses presumptively dead, the
good faith of the present spouse in contracting a second
marriage is already established. [58]
Of the same view is former Dean Ernesto L. Pineda (now Undersecretary of
Justice) who wrote that things are now clarified. He says judicial declaration of
presumptive death is now authorized for purposes of
remarriage. The present spouse must institute a summary proceeding for
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, where the ordinary rules of
procedure in trial will not be followed. Affidavits will suffice, with possible
clarificatory examinations of affiants if the Judge finds it necessary for a full
grasp of the facts. The judgment declaring an absentee as presumptively dead
is without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the said absentee.
Dean Pineda further states that before, the weight of authority is that the clause
'before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead x x x should
be disregarded because of Article 83, paragraph 3 of the Civil Code. With the
new law, there is a need to institute a summary proceeding for the declaration
of the presumptive death of the absentee, otherwise, there is bigamy. [59]
According to Retired Supreme Court Justice Florenz D. Regalado, an eminent
authority on Criminal Law, in some cases where an absentee spouse is
believed to be dead, there must be a judicial declaration of presumptive death,
which could then be made only in the proceedings for the settlement of his
estate. [60]Before such declaration, it was held that the remarriage of the other
spouse is bigamous even if done in good faith. [61] Justice Regalado opined
that there were contrary views because of the ruling in Jones and the
provisions of Article 83(2) of the Civil Code, which, however, appears to have
been set to rest by Article 41 of the Family Code, which requires a summary
hearing for the declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse before
the other spouse can remarry.
Under Article 238 of the Family Code, a petition for a declaration of the
presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code
may be filed under Articles 239 to 247 of the same Code. [62]
On the second issue, the petitioner, likewise, faults the trial court and the CA
for awarding moral damages in favor of the private complainant. The petitioner
maintains that moral damages may be awarded only in any of the cases
provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, and bigamy is not one of them. The
petitioner asserts that the appellate court failed to apply its ruling in People v.
Bondoc, [63] where an award of moral damages for bigamy was disallowed.
In any case, the petitioner maintains, the private complainant failed to adduce
evidence to prove moral damages.
The appellate court awarded moral damages to the private complainant on its
finding that she adduced evidence to prove the same. The appellate court
ruled that while bigamy is not included in those cases enumerated in Article
2219 of the Civil Code, it is not proscribed from awarding moral damages
against the petitioner. The appellate court ruled that it is not bound by the
following ruling in People v. Bondoc:
... Pero si en dichos asuntos se adjudicaron daos, ello se debi
indedublamente porque el articulo 2219 del Cdigo Civil de
Filipinas autoriza la adjudicacin de daos morales en los
delitos de estupro, rapto, violacin, adulterio o concubinato, y
otros actos lascivos, sin incluir en esta enumeracin el delito
de bigamia. No existe, por consiguiente, base legal para
adjudicar aqu los daos de P5,000.00 arriba
mencionados. [64]
The OSG posits that the findings and ruling of the CA are based on the
evidence and the law. The OSG, likewise, avers that the CA was not bound by
its ruling in People v. Rodeo.
The Court rules against the petitioner.
Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation,
moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the
defendant's wrongful act or omission. [65] An award for moral damages
requires the confluence of the following conditions: first, there must be an
injury, whether physical, mental or psychological, clearly sustained by the
claimant; second, there must be culpable act or omission factually
established; third, the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the
proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and fourth, the award
of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219 or Article
2220 of the Civil Code. [66]
Moral damages may be awarded in favor of the offended party only in criminal
cases enumerated in Article 2219, paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 5 and 7 of the Civil Code
and analogous cases, viz.:
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following
and analogous cases.
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious
acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
 (9) Acts mentioned in article 309;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26,
27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35.
The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or
abused, referred to in No. 3 of this article, may also recover
moral damages.
The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and
sisters may bring the action mentioned in No. 9 of this article
in the order named.
Thus, the law does not intend that moral damages should be awarded in all
cases where the aggrieved party has suffered mental anguish, fright, moral
anxieties, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation and similar injury arising out of an act or omission of another,
otherwise, there would not have been any reason for the inclusion of specific
acts in Article 2219 [67] and analogous cases (which refer to those cases
bearing analogy or resemblance, corresponds to some others or resembling,
in other respects, as in form, proportion, relation, etc.) [68]
Indeed, bigamy is not one of those specifically mentioned in Article 2219 of the
Civil Code in which the offender may be ordered to pay moral damages to the
private complainant/offended party. Nevertheless, the petitioner is liable to the
private complainant for moral damages under Article 2219 in relation to Articles
19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code.
