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Kohli and P. Singh (eds) Routledge Handbook of Indian Politics. pp119-128. New
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Dalit Politics: Untouchability, Identity and Assertion
Hugo Gorringe
Introduction
Dalit, the Marathi term meaning downtrodden, implies ‘those who have been broken,
ground down by those above them in a deliberate and active way’ (Zelliot 1996: 267).
Since the 1970s, it has increasingly been adopted by those at the foot of the caste hierarchy
across India. Rejecting other appellations, activists seeking equality, justice and the
implementation of the constitution have opted to highlight their continued oppression by
calling themselves what they are (downtrodden). The term thus, Zelliot continues, contains
‘an inherent denial of pollution, karma, and justified caste hierarchy’. Dalits previously
called untouchables, outcastes, Depressed Classes, harijans and panchamas (see Charsley
1996) were those condemned to perform the most menial and degrading jobs, and
considered to be carriers of pollution. Now, in calling themselves Dalits, activists have
inverted the stigma associated with their lowly status. Although not all exuntouchables use
or recognise the term, it is widely employed in local, national and global politics and
carries legitimacy in its stance against caste discrimination.
1
Gorringe, H. 2012: ‘Dalit Politics: Untouchability, Identity and Assertion’, in A.
Kohli and P. Singh (eds) Routledge Handbook of Indian Politics. pp119-128. New
York & London: Routledge. ISBN: 978-0-415-77685-1
Indeed, in 2010, when the first black President of the USA addressed the Indian Parliament
he paid homage to Dr Ambedkar, the first Law Minister of India and preeminent champion
of the lowest castes, referring to him as a Dalit. Seated alongside Barack Obama as he
made that speech was Meira Kumar, the speaker of the house and also an exuntouchable.
Around that time Mayawati, the Dalit Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh, was touted as a
potential future Prime Minister despite leading a mainly Dalit party. Notwithstanding her
position and achievements, in 2008 a dominant caste farmers’ leader abused Mayawati in
casteist terms from a public platform. The strength of feeling inspired by caste and the
distance still to be travelled towards equality may be seen in the fact that neither of the two
main political parties condemned the abuse. Would such silence have been acceptable had
an opposition leader ridiculed Obama in racial terms? Whilst the Constitution of
Independent India rendered untouchability a criminal offence and identified a number of
‘Scheduled Castes’ (SCs) as requiring positive discrimination to offset generations of
subordination, therefore, it is the language of Dalithood and mobilisation on that basis that
has animated the fight against caste.
This chapter offers an overview of Dalit mobilization and engagement with politics starting
with the colonial period. It provides a brief introduction to pre and postIndependence
Dalit politics, parties and outcomes. For all the successes of Dalit politics, some have
questioned it ability to articulate an alternative (Omvedt 1994); to push on from its initial
successes (Shah 2004); or to improve the lives of those it claims to represent (Pai 2002). I
2
Gorringe, H. 2012: ‘Dalit Politics: Untouchability, Identity and Assertion’, in A.
Kohli and P. Singh (eds) Routledge Handbook of Indian Politics. pp119-128. New
York & London: Routledge. ISBN: 978-0-415-77685-1
will, therefore, chart some of the diverse ways in which Dalits have sought to challenge
caste hegemony. Whilst autonomous Dalit parties have increasingly gained political
recognition and victories, they cannot be divorced from the social conditions faced by the
majority of Dalits. Dalit parties, as Pai (2002) puts it, are always also social movements.
Looking beyond political institutions reveals the social and cultural aspects of the Dalit
struggle in fields such as religion, arts and literature. Dalit movements also operate on
multiple scales: highlighting atrocities and practices of untouchability at the local level;
forging alliances and raising demands at the national level; and engaging allies, institutions
and governments across the world. Even as it has gained global currency, however, the
term Dalit has lost some of its resonance for those on the ground and some Dalits across
India are envisioning a postDalit future. I conclude by considering what such a future
might look like, but begin by looking back to the origins of Dalit politics.
