A.C. No.
376 April 30, 1963 permission to marry, for her foster parents will object and even my
JOSEFINA ROYONG, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ARISTON OBLENA, respondent.
BARRERA, J.:
In a verified complaint filed with this Court on January 14, 1959,
complainant Josefina Royong charged the respondent Ariston J. Oblena,
a member of the Philippine Bar, with rape allegedly committed on her
person in the manner described therein. Upon requirement of this
Court, the respondent filed his answer denying all the allegations in the
complaint and praying that he be not disbarred. On February 3, 1959,
this Court referred the case to the Solicitor General for investigation,
report and recommendation.
On July 10, 1961, the Solicitor General submitted his report on the case
with the recommendation that the respondent "be permanently
removed from his office lawyer and his name be stricken from the roll
of attorneys". The pertinent part of the report reads as follows:
The complainant testified that after lunch on August 5, 1958, Cecilia
Angeles, her foster mother, left her alone in their house and went down
to the pig sty to feed the pigs. At about 1:00 p.m., while she"
(complainant) was ironing clothes on the second floor of the house the
respondent entered and read a newspaper at her back. Suddenly he
covered her mouth with one hand and with the other hand dragged her
to one of the bedrooms of the house and forced her to lie down on the
floor. She did not shout for help because he threatened her and her
family with death. He next undressed as she lay on the floor, then had
sexual intercourse with her after he removed her panties and gave her
hard blows on the thigh with his fist to subdue her resistance. After the
sexual intercourse, he warned her not to report him to her foster
parents, otherwise, he would kill her and all the members of her family.
She resumed ironing clothes after he left until 5:00 o'clock that
afternoon when she joined her foster mother on the first floor of the
house. As a result of the sexual intercourse she became pregnant and
gave birth to a baby on June 2, 1959 (pp. 4-8, 21, 23, 26, 27, t.s.n.,
hearing of Aug. 5, 1959).
She admitted that had she shouted for help she would have been heard
by the neighbors that she did not report the outrage to anyone because
of the threat made by the respondent; that she still frequented the
respondent's house after August 5, 1959, sometimes when he was
alone, ran errands for him, cooked his coffee, and received his mail for
him. Once, on November 14, 1958, when respondent was sick of
influenza, she was left alone with him in his house while her aunt
Briccia Angeles left for Manila to buy medicine (pp. 11, 14-18, 24, t.s.n.,
hearing of August 5, 1959).
The respondent on the witness stand denied that he raped the
complainant (p. 3, t.s.n., hearing of March 25 1960). He testified that
after lunch on August 5, 1958, he went to the Commission Of Civil
Service to follow up his appointment as technical assistant in the office
of the mayor of Makati, Rizal, and read the record of the administrative
case against Buenaventura Perez (pp. 23, 24, 34, t.s.n., hearing of
March 25, 1960, Exhs. 1 and 2).
The respondent, however, admitted that he had illicit relations with the
complainant from January, 1957 to December, 1958, when their
clandestine affair was discovered by the complainant's foster parents,
but to avoid criminal liability for seduction, according to him, he limited
himself to kissing and embracing her and sucking her tongue before
she completed her eighteenth birthday. They had their first sexual
intercourse on May 11, 1958, after she had reached eighteen, and the
second one week later, on May 18. The last intercourse took place
before Christmas in December, 1958. In all, they had sexual
intercourse about fifty times, mostly in her house and sometimes in his
house whenever they had the opportunity. He intended to marry her
when she could legally contract marriage without her foster parents'
intervention, 'in case occasion will permit ... because we cannot ask
common-law wife, will object.' After the discovery of their relationship
by the complainant's foster parents, he confessed the affair to Briccia,
explaining that he wanted to have a child, something she (Briccia)
could not give him. (pp. 14-16, 19-25, t.s.n., hearing of March 25,
1960).
xxx xxx xxx
FINDINGS AND COMMENT
There is no controversy that the respondent had carnal knowledge of
the complainant. The complainant claims she surrendered to him
under circumstances of violence and intimidation, but the undersigned
are convinced that the sexual intercourse was performed not once but
repeatedly and with her consent. From her behaviour before and after
the alleged rape, she appears to have been more a sweetheart than of
the victim of an outrage involving her honor ....
But the foregoing observations notwithstanding, the undersigned
cannot in conscience recommend respondent's exoneration. The
respondent tempted Briccia Angeles to live maritally with him not long
after she and her husband parted, and it is not improbable that the
spouses never reconciled because of him. His own evidence shows
that, tiring of her after more than fifteen years of adulterous
relationship with her and on the convenient excuse that she, Briccia
Angeles, could not bear a child, he seduced Josefina Andalis, then 17
or 18 years of age, resulting in her pregnancy and the birth of a child,
on June 2, 1959. The seduction was accomplished with grave abuse of
confidence and by means of promises of marriage which he knew he
could not fulfill without grievous injury to the woman who forsook her
husband so that he, respondent, could have all of her. He also took
advantage of his moral influence over her. From childhood, Josefina
Andalis, treated him as an uncle and called him 'tata' (uncle),
undoubtedly because he is the paramour of a sister of her mother.
Considering her age (she was 17 or 18 years old then), it is not difficult
to see why she could not resist him.
The evidence further shows that on July 22, 1954, the respondent filed
a sworn petition dated May 22, 1954 alleging "that he is a person of
good moral character" (Par. 3) and praying that the Supreme Court
permit him "to take the bar examinations to be given on the first
Saturday of August, 1954, or at any time as the Court may fix.."
But he was not then the person of good moral character he
represented himself to be. From 1942 to the present, he has
continuously lived an adulterous life with Briccia Angeles whose
husband is still alive, knowing that his concubine is a married woman
and that her marriage still subsists. This fact permanently disqualified
him from taking the bar examinations, and had it been known to the
Supreme Court in 1954, he would not have been permitted to take the
bar examinations that year or thereafter, or to take his oath of office as
a lawyer. As he was then permanently disqualified from admission to
the Philippine Bar by reason of his adulterous relations with a married
woman, it is submitted that the same misconduct should be sufficient
ground for his permanent disbarment, unless we recognize a double
standard of morality, one for membership to the Philippine Bar and
another for disbarment from the office of a lawyer.
xxx xxx xxx
RECOMMENDATION
Wherefore, the undersigned respectfully recommend that after due
hearing, respondent Ariston J. Oblena be permanently removed from
his office as a lawyer and his name be stricken from the roll of
attorneys.
In view of his own findings as a result of his investigation, that even if
respondent did not commit the alleged rape nevertheless he was guilty
of other misconduct, the Solicitor General formulated another
complaint which he appended to his report, charging the respondent of
falsely and deliberately alleging in his application for admission to the
bar that he is a person of good moral character; of living adulterously
with Briccia Angeles at the same time maintaining illicit relations with
the complainant Josefina Royong, niece of Briccia, thus rendering him
unworthy of public confidence and unfit and unsafe to manage the
legal business of others, and praying that this Court render judgment
ordering "the permanent removal of the respondent ... from his office
as a lawyer and the cancellation of his name from the roll of attorneys."
In his answer to this formal complaint, respondent alleged the special
defense that "the complaint does not merit action", since the causes of
action in the said complaint are different and foreign from the original
cause of action for rape and that "the complaint lacks the necessary
formalities called for in Sec. 1, Rule 128 of the Rules of Court."
Respondent prayed that after due notice and hearing for additional
evidence, the complaint be dismissed.
On September 13, 1961, this Court designated the Court Investigators
to receive the additional evidence. Accordingly the case was set for
hearing of which the parties were duly notified. On September 29, 1961,
respondent asked leave to submit a memorandum which was granted,
and on October 9, 1961 the same was filed, alleging the following: 1)
That the charge of rape has not been proven; 2) That no act of
seduction was committed by the respondent; 3) That no act of perjury
or fraudulent concealment was committed by the respondent when he
filed his petition for admission to the bar; and 4) That the respondent is
not morally unfit to be a member of the bar.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation
of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without
prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not
covered by this stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
At the hearing on November 16, 1961, respondent presented his
common-law wife, Briccia Angeles, who testified as follows:
... Respondent is her common-law husband (t.s.n. 23). She first met
respondent on December 16, 1941 at Cavinti, Laguna (t.s.n. 23). She
and her sister Cecilia Angeles-Royong were evacuated to Cavinti by the
Red Cross (t.s.n. 23). She was already married (to Teodoro Arines) at
the time (t.s.n. 24). She and Arines are from Iriga, Camarines Sur (t.s.n.
24). Respondent and one Mr. Flores registered them (t.s.n. 24) as
evacuees. When Mr. Flores asked her about her status she told him she
was 'single' (t.s.n. 25). She and her sister, Cecilia, were then told to
stay at respondent's house, respondent courted her (t.s.n. 26).
Respondent asked her if she was married and she told him 'we will talk
about that later on' (t.s.n. 26). She told respondent she was married
(to Arines) when she and respondent were already living together as
'husband and wife', in 1942( t.s.n. 26). Respondent asked her to marry
him, when they were living as husband and wife (t.s.n. 27). Her sister
Cecilia left Cavinti 2 months after their arrival thereat, but she did not
go with her because she and respondent 'had already a good
understanding'(sexual relations) [t.s.n. 27]. Later, she left Cavinti and
went to her hometown in Iriga, Camarines Sur, because respondent
was already reluctant to live with her and he told her it was better for
her to go home to Iriga (t.s.n. 25). Arriving at Iriga, she met her
legitimate husband (Arines), who told her he had already a wife,
named Conching Guevara (t.s.n. 28-29). She then went back to Cavinti
(in 1943), with her father, and lived with respondent (t.s.n. 29).
Respondent eventually agreed that she live with him (t.s.n. 35); in fact,
she is still presently living with respondent (t.s.n. 35) [Report of Court
Investigators, March 6, 1962, pp. 5-6]."
Thereafter, respondent requested permission to submit an affidavit at a
later date, which request was also granted. The affidavit was filed on
December 16, 1961, the respondent averring, among others, the
following:.
... That he never committed any act or crime of seduction against the
complainant, because the latter was born on February 19, 1940, and
his first sexual intercourse with her took place on May 11, 1958, when
she was already above 18 years of age; that he had been living with
his common-law wife, Briccia Angeles, for almost 20 years, but from
the time he began courting her, he 'had no intention to alienate' her
love for her husband, Arines, or to commit the crime of adultery; that
he courted Briccia on October 16, 1941, and was shortly thereafter
accepted by her; that on February 21, 1942, he found Briccia alone in
his house, who told him that her sister, Cecilia, had gone to Pagsanjan
with the other evacuees; that from said date (February 21), to the
present, he and Briccia had been living together as common-law
husband and wife; that 2 or 3 weeks thereafter, he asked Briccia to
marry him, but she confessed she was already married, and maybe her
husband (Arines) was still living in Iriga; that he could not then drive
Briccia away, because she was a stranger in the place, nor could he
urge her to join her sister Cecilia, as the latter had left Pagsanjan; that
in 1943 she told Briccia to separate from him and to return to Iriga,
and urged her never to see him again; that contrary to his
expectations, Briccia returned to Cavinti 3 months thereafter; that
Briccia strongly insisted to live with him again, telling him that she
cannot separate from him anymore, as he was ashamed; that Briccia's
father told him that Briccia's husband (Arines) had agreed not to
molest them as in fact he (Arines) was already living with another
woman; that he had 'no choice but to live with her' (Briccia) again; that
when he filed his petition to take the bar examinations in 1954, he 'did
not have the slightest intention to hide' from this Court the fact of his
'open cohabitation with a married woman' (Briccia Angeles); that he
did not state said fact in his petition, because he did not see in the
form of the petition being used in 1954 that the fact must be stated;
and that since his birth, he thought and believed he was a man of good
moral character, and it was only from the Solicitor General that he first
learned he was not so; and that he did not commit perjury or
fraudulent concealment when he filed his petition to take the bar
examinations in 1954." (Report of the Court Investigators, pp. 6-8,
March 6, 1962).
After hearing, the investigators submitted a report with the finding that:
1) Respondent used his knowledge of the law to take advantage by
having illicit relations with complainant, knowing as he did, that by
committing immoral acts on her, he was free from any criminal liability;
and 2) Respondent committed gross immorality by continuously
cohabiting with a married woman even after he became a lawyer in
1955 to the present; and 3) That respondent falsified the truth as to
his moral character in his petition to take the 1954 bar examinations,
being then immorally (adulterously) in cohabitation with his
common-law wife, Briccia Angeles, a married woman. The
investigators also recommended that the respondent be disbarred or
alternatively, be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one
year.
Upon the submission of this report, a copy of which was served on
respondent, through his counsel of record, the case was set for
hearing before the Court on April 30, 1962. Respondent asked leave to
file his memorandum in lieu of oral argument. This was granted and
the corresponding memorandum was duly filed.
It is an admitted and uncontroverted fact that the respondent had
sexual relations with the complainant several times, and as a
consequence she bore him a child on June 2, 1959; and that he
likewise continuously cohabited with Briccia Angeles, in an adulterous
manner, from 1942 up to the present.
The main point in issue is thus limited illicit relations with the
complainant Josefina Royong the and the open cohabitation with
Briccia Angeles, a married woman, are sufficient grounds to cause the
respondent's disbarment.
It is argued by the respondent that he is not liable for disbarment
notwithstanding his illicit relations with the complainant and his open
cohabitation with Briccia Angeles, a married woman, because he has
not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude. It is true
that the respondent has not been convicted of rape, seduction, or
adultery on this count, and that the grounds upon which the
disbarment proceedings is based are not among those enumerated by
Section 25, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court for which a lawyer may be
disbarred. But it has already been held that this enumeration is not
exclusive and that the power of the courts to exclude unfit and
unworthy members of the profession is inherent; it is a necessary
incident to the proper administration of justice; it may be exercised
without any special statutory authority, and in all proper cases unless
positively prohibited by statute; and the power may be exercised in any
manner that will give the party be disbarred a fair trial and a fair
opportunity to be heard. (1 Francisco, Rules of Court [1958 ed.] 698,
citing In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). Although it is a well settled rule that
the legislature (or the Supreme Court by virtue of its rule-making power)
may provide that certain acts or conduct shall require disbarment, the
accepted doctrine is that statutes and rules merely regulate the power
to disbar instead of creating it, and that such statutes (or rules) do not
restrict the general powers of the court over attorneys, who are its
officers, and that they may be removed for other than statutory
grounds (7 C.J.S. 734). In the United States, where from our system of
legal ethics is derived, "the continued possession of a fair private and
professional character or a good moral character is a requisite condition
for the rightful continuance in the practice of law for one who has been
admitted, and its loss requires suspension or disbarment even though
the statutes do not specify that as a ground of disbarment". The moral
turpitude for which an attorney may be disbarred may consist of
misconduct in either his professional or non-professional activities (5
Am. Jur. 417). The tendency of the decisions of this Court has been
toward the conclusion that a member of the bar may be removed or
suspended from office as a lawyer for other than statutory grounds.
Indeed, the rule is so phrased as to be broad enough to cover
practically any misconduct of a lawyer (In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). In
the case at bar, the moral depravity of the respondent is most apparent.
His pretension that before complainant completed her eighteenth
birthday, he refrained from having sexual intercourse with her, so as
not to incur criminal liability, as he himself declared — and that he
limited himself merely to kissing and embracing her and sucking her
tongue, indicates a scheming mind, which together with his knowledge
of the law, he took advantage of, for his lurid purpose.
Moreover, his act becomes more despicable considering that the
complainant was the niece of his common-law wife and that he enjoyed
a moral ascendancy over her who looked up to him as her uncle. As the
Solicitor General observed: "He also took advantage of his moral
influence over her. From childhood, Josefina Andalis (Royong), treated
