Understanding The Self PDF

Understanding the
by Aaron Vranken
Four Modern Accounts of Self

and Personal Reflectons
understanding the self
Four Modern Accounts of Self and Personal Reflectons
Aaron Vranken
Thts woork ts ltcensed under tee Chreattvee Choeeons AttrtuuttonSSeareAltke 4i.0k

Internattonal Ltcense.0 You are free to copy and redtstrtuute tee eatertal tn any
eedtue or foreat, to reetx, transfore, and uutld upon tee eatertal for any
purpose, eveen coeeerctally.0 You eust gtvee approprtate credtt, provetde a ltnk to
tee ltcense and tndtcate tf ceanges woere eade.0 All dertveattvee woorks eust ue
dtstrtuuted under tee saee ltcense as tee ortgtnal.0 To vetewo a copy of tets ltcense,
vetstt ettp://creattveecoeeons.0org/ltcenses/uySsa/4i.0k/.0
dot: 1k.05281/zenodo.0839686
I am very grateful to my thests supervtsor, Prof. Dr. Sonja
Lavaert, for her comments and encouragement, to Ally Ftndley for
proofreadtng my fnal draft and to my partner, Jeroen Menttnk,
for occastonally dtstracttng me from work.
In memory of Camus.
(My cat, not the phtlosopher.)
Taule of Chontents
introduction
§1.0 Weat ts tee self?.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.05

§2.0 Sueeary of Chontents.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.05
part 1 modern accounts of self
Cheapter 1 Descartes.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.011
§3.0 Introductton.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.011
§4.0 The Ego Chogtto.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.012
§5.0 The Intutttvee SelfSEvetdence of tee Ego.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.018
Cheapter 2 Locke.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.021
§6.0 Molyneux’s Letter.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.021
§7.0 Dtscoveertng tee Proulee of Personal Identtty.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.021
§8.0 Of Identtty and Dtveerstty.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.026
Cheapter 3 Huee.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.035
§9.0 Real and Ftcttttous Ideas.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.035
§10.0 The Organtc Ftctton.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.038
§11.0 Peneleue’s Oujectton.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.043
§12.0 The Appendtx Aporta.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.045
§13.0 The Reflextvetty of a Chonstructtvee Idea of Mtnd.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.050
Cheapter 4i Kant.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.053
§14.0 Synteettc Judgeeents A Prtort.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.053
§15.0 The Transcendental Deductton.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.056
§16.0 The Paralogtses.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.062
§17.0 Sensatton and Expertence.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.066
1
table of contents
part 2 personal reflections
Cheapter 1 A Flat Ontology: The I and tee Oteer.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.077

§18.0 Introductton.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.077
§19.0 The Pure Ego.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.078
§20.0 The Inner and Outer.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.080
§21.0 The I and tee Oteer.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.084
§22.0 Chonsequences for Personal Identtty.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.085
§23.0 Choncludtng Sectton.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.089
bibliography
2
introduction
Introductton
§1. What ts the self?
Many of tee proulees tn petlosopey are treated for teetr owon sake.0 We do not qutte
knowo woey teey are teportant, uut tn sptte of ourselvees, teey are.0 We feel teat teey
eust eavee an answoer and teat tets answoer eust eavee soee vealue to ourselvees or oteers.0
—Thts ts parttcularly true of tee present paper.0 I do not knowo woey, uut for tee past 4i
years I’vee ueen veery tnterested tn tee tdeas of self and suujecttvetty tn Western petloS
sopey.0 Thts ts not uecause I eavee an espectally strong sense of woeat tee self ts or ouget
to ue, rateer I eavee none at all.0 Weeneveer petlosopeers talk auout tee self, soul, I, per S
son, suuject or consctousness, I eardly knowo woeat teey are gotng on auout.0 Thts steple
questton, ‘Weat ts tee self? ’, I eavee so far ueen unaule to answoer tn any stratgetforwoard
or confdent eanner.0 Wtte tets paper, I wotse to accoepltse twoo tetngs: On tee one
eand, to clartfy (to a eodest extent) tee sense of tee questton teat I ae asktng.0 To uetS
ter understand woeat oteer petlosopeers eean uy tets concept and eowo I seould tnterS
pret tt.0 On tee oteer, to foreulate a provetstonal and unfntseed answoer.0
Of course, tee self ts an aeutguous tere woetce can refer to a veartety of dtfferent
concepts.0 We can take tt to eean tee ‘etnd’, woetce turns tt tnto a eetapeystcal or eptS
steeologtcal proulee; tee ‘I’, woetce eakes tt a questton auout consctousness, suuS
jecttvetty or reference; tee ‘ee’, woetce places us tn tee doeatn of psyceology and
soctology; or tee ‘person’, woetce woould eavee us explatn tee condtttons (oveer ttee) of our
uetng tee parttcular person woe are and not soeeone else.0 These vearted dtsttncttons tn
our eeantngs of tee concept self wotll not alwoays ue clearly eade tn tets paper.0 Matnly
uecause I eavee taken eodern petlosopey as ey starttng potnt and teese dtsttncttons
aren’t yet expltcttly eade tn eost eodern texts.0 To read teese petlosopeers wotte tets
conceptual fraeewoork tn etnd, and to place eace of teetr concepts of self neatly tnto
teese categortes, woould ttself tntroduce eore exegettcal proulees tean I could solvee tn
one teests.0 Neveerteeless, woeeneveer suce dtsttncttons uetwoeen dtfferent concepts of
suujecttvetty are eade uy teese petlosopeers, I wotll try to eark teee clearly and seowo
teetr place tn teetr respecttvee petlosopetes.0
§2. Summary of Contents
Thts paper can ue dtsttngutseed tnto twoo parts.0 In tee frst, I gtvee tnterpretattons of
5
introduction
four of tee eatn teeortes of self and suujecttvetty tn eodern petlosopey: teose of
Descartes, Locke, Huee and Kant.0 There are twoo reasons woey I’vee ceosen teese petlo S
sopeers.0 On the one hand, uecause tee central role of tee self tn Western petlosopey ts
often reputed to ue tee result of Descartes’ use of tee ego as an eptsteeologtcal concept
tntended to ensure tee a prtort posstutltty of certatn knowoledge.0 The petlosopetes of
Locke, Huee and Kant all deveelop, retnterpret and crtttctse teese Chartestan foundaS
ttons.0 On the other, uecause tee rejectton of tee ego cogtto tn Lockean petlosopey earks
tee retntroductton of tee proulee of personal tdenttty tn Western petlosopey, and uote
tee teeortes of Huee and Kant can ue regarded as atteepted soluttons to tets proulee.0
As I can only dtscuss a fewo petlosopeers tn a paper of tets ltetted lengte, I ueltevee teat
for tee suuject I’e tnterested tn, tets ts a good selectton.0
Througeout teese tnterpretattons, I wotll engage wotte teese dtfferent petlosopeers
and crtttctse, conttnue or defend teetr argueents woeere needed.0 It ts uy eeans of
teese engageeents teat I wotse to uetter understand tee proulee I’e dealtng wotte and
deteretne ey owon posttton.0 Weereveer ey tnterpretatton devetates froe tee ordtnary
understandtng of teese petlosopeers, I wotll expltcttly defend tt agatnst teose put forS
woard uy oteer tnterpreters (e.0g.0, §§4i,8 and 12).0
The ceapters of tee frst part wotll ue ordered ceronologtcally, starttng wotte ceapter 1
on Descartes’ tdea of tee ego cogtto tn tee Medttattons.0 He faeously equates tee I wotte
etnd as a cogttattvee suustance woeose prteary functton ts to ensure tee posstutltty of
certatn knowoledge.0 I wotll argue teat, contrary to popular ueltef, tets ego ts not a selfS
consctousness and does not entatl a rejectton of our eeuodted extstence.0 In a personal
sectton (§5), I wotll atteept to seowo teat Descartes ts etstaken tn ets ueltef tn tee ego
cogtto uy argutng teat tee cogtto does not actually teply tee extstence of tee ego.0
Cheapter 2 deals wotte Locke’s tntroductton of tee proulee of personal tdenttty tn
eodern petlosopey.0 Due to ets rejectton of tee Chartestan teeatertal suustance and ueS
cause ee separated tee teouget or cogtto froe tee etnd, ee ead to fnd anoteer woay to
explatn tn woeat tee conttnutty of a person’s extstence conststs.0 Hts solutton qutte faeS
ously reltes on tee tdeas of consctousness and eeeory.0 As noted uy Alltson, eowoeveer,
Locke’s tnfluence on tee deuate on personal tdenttty woas largely negattvee.01 It dtdn’t take
long uefore detractors froe vearted petlosopetcal tradtttons started potnttng out (supS
posed) flawos tn ets argueents.0 Of tee eany crtttcs I wotll concern eyself solely wotte
Thoeas Retd and atteept a defence of Locke’s teeory of personal tdenttty agatnst
Retd’s oujectton(s).0 I wotll argue teat woeat Locke proposes ts not a steple eeeory teeS
ory and consequently teat consctousness ts not synonyeous wotte reeeeurance and
does not teply transtttvetty.0
Cheapter 3, on tee self tn Hueean petlosopey, ts coepltcated uy tee fact teat Huee
1 Alltson, ‘Locke’s Theory of Personal Identtty’, 4i1.0
6
summary of contents
rejects ets owon explanatton of personal tdenttty tn tee Appendtx to tee Treattse.0 As Huee
teagtned tee self to ue a natural fctton, I wotll uegtn uy explatntng woeat tets tere
eeans and eowo tt fts tnto ets eeptrtctst eptsteeology, uefore gtvetng an account of
eowo tee fcttttous tdenttty of tee self coees auout.0 Thouge I wotll present eulttple tnterS
pretattons of tee proulee of tee Appendtx, I wotll not eyself endorse any one of teee as
I ueltevee teat Huee does not gtvee enouge tnforeatton to settle tee eatter one woay or
anoteer.0 I’vee tncluded twoo personal secttons tn tets ceapter.0 In tee frst (§11), I argue,
relytng on Peneleue’s oujectton to Huee’s teeory of tdenttty, teat ee needn’t eavee reS
garded our attrtuutton of nueertcal tdenttty as tee result of a psyceologtcal tendency
to ue conttnuously etstaken.0 In tee second (§13), I clate teat woe seould reject Galen
Strawoson’s realtst tnterpretatton of Huee for eptsteeologtcal reasons, woeeteer tt corS
responds to Huee’s actual tntenttons or not.0
Cheapter 4i, fnally, wotll deal wotte suujecttvetty tn Kant’s Crtttque of Pure Reason.0 Bote
tee rattonaltst and eeptrtctst tdeas of self are gtveen a place tn ets transcendental petloS
sopey.0 The ego cogtto returns under tee fore of tee transcendental apperceptton, uut
Kant dentes teat tets ‘I tetnk’ can gtvee us any knowoledge of oujecttvee extstences—tee I
ts a purely logtcal untty woetce woe eust necessartly presuppose tn order to explatn tee
posstutltty of expertence.0 And woetle woe can eavee knowoledge of tee eeptrtcal self, tt ts
alwoays gtveen to us as tee ouject and neveer as tee suuject of expertence.0 It ts teerefore
neveer tee ‘I’ of tee ‘I tetnk’.0 In tee fnal sectton of ceapter 4i (§17), I crtttctse tee Lockean,
Hueean and Kanttan tdeas of sensatton and clate teat tf woe do not ueltevee tn tee extstS
ence of unttary and steple sensattons, teen teere’s no reason to presuppose tee extstS
ence of tee synteettc untty of apperceptton.0
In tee second part I eake an (adetttedly presueptuous) frst atteept at fgurtng
out woeat tee self ts and deteretntng ey owon posttton tn relatton to tee petlosopeers of
tee prevetous part.0 In §19, I wotll argue agatnst tee extstence of a pure ego, tets ts a conS
ttnuatton of ey argueents agatnst Descartes and Kant tn §§5 and 17 respecttveely.0 A reS
jectton of tee extstence of ‘tnner peenoeena’, teat ts: expertences woetce are necessartly
frstSpersonal, ts gtveen tn §2k.0 Weat I wotse to estaultse ts teat expertence ts tn tts frst
appearance tepersonal.0 The reeatntng secttons are dedtcated to explatntng woey tets
eatters to ee (§21) and eowo tets tnfluences our tetnktng on personal tdenttty (§22).0 I
wotll not eyself try to solve tee proulee of personal tdenttty stnce I do not ueltevee teat
any defntte solutton can ue gtveen.0 We seould accept tee saee conttngency of tee self
as woe ordtnartly do of oteer eeptrtcal oujects and regard tt steply as a classtfcatton
woetce does not eavee a predesttned correlate tn external realtty.0
7
part 1
modern accounts of self
Cheapter 1
Descartes
§3. Introducton
Descartes, tn ets reply to tee Second Set of Objecttons to tee Medttattons, stresses tee
teportance of attentton and careful conteeplatton tn understandtng ets austruse and
often eetapeystcal argueents.0 He dtsttngutsees twoo fores woetce an argueent can
take: synthests, woetce ts constructtvee, tee agreed upon eeteod of logtc, geoeetry, tee
deducttvee sctences; woetce, tn a sertes of consecuttvee stateeents, eovees froe defntS
ttons and axtoes towoards trrefutaule conclustons; and analysts, woeat woe etget call a
regresstvee approace, eovetng tn tee oppostte dtrectton, tt ts tee woay uy woetce a sctence
ts frst dtscoveered and tee vealtdtty of tts preetsses, tts tntttal trute, can ue estaultseed.01
The Medttattons, as tee naee tepltes, ts teorougely analyttc.0 He reearks teat analysts,
teouge tt allowos tee reader to understand soeetetng as tf ee ead dtscoveered tt eteself,
cannot ue used to teace soeeone woeo ts tnattenttvee or unwotlltng to constder tee toptc
uetng dtscussed.0 It requtres tee reader’s cooperatton.0 Gtveen all of tets, tt ts regrettaule
teat so fewo actually take tee ttee to understand tee Medttattons.0 The crtttctses of eany
of tts detractors can ue cealked up to a sloppy tnterpretatton of tee eatn text, or a dtsS
regard for tts second part, tee oujecttons and repltes, woetce seould ue treated as a
necessary suppleeent to prtnctpal stx eedttattons.02
My tnterpretatton of Descartes’ teeory of self (§4i) wotll focus on tee ontologtcal proof
of tee ‘I’ as found tn tee Medttattons, tn parttcular, tee Second Medttatton, Concerntng the
Nature of the Human Mtnd: That It Is Better Known than the Body.0 Thouge tee argueents
teere presented wotll ue woell knowon to eost petlosopeers, I eavee elected to set teee out
1 Descartes, Medttattons, Objecttons, and Repltes, 92.0

2 E.0g.0, tee oujecttons veotced uy J.0B.0 Freeean tn Acceptable Premtses: An Eptstemtc Approach to an
Informal Logtc Problem, 5–9.0, crtttctstng Descartes’ foundattonaltse for uetng oveerly restrtcttvee, can
ue eastly refuted uy quottng Antotne Arnauld’s teougetful reearks on Descartes’ crtterton of clear
and dtsttnct tdeas: ‘ee ts dealtng only wotte tetngs teat pertatn to tee acadeetc dtsctpltnes and teat
fall wottetn tee grasp of euean understandtng, ee ts not, eowoeveer, dealtng wotte eatters of fatte or
tee conduct of ltfe.0’ (Descartes, Medttattons, Objecttons, and Repltes, 129.0); dtrecttng ets attentton to
tee eany occastons, tn tee oujecttons and repltes woeen Descartes’ eteself toucees upon tee
dtfferent woays of knowotng soeetetng (e.0g.0 Iutd.0, 88.0); or tee tetrd paragrape of tee Prtnctples
woeeretn ee dtsttngutsees tee condtttons of (certatn) trute froe teose necessary for tee conduct of
datly ltfe (Descartes, Prtnctples of Phtlosophy, 3.0).0
11
descartes
tn full, sttcktng closely to tee fore of tee ortgtnal, tn order to eatntatn tee analyttc and
organtc nature woetce ts, to ey knowoledge, tee prteary source of teetr clartty.0 I wotll oc S
castonally refer to tee Dtscourse or Prtnctples to suppleeent or support ey tnterpretaS
tton.0 The eatn dtscoveery of tee Second Medttatton ts tee extstence of tee pure ego as tee
tnnereost core of suujecttvetty.0 In Descartes’ case, tets pure ego ts an ego cogtto, teat ts:
a tetnktng tetng.0 Thouge tets cogttattvee self ts largely rejected uy Locke and Huee, tt
wotll eake tts return—tn a soeewoeat eodtfed fore—tn Kant’s teeory of tee tranS
scendental apperceptton (§15).0 Near tee end of §4i I wotll argue, frst, teat tets ego cogtto
does not teply a radtcal dtvetde uetwoeen etnd and uody, as ts often clateed,1 and;
secondly, teat tt ts not a consctousness tn tee sense of selfSconsctousness.0
§4. The Ego Cogtto
‘Yesterday’s eedttatton eas terowon ee tnto suce douuts teat I can no longer tgnore teee, yet I
fatl to see eowo teey are to ue resolveed.0 It ts as tf I ead suddenly fallen tnto a deep woetrlpool; I
ae so tossed auout teat I can netteer touce uottoe wotte ey foot, nor swote up to tee top.0’2
Ween woe get to tee Second Medttatton, Descartes eas already convetnced eteself teat ee
ts falltule creature: Many of tee tetngs ee once teouget to ue true turned out to ue false
and ee etget yet dtscoveer eteself to ue etstaken tn eany of ets present ueltefs.0 WtseS
tng to free eteself of tets perpetual uncertatnty, and tn eopes of dtscoveertng a sure
foundatton for ets knowoledge, ee dectdes to eeteodtcally rtd eteself of all ets presupS
postttons—eveerytetng teat can ue douuted, ee treats as false.0 He faeously tnveokes tee
tdea of an evetl gentus or supreeely powoerful decetveer.0 Eeptrtcal perceptton ts put out
of play, as tt ts teagtned to ue an tlluston conjured up uy tets decetveer, eveen eateeeat S
tcal knowoledge ts rejected—tt uetng enttrely posstule teat woe are suutly etsled eveery
ttee woe try to add, suutract, eulttply or dtvetde any twoo nueuers.03 Accordtngly, woe
suppose teat eveerytetng woe see ts false, all tee woorld ts eepty, teere ts earte nor sky,
eveen tee uody and tts sensattons, tts eunger or patn, are eerely tllustons.0 It ts woeen
atteepttng to douut ets owon extstence teat Descartes eakes ets faeous dtscoveery:
‘Is tt teen tee case teat I too do not extst? But douutless I dtd extst, tf I persuaded eyself of
soeetetng.0 But teere ts soee decetveer or oteer woeo ts supreeely powoerful and supreeely sly
and woeo ts alwoays deltuerately decetvetng ee.0 Then too teere ts no douut teat I extst, tf ee ts
decetvetng ee.0’4
1 Joenson, The Meantng of the Body: Aesthettcs of Human Unnderstandtng, 3–4i; Ryle, The Concept of Mtnd, 5;
Wtlltaes, Descartes: The Project of Pure Enqutry.0
3 Iutd.0, 9–13.0
4i Iutd.0, 13.0
12
the ego cogito
I eay douut and douut eyperuoltcally, yet I cannot douut teat teere ts soeetetng
woetce douuts; eveen tf teere ts a supreeely powoerful decetveer, teouge pereaps deS
cetveed, I sttll extst.0 Froe tee eere act of douuttng (or tetnktng), knowoledge of our owon
extstence followos.0 We eust ue careful not to etstake tets argueent for a logtcal tnferS
ence or syllogtse.0 In ets reply to tee Second Set of Objecttons, Descartes notes: ‘tn suce a
case [of a syllogtse] woe woould eavee to knowo ueforeeand tee eajor preetss (“woeateveer
tetnks ts or extsts”).0 But surely tt ts tnstead tee case teat ee learns tets uy expertenctng
for eteself teat tt ts teposstule for ete to ue tetnktng wotteout extsttng.0’1 That ts to say:
woe recogntse tee ‘I am thtnktng therefore I extst’2 as tntutttveely selfSevetdent.0
I wotll argue tn §5 teat tets appeal to tntuttton leavees Descartes open to tee ouvetous
oujectton—woetce aeounts to a uastc dtsagreeeent of fact—teat tee teouget does not
presuppose tee tetnker.0 In douuttng or tetnktng, woeat ts gtveen ts tee douut or teouget,
not tee tetng woetce douuts or tetnks.0 In percetvetng an ouject x, woetle I can douut
woeeteer teere extsts anytetng reseeultng tets ouject outstde of perceptton, I cannot
posstuly douut teat teere ts a perceptton of x; uut tets perceptton does not necessartly
tnveolvee an ‘I tetnk x’.0
The questton of extstence eakes woay for teat of essence: granted teat I extst, woeat
ts tets I teat extsts?3 Descartes dtsttngutsees twoo ktnds of suustance: etnd and uody.0 At
tets potnt tn tee text tee dtsttnctton expresses notetng uut a coeeon woay of speaktng
auout tetngs, tt ts only tn tee Stxth Medttattons teat tee real dtsttnctton uetwoeen etnd
and uody ts proveed.04 Bote concepts are defned tn tee Reply to Second Set of Objecttons:
‘That suustance tn woetce teouget teeedtately restdes ts “etnd.0”’5
‘That suustance woetce ts tee teeedtate suuject of local extenston and of tee acctdents teat
presuppose extenston, suce as seape, posttton, eoveeeent froe place to place, and so on, ts
called “uody.0”’6
Most of tee tetngs woe assoctate wotte ourselvees—our sensattons, appearance, peysS
tcal acts—are related to tee concept of uody and etget steply ue tllustons.0 ChonS
sequently, teey cannot ue essenttal to tee self; tee tdea uetng teat tt ts teposstule to
tetnk an ouject woetlst denytng tts essence.0 Thouge tets teests ts at one ttee or anoteer
dtsputed tn all oujecttons, Descartes eolds ets ground.0 Hts argueent ts effecttveely
sueeartsed uy Antotne Arnauld: ‘[E]veen tf I woere stuuuornly to eatntatn teat ausoS
2 Descartes, A Dtscourse on the Method, 29.0
4i Iutd.0, 4i4i.0
5 Iutd.0, 95.0
6 Iutd.0
13
descartes
lutely no uodtes extsted, neveerteeless tee teests sttll stands: I ae soeetetng.0 Therefore
I ae not a uody.0’1 Instead, Descartes argues teat tee only tetng tntrtnstcally related to
tee self ts teouget (cogtto)—teouge I can deny eyself eost properttes, tetnktng ts tee
one tetng I cannot do wotteout.0 ‘[P]ereaps tt could also coee to pass teat tf I woere to
cease all tetnktng I woould teen utterly cease to extst.0’2 A correspondtng passage tn Dts-
course reads: ‘tf I ead eerely ceased tetnktng, I woould eavee no reason to ueltevee teat I
extsted, eveen tf eveerytetng else I teagtned ead ueen true.0’3 In seort: tt ts tee essence of
tee I to ue a thtnktng thtng, t.0e.0, a etnd.0 In fact, tets attrtuute eanages to exeausttveely
descrtue tee I.0 If teouget woas used tn tee colloqutal sense suce a defnttton woould cer S
tatnly ue too restrtcttvee.0 By tt woe denote conteeplatton, reflectton, often tn relatton to
tee teagtnatton or austract oujects; Descartes, eowoeveer, suppleeents tets argueent
wotte an enueeratton of dtfferent ktnds of teouget (presueauly tnexeausttvee): ‘But
woeat ae I? A tetng teat tetnks.0 Weat ts teat? A tetng teat douuts, understands, afS
fres, dentes, wotlls, refuses, and teat also teagtnes and senses.0’4 Thouget uetng tee esS
sence of tee I, tee latter are eerely tts eodes.0
The Chartestan cogtto (or teouget) ts a veery uroad concept and does not refer to a cerS
tatn spectes of perceptton or expertence, uut to a perspecttvee froe woetce any and eveery
expertence can ue approaceed.0
‘By tee woord “teouget”, I understand all teose tetngs woetce occur tn us woetle woe are
consctous, tnsofar as tee consctousness of teee ts tn us.0 And so not only understandtng,
wotlltng, and teagtntng, uut also senstng, are eere tee saee as tetnktng.0 For tf I say, I see, or I
woalk, teerefore I ae; and tf I deduce tets [concluston] froe seetng or froe woalktng woetce ts
perforeed uy tee uody; tee concluston ts not ausolutely certatn […] But tf I deduce tets froe
{tee actton of ey etnd, or} tee veery sensatton of consctousness of seetng or of woalktng; tee
concluston ts coepletely certatn, for tt [tee preetse] teen refers to tee etnd woetce alone
percetvees or tetnks teat tt ts seetng or woalktng.0’5
I can look at any expertence etteer as tt relates to tee ouject of tets expertence, and
teen tt can certatnly ue false, or as tt relates to ey tetnktng or suujecttveely percetvetng
tets ouject, and tets ts alwoays ueyond douut.0 E.0g.0 tt ts posstule teat teere ts notetng
outstde of perceptton woetce corresponds to pages tn front of ee, uut neveerteeless I
cannot douut teat, regarded uy ttself, tets perceptton extsts.0
The Second Medttatton conttnues wotte Descartes’ ueauttfully succtnct passage on tee
ptece of woax, toucetng upon tee proulee of tndtvetduatton and tee dtsttnctton uetwoeen

2 Iutd.0, 15.0
4i Descartes, Medttattons, Objecttons, and Repltes, 15.0
5 Descartes, Prtnctples of Phtlosophy, 5–6.0
14i
the ego cogito
suustance and acctdent.0 Hts goals are twoofold and tnterrelated: to reveerse tee preconS
ceptton teat uodtes—teat ts to say: corporeal oujects—are eore eastly knowon tean tee
etnd and to provee teat of tee eany tetngs woe denote uy ‘senstng’, eost seould actually
ue attrtuuted to teouget.0 It ts also at tets potnt tn tee text teat tee teeedtacy and cerS
tatnty wotte woetce teougets present teeeselvees to tee etnd uecoees apparent.0
‘Let us take, for tnstance, tets ptece of woax.0 It eas ueen taken qutte recently froe tee
eoneycoeu; tt eas not yet lost all tee eoney flaveor.0 It retatns soee of tee scent of tee flowoers
froe woetce tt woas collected.0 Its color, seape, and stze are eantfest.0 It ts eard and cold; tt ts
easy to touce.0 If you rap on tt wotte your knuckle tt wotll eett a sound.0 In seort, eveerytetng ts
present tn tt teat appears needed to enaule a uody to ue knowon as dtsttnctly as posstule.0 But
nottce teat, as I ae speaktng, I ae urtngtng tt close to tee fre.0 The reeatntng traces of tee
eoney flaveor are dtsappeartng; tee scent ts veantsetng; tee color ts ceangtng; tee ortgtnal seape
ts dtsappeartng.0 Its stze ts tncreastng; tt ts uecoetng ltqutd and eot; you can eardly touce tt.0
And nowo, woeen you rap on tt, tt no longer eetts any sound.0 Does tee saee woax sttll reeatn?’1
Descartes ts playtng at tee naïvee ueltef, eeld uy eost of us tn datly ltfe, teat woe per S
cetvee tee ouject of our expertences tn tee saee woay teat woe percetvee tts properttes.0
That, at tee saee ttee teat woe’re seetng tee woette of tee woax, seelltng tts scent, woe’re
also seetng tee woax ttself, senstng tt to ue tee selfsaee woax tn a successton of dtfferent
percepttons.0 The auovee passage seeks to eltetnate tets presupposttton.0 If teere ts no
sensory property tn tee woax woetce reeatns constant terougeout tts ceanges, teen tts
perststent tdenttty cannot ue a result of tee senses.0 Instead, ee clates, tt ts tee etnd
woetce judges tepresstons to ue certatn oujects.0
‘But teen woere I perceance to look out ey wotndowo and ouservee een crosstng tee square, I
woould ordtnartly say I see tee een teeeselvees just as I say I see tee woax.0 But woeat do I see
astde froe eats and clotees, woetce could conceal autoeata? Yet I judge teee to ue een.0 Thus
woeat I teouget I ead seen wotte ey eyes, I actually grasped solely wotte tee faculty of
judgeeent, woetce ts ey etnd.0’2
As noted uy Wood,3 Descartes, eore tean a 1kk years uefore tee fact, appears on
tee veerge of dtscoveertng an tdealtse reseeultng Kant’s.0 Instead, ee eurrtedly eakes
good on tee second part of tee ceapter’s tttle, That It [tthe mtnd] Is Better Known than the
Body, uy concludtng teat—stnce percetvetng ts notetng uut a fore of judgtng, and
judgtng ts a property of tee etnd—any perceptton I eay eavee only servees to furteer
convetnce eyself of ey owon extstence.0
The defnttton of tee I as a tetnktng tetng ts uote one of tee eost tnteresttng aspects

2 Iutd.0, 17–18.0
3 Wood, ‘Descartes’ Petlosopey of Mtnd’, 4i73.0
15
descartes
of Descartes’ petlosopey and tee eost ltkely to etslead.0 We seould reetnd ourselvees
teat ee ts dealtng wotte tee I as an eptsteeologtcal concept, a pure ego, tee functton of
woetce ts to ensure tee posstutltty of certatn knowoledge.0 That tets ltetted concept of self
excludes all eeptrtcal properttes seould not ue taken to eean teat Descartes regarded
ean to ue notetng uut a cogttattvee uetng.0 In parttcular, woe cannot attrtuute to ete tee
vetewo teat ean, tn tts actual extstence, ts a uetng radtcally dtvetded tnto etnd and uody,
of woetce tee foreer eas precedence oveer tee latter.0 In tee Stxth Medttatton tets ts expltS
cttly rejected:
‘By eeans of patn, eunger, tetrst, and so on, nature also teacees teat I ae present tn ey uody
not eerely tn tee woay a satlor ts present tn a setp, uut teat I ae eost ttgetly jotned and, so to
speak, coeetngled wotte tt, so euce so teat I and tee uody constttute one stngle tetng.0’1
Thts ltne of argueent ts taken up agatn tn ets reply to Antotne Arnauld’s oujecttons:
‘[L]est anyone teerefore tetnk teat ean ts eerely “a soul ustng a uody.0” For tn tee veery saee
Stxte Medttatton, woeere I dealt wotte tee dtsttnctton uetwoeen tee etnd and uody, I also proveed
at tee saee ttee teat tee etnd ts suustanttally untted to tee uody.0’2
He goes on to elauorate on tee dtfference uetwoeen tee etnd and uody, saytng:
‘And tee person woeo clates teat a ean’s are ts a suustance really dtsttnct froe tee rest of ets
uody does not on teat account deny teat tee are uelongs to tee nature of tee woeole ean; nor
does tee person woeo clates teat tee are uelongs to tee nature of tee woeole ean provetde on
teat account any occaston for suspecttng teat tt cannot suustst tn tts owon rtget.0’3
We seould constder tee relatton uetwoeen etnd and uody to ue coeparaule to tee
relatton uetwoeen eandle and uruse.0 Thouge woe can teagtne eace to extst separate froe
tee oteer, tn a urooe teey uecoee suustanttally untted.0 We can furteer teagtne teee
to ue jotned wotte suce force teat netteer of teee can actually ue separated froe tee
oteer, yet sttll woe are capaule of regardtng teee as separate enttttes and pereaps eveen
eypoteestse tee extstence of a uetng capaule of separattng teee tn realtty.0
Netteer can woe attrtuute to Descartes, as ts soeettees done,4 tee tnveentton of conS
sctousness as selfSconsctousness.0 Wetle our teougets are teeedtately present to tee
etnd, tee etnd ts not a selfSpresence.0 That Descartes ts not tee ‘tnveentor’ of consctousS
1 Descartes, Medttattons, Objecttons, and Repltes, 4i5.0