Roots of Resistance: caste, colonialism and independence
‘If traditional scholarship on caste were to be accepted’, Gupta (2005: 411) observes, ‘then
even those who were considered low or impure in the ritual order would consider their
position to be just and befitting their status’. Indeed, as recently as 1979, Moffatt concluded
that untouchables accept the cultural underpinnings of the dominant social order.
Conceived like this, caste is a consensual, functional and harmonious system. More
recently, however, historical research and advances in the theoretical understanding of
3
Gorringe, H. 2012: ‘Dalit Politics: Untouchability, Identity and Assertion’, in A.
Kohli and P. Singh (eds) Routledge Handbook of Indian Politics. pp119-128. New
York & London: Routledge. ISBN: 978-0-415-77685-1
power have suggested alternate ways of understanding caste (Gorringe and Rafanell 2007;
Mosse 2007). Such work points to the antecedents of contemporary Dalit movements in the
egalitarian bhakti (devotional) cults dating back to the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries
(Zelliot 1996); in cases of flight or migration (Srinivas 1991); in conversion to ‘casteless’
religions like Buddhism, Sikhism, Islam or Christianity (Webster 1992); and in instances
where whole castes – such as the Nadars in Tamil Nadu – attained upward mobility with
political, economic and educational assets (Hardgrave 1969). Resistance of this nature,
however, was rarely widespread, systematic or organised. It was the onset of British rule
that paved the way for the modern Dalit movement.
The Raj unwittingly contributed to subaltern – including Dalit – mobilisation in multiple
ways. The move towards a centralised state expanded the horizons of previously segmented
groups, opening up the possibilities for translocal relationships, identities and politics.
This process was augmented by the creation of meaningful panIndian categories like the
‘Depressed Classes’ around which disparate jatis (local caste groups) could coalesce. If
such categories provided identity options, the collection of census data by caste served to
delineate and animate caste boundaries, enabling the emergence of statewide caste
associations (Rudolph and Rudolph 1967). Simultaneously, colonialism resulted in the
separation of social and state power. This opened up avenues for social protest and
mobility: those facing caste discrimination could now appeal to British courts; those
wishing to change their social status could lobby census officials; those seeking caste
4
Gorringe, H. 2012: ‘Dalit Politics: Untouchability, Identity and Assertion’, in A.
Kohli and P. Singh (eds) Routledge Handbook of Indian Politics. pp119-128. New
York & London: Routledge. ISBN: 978-0-415-77685-1
neutral jobs had greater opportunities; educational institutions were provided for (or opened
to) lower castes; and improvements in transport infrastructure enhanced the movement of
people and ideas (Omvedt 1994; Shah 2001; Jaffrelot 2003). Furthermore,
commercialization, as Bayly (1988: 11) argues, meant not just the increase in the use of
money in the economy but also ‘the use of objective monetary values to express social
relationships’. In short, these sociostructural changes eroded established hierarchies, and
challenged the authority of dominant castes, monarchs and spiritual leaders (Dirks 1987).
As a consequence, the gradual introduction of the institutions of selfgovernance was
attended by multiple expressions of caste politics.
Six (overlapping) political currents in the preIndependence phase influenced and continue
to shape the contours of Dalit politics. These are communist parties, Dravidian or non
Brahmin parties, the institution of reservations, Gandhi’s views on untouchability,
Ambedkar’s politics, and the rise of Hindu nationalism. Communist or socialist movements
in India have perceived the class struggle to be paramount and sought to unite the poor of
all castes. Although there have been successful campaigns by peasants and agricultural
workers (see Gough 1991), and stategovernments in Kerala and West Bengal have
improved human development indicators, the lowest castes have tended to be excluded
from leadership. They have been represented, rather than representing themselves. Even
today Maoist or Naxalite movements emerge from the discrimination faced by the
impoverished but are rarely led by them. ‘NonBrahmin’ politics extended leadership
5
Gorringe, H. 2012: ‘Dalit Politics: Untouchability, Identity and Assertion’, in A.