According to Article 19, 'every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in
the performance of his act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith. This provision contains what is commonly referred to
as the principle of abuse of rights, and sets certain standards which must be
observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance
of one's duties. The standards are the following: act with justice; give everyone
his due; and observe honesty and good faith. The elements for abuse of rights
are: (a) there is a legal right or duty; (b) exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the
sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. [69]
Article 20 speaks of the general sanctions of all other provisions of law which
do not especially provide for its own sanction. When a right is exercised in a
manner which does not conform to the standards set forth in the said provision
and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which
the wrongdoer must be responsible. [70] If the provision does not provide a
remedy for its violation, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article
21 of the Civil Code would be proper. Article 20 provides that 'every person
who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another shall
indemnify the latter for the same. On the other hand, Article 21 provides that
'any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter
for damages. The latter provision
is adopted to remedy 'the countless gaps in the statutes which leave so many
victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered
material and moral injury should vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that
untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to
prove for specifically in the statutes. Whether or not the principle of abuse of
rights has been violated resulting in damages under Article 20 or Article 21 of
the Civil Code or other applicable provisions of law depends upon the
circumstances of each case. [71]
In the present case, the petitioner courted the private complainant and
proposed to marry her. He assured her that he was single. He even brought
his parents to the house of the private complainant where he and his parents
made the same assurance ' that he was single. Thus, the private complainant
agreed to marry the petitioner, who even stated in the certificate of marriage
that he was single. She lived with the petitioner and dutifully performed her
duties as his wife, believing all the while that he was her lawful husband. For
two years or so until the petitioner heartlessly abandoned her, the private
complainant had no inkling that he was already married to another
before they were married.
Thus, the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioner's
chicanery and heartless deception, the fraud consisting not of a single act
alone, but a continuous series of acts. Day by day, he maintained the
appearance of being a lawful husband to the private complainant, who
changed her status from a single woman to a married woman, lost the
consortium, attributes and support of a single man she could have married
lawfully and endured mental pain and humiliation, being bound to a man who
it turned out was not her lawful husband. [72]
The Court rules that the petitioner's collective acts of fraud and deceit before,
during and after his marriage with the private complainant were willful,
deliberate and with malice and caused injury to the latter. That she did not
sustain any physical injuries is not a bar to an award for moral damages.
Indeed, in Morris v. Macnab, [73] the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled:
xxx The defendant cites authorities which indicate that, absent
physical injuries, damages for shame, humiliation, and mental
anguish are not recoverable where the actor is simply
negligent. See Prosser, supra, at p. 180; 2 Harper & James,
Torts, 1031 (1956). But the authorities all recognize that
where the wrong is willful rather than negligent, recovery may
be had for the ordinary, natural, and proximate consequences
 though they consist of shame, humiliation, and mental
anguish. See Spiegel v. Evergreen Cemetery Co., 117 NJL
90, 94, 186 A 585 (Sup. Ct. 1936); Kuzma v. Millinery
Workers, etc., Local 24, 27 N.J. Super, 579, 591, 99 A.2d 833
(App. Div. 1953); Prosser, supra, at p. 38. Here the
defendant's conduct was not merely negligent, but was
willfully and maliciously wrongful. It was bound to result in
shame, humiliation, and mental anguish for the plaintiff, and
when such result did ensue the plaintiff became entitled not
only to compensatory but also to punitive damages. See
Spiegel v. Evergreen Cemetery Co., supra; Kuzma v Millinery
Workers, etc., Local 24, supra. CF. Note, 'Exemplary
Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 517 (1957).
The plaintiff testified that because of the defendant's
bigamous marriage to her and the attendant publicity she not
only was embarrassed and 'ashamed to go out but 'couldnt
sleep but 'couldnt eat, had terrific headaches' and 'lost quite a
lot of weight. No just basis appears for judicial interference
with the jury's reasonable allowance of $1,000 punitive
damages on the first count. See Cabakov v. Thatcher, 37 N.J.
Super 249, 117 A.2d 298 (App. Div. [74] 1955).
The Court thus declares that the petitioner's acts are against public policy as
they undermine and subvert the family as a social institution, good morals and
the interest and general welfare of society.
Because the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioner's
perfidy, she is not barred from claiming moral damages. Besides, even
considerations of public policy would not prevent her from recovery. As held
in Jekshewitz v. Groswald: [75]
Where a person is induced by the fraudulent representation
of another to do an act which, in consequence of such
misrepresentation, he believes to be neither illegal nor
immoral, but which is in fact a criminal offense, he has a right
of action against the person so inducing him for damages
sustained by him in consequence of his having done such act.
Burrows v. Rhodes, [1899] 1 Q.B. 816. In Cooper v. Cooper,
147 Mass. 370, 17 N.E. 892, 9 Am. St. Rep. 721, the court
said that a false representation by the defendant that he was
divorced from his former wife, whereby the plaintiff was
induced to marry him, gave her a remedy in tort for deceit. It
seems to have been assumed that the fact that she had
unintentionally violated the law or innocently committed a
crime by cohabiting with him would be no bar to the action,
but rather that it might be a ground for enhancing her
damages. The injury to the plaintiff was said to be in her being
led by the promise to give the fellowship and assistance of a
wife to one who was not her husband and to assume and act
in a relation and condition that proved to be false and
ignominious. Damages for such an injury were held to be
recoverable in Sherman v. Rawson, 102 Mass. 395 and
Kelley v. Riley, 106 Mass. 339, 343, 8 Am. Rep. 336.