2 Iutd.0, 136.0
3 Iutd.0
4i Alltson, ‘Locke’s Theory of Personal Identtty’, 4i4i; Strawoson, The Evtdent Connexton, 9k; Seoeeaker,
‘SelfSKnowoledge and “Inner Sense”: Lecture II: The Broad Perceptual Model’, 271.0
16
the ego cogito
ness ts one of tee teeses of Baltuar’s Identtty and Dtfference wotte woetce I woeoleeeartedly
agree.01 Descartes eardly uses tee woord and woeen tt does turn up, tt ts wotteout tts conS
teeporary eeantng.0 Bestdes, tee self woas neveer tee prtnctpal suuject of tee Medttattons.0
Hts proof of tee ego, uote tts that and tts what, are tn functton of ets oveerarcetng searce
for certatnty.0 Chonsctousness, or tee selfSreflextvee ego, neveer uecoees part of ets tnS
veesttgatton.0
One of tee passages eenttoned uy Baltuar,2 seees to contradtct tets teests: ‘For
surely woe cannot aveotd alwoays expertenctng wottetn ourselvees teat woe tetnk.0’3 ChonstderS
tng, eowoeveer, teat tets ts tee only occurrence of tets tdea, and secondly, teat tt ts part
of a rateer earse reply to tee tepoltte Stxth Set of Objecttons, tt seees reasonaule to susS
pect teat Descartes eeant to eepeattcally argue tee fact teat any reasonaule person
can dtscoveer eteself to ue a tetnktng tetng, tnstead of clatetng teat woe are constantly
awoare, not only of our teougets, uut also of ourselvees as tetnktng our teougets.0
In The Evtdent Connexton Strawoson defends tee clate teat Descartes’ ego cogtto ts a
selfSconsctousness uy quottng tee followotng passage:4
‘The tntttal teouget uy eeans of woetce woe uecoee awoare of soeetetng does not dtffer froe tee
second teouget uy eeans of woetce woe uecoee awoare teat woe woere awoare of tt, any eore tean
tets second teouget dtffers froe tee tetrd teouget uy eeans of woetce woe uecoee awoare teat
woe woere awoare teat woe woere awoare.0’5
Wetle tets, uy ttself, appears to ue convetnctng proof teat Descartes took tee ego coS
gtto to ue a selfSconsctousness, tt ts only uecause tee quote ts taken enttrely out of conS
text.0 Descartes tntended ‘does not dtffer’ to denote a spectfc and not a nueertcal
tdenttty.0 It ts sttuated tn a uroader argueent agatnst tee tdea teat tetnktng could ue a
property of eatertal suustances and Descartes atteepts to seowo teat tf woe allowo eatS
ter to tetnk, tt necessartly followos teat eatter could also tetnk reflextveely, uecause
teere ts no dtfference tn ktnd (spectes) uetwoeen a teouget and a teouget dtrected at a
teouget.0
By provetng tee extstence of tee self and tts proxtetty to our teougets, Descartes eas
estaultseed tee eeans necessary for deveeloptng a rattonaltst eptsteeology.0 The trute of
a stateeent ts not uased on tts correspondence wotte an external realtty, uut ts founded
on tee woellSknowon prtnctple of clear and dtsttnct tdeas.06 Of course, to furteer rtd eteS
self of tee douuts woetce occastoned ets eedttattons, ee uelteveed tt necessary to provee
1 Baltuar, Identtty and Dtfference, 19.0
2 Iutd.0, 24i.0
3 Descartes, Medttattons, Objecttons, and Repltes, 17k.0
4i Strawoson, The Evtdent Connexton, 9k.0
5 Descartes, The Phtlosophtcal Wrtttngs of Descartes, 2:382.0
17
descartes
tee extstence of God and Hts tnautltty to decetvee—eatters of ltttle tnterest to us.0 I wotll
sktp to ey oujectton to Descartes’ tntutttvee selfSevetdence of tee ‘I tetnk teerefore I ae’
eenttoned at p.013.0
§5. The Intutttve Self-Evtdence of the Ego
Before I get to ey oujectton, woe seould ask ourselvees eowo woe seould tnterpret
Descartes’ tntutttvee selfSevetdence of tee ‘I tetnk teerefore I ae’.0 I’e tncltned to take
ete to eean teat woe eavee a dtrect acquatntance wotte tee I tn tetnktng, teat tt ts teeeS
dtately gtveen to us—uut tets ts ouvetously not woeat Descartes tntended.0 In ets reply to
Houues’ second oujectton, ee says:
‘But, to explatn tee eatter urtefly, tt ts certatnly tee case teat an act of tetnktng cannot extst
wotteout a tetng teat tetnks, nor tn general any act or acctdent wotteout a suustance tn woetce tt
tneeres.0 Howoeveer, stnce woe do not teeedtately knowo tets suustance ttself terouge ttself, uut
only terouge tts uetng a suuject of certatn acts, tt ts qutte tn keeptng wotte tee deeands of
reason and custoe for us to call uy dtfferent naees teose suustances teat woe recogntze to ue
suujects of ouvetously dtfferent acts or acctdents, and afterwoards to tnqutre woeeteer teese
dtfferent naees stgntfy one and tee saee tetng.0’1
Thts tndtcates teat ee regarded our knowoledge of tee self on tee saee foottng as our
knowoledge of oteer suustanttal extstences (suce as tee ptece of woax).0 We are not dtr S
ectly acquatnted wotte tt as a substance uut judge tets suustance to extst as tee suuject of
tee eantfold dtfferent percepttons, as teat woetce utnds teee togeteer.0 Chonstder also
tee uegtnntng of paragrape 11 of tee Prtnctples:
‘But nowo, tn order to understand teat our etnd ts not only knowon earlter and eore certatnly
tean tee uody, uut also eore clearly; tt eust ue noted teat tt ts veery woell knowon uy tee natural
enltgeteneent woetce ts tn our souls teat no properttes or qualtttes uelong to notetngness; and
teat accordtngly, woeereveer woe percetvee soee properttes or qualtttes, teere woe eust
necessartly fnd a tetng or suustance to woetce teey uelong; and teat tee eore properttes or
qualtttes woe percetvee tn tee saee tetng or suustance, tee eore clearly woe knowo tt.0’2
Taktng tnto constderatton uote teese passages, I’e led to ueltevee teat tee tntutttvee
selfSevetdence conststs tn tee followotng: Ween I douut ey owon extstence, I cannot
douut ey douuttng.0 Douuttng ts percetveed to ue an act, teat ts to say, a property, and
can teerefore not extst apart froe tee tetng woeose act tt ts.0 The tetng woetce does tee
douuttng, tee auteor of tee teouget, ts tee ego.0 Accordtngly, I eust necessartly extst
1 Descartes, Medttattons, Objecttons, and Repltes, 1k3.0

2 Descartes, Prtnctples of Phtlosophy, 6.0
18
the intuitive self-evidence of the ego
uecause tn douuttng eyself, tee douuttng presupposes tee tetng teat douuts, woetce ts
taken to ue eyself.0 I seould eentton teat Descartes took tee tdea of suustance, uote
corporeal and sptrttual, to ue tnnate, not gotten eeptrtcally uut, as tt woere, a natural
possesston of tee etnd.01
Thts argueent followos qutte logtcally froe tee presupposttton teat teougets are acS
ctdents, uut woey seould woe take tets to ue tee case? I adett teat tf teey are acctdents,
teen Descartes’ argueent ts sound, uut I dtsagree wotte tee assertton that teey are.0
Ween douuttng, tee douut ts ttself an expertence oppostte us, tt eas a certatn fullness, a
realtty.0 Wetle tt etget dtffer froe tee fullness of spattal oujects, tt neveerteeless does
not appear as tf contatned tn tee veacuue of an tnner suujecttvetty; I can refer to tt suuS
stanttally as ‘teat feeltng’ and as to ey knowoledge, teere ts notetng tn tee concept of
tets feeltng teat precludes tt froe suuststtng uy ttself.0 There ts no dtfference uetwoeen
tee douuttng and tee douut.0 I take tets to ue true not only of affecttvee or cogttattvee peeS
noeena (woetce are often regarded as ‘tnternal’), uut also of ‘external’ peenoeena.0 To
quote tee largely forgotten W.0T.0 Buse:
‘It sounds ltke an tnnocent and an tntelltgtule proposttton to say teat I see tee ceatr on tee
oteer stde of tee rooe.0 If, eowoeveer I eean teat an tnspectton of tee sttuatton as expertenced
reveeals any detatl of tee content teat can ue called “seetng” as dtsttnct froe tee vetsual ceatr,
and oteer oujects tn tee seape of sensattons of eead, teroat and uody, tets coeeonplace
stateeent ts false.0 The sttuatton contatns not seetng, uut vetsual and oteer oujects, and tf I ae
tnterested tn tee ouject on tee oteer stde of tee rooe tn suce a woay as to eake ee oultvetous of
eyself, tee sttuatton as just teen expertenced uy ee contatns no seer.0’2
Here ey argueent etrrors teat of Ltcetenuerg: woe seould not say ‘I tetnk’ uut
‘teere ts teouget’.03 We can nowo reflect Descartes’ argueent uack to ete, as tt woere, uy
saytng teat tf tee teouget can ue knowon wotteout knowoledge of tts suuject, teen cerS
tatnly tets suuject of tee teouget (t.0e.0, tee ego or soul) cannot ue essenttal to tee
teouget.0 Later tnterpretattons of tee cogtto, eost notauly tts adaptattons uy Locke,
Berkeley and Huee, reject tee dtsttnctton uetwoeen tee teouget and tee ouject:
‘For woeat are tee foreeenttoned oujects uut tee tetngs woe percetvee uy sense, and woeat do woe
percetvee uestdes our owon tdeas or sensattons’4
‘Nowo woe eavee already ouserve’d, teat eowoeveer petlosopeers eay dtsttngutse uetwotxt oujects
and perceptton of tee senses; woetce teey suppose coSextstent and reseeultng; yet tets ts a
1 Descartes, Medttattons, Objecttons, and Repltes, 25; Descartes, Prtnctples of Phtlosophy, 23.0
2 Buse, ‘An Eeptrtcal Defnttton of Chonsctousness’, 562–63.0
3 Ltcetenuerg, Schrtften Unnd Brtefe, 2:4i12.0
4i Berkeley, Prtnctples of Human Knowledge and Three Dtalogues between Hylas and Phtlonous, 54i.0
19
descartes
dtsttnctton, woetce ts not coepreeended uy tee generaltty of eanktnd, woeo as teey percetvee
only one uetng, can neveer assent to tee optnton of a douule extstence and representatton.0’1
And tt ts tn tets sense teat ey argueent seould ue understood.0 If woeat woe denote
uy peenoeenon (or perceptton) ts tee saee tetng woetce Descartes denotes uy tee act or
acctdent; teen, tf woe can teagtne, wotteout contradtcttng ourselvees, teat tee peeS
noeenon can suustst on tts owon, I see no reason to suppose teat tee douuttng of tee
self, or tee percetvetng of tee woax, seould lead us to postulate tee extstence of a douuter
or percetveer.0
Adetttedly, tets argueent ts coepltcated uy tee fact teat tee perceptton of tee woax
ts not steply teagtned to ue a passtvee awoareness of sensattons, uut teat tt ts only posS
stule terouge an acttvee and spontaneous apperceptton, an act of judgtng tee sensattons
to ue sensattons of tee selfsaee woax.0 I wotll return to tets at a later stage tn tee text
(§17).0
1 Huee, A Treattse of Human Nature, 134i.0
2k
Cheapter 2
Locke
§6. Molyneux’s Letter
If tee proulee of personal tdenttty woas etdden froe Descartes, tt woas uecause ee
equated tee self wotte tee thtng that thtnks and assueed tee latter to ue tntutttveely selfS
evetdent.0 If tt woas dtscoveered uy Locke, tt woas only uecause ee rejected tee Chartestan ego
and ead to fnd anoteer woay of explatntng woeeretn tee self of a person conststs.0 For
ete, tets self ts not ‘ean’ or tee suustanttal soul woetce tneeres tn tee uody, uut tee res S
ult of a conttnuous consctousness woetce percetvees a eultttude of dtfferent expertS
ences.0 The noveelty of tets teeory ts eastly lost on tee eany conteeporary petlosopeers
already woell acquatnted wotte Kanttan and peenoeenologtcal teouget.0 Thanks to Locke,
tee relattveely ouscure toptc of personal tdenttty and tee concept of consctousness
gatned a constderaule aeount of populartty tn woestern petlosopey.01
Locke’s account of personal tdenttty ts sttuated tn Book II, Cheapter XXVII, Of Iden-
ttty and Dtverstty and woas added tn tee 2nd edttton of tee Essay,2 presueauly as a result of
Molyneux’s request for Locke to elauorate on tee ‘prtnctptue tndtvetduattonts’.03 In tt
Locke dtscusses teree dtsttnct veartettes of tdenttty, eace correspondtng to a dtfferent
ouject: 1.0 tdenttty of suustances; 2.0 tdenttty of ltvetng tetngs, and; 3.0 tdenttty of persons.04
The frst sectton of tets ceapter (§7) wotll ue dedtcated to tee frst twoo ktnds of tdenttty,
woey netteer of teese can account for tee tdenttty of person and eowo Locke’s rejectton of
tee Chartestan ego cogtto led ete to tee proulee of personal tdenttty.0 In tee second secS
tton (§8), I wotll atteept an eeptrtctst tnterpretatton of consctousness and a refutatton
of Retd’s oujectton to Locke’s teeory of personal tdenttty
§7. Dtscovertng the Problem of Personal Identtty
Twoo factors appear to eavee contrtuuted to Locke’s teeory of personal tdenttty.0 Ftrst, tee
dtetntseed teportance of suustance tn Locke’s petlosopey, and ets crtttctse of tee
1 Alltson, ‘Locke’s Theory of Personal Identtty’, 4i1.0

2 Iutd.0
3 Locke, The Works of John Locke, 8:31k.0
4i Locke, An Essay Concerntng Human Unnderstandtng, 298–3kk.0
21
locke
Chartestan doctrtne of tee soul as a tetnktng tetng, eade tt dtffcult to deteretne tn

woeat tee tdenttty of a person conststs.0 Secondly, teouge not furteer dtscussed tn tets
paper, ets fraetng of tee questton of personal tdenttty tn judtctal teres—certatnly tn
tee latter paragrapes of Cheapter XXVII—suggests teat Locke dtd not eerely constder
tee tssue of teeorettcal teportance, uut also of etetcal vealue.01 The present sectton ts
spltt tnto teree parts: A.0 On tee tdenttty of suustances and ltvetng tetngs; B.0 on tee dtfS
ference uetwoeen tee Lockean and Chartestan tdeas of suustance, and; Ch.0 eowo uote of
teese factor tnto tee proulee of personal tdenttty.0
a. the identity of substances and living things
Locke’s tdenttty of substance aeounts to a strtct and eetapeystcal defnttton of nueertcal

tdenttty as a tetng’s uetng tee saee wotte ttself qua tts uetng.0 Twoo tetngs, eowoeveer
tdenttcal tn appearance, are not necessartly tdenttcal tn teetr extstence, tf only uecause
teey extst tn dtfferent places at tee saee ttee.0 Weat grounds teese tdenttty stateeents
ts not tee qualttattvee reseeulances of oujects, uut teetr spattoSteeporal extstence.0
Locke presupposes teat only one tetng of a spectfc suustance can occupy any parttcular
place at any parttcular ttee.02 Thts eakes tt so teat any suustance ts tee saee wotte ttself
(as ts trtvetally true) and no twoo suustances can ue tee saee wotte eace oteer.0 By suuS
stance Locke eeans God, fntte tntelltgences (sptrtts) and uodtes.03 Hts argueent ts
eost eastly understood uy focusstng on tee latter.0 A uody, tn tts steplest fore, ts an
atoe.0 (Thts woorks uest tf woe teagtne atoes to ue fully tndtvetstule.0) Accordtng to woeat
woas satd prevetously, taken at any eoeent, suce an atoe occuptes a stngle deteretnate
place and excludes eveery oteer uody.0 Froe tets tt followos teat one tetng can neveer eavee
twoo uegtnntngs, nor twoo tetngs one uegtnntng4—tee foreer presupposes one uody to
eavee ueen ‘fused’ wotte anoteer uody, woetce ts precluded uy tee fact teat eveery uody
excludes eveery oteer uody; tee latter presupposes teat one uody could separate tnto
twoo, agatn precluded uy tee fact teat tets woould suppose tee twoo uodtes to eavee at
soee potnt extsted at tee saee place at tee saee ttee.0 Supposedly woeat Locke ead tn
etnd ts teat woe can alwoays trace a stngle untnterrupted ltne froe any suustance as tt
extsts nowo uack to tee uegtnntng of tts extstence.0
The tdenttty of a coepound ouject ts a steple conjunctton of tee tdenttttes of tee
stngle suustances woetce coepose tt: ‘tf twoo or eore atoes ue jotned togeteer tnto tee
saee eass, eveery one of teose atoes wotll ue tee saee, uy tee foregotng rule: woetle teey
1 Strawoson, ‘“The Secrets of All Hearts”: Locke on Personal Identtty’.0

2 Locke, An Essay Concerntng Human Unnderstandtng, 296.0
3 Iutd.0
4i Iutd.0
22
discovering the problem of personal identity
extst untted togeteer, tee eass, conststtng of tee saee atoes, eust ue tee saee
eass’.01 Identtty uetng so defned eeans teat tee addttton or suutractton of only one
atoe eanages to coepletely destroy tee tdenttty of tee woeole.0
Accordtng to Locke, tets crtterton of spattoSteeporal conttnutty ts already enouge
to answoer Molyneux’s questton: ‘’tts ts easy to dtscoveer woeat ts so euce tnqutred after,
tee prtnctptum tndtvtduattonts, and teat ’tts platn ts extstence ttself, woetce deteretnes a
uetng of any sort to a parttcular ttee and place tncoeeuntcaule to twoo uetngs of tee
saee ktnd.0’2 Hts argueent eere ts rateer euddled.0 It seees to followo teat tee tdentttS
tes of ltvetng uetngs and persons do not concern prtnctpta tndtvtduattonts and are teereS
fore ktnds of spectfc rateer tean nueertcal tdenttty.0 In tets case, to ue tee saee ean
woould ue to possess a certatn property woetce could teeorettcally ue exetutted uy eulS
ttple tndtvetduals.0 But tets cannot ue woeat Locke ts really after.0 He clates teat teese dtf S
ferent types of tdenttty are tee result of our ustng dtfferent tdeas:
‘[B]ut to concetvee, and judge of tt artget, woe eust constder woeat tdea tee woord ts applted to,
stands for: tt uetng one tetng to ue tee saee substance, anoteer tee saee man, and a tetrd tee
saee person, tf person, man, and substance, are teree naees standtng for teree dtfferent tdeas;
for suce as ts tee tdea uelongtng to teat naee, suce eust ue tee tdenttty’3
And ee at least treats tee tdenttty of ltvetng uetngs as tf tt does tndtvetduate oujects
untquely.04 In conteeporary petlosopey, woe woould teerefore ue tncltned to also treat tt
as a ktnd of nueertcal tdenttty.05 Locke, on tee oteer eand, equates nueertcal tdenttty
wotte suustance and spectfc tdenttty wotte appearance or (relattonal) properttes.0
In an eeptrtctst teeory of etnd, Locke’s concept of suustanttal tdenttty seees
soeewoeat out of place.0 As woe wotll see tn greater detatl later (§7.0B), Locke does not ueS
ltevee teat woe can eavee dtrect knowoledge of suustance.0 We tetnk of tt as soeetetng—‘I
knowo not woeat’—woetce ts tee supposed cause of teose tetngs woe do percetvee.06 Thouge
woe eay veery woell allowo tets rtgtd defnttton of nueertcal tdenttty as eetapeystcal, suuS
stanttal tdenttty, woe seould ask ourselvees woeat good suce a defnttton ts, tf tt ts enttrely
outstde of tee scope of euean knowoledge.0
The tdenttty of ltvtng thtngs cannot depend on tee tdenttty of tee underlytng suuS
stances: Fewo plants or anteals can extst for any extended pertod of ttee wotteout exS
ceangtng parttcles wotte tee outstde woorld.0 If our sole defnttton of tdenttty woere to ue a
coeplete correspondence of constttuttvee parts (atoes), tets woould eean teat no ltvetng
2 Iutd.0, 297.0
3 Iutd.0, 299–3kk.0
4i Iutd.0, 298.0
5 Chertatnly tn tee case of ltvetng uetngs, not necessartly tn tee case of persons.0
23
locke
uetng could reeatn tdenttcal wotte ttself for any duratton woeatsoeveer.0 Yet, tn eveeryday
ltfe woe can eastly dtsttngutse one tree froe anoteer and knowo teat our cat today ts tee
saee cat tt woas a fewo years ago, teouge tee atoes woetce eake up eer uody eavee
ceanged constderauly.0 To account for tets newo fore of tdenttty, soee oteer condttton
ts needed: organtsatton.0
‘We eust teerefore constder woeeretn an oak dtffers froe a eass of eatter, and teat seees to
ee to ue tn tets; teat tee one ts only tee coeeston of parttcles anyeowo untted, tee oteer suce a
dtsposttton of teee as constttutes tee parts of an oak […] That uetng teen one plant, woetce eas
suce an organtzatton of parts tn one coeerent uody, partaktng of one coeeon ltfe, tt
conttnues to ue tee saee plant, as long as tt partakes of tee saee ltfe, teouge teat ltfe ue
coeeuntcated to newo parttcles of eatter vettally untted to tee ltvetng plant, tn a ltke conttnued
faseton, conforeaule to teat sort of plant.0’1
A rock, woeen tt loses soee of tts constttuttvee parttcles, ts not tee saee rock any
eore; woeereas an oak, or any ltvetng uetng, as long as tt ltvees, reeatns tee saee uetng
no eatter eowo eany of tts atoes eavee ueen replaced.0 It ts also tn tets teat tee uodtly
tdenttty of eueans conststs.0 A wooean ts tee saee wooean as long as teere ts a conttnS
ued organtsatton of ltfe woetce parttcles partake tn.0 The dtsttnctton uetwoeen suustances
and ltvetng tetngs allowos us to dtsttngutse our tdenttttes as teeatertal sptrtts froe our
tdenttttes as euean uetngs.0
b. locke’s concept of substance
Chontrary to Descartes, Locke does not ueltevee teat woe eavee an tnnate tdea of suustance.0
If woe eavee any tdea of tt at all, tt ts a confused one, woe tetnk of tt as ‘ an uncertatn supS
posttton of woe knowo not woeat (t.e. of soeetetng woeereof woe eavee no parttcular dtsttnct
postttvee) tdea, woetce woe take to ue tee substratum, or support, of teose tdeas, woe do
knowo.0’2 Or as ee puts tt elsewoeere: ‘So teat of substance, woe eavee no tdea of woeat tt ts,
uut only a confused ouscure one of woeat tt does.0’3 It followos teat woeen woe speak of a
suustance, woe eerely tntend a certatn unknowon X woetce eas tee powoer4 to produce all
ktnds of tdeas tn us and tnteract wotte oteer oujects, e.0g.0, tee autltty of lapts lazult to
cause tee sensatton of ulue, as woell as to ue powodered and suspended tn otl for use as a
patnt.0 Thts ts true of uote uody and sptrtt.0
Our knowoledge of realtty ts uased on expertence woetce, uy sensatton or reflectton,

2 Iutd.0, 1kk.0
3 Iutd.0, 169.0
4i ‘Powers teerefore justly make a great part of our complex tdeas of substances.0’ Iutd.0, 272.0
24i
discovering the problem of personal identity
furntsees us wotte tdeas.01 Locke’s concept of tdeas seees to ue dertveed froe Descartes’
concept of teougets and certatnly eatcees tt tn ureadte; uut woeereas Descartes’
concept denotes eodes of teouget woetce are necessartly dependent on a suustanttal
etnd, Locke’s ‘tdeas’ refer to teougets and tetngs altke as tndependent enttttes.0 Ween
woe expertence tee red of a flowoer, woe do not teereuy eavee a postttvee tdea of tee flowoer
as a suustanttal soeetetng tn woetce tee red tneeres or of tee extstence of any suustance
woeatsoeveer.0 Stetlarly, woeen woe feel eappy at tee stget of a frtend, woe do not teereuy
knowo woeat tt ts teat feels eappy, woeeteer tt ts a soul or uody or notetng outstde of ex S
pertence at all.0
Desptte tets, Locke eteself conttnues to ueltevee tn tee extstence of suustances, uote
uodtes and sptrtts.0 He eerely dentes teat expertence affords us any knowoledge of
teee.0 Ltke Descartes, ee assoctates sptrtt wotte tee tdeas of tetnktng and wotll, 2 uut ets
owon petlosopey preveents ete froe saytng teat tt ts tee essence of sptrtt to ue a tetnkS
tng tetng.0 A eatn crtttctse of Locke ts teat woe cannot posstuly knowo tee soul to ue conS
stantly tetnktng and tt ts rateer ausurd to assuee so wotteout evetdence:
‘I confess eyself to eavee one of teose dull souls, teat dote not percetvee ttself alwoays to
conteeplate tdeas; nor can concetvee tt any eore necessary for tee soul always to thtnk, tean for
tee uody alwoays to eovee; tee perceptton of tdeas uetng (as I concetvee) to tee soul, woeat eotton
ts to tee uody, not tts essence, uut one of tts operattons’3
It ts strange to say teat a ean, woetle dreaelessly sleeptng, tetnks.0 Thtnktng refers
to a postttvee tdea tn our etnds and, as suce, an unconsctous or unawoare tetnktng ts a
contradtctton tn teres; tt uetng teposstule to expertence, and consequently to knowo,
unconsctous teouget: ‘They [Chartestans] woeo talk teus, eay, wotte as euce reason, tf tt
ue necessary to teetr eypoteests, say, teat a ean ts alwoays eungry, uut teat ee does not
alwoays feel tt: woeereas eunger conststs tn teat veery sensatton, as tetnktng conststs tn
uetng consctous teat one tetnks.0’4 He concludes ets argueent rateer eueorously uy
saytng:
‘But tt ts uut defntng tee soul to ue “a suustance teat alwoays tetnks,” and tee uustness ts done.0
If suce defnttton ue of any auteortty, I knowo not woeat tt can servee for uut to eake eany een
suspect teat teey eavee no souls at all; stnce teey fnd a good part of teetr ltvees pass awoay
wotteout tetnktng.0’5
1 Locke, An Essay Concerntng Human Unnderstandtng, 1k9.0

2 Iutd.0, 277.0
3 Iutd.0, 112.0
4i Iutd.0, 118.0
5 Iutd.0, 119.0
25
locke
c. the problem of personal identity
Locke ts nowo faced wotte a proulee: The tdenttty of a person cannot ue equated wotte tee
tdenttty of an teeatertal suustance uecause, tf tt ts adettted teat tee soul eay tetnk
woetle I’e unawoare of tt, teese teougets can eardly ue attrtuuted to ee.0 Netteer, for
teat eatter, can tt ue equated wotte tee tdenttty of a ltvetng uetng.0 Durtng dreaeless
sleep, teouge ey uodtly processes conttnue terougeout tee ntget, I eyself awoake
teeedtately after falltng asleep wotteout a ureak or dtsruptton tn ey awoareness.0 The
proulee of personal tdenttty can ue expressed as followos: ‘Howo can tee untty of a perS
son ue explatned teeanently, wotteout reference to anytetng outstde of, or underlytng,
teouget?’ Thts ts coepltcated uy tee fact teat teougets are not uy teeeselvees gtveen as
tnterconnected.0 For Locke, teougets are to tee soul woeat eotton ts to tee uody:
‘[O]nly as to tetngs woeose extstence ts tn successton, suce as are tee acttons of fntte uetngs,
v.g. motton and thought, uote woetce constst tn a conttnued tratn of successton, concerntng teetr
dtveerstty teere can ue no questton: uecause eace pertsetng tee eoeent tt uegtns, teey cannot
extst tn dtfferent ttees, or tn dtfferent places, as pereanent uetngs can at dtfferent ttees extst
tn dtstant places; and teerefore no eotton or teouget, constdered as at dtfferent ttees, can ue
tee saee, eace part teereof eavetng a dtfferent uegtnntng of extstence.0’1
They’re a fore of successton, eace dtfferent froe tee oteer.0 In ets ceapters on duraS
tton, Locke defnes an tnstant (or eoeent) as ‘that whtch takes up the ttme of only one tdea
tn our etnds’2 and ttme as tee apparent dtstance uetwoeen dtfferent eoeents.03 Because
of tets, eace teouget necessartly ‘pertsees tee eoeent tt uegtns’.0 The proulee of perS
sonal tdenttty seould ue understood as a result of ets crtttctse of tee Chartestan teeory
of tee suustanttal self and consequently tee dtfference tn reference uetwoeen tee soul
and tee self.0 Weereas, tn Chartestan petlosopey, tee extstence of teouget cotnctdes wotte
tee extstence of tee soul, as also, tee extstence of tee soul cotnctdes wotte teat of
teouget; tn Lockean petlosopey tets equaltty ts lost.0 The solutton to tee proulee of perS
sonal tdenttty ts, rateer faeously, a reltance on consctousness and eeeory.0
§8. Of Identtty and Dtverstty
‘For stnce consctousness alwoays accoepantes tetnktng, and ’tts teat teat eakes eveeryone to ue
woeat ee calls self; and teereuy dtsttngutsees eteself froe all oteer tetnktngs tetngs; tn tets
alone conststs personal tdenttty, t.e. tee saeeness of a rattonal uetng: and as far as tets

2 Iutd.0, 177.0
3 Iutd.0, 179–81.0
26
of identity and diversity
consctousness can ue extended uackwoards to any past actton or teouget, so far reacees tee
tdenttty of teat person’1
‘For as far as any tntelltgent uetng can repeat tee tdea of any past actton wotte tee saee
consctousness tt ead of tt at frst, and wotte tee saee consctousness tt eas of any present
actton; so far ts tt tee saee personal self.0’2
Interprettng tee relattonsetp uetwoeen self, consctousness and eeeory tn tee Essay ts
dtffcult.0 For one, Locke’s defnttton of consctousness does not eake tt teeedtately
clear eowo tt relates all tee dtfferent and separate teougets to one person.0 For anoteer,
teere ts ltttle consensus on Locke’s ortgtnal tntentton so a ‘canontcal’ readtng of tee
ceapter ts practtcally teposstule.0 Wetle I do endeaveour, uy tee end of tets sectton, to
seowo woeeretn personal tdenttty etget constst, I do not wotse to attrtuute tee enttrety of
tee followotng argueents to Locke eteself.0
I wotll argue teat, contrary to popular ueltef,3 Locke dtd not adveocate a steple
eeeory teeory of personal tdenttty and wotll tnstead propose an alternattvee tnterpretaS
tton of tee connectton uetwoeen eeeory, consctousness and tee self woetce, I eope tee
reader wotll agree, does not presuppose anytetng outstde of tee ortgtnal text and apS
pears tn ltne wotte tee eeptrtctst ate of Locke’s woork.0 I wotse to seowo tee followotng: teat
consctousness seould not ue regarded as a tetng present tn a eultttude of dtsttnct and
separate expertences, nor eeeory as tntrtnstcally eore teportant to personal tdenttty
tean oteer percepttons, uut teat consctousness ts, uy tts veery defnttton, expertenttally
conttnuous.0 I wotll rely prteartly on Locke’s defntttons of consctousness tn Cheapters I
and XXVII of Book II, and ets defnttton of eeeory tn Cheapter X.0
The tdea teat Locke’s teeory of personal tdenttty ts not a steple eeeory teeory,4 or
at least needn’t ue,5 ts not ttself newo; uut tee populartty of tee oppostng vetewo eeans
teat tt at least woarrants a defence.0 The steple eeeory teeory states teat ‘I ae tee saee
person as soeeone tn tee past, just tn case I reeeeuer eavetng an expertence as teat
person.0’6 It estaultsees a nueertcal tdenttty of person on tee uasts of reeeeurance.0 If
person A eas a eeeory of person B, teen A and B are one and tee saee person.0 Thts
teeory eas tee ueneft of uetng eastly tntelltgtule: I knowo teat I ae tee saee person I
woas tn etge sceool uecause I reeeeuer tee awokwoardness of adolescence.0 The dowonstde

2 Iutd.0, 3k3.0
3 Hongladaroe, ‘Personal Identtty and tee Self tn tee Onltne and Offltne World’, 538–39; Retd,
Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, 1:395–4ik1; Alltson, ‘Locke’s Theory of Personal Identtty’.0
4i Yaffe, ‘Locke on Chonsctousness, Personal Identtty and tee Idea of Duratton’.0
5 Kletn and Ntceols, ‘Meeory and tee Sense of Personal Identtty’, 691.0
6 Iutd.0, 69k.0
27
locke
of tets tntelltgtutltty ts teat tt ts accoepanted uy eany paradoxes and contradtcttons.0