Kohli and P. Singh (eds) Routledge Handbook of Indian Politics. pp119-128. New
York & London: Routledge. ISBN: 978-0-415-77685-1
beyond the highest castes, especially in the south where there are fewer representatives of
the Kshastriya varna (or warrior class), and intermediate and lower castes mobilised around
that administrative category (Irschick 1969; Gorringe 2005). Although they varied across
states, most nonBrahmin movements gained forms of affirmative action and challenged
Brahmin superiority and power. In northern states, by contrast, caste constituencies and
landholding patterns precluded such developments (Jaffrelot 2003).
Already in the manoeuvring of nonBrahmin castes we can see the influence of quota or
reservation politics. Quotas for members of the Scheduled Castes were introduced as early
as 1892. The structure of reservations subsequently expanded significantly and remains
central to Indian politics. Although reserved places in educational institutions and
government jobs have had limited impact due to the number of unfilled places and the
preponderance of SCs in more menial positions, they have facilitated the emergence of a
Dalit middle class from which the leadership of contemporary Dalit movements is drawn
(Shah 2001; Pai 2002; Jaffrelot 2003). The results of reservations in the political arena have
been more ambiguous, largely due to the opposition between Gandhian and Ambedkarite
visions of caste. Whilst Gandhi led the struggle for a free and united India, Ambedkar
questioned the value of Independence under upper caste rule (Gorringe 2008). Both saw
untouchability as evil, but they articulated fundamentally different prescriptions for caste
reform: Gandhi portrayed a functional system of socioeconomic cooperation in which
each caste fulfilled different but equally essential roles. The key task before Hindus,
6
Gorringe, H. 2012: ‘Dalit Politics: Untouchability, Identity and Assertion’, in A.
Kohli and P. Singh (eds) Routledge Handbook of Indian Politics. pp119-128. New
York & London: Routledge. ISBN: 978-0-415-77685-1
therefore, was to embrace manual workers and lower castes as equals. Ambedkar, by
contrast, felt that caste was inimical to equality and he confronted it through social
agitation, political engagement and, ultimately, conversion to Buddhism (Zelliot 2006).
This clash of ideologies had material political consequences. At the Round Table
Conference in 1931 Ambedkar argued that the untouchables could not select candidates
who represented their interests unless they were empowered to vote separately from the rest
of the population. When he won the argument, Gandhi went on a ‘fast unto death’. Separate
electorates, he insisted, would drive an irreversible wedge between the untouchables and
the rest of (Hindu) society much as the Morley Minto reforms of 1909 were seen to have
resultant Poona Pact established that there would be constituencies that were reserved for
untouchable candidates (in proportion to their population), but were open to all voters
(Zelliot 1996: 168). Since Dalits do not form a majority in any constituency, ‘nonDalits
decide which Dalit should win’ (Larbeer, in Gorringe 2005: 309). Requiring each party to
field Dalit candidates, furthermore, means that Dalit leaders are badly divided and
beholden to particular parties which ‘tends to produce compliant and accommodating
leaders’ (Galanter 1991: 549). Reservations have, nevertheless, proved to be politically
contentious and when the Mandal Commission (see Jaffrelot, this volume) recommended
extending quotas to other low castes, advocates of the report clashed with higher caste
adversaries. Mandal threatened the unity of the category Hindu, and was both a reaction to,
7
Gorringe, H. 2012: ‘Dalit Politics: Untouchability, Identity and Assertion’, in A.
Kohli and P. Singh (eds) Routledge Handbook of Indian Politics. pp119-128. New
York & London: Routledge. ISBN: 978-0-415-77685-1
and further catalyst for, the politics of Hindutva (Muralidharan 1990). If nothing else,
Mandal demonstrated the continued strength of caste sentiment.