Furthermore, in the case at bar the plaintiff does not base her
cause of action upon any transgression of the law by herself
but upon the defendant's misrepresentation. The criminal
relations which followed, innocently on her part, were but one
of the incidental results of the defendant's fraud for which
damages may be assessed.
[7] Actions for deceit for fraudulently inducing a woman to
enter into the marriage relation have been maintained in other
jurisdictions. Sears v. Wegner, 150 Mich. 388, 114 N.W. 224,
17 L.R. A. (N.S.) 819; Larson v. McMillan, 99 Wash. 626, 170
P. 324; Blossom v. Barrett, 37 N.Y. 434, 97 Am. Dec. 747;
Morril v. Palmer, 68 Vt. 1, 33 A. 829, 33 L.R.A. 411.
Considerations of public policy would not prevent recovery
where the circumstances are such that the plaintiff was
conscious of no moral turpitude, that her illegal action was
induced solely by the defendant's misrepresentation, and that
she does not base her cause of action upon any transgression
of the law by herself. Such considerations
distinguish this case from cases in which the court has refused
to lend its aid to the enforcement of a contract illegal on its
face or to one who has consciously and voluntarily become a
party to an illegal act upon which the cause of action is
founded. Szadiwicz v. Cantor, 257 Mass. 518, 520, 154 N.E.
251, 49 A. L. R. 958. [76]
Considering the attendant circumstances of the case, the Court finds the
award of P200,000.00 for moral damages to be just and reasonable.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED .
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
' Associate Justice

G.R. No. 80762 March 19, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FAUSTA GONZALES, AUGUSTO GONZALES, CUSTODIO GONZALES,
SR., CUSTODIO GONZALES, JR., NERIO GONZALES and ROGELIO
LANIDA, accused, CUSTODIO GONZALES, SR., accused-appellant.
SARMIENTO, J.:
In a decision 1 dated October 31, 1984, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo,
Branch XXXVIII (38), in Criminal Case No. 13661, entitled "People of the
Philippines vs. Fausta Gonzales, Augusto Gonzales, Custodia Gonzales,
Custodio Gonzales, Jr., Nerio Gonzales and Rogelio Lanida," found all the
accused, except Rogelio Lanida who eluded arrest and up to now has remain
at large and not yet arrained, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder as defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. They were
sentenced "to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one
(1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased victim in the amount of P40,000.00, plus
moral damages in the sum of P14,000.00 and to pay the costs." 2 The victim
was Lloyd Peñacerrada, 44, landowner, and a resident of Barangay Aspera,
Sara, Iloilo.
Through their counsel, all the accused, except of course Rogelio Lanida, filed
a notice of appeal from the trial court's decision. During the pendency of their
appeal and before judgment thereon could be rendered by the Court of
Appeals, however, all the accused-appellants, except Custodio Gonzales, Sr.,
withdrew their appeal and chose instead to pursue their respective
applications for parole before the then Ministry, now Department, of Justice,
Parole Division. 3
On October 27, 1987, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision 4 on the
appeal of Custodio Gonzales, Sr. It modified the appealed decision in that the
lone appellant was sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs
of Lloyd Peñacerrada in the amount of P30,000.00. In all other respect, the
decision of the trial court was affirmed. Further, on the basis of our ruling
in People vs. Ramos, 5 the appellate court certified this case to us for review.6
The antecedent facts are as follows:
At around 9:00 o'clock in the evening of February 21, 1981, Bartolome Paja,
the barangay captain of Barangay Tipacla, Ajuy, Iloilo, was awakened from his
sleep by the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales. Augusto informed Paja
that his wife had just killed their landlord, Lloyd Peñacerrada, and thus would
like to surrender to the authorities. Seeing Augusto still holding the knife
allegedly used in the killing and Fausta with her dress smeared with blood,
Paja immediately ordered a nephew of his to take the spouses to the police
authorities at the Municipal Hall in Poblacion, Ajuy. As instructed, Paja's
nephew brought the Gonzales spouses, who "backrode" on his motorcycle, to
the municipal building. 7 Upon reaching the Ajuy Police sub-station, the couple
informed the police on duty of the incident. That same night, Patrolman
Salvador Centeno of the Ajuy Police Force and the Gonzales spouses went
back to Barangay Tipacla. Reaching Barangay Tipacla the group went to
Paja's residence where Fausta was made to stay, while Paja, Patrolman
Centeno, and Augusto proceeded to the latter's residence at Sitio Nabitasan
where the killing incident allegedly occurred. 8 There they saw the lifeless body
of Lloyd Peñacerrada, clad only in an underwear, sprawled face down inside
the bedroom. 9 The group stayed for about an hour during which time
Patrolman Centeno inspected the scene and started to make a rough sketch
thereof and the immediate surroundings. 10 The next day, February 22, 1981,
at around 7:00 o'clock in the morning, Patrolman Centeno, accompanied by a
photographer, went back to the scene of the killing to conduct further
investigations. Fausta Gonzales, on the other hand, was brought back that
same day by Barangay Captain Paja to the police substation in Ajuy. When
Patrolman Centeno and his companion arrived at Sitio Nabitasan, two
members of the 321st P.C. Company stationed in Sara, Iloilo, who had likewise
been informed of the incident, were already there conducting their own
investigation. Patrolman Centeno continued with his sketch; photographs of
the scene were likewise taken. The body of the victim was then brought to the
Municipal Hall of Ajuy for autopsy.