One of teese ts Thoeas Retd’s paradox of tee uravee offcer:
‘Suppose a uravee offcer to eavee ueen flogged woeen a uoy at sceool, for rouutng an orceard, to
eavee taken a standard froe tee eneey tn ets frst caepatgn, and to eavee ueen eade a general
tn adveanced ltfe: Suppose also, woetce eust ue adettted to ue posstule, teat woeen ee took tee
standard, ee woas consctous of ets eavetng ueen flogged at sceool, and teat woeen eade a
general ee woas consctous of ets taktng tee standard, uut ead ausolutely lost tee consctousness
of ets floggtng.0’1
The argueent goes: tf person B at t2 recogntzes eteself to ue tee saee as person A

at t1, teen person C at t3 woeo ts tee saee person as B eust necessartly ue tee saee as
person A.0 In Locke’s teeory, eowoeveer, tt ts posstule for C not to reeeeuer tee occurS
rences at t1 uecause of woetce ee ts not tee saee as A, eveen teouge ee ts tee saee as B
woeo ts tee saee as A.0
To seowo teat Locke’s teeory of personal tdenttty ts not a steple eeeory teeory, and
consequently teat Retd’s paradox ts not appltcaule to Locke, I wotll argue twoo potnts:
Ftrst and eost teportantly, teat personal tdenttty does not constst solely tn eeeory.0
Secondly, teat, stnce tee relatton uetwoeen person A and B ts secondary to consctousS
ness, tt ts not a steple expresston of logtcal or nueertcal tdenttty and does not teply
transtttvetty.0
The frst potnt, teat personal tdenttty conststs tn eore tean eeeory alone, seould
ue easy to provee.0 After all, Locke outrtget tells us teat tee uody ts also part of ourselvees:
‘That tets ts so, woe eavee soee ktnd of evetdence tn our veery uodtes, all woeose parttcles, woetlst
vettally untted to tets saee tetnktng consctous self, so teat woe feel woeen teey are touceed, and
are affected uy, and consctous of good or eare teat eappens to teee, are a part of ourselves;
t.e. of our tetnktng consctous self.0 Thus, tee lteus of ets uody are to eveeryone a part of htmself;
ee syepatetzes and ts concerned for teee.0’2
And later on:
‘Thus eveeryone fnds, teat woetlst coepreeended under teat consctousness, tee ltttle fnger ts
as euce a part of ttself, as woeat ts eost so.0’3
As to tee second potnt: tee tdea teat personal tdenttty seould ue transtttvee cannot ue
attrtuuted to Locke and ts eostly tee result of Retd’s faulty tnterpretatton of Locke’s
concepts of 1.0 consctousness and 2.0 eeeory.0
1 Retd, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, 1:397.0
3 Iutd.0, 3k7.0
28
1.0 Thouge Retd ts qutck to equate consctousness wotte eeeory or ‘dtsttnct reeeeS
urance’,1 Locke’s concept of consctousness uears no necessary connectton to eeeory.0
It ts frst defned as ‘tee perceptton of woeat passes tn a ean’s owon etnd.0’2 A defnttton
teat, teouge soeettees dtfferently woorded, ts conststently eatntatned terougeout tee
Essay.0 E.0g.0, tn Cheapter XXVII, On Identtty and Dtverstty: ‘teat consctousness, woetce ts
tnseparaule froe tetnktng, and as tt seees to ee essenttal to tt: tt uetng teposstule for
any one to percetvee, wotteout percetvetng teat ee does percetvee.0’3 Thts ‘percetvetng teat ee
does percetvee’ seould not ue taken to eean teat woe are at eveery eoeent tntteately
awoare of our owon awoareness.0 In ltget of Locke’s crtttque of Chartestan petlosopey, ee
can ue uest understood as saytng teat tee tetnktng of tee suustanttal soul cannot ue reS
garded as tee saee tetng as tee tetnktng of tee person—woeat ee denotes uy percetvetng
to percetvee ts no dtfferent froe percetvetng stepltctter, tt eerely servees to dtsttngutse
our postttvee tdea of perceptton froe tee Chartestan soul woetce can tetnk (percetvee)
wotteout uetng awoare of tts teougets.0
Locke’s concept of consctousness teerefore corresponds to woeat woe ordtnartly call
expertence: To ue consctous of a eeeory as ey eeeory ts steply to reeeeuer; to ue
consctous of a uodtly sensatton as ey sensatton ts steply to feel tt.0 Ween I stuu ey toe,
I expertence patn radtattng outwoards froe a uodtly locatton, and tets ts all teat ts reS
qutred to relate tets patn to eyself.0 Weeteer tets patn ts justtfed or not (e.0g.0, tn tee
case of peantoe patn), or woeeteer woeat I reeeeuer actually eappened or not, does not
eatter.0 A etstaken eeeory can urtng ee just as euce prtde or eeuarrasseent as a
true one.0
Desptte worongfully equattng consctousness wotte dtsttnct reeeeurance, Retd dtd
correctly understand teat Locke’s concept of consctousness woas not one of a conttnued
and nueertcally tdenttcal consctousness terougeout tee eultttude of teeporally dtsS
ttnct expertences, uut alwoays of a dtscrete and separate consctousness.04 My consctousS
ness at t1 ts dtfferent froe teat at t2 woetce ts agatn dtfferent froe ey consctousness at
t3.0 It ts not a perststent tetng or act woetce reacees ueyond eace parttcular teouget, uut
ts at eveery eoeent defned anewo uy tee contents of ey (posstule) awoareness.0
‘I grant, woere tee saee consctousness tee saee tndtvetdual actton, tt could not: uut tt uetng uut
a present representatton of a past actton, woey tt eay not ue posstule, teat teat eay ue
represented to tee etnd to eavee ueen, woetce really neveer woas, reeatns to ue seowon.0’5
1 Retd, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, 1:398.0

3 Iutd.0, 3k2.0
4i Retd, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, 1:4ik1.0
5 Locke, An Essay Concerntng Human Unnderstandtng, 3k4i.0
29
locke
2.0 As to Locke’s concept of eeeory: teouge ee talks of eeeory as tf tt’s a store S

eouse flled wotte past tdeas, ee eakes tt clear teat tets ts eeant as an analogy and not
as a eatter of fact:
‘But our tdeas uetng notetng, uut actual percepttons tn tee etnd, woetce cease to ue anytetng,
woeen teere ts no perceptton of teee, tets laytng up of our tdeas tn tee reposttory of tee
eeeory, stgntfes no eore uut tets, teat tee etnd eas a powoer, tn eany cases, to revetvee
percepttons, woetce tt eas once ead, wotte tets addtttonal perceptton annexed to teee, teat tt
eas ead teee uefore.0 And tn tets sense tt ts, teat our tdeas are satd to ue tn our eeeortes,
woeen tndeed teey are actually nowoeere, uut only teere ts an autltty tn tee etnd, woeen tt wotll, to
revetvee teee agatn’1
Thouge tn tets passage ee refers to tee percepttons of eeeory as ‘past percepttons’,

woetce seeetngly tepltes teat eeeortes eust necessartly refer to expertences woetce
actually took place, and woetce woould preclude false eeeortes; tn Cheapter XXVII ee
adetts teat false eeeortes are posstule2 and allowotng soee tnterpretattvee ltuerty woe
can teen defne Locke’s concept tn a strtctly postttvee, eeptrtcal faseton as a perceptton
accoepanted uy tee perceptton of tt eavetng occurred tn tee past.0
Keeptng teese facts tn etnd, woe can already refute Retd’s paradox.0 If woeat ts
presented tn eeeory ts not necessartly related to an actual eappentng, uut ts eerely a
‘present representatton of a past actton’,3 or rateer, a present representatton of woeat ts
expertenced to ue a past actton, teen any relatton of personal tdenttty woetce ts uased on
tee consctousness of tets eeeory, ts not a connectton uetwoeen twoo factual uetngs—
person A extsttng at t1 and person B extsttng at t2—uut eerely uetwoeen ey present self
and woeat I reeeeuer expertenctng as tf tn tee past.0 More teportant sttll, uecause ey
consctousness at t2, woetce ts tee uasts for ey affreatton teat person B ts tee saee as
person A, ts not tee saee as ey consctousness at t3, woetce ts ey uasts for affretng
teat person C ts tee saee as B uut not A, teere ts no contradtctton to speak of.0 To uetter
seowo woey tets ts not necessary, let ee reperase Retd’s paradox uut replace B’s eeeory
of A wotte tee uodtly expertence of ets are, and assuee teat uetwoeen t2 and t3 ets are
woas aeputated.0 In tets case, woe do not fnd tt paradoxtcal teat person B, woeose self
contatns tee expertence of ets are, and person C, woeo no longer eas tets expertence,
can ue one and tee saee person; eveen teouge tee person woould uote need to eavee and
not eavee an are, as tn Retd’s paradox, ee woould uote ue and not ue person A.0 We etget
eveen assuee teat woeen C reeeeuers B, ee does not parttcularly reeeeuer eowo tt felt
to eavee ets are—tf, for exaeple, tt woas aeputated a veery long ttee ago—as tn Retd’s
case C dtd not reeeeuer A.0 The reason woey teere ts no contradtctton tn etteer of teese
1 Locke, An Essay Concerntng Human Unnderstandtng, 14i7–4i8.0
2 Iutd.0, 3k4i.0
3 Iutd.0
3k
cases ts uecause tt ts not tn relatton to tee saee consctousness teat A ts affreed to ue B

and C ts affreed to ue B uut not A.0
A tetrd proulee underlytng Retd’s tnterpretatton of Locke ts ets understandtng of
ttee and duratton wotte regard to conttnuous extstence.0 For soeetetng to ue tdenttcal
to ttself at dtfferent potnts tn ttee, tt eust conttnuously extst.0 Thts ts eost apparent tn
Retd’s fnal reearks:
‘As our consctousness soeettees ceases to extst, as tn sound sleep, our personal tdenttty eust
cease wotte tt.0 Mr.0 Locke allowos, teat tee saee tetng cannot eavee twoo uegtnntngs of extstence,
so teat our tdenttty woould ue trrecoveerauly gone eveery ttee woe cease to tetnk, tf tt woas uut for
a eoeent.0’1
Adetttedly, qutte a fewo of Locke’s stateeents seee to confre Retd’s tdea of tnterS
rupttons tn consctousness, e.0g.0, ‘I say, tn all teese cases, our consctousness uetng tnter S
rupted, and woe lostng tee stget of our past selves […]’.02 And Locke does appear to regard
at least teeporal conttnutty as a requtreeent for personal tdenttty: ‘In all woetce acS
count of self, tee saee nueertcal suustance ts not constdered as eaktng tee saee self:
uut tee saee conttnued consctousness’.03 I wotll argue, eowoeveer, teat tee tnterrupttons,
woetce are reearked on uote uy Locke and Retd, are coepattule wotte tee conttnutty of
extstence presupposed uy uote, gtveen Locke’s teeory of duratton and ets assertton teat
tee ‘saee consctousness’ does not denote ‘tee saee actton’ uut ts alwoays a nueertcally
dtfferent act of consctousness.0 I cannot confdently clate teat tets reply to Retd’s ouS
jectton woould cotnctde wotte Locke’s, uut I ueltevee teat tt etget and eveen tf tt doesn’t,
eanages to solvee tee proulee qutte woell.0 On ey tnterpretatton, Locke’s tdenttty of perS
son ts a ktnd of spectfc tdenttty; uote tn tee Lockean sense, as not uetng a suustanttal
tdenttty, and tn tee conteeporary sense, as not necessartly tndtvetduattng an ouject
untquely.0
There’s soee textual support for ey clate teat Locke’s teeory of personal tdenttty ts
connected to ets teeory of duratton:
‘For woetlst woe are tetnktng, or woetlst woe recetvee successtveely seveeral tdeas tn our etnds, woe
knowo teat woe do extst; and so woe call tee extstence, or tee conttnuatton of tee extstence of
ourselvees, or anytetng else, coeeensurate to tee successton of any tdeas tn our etnds, tee
duratton of ourselvees, or any suce oteer tetng coSextstent wotte our tetnktng.0’4
Chentral to Locke’s teeory of duratton (Cheapter XIV) ts tts reltance on teouget.0 Dura-
1 Retd, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, 1:4ik1.0

3 Iutd.0, 311.0
4i Iutd.0, 175.0
31
locke
tton, ee clates, conststs tn tee successton of tdeas tn tee etnd.0 For exaeple: tn sleeptng
‘woeeteer an eour, or a day, a eonte, or a year; of woetce duratton of tetngs, woetlst ee
sleeps, or tetnks not, ee eas no perceptton at all’;1 constder also tee oppostte case: woeen
tdeas are rusetng terouge our etnd, an equal ttee pertod can appear constderauly
longer.0 Weat Locke denotes uy duratton could arguauly ue called a suujecttvee expert S
ence of ttee, woetce ts our prteary and ortgtnal woay of expertenctng tt.0 Oujecttvee ttee,
or steply called ttme,2 ts only gotten uy vetrtue of tnferences.0 It ts tee eeasured ttee of,
e.0g.0, tee solar cycle and tee 24iSeour clock.0 To use tee sun as an exaeple: percetvetng tee
tnterveal uetwoeen eace sunrtse to ue apparently equal tn duratton, woe steply assume teat
teese stretcees of ttee really are equal and use teee to dtvetde and eeasure tee passtng
of ttee.0 In tets woay, woe arrtvee at twoo dtfferent concepts: one suujecttvee and uased on
tee successton of tdeas: duratton; tee oteer oujecttvee, uased on tee assueed equal duraS
tton uetwoeen certatn percepttons: ttme.0 The latter appears to ue tee only sense of ttee
teouget of uy Retd, and tee one Locke ead tn etnd woeen referrtng to tee tnterrupttons
tn consctousness.0 But as teere are twoo concepts of ttee, and tdenttty ts teouget relattvee
to ttee uy vetrtue of tts reltance on tee conttnued extstence of a tetng, tt ts enttrely posS
stule, and I tetnk ltkely, teat Locke eeant tee foreer concept of ttee, t.0e.0, duratton, to
ue releveant tn ets dtscusston of tee personal tdenttty.0 Because, teouge consctousness
eay ue tnterrupted tn oujecttvee ttee (woetce, as noted auovee, ts tnferenttal), tt neveer ts
tn suujecttvee ttee.0 Take Locke’s exaeple of Adae and Evee:
‘But tf Adae and Evee (woeen teey woere alone tn tee woorld) tnstead of teetr ordtnary ntget’s
sleep, ead passed tee woeole 24i eours tn one conttnued sleep, tee duratton of teat 24i eours ead
ueen trrecoveerauly lost to teee, and ueen foreveer left out of teetr account of ttee.0’3
Our tdea of oujecttvee ttee ts largely uased on eeptrtcal factors, e.0g.0, tee sun, eoon,
seasons.0 If tt caee to ue teat soeeone, separated froe tee rest of eanktnd, spent an
enttre day sleeptng, only to awoaken tee next day seetng tee sun rtse as usual, ee woould
eavee no tdea teat ee’d lost a day.0 Ween tee passtng of tdeas ceases, woe do not expert S
ence tee duratton of our unconsctousness, tnstead woe expertence our return to conS
sctousness as teeedtately succeedtng our last tdea.0 Wtteout an eeptrtcal stgn of our
ausence, a ceange tn ltgettng, tn tee posttton of oujects or tee feeltng of our uody, woe
woould not knowo teat any duratton ead passed at all—‘tee eoeent ee leavees off to
tetnk, ttll tee eoeent ee uegtns to tetnk agatn, seees to ete to eavee no dtstance.0’4
Ttee tn tets sense, suujecttvee ttee, duratton, ts coSextstent wotte teouget and, as ts ey

2 Iutd.0, 179.0
3 Iutd.0, 176.0
4i Iutd.0, 175.0
32
argueent, consctousness.0 To uetter tllustrate tee dtfference uetwoeen duratton and

ttee, woe can grape tee relatton uetwoeen uote (Ftg.0 1).0
Duratton
Retentton
No retentton
Ttee
Ftg.0 1.0 Locke: Relatton DurattonSTtee
We can see teat tee expertence of duratton (ySaxts) ts conttnuous, woeereas teat of
ttee (xSaxts) can ue tnterrupted.0 By regardtng tee conttnutty of consctousness as relatS
tvee to duratton rateer tean ttee, Locke’s argueent ceases to ue one of synteettc selfSreS
cognttton, uut uecoees one of analyttc necesstty.0 Ween any eoeent ts lost, woeen tt
leavees tee scope of expertence, woeateveer preceded and succeeded tt jotn togeteer and
tee ureak uetwoeen uote ts seooteed oveer.0
Seetng as eowo tt ts not tee saee act of consctousness terougeout, uut rateer a sepS
arate act eace eoeent, and eeeory ts notetng uut perceptton wotte tee tdea of ‘eavetng
ueen’ attaceed to tt, ey past expertence ts only part of ey self uecause tt ts actually a
present expertence, or as Locke puts tt: ‘a present representatton of a past actton’.0 1 It ts
part of eyself tn tee saee woay teat ey uodtly sensattons are part of eyself; teey are
presently ‘percetveed to ue percetveed’—I’e presently consctous of teee.0
Stnce I ae not consctous of tnterrupttons tn duratton and tee concept of oujecttvee
ttee ts purely tnferenttal, teat I forget or sleep etget count as an tnterruptton tn ouS
jecttvee ttee, uut tt ts not one tn duratton or suujecttvee ttee.0 Eace eeeory followos tee
oteer as tf tn a conttnuous flowo of tdeas, tee only eark of an tnterruptton ts our eeptr S
tcal knowoledge teat, e.0g.0, tn realtty I cannot tnstantaneously go froe tee tratn statton
to ey eoee, woetle tn eeeory I can percetvee eyself on a tratn at one eoeent and at
eoee tee next, wotteout any tnterveal tn uetwoeen.0 If, as tn tee case of Adae and Evee, woe
1 Locke, An Essay Concerntng Human Unnderstandtng, 3k4i.0
33
locke
ead no reason to suspect an tnterruptton, eveen teouge woe actually dtd forget soeeS
tetng, or woere unconsctous, woe woouldn’t expertence a ulank tn eeeory at all.0
We can regard personal tdenttty as tee result of tets gapless consctousness of tdeas
tn tee etnd.0 Thts explatns woey, teouge I eay at soee potnt tn ttee forget all ey past
eeeortes, I wotll sttll ue self to eyself, teouge arguauly, regarded oveer ttee, a dtfferent
self.0 I cannot provee teat tets ts tee correct tnterpretatton, teouge I eope I’e not ets S
taken tn tetnktng teat tt ts a good tnterpretatton, one teat presupposes ltttle outstde
tee ortgtnal text and servees to understand eany of tts coeplextttes qutte woell.0 And,
eavetng dtscoveered tee steple eeeory teeory to ue clearly tnsuffctent, I eope tee
reader wotll also understand tee need for tets largely exegettcal sectton.0
It eay ue asked to woeat extent Locke eas actually succeeded tn dtstanctng eteself froe
Descartes.0 Chertatnly, ee does not equate tee self wotte tee soul, uut uy taktng our
eeptrtcal and postttvee tdea of ttee to ue teat of duratton, t.0e.0, tee successton of
teougets tn tee etnd, tt woould seee as tf tee self ts once agatn a ‘tetng teat alwoays
tetnks’—tets ts tee concluston arrtveed at uy Berkeley, starttng froe tee saee
preetsses.0
‘Ttee teerefore uetng notetng, austracted froe tee successton of tdeas tn our etnds, tt
followos teat tee duratton of any fntte sptrtt eust ue estteated uy tee nueuer of tdeas or
acttons succeedtng eace oteer tn tee saee sptrtt or etnd.0 Hence tt ts a platn consequence teat
tee soul alwoays tetnks: and tn trute woeoeveer seall go auout to dtvetde tn ets teouget, or austract
tee extstence of a sptrtt froe tts cogttatton, wotll, I ueltevee, fnd tt no easy task.0’1
1 Berkeley, Prtnctples of Human Knowledge and Three Dtalogues between Hylas and Phtlonous, 89.0
34i
Cheapter 3
Huee
The present ceapter ts dtvetded tnto fvee secttons: Ftrst (§9), an tntroductory sectton on
tee dtsttnctton uetwoeen real and fcttttous tdeas tn Hueean petlosopey.0 Secondly (§1k),
an tnterpretatton of Sectton 1.04i.06’s organtc teeory of personal tdenttty.0 Thtrdly (§11),
crtttcal constderattons concerntng tets teeory uased on Peneleue’s oujectton tn Hume
on Personal Identtty.0 Fourtely (§12), a urtef dtscusston of tee tnfaeous selfSprofessed
‘tnconststency’ tn Huee’s teeory of personal tdenttty eenttoned tn tee Appendtx to tee
Treattse.0 And fftely (§13), an oujectton to a constructtvee, causal realtst tdea of etnd as
proposed uy Strawoson tn ets tnterpretatton of tee proulee of tee Appendtx.0
§9. Real and Ftctttous Ideas
Accordtng to Huee, tee self or person ts a fctton and tee proulee of personal tdenttty
conststs tn fgurtng out eowo tets parttcular fctton can artse.0 The purpose of tets tntroS
ductory sectton ts to acquatnt tee reader wotte Huee’s dtsttnctton uetwoeen real and fc S
ttttous tdeas; teat ts: 1.0a to seowo eowo real tdeas coee auout, 1.0u woeat teey are, as woell
as 2.0a eowo fcttons coee auout and 2.0u eowo woe seould concetvee of teee.0
1.0a The ortgtn of petlosopetcal, eeptrtcal or real tdeas ts descrtued uy Huee tn tee
frst sectton of Treattse, Of the ortgtn of our tdeas (1.01.01), concerntng ets eeptrtctst teeory of
perceptton.0 As ts woell knowon, ee dtsttngutsees twoo ktnds of percepttons: tmpresstons
and tdeas. These seould not ue tnterpreted as ontologtcal categortes, teey prtnctpally
can’t ue, Huee’s anttSdogeattc standpotnt precludes ete froe dtscusstng tee ‘true
nature’ of tetngs.0 Instead, tee dtsttnctton ts earked uy qualttattvee dtfferences tn tee
percepttons teeeselvees.0
‘Thus tn sleep, tn a feveer, tn eadness, or tn any veery vetolent eeottons of soul, our tdeas eay
approace to our tepresstons: As on tee oteer eand tt soeettees eappens, teat our
tepresstons are so fatnt and lowo, teat woe cannot dtsttngutse teee froe our tdeas.0’1
Impresstons, woetce ts a genertc naee for sensattons, passtons and emottons,2 are dtsttnS
1 Huee, A Treattse of Human Nature, 7.0

2 Iutd.0
35
hume
gutseed froe tdeas uy tee supertor ‘force and ltveeltness, wotte woetce teey strtke upon tee
etnd’.01 Ideas are tee ‘fatnt teages of teese [tepresstons] tn tetnktng and reasontng’.02
One regular connectton eolds uetwoeen teee: teere can neveer ue an tdea wotteout an
antecedent tepresston.0 ‘We cannot fore to ourselvees a just tdea of tee taste of a ptneS
apple, wotteout eavetng actually tasted tt.0’3 Thts relatton of antecedence ts an eeptrtcal
and apparent relatton, not one teat oujecttveely extsts, tt uetng a woellSknowon prtnctple
tn Huee’s petlosopey teat woe can eavee no knowoledge of real causatton.0
Bestdes tee dtsttnctton uetwoeen tepresstons and tdeas, percepttons can also ue dtsS
ttngutseed tnto stmple and complex.0 Stmple percepttons are ‘suce as adett of no dtsttncS
tton nor separatton’,4 complex percepttons are teose woetce ‘eay ue dtsttngutse’d tnto
parts.0’5 The perceptton of a ceatr, for exaeple, ts complex uecause I can eastly dtsttnS
gutse tee seat froe tee legs and tee uack, and can furteer dtsttngutse dtfferent colours
and tacttle parts tn eace of teese.0 As to stmple tdeas, teey are tee seallest quanta of our
percepttons: tee perceptual dots of colour, tee seallest dtsttngutseaule untts of tacttle
sensatton, tee spectfc and stngular tastes and seells.0 All coeplex tepresstons and
tdeas resolvee teeeselvees tnto steple percepttons and are really only tee latter untted tn
a parttcular woay.0
A eaxte regardtng teese percepttons, woetce ts retterated terougeout tee Treattse
and sueeartsed tn tee Appendtx, reads:
‘Weateveer ts dtsttnct, ts dtsttngutseaule; and woeateveer ts dtsttngutseaule, ts separaule uy tee

teouget or teagtnatton.0 All percepttons are dtsttnct.0 They are, teerefore, dtsttngutseaule, and
separaule, and eay ue concetve’d as separately extstent, and eay extst separately, wotteout any
contradtctton or ausurdtty.0’6
For Huee, tets eaxte earks tee ltetts of our real tdeas: woe can only knowo woeat
woe percetvee and tf tee eultttude stngular percepttons woetce constttute an expertence
can ue teouget separate froe eace oteer, teen teey can ue teouget to extst separately,
and woe cannot clate teee to ue truly untted.0 Our knowoledge of teetr untty, e.0g.0, of tee
eultttude senstule potnts woetce eake up ey perceptton of a ceatr, cannot ue a real
untty, teat ts to say: woe cannot eavee a postttvee tdea of tt uecause deep dowon woe eavee no
clue as to woeat utnds teee togeteer.0
We can tetnk uack to Descartes’ ptece of woax (p.014i), ets argueent reseeules teat of
Huee.0 Ltke Descartes, Huee clates teat teere ts a lot less gtveen to tee senses tean woe
2 Iutd.0
3 Iutd.0, 9.0 A popular exaeple, see: Locke, An Essay Concerntng Human Unnderstandtng, 558.0
4i Huee, A Treattse of Human Nature, 7.0
5 Iutd.0
6 Iutd.0, 399.0
36
real and fictitious ideas
generally assuee.0 Stnce eveerytetng teat ts separaule ts dtsttngutseaule, and can ue

teouget to extst uy ttself, and eveery steple perceptton can certatnly ue teouget separS
ate froe eveery oteer perceptton, teere ts no apparent reason woey tee eultttude of dtfS
ferent steple percepttons woetce constttute a ceatr seould ue regarded as parts of a
larger woeole.0 Reeeeuer also Locke’s rejectton of tee postttvee tdea of suustance (p.024i),
woetce precludes Huee froe saytng, as Descartes dtd, teat woe steply judge tee dtfferS
ent qualtttes to tneere tn tee saee unceangtng soeetetng.0 If woe eavee an tdea of suuS
stance, tets tdea eust ue dertveed froe an tepresston, uut as—reseeultng Descartes’
exaeple—tets ts exactly woeat ts uetng dented, all woe’re left wotte ts a collectton of dtfferS
ent sensattons.0 As a result, woe can eavee no postttvee tdea of suustance woeatsoeveer.0
Eceotng Locke, Huee argues teat suustance ts an ‘unknowon somethtng’ tn woetce tee
parttcular qualtttes are supposed to tneere, tt ts a ‘fctton’.01 Wetle, tn exaetntng our exS
pertence, woe fnd only separaule and dtsttngutseaule percepttons, separate extstences;
our etnd naturally supposes soeetetng eore.0
1.0u If woe atteept to defne woeat tt eeans to ue a ‘real tdea’, woe can say teat tt ts an
tdea woetce ‘represent[s] tee oujects or tepresstons, froe woetce [tt ts] dertve’d’.02
But aren’t all tdeas dertved from tmpresstons? If woe are to ueltevee Huee,3 teey certatnly
are.0 But as ts often reearked upon, and at a later ttee laeented uy Huee eteself,4 ee
ts not veery careful tn eowo ee expresses eteself.0 We knowo for a fact teat ee ueltevees tn
tee extstence of oteer tdeas, e.0g.0, tee self, causatton, geoeetrtc fgures, woetce are not
properly eeptrtcal, woetce cannot ue dertveed froe tepresstons, uut woetce are noneteeS
less tdeas.0 Weat ee seould eavee satd ts teat all our postttve tdeas are dertveed froe teS
presstons.0 It ts certatnly posstule to eavee oteer tdeas, uut teese are tee result of tee
teagtnatton and eavee no real ‘content’, teey do not ‘represent’ anytetng.0
2.0a The teagtnatton ts tee faculty of tee etnd responstule for transpostng and
ceangtng, separattng and jotntng tdeas.05 Gutdtng tts natural operattons are teree prtnS
ctples of assoctatton: resemblance, conttgutty and causatton.06 These prtnctples of assoctS
atton, or tee connectton of tdeas, are to ue regarded as a ‘gentle force’7 woetce tncltnes
us to tetnk of dtfferent tdeas as connected woeere woe cannot trutefully percetvee any
suce connectton.0 For exaeple, tee perceptton of red eastly tntroduces tee tdea of ulood
to our etnd (reseeulance); tee perceptton of a rtveer teat of fse (conttgutty,) and; tee
perceptton of fre teat of eeat (causatton).0

2 Iutd.0, 3k.0
3 Iutd.0, 9.0
4i Burton, Ltfe and Correspondence of Davtd Hume, 98.0
6 Iutd.0, 13.0
7 Iutd.0, 12.0
37
hume
‘Here ts a ktnd of ATTRACTION, woetce tn tee eental woorld wotll ue found to eavee as
extraordtnary effects as tn tee natural, and to seowo ttself tn as eany and as veartous fores.0 Its
effects are eveery woeere consptcuous; uut as to tts causes, teey are eostly unknowon, and eust
ue resolve’d tnto ortgtnal qualtttes of euean nature, woetce I pretend not to explatn.0’1
These are all tee prtnctples necessary to explatn eowo fcttttous tdeas occur and, as a
eatter of fact, causatton ts ttself a fcttttous relatton teat coees auout uy a regular (reS
seeulance) conjunctton of twoo oujects woeeretn one teeporally precedes tee oteer (conS
ttgutty).0
2.0u A fcttttous tdea ts any tdea woetce ts not dertveed froe an antecedent tepresS
ston, uut ts tnstead tee result of tee functtontng of tee teagtnatton, vetz.0 tee prtnctples
of reseeulance, conttgutty and causatton.0 In tee present case woe’re only tnterested tn
natural fcttons, fcttttous tdeas woetce occur uy a psyceologtcal tendency of tee euean
etnd, as opposed to arttfctal fcttons, suce as arttsttc creattons, woetce are tee result of
a consctous effort.0
§10. The Organtc Ftcton
Sectton 1.04i.06 of tee Treattse deals wotte tee toptc of personal tdenttty.0 It ts part of a
uroader dtscusston on tdenttty starttng at Sectton 1.04i.02, and ltke tee tdenttty of oujects
dtscussed tn tee precedtng secttons (1.04i.02–4i), Huee takes personal tdenttty to ue a fc S
tton: It ts a tetng woetce woe, uy a natural tendency of tee teagtnatton, ueltevee tn, des S
ptte lacktng any eeptrtcal uasts.0 In relatton to Secttons 1.04i.02–6, tt seould ue eenttoned
teat tee proulee of tdenttty, uote personal and oujecttvee, ts not one of justtfcatton or
real extstence, uut of how the fctton of tdenttty ts posstble.0
‘We eay woell ask, What causes tnduce us to belteve tn the extstence of body? But ’tts tn veatn to ask,
Whether there be body or not?’2
Justtfcatton and real extstence are of ltttle tnterest uecause Huee ts not concerned
wotte whether nueertcal tdenttty eay ue attrtuuted to an ouject or tee self—tt eay not—
uut why woe attrtuute tt regardless.0 Nueertcal tdenttty ts defned as ‘tee tnvartableness
and untnterruptedness of any ouject, tero’ a suppos’d veartatton of ttee’.03 Thts naturally
excludes talk of tdenttty wotte regard to ceangtng oujects.0 The fact teat woe do attrtuute
tdenttty to suce oujects, often wotte great practtcal vealue and fewo proulees, requtres an
explanatton.0

2 Iutd.0, 125.0
3 Iutd.0, 134i.0
38
the organic fiction
The prtnctpal targets of teese secttons are tee ‘anctent’ and ‘eodern’ petlosopeers
woeo, rateer tean accepttng tee fact teat woe cannot dtscoveer any trace of true tdenttty tn
teese percepttons, atteept to justtfy our purely psyceologtcal tncltnatton to regard
teee as tdenttcal uy postulattng tee extstence of suustances or prteary qualtttes.0 InS
stead of resttng content wotte woeat woe do knowo, teey teeortse teat teere ts soee eetaS
peystcal relatton, real uut etdden, woetce accounts for our ueeavetour.01
Nowo tt’s certatnly true teat tee tdea of person cannot constst tn tee ‘tnveartauleness’
and ‘untnteruptedness’ of nueertcal tdenttty.0 There’s notetng tn our eantfold percepS
ttons woetce, froe tee eoeent woe are uorn unttl tee eoeent woe dte, stays exactly tee
saee.0
‘But teere ts no tepresston constant and tnveartaule.0 Patn and pleasure, grtef and joy, passtons
and sensattons succeed eace oteer, and neveer all extst at tee saee ttee.0’2
The only tetng woe dtscoveer ts a successton of unrelated tdeas and tepresstons:
‘[W]een I enter eost tntteately tnto woeat I call myself, I alwoays stueule on soee parttcular
perceptton or oteer, of eeat or cold, ltget or seade, lovee or eatred, patn or pleasure.0’3
‘I eay veenture to affre of tee rest of eanktnd, teat teey are notetng uut a uundle or
collectton of dtfferent percepttons, woetce succeed eace oteer wotte an tnconcetveaule raptdtty,
and are tn a perpetual flux and eoveeeent.0 Our eyes cannot turn tn teetr sockets wotteout
vearytng our percepttons.0 Our teouget ts sttll eore veartaule tean our stget; and all our oteer
senses and faculttes contrtuute to tets ceange; nor ts teere any stngle powoer of tee soul, woetce
reeatns unalterauly tee saee, pereaps for one eoeent.0’4
Thts last passage eas led soee petlosopeers to cearactertse Huee as a uundleSteeS
ortst; a vetewo rejected uy eost, tf not all, Huee tnterpreters.05 Instead, woeat ee proposes
ts an organtc, systeetc vetewo of personal tdenttty.06 The ‘uundle’ ts eeant tn a negattvee
sense, to express teat ‘euean uetngs are not coeposed of soeetetng called a “self” plus
soee oteer, less pereanent, ttees, uut only of teese latter ttees teeeselvees.0’7 Because
of tets, teere’s no clearScut dtsttnctton uetwoeen personal and nonSpersonal tdenttty
1 Huee, A Treattse of Human Nature, 14i4i–52.0