him as an uncle and called him 'tata' (uncle), undoubtedly because he
is the paramour of a sister of her mother. Considering her age (she was
17 or 18 years old then), her inexperience and his moral ascendency
over her, it is not difficult to see why she could not resist him."
Furthermore, the blunt admission of his illicit relations with the
complainant reveals the respondent to be a person who would suffer
no moral compunction for his acts if the same could be done without
fear of criminal liability. He has, by these acts, proven himself to be
devoid of the moral integrity expected of a member of the bar.
The respondent's misconduct, although unrelated to his office, may
constitute sufficient grounds for disbarment. This is a principle we have
followed since the ruling in In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567, where this Court
quoted with approval the following portion of the decision of the
Supreme Court of Kansas in the case of Peyton's Appeal (12 Kan. 398,
404), to wit:.
The nature of the office, the trust relation which exists between
attorney and client, as well as between court and attorney, and the
statutory rule prescribing the qualifications of attorneys, uniformly
require that an attorney be a person of good moral character. If that
qualification is a condition precedent to a license or privilege to enter
upon the practice of the law, it would seem to be equally essential
during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege.
So it is held that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice
and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct not
connected with his professional duties, which shows him to be unfit for
the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law
confer upon him. (Emphasis supplied).
Respondent's conduct though unrelated to his office and in no way
directly bearing on his profession, has nevertheless rendered him unfit
and unworthy of the privileges of a lawyer. We cannot give sanction to
his acts. For us to do so would be — as the Solicitor General puts it —
recognizing "a double standard of morality, one for membership to the
Philippine Bar, and another for disbarment from the office of the
lawyer." If we concede that respondent's adulterous relations and his
simultaneous seduction of his paramour's niece did not and do not
disqualify him from continuing with his office of lawyer, this Court
would in effect be requiring moral integrity as an essential prerequisite
for admission to the bar, only to later on tolerate and close its eyes to
the moral depravity and character degeneration of the members of the
bar.
The decisions relied upon by the respondent in justifying his stand that
even if he admittedly committed fornication, this is no ground for
disbarment, are not controlling. Fornication, if committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as have proven in this case, as
to shock common sense of decency, certainly may justify positive
action by the Court in protecting the prestige of the noble profession of
the law. The reasons advanced by the respondent why he continued
his adulterous relations with Briccia Angeles, in that she helped him in
some way finish his law studies, and that his "sense of propriety and
Christian charity" did not allow him to abandon her after his admission
to the bar after almost 13 years of cohabitation, are hardly an excuse
for his moral dereliction. The means he employed, as he stated, in
order to extricate himself from the predicament he found himself in, by
courting the complainant and maintaining sexual relations with her
makes his conduct more revolting. An immoral act cannot justify
another immoral act. The noblest means he could have employed was
to have married the complainant as he was then free to do so. But to
continue maintaining adulterous relations with a married woman and
simultaneously maintaining promiscuous relations with the latter's
niece is moral perversion that can not be condoned. Respondent's
conduct therefore renders him unfit and unworthy for the privileges of
the legal profession. As good character is an essential qualification for
admission of an attorney to practice, he may be removed therefrom
whenever he ceases to possess such character (7 C.J.S. 735).
The respondent further maintains that the Solicitor General exceeded
his authority in filing the present complaint against him for seduction,
adultery and perjury, as it charges an offense or offenses different
from those originally charged in the complaint of January 14, 1959 for
rape, and cites as authority Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 128 of the Rules
of Court, which state:.
SEC. 4. Report of the Solicitor General.— Based upon the evidence
adduced at the hearing, if the Solicitor General finds no sufficient
ground to proceed against the respondent, he shall submit a report to
the Supreme Court containing his findings of fact and conclusion,
whereupon the respondent shall be exonerated unless the court orders
differently.
SEC. 5. Complaint of the Solicitor General. Answer of the respondent.
— If the Solicitor General finds sufficient ground to proceed against the
respondent, he shall file the corresponding complaint, accompanied
with all the evidence introduced in his investigation, with the Supreme
Court, and the respondent shall be served by the clerk of the Supreme
Court with a copy of the complaint with direction to answer the same
within fifteen days.
The contention is devoid of merit. Nothing in the language of the
foregoing rules requires the Solicitor General to charge in his complaint
the same offense charged in the complaint originally filed by the
complainant for disbarment. Precisely, the law provides that should the
Solicitor General find sufficient grounds to proceed against the
respondent, he shall file the corresponding complaint, accompanied by
the evidence introduced in his investigation. The Solicitor General
therefore is at liberty to file any case against the respondent he may be
justified by the evidence adduced during the investigation..
The respondent also maintains that he did not falsify his petition to take
the bar examinations in 1954 since according to his own opinion and
estimation of himself at that time, he was a person of good moral
character. This contention is clearly erroneous. One's own
approximation of himself is not a gauge to his moral character. Moral
character is not a subjective term, but one which corresponds to
objective reality. Moral character is what a person really is, and not
what he or other people think he is. As former Chief Justice Moran
observed: An applicant for license to practice law is required to show
good moral character, or what he really is, as distinguished from good
reputation, or from the opinion generally entertained of him, the
estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is
known. As has been said, ante the standard of personal and
professional integrity which should be applied to persons admitted to
practice law is not satisfied by such conduct as merely enables them to
escape the penalties of criminal law. Good moral character includes at
least common honesty (3 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court,
[1957 ed.] 626, citing In Re Weinstein, 42 P. [2d] 744 B.L.D., Cooper v.
Greeley. 1 Den. [N.Y.] 3447; In Re Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399; and
People v. Macauley, 82 N.E. 612). Respondent, therefore, did not
possess a good moral character at the time he applied for admission to
the bar. He lived an adulterous life with Briccia Angeles, and the fact
that people who knew him seemed to have acquiesced to his status, did
not render him a person of good moral character. It is of no moment
that his immoral state was discovered then or now as he is clearly not
fit to remain a member of the bar.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby entered striking the name of herein
respondent, Ariston J. Oblena, from the roll of attorneys.
G.R. Nos. 115908-09 March 29, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DANNY GODOY, accused-appellant.
JUDGE EUSTAQUIO Z. GACOTT, JR. complainant,
vs.
MAURICIO REYNOSO, JR. and EVA P. PONCE DE
LEON, respondents.
RESOLUTION
REGALADO, J.:
For separate resolution, as an incident arising from these criminal cases
under automatic review by the court, is a complaint1 filed by judge
Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan and
Puerto Princesa City, Branch 47, to cite for indirect contempt Mauricio
Reynoso, Jr., a columnist, and Eva P. Ponce de Leon, publisher and
chairman of the editorial board, respectively, of the Palawan Times. His
Honor's plaint is based on an article written by respondent Reynoso, Jr.
in his column, "On the Beat," and published in the July 20, 1994 issue
of said newspaper which is of general circulation in Puerto Princesa
City.
The pertinent portions of the article complained of are hereunder
reproduced, with the alleged contemptuous statements italicized for
ready identification as the particulars equivalent to the innuendo in a
libel charge:
Isang maalab na issues (sic) pa ay ang DEATH THREATS laban kono
kay Judge Eustaquio Gacott, Jr. ng mga pamilya ng kanyang
sinentensiyahan ng Double Death Penalty. Sinabi ni Wilmar Godoy sa
DWRM programa na wala silang pagbabantang ginawa umano, at hindi
nila ito kailan man isinaisip. Umaasa na lamang sila sa magiging resulta
ng review ng Korte Suprema. Ayon naman kay Gacott sa kanyang
interview sa DYPR ay totoong pinagbabantaan siya ng mga
Godoy. Kaya ayon marami siyang Security na armado, in full battle
gear. Kung totoo ito, bakit hindi niya kasuhan ang mga ito? Ito rin ang
katanungan ni Mr. Tony Omaga Diaz, ang station manager ng DYPR. O
bale ba gumawa siya ng sariling MULTO Pagkatapos ay takot na takot
siya sa multong kanyang ginawa.
Usap-usapan pa rin ang kaso ni Godoy. Ito raw ay isang open book
maging sa kanyang mga co-teachers sa Pulot na nagli-live in si Godoy
at ang babaing si Mia Taha. Matagal na ang kanilang ugnayan. Meron
ding "balita" ewan kung totoo, na noong si Godoy daw ay nasa
Provincial Jail pa ay dinadalaw siya ni Taha At kumakain pa sila sa
labas kasama ang isang Provincial Guard. Ito rin ang dahilan kung
bakit ipinagpilitan ni Judge Gacott na madala kaagad sa Muntinlupa sa
National Bilibid Prisons si Godoy kahit na ang kaso ay naka-apela pa.
xxx xxx xxx
Pero mayroon payo si Atty. Telesforo Paredes, Jr. sa mga mamamayan
ng Palawan, mag-ingat kayo sa paglalakad at baka kung hindi kayo
madapa ay madulas daw kayo. Dahil ayon daw kay Judge Gacott, base
sa kanyang interview sa Magandang Gabi Bayan, "Tagilid na raw and
mundo. Maraming nagpapatunay daw dito, maski sa kapitolyo." Joke
lang. Pero isang warning din sa may mga nobya, na mag-ingat sa
pag-break sa inyong girlfriend, dahil baka mademanda kayo at
masentensyahan ng double death penalty, lalo na kung kay Judge
Gacott, dahil alam na ninyo, tagilid and laban diyan.
The complaint avers that the article tends to impede, obstruct, belittle,
downgrade and degrade the administration of justice; that the article
contains averments which are disrespectful, discourteous, insulting,
offensive and derogatory; that it does not only cast aspersions on the
integrity and honesty of complainant as a judge and on his ability to
administer justice objectively and impartially, but is an imputation that
he is biased and he prejudges the cases filed before him; and that the
article is sub judice because it is still pending automatic review.
Respondent Mauricio Reynoso, Jr. contends in his Comment 2 that his
article does not intend to impede nor obstruct the administration of
justice because the same was published after complainant had
promulgated his decision in the case; that such publication will not
affect or influence the review by the Supreme Court of the criminal
case, considering that the Palawan Times is circulated only in the City
of Puerto Princess and some parts of Palawan; that the comments
made therein were made in good faith and in the exercise of the
freedom of expression and of the press; that while the article may
contain unfavorable comments about complainant, it cannot be
considered as having the tendency to degrade or impede the
administration of justice; and that the complaint, which is for contempt
of a judge of a regional trial court, was erroneously filed with the
Supreme Court contrary to Section 4, Rule 71 of the rules of Court.
Respondent Eva P. Ponce de Leon, in her Comment3 and Supplemental
Comment,4 asserts that the article is merely in reaction to the
television interview given by complainant in the show, "Magandang
Gabi Bayan," last June 18, 1994 wherein the latter defended his
decision in Criminal Cases Nos. 11640-41, entitled "People vs. Godoy;"
that the article is no longer sub judice as the same was published only
after complainant had rendered his decision and had already lost
jurisdiction over the case; that the article cannot be considered
contemptuous and defamatory in the absence of a clear and present
danger that it will tend directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct, or
ridicule the administration of justice; that it constitutes a valid exercise
of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of the press; that a reading
of the subject article in its entirety will show that the same does not
constitute contempt but, at most, is merely a fair criticism which did
not intend to malign nor place him in disrepute in the performance of
his functions; and that respondent Ponce de Leon cannot be held liable
for contempt because she did not have either actual knowledge of, or
Personal connection with, the authorship or publication of the allegedly
contemptuous article, since she had just returned from the United
States when the same was published.
On the issue of whether the specified statements complained of are
contumacious in nature, we are inclined, based on an overall perusal
and objective analysis of the subject article, to hold in the negative. We
have read and reread the article in its entirety and we are fully
convinced that what is involved here is a situation wherein the alleged
disparaging statements have been taken out of context. If the
statements claimed to be contumelious had been read with contextual
care, there would have been no reason for this contempt proceeding.
In our aforestated evaluation, we were sufficiently persuaded to
favorably consider the following explanation of respondent Ponce de
Leon in her Supplemental Comment:
On the other hand, a reading of the subject article in its entirety will
show that the same does not constitute contempt, but at most, merely
constitutes fair criticism.
The first portion of the article reads:
"Isang maalab na issues (sic) pa ay ang DEATH THREATS laban kono
kay Judge Eustaquio Gacott, Jr. ng mga pamilya ng kanyang
sinentensiyahan ng Double Death Penalty. Sinabi ni Wilmar Godoy sa
DWRM programa na wala silang pagbabantang ginawa umano, at hindi
nila ito kailan man isinaisip. Ayon naman kay Gacott sa kanyang
interview sa DYPR ay totoong pinagbabantaan siya ng mga Godoy.
Kaya ayon marami siyang Security na armado, in full battle gear. Kung
totoo ito, bakit hindi niya kasuhan ang mga ito? Ito rin ang katanungan
ni Mr. Tony Omaga Diaz, ang station manager ng DYPR. O bale ba
gumawa siya ng sariling MULTO Pagkatapos ay takot na takot siya sa
multong kanyang ginawa."
The foregoing does not even deal with the merits of the case, but with
the public accusations being made by complainant that he is being
given death threats by the family of the accused, Danny Godoy. The
article only makes a justifiable query as to why Complainant does not
file the appropriate charges if his accusations are true.
"Usap-usapan pa rin ang kaso ni Godoy. Ito raw ay isang open book
maging sa kanyang mga co-teachers sa Pulot na nagli-live in si Godoy
at ang babaing si Mia Taha. Matagal na ang kanilang ugnayan. Meron
ding ‘balita’ ewan kung totoo, na noong si Godoy daw ay nasa
Provincial Jail pa ay dinadalaw siya ni Taha At kumakain pa sila sa labas
kasama ang isang Provincial Guard. Ito rin ang dahilan kung bakit
ipinagpilitan ni Judge Gacott na madala kaagad sa Muntinlupa sa
National Bilibid Prisons si Godoy kahit na ang kaso ay naka-apela pa."
(Emphasis supplied)
The foregoing is merely a report of rumors regarding the accused
Danny Godoy. They are not presented as facts by respondent Mauricio
Reynoso, Jr. In fact, he even goes to the extent of acknowledging that
he himself does not know if the rumors are true or not.
The subject article then offers the following analysis:
"Malaking epekto ang desisyon ng Korte Suprema sa dalawang tao, kay
Danny Godoy at Judge Gacott. Kung babaliktarin ng Supreme Court
and decision ni Gacott, lalaya si Godoy, si Gacott naman ang masisira,
ang kanyang aspirations na maitaas sa Court of Appeals at eventually
makasama sa mga miyembro ng korte suprema ng bansa. Kung
papaboran naman Gacott ay sigurado na ang kamatayan ni Godoy, at
double pa pero si Gacott maitataas pa ang puwesto. Tayo naman,
hintay lamang tayo ng ano mang magiging developments ng kaso."
The foregoing is nothing more than a fair analysis. For indeed, if the
Honorable Court affirms the Decision of Complainant, the accused
Danny Godoy would be meted the death sentence. On the other hand,
if the decision is reversed, this may adversely affect the aspirations of
Complainant to be promoted to the Court of Appeals, and eventually to
the Honorable Court.
Finally, the subject article reads:
"Pero mayroon payo si Atty. Telesforo Paredes, Jr. sa mga
mamamayan ng Palawan, mag-ingat kayo sa paglalakad at baka kung
hindi kayo madapa ay madulas daw kayo. Dahil ayon daw kay Judge
Gacott, base sa kanyang interview sa Magandang Gabi Bayan, 'Tagilid
na raw and mundo. Maraming nagpapatunay daw dito, maski sa
kapitolyo.' Joke lang. Pero isang warning din sa may mga nobya, na
mag-ingat sa pag-break sa inyong girlfriend, dahil baka mademanda
kayo at masentensyahan ng double death penalty, lalo na kung kay
Judge Gacott, dahil alam na ninyo, tagilid and laban diyan."
Again, the subject article merely reports what Atty. Telesforo Paredes,
Jr. allegedly said. But more importantly, the foregoing is merely a
reaction not so much to Complainant's Decision, but to the public
statements made by Complainant in the national television show
"Magandang Gabi Bayan."
Snide remarks or sarcastic innuendoes do not necessarily assume that
level of contumely which is actionable under Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court. Neither do we believe that the publication in question was
intended to influence this Court for it could not conceivably be capable
of doing so. The article has not transcended the legal limits for editorial
comment and criticism. Besides, it has not been shown that there
exists a substantive evil which is extremely serious and that the degree
of its imminence is so exceptionally high as to warrant punishment for
contempt and sufficient to disregard the constitutional guaranties of
free speech and press.
It has been insightfully explained and suggested that a judge will
generally and wisely pass unnoticed any mere hasty and unguarded
expression of passion, or at least pass it with simply a reproof. It is so
that in every case where a judge decides for one party, he decides