Identity and its Discontents
India, Corbridge and Harriss (2000: 21) argue, experienced a ‘passive revolution’ which
saw radical changes in legislation and planning but stymied grassroots assertion or actual
sociostructural reform. Some effects of such a ‘revolution’ can filter down and generate
change – not least through a ‘revolution of rising expectations’ – and this encapsulates
developments in Dalit politics. Disillusioned by the compromises built into the process
Ambedkar declared that he himself would burn the constitution and led a mass conversion
to Buddhism to emphasise his rejection of Hinduism (Omvedt 1994). Thus, whilst
Congress was able to secure the support of a broad crosssection of society (including
Dalits) in the postwar years, their legitimacy was always subject to question as reforms
failed to match either legislation or rhetoric (Rawat 2003). Frustrated at the slow pace of
change and the inability of Dalit parties to make political inroads, and inspired by struggles
around the world, new Dalit movements emerged in the 1970s and 1980s. This wave of
assertion is best characterised by the Dalit Panthers of Maharashtra who echoed the
struggles of the Black Panthers in the USA and operated in social, cultural and political
spheres (Joshi 1986). This phase witnessed the emergence of Dalit arts and literature and
saw a revival of actions that confronted untouchability headon by walking down high caste
streets, smashing up teastalls that used separate receptacles for Dalits and so on.
8
Gorringe, H. 2012: ‘Dalit Politics: Untouchability, Identity and Assertion’, in A.
Kohli and P. Singh (eds) Routledge Handbook of Indian Politics. pp119-128. New
York & London: Routledge. ISBN: 978-0-415-77685-1
This phase, which gradually spread across much of the country, signalled a rejection of
established parties and the ‘token representation’ (McMillan 2005) afforded by the election
of ‘tame’ SC candidates. Kanshi Ram (1982) – who founded the Backward and Minorities
Community Employees Federation (BAMCEF) which organised elite members of the
Scheduled Castes and the Bahujan Samaj Party (see Pai, this volume) – captured this spirit
of assertion in referring to Dalit politicians as chamchas (stooges). He portrayed them as
‘internal others’ and called for autonomous organisation to achieve meaningful change.
The issue of autonomy is crucial here. Initially it meant Dalit parties that were independent
from, and opposed to, established political players. States across India witnessed the
emergence of Dalit parties operating outside institutional politics before entering the
political arena. Increasingly, however, the inability of such parties to gain electoral success
saw their autonomy eroded. Dalit politics came to mean mobilization under Dalit
leadership even if those parties were subsequently coopted and incorporated (Omvedt
1994).
The premise of identity politics (or the politics of recognition) is that the oppressed can and
should represent themselves. It presumes the preeminence of one out of the multiple
identities available to (and assumed by) the group. Thus a Dalit is presumed to be a Dalit
despite also being a worker, a woman, a Tamil, a parent, a Paraiyar and an Indian (not to
mention possible affiliations to green politics or sports which may shape their self
9
Gorringe, H. 2012: ‘Dalit Politics: Untouchability, Identity and Assertion’, in A.
Kohli and P. Singh (eds) Routledge Handbook of Indian Politics. pp119-128. New
York & London: Routledge. ISBN: 978-0-415-77685-1
definition). The forms of identity that can be adopted, however, are socially delimited.
Despite his outstanding achievements, for instance, the President of India, K. R Narayanan,
was routinely depicted as a Dalit. He was pigeonholed into a category of origin that was
deemed to say more about him than any other label. The politicisation of a chosen identity,
in other words, can crystallise social boundaries (Gorringe 2005).
Identitybased Dalit mobilisation has given the lie to the notion of Congress and others as
‘umbrella parties’ that represent the interests of diverse social groups. Collective action has
mobilised previously inactive citizens, increased their consciousness of rights, raised the
issues in the public domain and opened the portals of institutional politics to hitherto un
represented and marginalised actors and issues. Furthermore, by mobilising around a
stigmatised identity, Dalits successfully challenged stigma and offered a (re)celebration of
hitherto neglected or despised cultural forms. Given the centrality of notions of honour to
everyday interaction across India, the struggle for selfesteem is critical in the search for
sociopolitical inclusion. Symbolic politics have been central to this endeavour. Dalit
movements have colonised the public sphere both physically (through marches, fasts and
rallies) and symbolically (Gorringe 2005; Waghmore 2010). A process of
Ambedkarisation, especially since 1990 (his centenary year), has seen statues, street and
estate names, portraits, murals, posters and plaques pay homage to Ambedkar in many
states . He is usually depicted as a blue suited, bespectacled man with a large book
(representing the constitution) under one arm. These statues stand as metonyms for Dalit
10
Gorringe, H. 2012: ‘Dalit Politics: Untouchability, Identity and Assertion’, in A.