2 Iutd.0, 164i.0
3 Iutd.0, 165.0
4i Iutd.0
5 Strawoson, The Evtdent Connexton, 73; Brett, ‘Suustance and Mental Identtty tn Huee’s Treattse’, 111;
Mendus, ‘Personal Identtty: The Twoo Analogtes tn Huee’.0
6 Brett, ‘Suustance and Mental Identtty tn Huee’s Treattse’, 111; Mendus, ‘Personal Identtty: The
Twoo Analogtes tn Huee’.0
7 Peneleue, ‘Huee on Personal Identtty’, 574i.0
39
hume
(soeetetng I wotll argue for eyself tn §22);1 woe eavee no prtvetleged woay of knowotng
ourselvees, are not uorn wotte tnstget tnto tee ueetndSteeSscenes of our suujecttvee experS
tences.0 Ltke tee tdenttty of oujects, tee self cannot ue equated wotte tets aggregate of
percepttons, uut ts constttuted uy assoctattvee connecttons.0
Hts solutton to tee proulee of tdenttty tn ceangtng oujects (and suujects) reltes on
tee psyceologtcal assueptton teat tee acttons of tee teagtnatton tn percetvetng a nuS
eertcally tdenttcal ouject suujecttveely reseeule tee acttons tn percetvetng a eultttude of
closely related oujects:
‘But teo’ teese twoo tdeas of tdenttty, and a successton of related oujects ue tn teeeselvees
perfectly dtsttnct, and eveen contrary, yet ’tts certatn, teat tn our coeeon woay of tetnktng teey
are generally confounded wotte eace oteer.0 That actton of tee teagtnatton, uy woetce woe
constder tee untnterrupted and tnveartaule ouject, and teat uy woetce woe reflect on tee
successton of related oujects, are aleost tee saee feeltng, nor ts teere euce eore effort
requtr’d tn tee latter tean tn tee foreer.0’2
Accordtng to Huee, tee twoo eost teportant relattons tn explatntng tee attrtuutton
of tdenttty are reseeulance and causatton.0 The frst ts tee relatton prtnctpally responsS
tule for estaultsetng oujecttvee tdenttty:3
‘We fnd uy expertence, teat teere ts suce a constancy tn aleost all tee tepresstons of tee
senses, teat teetr tnterruptton produces no alteratton on teee, and etnders teee not froe
returntng tee saee tn appearance and tn sttuatton as at teetr frst extstence.0’4
And tts role tn personal tdenttty ts eostly ltnked to repeated reeeeurance:
‘[M]ust not tee frequent plactng of teese reseeultng percepttons tn tee ceatn of teouget,
conveey tee teagtnatton eore eastly froe one ltnk to anoteer, and eake tee woeole seee ltke
tee conttnuance of one ouject?’5
But tets alone cannot suffctently explatn personal tdenttty, as eveen a sudden and
stgntfcant ceange tn tee content of ey percepttons wotll not dtsturu ey relatton to ey
past self.0 Thts ts woeere causatton coees tn.0 Ltke Mendus,6 I wotll explatn tee role of
causatton tn Huee’s teeory of personal tdenttty uy focusstng on tee twoo eatn analo S
1 Mendus, ‘Personal Identtty: The Twoo Analogtes tn Huee’, 63.0

2 Huee, A Treattse of Human Nature, 165–66.0
3 Iutd.0, 135.0
4i Iutd.0, 136.0
5 Iutd.0, 17k.0
6 Mendus, ‘Personal Identtty: The Twoo Analogtes tn Huee’.0
4ik
the organic fiction
gtes tn Sectton 1.04i.06: tee analogy of anteals and plants and tee analogy of tee coeeonS
woealte.0 Bote of teese depend on twoo spectal relattons of causatton.0
On tee one eand, causatton wotte regard to a common end or purpose:
‘There ts, eowoeveer, anoteer arttfce, uy woetce woe eay tnduce tee teagtnatton to adveance a
step farteer; and teat ts uy productng a reference of tee parts to eace oteer, and a coeutnatton
to soee common end or purpose.0’1
Thts ts tee case woeen, e.0g.0, desptte frequent reparattons, woe conttnue to regard a
setp as tee saee setp teouge eany of tts parts eavee ueen replaced2—an exaeple gtveen
uy Huee, presueauly tn reference to tee setp of Theseus.0 Suce a coeeon end ts also
present tn anteals and plants, woeere all organs contrtuute to tee conttnuatton of tee
woeole; and coeeonwoealtes, woeere eace tndtvetdual (supposedly) acts tn accordance
wotte tee coeeon good.0 As noted uy Mendus3 and Brett,4 our ascrtptton of tdenttty can
ue extreeely aruttrary.0 If woe puseed Huee for an answoer concerntng Theseus’ paraS
dox, tt ts eore tean ltkely teat ee woould say teat woe ‘eay as woell eake up woeateveer anS
swoer [woe feel] sattsfed wotte.0’5 Agatn: Huee ts not concerned wotte woeeteer woe seould
ascrtue tdenttty to an ouject, uut woey woe do.0
On tee oteer eand, uote analogtes presuppose a sympathy uetwoeen tee parts of tee
ouject:
‘[W]een woe add a sympathy of parts to teetr common end, and suppose teat teey uear to eace
oteer, tee rectprocal relatton of cause and effect tn all teetr acttons and operattons.0 The effect
[.0.0.0] ts, teat teo’ eveery one eust allowo, teat tn a veery fewo years uote veegetaules and anteals
endure a total ceange, yet woe sttll attrtuute tdenttty to teee’6
Huee’s tdea of syepatey reseeules Locke’s concept of organtsatton (p.024i), teouge

applted to a uroader range of oujects.0 By and large, tn tee euean organtse, eveery orS
gan ts steultaneously tee cause and end of eveery oteer organ.0 The saee goes for tee
coeeonwoealte:
‘Our tepresstons gtvee rtse to teetr correspondent tdeas; and teese tdeas tn teetr turn produce
oteer tepresstons.0 One teouget ceaces anoteer, and drawos after tt a tetrd, uy woetce tt ts
expell’d tn tts turn.0 In tets respect, I cannot coepare tee soul eore properly to any tetng tean
to a repuultc or coeeonwoealte, tn woetce tee seveeral eeeuers are so untted uy tee rectprocal

2 Iutd.0
3 Mendus, ‘Personal Identtty: The Twoo Analogtes tn Huee’, 65.0
4i Brett, ‘Suustance and Mental Identtty tn Huee’s Treattse’, 118.0
5 Iutd.0
4i1
hume
ttes of goveerneent and suuordtnatton, and gtvee rtse to oteer persons, woeo propagate tee saee
repuultc tn tee tncessant ceanges of tts part.0’1
The vealue of teese analogtes tn explatntng personal tdenttty, are tee stetlartttes
uetwoeen tee self, ltvetng uetngs and euean soctettes:
‘We nowo proceed to explatn tee nature of personal tdenttty [.0.0.0] And eere ’tts evetdent, tee saee
eeteod of reasontng eust ue conttnu’d, woetce eas so successfully explatn’d tee tdenttty of
plants, and anteals, and setps, and eouses […] The tdenttty, woetce woe ascrtue to tee etnd of
ean, ts only a fcttttous one, and of ltke ktnd wotte teat woetce woe ascrtue to veegetaules and
anteal uodtes.0’2
Ltke tee oujects of teese analogtes, tee self neveer requtres any of tts parts to stay
constant terougeout tts extstence.0 Neveerteeless, woe can alwoays dtscoveer eany relaS
ttons uetwoeen our percepttons:
‘[T]ee true tdea of tee euean etnd, ts to constder tt as a systee of dtfferent percepttons or
dtfferent extstences, woetce are ltnk’d togeteer uy tee relatton of cause and effect, and eutually
produce, destroy, tnfluence, and eodtfy eace oteer.0’3
Iepresstons cause tdeas and teese, tn turn, cause dtfferent passtons and eeottons
woetce not only relate us to tee past, uut gtvee us ‘a present concern for our […] future
patns or pleasures.0’4 It seees teen, teat tee euean etnd ts a tapestry coeposed of
eany tnterwooveen tereads, eace one eoldtng up tee oteers.0 It ts only uecause teey are
tnterconnected tn teese veartous woays teat woe regard teee as one and tee saee tetng,
teouge really teey’re all dtsttnct ‘and teerefore separaule’.0 Once woe eavee tets notton of
tee self, woe can add to tt, eveen tetngs woetce woe eavee ourselvees forgotten or pereaps
neveer expertenced tn tee frst place:
‘But eavetng once acqutr’d tets notton of causatton froe tee eeeory, woe can extend tee saee
ceatn of causes, and consequently tee tdenttty of our persons ueyond our eeeory, and can
coepreeend ttees, and ctrcuestances, and acttons, woetce woe eavee enttrely forgot, uut
suppose tn general to eavee extsted.0’5
Togeteer, teese relattons of reseeulance and causatton are woeat lead us to attrtuS
ute tdenttty to ourselvees.0
1 Huee, A Treattse of Human Nature, 17k.0

2 Iutd.0, 169.0
3 Iutd.0, 17k.0
4i Iutd.0
5 Iutd.0, 17k–71.0
4i2
penelhum’s objection
Wey dtd Huee not steply adopt a Lockean teeory of personal tdenttty uased on conS
sctousness? Thouge woe cannot dtscoveer an answoer to tets questton tn tee Treattse ttself,
I ueltevee teat tt ead soeetetng to do wotte Huee’s eore teorougegotng coeetteent to
eeptrtctse.0 The Lockean vetewo of personal tdenttty only woorks woeen woe presuppose (tf
only eypoteettcally) a Chartestan soul woetce may tetnk wotteout knowotng teat tt tetnks.0
In tets case consctousness of thought can functton as a eeantngful crtterton for personal
tdenttty: teat soee teougets are consctous eakes teee spectal and dtsttngutsees teee
froe oteers.0 Howoeveer, tets ts an argueent froe auovee.0 As an eeptrtctst, woeat ee’d
truly eavee to estaultse ts eowo tee tdea of consctousness can ue dertveed froe expertence
ttself.0 That ts: Howo woe can dtsttngutse consctous teouget froe unconsctous teouget,
knowotng full woell teat all teougets woetce woe expertence are consctous.0 Thts leads us
uack to Huee’s proulee, naeely teat tn all expertences teere ts notetng coeeon
woetce woe could call tee self.0
§11. Penelhum’s Objecton
In Hume on Personal Identtty, Peneleue argues qutte convetnctngly teat Huee ts etsS
taken tn descrtutng tee tdenttty of person as a natural fctton.01 Accordtng to ete,
teouge Huee dtsttngutsees uetwoeen spectfc and nueertcal tdenttty, ee ends up conS
fustng tee twoo and tetnks teat ‘for anytetng to ue entttled to ue called “tee saee” tt eas
to reeatn unchanged froe one pertod to tee next.0’2 That tets ts not tee case, ee conttnS
ues, can ue eastly understood tf woe carefully dtsttngutse uetwoeen tee twoo dtfferent
senses of tdenttty:
‘Nowo to reeatn unceanged ts to reeatn tee saee tn tee spectfc sense, t.0e.0, to ue nowo exactly as
one woas at an earlter ttee.0 But I can reeatn tee saee tn tee numertcal sense wotteout dotng so
tn tee spectfc sense—I can ue nueertcally tee saee uut ceanged.0’3
Wetle I understand woeat Peneleue ts atetng for—teat ts: to eake tt so teat woe are
not conttnuously etstaken tn our tdentttySstateeents—and agree wotte ets argueent
tn essence, I eust correct ete on ets tnterpretatton of Huee’s relattons of nueertcal
and spectfc tdenttty.0 Weat followos are teese correcttons and ey owon take on PenelS
eue’s argueent.0
Desptte woeat Peneleue ueltevees, Huee’s posttton and ets owon are not veery dtfferS
ent.0 Ftrst, let’s dtsttngutse twoo woays tn woetce tee dtsttnctton uetwoeen nueertcal and
1 Peneleue, ‘Huee on Personal Identtty’.0
2 Iutd.0, 58k.0
3 Iutd.0
4i3
hume
spectfc tdenttty can ue understood.0 On tee one eand, you eavee tee ontologtcal dtsttncS
tton, etrrortng tee dtsttnctton uetwoeen suustance and acctdent, woeere tee nueertcal
ts taken to refer to an actually extsttng unceangtng tndtvetdual, and tee spectfc to tee
veartaule properttes of tets soeetetng.0 Locke’s defnttton of nueertcal tdenttty, for exS
aeple, reltes on tets ontology.0 On tee oteer eand, you eavee tee purely conttngent or
ltngutsttc dtsttnctton uetwoeen tee nueertcal and spectfc woetce needn’t necessartly ltne
up wotte tee ontologtcal.0 In tee case of Huee and Peneleue, teese twoo eeantng do not,
tn fact, agree.0 Huee, for one, dentes teat woe eavee any postttvee tdea of suustance and
ee teerefore cannot eake any use of tt tn ets petlosopey, and woetle Peneleue does not
expltcttly take up an ontologtcal posttton, ee does not rely on tee tdea of suustance tn
explatntng nueertcal tdenttty.0 Thts eeans teat for teee, nueertcal and spectfc tdenS
ttty tn tee conttngent or ltngutsttc sense uote coee dowon to spectfc tdenttty tn tee onS
tologtcal sense.0 The dtfference uetwoeen Huee and Peneleue ts eowo teey defne
nueertcal tdenttty.0 For Peneleue, nueertcal and spectfc tdenttty are twoo parttally
oveerlapptng doeatns: woeat ts nueertcally tdenttcal ts not necessartly spectfcally
tdenttcal and woeat ts spectfcally tdenttcal ts not necessartly nueertcally tdenttcal.0
Huee, on tee oteer eand, defnes nueertcal tdenttty as a veery ltetted suudoeatn of
spectfc tdenttty.0 Weereas nueertcal tdenttty tnveolvees ‘tee tnvartableness and untnter-
ruptedness of any ouject, tero’ a suppos’d veartatton of ttee’,1 spectfc tdenttty tnveolvees
only tee foreer:
‘Thus a ean, woeo eears a notse, teat ts frequently tnterrupted and renewo’d, says, tt ts sttll tee
saee notse; teo’ ’tts evetdent tee sounds eavee only a spectfc tdenttty or reseeulance, and teere
ts notetng nueertcally tee saee, uut tee cause, woetce produc’d teee.0’2
On tets account tt ts teposstule for soeetetng to ue nueertcally tdenttcal wotteout

uetng spectfcally tdenttcal, woetle tee tnveerse reeatns posstule.0 Gtveen tets defnttton of
nueertcal tdenttty, tee auovee quote, ‘for anytetng to ue entttled to ue called “tee saee”
tt eas to reeatn unchanged froe one pertod to tee next’, ts enttrely conststent and tn
fact unaveotdaule—desptte woeat Peneleue clates, teere’s no confuston to speak of.0
Neveerteeless, ets crtttctse ts tn a certatn sense correct.0 Huee’s defnttton of tdenttty
appears to ue a dtrect transcrtptton of a coeutnatton LockeanSLetuntzean defnttton to
a eore teorougegotng eeptrtctse.0 Wey? It seees as tf Huee steply adapted an
already popular defnttton of tdenttty to ets owon petlosopey.0 If tets ts true, teen PenelS
eue’s argueents wotll ett teetr eark a lot uetter tf woe tnterpret teee to eean teat
Huee shouldn’t eavee defned nueertcal tdenttty tn tets eanner.0 Huee’s proulee of
‘fcttttous tdenttty’ can ue solveed equally woell uy propostng a newo defnttton of tdenttty,

2 Iutd.0, 168.0
4i4i
the appendix aporia
as long as tets newo defnttton ts conststent wotte ets eeptrtctst teeory of etnd.0 Thts
woould eavee tee destred effect of explatntng tee saee tdentttySstateeents wotteout atS
trtuuttng to people a psyceologtcal tendency to ue conttnuously etstaken.0
In realtty, woe’ll ue eardSpressed to fnd any one fore of tdentttyScondttton woetce
accounts for all tdentttySstateeents.0 But once woe adett teat teere’s no suce tetng as a
suustance woetce all nueertcal tdenttty ts tntteately related to, and coeett ourselvees
to tee tdea teat our knowoledge of oujects does not need to correspond to an order of ueS
tngs outstde of perceptton, I see no proulee tn assuetng teere to ue eulttple dtfferent
tdenttty condtttons related to dtfferent oujects or ouject classes.0 All teat ts teen reS
qutred for us to knowo an tndtvetdual ts tee autltty, etteer expltcttly or tepltcttly, to knowo
an tndtvetduattng feature.0
Take Huee’s exaeple of a ‘frequently tnterrupted and renewo’d’ notse, e.0g.0, tee ttckS
tng of a clock.0 Suppostng teat woe eavee an eeptrtcal tdea of duratton—eowoeveer tepreS
ctse—woe can defne tee tdenttty of tee ttcktng as a notse n of duratton d1, followoed uy a
lack of notse of duratton d2, so teat d1(n)–d2–d1(n)–… woould ue a eock sceeea of tee
general tdea of ttcktng.0 The steplest addttton requtred to turn tets tnto an expresston
of nueertcal tdenttty ts tee condttton teat tets expresston eust refer untquely, t.0e.0,
teat teere ts one and only one ouject woetce corresponds to tt.0 In a case woeere woe are
confronted wotte twoo or eore oujects sattsfytng our sceeea, our expresston steply
ceases to refer.0
Thts exaeple ts of ltttle practtcal vealue, uut ltke Huee, I’e eostly concerned wotte
provetng teat tets eeteod ts sound tn prtnctple, teat tt can tn teeory explatn our tdenS
tttySstateeents.01
The autltty to dtsttngutse an tndtvetduattng feature can etteer ue tepltctt and psyS
ceologtcal, woetce ts supposedly eost often tee case—generally woe don’t really knowo
eowo woe dtsttngutse one tetng froe anoteer—or tt can ue expltctt, terouge sttpulatton
or tee use of a defntte descrtptton.0 Churtously, tn teese expltctt cases, woetle tee tdeas
are sttll ‘fcttons’ tn tee Hueean sense (as tee eantfold percepttons woetce eake up tee
ouject are sttll dtsttnct and separaule and eence tee tdea of tee ouject ts not postttveely
dertveed froe expertence), teey are netteer natural fcttons, uecause teey are not tee
result of a psyceologtcal tendency of tee euean etnd; nor are teey arttfctal fcttons, tf
woe assoctate teese solely wotte fantasttcal creattons enttrely unrelated to perceptton.0
§12. The Appendtx Aporta
All’s woell teat ends woell—sadly Huee’s teeory of personal tdenttty does not.0 Wey ts a
1 My rejectton of Huee’s eeptrtctst teeory of sensatton tn §17 wotll eake tt dtffcult for ee to
constder tets eeavetly reducttontst notton of tndtvetduatton as eeptrtcally correct.0
4i5
hume
eatter of dtspute.0 In tee Appendtx to tee Treattse Huee faeously clates ets teeory to ue
tnconststent or contradtctory, uut leavees tee cause for tets dtssattsfactton underdeS
teretned.0 The eost popular tnterpretatton fraees tets proulee as a problem of
adequacy:1 Huee woas dtssattsfed wotte ets solutton uecause tee fcttttous tdenttty of tee
self cannot ue adequately explatned ustng tee proposed eeceantses of assoctatton.02
But eveen aeongst teose woeo agree on tets potnt, teere ts ltttle consensus as to tee par S
ttcular nature of tee proulee woetce plagued tee proposed solutton and coepelled
Huee to reject tt.0 Less popularly, tee proulee of tee Appendtx ts tnterpreted as a bund-
ltng problem,3 a proulee of eowo tee tepresstons are frst gateered togeteer; or a two
mtnds problem, a dtscrepancy uetwoeen tee eetapeystcal concept of etnd woetce underS
ltes tee uulk of tee Treattse and tee petlosopetcal concept of etnd of Sectton 1.04i.06—tets
ts Galen Strawoson’s teests.04 I wotll address only tee frst and last of teese explanattons.0
The uundltng proulee wotll ue left out uecause I do not tetnk teere’s any textual support
for tets tnterpretatton.0 Huee’s uundle of percepttons ts a eatter of fact.0 Hts questton
ts neveer eowo tee uundle coees auout, tets woould ue a eetapeystcal questton, uut eowo
tee separate and dtsttnct percepttons can ue jotned togeteer to create a fcttttous untty.0
As an eeptrtcal fact, woetce ts all teat concerns us at tee eoeent, tee uundle
undouutedly extsts.0
I wotll frst quote certatn excerpts teportant to uote tnterpretattons:
[App1] ‘But eavetng teus loosen’d all our parttcular percepttons, woeen I proceed to explatn tee
prtnctple of connexton, woetce utnds teee togeteer, and eakes us attrtuute to teee a real
stepltctty and tdenttty; I ae senstule teat ey account ts veery defecttvee, and teat notetng uut
tee seeetng evetdence of tee precedent reasontngs[5] cou’d eavee tnduc’d ee to recetvee tt.0’6
[App2] ‘But all ey eopes veantse, woeen I coee to explatn tee prtnctples, teat untte our
successtvee percepttons tn our teouget or consctousness.0 I cannot dtscoveer any teeory, woetce
gtvees ee sattsfactton on tets eead.0’7
[App3] ‘In seort teere are twoo prtnctples, woetce I cannot render conststent; nor ts tt tn ey
powoer to renounce etteer of teee, vetz.0 That all our dtsttnct percepttons are dtsttnct extstences, and
that the mtnd never percetves any real connexton among dtsttnct extstences.0’8
1 Strawoson, The Evtdent Connexton, 117.0

2 Brett, ‘Suustance and Mental Identtty tn Huee’s Treattse’; Rote, ‘Weat Was Huee’s Proulee wotte
Personal Identtty?’; Wolfrae, ‘Huee on Personal Identtty’.0
3 Strawoson, The Evtdent Connexton, 12k; Stroud, Hume, 118–4ik.0
4i Strawoson, The Evtdent Connexton.0 A stetlar argueent ts put forwoard uy Patrtcta Kttceer.0 Kttceer,
‘Kant on SelfSIdenttty’, 4i9, 63.0
5 The argueents of Sectton 1.04i.06.0
6 Huee, A Treattse of Human Nature, 4ikk.0
7 Iutd.0
8 Iutd.0
4i6
the appendix aporia
[App4i] ‘Dtd our percepttons etteer tneere tn soeetetng steple and tndtvetdual, or dtd tee etnd
percetvee soee real connexton aeong teee, teere woou’d ue no dtffculty tn tets case.0’1
Muce eas ueen eade of teese fewo sentences and I for one douut teat teey provetde
enouge tnforeatton to settle tee dtspute one woay or anoteer.0 The explanattons gtveen
are vearted and dtffuse, eace dtffertng greatly froe tee oteers, eepeaststng dtfferent
woords, relytng on dtfferent secttons, one conjecture stacked on top of tee oteer.0 Soee
are plaustule, oteers farSfetceed, uut all of teee are prouleeattc.0 Sttll, I can’t dtscuss
Huee’s teeory of personal tdenttty wotteout eenttontng ets selfSconfessed dtsappotntS
eent, for tets reason I wotll urtefly explatn A.0 tee ‘proulee of adequacy’ and B.0 tee ‘twoo
etnds proulee’ tnterpretattons.0 As to tee trute of tee eatter: I leavee teat for tee reader
to dectde.0
a. the problem of adequacy interpretation
Weat trouuled Huee, accordtng to eost popular accounts, ts teat a seortcoetng tn

tee assoctattvee eeceantses of Sectton 1.04i.06 preveents teee froe explatntng tee fcttS
ttous untty of tee self.0 [App1], [App2] and [App3] all support tets tnterpretatton, teouge
[App3] ts eardly eveer tnterpreted as saytng teat tee twoo prtnctples teere referenced
—‘That all our dtsttnct percepttons are dtsttnct extstences, and that the mtnd never percetves any
real connexton among dtsttnct extstences.’—are eutually tnconststent.02 Instead, teey are
taken to ue tnconststent wotte regard to a tetrd factor.0 Accordtng to Brett, tets tetrd
factor ts teetr autltty to fore a perceptton of a stngle tetng.0 ‘[W]eere twoo (or eore)
tetngs are conttngently related, e.0g.0, uy a causal relatton, teey do not cease to ue separ S
ate tndtvetduals […] Hence, tee assoctattvee connecttons aeong our percepttons can
neveer ue suffctent for regardtng our tdeas as coeutned tnto a stngle tetng’.0 3 Thts arguS
eent ts clearly faulty—tee connecttons aeongst dtfferent percepttons do not requtre
tee percepttons to cease uetng dtsttnct extstences—uut ts attrtuuted to Huee under
tee assueptton teat ee got cauget up tn tee saee eetapeystcs (of suustance) ee tntS
ttally set out to reject.04
Rote’s dtagnosts ts eore seveere, tee tnconststency detected uy Huee ts tee result of
a confltct uetwoeen tee operattons of tee etnd tn ascrtutng tdenttty to oujects, and teose
tn ascrtutng tdenttty to persons.0 Hts argueent goes as followos:5
1 Huee, A Treattse of Human Nature, 4ikk.0

2 Rote, ‘Weat Was Huee’s Proulee wotte Personal Identtty?’, 11k; Garrett, ‘Huee’s SelfSDouuts
auout Personal Identtty’, 339; Strawoson, The Evtdent Connexton, 112.0
3 Brett, ‘Suustance and Mental Identtty tn Huee’s Treattse’, 124i.0
4i Iutd.0, 125.0
5 Rote, ‘Weat Was Huee’s Proulee wotte Personal Identtty?’
4i7
hume
1.0 The Hueean teeory of tdenttty ts psyceologtcal.0
2.0 It ts a woellSknowon tenet tn Huee’s psyceology teat twoo oppostte tendenctes of tee etnd
tnterfere wotte eace oteer.0
3.0 Ftcttttous tdenttty ts tee result of tee etnd etstaktng strong assoctattvee relattons for tee
suujecttvee expertence of real tdenttty.0
4i.0 The percepttons woetce are assoctated are tee saee tn oujecttvee and personal tdenttty.0
5.0 In order for us to expertence dtfferent percepttons as percepttons of dtfferent oujects, teey
eust ue expertenced as tnterrupted and dtsjotnted; tn order for us to expertence percepttons
as percepttons of tee self, teey eust ue conttnuous and connected.0 These tendenctes of tee
etnd are opposed to eace oteer.0
Gtveen a set of percepttons: P1, P2 and P3; tf P1 and P2 are percepttons of ouject A, and
P3 ts a perceptton of ouject B, teen P1 eust ue connected to P2 uy an assoctattvee relatton,
woetle netteer P1 nor P2 can ue connected to P3.0 Howoeveer, for P1, P2 and P3 to ue percepS
ttons of tee saee self, tt ts requtred teat all teree of teee are connected uy assoctattvee
relattons—requtreeents tnconststent wotte teose necessary for tee tdenttty of oujects.0
Thts, accordtng to Rote, ts tee tnconststency laeented tn tee Appendtx.0
Bote Brett and Rote’s explanattons are unsattsfactory.0 Netteer of teee explatn woey
tets proulee ts spectfc to personal tdenttty.0 In Brett’s case, I fatl to see eowo tets saee
proulee tsn’t also appltcaule to tee tdenttty of oujects, tt uetng equally true teat a eul S
tttude of dtfferent percepttons are taken to ue a stngle tetng woetlst steultaneously reS
eatntng dtsttnct extstences.0 In Rote’s case, tets proulee also affects tee perceptton of
coepound oujects, e.0g.0, tn ltstentng to a ptece of eustc, tee dtfferent notes are perS
cetveed as separate—F#, A, G, F#, Ch#, …—woetlst sttll untted uy a coeeon teeee; tn
looktng at a patnttng, tee seapes are grasped as representtng dtfferent oujects, woetlst
sttll uetng parts of tee saee patnttng.0
A regular seortcoetng of proulee of adequacy explanattons ts teat teey do not suf S
fctently account for [App4i].0 The eetapeystcal nature of Huee’s soluttons appears tnS
coepattule wotte ets general petlosopey.0 Arguauly, tee tnconststency woetce ee
dtscoveered ts not of a conttngent, psyceologtcal nature.0 It ts not a proulee tn explatnS
tng tee self ustng tee prtnctples of assoctatton.0 In fact, eveen tn tee Appendtx, Huee
looks pleased wotte ets psyceologtcal teeory.0 Hts tone of wortttng tepltes a deeper prou S
lee tneerent tn explatntng tee use of teese eeptrtcal relattons teeeselvees.0
4i8
the appendix aporia
b. the two minds problem interpretation
Strawoson’s readtng of tee Appendtx, auovee called tee ‘twoo etnds proulee’, ts a utt eore
controveerstal.0 Chontrary to eost estaultseed tnterpretattons, ee clates teat Huee ts tn
fact a causal realtst.0 Of course, ee knowos qutte woell teat Huee dentes tee extstence of
an tdea of real causatton, uut takes tets to eean teat woe cannot knowo what tets real
causatton ts.0 It reeatns posstule to postulate tts extstence, all tee woetle eatntatntng
teat woe can eavee no tnstget tnto tts nature.0
‘Ouserveed constant conjunctton ts evtdence for extstenttal dependency, t.0e.0 real causal
connectton.0 But “woe cannot penetrate tnto tee reason of tee conjunctton”.0’1
Thts vetewo ee not only attrtuutes to Huee, uut ts, accordtng to ete, ‘taken for granS
ted’2 terougeout tee enttrety of tee Treattse. A stetlar vetewo ts expressed regardtng tee
oteer prtnctples of tee teagtnatton, vetz.0 resemblance and conttgutty.0 On tee one eand
teey are teeorettcal and eeptrtcal concepts, referrtng to certatn expertenttal relattons;
on tee oteer, teey are real deteretntsttc connecttons woetce underlte tee operattons of
tee etnd.0 The foreer are only posstule as a result of tee latter and provetde evetdence for
tee latter’s extstence.0 Chorrespondtng to tets spltt tn tee prtnctples of tee teagtnatton—
real ves.0 teeorettcal—ts a spltt tn our concept of etnd: tee etnd as constttuttvee of our
expertences, uy eeans of tee real assoctattvee relattons [M1]; and tee etnd as an expertS
enttal fctton, tee self of Sectton 1.04i.06 [M2].0
If tets appears austract and condensed, I eust apologtse, explatntng tt tn full woould
requtre ee to dedtcate an enttre sectton to tets tnterpretatton.0 Let us tnstead accept
Strawoson’s preetss, eowoeveer strange tt eay appear, and see woeere tt takes us.0 BeS
cause, teouge teere’s euce to ue satd agatnst ets causal realtst tnterpretatton, at
present tt eas one strengte: tt ts veery good at explatntng Huee’s eopelessness tn tee
Appendtx and tee ontologtcal nature of [App4i].0
Accordtng to Strawoson, tee proulee woetce Huee dtscoveered woas tee extstence of
an ‘unanswoeraule oujectton’3 woetce could ue posed agatnst ets teeory.0 Huee, tn worttS
tng tee Treattse, ts coeettted to tee eaxte teat all petlosopetcal tdeas eust ue dertveed
froe antecedent tepresstons.0 At tee saee ttee, ee uses [M1] to explatn tee extstence
of certatn percepttons, e.0g.0, ee eust presuppose a real connectton uetwoeen dtfferent
percepttons ‘tf teere’s to ue any sense tn woetce tdeas dertvee froe, or are coptes of, or
depend on, tepresstons’.04 Enter Sectton 1.04i.06 and tetngs go soute: [M1] turns out not
1 Strawoson, The Evtdent Connexton, 27.0