The autopsy of Lloyd Peñacerrada's cadaver was performed at about 11:20
a.m. on February 22, 1981; after completed, a report was made with the
following findings:
PHYSICAL FINDINGS
1. Deceased is about 5 ft. and 4 inches in height, body
moderately built and on cadaveric rigidity.
EXTERNAL FINDINGS
1. Puncture wound, 1 cm. in width, 9 cm. in length, located at
the lower 3rd anterior aspect of the arm, right, directed upward
to the right axillary pit.
2. Stab wound, thru and thru, located at the proximal 3rd,
forearm right, posterior aspect with an entrance of 5 cm. in
width and 9 cm. in length with an exit at the middle 3rd,
posterior aspect of the forearm, right, with 1 cm. wound exit.
3. Stab wound, thru and thru, located at the middle 3rd,
posterior aspect of the forearm right, 1 cm. in width.
4. Incised wound, 4 cm. long, depth visualizing the right lateral
border of the sternum, 6th and 7th ribs, right located 1.5
inches below the right nipple.
5. Stab wound, 2 cm. in width, 10.5 cm. in depth, directed
inward to the thoracic cavity right, located at the left
midclavicular line at the level of the 5th rib left.
6. Stab wound, 2 cm. in width, 9.5 cm. in depth directed
toward the right thoracic cavity, located at the mid left scapular
line at the level of the 8th intercostal space.
7. Puncture wound, 1 cm. in width, located at the base of the
left armpit directed toward the left thoracic cavity.
8. Puncture wound, 1 cm. in width, 11 cm. in length, directed
toward the left deltoid muscle, located at the upper 3rd axilla
left.
9. Puncture wound, 3 cm in width, 11.5 cm in length, located
at the anterior aspect, proximal 3rd arm left, directed
downward.
10. Stab wound, thru and thru, 2.5 cm. in width, and 5 cm. in
length, medial aspect, palm right.
11. Stabwound, 4 cm.in width, iliac area, right, directed inward
with portion of large intestine and mysentery coming out.
12. Stab wound, 4 cm. in width, located at the posterior portion
of the shoulder, right, directed downward to the aspex of the
light thoracic cavity.
13. Incised wound, 1 cm. in width, 10 cm. in length, located at
the medial portion of the medial border of the right scapula.
14. Incised wound, 1 cm. in width, 4.5 cm. in length, located
at the posterior aspect of the right elbow.
15. Incised wound, 1 cm. in width, 2 cm. in length, located at
the posterior portion, middle 3rd, forearm, right.
16. Lacerated wound at the anterior tantanelle with fissural
fracture of the skull.
INTERNAL FINDINGS:
1. Stab wound No. 5, injuring the left ventricle
of the heart.
2. Stab wound No. 6, severely injuring the
right lower lobe of the lungs.
3. Stab wound No. 7, injuring the right middle
lobe of the lungs.
4. Stab wound No. 11, injuring the
descending colon of the large intestine, thru
and thru.
5. Stab wound No. 12, severely injuring the
apex of the right lungs (sic).
CAUSE OF DEATH:
MASSIVE
HEMMORRHAGE DUE TO
MULTIPLE LACERATED,
STABBED (sic),
INCISED AND
PUNCTURED WOUNDS.