against another; and oftentimes both parties are beforehand equally
confident and sanguine. The disappointment, therefore, is great, and it
is not in human nature that there should be other than a bitter feeling,
which often reaches to the judge as the cause of the supposed wrong.
A judge, therefore, ought to be patient, and tolerate everything which
appears as but the momentary outbreak of disappointment. A second
thought will generally make a party ashamed of such, outbreak, and
the dignity of the court will suffer none by passing it in silence.5
Prescinding from the foregoing adjudgment, the Court observes that
there are two primary issues presented in this incident which deserve a
more extended disquisition, firstly, because of their importance and
frequent involvement in contempt proceedings filed in the courts, and,
secondly, by reason of the fact that there are numerous and variant
pronouncements on the subject of contempt which need to be clarified.
The principal issues are (1) whether or not there can be contempt of
court in case of post-litigation statements or publications; and (2)
which court has jurisdiction over a contempt committed against the
trial court while the case is pending on appeal. Other cognate and
related issues must also be discussed so as to provide judicial guidance
on the present state of our statutory and case laws thereon.
Before we go into a more intensive analysis of said issues, however, it
may be beneficial for purposes thereof to preliminarily revisit and
expound on the nature and implications of a special civil action for
contempt or of any initiatory pleading therefor filed as an incident in
the main case. That exercise will further explain and justify our
disposition of the contempt charge herein.
I
Prefatorial Considerations
The exercise of the power to punish for contempt has a dual aspect,
primarily, the proper punishment of the guilty party for his disrespect
to the court, and, secondarily, his compulsory performance of some
act or duty required of him by the court and which he refuses to
perform. Due perhaps to this two fold aspect of the exercise of the
power to punish them, contempts are classified as civil or
criminal.6 However, the line of demarcation between acts constituting
criminal contempt, as distinguished from civil contempt, is quite
indistinct. The confusion in attempts to classify civil and criminal
contempts is due to the fact that there are contempts in which both
elements appear; or there are contempts which are neither wholly civil
nor altogether criminal, but partake of the characteristics of both; or it
is also possible that the same act may constitute both a civil and
criminal contempt.
A. As to the Nature of the Offense
A criminal contempt is conduct that is directed against the dignity and
authority of the court or a judge acting judicially; it is an act obstructing
the administration of justice which tends to bring the court into
disrepute or disrespect.7 On the other hand, civil contempt consists in
failing to do something ordered to be done by a court in a civil action
for the benefit of the opposing party therein and is, therefore, an
offense against the party in whose behalf the violated order is made.8
A criminal contempt, being directed against the dignity and authority of
the court, is an offense against organized society and, in addition, is
also held to be an offense against public justice which raises an issue
between the public and the accused, and the proceedings to punish it
are punitive. On the other hand, the proceedings to punish a civil
contempt are remedial and for the purpose of the preservation of the
right of private persons. It has been held that civil contempt is neither a
felony nor a misdemeanor, but a power of the court.9
It has further been stated that intent is a necessary element in criminal
contempt, and that no one can be punished for a criminal contempt
unless the evidence makes it clear that he intended to commit it. On
the contrary, there is authority indicating that since the purpose of civil
contempt proceedings is remedial, the defendant's intent in committing
the contempt is immaterial. Hence, good faith or the absence of intent
to violate the court's order is not a defense in civil contempt. 10
B. As to the Purpose for which the Power is Exercised
A major factor in determining whether a contempt is civil or criminal is
the purpose for which the power is exercised. Where the primary
purpose is to preserve the court’s authority and to punish for
disobedience of its orders, the contempt is criminal. Where the primary
purpose is to provide a remedy for an injured suitor and to coerce
compliance with an order, the contempt is civil. A criminal contempt
involves no element of personal injury. It is directed against the power
and dignity of the court; private parties have little, if any, interest in the
proceedings for punishment. Conversely, if the contempt consists in
the refusal of a person to do an act that the court has ordered him to do
for the benefit or advantage of a party to an action pending before the
court, and the contemnor is committed until he complies with the order,
the commitment is in the nature of an execution to enforce the
judgment of the court; the party in whose favor that judgment was
rendered is the real party in interest in the proceedings. Civil contempt
proceedings look only to the future. And it is said that in civil contempt
proceedings, the contemnor must be in a position to purge himself. 11
C. As to the Character of the Contempt Proceeding
It has been said that the real character of the proceedings is to be
determined by the relief sought, or the dominant purpose, and the
proceedings are to be regarded as criminal when the purpose is
primarily punishment, and civil when the purpose is primarily
compensatory or remedial. 12
Criminal contempt proceedings are generally held to be in the nature of
criminal or quasi-criminal actions. They are punitive in nature, and the
Government, the courts, and the people are interested in their
prosecution. Their purpose is to preserve the power and vindicate the
authority and dignity of the court, and to punish for disobedience of its
orders. Strictly speaking, however, they are not criminal proceedings or
prosecutions, even though the contemptuous act involved is also a
crime. The proceeding has been characterized as sui generis, partaking
of some of the elements of both a civil and criminal proceeding, but
really constituting neither. In general, criminal contempt proceedings
should be conducted in accordance with the principles and rules
applicable to criminal cases, in so far as such procedure is consistent
with the summary nature of contempt proceedings. So it has been held
that the strict rules that govern criminal prosecutions apply to a
prosecution for criminal contempt, that the accused is to be afforded
many of the protections provided in regular criminal cases, and that
proceedings under statutes governing them are to be strictly construed.
However, criminal proceedings are not required to take any particular
form so long as the substantial rights of the accused are preserved. 13
Civil contempt proceedings are generally held to be remedial and civil
in their nature; that is, they are proceedings for the enforcement of
some duty, and essentially a remedy for coercing a person to do the
thing required. As otherwise expressed, a proceeding for civil
contempt is one instituted to preserve and enforce the rights of a
private party to an action and to compel obedience to a judgment or
decree intended to benefit such a party litigant. So a proceeding is one
for civil contempt, regardless of its form, if the act charged is wholly
the disobedience, by one party to a suit, of a special order made in
behalf of the other party and the disobeyed order may still be obeyed,
and the purpose of the punishment is to aid in an enforcement of
obedience. The rules of procedure governing criminal contempt
proceedings, or criminal prosecutions, ordinarily are inapplicable to
civil contempt proceedings. It has been held that a proceeding for
contempt to enforce a remedy in a civil action is a proceeding in that
action. Accordingly, where there has been a violation of a court order
in a civil action, it is not necessary to docket an independent action in
contempt or proceed in an independent prosecution to enforce the
order. It has been held, however, that while the proceeding is auxiliary
to the main case in that it proceeds out of the original case, it is
essentially a new and independent proceeding in that it involves new
issues and must be initiated by the issuance and service of new
process. 14
In general, civil contempt proceedings should be instituted by an
aggrieved party, or his successor, or someone who has a pecuniary
interest in the right to be protected. In criminal contempt proceedings,
it is generally held that the State is the real prosecutor. 15
Contempt is not presumed. In proceedings for criminal contempt, the
defendant is presumed innocent and the burden is on the prosecution
to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt. In proceedings for civil
contempt, there is no presumption, although the burden of proof is on
the complainant, and while the proof need not be beyond reasonable
doubt, it must amount to more than a mere preponderance of
evidence. It has been said that the burden of proof in a civil contempt
proceeding lies somewhere between the criminal "reasonable doubt"
burden and the civil "fair preponderance" burden. 16
On the basis of the foregoing legal principles which are now well
settled, it can be safely concluded that under paragraph (d) of Section
3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court on indirect contempt, any improper
conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade
the administration of justice, constitutes criminal contempt.
II
Whether or not Post-Litigation Publications can be the Subject of
Contempt Proceedings
A. Effect of Freedom of Speech and Press Guaranties
In the case of In re Sotto, 17 this Court had the opportunity to define
the relation between the courts and the press, quoting there in the
statements made by Judge Holmes in U.S. vs. Sullen, 18 thus:
The administration of justice and the freedom of the press, though
separate and distinct, are equally sacred, and neither should be
violated by the other. The press and the courts have correlative rights
and duties and should cooperate uphold the principles of the
Constitution and laws, from which the former receives its prerogative
and the latter its jurisdiction. The right of legitimate publicity must be
scrupulously recognized and care taken at all times to avoid impinging
upon it. In a clear case where it is necessary in order to dispose of
judicial business unhampered by publications which reasonably tend to
impair the impartiality of verdicts, or otherwise obstruct the
administration of justice, this Court will not hesitate to exercise its
undoubted power to punish for contempt. This Court must be
permitted to proceed with the disposition of its business in an orderly
manner free from outside interference obstructive of its constitutional
functions. This right will be insisted upon as vital to an impartial court,
and, as a last resort, as an individual exercises the right of self-defense,
it will act to preserve its existence as an unprejudiced tribunal.
Hence, a person charged with contempt of court for making certain
utterances or publishing writings which are clearly opprobrious may not,
ordinarily, escape liability therefor by merely invoking the constitutional
guaranties of freedom of speech and press. Liberty of speech and the
press must not be confused with an abuse of such liberties. Obstructing,
by means of the spoken or written word, the administration of justice
by the courts has been described as an abuse of the liberty of speech or
the press such as will subject the abuser to punishment for contempt of
court.
Guaranties of free speech and a free press, as they appear in the
Constitution, are frequently couched so as to impute responsibility for
any abuse of the privilege, and it is sometimes recognized that with
respect to whether an allegedly scandalous publication or utterance is
to be treated as a contempt, a line must be drawn between those
speeches or writings which are protected by the privilege of free
speech and a free press and those which constitute an abuse of it.
The right of freedom of the press is only a specific instance of the
general right of freedom of speech; persons engaged in the newspaper
business cannot claim any other or greater right than that possessed by
persons not in that business. 19
B. Different Doctrines or Schools of Thought
In the case of In re Francisco Brillantes, 20 Justice Perfecto explained in
his dissenting opinion that "as to whether contempt may be committed
for criticizing a tribunal after the same has rendered decision or taken
final action on a matter which is the subject of criticism, there are two
schools of thought represented, respectively, by what we may call the
English doctrine and the American doctrine, the first for the affirmative
and the last one for the negative. The question now is to determine
which of the two doctrines is more conformable to reason and justice
and, therefore, should be, adopted and applied by our tribunals."
1. The English Doctrine
According to Justice Perfecto, the rule in England is that there can be
contempt of court even after the case has been terminated. He then
proceeded to ramify:
In England comments upon the court's action in a concluded case,
where libelous or calculated to bring the court into disrepute, were
freely punishable as contempt under the early common law. Distinction
between pending and concluded matters does not seem to have been
made. Any comment impairing the dignity of the court was punishable
as contempt regardless of the time at which made.
xxx xxx xxx
The whole theory of the early common law of contempt is admirably
delivered by Wilmot, J., in King vs. Almon, . . . . The publication there
complained of was a volume containing a diatribe against Lord
Mansfield for allowing an amendment of pleading as of course, and
apparently from corrupt motives, in a concluded case, and further
charging him with having introduced a practice to defeat the efficacy of
the writ of habeas corpus. It is there said: "The arraignment of the
justice of the judges is arraigning the King's justice; it is an
impeachment of his wisdom and goodness in the choice of his judges,
and excites in the mind of the people a general dissatisfaction with all
judicial determinations, and indisposes their minds to obey them; and,
whenever men's allegiance to the laws is so fundamentally shaken, it is
the most fatal and most dangerous obstruction of justice, and, in my
opinion, calls for a more rapid and immediate redress than any other
obstruction whatever — not for the sake of the judges as private
individuals, but because they are the channels by which the Kings'
justice is conveyed to the people. To be impartial, and to be universally
thought so, are both absolutely necessary for giving justice that free,
open, and uninterrupted current which it has for many ages found all
over this Kingdom, and which so eminently distinguishes and exalts it
above all nations upon the earth . . . . The constitution has provided
very apt and proper remedies for correcting and rectifying the
involuntary mistakes of judges, and for punishing and removing them
for any voluntary perversions of justice. But, if their authority is to be
trampled upon by pamphleteers and newswriters, and the people are
to be told that the power given to the judges for their protection is
prostituted to their destruction, the court may retain its power some
little time; but I am sure it will instantly lose all its authority, and the
power of the court will not long survive the authority of it: Is it possible
to stab that authority more fatally than by charging the court, and
more particularly the chief justice, with having introduced a rule to
subvert the constitutional liberty of the people? A greater scandal
could not be published . . . . It is conceded that an act of violence upon
his person when he was making such an order would be contempt
punishable by attachment. Upon what principle? For striking a judge in
walking along the streets would not be a contempt of the court. The
reason, therefore, must be, that he is in the exercise of his office, and
discharging the function of a judge of this court; and, if his person is
under this protection, why should not his character be under the same
protection? It is not for the sake of the individual, but for the sake of
the public, that his person is under such protection; and, in respect of
the public, the imputing of corruption and the perversion of justice to
him, in an order made by him at his chambers, is attended with much
more mischievous consequences than a blow; and therefore the
reason of proceeding in this summary manner applies with equal, if not
superior, force, to one case as well as the other. There is no greater
obstruction to the execution of justice from the striking a judge than
from the abusing him, because his order lies open to be enforced or
discharged, whether the judge is struck or abused for making it.
2. The American Doctrine
In American jurisprudence, the general rule is that defamatory
comments on the conduct of a judge with respect to past cases or
matters finally disposed of do not constitute contempt, even though
libelous and reflecting on the integrity of the judge and the court. 21 It
has been said that the power to punish as a contempt a criticism
concerning a case made after its termination is denied under the
theory that such a power is not necessary as a safeguard to the proper
functioning of the court as a judicial tribunal. And it has been said that
comments, however stringent, relating to judicial proceedings which
are past and ended are not contempt of court even though they may
be a libel against the judge or some other officer of the court. There is
even the view that when a case is finished, the courts and judges are
subject to the same criticisms as other people and that no comment
published in connection with a completed case, however libelous or
unjust, is punishable as contempt of court. Thus it is said that the
remedies of a judge who suffers abuse at the hands of the press, not
amounting to contempt, are the same as those available to persons
outside the judiciary. 22
To the same effect was the holding in People ex rel. Supreme Court
vs. Albertson, 23 where it was declared that —
The great weight of authority is to the effect that — in so far as
proceedings to punish for contempt are concerned — comment upon
the behavior of the court in cases fully determined in the particular
court criticized is unrestricted under our constitutional guaranty of
liberty of the press and free speech, especially in the absence of a
statute of direct application to the contrary. This view in brief is based
upon the theory
that — keeping our constitutional guaranties in mind — libelous
publications which bear upon the proceedings of a court while they are
pending may in some way affect their correct determination, and are