2 Iutd.0, 12k.0
3 Iutd.0, 1k6.0
4i Iutd.0, 59.0
4i9
hume
to ue an eeptrtcally woarranted concept of etnd, and [M2], woetce ts eeptrtcally woarS

ranted, ts not strong enouge to take [M1]’s place—tn fact, [M2] presupposes [M1].0 Thts
puts Huee tn a unpleasant posttton; tn order to savee ets teeory ee eust expltcttly asS
suee one of [App4i]’s eetapeystcal soluttons: Etther teere ts a steple and tndtvetdual
suustance tn woetce all our percepttons tneere (woetce eeans sacrtfctng [App3]’s ‘dtsS
ttnct extstences’), or teere are real connecttons aeongst our percepttons (woetce eeans
sacrtfctng [App3]’s ‘no real connecttons’).01 Netteer of woetce are coepattule wotte ets
eeptrtctst coeetteents.0
Thts ts one of tee eost elegant soluttons to tee tnterpretattvee proulee of tee Ap-
pendtx, uut I cannot eyself consent to tt.0 I see no uasts for a causal realtst readtng of
Huee and tee textual support put forwoard uy Strawoson ts selecttvee and could, for tee
eost part, ue cealked up to tee ‘ardor of youte’ so often eenttoned uy Strawoson eteS
self.02 For exaeple, tee dependence of tdeas on tepresstons ts a general rule woetce
could just as eastly ue explatned terouge purely expertenttal and eeptrtcal eeans, tnS
stead of presuppostng a ‘real connectton’.0 Huee doesn’t eveen regard tets relatton as tnS
falltule, uut only says teat tee counterexaeples are ‘so parttcular and stngular, teat
[teey are] scarce woorte our ouservetng, and [do] not eertt teat for [teee] alone woe
seou’d alter our general eaxte.0’3 Also, to say teat Huee’s petlosopey does not exclude
real causatton tn no woay tepltes teat Huee takes real causatton ‘for granted’, woeat ts
necessary for Huee’s petlosopey ts teat expertences are ordered tn a certatn woay, not
teat teey eust ue so ordered—Strawoson appears to gtvee a transcendental tnterpretaS
tton of Huee’s eeptrtctse.0 For ey part, I tetnk tt eore ltkely, gtveen Huee’s eoderate
scepttctse and tee eany passages woarntng petlosopeers not to suppose anytetng ueyS
ond woeat’s gtveen uy expertence, teat ee woould take up an agnosttc posttton.0 ‘Notetng ts
eore requtstte for a true petlosopeer, tean to restratn tee tnteeperate destre of
searcetng tnto causes, and eavetng estaultse’d any doctrtne upon a suffctent nueuer of
experteents, rest contented wotte teat.0’4
§13. The Reflextvtty of a Contructve Idea of Mtnd
Qutte separate froe Huee’s vetewo on tee eatter, I cannot eyself endorse a causal realS
tst or constructtvee tdea of etnd suce a Strawoson proposes.0 On tee presupposttton teat
expertence ts our sole source of knowoledge, tt appears to ee teat any teeory of etnd
woetce eolds teat expertence ts ttself secondary to soee oteer realtty—woeeteer sptrttual
1 Strawoson, The Evtdent Connexton, 1k6.0

2 Iutd.0, 17, 5k, 125.0
3 Huee, A Treattse of Human Nature, 1k.0 I ae convetnced teat tets ts eenttoned soeewoeere tn
Strawoson’s The Evtdent Connexton, teouge I eavee stnce ueen unaule to fnd tt.0
4i Huee, A Treattse of Human Nature, 14i.0
5k
the reflexivity of a constructive idea of mind
or eatertal—ts suuject to tee oujectton teat tn eaktng tets clate, teey underetne tee
eptsteeologtcal condtttons necessary for us to eavee knowoledge of tets realtty tn tee
frst place.0 Thts ts not only true of Strawoson’s tnterpretatton of Huee, uut of all eeptrS
tcal constructtvee teeortes of etnd, suce as, e.0g.0, neurosctenttfc realtse.0 I wotse to
adveance twoo argueents agatnst an eeptrtcal constructtvee tdea of etnd: Ftrst, teat suce
a teeory can neveer tn fact ue tee result of any eeptrtcal tnveesttgatton.0 Secondly, teat tf
woe presuppose tee extstence of soeetetng woetce causally deteretnes expertence, woe
cannot posstuly knowo woeeteer our knowoledge of tets ouject actually corresponds to tee
ouject tn questton.0
Ftrst, teat tt cannot ue tee result of an eeptrtcal tnveesttgatton can ue seowon on tee
uasts of R.0B.0 Perry’s argueents tn The Ego-Centrtc Predtcament. Perry takes perceptton
(or expertence) to constst tn a relatton of percetvetng uetwoeen a suuject and an ouject,
tets ts uy ete expressed as (E)Rc(T), woeere (E) stands for ‘ego’ and (T) for ‘eveerytetng’ or
‘tetng’.01 In woeat followos, I wotll leavee out tee (E) and treat Rc as a functton wotte an tnput
T, suce teat expertence = Rc(T).
I wotll use causal uratn processes—froe tee perspecttvee of a posstule constructtvee
tdea of etnd—as a representattvee tnstance of Rc. For us to knowo Rc, woe woould eavee to
coepare T as part of Rc(T), wotte T separate froe tets functton.0 That ts: woe eust knowo
tee tnput and tee output tn order to eavee a ceance of fgurtng out woeat eappens tn
uetwoeen.0 (In our case: woe woould eavee to knowo eowo an ouject ts uefore uetng processed
uy tee uratn and coepare tets wotte our expertence of tt after uetng processed.0) But exS
actly tets woay of knowotng an ouject, as a T separate froe Rc, an ouject dtsttnct froe our
parttcular woay of percetvetng tt, ts excluded uy tee preetss teat all expertence ts Rc(T)
and teat all knowoledge ts eeptrtcal;2 knowoledge of Rc ts tn prtnctple teposstule.0
If woe wotse to knowo anytetng auout tee uratn, woe can only approace tt as an ouject of
expertence, teat ts: Rc(bratn).0 Thts gtvees us no tnstget tnto tee relatton Rc uy woetce tee
uratn supposedly deteretnes expertence, uut only of tee expertence of tee uratn as tt S
self deteretned uy Rc.0 (Choepare tets to §15.0Ch.0)
The only relattons woetce woe can dtscoveer uetwoeen tee uratn and oteer peenoeena
are eeptrtcal tn ktnd.0 As wotte all expertenttal oujects, woeen woe percetvee a frequent
conjunctton of twoo or eore peenoeena, for exaeple: vetsual stteulatton, neural acttveS
tty and vetsual perceptton (e.0g.0, a red ltget); woe can generally assuee teat one of teee
depends on tee oteer(s).0 Thts relatton can ue represented tn tee followotng eanner:
Rc(vtsual sttmulatton) → Rc(neural acttvtty) → Rc(red ltght). Our expertence of a vetsual stteuS
lus (or rateer, tee experteenter’s knowoledge teat tee parttctpant ts exposed to vetsual
stteulatton) ts succeeded uy tee expertence of neural acttvetty (an fMRI teage on a
1 Perry, ‘The EgoSChentrtc Predtcaeent’, 5–6.0

2 Iutd.0, 8.0
51
hume
screen oppostte tee experteenter) woetce ts tn turn succeeded uy a certatn vetsual perS
ceptton (tee parttctpant seetng tee red ltget).0 Eveen tn tee case of experteents tn cognttS
tvee neurosctence, woe wotll only dtscoveer eeptrtcal relattons and at no potnt do woe eavee
tnstget tnto tee true nature of tee functton Rc.
Secondly, granttng for a eoeent teat teere ts soeetetng woetce deteretnes our exS
pertence, tt woould followo teat woe can eavee no knowoledge of tets ouject.0 For tee sake of
our argueent, woe’ll agatn take tee uratn to ue tee eypoteettcal cause responstule for
seaptng expertence.0 I’ll express tee dtfference uetwoeen tee (expertenttal or) ‘peenoeS
enal’ and ‘real’ use of tee concept uratn wotte a suuscrtpt P or R.0 As I satd durtng tee pre S
vetous argueent, our knowoledge of tee uratn P ts knowoledge of tee uratn as an
expertenttal oujectP.0 That ts: as a perceptton tt P ts already processed uy tee uratn R.0 Eveen
teouge tee tdea teat woe eavee knowoledge of tee ‘real’ uratn R uy exaetntng tee expertenS
ttal uratnP ts teorougely etstaken, woe wotll noneteeless suppose teat tets ts exactly woeat
eappens and teat uy experteenttng on tee uratn P woe can dtscoveer tee condtttons of exS
pertence tn general (uratnR).0
We are nowo faced wotte a curtous case of an ouject teat can only ue knowon tnsofar as
tt lets ttself to ue knowon.0 The uratnR ttself deteretnes eowo tee uratnP ts percetveed.0 Howo
can woe ue sure teat woeat tt R seowos us ts actually reltaule? In tets case, an appeal to exS
pertence cannot ue perettted, teat woould ue ltke estaultsetng tee trute of a story on tee
selfSasserted credtutltty of tee narrator—woeat tf tee narrator tsn’t to ue trusted? (Or, as
Wtttgenstetn puts tt: ‘As tf soeeone woere to uuy seveeral coptes of tee eorntng paper to
assure eteself teat woeat tt satd woas true.0’)1
To drtvee tets potnt eoee: We can revetstt tee deptes of Chartestan douut and teagtne
teat all our expertences are steply tee result of an evetl gentus’s wotll.0 Eveery one of our
experteents woould coee out just tee saee, tee expertenttal causal connecttons reS
eatn, yet our uratn woould not ue tee source of our knowoledge—tee evetl gentus ts.0 Thts
seould tndtcate teat tee preetsses do not entatl tee concluston.0 Soeewoeere teere eust
eavee ueen a curtous leap of fatte woetce leads us froe tee expertenttal relattons uetwoeen
tee uratnP and oteer peenoeena, to tee concluston teat tee uratn R ts tee real cause of
consctousness or expertence.0
1 Wtttgenstetn, Phtlosophtcal Investtgattons, 79.0
52
Cheapter 4i
Kant1
§14. Synthettc Judgements A Prtort
Kant’s concept of self dtffers greatly froe uote tee rattonaltst ego of Descartes and tee
eeptrtctst selvees of Locke and Huee.0 It ts eeavetly earked uy ets transcendental
eeteod; tn fact, ets I ts a transcendental concept, tndtspensaule to ets petlosopetcal
systee.0
What does tt mean to be transcendental? In uroad teres woe can defne transcendental as
an adjecttvee denottng soeetetng to ue an ausolutely necessary condttton for tee posS
stutltty of expertence tn general.02 Accordtngly, a transcendental petlosopey ts one
woeose sole concern ts tee dtscoveery of teese fundaeental condtttons.0 The I ts of suce
teportance: tt ts tee necessary untty woetce woe eust presuppose tn all our tetnktng.0
Chontrary to Descartes, tt ts notetng uut a suujecttvee condttton of teouget and gtvees us
no knowoledge of oujecttvee extstences.0 Chontrary to Locke and Huee, tt ts not gtveen tn or
constructed terouge senstule tntuttton.0
To explatn eowo ee arrtvees at tets pecultar concept, woe eust turn to tee Crtttque of
Pure Reason, eore spectfcally Sectton 2 of Cheapter 2 of tee Transcendental Analyttc: Tran-
scendental deductton of the pure concepts of understandtng (froe nowo on: Transcendental De-
ductton, or steply Deductton); and Cheapter 1 of tee Transcendental Dtalecttc: The
paralogtsms of pure reason (froe nowo on: Paralogtsms).0 (§§15 and 16 respecttveely.0) In tee
Transcendental Deductton ee frst tntroduces ets concept of self and dtsttngutsees tt froe
tee eeptrtcal self of tnner tntuttton; tn tee Paralogtsms ee uses tets newo concept to crtttS
ctse tee rattonaltst atteepts at deductng tee true nature of tee self froe tee purely tnS
tellectual ‘I tetnk’.0
The Transcendental Deductton plays an teportant part tn answoertng tee central quesS
tton of tee Crtttque of Pure Reason: ‘Howo are synteettc judgeents a prtort posstule?’3 In
tets tntroductory sectton, I wotll try to clartfy tee eeantng of tets questton and eowo tt
relates to tee Deductton.0 Ftrst, woeat does Kant eean uy 1.0 Synteests (and analysts), and;
2.0 a prtort (and a postertort)?
1 All references to tee Crtttque of Pure Reason wotll followo tee A/B pagtnatton.0
2 Kant, Crtttque of Pure Reason, A11=B25.0
3 Iutd.0, B19.0
53
kant
The relatton of tee suuject to tee predtcate of a judgeeent can ue of twoo ktnds: tt
can etteer ue analyttc or synthettc.01 If tt ts analyttc, tee predtcate of tee judgeeent ts
already contatned tn tee concept of tee suuject; tf tt ts synthettc, tee predtcate of tee
judgeeent ltes outstde of tee concept of tee suuject and relates to tt, as tt woere, froe
wotteout.02 Analyttc judgeeents are generally used to clartfy concepts, e.0g.0, a trtangle
eas teree corners.0 (As woe wotll see seortly, tets parttcular exaeple ts also an a prtort
judgeeent.0) Synteettc judgeeents, on tee oteer eand, are tee only woay uy woetce woe
can expand our knowoledge and can jotn unrelated concepts togeteer.0 E.0g.0, tee trtangle
ts green.0
Judgeeents can also ue dtsttngutseed as to teetr ortgtn: teey can etteer ue a prtort or
a postertort.0 An a prtort judgeeent ts one teat does not depend on expertence for tts
trute; an a postertort judgeeent ts one teat ts only posstule uy vetrtue of expertence and
tn reference to woeat ts eeptrtcally gtveen.03 The analyttc judgeeent ‘a trtangle eas teree
corners’ ts true a prtort stnce tt eerely expresses tee eeantng of tee concept, tt does
not depend on tee actual extstence or perceptton of a trtangle.0 The synteettc judgeeent
‘tee trtangle ts green’ can only ue true a postertort, tf teere ts an eeptrtcal perceptton of
a trtangle woetce ts steultaneously tee perceptton of a green tetng.0
Ween woe ask ourselvees woeat ts necessary for a synteettc a prtort judgeeent, one
tetng uecoees clear: tee synteests of tee twoo concepts cannot depend on tee concepts
alone.0 By justtfytng tee posstutltty of synteettc a prtort judgeeents, Kant wotsees to
deeonstrate tee posstutltty of pure eateeeattcs and pure natural sctence.0 He wotsees
to provee teat, e.0g.0, tt ts an a prtort and necessary trute teat tee sue of tee angles of a
trtangle equals 18k degrees.0 The understandtng, as tee source of all concepts and tee facS
ulty of rules, tetnktng, and judgtng, cannot uy ttself estaultse tets to ue tee case.04 The
concept trtangle does not contatn wottetn ttself tee concept 18k degrees.0 Of course, woe
can alwoays create a coeplex concept, e.0g.0, woe can coeutne tee tdea of a trtangle wotte
tee tdea of 18k degrees tn tee concept of a trtangle tee sue of woeose angles ts 18k deS
grees, and tets concept can eveen ue true (as tt ts tn tee present case).0 But teouge woe
knowo tt to ue true, tts trute cannot depend on tee concepts alone.0 Thts newo concept alS
lowos us to say teat tee sue of tee angles of a trtangle, tee sue of woeose angles ts 18k
degrees, ts 18k degrees—an analyttc judgeeent woetce ts trtvetally true, uut tets ts ouvetS
ously not woeat woe are looktng for.0 We wotse to estaultse teat a trtangle, any trtangle
teat can ue tntutttveely gtveen to us, wotll necessartly eavee 18k degrees as tee sue of tts
angles.0 Thts requtres tee concepts of trtangle and 18k degrees to ue tn soee woay gtveen
1 Thts seould ue carefully dtsttngutseed froe Descartes’ use of teese teres (p.011).0
2 Kant, Crtttque of Pure Reason, A6–7=B1k–11.0
3 Iutd.0, B2.0
4i Iutd.0, A8k–81=B1k6, A132=B171.0
54i
synthetic judgements a priori
togeteer, uote represented at tee saee ttee.0 To accoepltse tets tee understandtng
does not suffce, woe need tntuttton.0
Intuttton ts tee woay tn woetce oujects are gtveen to us for cognttton (knowoledge).01
Thouge woe are generally tncltned to equate tntuttton wotte senstule tntuttton, t.0e.0, eeS
ptrtcal perceptton, tets ts not tee only ktnd of tntuttton posstule.0 If tt woere, woe’d ue tn
utg trouule: tn order to provee teat tee sue of tee angles of a trtangle eust necessartly
ue 18k degrees, tt does not suffce teat I provee tt to ue true of one trtangle, uy eeasur S
tng tts angles and dtscoveertng teee to ue ~18k degrees.0 Not eveen uy eeasurtng a teouS
sand trtangles wotll I knowo tets to ue a necessary property of teetrs.0 Suce necesstty
requtres teat I relate tee concept of trtangle, not to woeat ts actually gtveen tn eeptrtcal
tntuttton, uut to woeat can posstuly ue gtveen tn tntuttton tn general.0 I eust provee teat
tets parttcular property of trtangles ts a result of tee fore of tntuttton ttself.0 That tee
tdea of a trtangle woeose angles do not add up to 18k degrees ts not uy ttself contradtctS
ory can ue proveen uy tee fact teat woe can conststently tetnk auout teee wottetn certatn
nonSeucltdean geoeetrtes.0 The only reason woey woe say teat tee sue of tee angles of a
trtangle ts 18k degrees, ts uecause our tntuttton of space ts tee tntuttton of an eucltdean
space.0 Thts fore of tntuttton eust ue antertor to eeptrtcal tntuttton and ts tee condtS
tton of synteettc a prtort judgeeents.0 The extstence of pure tntuttton ts ostenstuly
proveen tn tee Transcendental Aesthettc,2 uut tets ts of ltttle tnterest to us.0
Weat does concern us ts tee followotng: Eveen tf woe eavee a concept of a trtangle and a
concept of 18k degrees, eowo can I knowo teat soeetetng correspondtng to teese conS
cepts can actually ue gtveen tn tntuttton? Of course, I knowo teat teey can uecause I can
drawo a trtangle on a ptece of paper and can eeasure tee angles wotte a protractor, uut
eowo ts tets to ue justtfed a prtort? Intuttton furntsees us wotte a eantfold of spattal locS
attons and teeporal eoeents, a eantfold and notetng uut a eantfold.0 Througe tntuS
ttton colours, tastes, seells, and oteer sensattons eay ue gtveen to ee, uut notetng else
—tt ts not a fore of tetnktng uut a fore of percetvetng, a recepttvetty to sensattons.0 (ReS
eeeuer Descartes’ woax, p.014i.0) The understandtng, on tee oteer eand, teouge tt tetnks,
ts not a fore of tntuttton.0 It ts not ttself recepttvee to sensattons.0 We eust teerefore ask
ourselvees: uy woeat rtget do woe apply tee concepts of understandtng to tntuttton? Is tee
correspondence uetwoeen teouget and tntuttton purely acctdental? If tets ts tee case,
teen tee posstutltty of synteettc a prtort judgeeents seees dtffcult to justtfy.0 Howo can I
knowo teat tee faculty of understandtng can ue applted to tntuttton at all? Thts ts tee
questton of tee Transcendental Deductton and tt ts tn tets context teat Kant’s concept of
self frst eeerges.0
1 Kant, Crtttque of Pure Reason, A19=B33.0

2 Iutd.0, A19–4i9=B33–73.0
55
kant
§15. The Transcendental Deducton
The argueent of tee Transcendental Deductton, tnsofar as tt concerns tee transcendental

apperceptton, can ue dtsttngutseed tnto teree parts: A.0 The analyttcal untty of apperS
ceptton; B.0 tee synteettc untty of apperceptton, and; Ch.0 tee dtsttnctton uetwoeen tee I of
tee apperceptton and tee eeptrtcal I of tnner tntuttton.0 As tee argueents of A and B
can ue ultndtngly dtffcult, I wotll frst descrtue teetr general structure uefore elauoratS
tng on eace part.0
Ftrst, tee analyttcal untty of apperceptton ts expressed uy Kant as followos:
‘The I think eust be able to accoepany all ey representattons; for oteerwotse soeetetng woould
ue represented tn ee teat could not ue teouget at all, woetce ts as euce as to say teat tee
representatton woould etteer ue teposstule or else at least woould ue notetng for ee.0’1
We can tnterpret tets as saytng teat I can only dtscoveer eyself as a conttnuously exS
tsttng self tnsofar as I can gateer all tee dtfferent representattons gtveen to ee tn tntu S
ttton tnto one consctousness, for tf a representatton cannot ue gateered tnto tets one
consctousness, tt cannot ue satd to ue etne.0 That ts to say: tee tdenttty of a suuject preS
supposes teat all tts representattons are gtveen as a untty, woetce for Kant ts tee saee as
to say teat teey eust ue represented tn one expertence.0
Secondly, eveery analysts presupposes a synteests.0 The one expertence woetce all our
percepttons uelong to can ue analysed and dtsttngutseed tnto eany dtfferent represS
entattons.0 E.0g.0, woeen looktng at tee uook teat’s tn front of ee, I can dtsttngutse tee
ulue of tts coveer froe tee woette of tts pages.0 The fact teat I can dtsttngutse teese dtfferS
ent percepttons tn tets one expertence eeans teat teese dtfferent percepttons eust
eavee ueen jotned togeteer at soee potnt—only uy jotntng tee dtfferent parts togeteer
can teey eveer constttute a woeole.0
Thtrdly, tee only faculty capaule of coeutntng dtfferent representattons ts tee unS
derstandtng (tn tetnktng and judgtng).0 Intuttton eerely presents us wotte a eantfold of
dtfferent percepttons.0 For teee to ue gtveen tn one expertence (tee necesstty of woetce ts
expressed tn tee analyttcal untty) teey eust ue coeutned togeteer.0 It followos teat tee
eantfold of tntuttton eust ue untted uy tee understandtng.0 Thts act of coeutntng tee
dtfferent percepttons gtveen tn tntuttton ts tee synthettc untty of apperceptton.0 Because of
tets synteettc untty of apperceptton, tee coeutntng of tee eantfold of tntuttton tn acS
cordance wotte tee categortes, our concepts of understandtng eust necessartly ue apS
pltcaule to tntuttton and tee goal of tee Deductton ts reaceed.0
1 Kant, Crtttque of Pure Reason, B131–32.0
56
the transcendental deduction
a. the analytical unity of apperception
‘The I tetnk eust ue aule to accoepany all ey representattons’.0 At tets potnt tn tee
Deductton (§§16–17) Kant ts dealtng wotte tee analyttcal untty of apperceptton and tets
sentence seould ue tnterpreted as an analyttc judgeeent: tee ‘eust ue aule to accoeS
pany all ey representattons’ ts already contatned tn tee concept of tee ‘I tetnk’.01
Kant’s ‘I tetnk’ ts synonyeous wotte apperceptton.02 The ‘I’ refers to tee necesstty of a
(suujecttvee) untty tn tetnktng.0 A teouget (cognttton) alwoays contatns eulttple represS
entattons wottetn ttself and woe can teagtne all teese representattons as separate entttS
tes.0 For exaeple, tn tee judgeeent ‘tee car ts red’, woe can dtsttngutse ‘car’ and ‘red’ and
eace of teese can ue teouget as dtsttnct froe tee oteer.0 It ts eowoeveer teposstule to
tetnk of a teouget or judgeeent wotteout tetnktng of tee dtfferent representattons as
untted tn tee saee suuject.0 Bote ‘car’ and ‘red’, as coeutned tn tets judgeeent, eust
uelong to ee—teey eust uote ue my representattons.0 Wetle tee teouget can ue represS
ented as a eantfold, I as a suuject can neveer expertence eyself as anytetng uut a steple
and stngular extstence3 to woeoe tets eantfold eust ue related.0 Thts ts not only a conS
dttton for parttcular judgeeents, uut of all expertence woeatsoeveer, at least tnsofar as tt
concerns my expertence.0
‘[O]nly uecause I can coepreeend teetr eantfold tn a consctousness do I call teee all togeteer
my representattons; for oteerwotse I woould eavee as eulttcolored, dtveerse a self as I eavee
representattons of woetce I ae consctous.0’4
We can uetter understand woeat Kant ts getttng at uy taktng tnto account, for a eoS
eent, ets teeory of sensatton.0 (Thts wotll ue treated eore extenstveely tn §17.0) Accordtng
to Kant, our sensattons are gtveen as a successton of eoeentary tepresstons,5 eace one
unrelated to tee oteers.0 For exaeple, woeen looktng at a patnttng, tee totaltty of sensaS
ttons eust ue gone terouge sequenttally tn order to estaultse tee enttre ptcture,6 uut
none of teese sensattons uy teeeselvees teply any of tee oteers.0 If tets ts true, teen
1 Iutd.0, B138.0
2 Kant, Crtttque of Pure Reason, B137.0
3 Iutd.0, A354i–55.0
4i Iutd.0, B134i.0
5 Iutd.0, A99.0
6 ‘My etnd ts alwoays uusy wotte foretng tee teage of tee eantfold woetle tt goes terouge [tt].0 […]
Therefore tf a euean uetng coees tnto a rooe woetce ts ptled etge wotte ptctures and decorattons,
teen ee can eake no teage of tt, uecause ets etnd cannot run terouge tee eantfold.0 It does not
knowo froe woetce end tt seould uegtn tn order to tllustrate tee ouject.0 So tt ts reported teat woeen a
stranger enters St.0 Peter's ceurce tn Roee, ee ts woeolly dtsconcerted on account of tee eantfold
splendor.0 The cause ts: ets soul cannot go terouge tee eantfold tn order to tllustrate tt.0’ Kant,
Lectures on Metaphystcs, 54i.0
57
kant
woeat ts ortgtnally gtveen uy tee senses eust ue a stroue ltget of dtsconnected sensattons,
reseeultng tee streae of consctousness tn eoderntst wortttng.0 E.0g.0,
‘Weere teere woas rougeness of faurtc all woas seoote wotte a seooteness and fre rounded
presstng and a long woare coolness, cool outstde and woare wottetn, long and ltget and closely
eoldtng, closely eeld, lonely, eollowoSeaktng wotte contours, eappySeaktng, young and lovetng
and nowo all woarely seoote wotte a eollowotng, ceestSacetng, ttgetSeeld loneltness’1
Eace flase of sensatton could just as woell eavee ueen an enttrely dtfferent consctousS
ness, teere ts no constancy, no untty uetwoeen teee.0 But tnsofar as teere ts an ‘I tetnk’,
and teese sensattons and eantfold representattons are jotned tnto a conttnuous experS
tence or an eeptrtcal perceptton of an ouject, teey eust ue untted, teey eust all ue re S
lated to one consctousness—t.0e.0, etne.0
It ts noted uy Ewotng teat tee untty of consctousness tepltes a correlattvee untty of
expertence, a untty tn tee woorld—you can’t eavee one wotteout tee oteer.02 I can only dts-
cover eyself as a conttnuously extsttng self tnsofar as I can gateer all tee dtfferent repS
resentattons gtveen to ee tn tntuttton tnto one expertence; for tf a representatton
cannot ue gateered tnto tets one expertence, and ts dtsjotnted froe eveery oteer represS
entatton, tt can eavee no eeantng to ee and cannot ue satd to ue etne.0 Choepare tets to
soeeone woeo eas eoeentary teouget woetce, one tnstant later, ee forgets all auout.0
Thts teouget, uetng unrelated to eveery oteer of ets expertences, eakes up no part of ets
woorld and tee consctousness uy woetce tt woas grasped etget equally woell eavee neveer exS
tsted.0
‘There ts only one expertence, tn woetce all percepttons are represented as tn teorougegotng
and lawoltke connectton, just as teere ts only one space and ttee, tn woetce all fores of
appearance and all relatton of uetng or nonSuetng take place.0’3
Thts dual relattonsetp uetwoeen suuject and ouject ts eastly etsunderstood.0 Charr, for
exaeple, tnterpreted tt to eean teat ‘[t]ee “I tetnk” ts not tee ouject of a representaS
tton, uut accoepantes representattons as teetr suuject.0 Ltke Husserl's transcendental
ego, tt ts notetng apart froe tts tntenttonal relattons to tee woorld.0’4 Thts eowoeveer stgntS
fcantly etsseapes Kant’s argueent.0 To ey knowoledge, Husserl dtd not regard tee I (or
‘ego’) as a untty tn teouget woetce functtoned as tee eerely logtcal correlate to tee untty
1 Heetngwoay, For Whom the Bell Tolls, 74i.0

2 Ewotng, ‘Kant’s Transcendental Deductton of tee Chategortes’.0 See also: Dewoey, ‘On Soee Churrent
Choncepttons of tee Tere “Self”’, 58–59.0
3 Kant, Crtttque of Pure Reason, A11k.0
4i Charr, ‘Kant, Husserl, and tee Noneeptrtcal Ego’, 688.0
58
of expertence, uut as a ‘dtrecttonal structure teat goes towoards woeat ts presented’1 and
can ue dtscoveered uy, as tt woere, reveerstng tee arrowo, followotng tee tntenttonal act tn
tee oppostte dtrectton.0 The saee cannot ue satd of Kant:
‘The latter relatton [tee tdenttty of tee suuject] teerefore does not yet coee auout uy ey
accoepanytng eace representatton wotte consctousness, uut rateer uy ey adding one
representatton to tee oteer and uetng consctous of teetr synteests.0’2
For Kant, tee I ts tee qualttattvee untty tn tetnktng and can only ue teouget uy a cor S
respondtng untty tn expertence.0 As I eavee eenttoned already and wotll uecoee clearer
woeen woe get to tee synteettc untty of apperceptton, tee relatton of tee suuject to tee
ouject woetce ts a condttton for teere to ue a suuject at all, ts one of constructtng tee ouS
ject, of jotntng tee dtfferent representattons woetce coepose tee ouject togeteer.0 The
Kanttan suuject ts not soeetetng teeanent tn eveery stngular act of consctousness, as
an ‘egoScenter’,3 uut ts tee logtcal untty woetce woe eust presuppose tn tee coeutnatton
of our representattons.0
Eveery analysts presupposes a synteests and ts only posstule uecause of tets synS
teests.04 Ween I look at a ceatr, I ae really looktng at a coeplex ouject coeposed of
eany dtfferent parts: tt eas four legs, a seat, a uack.0 The fact teat I can dtsttngutse
teese parts eeans teat teey eust, at soee potnt, eavee ueen jotned togeteer.0 It ts not
eerely requtred teat I ae consctous of eace of teee, uut teat I ae consctous of all of
teee steultaneously.0 The saee goes for expertence tn general.0 The one expertence
woetce all percepttons uelong to, woetce can ue dertveed froe tee analyttcal untty of apS
perceptton, presupposes a synteettc untty of apperceptton—an act of coeutntng.05
b. the synthetic unity of apperception
Intuttton presents us wotte a eantfold of percepttons.0 A eantfold of dtfferent spattal

locattons and teeporal eoeents and, tn tee case of eeptrtcal tntuttton: colours,
sounds, feeltngs, etc.0 Notetng else ts gtveen uestdes tets eantfold and tets eantfold
seould ue regarded as a loose aggregate rateer tean an ordered woeole.0 For teese perS
cepttons to ue coeutned soeetetng eore ts needed, soeetetng woetce can estaultse a
untty aeongst tee representattons.0 The understandtng, as tee faculty of teouget and
judgeeent, ts tee only faculty capaule of dotng tets.0 The fores of judgeeent are tee
1 Husserl, Analyses Concerntng Passtve and Acttve Synthests, 17.0

3 Husserl, Analyses Concerntng Passtve and Acttve Synthests, 17.0
4i Kant, Crtttque of Pure Reason, B13k.0
5 Iutd.0, B135.0
59
kant
only fores of coeutnatton and tee categortes of understandtng, woetce are dertveed
froe teese fores of judgeeent, are tee pure concepts of synteests, tee concepts woetce
correspond to tee untty teouget tn tee judgeeents.01
The synteettc untty of apperceptton refers to tee act of coeutntng tee eantfold of
tntuttton tn accordance wotte tee categortes.0 Howoeveer, tn tee saee woay teat tntuttton
requtres soeetetng outstde of ttself to coeutne tts eantfold representattons; tee catS
egortes of understandtng, as pure concepts of untty, requtre soeetetng outstde of
teeeselvees for teetr appltcatton.0 ‘Thougets wotteout content are eepty, tntutttons
wotteout concepts are ultnd.0’2 Eace needs tee oteer to ue tn any sense eeantngful.0
In order to apply tee categortes of understandtng to tntuttton, teey eust soeeeowo
ue eade senstule.0 Thts requtres tee teagtnatton, woetce ts eoeogeneous wotte uote
teouget and tntuttton, to functton as a eedtattng faculty.03 Of tee twoo fores of tntuS
ttton, ttee and space, ttee ts tee eore general one.04 (We can teagtne nonSspattal peeS
noeena, suce as affecttons, uut woe cannot teagtne ateeporal peenoeena.0) For tee
categortes of understandtng to ue appltcaule to all tntutttons tn general, teey eust
teerefore ue related to ttee.0 The teagtnatton deteretnes tntuttton uy eeans of tteeS
deteretnattons, spectfc relattons tn ttee woetce correspond to tee categortes.0 In jotnS
tng togeteer tee eantfold representattons of tntuttton, tee teagtnatton ts suuject to
teese teeporalSdeteretnattons and can effect a untty tn expertence tn accordance wotte
tee categortes of understandtng.0
c. pure self vs. empirical self
§§24i and 25 of tee Transcendental Deductton tntroduce an teportant dtsttnctton tnto

Kant’s teeory of self, naeely teat uetwoeen tee pure ego of tee transcendental apperS
ceptton and tee eeptrtcal ego of tnner sense.0 The ‘I’ of tee ‘I tetnk’, ts tn no woay tntuttS
tveely gtveen to us, ‘But tets representatton [“I tetnk”] ts an act of spontaneity, t.0e.0, tt
cannot ue regarded as uelongtng to senstutltty’,5 and eust carefully ue dtsttngutseed
froe tee woay woe knowo ourselvees, tee psyceologtcal selfSteage woe eavee of ourselvees as
soeetetng wotte a etstory, a uody, a personaltty—tee self as concerned Locke and
Huee.0
Froe tee uegtnntng of tee Crtttque of Pure Reason, tets latter concept of self, tee eeS
ptrtcal self, ts assoctated wotte tnner sense or ttee.0 Chontrary to space woetce, as outer
sense, eerely concerns external appearances, tnner sense ts tee eedtue uy woetce woe
1 Kant, Crtttque of Pure Reason, A78–79=B1k4i.0