Kohli and P. Singh (eds) Routledge Handbook of Indian Politics. pp119-128. New
York & London: Routledge. ISBN: 978-0-415-77685-1
assertion and the unfinished business of nationbuilding. Though all parties now honour
Ambedkar’s birthday, it is Dalits who perceive him as one of their own and jealously guard
his image – resorting to violence where it is demeaned (Jaoul 2006).
There is a paradox here. Whilst the occupation of public spaces with such symbols inspire
Dalits with aspirations and pride, Ravikumar activisttheoretician of the Dalit movement
and Tamil MLA between 20062011 – argues that ‘if we allow caste pride, we can never
achieve the annihilation of caste, nor even equality among castes’ (2009: 280). Indeed,
Dalit movements have prompted the formation of (often aggressive) countermovements
which have responded to Dalit assertion with ‘extravagant revenge’ (Mendelsohn and
Vicziany 1998: 54). The phrase describes instances in which challenges to caste norms
(such a walking down a high caste street or wearing western clothes) have been met by
disproportionate violence calculated to ‘keep Dalits in their place’. Radical Dalit groups
have responded by advocating a counterviolence of the oppressed; a strategy that has, at
best, mixed results (Gorringe 2006; Jaoul 2008). Alongside the jubilation at shedding a
‘slave mentality’ has been the anguish and fear that attends caste atrocities. Exclusive
mobilisation can rob Dalits of their individuality by casting them as representative of the
entire group (and punishable as such) (cf. Shah et al 2006). Sectoral mobilisation can also
limit successes, as when movement demands are met by compartmentalising the issues and
creating a ‘commissioner for Scheduled Castes’. Such legal exceptionalism, Rao (2009)
argues, reinforces distinctions and increases vulnerability in the act of legislating against it.
11
Gorringe, H. 2012: ‘Dalit Politics: Untouchability, Identity and Assertion’, in A.
Kohli and P. Singh (eds) Routledge Handbook of Indian Politics. pp119-128. New
York & London: Routledge. ISBN: 978-0-415-77685-1
Such politics also raise questions pertaining to organisation and constituency: If a group
can only be represented by a group member then who defines the parameters of the group?
How specific should identity claims be? Should Dalit movements organise at the national,
state or local level, and along lines of category, caste or subcaste? Furthermore shouldn’t
due consideration be given to the divergent interests of Dalit women, workers and
students? Such questions have partly fuelled the fragmentation of Dalit politics. Most
parties are overlycentralised, and since Dalit parties tend to lack resources this encourages
ambitious secondary leaders to form splinter groups. The rhetoric of authenticity and
representation also drives the formation of castespecific organisations, often in
competition with each other for votes, resources or even reservations (as in the demand for
subreservations within the SC quota). As Omvedt (2001: 156) observes, the rise of
independent parties has shattered the image of the Dalits as a homogeneous votebank to be
bought off in elections. Instead we have ‘voting blocs – autonomous, acting on their own
and bargaining with the larger parties. But these have proved to be jatibased blocs’, thus
impairing the transformative potential of a broader Dalit politics, fostering intraDalit
competition and focusing attention on relative deprivation between Dalit castes.
Somewhat more positively, the recognition of identity has resulted in a welcome
recognition of gender issues. Given that gender and caste combine to render Dalit women
more vulnerable to caste discrimination, the opportunity to voice concerns and highlight
12
Gorringe, H. 2012: ‘Dalit Politics: Untouchability, Identity and Assertion’, in A.