properly the subject of contempt proceedings. On the other hand, such
publications or oral utterances of entirely retrospective bearing come
within the sphere of authorized comment unless they affect a judge
personally, when he has his remedy in an action of libel or slander, as
does any other individual thus offended. He has the right to bring an
action at law before a jury of his peers.
Along similar lines, in Ex Parte Mcleod, 24 the court ruled that:
The right of a court to punish, as for contempts, criticisms of its acts, or
even libels upon its officers, not going to the extent, by improper
publications, of influencing a pending trial, . . . would not only be
dangerous to the rights of the people, but its exercise would drag down
the dignity and moral influence of these tribunals. Such criticism is the
right of the citizen, and essential not only to the proper administration
of justice, but to the public tranquility and contentment. Withdrawing
power from courts to summarily interfere with such exercise of the
right of the press and freedom of speech deprives them of no useful
power.
Likewise, the State Supreme Court of Montana in State ex rel. Metcalf
vs. District Court, 25 pointed out that the legal proceeding involved
therein was not pending when the alleged libelous article was published,
then referred to the guaranty of freedom of speech and the press, and
eventually held that the publication involved was not punishable as
contempt. It declared that so long as the published criticism does not
impede the due administration of the law, it is better to maintain the
guaranty of the Constitution than to undertake to compel respect or
punish libel by the summary process of contempt.
Finally, in holding that persons who had published newspaper articles
alleging that a designated judge had been intentionally partial and
corrupt in the trial of certain causes which had been decided and were
not pending when the publication occurred could not be punished as
for contempt the court, in State ex rel. Attorney General vs. Circuit
Court, 26 cited a number of cases supporting the view that libelous
newspaper comments upon the acts of a court in actions past and
ended do not constitute contempt. It pointed out that some of such
decisions took the position that to punish such publications would
constitute a serious invasion of constitutional guaranties of free speech
and a free press.
It ratiocinated in this manner: "Important as it is that courts should
perform their grave public duties unimpeded and unprejudiced by
illegitimate influences, there are other rights guaranteed to all citizens
by our Constitution and form of government, either expressly or
impliedly, which are fully as important, and which must be guarded
with an equally zealous care. These rights are the rights of free speech
and of free publication of the citizens' sentiments on all subjects. It
seems clear to us that so extreme a power as to punish for contempt
because of libelous publications as to past litigation, is inconsistent with,
and would materially impair, the constitutional rights of free speech
and free press."
However, even under American jurisprudence, as shall hereafter be
demonstrated, the aforesaid rulings are not without exceptions. There
is ample authority that, under proper circumstances, constitutional
guaranties of freedom of speech and liberty of the press do not protect
contemptuous publications relating to court proceedings even though
such publications are not made until after the pendency of the litigation
in question.27
3. The Philippine Doctrine
In the Philippine setting, as we have noted, there are conflicting views
on this issue which have to be analyzed and, if possible, reconciled. On
that exordial indication, we have digressed into these aspects of the
law on contempt and seized upon this incident in the criminal cases at
bar in order to essay a rapprochement of such views into what we may
call the Philippine doctrine.
In the early cases decided by this Court involving contempts through
newspaper publications, the rule was that contemptuous publications
were actionable only if committed with respect to pending suits.
Apparently, the weight of authority then was to the effect that criticism
of the conduct of a judge or a court with regard to matters finally
disposed of does not constitute contempt, even though it may be
libelous.
That rule first found application in the case of In re Lozano, et
al. 28 and was reiterated in the subsequent cases of In re
Abistado, 29 and People vs. Alarcon, et al, 30 where this Court,
speaking through Justice Malcolm, tersely stated:
The rule is well established that newspaper publications tending to
impede, obstruct, embarrass, or influence the courts in administering
justice in a pending suit proceeding constitute criminal contempt which
is summarily punishable by the courts. The rule is otherwise after the
cause is ended. . . . (6 R.C.L., pp. 508-515).
It will be noted that the aforequoted conclusion was arrived at after a
short discourse presented by the ponente on the existing divergence
of opinions on the matter between the English and American courts.
But the learned justice, notwithstanding his preference for and
application of the American doctrine, nonetheless thereafter made the
recommendatory observation that "(w)ith reference to the applicability
of the above authorities, it should be remarked first of all that this
court is not bound to accept any of them absolutely and unqualifiedly.
What is best for the maintenance of the judiciary in the Philippines
should be the criterion."
It seems that this view was shared by then Associate Justice Moran
when he dissented from the majority opinion in the aforecited case
of People vs. Alarcon, et al., which upheld the doctrine enunciated
in Lozano and Abistado, in this wise: "I know that in the United States,
publications about courts, after the conclusion of a pending case, no
matter how perverse or scandalous, are in many instances brought
within the constitutional protection of the liberty of the press. But while
this rule may find justification in that country, considering the
American temper and psychology and the stability of its political
institutions, it is doubtful whether here a similar toleration of gross
misuse of liberty of the press would, under our circumstances, result in
no untoward consequences to our structure of democracy yet in the
process of healthful development and growth."
Such perception could have probably impelled Justice Moran to deviate
from the then accepted doctrine, with this rationalization:
Contempt, by reason of publications relating to courts and to court
proceedings, are of two kinds. A publication which tends to impede,
obstruct, embarrass or influence the courts in administering justice in a
pending suit or proceeding, constitutes criminal contempt which is
summarily punishable by courts. This is the rule announced in the
cases relied upon by the majority. A publication which tends to
degrade the courts and to destroy public confidence in them or that
which tends to bring them in any way into disrepute, constitutes
likewise criminal contempt, and is equally punishable by courts. In the
language of the majority, what is sought, in the language of the
majority, what is sought, in the first kind of contempt, to be shielded
against the influenced of newspaper comments, is the all-important
duty of the courts to administer justice in the decision of a pending
case. In the second kind of contempt, the punitive hand of justice is
extended to vindicate the courts from any act or conduct calculated to
bring them into disfavor or to destroy public confidence in them. In the
first, there is no contempt where there is no action pending, as there is
no decision which might in any way be influenced by the newspaper
publication. In the second, the contempt exists, with or without a
pending case, as what is sought to be protected is the court itself and
its dignity. Courts would lose their utility if public confidence in them is
destroyed.
That dissenting opinion was impliedly adopted in the subsequent case
of In re Brillantes, 31 where the editor of the Manila Guardian was
declared in contempt of court for publishing an editorial, stating that
the 1944 Bar Examinations were conducted in a farcical manner, even
after the case involving the validity of said examinations had been
terminated. This was followed by In re Almacen 32 where the Court
stated categorically that the rule that bars contempt after a judicial
proceeding has terminated had lost much of its validity, invoking
therein the ruling in Brillantes and quoting with approval the dissenting
opinion in Alarcon.
It appears, therefore, that in the two latest cases decided by this Court,
the general rule that there can be no contempt in post-litigation
publications is not necessarily all-embracing under certain situations.
From the shift in judicial approach in Brillantes to the position
announced in Almacen, it can inevitably be concluded that the
termination of the case is not a guaranty of immunity from a contempt
charge for publications or utterances which are defamatory or libelous,
depending on the purpose and effects thereof. In other words, one
may still be cited for contempt of court even after a case has ended,
where such punitive action is necessary to protect the court and its
dignity and to vindicate it from acts or conduct intended or calculated
to degrade, ridicule or bring the court into disfavor and thereby erode
or destroy public confidence in that court.
This qualified distinction is not without justification and, in fact, was
also foreshadowed by the concurring opinion of Justice Briones
in Brillantes wherein, after noting the conflicting views on the
amenability of the contemnor during the pendency or after the
termination of the judicial proceeding in the court involved as
illustrated by the English and American doctrines thereon, he advanced
the proposition that —
. . . esta distincion no tiene mucha importancia. Lo importante para mi
es ver si la critica lanzada por el recurrido es falsa y esta concebida en
terminos tales que "tiende directamente a degradar la administracion
de justicia," . . . es indiferente si versa sobre un asunto o negociacion
totalmente terminada o no; el desacato existe entonces y debe ser
castigado.
. . . Se trata simplemente de la facultad inherente en los tribunales de
reprimir y castigar todo acto que tiende a ambarazarles y obstruirles en
su funcion de administrar justicia, . . . .
The rationale for making a qualification to the rule generally considered
as the American doctrine, which rule as herein qualified we now adopt
and refer to as the Philippine doctrine on this issue, is profoundly and
eloquently explicated by Justice Moran in Alarcon, to wit:
It is true that the Constitution guarantees the freedom of speech and of
the press. But license or abuse of that freedom should not be confused
with freedom in its true sense. Well-ordered liberty demands no less
unrelaxing vigilance against abuse of the sacred guaranties of the
Constitution than the fullest protection of their legitimate exercise. As
important as is the maintenance of a free press and the free exercise of
the rights of the citizens is the maintenance of a judiciary unhampered
in its administration of justice and secure in its continuous enjoyment
of public confidence. "The administration of justice and freedom of the
press, though separate and distinct are equally sacred, and neither
should be violated by the other. The press and the courts have
correlative rights and duties and should cooperate to uphold the
principles of the Constitution and the laws, from which the former
receives its prerogatives and the latter its jurisdiction." (U.S. vs. Su
liens, 38 Fed., 2d., 230.) Democracy cannot long endure in a country
where liberty is grossly misused any more than where liberty is
illegitimately abridged.
xxx xxx xxx
If the contemptuous publication made by the respondent herein were
directed to this Court in connection with a case already decided, the
effect of the rule laid down by the majority is to deny this court the
power to vindicate its dignity. The mischievous consequences that will
follow from the situation thus sought to be permitted, are both too
obvious and odious to be stated. The administration of Justice, no
matter how righteous, may be identified with all sorts of fancied
scandal and corruption. Litigants, discontented for having lost their
cases, will have every way to give vent to their resentment. Respect
and obedience to Law will ultimately be shattered, and, as a
consequence, the utility of the courts will completely disappear.
It may be said that respect to courts cannot be compelled and that
public confidence should be a tribute to judicial worth, virtue and
intelligence. But compelling respect to courts is one thing and denying
the courts the power to vindicate themselves when outraged is
another. I know of no principle of law that authorizes with impunity a
discontented citizen to unleash, by newspaper publications, the
avalanche of his wrath and venom upon courts and judges. If he
believes that a judge is corrupt and that justice has somewhere been
perverted, law and order require that he follow the processes provided
by the Constitution and the statutes by instituting the corresponding
proceedings for impeachment or otherwise. As Mr. Justice Palmer, in
speaking of the duty of courts and court officers, has wisely said:
Would it be just to the persons who are called upon to exercise these
powers to compel them to do so, and at the same time allow them to
be maltreated or libeled because they did so? How would a suitor like a
juryman trying his case who might expect he would be assaulted,
beaten, his property destroyed, or his reputation blasted, in case he
decided against his opponent? Apply the same thing to judges, or the
sheriff, and how long could organized society hold together? With
reference to a judge, if he has acted corruptly, it is worse than a mere
contempt. But it is apparent it would not be right that the court of
which he is a member should determine this, and consequently the law
has provided a plain and easy method of bringing him to justice by a
petition to Parliament; but, while the law authorizes this, it does not
allow infamous charges to be made against him by persons, either in
the newspapers or otherwise, with reference to how he has or shall
discharge the duties of his office. It must be apparent to all right
thinking men that, if such were allowed to be indulged in, it must end
in the usefulness of the court itself being destroyed, however righteous
its judges may act. From what I have said it must not be supposed that
I think that the decisions of the court, or the actions of the judges, or
other persons composing the court, are not to be discussed; on the
contrary, I would allow the freest criticism of all such acts if done in a
fair spirit, only stopping at what must injure or destroy the court itself
and bring the administration of the law into disrepute, or be an outrage
on the persons whose acts are discussed, or when such discussion
would interfere with the right decision of the cause before the court.
We do not hesitate to hereby give our imprimatur to the aforequoted
opinion which, we fully believe, conforms to basic dogmatic teachings
on judicial and professional conduct requiring respect for and the
giving of due deference to the judicial system and its members —
ethical standards which this Court has, time and again, been trying to
inculcate in the minds of every member of the Bar and the public in
general.
4. Cautela on the Balancing of Interests
On the bases of the foregoing authorities, it is evident that a line has to
be drawn between those utterances or writings which are protected by
the privileges of free speech and a free press and those which
constitute an abuse thereof, in determining whether an allegedly
scurrilous publication or statement is to be treated as contempt of
court. But to find the line where the permissible right of free speech
ends and its reprehensible abuse begins is not always an easy task. In
contempt proceedings, it was held that this line must usually be
defined by the courts themselves, and in such cases its location is to be
established with special care and caution. 33
In so doing, it becomes necessary to give the subject that careful
examination commensurate with its importance, mindful that, on the
one hand, the dignity and authority of the courts must be maintained,
while, on the other, free speech, a free press, and the liberty of the
citizen must be preserved. Both are equally valuable rights. If the court
is shorn of its power to punish for contempt in all proper cases, it
cannot preserve its authority, so that even without any constitutional or
statutory guaranty this power is inherent in the court. But the
Constitution itself, in the Bill of Rights, guarantees free speech and
liberty of the press. Of course, it was never intended, under the guise
of these constitutional guaranties, that the power of the court should
be trenched upon. 34
How to determine whether an act or utterance is covered by the
protective mantle of the constitutional guaranty of liberty of the press
or whether it is already outside or an abuse thereof, is an altogether
different matter. We have perforce to draw from tenets in American
jurisprudence, although with discriminating choice, since after all our
present doctrines on contempt vis-a-vis constitutional limitations trace
their roots in the main to the lessons laid down and born of the social
and judicial experience in that jurisdiction.
The liberty of the press consists in the right to publish with impunity the
truth, with good motives and for justifiable ends, whether it respects
governments individuals; the right freely to publish whatever the
citizen may please and to be protected against any responsibility for so
doing, except in so far as such publications, from their blasphemy,
obscenity, or scandalous character, may be a public offense, are as by
their falsehood and malice they may injuriously affect the standing,
reputation, or pecuniary interests of individuals. The true liberty of the
press is amply secured by permitting every man to publish his opinion;
but it is due to the peace and dignity of society to inquire into the
motives of such publications, and to distinguish between those which
are meant for use and reformation, and with an eye solely to the public
good, and those which are intended merely to delude and defame. To
the latter description, it is impossible that any good government should
afford protection and impunity.
The liberty of the press means that anyone can publish anything he
pleases, but he is liable for the abuse of this liberty. If he does this by
scandalizing the courts of his country, he is liable to be punished for
contempt. In other words, the abuse of the privilege consists principally
in not telling the truth. There is a right to publish the truth, but no right
to publish falsehood to the injury of others with impunity. It, therefore,
does not include the right to malign the courts, to libel and slander and
utter the most flagrant and indecent calumnies about the court and its