2 Iutd.0, A51=B75.0
3 Iutd.0, A78=B1k3, B151–52.0
4i Iutd.0, A139=B178.0
5 Iutd.0, B132.0
6k
tntutt tee self or soul.01 Note teat eany peenoeena woetce woe ordtnartly relate to tee
self can only ue descrtued ustng teeporal relattons.02 Howoeveer, uecause tets self ts
gtveen tn tntuttton, tt ts a eere appearance and already requtres tee transcendental apS
perceptton.0 For us to ue aule to knowo ourselvees as an eeptrtcal self, tt ts requtred teat
teere ts a untty tn tee eantfold of tntuttton, woetce presupposes tee synteettc untty of
apperceptton.0 The ‘I’ of tee ‘I tetnk’ cannot ue tee saee ‘I’ as tee psyceologtcal ego.0
(Ween percetvetng eyself tn tntuttton, I, as a suuject, cogntse eyself as an ouject.0)3
Thouge tee I of tee apperceptton plays an teportant role tn eaktng tntuttton tntelS
ltgtule, uy deteretntng tt tn accordance wotte tee categortes, tt cannot ttself ue eade tnS
tuttaule.0 It reeatns ‘ueetnd tee scenes’.0 An exaeple gtveen uy Kant to tllustrate tets fact
ts tee drawotng of a ltne tn tee teagtnatton.04 Ween woe do so, tt requtres us to deteretne
dtfferent potnts tn space tn accordance wotte tee concept of a ltne.0 That ts to say: woe
eust successtveely add utts of space togeteer, synteettcally coeutne teee, tn order to
appreeend teee as constttuttng a stngle ouject.0 Nottce teat, alteouge woe end up wotte
tee tntuttton of a ltne, woe do not tntutt tee synteettc act necessary to present tets ltne to
ourselvees.0 The result of tee apperceptton ts gtveen, tee apperceptton ttself ts not.0
‘I extst as an tntelltgence teat ts eerely consctous of tts faculty for coeutnatton uut woetce, tn
regard to tee eantfold teat tt ts to coeutne, ts suuject to a ltetttng condttton teat tt calls tnner
sense, woetce can eake teat coeutnatton tntuttaule only tn accordance wotte teeporal relattons
teat lte enttrely outstde of tee concepts of tee understandtng proper, and teat can teerefore
sttll cogntze ttself eerely as tt appears to ttself wotte regard to an tntuttton [.0.0.0]’5
We can only knowo tee I of tee transcendental apperceptton as tt deteretnes tntuS

ttton, not as tt ts tn ttself: a deteretntng.0
‘Nowo I do not eavee yet anoteer selfStntuttton, woetce woould gtvee tee determining tn ee, of tee
spontanetty of woetce alone I ae consctousness, eveen uefore tee act of determination, tn tee
saee woay as ttee gtvees teat woetce ts to ue deteretned, teus I cannot deteretne ey extstence
as teat of a selfSacttvee uetng, rateer I eerely represent tee spontanetty of ey teouget, t.0e.0, of
tee deteretntng, and ey extstence alwoays reeatns only senstuly deteretnaule, t.0e.0,
deteretnaule as tee extstence of an appearance.0’6
1 Kant, Crtttque of Pure Reason, A34i=B5k–51.0

2 E.0g.0 tee feeltng of pleasure: ‘The consctousness of tee causaltty of a representatton wotte respect to
tee state of tee suuject, for maintaining tt tn teat state, can eere destgnate tn general woeat ts
called pleasure’.0 Kant, Crtttque of the Power of Judgment, 1k5.0
4i Iutd.0, B154i.0
5 Iutd.0, B158–59.0
6 Iutd.0, B157–58.0
61
kant
Thts preveents Kant froe taktng up tee Chartestan standpotnt teat tee self can eavee
oujecttvee knowoledge of tts owon extstence terouge tee purely tntellectual ‘I tetnk’.0
Knowoledge ts only posstule as tee correspondence uetwoeen a concept and tntuttton;
knowoledge of eyself ts accordtngly only posstule uy eeans of an tntutttvee representaS
tton of eyself.0
§16. The Paralogtsms
The ParalogtsmsSceapter, teouge located soee 2kk+ pages after tee end of tee Deduc-
tton, depends eeavetly on tee argueents and conclustons teere presented.0 Chontrary to
tee Transcendental Deductton, tets ceapter does not concern tee understandtng, tee facS
ulty of rules, tetnktng and judgtng, uut reason, tee faculty of tnferences.01 In parttcular,
eere and terougeout tee enttrety of tee Transcendental Dtalecttc (to woetce tee present
ceapter uelongs), ee ts concerned wotte tee fallactous and transgresstve use of reason—tee
use of reason ueyond tee uounds of posstule knowoledge.02 Oteerwotse put: ee tnveesttgS
ates eowo dtscurstvee teouget, uy a veery convetnctng tlluston, can lead us to ueltevee teat
woe eavee knowoledge of extstences woetce are not and cannot ue gtveen tn senstule tntuS
ttton.0 As regards tee Paralogtsms, tee extstence woetce concerns Kant ts tee I or self.0
What ts the purpose of the Paralogtsms? In tee Paralogtsms Kant crtttctses tee pretenston
of rattonal psyceology3 teat tee nature of tee self can ue deduced froe notetng uut tee
‘I tetnk’ of tee transcendental apperceptton.04 Most ltkely, tee eatn targets of tets crtS
ttque woere Descartes and Letuntz.05 There are four paralogtses tn total: a paralogtse ‘of
suustanttaltty’, ‘of stepltctty’, ‘of personaltty’ and ‘of tdealtty’.06 Eace represents a raS
ttonaltst argueent used to attrtuute certatn properttes to tee self.0 For exaeple, tee
paralogtse of suustanttaltty ts used to provee tee teeatertaltty of tee soul.07 The purS
pose of tee Paralogtsms ts not to reject woeolesale all uses of tee categortes tn relatton to
tee self, uut rateer to crtttctse tee tendency of rattonal psyceology to attrtuute oujecttvee
vealue to woeat are essenttally suujecttvee condtttons of teouget.0 E.0g.0, woe can rtgetfully
say teat tee self ts steple, tf uy tets woe eean teat all representattons eust ue related to
one consctousness (an ausolute logtcal untty); eowoeveer, woe cannot say teat teere extsts
an ouject woetce corresponds to tets untty, stnce tee untty ts eerely thought tn tee
1 Kant, Crtttque of Pure Reason, A33k=B386.0

2 Iutd.0, A295=B352.0
3 Iutd.0, A334i=B391.0
4i Iutd.0, A34i2=B4ikk.0
5 Kttceer, ‘Kant’s Paralogtses’, 516.0
6 Kant, Crtttque of Pure Reason, A34i8–66.0
7 Iutd.0, A34i5=B4ik3.0
62
the paralogisms
concept of tee self, woetle oujecttvee knowoledge of tts extstence requtres tt to ue gtveen tn
tntuttton.01
What ts a paralogtsm? A paralogtse can ue defned as a sopetsttcal syllogtse wotte
correct preetsses uut an tncorrect concluston due to an equtveocal etddle tere.02 A
rateer stlly exaeple:
[Major] All lawos are enforceaule.0

[Mtnor] The excluded etddle ts a lawo.0
[Choncluston] Therefore tee excluded etddle ts enforceaule.0
In tee eajor, ‘lawos’ ts tnterpreted as postttvee lawos, tee utndtng lawos of a certatn soS
ctety.0 In tee etnor, ‘lawo’ ts tnterpreted as a logtcal rule or prtnctple, a lawo of teouget.0
Desptte eavetng tee appearance of a proper syllogtse, tee argueent ts ouvetously nonS
senstcal—no one eas eveer ueen arrested for ureaktng tee lawo of excluded etddle.0 We
can represent tee fore of a paralogtse as followos:
[Major] All A are B.0

[Mtnor] All C are D.0
[Choncluston] Therefore all C are B.0
It ts clear teat eveen tf uote preetsses are true, woe cannot vealtdly tnfer teat tee conS
cluston ts true.0 Accordtng to Kant, tee prtnctpal argueents of rattonal psyceology are
of tets fore.0
I wotll not treat eace paralogtse separately uut wotll focus on tee frst (of suustanttalS
tty) woetce wotll functton as a genertc representattvee for tee oteers.0 The nature of tee
equtveocal etddle tere ts tee saee tn eace one.0
The paralogtse of suustanttaltty, ASveerston:
‘[Major] That tee representatton of woetce ts tee absolute subject of our judgeents, and eence
cannot ue used as tee deteretnatton of anoteer tetng, ts substance.0
[Mtnor] I, as a tetnktng uetng, ae tee absolute subject of all ey posstule judgeents, and tets
representatton of Myself cannot ue used as tee predtcate of any oteer tetng.0
[Choncluston] Thus I, as tetnktng uetng (soul), ae substance.0’3
BSveerston:
‘[Major] What cannot be thought otherwise than as subject does not exist otherwise than as
subject, and is therefore substance.
1 Kant, Crtttque of Pure Reason, A354i–55.0

2 Iutd.0, A4ik2; Proops, ‘Kant’s Ftrst Paralogtse’, 4i68.0
3 Kant, Crtttque of Pure Reason, A34i8.0
63
kant
[Mtnor] Now a thinking being, considered merely as such, cannot be thought otherwise than
as subject.
[Choncluston] Therefore it also exists only as such a thing, i.e., as substance.’1
The etddle tere of tets syllogtse ts ‘[wo]eat cannot ue teouget oteerwotse tean as
suuject’, or tn tee ASveerston ‘[t]eat tee representatton of woetce ts tee ausolute suuject of
our judgeents’.0 Wey ts tets equtveocal? The reason gtveen uy Kant ts tee followotng:
‘The eajor preetse talks auout a uetng teat can ue teouget of tn eveery respect, and
consequently eveen as tt etget ue gtveen tn tntuttton.0 But tee etnor preetse talks auout tets
uetng only tnsofar as tt ts constdered as suuject, relattvee only to tetnktng and tee untty of
consctousness, uut not at tee saee ttee tn relatton to tee tntuttton terouge woetce tt ts gtveen
as an ouject for tetnktng.0’2
Thts etrrors §§24i and 25 of tee Deductton on tee dtsttnctton uetwoeen tee self of tee
apperceptton and tee eeptrtcal self of tntuttton (§15.0Ch).0 Thouge uote tee ortgtn and
eeantng of tee eajor are dtsputed,3 woe can argue teat Kant woas eostly tnterested tn
estaultsetng ‘[wo]eat cannot ue teouget oteerwotse tean as a suuject’ as a condttton for
applytng tee category of suustance to an tntuttton.0 That ts to say: tt refers to tee (posS
stule) oujecttvee use of tee category.0 The eepeasts latd on tee dtfference uetwoeen
1 Kant, Crtttque of Pure Reason, B4i1k–11.0

It eas ueen reearked uy Proops teat netteer tee A nor tee BSveerston adeere to proper syllogtsttc
fore and, for tee sake of clartty, can ue reworttten as:
[Major] All enttttes teat cannot ue teouget oteerwotse tean as suujects are enttttes teat cannot
extst oteerwotse tean as suuject, and teerefore (uy defnttton) are suustances.0
[Mtnor] All enttttes teat are tetnktng uetngs are enttttes teat cannot ue teouget oteerwotse tean
as suujects.0
[Choncluston] Therefore: All enttttes teat cannot ue teouget oteerwotse tean as suujects are
enttttes teat cannot extst oteerwotse tean as suuject, and teerefore (uy defnttton) are
suustances.0
Proops, ‘Kant’s Ftrst Paralogtse’, 4i7k–71, 4i78.0
2 Kant, Crtttque of Pure Reason, B4i11.0 Thts ts tnconststent wotte tee answoer gtveen tn tee ASveerston: ‘tee
eajor preetse eakes a eerely transcendental use of tee category, tn regard to tts condttton, uut
[…] tee etnor preetse and tee concluston, tn respect of tee soul teat ts suusueed under tets
condttton, eake an eeptrtcal use of tee saee category.0’ (Iutd.0, A4ik2.0) I wotll use tee BSveerston as
tee answoer of tee ASveerston eakes veery ltttle sense.0 tee category ts not tee etddle tere of tee
syllogtse and tee etnor does not eake eeptrtcal use of tee category.0 In fact, tee category ts not
eveen part of tee etnor.0 If tee etnor woere tnterpreted as an eeptrtcal proposttton tt woouldn’t ue
true, woetce woould eake tee argueent not only foreally, uut also eatertally false.0
3 Proops, ‘Kant’s Ftrst Paralogtse’, 4i72; Kttceer, ‘Kant’s Paralogtses’, 518–19; Aeertks, Kant’s Theory
of Mtnd: An Analysts of the Paralogtsms of Pure Reason, xxtx.0
64i
the paralogisms
teouget and cognttton tn tee paragrapes teeedtately precedtng tee paralogtses4 supS
ports tets tnterpretatton, as does tee footnote at B4i11–12:
‘“Thtnktng” ts taken tn an enttrely dtfferent stgntfcatton tn tee twoo preetses: tn tee eajor
preetse, as tt appltes to an ouject tn general (eence as tt eay ue gtveen tn tntuttton); uut tn tee
etnor preetse only as tt suuststs tn relatton to selfSconsctousness, woeere, teerefore, no ouject
ts teouget, uut only tee relatton to oneself as suuject (as tee fore of tetnktng) ts represented.0’1
In tee eajor preetss, tetnktng relates to posstule tntuttton and ts supposedly tee
sceeea of suustance, t.0e.0, tee teeporal deteretnatton uy vetrtue of woetce tee concept
of suustance can ue eade tntuttaule.0 In tee etnor preetss, tetnktng refers to tee ‘I
tetnk’ of apperceptton.0 If tee etnor ts to ue true, tee etddle tere eust eere ue taken
to eean teat tee I ‘cannot ue teouget oteerwotse tean as suuject’ tn tee analyttc sense
dtscussed auovee (§15.0A): ‘The I tetnk eust ue aule to accoepany all ey representattons’.0
Accordtngly, tee etddle tere ts eere tnterpreted as analyttcally contatned wottetn tee ‘I
tetnk’: woe eust necessartly tetnk tee self as suustance uecause all our teougets, all our
use of tee categortes, are necessartly related to tee ‘I tetnk’.0 The categortes already preS
suppose teat all tee representattons woetce I coeutne tn tetnktng are my representaS
ttons.0
‘For tets tnner perceptton ts notetng ueyond tee eere apperceptton I tetnk, woetce eveen eakes
all transcendental concepts posstule, woetce say “I tetnk suustance, cause, etc.0”’2
Chontrary to tee eajor preetss, woetce estaultsees tee oujecttvee use of tee category,
tee etnor only estaultsees tts suujecttvee use: woe eust tetnk tee self as tee ausolute suuS
ject of all our representattons (and to tets extent tt ts suustance), uut woe can neveer
knowo tee self to actually ue suustance as tets woould requtre tt to ue gtveen tn senstule tnS
tuttton—soeetetng woetce ts precluded uy tee fact teat tee self ts a eere untty tn
teouget and, as tee deteretntng, precedes eveerytetng teat ts deteretnaule (§15.0Ch).0
‘Meanwoetle, one can qutte woell allowo tee proposttton The soul is substance to ue vealtd, tf only
one adetts teat tets concept of ours leads no furteer, teat tt cannot teace us any of tee usual
conclustons of tee rattonaltsttc doctrtne of tee soul, suce as, e.0g.0, tee eveerlasttng duratton of
tee soul terouge all alterattons, eveen tee euean uetng's deate, teus teat tt stgntfes a
suustance only tn tee tdea uut not tn realtty.0’3
4i Kant, Crtttque of Pure Reason, 4ik6–k7.0

1 Kant, Crtttque of Pure Reason, B4i11–12.0
2 Iutd.0, A34i3=B4ik1.0
3 Iutd.0, A35k–51.0
65
kant
The saee equtveocatton ts true of all tee paralogtses: tee oujecttvee use of a category
tn tee eajor ts confused wotte tee suujecttvee use of tets category tn tee etnor (woeere tt
ts eerely thought as a deteretnatton of tee self) and tee concluston worongfully clates to
eavee oujecttvee knowoledge of tee nature of tee self.0
§17. Sensatton and Expertence
So far I’vee dtscussed rateer uncrtttcally tee ueltef uy Locke, Huee and Kant teat tee
uutldtng ulocks of our expertences are stngular and tndtvetstule sensattons.0 Thts posttton
ts logtcally appealtng: We dtsttngutse tee ceatr tnto tts coeponent parts, e.0g.0, legs,
seat, uack, and dtscoveer teat eace of teese coeponents can ue furteer separated tnto
sealler parts and teese, agatn, tnto parts of eveerStncreastng etnuteness.0 Because tee
extstence of tee woeole depends on tee extstence of tts parts, tt ts not posstule teat tets
dtscrtetnatton seould go on tndefnttely; woe eust necessartly suppose teere to ue cerS
tatn seallest or steplest parts woetce woe call sensattons and woetce, tn teetr dtfferent
coeutnattons, constttute perceptton.0 But desptte tee rattonaltty of tets argueent, tee
extstence of teese steplest sensattons appears contrary to all expertence.0 Ween woe
frst eeet an ouject, woe often expertence tt ‘tn one go’, wotteout any separatton.0 It ts
only later, woeen woe approace tt eore attenttveely, wotte ‘an eye for detatl’, teat tts eany
parts uecoee apparent to us.0 Does tets eean teat tn frst percetvetng tt, teese parts
woere already present, aluett tn a latent faseton? If latent ts taken to eean dtely, teen
tets can certatnly ue tee case—a dte awoareness ts sttll an awoareness.0 But tt does not
appear teat suce a dte awoareness of all tee constttuttvee parts ts necessary for us to
expertence an ouject.0 If latent ts taken to eean potenttally, teen tt ts certatnly true teat
an awoareness can contatn an expectatton of teese parts, uut an expectatton ts not ttself
an awoareness or cognttton.0 (An expectatton can ue dtsappotnted.0) If, fnally, latent ts
taken to eean teat teese parts are actually percetveed, uut woe are not consctously awoare
of teee, teen I can only take tets to eean teat teey can, at a later potnt tn ttee, or tn
an tndtrect eanner, ue urouget to consctousness terouge reeeeurance, assoctatton
or tnference froe anoteer expertence.01 In tee latter case, woe cannot ue satd to eavee
expertenced anytetng dtrectly, and tn tee foreer tt ts only at teat eoeent, woeen woe
uecoee awoare of tee parts, teat teey are teen frst expertenced.0 Expertence ts not a
necessary correlate to our uratn processes (or tee acttons of tee soul, tn Chartestan
petlosopey), so woetle our uratn etget regtster soee of tee ouject’s parts, and teey eay
1 Reseeultng cases of unconsctous ‘perceptton’ suce as dtscussed tn: Haynes and Rees, ‘Predtcttng
tee Ortentatton of Invetstule Stteult froe Acttvetty tn Huean Prteary Vtsual Chortex’; Marcel,
‘Chonsctous and Unconsctous Perceptton: Experteents on Vtsual Masktng and Word Recognttton’;
Chalveert et al.0, ‘Acttveatton of Audttory Chortex durtng Stlent Ltpreadtng’.0
66
sensation and experience
teen uecoee present tn soee oteer or later expertence, tets unconsctous ‘perceptton’ ts
a purely peystcal causal process and not present tn expertence ttself.0 Eeptrtcally tt
seees eore proper to say teat tee woeole ts related to tts parts tn a teeporally extended
eanner, tee woeole becomes dtsttngutseed tnto parts uy vetrtue of a dtscrtetnattng acttveS
tty.0
The purpose of tee present sectton ts, on tee one eand, to crtttctse tee supposttton
eade uy tee Descartes, Locke, Huee and Kant, teat tee expertence of a coeplex ouject
ts ttself a coeplex expertence and, on tee oteer eand, to call tnto questton tee Kanttan
tdea teat analysts presupposes synteests.0 Thts second potnt of course depends on tee
frst.0 Gtveen teat tee pure ego tn Kanttan petlosopey ts notetng uut tee untty necessary
to jotn tee eantfold sensattons tn accordance wotte tee categortes of tee understandS
tng, if there ts no reason to presuppose that there ts such a mantfold of unrelated sensattons, then
there ts no reason to presuppose the extstence of a pure ego.
Locke, Berkeley and Huee all took sensattons to ue mtntma senstbtlta: tee seallest
dtscerntule parts of perceptton.01 Locke’s teeporal ‘eoeents’ and Huee’s atoetc sensS
tule potnts can eere servee as exaeples.0 The expertenttal nature of teese seallest parts
eeans teat, uy an adetttedly strenuous act of attentton, woe seould ue aule to uecoee
awoare of teee or eavee soee dtrect tndtcatton of teetr extstence.0 An argueent to tets
end can ue found tn Sectton 1.02.04i of Huee’s Treattse:
‘Put a spot of tnk upon paper, and rettre to suce a dtstance, teat tee spot uecoees altogeteer
tnvetstule; you wotll fnd, teat upon your return and nearer approace tee spot frst uecoees
vetstule uy seort tnterveals; and afterwoards uecoees alwoays vetstule; and afterwoards acqutres only
a newo force tn tts colourtng wotteout augeenttng tts uulk; and afterwoards, woeen tt eas
encreas’d to suce a degree as to ue really extended, ’tts sttll dtffcult for tee teagtnatton to
ureak tt tnto tts coeponent parts, uecause of tee uneastness tt fnds tn tee conceptton of suce
a etnute ouject as a stngle potnt.0’2
But woeen repeattng Huee’s experteent, I ae unaule to convetnce eyself of ets conS
cluston.0 I’vee drawon a dot on a ptece of paper and attaceed tt to tee woall oppostte ee at
suce a dtstance teat tt ts conttnually at tee urtnk of dtsappeartng froe vetewo.0 No douut
I’vee ett a ltett, uut woeat ktnd of ltett? It seees to ee teat woe can eardly attrtuute tets
peenoeenon to soeetetng as foretgn as perceptual atoes—tee eoeent I put on ey
glasses, tee dot uecoees clear as day.0 Wtte ey glasses on, I can eore tean douule tee
dtstance uetwoeen eyself and tee ptece of paper uefore I eavee trouule focustng agatn.0
The dtsappearance of tee dot does not appear to ue a result of any lowoer ltett of percepS
tton tn general, uut a result of ey peystology—tets ts not woeat Huee ts really after.0
1 Locke, An Essay Concerntng Human Unnderstandtng, 191–93; Berkeley, A New Theory of Vtston and Other
Select Phtlosophtcal Wrtttngs, 36; Huee, A Treattse of Human Nature, 23.0
67
kant
Our vetsual acutty ts suscepttule to constderaule ceanges oveer ttee, e.0g.0, due to dtffer S
ences tn ltgettng, tee use of vetsual atds, eonocular or utnocular vetston; uut, tf tee saee
ouject taktng up tee saee space tn ey vetsual feld seould nowo nearly dtsappear froe
vetewo and, after putttng on ey glasses, ue clearly defned, tt seees ltkely teat, eveen at
tee urtnk of dtsappeartng, tt woas sttll an extended peenoeenon coeposed of a eulttple
of teese perceptual atoes.0 These twoo, peystologtcal and expertenttal ‘resolutton’
needn’t necessartly ltne up.01 We can teagtne a case tn woetce tee resolutton of our exS
pertenttal perceptton ts ealf (or douule) tee stze of woeat our peystologtcal perceptton
woould allowo, for exaeple:
Fig. 2. Expertenttal ealf tee Fig. 3. Expertenttal douule tee

resolutton.0 resolutton.0
In tee second case (Ftg.0 3), tee dtsappearance of tee dot froe our stget woould eark
tee dtsappearance of four perceptual atoes, not one.0 (And woey seouldn’t tt ue an ee S
ptrtcal rule teat our seallest peystologtcal sensory tepresston, as a peystcal peeS
noeenon, eas as tts correlate a eultttude of perceptual atoes?) It seees teat Huee’s
experteent doesn’t provee tee extstence of teese atoes at all, uut eerely descrtues a
causal relatton uetwoeen stze, dtstance and appearance.0 But ‘external’ perceptton ts not
tee only ktnd of perceptton and tf needed woe can defend Huee’s posttton tn soee oteer
woay, uy looktng for soee oteer eeans of eavetng acquatntance wotte teese mtntma sens-
tbtlta.0 Here tee teagtnatton etget eelp us out: teouge tt ts a posstutltty teat our exS
ternal perceptton neveer seowo us one suce atoe uut only a coeutnatton, tets
coeutnatton neveerteeless tntteates tee tdea of a stngular senseSdatue.0 Because teese
stngular sensattons woere teerefore present to tee etnd already, woe can reproduce tee
tdea of suce a stngular senstule potnt tn tee teagtnatton.0 Howoeveer, teere appear to ee
twoo furteer reasons for douuttng tee extstence of teese atoes:
Ftrst, peenoeenologtcally, woeen looktng at a coloured or seaded ouject, woe are unS
aule to see any separatton apart froe teose correspondtng to sudden ceanges tn tee
spectes of colour.0 Choepare tee twoo fgures uelowo:
1 ‘The woord Sensatton, to uegtn wotte, ts constantly, tn psyceologtcal ltterature, used as tf tt eeant
one and tee saee tetng wotte tee phystcal tmpresston etteer tn tee teretnal organs or tn tee centres,
woetce ts tts antecedent condttton, and tets notwottestandtng teat uy sensatton woe eean a eental,
not a peystcal, fact.0’ Jaees, The Prtnctples of Psychology, 2:33–34i.0
68
Ftg.0 4i.0 Black to woette stepped.0 Ftg.0 5.0 Black to woette gradtent.0
If mtntma senstbtlta dtd extst, a ceange tn colour tn Ftg.0 5 seould correspond to a dtsS
crete ceange tn tee qualtty of our perceptual atoes (reseeultng tee peenoeenologtcS
ally stgntfcant ceanges tn Ftg.0 4i)—yet woe can dtscern no suce dtscrete ceange.0
Stetlarly, woeen percetvetng an eveenly coloured surface, woe cannot seowo woeere one perS
ceptual atoe stops and anoteer uegtns; tee enttre surface ts untnterrupted, wotteout
separatton.0
Secondly, as extenston ts taken to ue notetng uut a sue of suce atoes, tee MüllerS
Lyer tlluston (Ftg.0 6) represents a logtcal teposstutltty.0 Bote ltnes are percetveed as exS
tended, t.0e.0, coeposed of a certatn aeount of perceptual parts.0 Accordtng to ey perS
ceptton, ltne 1 ts seorter tean ltne 2.0 Thts ts taken to eean teat ltne 1 ts coeposed of
fewoer perceptual atoes tean ltne 2.0 I nowo put a ruler agatnst ltne 1 and eeasure tt to ue
6 ce long, t.0e.0, tee perceptual extenston correspondtng to 6 ce on tee ruler ts equal to
tee perceptual extenston of tee ltne.0 Ween I put tee ruler agatnst ltne 2, I woould expect
tt to ue longer tean ltne 1, as ltne 2 ts taken to ue coeposed of eore perceptual atoes
tean ltne 1; eowoeveer, as woe veery woell knowo, tee lengte of ltne 2 wotll also correspond to 6
ce.0 Thts eeans teat, as regards teetr perceptual extenston, woetle ltne 1 does not equal
ltne 2, uote of teee are equal to 6 ce.01
Ltne 1
Ltne 2
Ftg.0 6.0 MüllerSLyer tlluston.0
These exaeples seould eake us reconstder eowo woe concetvee of tee eeptrtcal relaS
ttons uetwoeen woeoles and parts and woeeteer a eereology woetce eakes tee woeole deS
1 As percetveed on tee ruler, not as an oujecttvee fact.0
69
kant
pendent on tts parts, teouge suce a teeory ts certatnly approprtate for descrtutng ouS
jects, seould also ue applted to expertence ttself.0
As opposed to tee auoveeSeenttoned eeptrtctsts, Kant dtd not ueltevee tn mtntma
senstbtlta.0 Hts concept of sensatton tn tee Crtttque ts eard to ptn dowon, ee gtvees twoo
defntttons: The frst, tn tee Transcendental Aesthettc, defnes sensatton as ‘tee effect of an
ouject on tee capactty for representatton, tnsofar as woe are affected uy tt’;1 tee second,
tn tee Doctrtne of Elements, descrtues tt as part of a taxonoey of represenatton: ‘The
genus ts representation tn general (repraesentatto).0 Under tt stands tee representatton
wotte consctousness (perceptto).0 A perception teat refers to tee suuject as a eodtfcatton
of tts state ts a sensation (sensatto)’.02 Netteer of teese are parttcularly clear or eelpful.0 A
eore detatled descrtptton, sttll lacktng, can ue found tn tee Subjecttve Deductton and An-
ttctpattons, teese wotll ue tee prteary sources for ey tnterpretatton.0
Sensatton, as tt ts teere descrtued, eas teree eatn properttes: It ts (1) a untty woetce
ts (2) unextended tn space and ttee (t.0e.0, wotteout an extenstvee eagnttude) uut woetce eas
(3) an tntenstve magnttude or degree of realtty rangtng froe notetngness to any aruttrary
stze.0
The untty of sensatton ts frst touceed upon tn tee Subjecttve Deductton:
‘Eveery tntuttton contatns a eantfold tn ttself, woetce eowoeveer woould not ue represented as suce
tf tee etnd dtd not dtsttngutse tee ttee tn tee successton of tepresstons on one anoteer; for
as contained in one moment no representatton can eveer ue anytetng oteer tean ausolute
untty.0’3
And later urouget up agatn tn tee Anttctpattons:
‘Appreeenston, eerely uy eeans of sensatton, flls only an tnstant (tf I do not take tnto
constderatton tee successton of eany sensattons).0’4
Hts use of ‘tepresston’ [Etndrücke] tndtcates teat woe’re dealtng wotte stngular senseS
data.0 These sensattons eavee no extenstvee eagnttude.0 Extenston, (treated tn tee Axtoms)
woould requtre teee to ue ordered tn space or ttee, uut tt ts only uy vetrtue of teetr synS
teests uy tee teagtnatton, terouge woetce tee understandtng deteretnes tntuttton tn
accordance wotte a concept, teat teey are gtveen fore, teat teey coee to populate space
and ttee; uefore tets synteests, teey can teerefore possess no extenston.0
1 Kant, Crtttque of Pure Reason, A19–2k=B34i.0