Kohli and P. Singh (eds) Routledge Handbook of Indian Politics. pp119-128. New
York & London: Routledge. ISBN: 978-0-415-77685-1
issues in ‘women’s wings’ creates a ‘space within the struggle’ (Sen 1990). Again, though,
the separation of issues means that the female strand of the movement can be accorded
secondary importance; ‘the caste struggle first and then we’ll think about patriarchy’, in a
stance that ignores the patriarchal lives of many Dalit activists (Dietrich 1998). Arguably,
the goal of commanding or sharing political power has come to dominate Dalit politics.
The neglect of gender concerns and the willingness to forge alliances with communal
parties suggests an overly political focus, and even where Dalit parties have reached out to
nonDalits, this engagement has been political rather than social (Shah 2001) as witnessed
by the problems of reaching out to Muslim and Christian ‘Dalits’ (Govinda 2009). Whilst
the move to politics was partly a response to repression, the emphasis on gaining political
power rather than challenging caste in its everyday manifestations means some activists
still struggle to eat, drink and work with those from lower Dalit castes (Gorringe and
Rafanell 2007).
Dalit Politics at an Impasse?
Dalit movements, in other words, are being ‘institutionalised’, whereby they ‘develop
internal organisation, become more moderate, adopt a more institutional repertoire of
action and integrate into the system of interest representation’ (Della Porta & Diani 1999:
148). This process has alienated many supporters (EPW 2009a), reinforcing the point that
electoral success in itself does not necessarily reflect the interests of the disadvantaged
(Jeffery et al, 2001). Pai (2002) contends that the BSP primarily pursues empowerment
13
Gorringe, H. 2012: ‘Dalit Politics: Untouchability, Identity and Assertion’, in A.
Kohli and P. Singh (eds) Routledge Handbook of Indian Politics. pp119-128. New
York & London: Routledge. ISBN: 978-0-415-77685-1
from ‘above’, viewing it in purely political terms. The BSP has, thus, allied with parties
opposed to Dalit assertion, weakening attempts to eradicate caste inequalities. Dalit parties
in Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu have suffered a similar fate (Omvedt 2003), indicating an
enduring tension between radical movements seeking to transform social relations and
political parties seeking poll success. A scathing EPW editorial (2009b) argues that the
BSP’s politics of symbolism masks a failure to tackle enduring hierarchies and forms of
exploitation. Dalit parties’ inability to implement policies such as land reform or ensure
that atrocities are punished and reservations filled, jars with the increased expectations of
followers, resulting in the argument that Dalit politics has ‘reached an impasse’ (Shah
2004:131).
Given the successes of Dalit politics, especially in Uttar Pradesh – where the BSP’s
formation of statelevel governments led some commentators (Kohli 2001; Jaffrelot 2003)
to identify a ‘Dalit revolution’ in northern India even before it won an unparalleled
absolute Assembly majority in 2007 – some might question the idea of an impasse. The
BSP has undoubtedly effected significant social and political alterations in UP, expanded
the public sphere and underscored the ability of Dalits to wield political power (Pai 2002;
Ciotti 2010), but electoral alliances, votes polled and seats contested say little about the
microdynamics of caste politics. Jeffrey et al (2008: 1366), therefore, critique the tendency
to focus on state or national level impacts of political shifts at the expense of ‘people’s
consciousness of political change’, and highlight a ‘marked disjuncture between formal
14
Gorringe, H. 2012: ‘Dalit Politics: Untouchability, Identity and Assertion’, in A.
Kohli and P. Singh (eds) Routledge Handbook of Indian Politics. pp119-128. New
York & London: Routledge. ISBN: 978-0-415-77685-1
political change and groundlevel political realities’ (2008: 1392; Lerche 2008). Elsewhere,
studies suggest that cadre from established parties refuse to campaign or vote for Dalit
coalition partners (Gorringe 2007; Wyatt 2009). The ‘impasse’, thus, refers to the fact that
significant symbolic victories coexist with continuing casteism and deprivation (Pai 2009).