officers, nor to invade the sanctuaries of the temples. Such practices
and such miscreants ought to be condemned, and the courts would
deserve condemnation and abolition if they did not vigorously and
fearlessly punish such offenders. Such practices are an abuse of the
liberty of the press, and if the slander relates to the courts, it concerns
the whole public and is consequently punishable summarily as a
criminal contempt. It is therefore the liberty of the press that is
guaranteed, not the licentiousness. It is the right to speak the truth,
not the right to bear false witness against your neighbor. 35
This brings to fore the need to make a distinction between adverse
criticism of the court's decision after the case is ended and
"scandalizing the court itself." The latter is not criticism; it is personal
and scurrilous abuse of a judge as such, in which case it shall be dealt
with as a case of contempt. 36
It must be clearly understood and always borne in mind that there is a
vast difference between criticism or fair comment on the one side and
defamation on the other. Where defamation commences, true criticism
ends. True criticism differs from defamation in the following particulars;
(1) Criticism deals only with such things as invite public attention or call
for public comment. (2) Criticism never attacks the individual but only
his work. In every case the attack is on a man's acts, or on some thing,
and not upon the man himself. A true critic never indulges in
personalities. (3) True criticism never imputes or insinuates
dishonorable motives, unless justice absolutely requires it, and then
only on the clearest proofs. (4) The critic never takes advantage of the
occasion to gratify private malice, or to attain any other object beyond
the fair discussion of matters of public interest, and the judicious
guidance of the public taste. 37
Generally, criticism of a court's rulings or decisions is not improper,
and may not be restricted after a case has been finally disposed of and
has ceased to be pending. So long as critics confine their criticisms to
facts and base them on the decisions of the court, they commit no
contempt no matter how severe the criticism may be; but when they
pass beyond that line and charge that judicial conduct was influenced
by improper, corrupt, or selfish motives, or that such conduct was
affected by political prejudice or interest, the tendency is to create
distrust and destroy the confidence of the people in their courts. 38
Moreover, it has been held that criticism of courts after a case is finally
disposed of, does not constitute contempt and, to this effect, a case
may be said to be pending so long as there is still something for the
court to do therein. But criticism should be distinguished from insult. A
criticism after a case has been disposed of can no longer influence the
court, and on that ground it does not constitute contempt. On the
other hand, an insult hurled to the court, even after a case is decided,
can under no circumstance be justified. Mere criticism or comment on
the correctness or wrongness, soundness or unsoundness of the
decision of the court in a pending case made in good faith may be
tolerated; but to hurl the false charge that the Supreme Court has
been committing deliberately so many blunders and injustices would
tend necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people in the
honesty and integrity of its members, and consequently to lower or
degrade the administration of justice, and it constitutes contempt. 39
The Philippine rule, therefore, is that in case of a post-litigation
newspaper publication, fair criticism of the court, its proceedings and
its members, are allowed. However, there may be a contempt of court,
even though the case has been terminated, if the publication is
attended by either of these two circumstances: (1) where it tends to
bring the court into disrespect or, in other words, to scandalize the
court; 40 or (2) where there is a clear and present danger that the
administration of justice would be impeded. And this brings us to the
familiar invocation of freedom of expression usually resorted to as a
defense in contempt proceedings.
On the first ground, it has been said that the right of free speech is
guaranteed by the Constitution and must be sacredly guarded, but
that an abuse thereof is expressly prohibited by that instrument and
must not be permitted to destroy or impair the efficiency of the courts
or the public respect therefor and the confidence therein. 41
Thus, in State vs. Morril, 42 the court said that any citizen has the right
to publish the proceedings and decisions of the court, and if he deems
it necessary for the public good, to comment upon them freely, discuss
their correctness, the fitness or unfitness of the judges for their
stations, and the fidelity with which they perform the important public
trusts reposed in them; but he has no right to attempt, by defamatory
publications, to degrade the tribunal, destroy public confidence in it,
and dispose the community to disregard and set at naught its orders,
judgments and decrees. Such publications are an abuse of the liberty
of the press; and tend to sap the very foundation of good order and
well-being in society by obstructing the course of justice. Courts
possess the power to punish for contempt libelous publications
regarding their proceedings, present or past, upon the ground that
they tend to degrade the tribunals, destroy public confidence and
respect for their judgments and decrees, so essentially necessary to
the good order and well-being of society, and most effectually obstruct
the free course of justice.
Then, in In re Hayes, 43 it was said that publishers of newspapers have
the right, but no higher right than others, to bring to public notice the
conduct of the courts, provided the publications are true and fair in
spirit. The liberty of the press secures the privilege of discussing in a
decent and temperate manner the decisions and judgments of a court
of justice; but the language should be that of fair and honorable
criticism, and should not go to the extent of assigning to any party or
the court false or dishonest motives. There is no law to restrain or
punish the freest expressions of disapprobation that any person may
entertain of what is done in or by the courts. Under the right of
freedom of speech and of the press the public has a right to know and
discuss all judicial proceedings, but this does not include the right to
attempt, by wanton defamation, groundless charges of unfairness and
stubborn partisanship, to degrade the tribunal and impair its efficiency.
Finally, in Weston vs. Commonwealth, 44 it was ruled that the freedom
of speech may not be exercise in such a manner as to destroy respect
for the courts, the very institution which is the guardian of that right.
The dignity of the courts and the duty of the citizens to respect them
are necessary adjuncts to the administration of justice. Denigrating the
court by libelous attacks upon judicial conduct in an ended case, as well
as one which is pending before it, may seriously interfere with the
administration of justice. While such an attack may not affect the
particular litigation which has been terminated, it may very well affect
the course of justice in future litigation and impair, if not destroy, the
judicial efficiency of the court or judge subjected to the attack.
Anent the second ground, the rule in American jurisprudence is that
false and libelous utterances present a clear and present danger to the
administration of justice. 45 To constitute contempt, criticism of a past
action of the court must pose a clear and present danger to a fair
administration of justice, that is, the publication must have an inherent
tendency to influence, intimidate, impede, embarrass, or obstruct the
court's administration of justice. 46 It is not merely a private wrong
against the rights of litigants and judges, but a public wrong, a crime
against the State, to undertake by libel or slander to impair confidence
in the judicial functions. 47
Elucidating on the matter, this Court, in Cabansag vs. Fernandez,
et al., 48 held as follows:
. . . The first, as interpreted in a number of cases, means that the evil
consequence of the comment or utterance must be ''extremely serious
and the degree of imminence extremely high" before the utterance can
be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the "substantive evil"
sought to be prevented. And this evil is primarily the "disorderly and
unfair administration of justice." This test establishes a definite rule in
constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words may be
published. Under this rule, the advocacy of ideas cannot
constitutionally be abridged unless there is a clear and present danger
that such advocacy will harm the administration of Justice.
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, speaking of the extent and scope of the application of this rule,
the Supreme Court of the United States said: "Clear and present danger
of substantive evils as a result of indiscriminate publications regarding
judicial proceedings justifies an impairment of the constitutional right
of freedom of speech and press only if the evils are extremely serious
and the degree of imminence extremely high. . . . The possibility of
engendering disrespect for the judiciary as a result of the published
criticism of a judge is not such a substantive evil as will justify
impairment of the constitutional right of freedom of speech and
press." . . .
No less important is the ruling on the power of the court to punish for
contempt in relation to the freedom of speech and press. We quote:
"Freedom of speech and press should not be impaired through the
exercise of the power to punish for contempt of court unless there is no
doubt that the utterances in question are a serious and imminent threat
to the administration of justice. A judge may not hold in contempt one
who ventures to publish anything that tends to make him unpopular or
to belittle him. The vehemence of the language used in newspaper
publications concerning a judge's decision is not alone the measure of
the power to punish for contempt . The fires which it kindles must
constitute an imminent, not merely a likely, threat to the administration
of justice." . . .
And in weighing the danger of possible interference with the courts by
newspaper criticism against the free speech to determine whether
such may constitutionally be punished as contempt, it was ruled that
"freedom of public comment should in borderline instances weigh
heavily against a possible tendency to influence pending cases." . . .
The question in every case, according to Justice Holmes, is whether
the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring
about the substantive evils that congress has a right to prevent. It is a
question of proximity and degree. . . .
Although Cabansag involved a contempt committed during the
pendency of a case, no compelling reason exists why the doctrines
enunciated therein should not be made applicable to vituperative
publications made after the termination of the case. Whether a case is
pending or not, there is the constant and ever growing need to protect
the courts from a substantive evil, such as invective conduct or
utterances which tend to impede or degrade the administration of
justice, or which calumniate the courts and their judges. At any rate, in
the case of In re Bozorth, 49it was there expressly and categorically
ruled that the clear and present danger rule equally applies to
publications made after the determination of a case, with the court
declaring that a curtailment of criticism of the conduct of finally
concluded litigation, to be justified, must be in terms of some serious
substantive evil which it is designed to avert.
Adverting again to what was further said in State vs. Shepherd, supra,
let it here be emphasized that the protection and safety of life, liberty,
property and character, the peace of society, the proper administration
of justice and even the perpetuity of our institutions and form of
government, imperatively demand that everyone — lawyer, layman,
citizen, stranger, newspaperman, friend or foe — shall treat the courts
with proper respect and shall not attempt to degrade them, or impair
the respect of the people, or destroy the faith of the people in them.
When the temples of justice become polluted or are not kept pure and
clean, the foundations of free government are undermined, and the
institution itself threatened.
III
Jurisdiction in Contempt Proceedings where the Alleged Contumely is
Committed Against a Lower Court while the Case is Pending in the
Appellate or Higher Court
In whatever context it may arise, contempt of court involves the doing
of an act, or the failure to do an act, in such a manner as to create an
affront to the court and the sovereign dignity with which it is clothed.
As a matter of practical judicial administration, jurisdiction has been
felt properly to rest in only one tribunal at a time with respect to a
given controversy. Partly because of administrative considerations,
and partly to visit the full personal effect of the punishment on a
contemnor, the rule has been that no other court than the one
contemned will punish a given contempt. 50
The rationale that is usually advanced for the general rule that the
power to punish for contempt rests with the court contemned is that
contempt proceedings are sui generis and are triable only by the court
against whose authority the contempt are charged; 51 the power to
punish for contempt exists for the purpose of enabling a court to
compel due decorum and respect in its presence and due obedience to
its judgments, orders and processes: 52 and in order that a court may
compel obedience to its orders, it must have the right to inquire
whether there has been any disobedience thereof, for to submit the
question of disobedience to another tribunal would operate to deprive
the proceeding of half its efficiency. 53
There are, however, several jurisprudentially and statutorily
recognized exceptions to the general rule, both under Philippine and
American jurisprudence, viz.:
1. Indirect contempt committed against inferior court may also be tried
by the proper regional trial court, regardless of the imposable
penalty. 54
2. Indirect contempt against the Supreme Court may be caused to be
investigated by a prosecuting officer and the charge may be filed in and
tried by the regional trial court, or the case may be referred to it for
hearing and recommendation where the charge involves questions of
fact. 55
3. In People vs. Alarcon, et al., supra, this Court ruled that "in the
interrelation of the different courts forming our integrated judicial
system, one court is not an agent or representative of another and may
not, for this reason, punish contempts in vindication of the authority
and decorum which are not its own. The appeal transfers the
proceedings to the appellate court , and this last court becomes
thereby charged with the authority to deal with contempts committed
after the perfection of the appeal." The apparent reason is that both
the moral and legal effect of a punishment for contempt would be
missed if it were regarded as the resentment of personal affronts
offered to judges. Contempts are punished as offenses against the
administration of justice, and the offense of violating a judicial order is
punishable by the court which is charged with its enforcement,
regardless of the court which may have made the order. 56 However,
the rule presupposes a complete transfer of jurisdiction to the appellate
court, and there is authority that where the contempt does not relate
to the subject matter of the appeal, jurisdiction to punish remains in
the trial court. 57
4. A court may punish contempts committed against a court or judge
constituting one of its parts or agencies, as in the case of a court
composed of several coordinate branches or divisions. 58
5. The biggest factor accounting for the exceptions is where the
singular jurisdiction of a given matter has been transferred from the
contemned court to another court. One of the most common reasons
for a transfer of jurisdiction among courts is improper venue. The cases
involving venue deal primarily with the question whether a change of
venue is available after a contempt proceeding has been begun. While
generally a change of venue is not available in a contempt proceeding,
some jurisdictions allow such a change in proper circumstances. 59
6. A new court wholly replacing a prior court has jurisdiction to punish
for violations of orders entered by its predecessor, although where the
successor court is created by a statute which does not extinguish
jurisdiction in the predecessor, an affirmative transfer of jurisdiction
before the contempt occurs is necessary to empower the successor
court to act. 60
7. Transfers of jurisdiction by appellate review have produced
numerous instances where contempt against the trial court has been
punished in the appellate court, and vice versa. Some appellate courts
have taken the view that a contempt committed after an appeal is
taken is particularly contemptuous of the appellate court because of
the tendency of such contempts to upset the status quo or otherwise
interfere with the jurisdiction of such court. 61
8. A judge may disqualify himself, or be disqualified, on a contempt
hearing or in the main case, which circumstance may require a transfer
of jurisdiction, but where a judge is disqualified only in the main case,
because of matters which do not disqualify him in a contempt
proceeding, the regular judge should sit in the contempt proceeding.
Likewise, where the regular judge, is absent or otherwise unavailable
and an order is entered by another judge and made returnable to the
proper court, the regular judge may punish for violations of orders so
entered. 62
9. Where the same act is a contempt against two or more courts, it is
no bar to contempt proceedings in one of them that there is also a
contempt against the other. 63
10. While professional disciplinary proceedings have been resorted to
as a punishment for contempt, the more recent view is that
punishment is of secondary importance to the need to protect the
courts and the people from improper professional practice. To the
substantial extent that disciplinary action remains a punishment,
disciplinary measures imposed by another court than the one
contemned furnish an exception to the rule against punishing for
contempt of another court. 64
11. Some contemptuous acts are also crime, usually misdemeanors,
which are often punishable in other courts than those against which
the contemptuous act was done. 65
12. Finally, a conviction for contempt against another court has been
allowed to stand on the basis that the failure of the defendant to make
timely objection operated as a waiver of the right to be tried before the
court actually contemned. 66
The rule, as now accepted and deemed applicable to the present
incident, is that where the entire case has already been appealed,
jurisdiction to punish for contempt rests with the appellate court where
the appeal completely transfers the proceedings thereto or where
there is a tendency to affect the status quo or otherwise interfere with