The autopsy report thus showed that Dr. Rojas "found sixteen (16) wounds,
five (5) of which are fatal because they penetrated the internal organs, heart,
lungs and intestines of the deceased." 12
On February 23, two days after the incident, Augusto Gonzales appeared
before the police sub-station in the poblacion of Ajuy and voluntarily
surrendered to Police Corporal Ben Sazon for detention and protective
custody for "having been involved" in the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada. He
requested that he be taken to the P.C. headquarters in Sara, Iloilo where his
wife, Fausta, was already detained having been indorsed thereat by the Ajuy
police force. 13
Based on the foregoing and on the investigations conducted by the Ajuy police
force and the 321st P.C. Company, an information for murder dated August
26, 1981, was filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo against the spouses
Augusto and Fausta Gonzales. The information read as follows:
The undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses FAUSTA
GONZALES and AUGUSTO GONZALES of the crime of
MURDER committed as follows:
That on or about the 21st day of February, 1981, in the
Municipality of Ajuy, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named accused with
four other companions whose identities are still unknown and
are still at large, armed with sharp-pointed and deadly
weapons, conspiring, confederating and helping each other,
with treachery and evident premeditation, with deliberate
intent and decided purpose to kill, and taking advantage of
their superior strength and number, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, stab, hack, hit and
wound Lloyd D. Peñacerrada, with the weapons with which
said accused were provided at the time, thereby inflicting
upon said Lloyd D. Peñacerrada multiple wounds on different
parts of his body as shown by autopsy report attached to the
record of this case which multifarious wounds caused the
immediate death of said Lloyd D. Peñacerrada.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Iloilo City, August 26, 1981. 14
When arraigned on September 16, 1981, Augusto and Fausta both entered a
plea of not guilty. Before trial, however, Jose Huntoria 15 who claimed to have
witnessed the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada, presented himself to Nanie
Peñacerrada, the victim's widow, on October 6, 1981, and volunteered to
testify for the prosecution. A reinvestigation of the case was therefore
conducted by the Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo on the basis of which an Amended
Information, 16 dated March 3, l 1982, naming as additional accused Custodio
Gonzales, Sr. (the herein appellant),
o Custodio Gonzales, Jr., Nerio Gonzales,
and Rogelio Lanida, was filed. Again, all the accused except as earlier
explained, Lanida, pleaded not 1 guilty to the crime.
At the trial, the prosecution1 presented Dr. Jesus Rojas, the Rural Health
physician of Ajuy who conducted the autopsy on the body of the victim;
Bartolome Paja, the barangay captain of Barangay Tipacla; Patrolman
Salvador Centeno and Corporal Ben Sazon of the Ajuy Police Force; Sgt. (ret)
Nicolas Belicanao and Sgt. Reynaldo Palomo of the 321st P.C. Company
based in Sara, Iloilo; Jose Huntoria; and Nanie Peñacerrada, the widow.
Dr. Jesus Rojas testified that he performed the autopsy on the body of the
deceased Lloyd Penacerrada at around 11:20 a.m. on February 22, 1981 after
it was taken to the municipal hall of Ajuy. 17 His findings revealed that the victim
suffered from 16 wounds comprising of four (4) punctured wounds, seven (7)
stab wounds, four (4) incised wounds, and one (1) lacerated wound. In his
testimony, Dr. Rojas, while admitting the possibility that only one weapon might
have caused all the wounds (except the lacerated wound) inflicted on the
victim, nevertheless opined that due to the number and different
characteristics of the wounds, the probability that at least two instruments were
used is high. 18 The police authorities and the P.C. operatives for their part
testified on the aspect of the investigation they respectively conducted in
relation to the incident. Nanie Peñacerrada testified mainly on the expenses
she incurred by reason of the death of her husband while Barangay Captain
Bartolome Paja related the events surrounding the surrender of the spouses
Augusto and Fausta Gonzales to him, the location of the houses of the
accused, as well as on other matters.
By and large, the prosecution's case rested on Huntoria's alleged eyewitness
account of the incident. According to Huntoria, who gave his age as 30 when
he testified on July 27, 1982, 19 at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon on February
21, 1981, he left his work at Barangay Central, in Ajuy, Iloilo where he was
employed as a tractor driver by one Mr. Piccio, and walked home; 20 he took a
short-cut route. 21 While passing at the vicinity of the Gonzales spouses' house
at around 8:00 o'clock in the evening, he heard cries for help. 22 Curiosity
prompted him to approach the place where the shouts were emanating. When
he was some 15 to 20 meters away, he hid himself behind a clump of banana
trees. 23 From where he stood, he allegedly saw all the accused ganging upon
and takings turns in stabbing and hacking the victim Lloyd Peñacerrada, near
a "linasan" or threshing platform. He said he clearly recognized all the accused
as the place was then awash in moonlight. 24 Huntoria further recounted that
after the accused were through in stabbing and hacking the victim, they then
lifted his body and carried it into the house of the Gonzales spouses which was
situated some 20 to 25 meters away from the "linasan". 25 Huntoria then
proceeded on his way home. Upon reaching his house, he related what he
saw to his mother and to his wife 26 before he went to sleep. 27Huntoria
explained that he did not immediately report to the police authorities what he
witnessed for fear of his life. 28 In October 1981 however, eight months after
the extraordinary incident he allegedly witnessed, bothered by his conscience
plus the fact that his father was formerly a tenant of the victim which, to his
mind, made him likewise a tenant of the latter, he thought of helping the victim's
widow, Nanie Peñacerrada. Hence, out of his volition, he travelled from his
place at Sitio Nabitasan, in Barangay Tipacla Municipality of Ajuy, to Sara,
Iloilo where Mrs. Peñacerrada lived, and related to her what he saw on
February 21, 1981. 29
Except Fausta who admitted killing Lloyd Peñacerrada in defense of her honor
as the deceased attempted to rape her, all the accused denied participation in
the crime. The herein accused-appellant, Custodio Gonzales, Sr., claimed that
he was asleep 30 in his house which was located some one kilometer away
from the scene of the crime 31 when the incident happened. He asserted that
he only came to know of it after his grandchildren by Augusto and Fausta
Gonzales went to his house that night of February 21, 1981 to inform him. 32
The trial court disregarded the version of the defense; it believed the testimony
of Huntoria.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Custodia Gonzales, Sr., the lone appellant,
contended that the trial court erred in convicting him on the basis of the
testimony of Jose Huntoria, the lone alleged eyewitness, and in not
appreciating his defense of alibi.