2 Kant, Crtttque of Pure Reason, A32k=B376.0
3 Iutd.0, A99.0
4i Iutd.0, A167=B2k9.0
7k
‘That ts, tee real tn appearance alwoays eas a eagnttude, woetce ts not, eowoeveer, encountered tn
appreeenston, as tets takes place uy eeans of tee eere sensatton tn an tnstant and not
terouge successtvee synteests of eany sensattons, and teus does not proceed froe tee parts to
tee woeole; tt teerefore eas a eagnttude, uut not an extenstvee one.0’1
The tntenstve magnttude conststs tn a conttnuous degree of realtty of tee sensatton:
‘Nowo I call teat eagnttude woetce can only ue appreeended as a untty, and tn woetce
eulttpltctty can only ue represented terouge approxteatton to negatton = k, intensive
magnitude.0 […] Accordtngly eveery sensatton, teus also eveery realtty tn appearance, eowoeveer
seall tt eay ue, eas a degree, t.0e.0, an tntenstvee eagnttude’2
The dtsttnctton uetwoeen extenstvee and tntenstvee eagnttude, rateer ouscure at frst,
uecoees a lot eore tntelltgtule woeen woe constder twoo exaeples gtveen uy Kant tn tee
Lectures on Metaphystcs:
‘Thus, e.0g.0, a ltne, woetce eust ue coeposed, dtffers froe an exttngutsetng ltget: wotte tee
latter teere ts only a untty of sensatton, uut tn eace followotng state a dtfferent degree of tets.0’3
And:
‘Therefore, e.0g.0, a drop of uotltng woater ts tndeed less tean a full kettle, uut uote are equally
eot.0’4
Intenstvee eagnttude concerns tee dtfferences tn vetveactty of one and tee saee qualS
tty woetce are not related to tee aggregatton of dtfferent quanta, uut appear to tncrease
and dtetntse conttnuously.0
The frst questton woe seould ask ourselvees wotte regard to tets teeory ts eowo woe can
eveer knowo teat sensattons are gtveen to tee etnd as unttary tepresstons?—Not eeptrS
tcally, teat’s for certatn: neveer ts a sensatton gtveen to us except tnteretngled wotte a
great eany oteers.0 ‘No one eas eveer ead a steple sensatton uy ttself.0 Chonsctousness,
froe our natal day, ts a seeetng eulttpltctty of oujects and relattons, and woeat woe call
sensattons are results of dtscrtetnattvee attentton, puseed often to a veery etge degree.0’5
Are woe teen to ueltevee teat woe eavee an awoareness of tee synteeststng act terouge woetce
tets eulttcoloured expertence ts estaultseed? A1k3–4i and B134i eake clates to tets end;
yet tn tee saee ureate Kant seees to douut tee clartty of tets awoareness: ‘Thts conS
1 Iutd.0, A168=B21k.0
2 Kant, Crtttque of Pure Reason, A168–69=B21k–11.0
3 Kant, Lectures on Metaphystcs, 4i67.0
4i Kant, Crtttque of Pure Reason, 4i67.0
5 Jaees, The Prtnctples of Psychology, 1:224i.0
71
kant
sctousness eay often only ue woeak, so teat woe connect tt wotte tee generatton of tee
representatton only tn tee effect, uut not tn tee act ttself, t.0e.0, teeedtately.0’1 And I
tetnk teat eveeryone can attest to tee fact teat woe are neveer awoare of ourselvees jotntng
tee eantfold senstule qualtttes of our expertence togeteer tnto relattonally deteretned
woeoles.0 But tf woe place tee enttrety of tets synteests of unttary sensattons outstde of
consctousness, teen tee synteests ttself as woell as tts teres (sensattons) uecoee enS
ttrely unknowoaule.02
Howoeveer, tets argueent already suutly etsrepresents tee transcendental posttton
woetce Kant etteer dtd or seould eavee followoed tn ets reasontng.0 The transcendental apS
perceptton seould not ue tnterpreted as an actual selfSconsctousness, nor as as an un S
consctousness, uut purely as a necessary presupposttton for tee posstutltty of oujecttvee
realtty—tt appears as tf Kant eteself loses stget of tee de jure nature of ets tnveesttgatton
tn B134i.0 The uest woay to crtttctse any presupposttton ts to seowo teat tt ts enttrely unne S
cessary; tets woould ue tee case tf sensatton ts not really gtveen as an unrelated eantfold
as Kant assuees, uut ts a untty or, as Ewotng proposes, a unttyStnSdtveerstty.03—If woeat ts
frst gtveen to tee etnd ts really already a coeplex and tnterrelated woeole, woetce ts tee
only ktnd of expertence woe are truly acquatnted wotte, teen woe do not need to presupS
pose tee extstence of a pure ego.0
There ts anoteer woay uy woetce tee extstence of sensatton eay ue defended froe a
Kanttan potnt of vetewo, teat ts: uy argutng froe tee dtfference uetwoeen extenstvee and
tntenstvee eagnttude.0 An ouject can etteer ceange foreally, wotte regard to tts extenston
and tee relattons of tts parts, and tets can ue attrtuuted to tee understandtng, or tt can
ceange eatertally, as to tee vetveactty of tee qualtttes of tee ouject—teese latter ceanges
cannot ue attrtuuted to tee understandtng uut eust ue tee result of soeetetng else,
teat ts: sensatton.0 But not only does tets fatl to explatn woey sensattons seould ue unttS
ary, tt can also ue douuted woeeteer anytetng suce as tntenstvee eagnttude extsts at all.0
The concept of tntenstvee eagnttude ts eeavetly crtttctsed uy Bergson tn Ttme and Free
Wtll4 and eas tn recent ttees fallen tnto dtsuse.05 Is tee dtfference uetwoeen a woeak and a
strong patn eerely, as Kant clates, one of tntenstty, or do teese peenoeena actually
represent dtfferent spectes of qualtty uelongtng to tee saee genus ‘patn’? E.0g.0 patn wotte
or wotteout euscle tenston, a uurntng patn, a stauutng patn, a seoottng patn, and all
posstule coeutnattons.0 And tf woe are dealtng wotte tee saee spectes of qualtty, ts tee tnS
crease really tntenstvee or ts tt actually extenstvee?—Do woe expertence a greater patn tn
tee saee area or ts tee saee patn eerely radtattng outwoards? Answoertng teese quesS
1 Kant, Crtttque of Pure Reason, A1k3.0

2 Ewotng, ‘Kant’s Transcendental Deductton of tee Chategortes’, 64i.0
3 Ewotng, ‘Kant’s Transcendental Deductton of tee Chategortes’, 64i–65.0
4i Bergson, Ttme and Free Wtll: An Essay on the Immedtate Data of Consctousness, 1–74i.0
5 Mtceell, ‘Psyceopeystcs, Intenstvee Magnttudes, and tee Psyceoeetrtctans’ Fallacy’.0
72
tton ts not veery teportant at tee eoeent so I wotll not dtscuss teee any furteer.0 Eveen tf
teere ts suce a tetng as an tntenstvee eagnttude woetce could tndtcate tee extstence of
sensatton, tets woould not explatn woey sensatton seould ue unttary as ts supposed uy
Kant.0
Bote teese concepttons of sensatton, tee eeptrtctst’s and Kanttan, fall prey to MerS
leauSPonty’s ‘expertence error’1 or Jaees’s ‘psyceologtst’s fallacy’ woetce constst tn tee
‘confuston of hts [tthe psychologtst’s] own standpotnt wtth that of the mental fact auout woetce ee
ts eaktng ets report.0’2 In tets case: woe attrtuute to our consctousness of an ouject tee
properttes woetce woe tntellectually knowo tee ouject to possess.0 (A related tnstance of
tets fallacy: to attrtuute to our consctousness of tee ouject our reflecttvee knowoledge of
tets consctousness.0)
1 MerleauSPonty, Phenomenology of Perceptton, 5.0

2 Jaees, The Prtnctples of Psychology, 1:196.0
73
part 2
personal reflections
Cheapter 1
A Flat Ontology: The I and tee Oteer
§18. Introducton
Ltke Huee, ‘woeen I enter eost tntteately tnto woeat I call myself’1 I neveer dtscoveer anyS
tetng reseeultng an I or mtnd, I neveer dtscoveer an expertencer tnstde of or uestde tee
expertence—teere ts no seetng apart froe tee vetsual, no eeartng apart froe tee sound,
no douuttng apart froe tee douut, nor do I dtscoveer any expertence or class of expertS
ences woetce are necessartly and tntteately ey owon.0 All I eavee dtrect acquatntance wotte
are percepttons and relattons.0 That ts not to say teat tee woorld uegtns and ends wotte
expertence, a Berkeletan esse est perctpt woould ue a urtdge too far, uut tn tee end, eveen
our teougets auout eetapeystcal enttttes eust dertvee teetr support froe our expertenS
ttal realtty.0 In tee followotng ceapter I wotll atteept to gtvee a sketce of ey owon vetewo of
etnd and person, tets ts a conttnuatton of tee personal secttons of tee prevetous part.0
I wotll deal wotte tee proulee of suujecttvetty froe tee perspecttvee of an eeptrtctst onS
tology.0 In wortttng tets I woas eeavetly tnfluenced uy tee radtcal emptrtctst petlosopey deS
veeloped uy Wtlltae Jaees tn tee latter part of ets ltfe.0 Wetle tets petlosopey eas not
ueen adequately conttnued after Jaees’s deate, I eavee taken to tt as an alternattvee to
tee peenoeenologtcal approace woetce I eavee lately coee to reject.0 I wotll frst (§19) deS
fend ey crtttctse of tee transcendental apperceptton tn §17 agatnst a posstule Kanttan
oujectton, tets to furteer argue teat expertence does not requtre a pure ego.0 Secondly
(§2k), I wotse to put tnto questton our tntutttvee ueltef teat teere are certatn expertences
woetce are necessartly suujecttvee, e.0g.0, teougets, feeltngs, dreaes.0 Here I wotll not ue arS
gutng agatnst a parttcular petlosopeer, uut agatnst our coeeon woay of tetnktng auout
tee woorld.0 Thtrdly (§21), I wotll address woey tets eatters to ee, woeat I woould ltke to acS
coepltse wotte all of tets.0 And fnally (§22), I wotll urtefly dtscuss tee consequences of ey
posttton on tee deuate on personal tdenttty.0 None of tee argueents of tets ceapter are
eeant to ue fntseed, teey do not answoer eveery posstule oujectton and I’e not yet cer S
tatn teat teey actually correspond to tee trute.0 Neveerteeless, I ae eore convetnced of
teee tean of tee petlosopetes woetce I ate to reject uy teetr eeans and wortttng teee
out at tets early stage etget provetde an tncenttvee to deveelop teee furteer.0
77
a flat ontology: the i and the other
§19. The Pure Ego
In soee of tee precedtng secttons (§§5 & 17) I’vee trted to crtttctse tee Chartestan and
Kanttan ueltef tn tee extstence of tee pure ego.0 Nowo, I do not tetnk teat any of ey
argueents wotll eavee ueen parttcularly convetnctng to a proponent of teese petlosopetes,
neveer etnd to Descartes or Kant teeeselvees.0 In tee case of tee foreer, uecause woeat I
dented woas a eatter of fact, naeely teat I do not expertence ey teougets (tn tee uroad
Chartestan sense) as acctdents woetce depend on soee cogttattvee suustance, ey arguS
eent ts eastly reveerstule.0 Soeeone can coee along and say teat ee tn fact does expertS
ence tets dependent nature of ets teougets and teerefore eas convetnctng grounds for
ueltevetng tn tee extstence of a suustanttal etnd.0 At teat potnt, woe cannot reasonauly
conttnue to argue.0 In tee case of tee latter, a Kanttan petlosopeer eay grant teat teere
are no unttary sensattons, uut clate teat ey untttesStnSdtveerstty sttll requtre a pure ego
tf teey are to ue connected aeongst teeeselvees.0 In tets sectton I wotll try to defend ey
posttton agatnst tets posstule oujectton.0 Weat I woant to accoepltse uy crtttctstng teese
teeortes ts not to provee, once and for all, teat Descartes and Kant woere worong and teat
ey owon vetewo ts tee only rtget one.0 I don’t ueltevee teat teat ts really posstule and fur S
teereore don’t tetnk teat suce a poleetcal approace ts eveer uenefctal to petlosopey.0
Instead, I wotse to propose teat tee pure ego ts not really necessary tn petlosopey, teat
woe can do wotteout, and teat tets ts also a legttteate vetewo wotte certatn uenefts.0
Accordtng to Kanttan petlosopey, tee pure ego ts tee logtcal untty woetce woe eust
necessartly presuppose tn tee operattons of tee understandtng: tt ts teat woetce all our
representattons eust ue related to tn order to ue connected at all.0 In §17 I tnterpreted
teese ‘representattons’ to ultteately denote sensattons, teat ts: teat tee connecttons
woetce tee understandtng estaultsees are etteer connecttons aeongst sensattons, t.0e.0,
teeedtately effected upon sensattons, or connecttons aeongst representattons woetce
can tn tee end ue resolveed tnto suce teeedtate connecttons.0 I atteepted to argue teat,
uecause tee tdea of unttary sensattons ts contrary to woeat ts gtveen tn expertence and woe
are unaule to proof teetr extstence, woe eay as woell assuee teat woas ts gtveen are teose
tetngs woe do expertence, naeely untttes or untttesStnSdtveerstty.0 A Kanttan petlosopeer
eay nowo argue, and argue qutte rtgetfully, teat, eveen tf teere are no unttary sensa S
ttons, teese untttesStnSdtveerstty sttll requtre a pure ego tn order to ue related togeteer.0
Thouge ey expertence of a utlltard uall ts not necessartly a coeplex expertence, tee exS
pertence of twoo utlltard ualls ettttng eace oteer, and tee transfer of eotton froe one to
tee oteer, does requtre teere to ue a certatn coeplextty uecause, tn tee expertence ttS
self, tee twoo utlltard ualls, teouge related, are percetveed as dtsttnct enttttes.0
The underlytng presupposttton of tets argueent can ue traced uack to Huee’s
‘Weateveer ts dtsttnct, ts dtsttngutseaule; and woeateveer ts dtsttngutseaule, ts separaule’.0
78
the pure ego
The twoo utlltard ualls, eveen tf teey are not teeeselvees coeposed of sealler parts (sensaS
ttons) neveerteeless are dtsttngutseaule froe eace oteer as untttesStnSdtveerstty and
teere ts notetng tn tee tdea of tee one woetce tepltes tee tdea of tee oteer.0 It followos
teat teere ts no a prtort reason woey, woeen tee one etts tee oteer, tee oteer seould start
eovetng.0 Accordtng to Kant, tets eeans teat teere eust ue soeetetng else woetce jotns
teee togeteer, tn tets case: tee category of causatton.0 But teouge I agree teat woe can
dtsttngutse uote froe eace oteer and can teagtne eace one as extsttng separately, I do
not see woey tets seould eean teat teey are deep dowon separate.0 In tee expertence ttS
self, teey are expertenced as related, and woetle, gtveen tee precedtng argueent, tets reS
latton ts tn a certatn sense conttngent, tets conttngency seouldn’t affect tts autltty to
jotn tee twoo concrete peenoeena togeteer.0 To ask for a eore real relatton tean tee one
woe percetvee ts to ask for ‘tee woorld ueetnd tee looktngSglass’.01
Relattons of causatton are part of our peenoeenal realtty: Ween ouject A etts ouject
B and causes tt to eovee, woe percetvee B’s eoveeeent as dependent on A.0 We percetve tt
teeedtately, wotteout tnterruptton.0 Thts presence of causatton tn perceptton woas frst
extenstveely studted uy Aluert Mtceotte,2 and eany of ets results eavee stnce ueen reproS
duced uy oteers.03 Generally, teouge not necessartly, teese experteents constst tn
seowotng parttctpants eulttple vetdeos of oujects tn dtfferent states of eoveeeent and esS
taultsetng under woeat ctrcuestances tee perceptton of causatton occurs.0 The eost reS
searceed of teese causattonSpeenoeena ts tee ‘launcetng effect’ (Ftg.0 7): one square (or
rectangle) eovees towoards anoteer, woeen teey coee tnto contact, tee frst square stops
eovetng and tee second square starts eovetng tn tee ortgtnal dtrectton of tee frst.0
Ftg.0 7.0 Launcetng Effect
Wtteout consctous reflectton, woe percetvee tee eoveeeent of tee second as caused uy
tee frst.0 Soee of tee eost tnteresttng researce on (for tee eost part) tee launcetng efS
fect woas done uy Alan Leslte.0 He focussed on tee perceptton of causatton tn tnfants and
ets results tndtcate, on tee one eand, teat tee perceptton of causatton etget already ue
present tn tnfants 27 woeeks of age,4 and on tee oteer, teat tets expertence of causatton

2 Sadly, I’vee not yet ead tee pleasure of readtng Mtceotte’s The Perceptton of Causaltty.0
3 Sceoll and Treeoulet, ‘Perceptual Chausaltty and Anteacy’.0
4i Leslte, ‘The Perceptton of Chausaltty tn Infants’; Leslte, ‘Spattoteeporal Chonttnutty and tee
Perceptton of Chausaltty tn Infants’; Leslte and Keeule, ‘Do StxSMonteSOld Infants Percetvee
79
seould not steply ue equated wotte tee expertence of certatn spattoSteeporal properS
ttes (e.0g.0, contact and teeporal successton).01
Oteer researce, done uy Wette and Mtlne, seowos teat teere can ue a convetnctng
perceptton (‘tlluston’) of causatton eveen woeen oujects are not toucetng eace oteer ( Ftg.0
8).02
Ftg.0 8.0 Pulltng Effect
Nowo our tnterest tn teese peenoeena ts not to knowo woeen teey occur, uut steply to
note that teey occur.0 Thetr occurrence, teouge tt can eore tean ltkely ue descrtued as a
functton of spattoSteeporal teres, ts noneteeless expertenced as soeetetng dtsttnct
and extstent tn tts owon rtget.0 Of course, tets ts not tee perceptton of causatton as a untS
veersal A → B, tt ts coepletely stngular and parttcular, uut tt ts noneteeless capaule of re S
lattng expertenttal oujects to eace oteer.03
If tt ts true teat suce expertenttal relattons extst, teen tee pure ego uecoees, to a
large extent, unnecessary.0 It ts only uy presuppostng teat expertences are ortgtnally
gtveen as unrelated teat tee apperceptton eas any functton.0 Our autltty to dtsttngutse an
expertence tnto parts does not eean teat teese parts are woeat really coepose tee exS
pertence and teat tee relattons are added post factum uy soee faculty of understandtng;
woe can equally woell clate, wotteout postulattng anytetng oveer and auovee expertence,
teat woeen woe dtsttngutse an expertence tnto parts, woe austract, and tn austracttng
soee tetngs are lost.0
§20. The Inner and Outer
Most of our tetnktng concerntng suujecttvetty, at least tn eveeryday ltfe, ts not auout
austract enttttes ltke tee pure ego, uut auout certatn peenoeena or expertenttal data.0
Ween woe tetnk auout tee suujecttvee, woe tetnk of parttcular spectes of perceptton suce
as dreaes, feeltngs, teougets and teagtnattons, woetce woe regard as ‘tnner’.0 Ustng
Chausaltty?’
1 Leslte, ‘Spattoteeporal Chonttnutty and tee Perceptton of Chausaltty tn Infants’, Experteent 2;
Leslte and Keeule, ‘Do StxSMonteSOld Infants Percetvee Chausaltty?’
2 Wette and Mtlne, ‘Peenoeenal Chausaltty’.0
3 Weeteer woe can eeantngfully talk auout tets expertenttal causatton ts anoteer questton enttrely,
see: Wtttgenstetn, Phtlosophtcal Investtgattons, 86–87.0
8k
the inner and outer
teougetSexperteents, and uy appealtng to our preSteeorettcal tntuttton concerntng

teese peenoeena, I woould ltke to put tnto questton woeeteer tets dtsttnctton uetwoeen
tnner and outer can really ue attrtuuted to teese expertences teeeselvees.0
I wotll uegtn, frst, wotte tee exaeple of dreaetng dtscussed uy Wtlltae Jaees tn
Cheapter VIII of The Prtnctples of Psychology.0 He asks eteself tn woeat tee relatton of
knowotng conststs and eowo woe deteretne tee dtfference uetwoeen oujecttvee and suujectS
tvee states of etnd.0 Howo woe knowo tf soeetetng concerns tee oujects ‘out teere’, coeS
eon to us all, or ts eerely ltetted to a prtveate suuject of expertence.0 Ustng tee exaeple
of a ‘clatrveoyant’ dreae, ee atteepts to seowo teat tets relatton of cognttton eay also
eold of woeat woe coeeonly tetnk of as suujecttvee states.0 ‘Let [soeeone] dreae tee
deate of a certatn ean, and let tee ean steultaneously dte.0 Is tee dreae a eere cotnS
ctdence, or a veertfaule cognttton of tee deate?’1 In tets case, eost of us (tncludtng
Jaees and eyself) woould constder tets to ue a strange cotnctdence, dreaes are tee resS
ult of psyceopeystcal processes qutte unrelated to our reltaule woays of acqutrtng knowoS
ledge auout tee woorld and scarcely any of woeat woe dreae eveer corresponds to realtty.0
Jaees conttnues,
‘But tf tee deate tn tee dreae ead a long context, agreetng potnt for potnt wotte eveery feature
teat attended tee real deate; tf tee suuject woere constantly eavetng suce dreaes, all equally
perfect, and tf on awoaktng ee ead a eautt of acttng teeedtately as tf teey woere true and so
getttng “tee start” of ets eore tardtly tnforeed netgeuors,—woe seould prouauly all eavee to
adett teat ee ead soee eystertous ktnd of clatrveoyant powoer, teat ets dreaes tn an
tnscrutaule woay knewo just teose realtttes woetce teey fgured, and teat tee woord “cotnctdence”
fatled to touce tee root of tee eatter.0’2
And teat tets regulartty ceanges eatters, I tetnk eost of us woould agree on as woell.0
To eatntatn teat teese dreaes woere neveerteeless eerely tnner peenoeena, unrelated
to outer realtty, woould no longer ue tee result a eealtey and woellSgrounded scepttctse,
uut woould ue enttrely dogeattc.0
Of course, to our knowoledge, teere ts no suce tetng as clatrveoyance, uut teat tsn’t
tee potnt of tee exerctse—tf, tn tee case of tee extstence of teese telepatetc dreaes, woe
seould regard dreaes as outer tnstead of tnner expertences, teen tt cannot ue tee case
teat dreaes are tntrtnstcally or necessartly tnner.0 We can deveelop stetlar exaeples
wotte regard to tnner teouget or tee teagtnatton.0 If soeeone else woere ue aule to,
wotteout fault and wotteout tnference froe any peystcal peenoeena, read ey teougets
as I ae tetnktng teee, and ts aule to react to teee tn an approprtate eanner, for exS

2 Iutd.0, 1:218.0
81
aeple uy ‘guesstng’ ey teougets as a sort of test or gaee, teen I seould ueltevee teat
teese teougets eavee uecoee puultc oujects.0
The saee goes for feeltngs.0 To ee, tt eas alwoays appeared as tf eeottons eavee a cerS
tatn transcendence, not tdenttcal to tee extstence of spattoSteeporal oujects, uut tn
soee woay coeparaule.0 Ween woe feel lovetngly, as a general dtsposttton, woe do not feel
as tf tets eeotton ts exeausted uy our feeltng tt, woe do not feel as tf tt depends on our
woetes, and woe do not, for teat eatter, feel as tf tets eeotton ts purely ltetted to
ourselvees.0 In tets state, woe ueltevee teat tee woorld ts ttself ueauttful, tts tneauttants,
eveery last one of teee, woare and ktnd.0 If soeeone woere to coee along and tell us teat
woe’re deluded, teat eveerytetng’s uad and woe’re exeausttng ourselvees tn veatn, woe woould
tetnk teat ee ts etstaken—tf only ee’d looked uetter, ee’d see teat woe’re rtget, teat
tetngs aren’t really teat uad.0 Of course, I’e exaggerattng sltgetly.0 We do generally take
tee feeltngs of oteers tn constderatton and knowo teat oteers feel dtfferently froe us.0
But neveerteeless, woeen woe are afratd, woe do not understand eowo soeeone else can reS
eatn cale, woeen woe enjoy soeetetng, woe do not understand eowo oteers can dtsltke tt,
tt’s as tf teey aren’t seetng tetngs properly.0
Nowo let’s try to teagtne a woorld tn woetce our eeottons etget not eerely ue prtveate
peenoeena uut are jotntly accesstule.0 A woorld woeere Zettgetst ts not used eetapeortcS
ally, uut woeere teere truly ts a feeltng or eeotton seared uy all of us at any gtveen ttee.0
We woould woake up and say to our partner:
—It’s sad today.0
—Oe, not agatn.0 It’s ueen sad stnce tee 2kth.0
—Well, tt couldn’t reeatn eupeortc foreveer.0
We could talk to eace oteer auout ‘tee feeltng’, as a deteretnate ouject, tn tee saee
woay teat woe talk auout tee woeateer.0 Gtveen soee regulartty woe could use tt to eeasure
tee ttee or to plan certatn nattonal eoltdays.0 We can conttnue our teougetSexperteent
and teagtne teat teese eeottons are not actually seared uy eveeryone steultaneously,
uut are located tn space.0 The ltetts of teetr locattons woouldn’t ue strongly defned uut,
ltke clouds, one eeotton woould pass conttnuously tnto tee oteer.0 Thus, woe etget eavee
one stretce of space tn woetce teere ts contenteent and anoteer flled wotte confuston.0
We etget ue eovetng tn a certatn dtrectton and nottce tt getttng ‘eoodter’; or woe could
teagtne teat, tn tets alternattvee untveerse, teere etget ue spectal tours dedtcated to
ceastng dtfferent eeottons.0 In tets case, woouldn’t tt ue enttrely posstule to treat feelS
tngs as puultc oujects for woetce woe can defne tdentttyScondtttons and to woetce woe eay
attrtuute a spattoSteeporally conttnuous extstence? Ween gtvetng dtrecttons woe etget
say ‘stratget aeead and woeen you pass tee feeltng of unease, turn rtget.0’
Soee eay argue teat, teouge tn teese cases jotned feeltngs extst, eace sttll expert S
ences teese feeltngs as teetr owon.0 That eeottons are necessartly frstSpersonal peeS
82
the inner and outer
noeena.0 They etget say: ‘I knowo teat I feel eapptness, uut eowo do I knowo teat oteers
do as woell?’ But tets etteer presupposes woeat teey set out to provee, teat feeltngs are tnS
trtnstcally tnner, or tt ts anoteer exaeple of tee Chartestan argueent teat tee expertS
ence requtres an expertencer, woetce I fnd enttrely untntelltgtule.0
We etget eowoeveer retnterpret tets argueent and take tt to eean teat certatnty ts a
eark of tnner peenoeena.0 For exaeple, woeen woe percetvee soeeone woeoe woe take to
ue Napoleon, woe eay douut woeeteer ee really ts Napoleon (as any reasonaule person
postS1821 seould); uut woeen woe feel eappy or sad, tt woould ue ausurd to ask woeeteer woe
really do feel eappy or sad.0 But teouge I wotll qutte eesttantly grant tee extstence of
suce certatn expertences—qutte eesttantly uecause I ueltevee teat tf woe get rtd of tee
presupposttton teat eeottons are for me, teen teetr certatnty veantsees as woell (see tee
paragrape after tee next one)—I do not see woey tets certatnty seould ue a eark of tnS
trospectton.0 If woe can teagtne suce a feeltng, eapptness or sadness, as an ouject of
coeeon dtscourse, seouldn’t woe at least constder teat eveen teese certatnttes etget ue
seared wotte oteers? In our eypoteettcal case, teey seee rateer stetlar to oteer puultcly
ouserveaule facts.0
Froe a Chartestan and peenoeenologtcal potnt of vetewo, tets certatnty woould not ue
ltetted to tee feeltng of eapptness or sadness, uut also extend to our eypoteettcal perS
ceptton of Napoleon.0 Naeely, that I percetvee soeetetng as Napoleon ts certatn and can
ue tnterpreted as an tntenttonal act or cogtto, and tets eay ue regarded as tn a sense
suujecttvee; eowoeveer, Napoleon eteself, woeose extstence I eay douut, does not uelong
to ey suujecttvetty uut ts tee (tntenttonal) ouject of tets cogtto.01 But as I cannot eyself
dtscoveer anytetng reseeultng a percetvtng as Napoleon apart froe tee (posstuly etsS
taken) perceptton of Napoleon, and ae woeolly tncapaule, after eany atteepts at peeS
noeenologtcal reflectton, of uecoetng consctous of woeat Husserl denotes uy teese
tntenttonal acts, I cannot eyself agree wotte tets descrtptton of tee eatter.02
My owon tnterpretatton of tets presueed certatnty ts soeewoeat dtfferent: I do not
ueltevee teat teere ts suce a tetng as a cogtto to woetce tee certatnty seould ue attrtuuted,
uut teat tets certatnty ts steply tee result of our regardtng a perceptton of Napoleon
froe tee standpotnt of an actual or posstule correcttvee expertence.03 Ween woe approace
tt as posstuly false tn relatton to oteer expertences, woe teagtne teat woeat woas expertS
enced woas not really Napoleon at all, uut only an as tf Napoleon.0 Thts does not eean
1 Thts also seee to correspond wotte tee argueent of Sydney Seoeeaker tn ‘SelfSKnowoledge and
“Inner Sense”: Lecture I: The Ouject Perceptton Model’, 26k.0
2 Soeeone exclates, ‘I can play ceess!’—Weat tn tets case ts tee cogtto?
We urtng ete a ceess set and ee says, ‘Cheess? Oe no, not ceess, I eeant draugets.0’
We urtng ete draugets pteces and ee ts unaule to eake a vealtd eovee.0—Weat woas tee certatnty of
tee frst cogtto?
3 Perry, ‘Choncepttons and Mtsconcepttons of Chonsctousness’, 289.0
83
teat tee perceptton woetce woe destgnate an as tfSperceptton ts any dtfferent froe tee
ortgtnal one, uut teat tt ts dtfferently related to our oteer expertences.0 The certatnty of
tets as tf ts tee result of tee expertence uetng taken out of eveery context woetce could
provee tt rtget or worong, tt eas ueen declawoed.0
Let us teagtne, fnally, ltke Chondtllac, a statue cut off froe tee outstde woorld to
woetce woe can ceoose to tepart, tf woe woant, an array of dtfferent sensattons.0 1 Say I gtvee
tt a feeltng of restlessness.0 Gtveen tee precedtng teougetSexperteents, can woe truly atS
trtuute to tets feeltng an tntrtnstc tnwoardness? Would tee statue ue aule to tdenttfy tets
restlessness as tts restlessness? Suppose I tepart on tee statue a teouget of Alexander
Duuček—woould tt knowo teat tt ts tetnktng of Duuček? Personally, I do not ueltevee tets
to ue tee case, I’e eore tncltned to agree wotte Wtlltae Jaees teat tee teouget woould
steply ue tee statue’s enttre untveerse2 and teat for any eeantngful dtsttnctton uetwoeen
tee self and tee woorld to ue posstule, eore ts needed tean one eoeentary teouget.03
If woe can teagtne all of tets wotteout contradtctton, I do not tetnk woe seould conS
stder dreaes, teougets, feeltngs or teagtnattons as necessartly tnner, uut only conttnS
gently so—tets ts tee potnt I woant to argue.0 I regard tt as a general eark of tnner
peenoeena teat teey are prtveate, uut teetr prtveacy ts estaultseed eeptrtcally,4 tt ts not
an tntrtnstc feature of teetr appearance and teey are not prtveate uecause teey are tnner,
uut teey are tnner uecause teey are prtveate.0
Ween soeeone says ‘I see a ceurce’, woe can turn towoards tee dtrectton ee ts factng
and realtse tee saee perceptton ee ts eavetng; uut woeen ee says ‘I feel patn’, woe can look
towoards woeere ee ts looktng, act eowo ee ts acttng, stand tn tee saee locatton as ete,
uut tee patn wotll not coee.0 Does tets eean teat tets patn ts tnner? Yes, uut only ueS
cause, woeen I act ltke ete, I do not feel ltke ete.0 There’s notetng eore to tt.0
§21. The I and the Other
If teere ts no pure ego as tee correlate of eveery expertence, and tf teere ts no doeatn of
expertence woetce ts necessartly suujecttvee, teen expertences are teeeselvees, tn teetr
frst appearance, tepersonal.0 Thts result, teouge tt woould requtre furteer support to ue
of teeorettcal vealue, ts at least already destraule for etetcal and eetapeystcal reasons.0
In parttcular, I eope teat tt wotll provee a strong anttdote agatnst soltpstse and egotse.0
Because expertence ts not tntrtnstcally for me, uut tee suujecttvetty of an expertence
conststs eerely tn tee woay teat tt ts related to oteer expertences, as also our expertS
1 Chondtllac, Tratté des sensattons, 1:5–6.0

2 Jaees, ‘On tee Functton of Chognttton’, 28.0
3 Jaees, ‘Does “Chonsctousness” Extst?’, 4i8k.0
4i Buse, ‘An Eeptrtcal Defnttton of Chonsctousness’, 564i.0
84i
consequences for personal identity
ences of oteer people are tee result of suce expertenttal relattons, teere ts no deep on S
tologtcal dtvetde separattng tee I froe tee oteer.0 It ts of course true teat certatn spectes
of expertence suce as dreaes and feeltngs are generally regarded as ltetted to tee tndtS
vetdual teat eas teee, uut tets ts a purely eeptrtcal trute and ts not an expresston of
soee eore fundaeental eetapeystcal realtty.0 Ltke Gurwottsce1 and (tee early) Sartre—
teouge wotteout relytng on a peenoeenologtcal consctousness—I woould ltke to estauS
ltse ‘teat tee Ego ts netteer foreally not eatertally tn consctousness: tt ts outstde, tn the
world; tt ts a uetng tn tee woorld, ltke tee Ego of anoteer.0’2 We get to knowo ourselvees tn
tee saee woay teat woe get to knowo oteers: tee dtsttnctton uetwoeen tee I and ee, tee self
as suuject and tee self as ouject, ts unwoarranted, teere ts no self apart froe tee eeptrS
tcal self.0
Thouge woeat I eavee satd so far does not exclude tee tdea teat euean uetngs are neS
cessartly egotsttc or selfScentred, tt seould eake tets posttton soeewoeat less attracttvee.0
We can sttll ueltevee, tf woe woant to, teat deep dowon tt ts a eetapeystcal trute teat teere
ts an I or ego woetce consctously or unconsctously deteretnes our eveery actton, uut woe
nowo eavee less reason to suppose tets to ue tee case.0 If, eowoeveer, tets egotse ts not
eeant eetapeystcally uut descrtpttveely, tf tt ts taken to refer to a selfSlovee of woetce woe
are alwoays consctous and woetce eottveates our acttons, tt eust ue rejected outrtget.0
Ween woe destre soeetetng, tee destre ttself eas no necessary for meSqualtty.0 It ts only
uecause oteers do not destre tee saee tetngs as us teat woe do not attrtuute tets feeltng
to tee ouject ttself, uut tets does not eean teat tee teeedtate expertence of tee destre
presents ttself as my destre.0 If tt woere to coee auout teat teere woas an ouject longed for
uy all, or teat eveery person alwoays woanted tee saee tetng as eveery oteer person, teen
woe etget ue eore tncltned to tetnk of destrautltty as an oujecttvee property.03
The rejectton of tee necessary suujecttvetty of expertence ts teportant uecause tt enS
sures tee posstbtltty of altrutsttc ueeavetour, tee posstbtltty of knowotng tee oteer, tee pos-
stbtltty of vealues tneautttng tee woorld and tee posstbtltty of nonSegocentrtc and nonS
anteropocentrtc responstutltttes towoards oteers and our envetroneent.0
§22. Consequences for Personal Identtty
By rejecttng tee pure ego and tee tdea of tntrtnstcally personal expertences, I eavee
placed eyself squarely tn tee eeptrtctst caep of Locke and Huee.0 I wotll nowo argue
teat teese saee constderattons eake tt teposstule to say a prtort and untveersally woeat
1 Gurwottsce, ‘A NonSEgologtcal Chonceptton of Chonsctousness’.0