the jurisdiction of the appellate court. Accordingly, this Court having
acquired jurisdiction over the complaint for indirect contempt against
herein respondents, it has taken judicial cognizance thereof and has
accordingly resolved the same.
IV
Appropriate Remedies where the Alleged Contemptuous Statement is
also Claimed to be Libelous
Under the American doctrine, to repeat, the great weight of authority
is that in so far as proceedings to punish for contempt are concerned,
critical comment upon the behavior of the court in cases fully
determined by it is unrestricted, under the constitutional guaranties of
the liberty of the press and freedom of speech. Thus, comments,
however stringent, which have relation to judicial proceedings which
are past and ended, are not contemptuous of the authority of the court
to which reference is made. Such comments may constitute a libel
against the judge, but it cannot be treated as in contempt of the
court's authority.
On this score, it is said that prosecution for libel is usually the most
appropriate and effective remedy. 67 The force of American public
opinion has greatly restrained the courts in the exercise of the power
to punish one as in contempt for making disrespectful or injurious
remarks, and it has been said that the remedy of a judge is the same
as that given to a private citizen. 68 In such a case, therefore. the
remedy of a criminal action for libel is available to a judge who has
been derogated in a newspaper publication made after the termination
aid a case tried by him, since such publication can no longer be made
subject of contempt proceedings.
The rule, however, is different in instances under the Philippine
doctrine earlier discussed wherein there may still be a contempt of
court even after a case has been decided and terminated. In such case,
the offender may be cited for contempt for uttering libelous remarks
against the court or the judge. The availability, however, of the power
to punish for contempt does not and will not prevent a prosecution for
libel, either before, during, or after the institution of contempt
proceedings. In other words, the fact that certain contemptuous
conduct likewise constitutes an indictable libel against the judge of the
court contemned does not necessarily require him to bring a libel
action, rather than relying on contempt Proceedings. 69
The fact that an act constituting a contempt is also criminal and
punishable by indictment. or other method of criminal prosecution
does not prevent the outraged Court from punishing the
contempt. 70 This principle stems from the fundamental doctrine that
an act may be punished as a contempt even though it has been
punished as a criminal offense. 71 The defense of having once been in
jeopardy, based on a conviction for the criminal offense, would not lie
in bar of the contempt proceedings, on the proposition that a contempt
may be an offense against the dignity of a court and, at the same time,
an offense against the peace and dignity of the people of the
State. 72 But more importantly. adherence to the American doctrine by
insisting that a judge should instead file an action fur libel will definitely
give rise to an absurd situation and may even cause more harm than
good.
Drawing also from American jurisprudence, to compel the judge to
descend from the plane of his judicial office to the level of the
contemnor, pass over the matter of contempt, and instead attack him
by a civil action to satisfy the judge in damages for a libel, would be a
still greater humiliation of a court. That conduct would be personal; the
court is impersonal. In our jurisdiction, the judicial status is fixed to
such a point that our courts and the judges thereof should be protected
from the improper consequences of their discharge of duties so much
so that judicial officers have always been shielded, on the highest
considerations of the public good, from being called for questioning in
civil actions for things done in their judicial capacity.
Whenever we subject the established courts of the and to the degradation of
private prosecution, we subdue their independence, and destroy their authority.
instead of being venerable before the public, they become contemptible; and we
thereby embolden the licentious to trample upon everything sacred in society,
and to overturn those institutions which have hitherto been deemed the best
guardians of civil liberty. 73
Hence, the suggestion that judges who are unjustly attacked have a remedy in
an action for libel, has been assailed as being without rational basis in principle.
In the first place, the outrage is not directed to the judge as a private individual
but to the judge as such or to the court as an organ of the administration of
justice. In the second place, public interests will gravely suffer where the judge,
as such, will, from time to time, be pulled down and disrobed of his judicial
authority to face his assailant on equal grounds and prosecute cases in his
behalf as a private individual. The same reasons of public policy which exempt a
judge from civil liability in the exercise of his judicial functions, most
fundamental of which is the policy to confine his time exclusively to the
discharge of his public duties, applies here with equal, if not superior, force. 74
V Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo,
Whether or not the Same Contemptuous Conduct of a Member of the Bar can be
the Subject of both a Contempt Proceeding and an Administrative Disciplinary
Action
With the foregoing discussion of the appropriate remedies available to a judge,
we feel that this issue with respect to proper remedies against an erring member
or the Bar should consequentially be addressed, by way of reiteration, since
conflicting and erroneous remedies are sometimes resorted to by aggrieved
tribunals or parties.
The basic rule here is that the power to punish for contempt and the power to
disbar are separate and distinct, and that the exercise of one does not exclude
the exercise of the other. 75 A contempt proceeding for misbehavior in court is
designed to vindicate the authority of the court; on the other hand, the object of
a disciplinary proceeding is to deal with the fitness of the court's officer to
continue in that office, to preserve and protect the court and the public from the
official ministrations of persons unfit or unworthy to hold such
office. 76 The principal purpose of the exercise of the power to cite for contempt
is to safeguard the functions of the court and should thus be used sparingly on a
preservative and not, on the vindictive principle. 77 The principal purpose of the
exercise of disciplinary authority by the Supreme Court is to assure respect for
orders of such court by attorneys who, as much as judges, are responsible for
the orderly administration of justice. 78
Moreover, it has been held that the imposition a fine as a penalty in a contempt
proceeding is not considered res judicata to a subsequent charge for
unprofessional conduct. 79 In the same manner an attorney's conviction for
contempt was not collaterally estopped by reason of a subsequent disbarment
proceeding in which the court found in his favor on essentially the same facts
leading to conviction. 80 It has likewise been the rule that a notice to a lawyer to
show cause why he should not be punished for contempt cannot be considered
as a notice to show cause why he should not be suspended from the practice of
law, considering that they have distinct objects and for each of them a different
procedure is established. Contempt of court is governed by the procedures laid
down under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, whereas disciplinary actions in the
Practice of law are governed by file 138 and 139 thereof. 81
Although apparently different in legal bases, the authority to punish for
contempt and to discipline lawyers are both inherent in the Supreme Court and
are equally incidents of the court's basic power to oversee the proper
administration of justice and the orderly discharge of judicial functions. As was
succinctly expounded in Zaldivar vs.Sandiganbayan, et al.: 82
There are, in other words, two (2) related powers which come into play in cases
like that before us here: the Court's inherent power to discipline attorneys and
the contempt power. The disciplinary authority of the Court over members of
the Bar is broader than the power to punish for contempt. Contempt of court
may be committed both by lawyers and non-lawyers, both in and out of court.
Frequently, where the contemnor is a lawyer, the contumacious conduct also
constitutes professional misconduct which calls into play the disciplinary
authority of the Supreme Court. Where the respondent is a lawyer, however,
the Supreme Court's disciplinary authority over lawyers may come into play
whether or not the misconduct with which the respondent is charged also
constitutes contempt of court. The power to punish for contempt of court does
not exhaust the scope of disciplinary authority of the Court over lawyers. The
disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar is but corollary to
the court's exclusive power of admission to the bar. A lawyer is not merely a
professional but also an officer of the court and as such, he is called upon to
share in the task and responsibilities of dispensing justice and resolving
disputes in society. Any act on his part which visibly tends to obstruct, pervert,
or impede and degrade the administration of justice constitutes both
professional misconduct calling for the exercise of disciplinary action against
him, and contumacious conduct warranting application of the contempt power.
With this rounding out of the subordinate and principal issues in resolving the
incident, we feel that the guidelines we have laid down will provide assertive
references for the lower courts in disciplinary matters arising before them.
Coming back to the incident fore resolution, arising as a spin-off from the
criminal cases at bar, we reiterate what we have declared at the outset,
absolving judge for the reasons therein stated.
WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the complaint for indirect contempt
against herein respondents Mauricio Reynoso, Jr. and Eva P. Ponce de Leon is
hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.
[A.C. No. 2884. January 28, 1998]
IRENE RAYOS-OMBAC, complainant, vs. ATTY. ORLANDO A.
RAYOS, respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This case stemmed from a petition for disbarment filed with this
Court by Mrs. Irene Rayos-Ombac against her nephew, Atty. Orlando A.
Rayos, a legal practitioner in Metro Manila, for "his failure to adhere to
the standards of mental and moral fitness set up for members of the
bar."[1]
The records show that in January 1985, respondent induced
complainant who was then 85 years old to withdraw all her bank
deposits and entrust them to him for safekeeping.Respondent told her
that if she withdraws all her money in the bank, they will be excluded
from the estate of her deceased husband and his other heirs will be
precluded from inheriting part of it.
 Acting on respondent's suggestion, complainant preterminated all
her time deposits with the Philippine National Bank on January 18,
1985. She withdrew P588,000.00.
Respondent then advised complainant to deposit the money with
Union Bank where he was working. He also urged her to deposit the
money in his name to prevent the other heirs of her husband from
tracing the same.
Complainant heeded the advice of respondent. On January 22,
1985, respondent deposited the amount of P588,000.00 with Union
Bank under the name of his wife in trust for seven beneficiaries,
including his son. The maturity date of the time deposit was May 22,
1985.
On May 21, 1985, complainant made a demand on respondent to
return the P588,000.00 plus interest. Respondent told her that he has
renewed the deposit for another month and promised to return the
whole amount including interest on June 25, 1985. Respondent,
however, failed to return the money on June 25, 1985.
On August 16, 1985, respondent informed complainant that he
could only return P400,000.00 to be paid on installment. Complainant
acceded to respondent's proposal as she was already old and was in
dire need of money.
On the same date, respondent and complainant executed a
memorandum of agreement stating:
"WHEREAS, on January 22, 1985, (complainant) entrusted for
safekeeping to (respondent) the sum of FIVE HUNDRED EIGHTY
EIGHT THOUSAND PESOS (P588,000.00) which sum of money was
withdrawn by the parties from the Philippine National Bank on said
date.
WHEREAS, the said amount was deposited by (respondent) with the
consent of (complainant) with the UNION BANK, J.P. Rizal Branch,
Makati, Metro Manila.
WHEREAS, upon mutual agreement of the parties, they have agreed as
they hereby agree on the following terms for the purpose of disposing
of the above sum, to wit:
1. Of the sum of P588,000.00 received in trust, (respondent) shall
return only the sum of P400,000.00 to (complainant) in the following
manner:
a) P100,000.00 upon execution of this agreement;
b) P200,000.00 on or before October 19, 1985, to be covered by
postdated check;
c) P100,000.00 on or before November 19, 1985, to be covered by a
postdated check.
2. (Respondent) hereby undertakes and guarantees that at the time
the aforesaid postdated checks fall due, the same should be backed up
with sufficient funds on a best efforts basis.
3. That the remaining balance of P188,000.00, (respondent) hereby
acknowledges the same as his indebtedness to (complainant) to be
paid by the former when able or at his option.(Complainant) however
assures (respondent) that she will not institute any collection suit
against (respondent) (sic), neither will she transmit the same by way of
testamentary succession to her heirs, neither are (respondent's) heirs
liable.
4. That the parties have executed this agreement with the view of
restoring their previous cordial filial relationship."[2]
In accordance with the memorandum of agreement, respondent
issued to complainant the following checks:
1. UCPB Check No. 487974 dated August 19, 1985 in the amount
of P100,000.00;
2. UCPB Check No. 487975 dated October 19, 1985 in the
amount of P200,000;
3. UCPB Check No. 487976 dated November 19, 1985 in the
amount of P100,000.00.
Complainant was not able to encash UCPB Check No. 487974 as
it was dishonored due to insufficient funds.
Respondent, nonetheless, asserted that he was not duty-bound
to fund the check because under paragraph 2 of the memorandum of
agreement, he only guaranteed that the checks shall be "backed up
with sufficient funds on a best efforts basis." This prompted the other
relatives of respondent and complainant to intervene in the brewing
dispute between the two. They begged respondent to pay his
obligation to complainant. Heeding their plea, respondent replaced
UCPB Check No. 487974 with two new checks, one for P64,800.00 and
another for P35,200.00. Complainant was able to encash the first
check but not the second because it was dishonored by the drawee
bank. The remaining checks, UCPB Check No. 487975 and UCPB Check
No. 487976, were likewise dishonored by the drawee bank for lack of
funds.
On November 15, 1985, complainant filed a complaint for estafa
against respondent and a corresponding information was filed against
him by the provincial fiscal.
Respondent thereafter made a proposal to complainant for an
amicable settlement. To pay his debt, respondent offered to
complainant two second hand cars and cash amounting
to P40,000.00. Complainant refused the offer because she needed
cash to provide for her daily needs.
The records also show that respondent filed several suits against
complainant.
First, in February 1985, respondent filed a criminal case for
estafa against complainant. It appears that respondent has previously
told the tenants of a parcel of land owned by complainant that she had
promised to sell them the land and that she had authorized him to
negotiate with them. He obtained from the tenants advance payment
for the lots they were occupying. Respondent then prepared a special
power of attorney[3] authorizing him to sell the land and asked
complainant to sign it. Complainant, however, refused to sign because
she did not intend to make respondent her attorney-in-fact. Hence,
the tenants sued respondent for estafa. Respondent, in turn, sued
complainant for estafa for allegedly reneging on her promise to sell the
land.
Then, on April 5, 1986, respondent filed a pleading entitled
"Motion to Review Acts of Administratrix as a Prelude for Formal
Motion to (sic) her Discharge" in Special Proceedings No. 5544 for the
settlement of the estate of complainant's husband, pending before the
Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan.[4] Respondent filed the
pleading although he was not a party to the case.
Finally, on May 19, 1986, respondent indicted complainant for
"falsification by private individuals and use of falsified documents
under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code" for allegedly making
untruthful statements in her petition for appointment as administratrix
of the estate of her deceased husband.[5]
Thus, in June 1986, complainant filed with this Court a complaint
to disbar respondent on two grounds: (1) that respondent employed
clever scheme to defraud complainant, and (2) that respondent filed
frivolous cases against complainant to harass her.
Respondent subsequently filed a complaint for disbarment
against complainant's counsel, Atty. Abelardo Viray. The complaint
cited four causes of action: (1) assisting client to commit tax fraud; (2)
use of unorthodox collection method; (3) ignorance of the law; and (4)
subornation of perjury.[6]
 Both disbarment cases were consolidated and referred to the
Office of the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation.
The cases were transferred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation and disposition pursuant to Section
20 Rule 139-B which took effect on June 1, 1988.
After investigation, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP
recommended the suspension of respondent from the practice of law
for two years. It also recommended the dismissal of the complaint to
disbar Atty. Viray for lack of merit.[7]
On January 27, 1996, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed
Resolution No. XII-96-22 stating:
private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are
undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are
undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the
official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is
called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the
court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the
court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and
has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens
may have in the proper administration of justice.[14] Hence, if the
evidence on record warrants, the respondent may be suspended or
disbarred despite the desistance of complainant or his withdrawal of
the charges. In the instant case, it has been sufficiently proved that
respondent has engaged in deceitful conduct, in violation of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent is hereby DISBARRED. Let a

"RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED
copy of this decision be attached to respondent's record in the Bar
and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the
Confidant's Office and furnished the IBP and all our courts.
Investigating Commissioner in the above entitled case,
hereinmade part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"; and, SO ORDERED.
finding the recommendation therein to be supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo,
Respondent Atty. Orlando A. Rayos is hereby SUSPENDED from Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Panganiban, and Martinez,
the practice of law for two (2) years and the complaint against JJ, concur.
Atty. Abelardo V. Viray is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit."[8]

On June 6, 1996, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration

with regard to Administrative Case No. 2884.[9] The Board of Governors
of the IBP, however, denied the motion in Resolution No.
XII-96-193.[10]

On September 15, 1997, respondent filed with this Court a Motion

to Lift Suspension for Two Years, alleging that complainant has
executed an affidavit withdrawing the complaint for disbarment.[11]

We deny the motion of respondent.

Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:

"A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or

deceitful conduct."

Rule 1.03 of the same Code, on the other hand, provides:

"A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage
any suit or proceeding or delay any man's cause."

Respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility, as

well as his oath as an attorney when he deceived his 85-year old aunt
into entrusting to him all her money, and later refused to return the
same despite demand. Respondent's wicked deed was aggravated by
the series of unfounded suits he filed against complainant to compel
her to withdraw the disbarment case she filed against him. Indeed,
respondent's deceitful conduct makes him unworthy of membership in
the legal profession. The nature of the office of a lawyer requires that
he shall be of good moral character. This qualification is not only a
condition precedent to admission to the legal profession, but its
continued possession is essential to maintain one's good standing in
the profession.[12]

Considering the depravity of respondent's offense, we find the

penalty recommended by the IBP to be too mild. Such offense calls for
the severance of respondent's privilege to practice law not only for two
years, but for life.

The affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment case allegedly

executed by complainant does not, in any way, exonerate the
respondent. A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed
regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What
matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record,
the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been duly
proven.[13] This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary
proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any
sense a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the
respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no