The Court of Appeals found no merit in both assigned errors. In upholding
Huntoria's testimony, the appellate court held that:
. . . Huntoria positively identified all the accused, including the
herein accused-appellant, as the assailants of Peñacerrada.
(TSN, p. 43, July 27, 1982) The claim that Huntoria would
have difficulty recognizing the assailant at a distance of 15 to
20 meters is without merit, considering that Huntoria knew all
the accused. (Id., pp. 37-39) If Huntoria could not say who
was hacking and who was stabbing the deceased, it was only
because the assailant were moving around the victim.
As for the delay in reporting the incident to the authorities, we
think that Huntoria's explanation is satisfactory. He said he
feared for his life. (Id., pp. 50-51, 65) As stated in People
vs. Realon, 99 SCRA 442, 450 (1980): "The natural reticence
of most people to get involved in a criminal case is of judicial
notice. As held in People v. Delfin, '. . . the initial reluctance of
witnesses in this country to volunteer information about a
criminal case and their unwillingness to be involved in or
dragged into criminal investigations is common, and has been
judicially declared not to affect credibility.'"
It is noteworthy that the accused-appellant self admitted that
he had known Huntoria for about 10 years and that he and
Huntoria were in good terms and had no misunderstanding
whatsoever. (TSN, p. 33, July 18, 1984) He said that he could
not think of any reason why Huntoria should implicate him.
(Id., p. 34) Thus, Huntoria's credibility. is beyond question. 33
The Court of Appeals likewise rejected the appellant's defense of alibi. 34 The
appellate court, however, found the sentence imposed by the trial court on the
accused-appellant erroneous. Said the appellate court:
Finally, we find that the trial court erroneously sentenced the
accused-appellant to 12 years and 1 day to 17 years and 4
months of reclusion temporal. The penalty for murder under
Article 248 is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
death. As there was no mitigating or aggravating
circumstance, the imposible penalty should be reclusion
perpetua. Consequently, the appeal should have been
brought to the Supreme Court. With regard to the indemnity
for death, the award of P40,000.00 should be reduced to
P30,000.00, in accordance with the rulings of the Supreme
Court. (E.g., People v. De la Fuente, 126 SCRA 518 (1983);
People v. Atanacio, 128 SCRA 31 (1984); People v. Rado,
128 SCRA 43 (1984); People v. Bautista, G.R. No. 68731,
Feb. 27, 1987).35
The case, as mentioned earlier, is now before us upon certification by the
Court of Appeals, the penalty imposed being reclusion perpetua.
After a careful review of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, we find the
same insufficient to convict the appellant of the crime charged.
To begin with, the investigation conducted by the police authorities leave much
to be desired. Patrolman Centeno of the Ajuy police force in his sworn
statements 36 even gave the date of the commission of the crime as "March
21, 1981." Moreover, the sketch 37 he made of the scene is of little help. While
indicated thereon are the alleged various blood stains and their locations
relative to the scene of the crime, there was however no indication as to their
quantity. This is rather unfortunate for the prosecution because, considering
that there are two versions proferred on where the killing was carried out, the
extent of blood stains found would have provided a more definite clue as to
which version is more credible. If, as the version of the defense puts it, the
killing transpired inside the bedroom of the Gonzales spouses, there would
have been more blood stains inside the couple's bedroom or even on the
ground directly under it. And this circumstance would provide an additional
mooring to the claim of attempted rape asseverated by Fausta. On the other
hand, if the prosecution's version that the killing was committed in the field
near the linasan is the truth, then blood stains in that place would have been
more than in any other place.
The same sloppiness characterizes the investigation conducted by the other
authorities. Police Corporal Ben Sazon who claimed that accused Augusto
Gonzales surrendered to him on February 23, 1981 failed to state clearly the
reason for the "surrender." It would even appear that Augusto "surrendered"
just so he could be safe from possible revenge by the victim's kins. Corporal
Sazon likewise admitted that Augusto never mentioned to him the participation
of other persons in the killing of the victim. Finally, without any evidence on
that point, P.C. investigators of the 321st P.C. Company who likewise
conducted an investigation of the killing mentioned in their criminal
complaint 38 four other unnamed persons, aside from the spouses Augusto
and Fausta Gonzales, to have conspired in killing Lloyd Peñacerrada.