Mehrotra’s (2006) finding that Tamil Dalits fare better in social indicators than their UP
counterparts, suggests that Dalit power is no panacea. Harriss (2006: 238) points to three
key variables that impact on the performance of propoor policies: firstly agrarian power
relations and interactions between the local and state level; secondly the nature and
competitiveness of party systems; and finally the existence of an organised Left that can
challenge landed elites and deliver some agrarian reforms. He also (2006: 236) highlights
the importance of political participation amongst the lower castes and classes for the
implementation of such programmes, and the negative impact of upper caste domination.
From this perspective, it is unsurprising that general programmes such as the Public
Distribution System, the Midday Meals Scheme, Employment Guarantee Schemes and
basic health and education drives may benefit SCs more than programmes targeted
specifically at them (which face opposition as a consequence) (Heyer and Gopal Jayal
2009). It also highlights the potential (as yet unrealised) of panchayat reservations ‘to
transform the lived experiences of caste and gender’ (ibid. 14).
15
Gorringe, H. 2012: ‘Dalit Politics: Untouchability, Identity and Assertion’, in A.
Kohli and P. Singh (eds) Routledge Handbook of Indian Politics. pp119-128. New
York & London: Routledge. ISBN: 978-0-415-77685-1
Caste, this reminds us, is based on social rather than political relations meaning that we
need to shift our focus beyond formal institutions. Whilst Dalit parties have been said to
neglect bottomup mobilisation, Waghmore’s (2010) study of Dalit politics in Maharashtra
argues that we can only speak of an impasse if we ignore the ferment of activity at the local
level where increased awareness is translating into multiple struggles for land, rights and
dignity. Perhaps the most enduring legacy of Dalit mobilisation will be the erosion of fear
and the multiplicity of projects across India which it has spawned to contest caste
discrimination and render it socially unacceptable. Dalit literature, arts festivals, histories,
writing and NGOs all move the issues beyond the institutional realm and open up new
spaces in the struggle for equality.
Not the least of these spaces is the increasingly global engagement of Dalit activists. Whilst
Dalit politics emerges out of the everyday experiences of caste, it is at the global level
where a truly Dalit politics transcending markers of caste, class and region has emerged.
The declaration that ‘Dalit Rights are Human Rights’ has seen Dalit mobilisation extend
beyond the confines of the state (Lerche 2008). Similarly, innumerable Dalit
representatives attended the International Conference on Racism in Durban in 2001, and
ensured that caste discrimination was placed firmly on the UN agenda (Hardtmann 2009).
Dalit leaders addressed the World Social Forum in Mumbai to argue that defeating the twin
evils of casteism and communalism required Dalits to unite with other ‘radical, progressive
and democratic forces’ (Thirumaavalavan 2004: 239). They also echoed critiques of neo
16
Gorringe, H. 2012: ‘Dalit Politics: Untouchability, Identity and Assertion’, in A.
Kohli and P. Singh (eds) Routledge Handbook of Indian Politics. pp119-128. New
York & London: Routledge. ISBN: 978-0-415-77685-1
liberalism, pointing to their corrosive effect on state provision which is essential for so
many Dalits. Operating at the local, regional, national and global spheres, Dalit politics
have opened up multiple arenas of resistance and have shifted the ‘moorings of caste’
(Heyer 2010).
New Directions and PostDalit Politics?
Deliège argued that Untouchables suffer from a ‘paradoxical marginality’, because they are
‘socially excluded but economically indispensable’ (1997: 104). Their ‘paradoxical
marginality’ clearly extends into the political sphere where Dalits are indispensable to
electoral competition as voters, and reserved candidates (very few Dalits stand in general
constituencies), but are simultaneously excluded from real decisionmaking power and
responsibility. Since the 1970s Dalit movements have tried to move their concerns into the
centrestage, by forming independent parties and voting for themselves. The successes of
such parties should not be discounted. Indeed, Ciotti (2010) notes how empowered female
BSP activists are shedding the Dalit label which continues to be a marker of caste,
powerlessness and stigma not in a strategic search for leverage or resources but because it
does not capture their experiences. Just as the rejection of harijan and SC heralded a new
phase in the struggle against caste, so might the increased questioning of Dalit signal ‘a
new politics of caste.’