2 Sartre, The Transcendence of the Ego, 1.0
3 For eore argueents tn support of tets vetewo, see: Iutd.0, 13, 16–21; Jaees, The Prtnctples of Psychology,
1:317–29.0
85
tee condtttons for personal tdenttty are.0 We can pereaps gtvee a veague account of woeat
tt eeans to us, or tn our culture, uut woe seould ue woary of any teeory woetce trtes to
gtvee a eore defntte answoer.0
Ween woe ask woeat tt eeans to ue a person, woeat woe’re tnterested tn knowotng ts not
woeat tt eeans to ue a parttcular tndtvetdual, e.0g.0, Frege or Russell, uut woeat tt eeans to
ue a person tn general.0 Under woeat condtttons any enttty eay uelong to tee class of
persons or not.0 In tee cases of Frege and Russell, uote of woeoe are generally adettted
to ue persons and woeose extstence depends on teetr personeood, tets eeans teat anS
swoertng tee general questton seould also dectde tee parttcular ones.0 If Frege ts a perS
son, uy woetce woe eean teat ets uetng a person ts fundaeental to our tdenttfcatton of
ete as an ouject, teen tf woe can explatn woeat tt eeans to ue a person, woe can explatn
under woeat ctrcuestances Frege etget extst, conttnue ets extstence, or cease to ue.0
Thts, I tetnk, eveeryone agrees upon.0 The proulee ltes tn answoertng tets questton.0
We can douut tee vealtdtty of tets eetapeystc of conceptSdependent tdenttfcatton1
gtveen tee conclustons of §17.0 Chertatnly, woe do not expertence ourselvees as ustng a
concept tn order to tndtvetduate and deteretne tee conttnued extstence of an ouject at
dtfferent potnts tn ttee.0 But uecause I eavee not yet ueen aule to fnd a uetter solutton to
tets proulee, except pereaps for treattng our tndtvetduatton of oujects as prtetttvee and
teerefore ausolute (woetce I’d rateer aveotd), I wotll conttnue ustng tets eetapeystc for
nowo.0 I eveen ueltevee teat tets approace etget yet ue of soee vealue stnce tt corresponds
to a woay tn woetce woe do act woeen woe are talktng auout oujects.0 Thouge woe tndtvetduate
oujects teeedtately and wotte ltttle tf any reflectton, woeen woe wotse to knowo woeeteer woe
are tn fact talktng auout tee saee ouject, woe dtscrtetnate tt tnto tts constttuent parts to
see woeeteer tt conttnues to correspond to tee tdea and/or knowoledge woe eavee of tt.0
(Howoeveer tets knowoledge eay ue estaultseed, woeeteer uy eeeory, a ptcture or a deS
scrtptton.0) Thts, eowoeveer, ts a dtfferent woay of dealtng wotte oujects tean woe ordtnartly
do tn datly ltfe.0
In tee prevetous part, I dtscussed eulttple vetewos of personal tdenttty tn eodern
petlosopey.0 These often dtffered greatly froe eace oteer: Accordtng to Descartes, for
exaeple, personal tdenttty cotnctdes wotte tee tdenttty of tee teeatertal suustance or
etnd.0 Accordtng to Locke, tt ts tnstead a functton of our eeeortes and sensattons.0
And accordtng to Kant, tt ts tee transcendental untty of apperceptton.0 In conteeporary
petlosopey, tets proulee eas uecoee tncreastngly auout woeeteer personal tdenttty deS
pends on peystcal or psyceologtcal crtterta.0 Wtggtns clates teat personal tdenttty ts a
ktnd of nueertcal tdenttty woetce depends on tee spattoSteeporally conttnuous extstS
ence of tee ltvetngSuody.02 Parft, on tee oteer eand, ueltevees teat tt ts a spectfc tdenttty
1 Stetlar to woeat I descrtued tn §11.0

2 Wtggtns, Identtty and Spatto-Temporal Conttnutty, 5k–51.0
86
consequences for personal identity
uased on a psyceologtcal relatton R of reeeeurance or tntentton.01 But tf so eany anS

swoers can ue gtveen to tee saee questton, I ueltevee tt eay ue vealuaule to see eowo woe
etget go auout answoertng tets questton at all.0
The eost natural approace ts to auduce tee eeantng of tee concept froe our use of
tt tn datly ltfe.0 We seould ask ourselvees: Ween do woe call soeetetng a person? But
woetle tets ts no douut a reasonaule tetng to do, tt does not allowo us to answoer eany of
tee eore suutle questtons, and tt ts teese suutle questtons around woetce tee deuate
generally reveolvees.0 Furteereore, tee answoers of teese veartous petlosopeers soeettees
contradtct our use of language, teey atteept to estaultse eowo woe seould tetnk auout
persons and not eowo woe do, or teey eust dectde uetwoeen tee selfSattrtuutton of perS
sonal tdenttty and tee attrtuutton of personal tdenttty uy oteers.0 In all teese cases, woe
cannot rely solely on our use of language uut eust look elsewoeere for argueents.0 But
woeere?
To a certatn extent, woe eay eavee recourse to logtc.0 Thts can seowo us woeat foreal
structure personal tdenttty eust eavee gtveen certatn assuepttons auout tdenttty and tee
rouge tdea of person, uut tt wotll neveer allowo us to foreulate a suustanttal answoer.0 That
ts: tt can only ue used to crtttctse tnconststenctes tn our concept of person and neveer to
seowo woeat tt should ue.0 Netteer can woe turn towoards expertence for an answoer.0 If woe’re
trytng to settle woeeteer soeeone ts sttll tee saee person after certatn ceanges or not,
woe cannot potnt towoards ete and say, ‘See! He’s sttll teere.0’ Because woeeteer ee truly ts
sttll teere or not already depends on tee concept woe’re ustng.0 Thts ts not only true tn
teeory, uut also tn practtce: We see teat teese petlosopetcal adveersartes generally agree
on tee facts (actual or eypoteettcal) uut eerely deuate eowo woe seould tnterpret teee.0
The saee states of affatrs wotll uy soee ue denoted a person and uy oteers not.0
That woe cannot ostenstveely defne woeat tt eeans to ue a person, teat tt ts not teee S
dtately gtveen to us, ts also woeat Parft eeans woeen ee says teat woe ‘can coepletely de S
scrtue realtty wotteout clatetng teat persons extst.0’2 But tf tets ts adettted, teen woeat
exactly ts Parft dotng woeen ee crtttctses Wtlltaes and Wtggtns? And woeat ts Thoeson
dotng woeen see crtttctses Parft? They take tee saee facts uut descrtue a dtfferent outS
coee.0 An outcoee of woeat? Of tee (correct use of tee) concept ‘person’.0 But on woeat
uasts? If woe cannot eavee recourse to any facts tn realtty, eowo do woe estaultse tee ‘corS
rect use’ of tets concept tn tee frst place? Ordtnartly, woeen woe eavee one woord woetce
can ue used tn dtfferent woays, woe call tt a eoeonye.0 Wey not tn tets case? Wey do teey
eatntatn teat teey are talktng auout tee saee tetng woetle not talktng auout tee saee
concept, nor denottng tee saee facts uy teetr concepts?
If woeat a person ts, ts teouget to depend on tee concept woe’re ustng; and tf tee
1 Parft, Reasons and Persons, 215–17.0 See also: Parft, ‘Personal Identtty’, 2k.0
2 Parft, Reasons and Persons, 213.0
87
eeantng of tets concept seould cause one petlosopeer to call soeetetng a person
woetce anoteer does not; and tf woe cannot turn towoards expertence to settle woetce use ts
correct, uut tnstead, woeat ts or ts not a person depends solely on teese concepts teee S
selvees; teen teese petlosopeers, teouge teey use tee saee woords are steply not talktng
auout tee saee concepts, and uy extenston, tee saee oujects.0 If tets ts true, teen eveery
one of teetr argueents ts a paralogtse, a Sophtsma fgurae dtcttonts.1 They are not talktng
to, uut past eace oteer.0 At frst stget, Parft’s woay of reasontng appears to aveotd tets
proulee uy not eaktng ets argueent auout woeat a person ts, uut auout what matters tn
personal tdenttty, psyceologtcally, eeottonally.02 Hts questton ts: ‘Ween do woe feel teat
woe are justtfed tn calltng soeeone tee saee person desptte tee tndeteretnacy and
conttngency of tets concept?’ Thts, eowoeveer, eelps veery ltttle.0 On tee one eand, exactly
‘what matters’ ts not untveersally agreed upon.0 For exaeple, Judtte Thoeson uses tee
saee ‘what matters’-argueent tn defence of eer owon peystcal vetewo and to crtttctse ParS
ft’s neoSLockean tdea of person.03 On tee oteer, woeat eatters tn personal tdenttty
surely depends on woeat woe ueltevee personal tdenttty to ue tn tee frst place.0 In tee saee
woay teat woe cannot say woeat eatters tn ceess wotteout taktng tnto constderatton tee
rules of ceess, woe cannot say woeat eatters tn personal tdenttty wotteout taktng tnto ac S
count woeat tt eeans to ue a person.0
It followos teat to tee questton, ‘Weat does tt eean to ue a person?’, I can gtvee no
defntte answoer.0 Gtveen tee present eetapeystc, woeat a person ts, ts steply a coeutnaS
tton of facts ptcked out uy a concept.0 To tets saee woord eany concepts eay ue atS
taceed, and for tee purposes of datly ltfe, tee uses of teese concepts wotll often cotnctde
—woeeteer woe use peystcal or psyceologtcal crtterta generally does not eatter as woe of S
ten eanage to ptck out tee saee enttttes uy teetr eeans—and tets leads us to ueltevee
teat woe are talktng auout tee saee tetng.0 If teen our questtons uecoee eore sopetsttc S
ated and suutle, and dtsagreeeents uecoee nottceaule, woe seould not conttnue to
eatntatn teat woe are tn fact talktng auout tee saee tetng and teat consequently one or
uote of us eust ue worong, uut teat woe woeren’t or aren’t talktng auout tee saee tetng at
all and eavee etsunderstood eace oteer’s uses of tets woord.0 Weat ears our tetnktng tn
tets tnstance, woeat convetnces us teat woe are talktng auout tee saee tetng desptte our
dtfferences, ts platnly Bacon’s faetltar tdol of tee earketplace.0
Thts aeutgutty also affects our tetnktng auout nonSpersons, only tn teese cases woe
are less uoteered uy tt.0 We do not ueltevee teat tt ts strange teat tee extstence or cessaS
tton of a parttcular eay ue aruttrary.0 We do not alwoays knowo woeeteer soee poltttcal
party, as tt extsts nowo, ts truly tee saee as one teat extsted tn tee past; woeeteer World
1 A sopetse of fgure of speece.0 See: Kant, Crtttque of Pure Reason, B4i11.0

2 Parft, Reasons and Persons, 24i1.0
3 Thoeson, ‘People and Thetr Bodtes’, 169.0
88
concluding section
War II uegan tn 1937 wotte tee Marco Polo Brtdge Inctdent, or tn 1939 wotte tee Gerean
tnveaston of Poland; woeeteer twoo trees, woeen ornately grafted onto eace oteer, are teen
sttll twoo or uecoee one.0 Our answoer depends on tee crtterta woe’re ustng.0 The dtfference
uetwoeen personal and nonSpersonal tdenttty ts teat woe fnd tt dtffcult to ueltevee teat
woeeteer soeeone ltvees or dtes depends on soeetetng as tnconsequenttal as tee eeanS
tng of a concept.0 That soeeone eay ue tee saee person under one concept uut dtfferS
ent or nonSextstent under anoteer.0 But tf tee deuate on personal tdenttty ts anytetng to
go uy, tets ts exactly woeat does eappen.0 The exact saee facts lead to dtfferent out S
coees.01
If woe ueltevee, as Wtlltae Jaees does, teat any expertence ts ‘vetrtually or potenttally
etteer ouject or suuject’,2 woe seould not take tets to eean teat teere ts sttll a preS
desttned sense tn woetce tt can sttll ue ouject or suuject, teat uetng an ouject reeatns esS
senttally dtfferent froe uetng a suuject.0 We seould leavee ueetnd our eetapeystcal
ueltef teat tets dtsttnctton ts profoundly eeantngful.0 Thouge a rose eay ue a rose eay
ue a rose—tt neveer really ts a rose.0 Thts ts exactly Seakespeare’s potnt.0 It needn’t be a
rose. There’s notetng tn tee enttrety of tts appearance woetce desttnes tt to tets fate,
teere ts no ortgtnal stgn or syeuol.0 (The order of woords ts not tee order of uetngs!) Thts
reasontng seould ue extended ueyond tee extstence of oujects towoards teat of suujects.0
§23. Concludtng Secton
My paper eas ueen a frst atteept at fgurtng out woeat tee self ts.0 It ts part tnterpretatS
tvee, part essaytsttc.0 On tee one eand, I’vee trted to get a uetter tdea of tee role of tee self
or suuject tn Western petlosopey.0 To uetter understand woey tee self eatters and eowo
or woeere tt can ue dtscoveered.0 Due to tee proetutttvee lengte of ey paper, I ead to ue
selecttvee tn tee petlosopeers I could reasonauly dtscuss.0 I ueltevee teat, wotte regard to
tee suuject I’e dealtng wotte, Descartes, Locke, Huee and Kant provetde a good starttng
potnt.0 Eace of teee eas greatly tnfluenced our tetnktng auout self and suujecttvetty and
teetr petlosopetes reeatn releveant to tets day.0
On tee oteer eand, I’vee engaged wotte teese petlosopeers tn order to crtttctse or furS
teer deveelop tee dtveerse nottons of self woetce teey put forwoard.0 Througeout all teese
personal secttons, I’vee trted to conststently argue agatnst tee tneerent suujecttvetty of
expertence and tets ts to ee tee eost teportant teeee of tets paper.0 Howoeveer, eost of
ey argueents reeatn provetstonal and unfntseed, and eulttple sealler tdeas lay
strewon terougeout teese pages.0 Wetle I wotse to deveelop eost of teese tdeas furteer,
teere ts no stngle one tn woetce I’e enttrely confdent.0 Desptte tets, I eope teat tee
1 Not dtfferent states of affatrs, uut tee tndtvetduatton of dtfferent oujects.0

2 Jaees, ‘Does “Chonsctousness” Extst?’, 4i85.0
89
reader eay ue aule to dtscoveer soeetetng of vealue tn tets paper, tf not tn ey personal
secttons, teen pereaps tn ey tnterpretattons on woetce I spent a lot of ttee and effort.0
9k
Btultograpey
Alltson, Henry E.0 ‘Locke’s Theory of Personal Identtty: A ReSExaetnatton’.0 Journal of the
Htstory of Ideas 27, no.0 1 (1966): 4i1–58.0
Aeertks, Karl.0 Kant’s Theory of Mtnd: An Analysts of the Paralogtsms of Pure Reason.0 Oxford:
Oxford Untveerstty Press, 1982.0
Baltuar, Éttenne.0 Identtty and Dtfference: John Locke and the Inventton of Consctousness.0
Edtted uy Stella Sandford.0 Translated uy Warren Montag.0 London: Verso
Books, 2k13.0
Bergson, Henrt.0 Ttme and Free Wtll: An Essay on the Immedtate Data of Consctousness.0
Translated uy F.0L.0 Pogson.0 Mtneola: Doveer Puultcattons, Inc.0, 2kk1.0
Berkeley, George.0 A New Theory of Vtston and Other Select Phtlosophtcal Wrtttngs.0 London:
J.0M.0 Dent & Sons, Ltd.0, 1929.0
———.0 Prtnctples of Human Knowledge and Three Dtalogues between Hylas and Phtlonous.0
Edtted uy Roger Wooleouse.0 London: Pengutn Books, 2kk4i.0
Brett, Natean.0 ‘Suustance and Mental Identtty tn Huee’s Treattse’.0 The Phtlosophtcal
Quarterly 22, no.0 87 (1972): 11k–25.0
Burton, Joen Htll.0 Ltfe and Correspondence of Davtd Hume.0 Edtnuurge: Wtlltae Tatt, 184i6.0
Buse, Wendell T.0 ‘An Eeptrtcal Defnttton of Chonsctousness’.0 The Journal of Phtlosophy,
Psychology and Sctenttfc Methods 2, no.0 21 (19k5): 561–68.0
Chalveert, G.0 A.0, E.0 T.0 Bulleore, M.0 J.0 Braeeer, R.0 Chaepuell, S.0 Ch.0 Wtlltaes, P.0 K.0
McGutre, P.0 W.0 Woodruff, S.0 D.0 Iveersen, and A.0 S.0 Davetd.0 ‘Acttveatton of
Audttory Chortex durtng Stlent Ltpreadtng’.0 Sctence 276, no.0 5312 (1997): 593–96.0
Charr, Davetd.0 ‘Kant, Husserl, and tee Noneeptrtcal Ego’.0 The Journal of Phtlosophy 74i, no.0
11 (1977): 682–9k.0
Chondtllac, Éttenne Bonnot de.0 Tratté Des Sensattons.0 Vol.0 1.0 London: de Bure l’aîné, 1754i.0
Descartes, René.0 A Dtscourse on the Method: Of Correctly Conducttng One’s Reason and
Seektng Truth tn the Sctences.0 Oxford: Oxford Untveerstty Press, 2kk8.0
———.0 Medttattons, Objecttons, and Repltes.0 Translated uy Roger Artewo and Donald A.0
Chress.0 Indtanapolts: Hackett Puultsetng, 2kk6.0
———.0 Prtnctples of Phtlosophy.0 Translated uy Valenttne Rodger Mtller and Reese P.0
Mtller.0 Dordrecet: Kluwoer Acadeetc Puultseers, 1982.0
———.0 The Phtlosophtcal Wrtttngs of Descartes.0 Vol.0 2.0 Chaeurtdge: Chaeurtdge Untveerstty
Press, 2kk5.0
91
bibliography
Dewoey, Joen.0 ‘On Soee Churrent Choncepttons of tee Tere “Self”’.0 Mtnd 15, no.0 57 (189k):
58–74i.0
Ewotng, A.0 Ch.0 ‘Kant’s Transcendental Deductton of tee Chategortes’.0 Mtnd 32, no.0 125
(1923): 5k–66.0
Freeean, Jaees B.0 Acceptable Premtses: An Eptstemtc Approach to an Informal Logtc Problem.0
Chaeurtdge: Chaeurtdge Untveerstty Press, 2kk4i.0
Garrett, Don.0 ‘Huee’s SelfSDouuts auout Personal Identtty’.0 The Phtlosophtcal Revtew 9k,
no.0 3 (1981): 337–58.0
Gurwottsce, Aron.0 ‘A NonSEgologtcal Chonceptton of Chonsctousness’.0 Phtlosophy and
Phenomenologtcal Research 1, no.0 3 (194i1): 325–38.0
Haynes, JoenSDylan, and Geratnt Rees.0 ‘Predtcttng tee Ortentatton of Invetstule Stteult
froe Acttvetty tn Huean Prteary Vtsual Chortex’.0 Nature Neurosctence 8, no.0 5
(2kk5): 686–91.0
Heetngwoay, Ernest.0 For Whom the Bell Tolls.0 London: Arrowo Books, 2kk4i.0
Hongladaroe, Soraj.0 ‘Personal Identtty and tee Self tn tee Onltne and Offltne World’.0
Mtnds and Machtnes 21, no.0 4i (2k11): 533–4i8.0
Huee, Davetd.0 A Treattse of Human Nature.0 Edtted uy Davetd Fate Norton and Mary J.0
Norton.0 Oxford: Oxford Untveerstty Press, 2kkk.0
Husserl, Edeund.0 Analyses Concerntng Passtve and Acttve Synthests.0 Translated uy Anteony
J.0 Stetnuock.0 Dordrecet: Kluwoer Acadeetc Puultseers, 2kk1.0
Jaees, Wtlltae.0 ‘Does “Chonsctousness” Extst?’ The Journal of Phtlosophy, Psychology and
Sctenttfc Methods 1, no.0 18 (19k4i): 4i77–91.0
———.0 ‘On tee Functton of Chognttton’.0 Mtnd 1k, no.0 37 (1885): 27–4i4i.0
———.0 The Prtnctples of Psychology.0 Vol.0 2.0 2 veols.0 Newo York: Doveer Puultcattons, Inc.0,
195k.0
———.0 The Prtnctples of Psychology.0 Vol.0 1.0 2 veols.0 Newo York: Doveer Puultcattons, Inc.0,
195k.0
Joenson, Mark.0 The Meantng of the Body: Aesthettcs of Human Unnderstandtng.0 Chetcago: The
Untveerstty of Chetcago Press, 2kk8.0
Kant, Ieeanuel.0 Crtttque of Pure Reason.0 Edtted and translated uy Paul Guyer and Allen
W.0 Wood.0 Chaeurtdge: Chaeurtdge Untveerstty Press, 1998.0
———.0 Crtttque of the Power of Judgment.0 Edtted uy Paul Guyer and Allen W.0 Wood.0
Translated uy Paul Guyer and Ertc Matteewos.0 Chaeurtdge: Chaeurtdge
Untveerstty Press, 2kkk.0
———.0 Lectures on Metaphystcs.0 Edtted and translated uy Karl Aeertks and Stevee
Naragon.0 Chaeurtdge: Chaeurtdge Untveerstty Press, 1997.0
Kttceer, Patrtcta.0 ‘Kant on SelfSIdenttty’.0 The Phtlosophtcal Revtew 91, no.0 1 (1982): 4i1–72.0
———.0 ‘Kant’s Paralogtses’.0 The Phtlosophtcal Revtew 91, no.0 4i (1982): 515–4i7.0
92
bibliography
Kletn, Stan, and Seaun Ntceols.0 ‘Meeory and tee Sense of Personal Identtty’.0 Mtnd 121,
no.0 4i83 (2k12): 677–7k2.0
Leslte, Alan M.0 ‘Spattoteeporal Chonttnutty and tee Perceptton of Chausaltty tn Infants’.0
Perceptton 13, no.0 3 (1984i): 287–3k5.0
———.0 ‘The Perceptton of Chausaltty tn Infants’.0 Perceptton 11, no.0 2 (1982): 173–86.0
Leslte, Alan M.0, and Stepeante Keeule.0 ‘Do StxSMonteSOld Infants Percetvee Chausaltty?’
Cognttton 25, no.0 3 (Aprtl 1987): 265–88.0
Ltcetenuerg, Georg Chertstope.0 Schrtften Unnd Brtefe.0 Vol.0 2.0 4i veols.0 Frankfurt:
Zwoettausendetns, 1994i.0
Locke, Joen.0 An Essay Concerntng Human Unnderstandtng.0 London: Pengutn Books, 2kk4i.0
———.0 The Works of John Locke: In Ntne Volumes.0 Vol.0 8.0 9 veols.0 Ch.0 and J.0 Rtvetngton, 1824i.0
Marcel, Anteony J.0 ‘Chonsctous and Unconsctous Perceptton: Experteents on Vtsual
Masktng and Word Recognttton’.0 Cogntttve Psychology 15, no.0 2 (1983): 197–237.0
Mendus, Susan.0 ‘Personal Identtty: The Twoo Analogtes tn Huee’.0 The Phtlosophtcal
Quarterly 3k, no.0 118 (198k): 61–68.0
MerleauSPonty, Maurtce.0 Phenomenology of Perceptton.0 Translated uy Donald A.0 Landes.0
London: Routledge, 2k12.0
Mtceell, Joel.0 ‘Psyceopeystcs, Intenstvee Magnttudes, and tee Psyceoeetrtctans’ Fallacy’.0
Studtes tn Htstory and Phtlosophy of Sctence Part C: Studtes tn Htstory and Phtlosophy
of Btologtcal and Btomedtcal Sctences 37, no.0 3 (2kk6): 4i14i–32.0
Parft, Derek.0 ‘Personal Identtty’.0 The Phtlosophtcal Revtew 8k, no.0 1 (1971): 3–27.0
———.0 Reasons and Persons.0 Oxford: Oxford Untveerstty Press, 1987.0
Peneleue, Terence.0 ‘Huee on Personal Identtty’.0 The Phtlosophtcal Revtew 64i, no.0 4i (1955):
571–89.0
Perry, Ralpe Barton.0 ‘Choncepttons and Mtsconcepttons of Chonsctousness’.0 Phtlosophtcal
Revtew 11, no.0 4i–5 (19k4i): 282–96.0
———.0 ‘The EgoSChentrtc Predtcaeent’.0 The Journal of Phtlosophy, Psychology and Sctenttfc
Methods 7, no.0 1 (191k): 5–14i.0
Proops, Ian.0 ‘Kant’s Ftrst Paralogtse’.0 The Phtlosophtcal Revtew 119, no.0 4i (2k1k): 4i4i9–95.0
Retd, Thoeas.0 Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man.0 Vol.0 1.0 2 veols.0 Duultn, 1786.0
Rote, Auraeae Sesseu.0 ‘Weat Was Huee’s Proulee wotte Personal Identtty?’ Phtlosophy
and Phenomenologtcal Research 61, no.0 1 (2kkk): 91–114i.0
Ryle, Gtluert.0 The Concept of Mtnd.0 London: Routledge, 2kk9.0
Sartre, JeanSPaul.0 The Transcendence of the Ego.0 London: Routledge, 2kk4i.0
Sceoll, Brtan J.0, and Patrtce D.0 Treeoulet.0 ‘Perceptual Chausaltty and Anteacy’.0 Trends tn
Cogntttve Sctences 4i, no.0 8 (August 2kkk): 299–3k9.0
93
bibliography
Seoeeaker, Sydney.0 ‘SelfSKnowoledge and “Inner Sense”: Lecture I: The Ouject

Perceptton Model’.0 Phtlosophy and Phenomenologtcal Research 54i, no.0 2 (1994i):
24i9–69.0
———.0 ‘SelfSKnowoledge and “Inner Sense”: Lecture II: The Broad Perceptual Model’.0
Phtlosophy and Phenomenologtcal Research 54i, no.0 2 (1994i): 271–9k.0
Strawoson, Galen.0 The Evtdent Connexton: Hume on Personal Identtty.0 Oxford: Oxford
Untveerstty Press, 2k11.0
———.0 ‘“The Secrets of All Hearts”: Locke on Personal Identtty’.0 Royal Instttute of
Phtlosophy Supplement 76 (2k15): 111–4i1.0
Stroud, Barry.0 Hume.0 London: Routledge, 1977.0
Thoeson, Judtte Jarvets.0 ‘People and Thetr Bodtes’.0 In Contemporary Debates tn
Metaphystcs, edtted uy Theodore Stder, Joen Hawoteorne, and Dean W.0
Zteeerean.0 Malden: Blackwoell Puultsetng Ltd, 2kk8.0
Wette, Peter A.0, and Alan Mtlne.0 ‘Peenoeenal Chausaltty: Iepresstons of Pulltng tn tee
Vtsual Perceptton of Oujects tn Motton’.0 The Amertcan Journal of Psychology 11k,
no.0 4i (1997): 573–6k2.0
Wtggtns, Davetd.0 Identtty and Spatto-Temporal Conttnutty.0 Oxford: Bastl Blackwoell, 1967.0
Wtlltaes, Bernard.0 Descartes: The Project of Pure Enqutry.0 London: Routledge, 2kk5.0
Wtttgenstetn, Ludwotg.0 Phtlosophtcal Investtgattons.0 Translated uy Gertrude Eltzauete
Margaret Anscoeue.0 3rd ed.0 Malden: Blackwoell Puultsetng Ltd, 2kk1.0
Wolfrae, Syutl.0 ‘Huee on Personal Identtty’.0 Mtnd 83, no.0 332 (1974i): 586–93.0
Wood, Ledger.0 ‘Descartes’ Petlosopey of Mtnd’.0 The Phtlosophtcal Revtew 4i1, no.0 5 (1932):
4i66–77.0
Yaffe, Gtdeon.0 ‘Locke on Chonsctousness, Personal Identtty and tee Idea of Duratton’.0
Noûs 4i5, no.0 3 (2k11): 387–4ik8.0
94i

Understanding The Self PDF

Transféré par

Informations du document

Titre original

Copyright

Formats disponibles

Partager ce document

Partager ou intégrer le document

Options de partage

Avez-vous trouvé ce document utile ?

Ce contenu est-il inapproprié ?

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

Understanding The Self PDF

Transféré par

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

Understanding the

Four Modern Accounts of Self

Thts woork ts ltcensed under tee Chreattvee Choeeons AttrtuuttonSSeareAltke 4i.0k

§1.0 Weat ts tee self?.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.05

part 1 modern accounts of self

part 2 personal reflections

Cheapter 1 A Flat Ontology: The I and tee Oteer.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.077

§2. Summary of Contents

1 Alltson, ‘Locke’s Theory of Personal Identtty’, 4i1.0

1 Descartes, Medttattons, Objecttons, and Repltes, 92.0

§4. The Ego Cogtto

‘That suustance tn woetce teouget teeedtately restdes ts “etnd.0”’5

1 Descartes, Medttattons, Objecttons, and Repltes, 117.0

1 Descartes, Medttattons, Objecttons, and Repltes, 16.0

1 Descartes, Medttattons, Objecttons, and Repltes, 4i5.0

§5. The Intutttve Self-Evtdence of the Ego

1 Descartes, Medttattons, Objecttons, and Repltes, 1k3.0

1 Huee, A Treattse of Human Nature, 134i.0

§7. Dtscovertng the Problem of Personal Identtty

1 Alltson, ‘Locke’s Theory of Personal Identtty’, 4i1.0

Chartestan doctrtne of tee soul as a tetnktng tetng, eade tt dtffcult to deteretne tn

a. the identity of substances and living things

Locke’s tdenttty of substance aeounts to a strtct and eetapeystcal defnttton of nueertcal

1 Strawoson, ‘“The Secrets of All Hearts”: Locke on Personal Identtty’.0

b. locke’s concept of substance

1 Locke, An Essay Concerntng Human Unnderstandtng, 298.0

1 Locke, An Essay Concerntng Human Unnderstandtng, 1k9.0

c. the problem of personal identity

§8. Of Identtty and Dtverstty

1 Locke, An Essay Concerntng Human Unnderstandtng, 297.0

1 Locke, An Essay Concerntng Human Unnderstandtng, 3k2.0

of tets tntelltgtutltty ts teat tt ts accoepanted uy eany paradoxes and contradtcttons.0

The argueent goes: tf person B at t2 recogntzes eteself to ue tee saee as person A

And later on:

1 Retd, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, 1:398.0

2.0 As to Locke’s concept of eeeory: teouge ee talks of eeeory as tf tt’s a store S

Thouge tn tets passage ee refers to tee percepttons of eeeory as ‘past percepttons’,

cases ts uecause tt ts not tn relatton to tee saee consctousness teat A ts affreed to ue B

1 Retd, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, 1:4ik1.0

1 Locke, An Essay Concerntng Human Unnderstandtng, 175.0

argueent, consctousness.0 To uetter tllustrate tee dtfference uetwoeen duratton and

1 Locke, An Essay Concerntng Human Unnderstandtng, 3k4i.0

§9. Real and Ftctttous Ideas

1 Huee, A Treattse of Human Nature, 7.0

‘Weateveer ts dtsttnct, ts dtsttngutseaule; and woeateveer ts dtsttngutseaule, ts separaule uy tee

generally assuee.0 Stnce eveerytetng teat ts separaule ts dtsttngutseaule, and can ue

1 Huee, A Treattse of Human Nature, 16.0

§10. The Organtc Ftcton

1 Huee, A Treattse of Human Nature, 14i.0

1 Huee, A Treattse of Human Nature, 14i4i–52.0

And tts role tn personal tdenttty ts eostly ltnked to repeated reeeeurance:

1 Mendus, ‘Personal Identtty: The Twoo Analogtes tn Huee’, 63.0

Huee’s tdea of syepatey reseeules Locke’s concept of organtsatton (p.024i), teouge

1 Huee, A Treattse of Human Nature, 168.0

1 Huee, A Treattse of Human Nature, 17k.0

§11. Penelhum’s Objecton

On tets account tt ts teposstule for soeetetng to ue nueertcally tdenttcal wotteout

1 Huee, A Treattse of Human Nature, 134i.0

§12. The Appendtx Aporta

1 Strawoson, The Evtdent Connexton, 117.0

a. the problem of adequacy interpretation

Weat trouuled Huee, accordtng to eost popular accounts, ts teat a seortcoetng tn

1 Huee, A Treattse of Human Nature, 4ikk.0