Now on the medical evidence. Dr. Rojas opined that it is possible that the
sixteen wounds described in the autopsy report were caused by two or more
bladed instruments. Nonetheless, he admitted the possibility that one bladed
instrument might have caused all. Thus, insofar as Dr. Rojas' testimony and
the autopsy report are concerned, Fausta Gonzales' admission that she alone
was responsible for the killing appears not at all too impossible. And then there
is the positive testimony of Dr. Rojas that there were only five wounds that
could be fatal out of the sixteen described in the autopsy report. We shall
discuss more the significance of these wounds later.
It is thus clear from the foregoing that if the conviction of the appellant by the
lower courts is to be sustained, it can only be on the basis of the testimony of
Huntoria, the self-proclaimed eyewitness. Hence, a meticulous scrutiny of
Huntoria's testimony is compelling.
To recollect, Huntoria testified that he clearly saw all the accused, including
the appellant, take turns in hacking and stabbing Lloyd Peñacerrada, at about
8:00 o'clock in the evening, on February 21, 1981, in the field near a "linasan"
while he (Huntoria) stood concealed behind a clump of banana trees some 15
to 20 meters away from where the crime was being committed. According to
him, he recognized the six accused as the malefactors because the scene was
then illuminated by the moon. He further stated that the stabbing and hacking
took about an hour. But on cross-examination, Huntoria admitted that he could
not determine who among the six accused did the stabbing and/or hacking and
what particular weapon was used by each of them.
ATTY. GATON (defense counsel on cross-
examination):
Q And you said that the moon was bright, is
it correct?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And you would like us to understand that
you saw the hacking and the stabbing, at that
distance by the herein accused as identified
by you?
A Yes, sir, because the moon was brightly
shining.
Q If you saw the stabbing and the hacking,
will you please tell this Honorable Court who
was hacking the victim?
A Because they were surrounding
Peñacerrada and were in constant
movement, I could not determine who did the
hacking.
ATTY. GATON:
The interpretation is not clear.
COURT:
They were doing it rapidly.
A The moving around or the hacking or the
"labu" or "bunu" is rapid. I only saw the rapid
movement of their arms, Your Honor, and I
cannot determine who was hacking and who
was stabbing. But I saw the hacking and the
stabbing blow.
ATTY. GATON:
Q You cannot positively identify before this
Court who really hacked Lloyd Peñacerrada?
A Yes sir, I cannot positively tell who did the
hacking.
Q And likewise you cannot positively tell this
Honorable Court who did the stabbing?
A Yes sir, and because of the rapid
movements.
Q I noticed in your direct testimony that you
could not even identify the weapons used
because according to you it was just
flashing?
A Yes, sir.39
(Emphasis supplied)
From his very testimony, Huntoria failed to impute a definite and specific act
committed, or contributed, by the appellant in the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada.
It also bears stressing that there is nothing in the findings of the trial court and
of the Court of Appeals which would categorize the criminal liability of the
appellant as a principal by direct participation under Article 17, paragraph 1 of
the Revised Penal Code. Likewise, there is nothing in the evidence for the
prosecution that inculpates him by inducement, under paragraph 2 of the same
Article 17, or by indispensable cooperation under paragraph 3 thereof. What
then was the direct part in the killing did the appellant perform to support the
ultimate punishment imposed by the Court of Appeals on him?
Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides how criminal liability is incurred.
Art. 4. Criminal liability — Criminal liability shall be incurred:
1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense
against persons or property, were it not for the inherent
impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the
employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, one of the means by which criminal liability is incurred is through the
commission of a felony. Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other
hand, provides how felonies are committed.
 Art. 3. Definition — Acts and omissions punishable by law are
felonies (delitos).
Felonies are committed not only by means of deceit (dolo) but
also by means of fault (culpa).
There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate
intent; and there is fault when the wrongful act results from
imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the elements of felonies in general are: (1) there must be an act or
omission; (2) the act or omission must be punishable under the Revised Penal
Code; and (3) the act is performed or the omission incurred by means of deceit
or fault.
Here, while the prosecution accuses, and the two lower courts both found, that
the appellant has committed a felony in the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada,
forsooth there is paucity of proof as to what act was performed by the
appellant. It has been said that "act," as used in Article 3 of the Revised Penal
Code, must be understood as "any bodily movement tending to produce some
effect in the external world." 40 In this instance, there must therefore be shown
an "act" committed by the appellant which would have inflicted any harm to the
body of the victim that produced his death.
Yet, even Huntoria, as earlier emphasized, admitted quite candidly that he did
not see who "stabbed" or who "hacked" the victim. Thus this principal witness
did not say, because he could not whether the appellant "hacked or "stabbed"
victim. In fact, Huntoria does not know what specific act was performed by the
appellant. This lack of specificity then makes the case fall short of the test laid
down by Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code previously discussed.