17
Gorringe, H. 2012: ‘Dalit Politics: Untouchability, Identity and Assertion’, in A.
Kohli and P. Singh (eds) Routledge Handbook of Indian Politics. pp119-128. New
York & London: Routledge. ISBN: 978-0-415-77685-1
Dalit parties are deliberately shifting their horizons towards larger constituencies, most
notably in the BSP’s transformation from bahujan to ‘savarjan party’ representing all
castes and classes (Pai, this volume). Ciotti’s (2010: 54) analysis suggests that Dalit
identity may be a staging post towards a more egalitarian society, but if this applies only to
an elite who abandon the less empowered to their victimhood then a ‘postDalit’ politics
will be limited indeed. Dalit politics has deepened and democratised India’s political
institutions and significantly shifted social attitudes. No political party can now ignore
Dalit issues, few would question the desirability of equality as a social norm and some
blatant expressions of untouchability have declined, as has the dependence of Dalits on
higher caste landlords or patrons. There has also been significant social mobility for middle
class Dalits. Increasing differentiation on class lines, however, brings material concerns to
the fore. As Mendelsohn and Vicziany observe, it would be scant comfort for the Dalits if
social liberation was ‘attended by perpetual poverty’ (1998: 270). If mobilization becomes
merely a means to political ends, then the aspirations and ambitions of Dalit citizens will
continue to be frustrated and the potential for violence will remain.
‘Isolation, political marginalisation and social exclusion are … central to poverty and need
to be addressed before longterm economic initiatives can be successful’ (Thorp et al.
2005: 917). Heyer’s meticulous, longitudinal study of a deprived and marginal Tamil Dalit
caste offers an overview of the position of Dalits in a changing economy. She documents
the erosion of dependency, the increase in aspirations and education and the rise in political
18
Gorringe, H. 2012: ‘Dalit Politics: Untouchability, Identity and Assertion’, in A.
Kohli and P. Singh (eds) Routledge Handbook of Indian Politics. pp119-128. New
York & London: Routledge. ISBN: 978-0-415-77685-1
engagement. Despite this, she notes continuing exclusion and discrimination and concludes
that: ‘It is all too easy to see a future in which their relative position continues to
deteriorate, unless they can mobilize effectively to force changes’ (Heyer 2010: 241). Dalit
politics, in other words, remains as significant to the democratisation of India as ever, but it
continues to be defined by protest and lacks a coherent transformative agenda (Omvedt
1994; Pai 2002).
Dalit politics has arguably been clouded by the quest for formal power, but democracy is as
much a social practice as a system of political representation. Dalit movements have,
effectively, been antiuntouchability not anticaste. In focusing on state power and
mobilising around caste they not only animate the spirit of status competition on which the
caste system is predicated, but neglect the relations and structures that sustain it. There is a
certain resignation about the ‘compulsions and compromises’ of politics, but issues arise
when the leadership become divorced from the masses. Thachil and Herring (2008) note
that the Hindu Right gained Dalit votes by organising at the grassroots and providing
welfare. Ambedkar arguably failed in elections because he neglected the organizational and
programmatic aspects of party development which translated into a lack of popular support
(Bandyopadhyay 2000). Contemporary Dalit parties likewise need to confront issues of
internal democratization, accountability and openness with regard to leadership, gender,
(sub)caste identity and ideology, and nurture the grassroots networking and organisation
that carried them to power in the first place.
19
Gorringe, H. 2012: ‘Dalit Politics: Untouchability, Identity and Assertion’, in A.
Kohli and P. Singh (eds) Routledge Handbook of Indian Politics. pp119-128. New
York & London: Routledge. ISBN: 978-0-415-77685-1
Waghmore for helpful comments. The usual disclaimers apply.
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