Furthermore, the fact that the victim sustained only five fatal wounds out of the
total of sixteen inflicted, as adverted to above, while there are six accused
charged as principals, it follows to reason that one of the six accused could
not have caused or dealt a fatal wound. And this one could as well be the
appellant, granted ex gratia argumenti that he took part in the hacking and
stabbing alleged by Huntoria. And why not him? Is he not after all the oldest
(already sexagenarian at that time) and practically the father of the five
accused? And pursuing this argument to the limits of its logic, it is possible,
nay even probable, that only four, or three, or two of the accused could have
inflicted all the five fatal wounds to the exclusion of two, three, or four of them.
And stretching the logic further, it is possible, nay probable, that all the fatal
wounds, including even all the non-fatal wounds, could have been dealt by
Fausta in rage against the assault on her womanhood and honor. But more
importantly, there being not an iota of evidence that the appellant caused any
of the said five fatal wounds, coupled with the prosecution's failure to prove
the presence of conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt, the appellant's
conviction can not be sustained.
Additionally, Huntoria's credibility as a witness is likewise tarnished by the fact
that he only came out to testify in October 1981, or eight long months since he
allegedly saw the killing on February 21, 1981. While ordinarily the failure of a
witness to report at once to the police authorities the crime he
had witnessed should not be taken against him and should not affect his
credibility,41 here, the unreasonable delay in Huntoria's coming out engenders
doubt on his veracity. 42 If the silence of coming out an alleged eyewitness for
several weeks renders his credibility doubtful, 43 the more it should be for one
who was mute for eight months. Further, Huntoria's long delay in reveiling what
he allegedly witnessed, has not been satisfactorily explained. His lame excuse
that he feared his life would be endangered is too pat to be believed. There is
no showing that he was threatened by the accused or by anybody. And if it
were true that he feared a possible retaliation from the accused, 44 why did he
finally volunteer to testify considering that except for the spouses Augusto and
Fausta Gonzales who were already under police custody, the rest of the
accused were then still free and around; they were not yet named in the
original information, 45 thus the supposed danger on Huntoria's life would still
be clear and present when he testified.
Moreover, Huntoria is not exactly a disinterested witness as portrayed by the
prosecution. He admitted that he was a tenant of the deceased. In fact, he
stated that one of the principal reasons why he testified was because the victim
was also his landlord.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, Mr. Huntoria, why did it take you so
long from the time you saw the stabbing and
hacking of Lloyd Peñacerrada when you told
Mrs. Peñacerrada about what happened to
her husband?
A At first I was then afraid to tell anybody else
but because I was haunted by my conscience
and secondly the victim was also my
landlord I revealed what I saw to the wife of
the victim.46
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis ours.)
At this juncture, it may be relevant to remind that under our socioeconomic set-
up, a tenant owes the very source of his livelihood, if not existence itself, from
his landlord who provides him with the land to till. In this milieu, tenants like
Huntoria are naturally beholden to their landlords and seek ways and means
to ingratiate themselves with the latter. In this instance, volunteering his
services as a purported eyewitness and providing that material testimony
which would lead to the conviction of the entire family of Augusto Gonzales
whose wife, Fausta, has confessed to the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada, would,
in a perverted sense, be a way by which Huntoria sought to ingratiate himself
with the surviving family of his deceased landlord. This is especially so
because the need to get into the good graces of his landlord's family assumed
a greater urgency considering that he ceased to be employed as early as May
1981. 47 Volunteering his services would alleviate the financial distress he was
in. And Huntoria proved quite sagacious in his choice of action for shortly after
he volunteered and presented himself to the victim's widow, he was taken
under the protective wings of the victim's uncle, one Dr. Biclar, who gave him
employment and provided lodging for his family. 48 Given all the foregoing
circumstances, we can not help but dismiss Huntoria as an unreliable witness,
to say the least.
At any rate, there is another reason why we find the alleged participation of
the appellant in the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada doubtful — it is contrary to our
customs and traditions. Under the Filipino family tradition and culture, aging
parents are sheltered and insulated by their adult children from any possible
physical and emotional harm. It is therefore improbable for the other accused
who are much younger and at the prime of their manhood, to summon the aid
or allow the participation of their 65-year old 49 father, the appellant, in the
killing of their lone adversary, granting that the victim was indeed an adversary.
And considering that the appellant's residence was about one kilometer from
the scene of the crime, 50 we seriously doubt that the appellant went there just
for the purpose of aiding his three robust male sons (Custodia Jr., Nerio, and
Augusta), not to mention the brother and sister, Rogelio and Fausta, in the
killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada, even if the latter were a perceived enemy.
Finally, while indeed alibi is a weak defense, 51 under appropriate
circumstances, like in the instant case in which the participation of the
appellant is not beyond cavil it may be considered as exculpatory. Courts
should not at once look with disfavor at the defense of alibi for if taken in the
light of the other evidence on record, it may be sufficient to acquit the
accused. 52
In fine, the guilt of the appellant has not been proven beyond reasonable
doubt.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and the appellant is hereby ACQUITTED. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.