A.M. No. 1048 July 14, 1995
WELLINGTON REYES, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. SALVADOR M. GAA, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
This administrative complaint for disbarment charges respondent, a
former Assistant City Fiscal of manila, with malpractice and willful
violation of his oath as an attorney.
I
On March 30, 1971, at around 9:00 A.M. complainant reported to the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) that he had been the victim of
extortion by respondent, an Assistant City Fiscal of Manila, who was
investigating a complaint for estafa filed by complainant's business rival.
According to complainant, he had given respondent P500.00 on March
1, 1971 and a total of P500.00 on three other occasions. He said that
another "payoff" was scheduled at 11:00 A.M. that day in respondent's
office at the City Hall.
An entrapment was set up by the NBI.
Complainant furnished the NBI agents several peso bills totalling
P150.00 for marking. The paper bills were sent to the Forensic and
Chemistry Division of the NBI and subsequently returned to
complainant for the use in the entrapment.
When complainant went to respondent's office, he was told that the
latter would not return until around 2:30 P.M. So complainant and the
NBI agents went back at around 2:30 P.M. As there were other persons
doing business with respondent, complainant had to wait for thirty
minutes. When finally complainant was able to see respondent, the
latter greeted him in Tagalog "Ano ba ang sa iyo?" Complainant
answered "Hindi tayo nagkita kaninang umaga." To which respondent
replied "Oo, kanina pa kita hinihintay." Complainant then handed to
respondent the marked money which he placed inside his right pocket.
The NBI agents then apprehended respondent and brought him to the
NBI Forensic and Chemistry Division for examination. Respondent's
hands were found positive of the yellow florescent powder applied
earlier to the marked money. Respondent was thereafter taken to the
Office of the Anti-Organized Crime Division of the NBI where he was
photographed, fingerprinted and record checked. Respondent declined
to give a sworn statement to explain his side of the case, invoking his
right against self-incrimination.
On the same date, the NBI recommended the prosecution of
respondent for violation of Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019.
On April 13, 1971, the NBI recommended to the Secretary of Justice
the filing of administrative charges and the institution of disbarment
proceedings against him.
On April 21, 1971, President Marcos suspended respondent from office
pending investigation and disposition of his administrative case (Case
No. 74).
Aside from the criminal complaint and Administrative Case No. 74, two
other cases were earlier filed against respondent: namely,
Administrative Case No. 10 for Grave Misconduct filed by one Angel
Alora on October 13, 1969, wherein respondent was found guilty as
charged and was recommended for suspension; and Administrative
Case No. 10-A. for partiality filed by Fabiola Fajardo on April 26, 1970,
which was pending resolution.
In his answer to the complaint for disbarment, respondent asserted
that complainant surreptitiously planted the marked money in his
pocket without his knowledge and consent.
He further said that the criminal case (IS No. 71-6558) filed against
him by the NBI at the instance of complainant was still pending
preliminary investigation by the City Fiscal of Manila. In connection
with the incident of March 30, 1971, he said that he had filed a criminal
complaint for incriminatory machination, perjury and attempted
corruption of a public official against complainant with the City Fiscal of
Manila.
In reply to the answer, complainant denied that the several cases
against respondent were motivated by revenge, malice or personal ill
will. He said that the investigating fiscal had recommended the
dismissal of the charges filed by respondent against him.
In a resolution dated December 23, 1971, this Court resolved to refer
the disbarment case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report
and recommendation. However, upon the adoption of Rule 139-B of
the Revised Rules of Court., the case was transferred to the IBP Board
of Governors for investigation and disposition.
On March 15, 1993, Commissioner Vicente Q. Roxas of the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) recommended that respondent be disbarred. Said
recommendation was approved by the IBP Board of Governors in its
resolution dated March 26, 1994.
II
We agree with the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.
In the case at bench, respondent was caught in flagrante delicto in the
act of receiving the marked money from complainant during the
entrapment conducted by the NBI agents, which resulted in his arrest
and the subsequent filing of administrative and criminal cases against
him. In his defense, respondent merely denied the charge of extortion
and retorted that the marked money was planted by complainant.
It is settled that affirmative testimony is given greater weight than
negative testimony (Delos Reyes v. Aznar, 179 SCRA 653 [1989]).
When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not
enough that he denies the charges against him; he must meet the
issue and overcome the evidence against him (Malcolm, Legal and
Judicial Ethics 93 [1949]). He must show proof that he still maintains
that degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of
him (Bayasen v. Court of Appeals, 103 SCRA 197 [1981]; Vda. de
Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 81 SCRA 393 [1978]).
Where the misconduct of a lawyer as a government official is of such a
character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral
delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar on
such grounds (Gonzales-Austria v. Abaya, 176 SCRA 634 [1989]).
The extortion committed by respondent constitutes misconduct as a
public official, which also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer.
The lawyer's oath (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 138, Section 18; People
v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968 [1958]), imposes upon every lawyer the duty
to delay no man for money or malice. The lawyer's oath is a source of
his obligations and its violation is a ground for his suspension,
disbarment or other disciplinary action (Agpalo, Legal Ethics 66-67
[1983]).
WHEREFORE, respondent is DISBARRED and his name is ordered
STRICKEN OFF from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this resolution
be furnished the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and spread on the personal records of respondent.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. 598 March 28, 1969
AURORA SORIANO DELES, complainant,
vs.
VICENTE E. ARAGONA, JR., respondent.
Vicente E. Aragona, Jr. in his own behalf.
Office of the Solicitor General for the Government.
CASTRO, J.:
This is a disbarment proceeding against Vicente E. Aragona,
Jr. 1 upon a verified letter-complaint of Aurora Soriano Deles filed with
this Court on November 6, 19637 charging the former with having
made, under oath, false and unfounded allegations against her in a
motion filed in Court of Agrarian Relations cases 1254 and 1255 Iloilo,
which allegedly caused her great mental, torture and moral suffering.
On November 13, 1963 this Court required the respondent to answer
the complaint. On December 10, 1963 the respondent filed his answer,
affirming the truth of the allegations in the questioned motion, but
claiming in his defense that in preparing it, he relied not only upon
information received but also upon other matters of public record. He
also averred that the complainant had made a similar charge against
him in a counter-motion to declare him in contempt of court filed in the
same C.A.R. case which was however dismissed together with the
complainant's counterclaims when the main cases were dismissed; that
the complainant failed to move for the reconsideration of the said
dismissal or to appeal therefrom; and that during the few years that he
has been a member of the bar, he has always comforted himself
correctly, and has adhered steadfastly to his conviction that the
practice of law is a sacred trust in the interest of truth.
This Court, on December 14, 1963, referred the case to the Solicitor
General for investigation, report, and recommendation. Because both
parties reside in Iloilo City, the Solicitor General in turn referred the
case to the City Fiscal of Iloilo for investigation and reception of
evidence. Both the petitioner and the respondent adduced evidence in
the investigation which was conducted. Thereafter, the City Fiscal
forwarded to the Solicitor General the record of the investigation,
including the recommendation of the assistant city fiscal who
personally conducted the investigation that the petition for disbarment
be dismissed. The Solicitor General thereafter filed with this Court his
report, concurring in the recommendation of the assistant city fiscal.
Aurora Soriano Deles (hereinafter referred to as the complainant) is
the administratrix of the intestate estate of the late Joaquina Ganzon
(the deceased mother of Aurora and Enrique Soriano, Sr. who are heirs
of the estate concurrently with other forced heirs) in special
proceeding 128 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo.
On July 26, 1961, upon motion of Enrique Soriano, Sr. and over and
above the opposition of the complainant, the intestate court issued an
order denying a proposed lease of ten hectares of the estate by the
complainant to one Carlos Fuentes and sustaining the possession of
Enrique as lessee of the said land. In effect, the order likewise
sustained the possession by the brothers Federico and Carlos Aglinao
of a portion of the said land being tenanted by them upon authority of
the lessee, Enrique Soriano, Sr.
In disregard of the abovementioned order, the complainant
attempted to take possession of the landholdings by placing thereon
her own tenants. Predictably, the Aglinao brothers, to protect their
rights, countered by filing against a the complainant two petitions with
the Court of Agrarian relations in Iloilo (hereinafter referred to as the
agrarian court), docketed therein as C.A.R. cases 1254 and 1255
(hereinafter referred to as the C.A.R. cases). They alleged in their
respective petitions that they have been tenants of Enrique Soriano, Sr.
since 1960 on a parcel of riceland located in barrio Malapoc, Balasan
Iloilo, held by the complainant as administratrix of the intestate estate
of the deceased Joaquina Ganzon; and that they had started to plow
their leaseholds consisting of two hectares each at the start of the
agricultural year 1962-63 when "on March 7, 1962, the respondent
[complainant herein] ordered one Bonifacio Margarejo to harrow the
plowed land without the knowledge and consent" of the petitioners.
Consequently, they prayed for the issuance of an interlocutory order
enjoining the complainant and her representatives from interfering
with their peaceful cultivation of the lands in question pending
determination of the merits of their petitions. However, consideration
of the petitioners' prayer for the issuance of an interlocutory order of
injunction pendente lite was considerably delayed not only by reason
of several postponements granted at the behest of the complainant
but also because of the assurance made by her through counsel in
open court at the hearing of June 16, 1962, that neither she nor any of
her men would disturb or interfere with the petitioner's possession of
their leaseholds until their petitions shall have been finally resolved.
But on June 18, 1962, barely two days after the abovementioned
hearing, the complainant's men again entered the land in question and
planted rice thereon. This unauthorized entry prompted the Aglinao
brothers, through their counsel, the herein respondent Atty. Vicente
Aragona, Jr. (hereinafter referred to as the respondent), to file on June
20, 1962 an "Urgent Motion for Issuance of Interlocutory Order."
There being no objection by the complainant against the said motion,
and finding the same meritorious, the agrarian court issued on June 21,
1962 the interlocutory order prayed for, directing "the respondent, her
agent, or any person acting for and in her behalf to refrain from
molesting or in any way interfering with the work of the petitioners in
their respective landholdings."
On June 24, 1962, upon the agrarian court's direction, the PC
detachment stationed in Sara, Iloilo, served copies of the order on the
complainant's men, Bonifacio Margarejo and Carlos Fuentes, and
restored the Aglinao brothers to the possession of their landholdings.
On the same day, Margarejo and Fuentes informed their landlord, the
complainant, about the said order.lawphi1.ñet
For several months thereafter nothing of significance happened in the
C.A.R. cases until the palay planted on the land in question became ripe
and ready for harvest.
Then on October 2, 1962 Enrique Soriano, Sr. showed to the
respondent in Iloilo City a telegram 2 which reads as follows:
BALASAN OCT 2 62
GILDA ACOLADO
ILOILO AMERICAN SCHOOL MARIA CLARA AVENUE ILOILO CITY
TELL DADDY COMMUNICATE ARAGONA IMMEDIATELY ALBERT
HARVEST TODAY....
MAMANG
The sender of the telegram was Mrs. Isabel Soriano, wife of Enrique,
the addressee Gilda Acolado, their daughter.
After reading the telegram, the respondent asked Soriano whether
his wife (Mrs. Soriano) was coming to Iloilo City; when informed that
she was arriving, he decided to wait for her. Mrs. Soriano arrived from
Balasan in the afternoon of that same day, October 2, 1962. She went
to see the respondent, and informed the latter that it was she who had
sent the telegram upon request of the Aglinao brothers; that she was
personally present when one Albert, a tenant of the complainant,
accompanied by many armed men, went to the land in question and
harvested the palay thereon over the protests of the Aglinao brothers;
that upon inquiring why the said Albert and his armed companions
harvested the palay, she was told that they were acting upon orders of
the complainant; and that instead of filing a complaint with the chief of
police as she originally planned, she decided instead to see the
respondent without delay.
Possessed of the above information, the respondent promptly
prepared and filed with the agrarian court, on October 3, 1962, a
verified "Urgent Motion to Declare Respondent in Contempt of Court"
(hereinafter referred to as motion for contempt), praying that the
complainant and "her armed goons" be declared in, and punished for,
contempt of court for violating the interlocutory order of June 21, 1962.
This motion for contempt elicited, on the very same day it was filed, an
instant reply from the complainant who moved to strike it out from the,
records claiming that the allegations therein libeled her, and that it was
the respondent who should be punished for contempt for deliberately
misleading the agrarian court. Moreover, not content with this reply
and countermotion for contempt the complainant also lodged on
October 4, 1962 a criminal complaint for libel against the respondent
with the City Fiscal of Iloilo, based on the same allegedly libelous
allegations made against her by the respondent in the latter's motion
for contempt filed in the C.A.R. cases. However, after preliminarily
investigating the said complaint, the assistant city fiscal to whom it was
assigned dismissed the same on the ground that the allegations of the
motion for contempt were privileged communications. The complainant
did not appeal from the, said dismissal to the city fiscal; neither did she
elevate the same for review to the Department of Justice.
Meanwhile, no action was taken by the agrarian court in the C.A.R.
cases on the motion for contempt filed by the respondent against the
complainant, as well as on the latter's countermotion, also for
contempt, against the formal instead, by order dated October 24, 1963,
the agrarian court dismissed C.A.R. cases 1254 and 1255, including the
complainant's counterclaims therein, for lack of interest to prosecute
on the part of the petitioners, the Aglinao brothers. As a matter of
course, the dismissal of the main cases carried with it the dismissed of
all incidents therein, including the motion for contempt and
counter-motion for contempt. Again, the complainant did not ask for
reconsideration of the order of dismissal, nor did she appeal therefrom.
She filed instead the present administrative complaint against the
respondent.
The only issue raised in the present disbarment proceeding is
whether the respondent, Atty. Vicente E. Aragona, Jr., should be
disciplined or disbarred for having prepared and filed under oath the
"Urgent Motion to Declare Respondent in Contempt of Court" in C.A.R.
cases 1254 and 1255-Iloilo, which allegedly contains false and libelous
imputations injurious to the honor of the complainant.
For easy reference, the motion for contempt is hereunder
reproduced in toto.
COMES NOW the undersigned, in behalf of the petitioners in each of
the above-entitled cases, and to this Honorable Court respectfully
states that:
1. Upon urgent and verified motion of the undersigned dated June 20,
1962, this Honorable Court issued an interlocutory order dated June 21,
1962, the dispositive part of which is as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the motion meritorious, an
interlocutory order is hereby issued ordering the
respondent, her agent, or any person acting for and
in her behalf, to refrain from molesting or in any way
interfering with the work of the petitioners in their
respective landholdings, situated at Barrio Malapoc
Balasan Iloilo, with an area of 2 hectares for each of
them, in these two cases, pending the bearing of
these cases on the merits.
The Commanding Officer of the Constabulary
Detachment of the 56th PC Company stationed at
Sara, Iloilo, or his duly authorized representative, is
hereby ordered to implement this order and to
report to this Court his proceedings in this particular
within a week from the date of his implementation
of this order.
SO ORDERED.
Iloilo City, June 21, 1962.
(SGD.) JUAN C. TERUEL
Commissioner
2. Pursuant to the above-quoted order, the Commanding Officer of the
56th PC Company stationed at Sara, Iloilo, ordered the respondent and
her men not to enter the landholdings in question and to refrain from
molesting or in any way interfering with the work of petitioners in their
respective landholdings; the report of said Commanding Officer is now
on file with the records of the above-entitled cases;
3. On this date, the undersigned was just surprised when he received a
telegram from the petitioners, through Mrs. Isabel Soriano, copy of
which is thereto attached as Annex "A" and made part hereof,
informing the undersigned that respondent, thru a certain Albert, with
the aid of armed goons, harvested the palay of the petitioners
yesterday despite the vehement opposition of the petitioners not to
enter their landholdings;
4. The said acts of respondents and her men in harvesting the palay of
the petitioners, knowing fully well the existence and implementation of
the interlocutory order of this Court dated June 21, 1962, is a gross
and open defiance and disobedience of said order and a challenge to
the legal processes and authority of this Court in the peaceful
administration of justice;
5. This rebellious and seditious conduct of the respondent and her men
against the authority of this Court constitutes wanton resistance and
contumacious contempt of court;
6. Unless the respondent and her armed goons are declared in
contempt of Court and duly punished, the lawful orders, processes and
authority of this Court would be a mockery and rendered useless by the
stubborn resistance and defiance of the respondent.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is respectfully prayed of this
Honorable Court that respondent and her armed goons be declared and
punished for contempt of Court until such time that she turns over the
produce of the landholdings in question which she harvested illegally
and until such time that she fully complies with the interlocutory order
of this Court.
Petitioners pray for such other relief and remedies just and equitable
under the premises.
Iloilo City, October 3, 1962.
E. I. Soriano Jr. and V. E. Aragona
Counsel for the Petitioners
Lopez Bros. Bldg., Iznart Street
Iloilo City
By:
(sgd.) VICENTE E. ARAGONA JR.
The complainant's testimony is to the effect that (1) on October 2,
1962 she was not in Balasan but in Iloilo City where she testified at the
trial of C.A.R. cases 1254 and 1255 after which she left for her home
which is situated also in Iloilo City; (2) the distance between Balasan
and Iloilo City is 135 kilometers, and to reach Balasan from Iloilo City
one has to travel four hours by car or six hours by bus; (3) although she
knows that the person Albert, mentioned in the motion, is Alberto
Boneta, a helper of Carlos Fuentes, one of the tenants she had placed
on the lands involved in the C.A.R. cases she never met or saw Boneta
or Fuentes from the time she was informed of the interlocutory order
dated June 21, 1962 in the aforesaid cases, until October 2, 1962 when
the said Alberto Boneta and several armed men allegedly harvested the
crops on the lands in question; (4) she did not order Boneta to harvest
the said crops; and (5) she never visited the aforesaid lands in 1962.
Her uncontradicted testimony lends credence to her claim that she did
not order Alberto Boneta to harvest, with the aid of armed men, the
crops on the Aglinao brothers' landholdings.
Nonetheless, this Court is loath to uphold the view that the
preparation and the filing of the questioned motion for contempt,
furnish sufficient basis for disciplinary action against the respondent.
In People vs. Aquino 3 this Court laid down the decisional authority
that
[S]tatement made in the course of judicial proceedings are absolutely
privileged — that is, privileged regardless of defamatory tenor and of
the presence of malice — if the same are relevant, pertinent or material
to the cause in hand or subject of the inquiry. And that, in view of this,
the person who makes them — such as a judge, lawyer, or witness
— does not thereby incur the risk of being found liable thereon in a
criminal prosecution or an action for the recovery of damages.
(emphasis supplied)
Since there is no doubt that the allegations made by the respondent
in the questioned motion for contempt are statements made in the
course of a judicial proceeding — i.e., in C.A.R. cases 1254 and 1255 —
besides being relevant, pertinent or material to the subject-matter of
the said cases, they are absolutely privileged, thereby precluding any
liability on the part of the respondent.
To be sure, the charges levelled by the respondent against the
complainant in the questioned pleading lack sufficient factual basis.
But even this circumstance will not strengthen the complainant's
position. "The privilege is not affected by factual or legal inaccuracies
in the utterances made in the course of judicial proceedings." 4 In fact,
"Even when the statements are found to be false, if there is probable
cause for belief in their truthfulness and the charge is made in good
faith, the mantle of privilege may still cover the mistake of the
individual .... The privilege is not defeated by the mere fact that the
communication is made in intemperate terms .... A privileged
communication should not be subjected to microscopic examination to
discover grounds of malice or falsity. Such excessive scrutiny would
defeat the protection which the law throws over privileged
communications. The ultimate test is that of bona fides." 5
Indeed, the actuations of the respondent were motivated by the
legitimate desire to serve the interests of his clients. For, contrary to
the complainant's claim, the respondent did not rely merely on Mrs.
Soriano's telegram (exh. 5) when he prepared the motion for contempt.
According to his unrebutted testimony, when Mr. Soriano brought to
him the said telegram on October 2, 1962, he asked the former
whether his wife, the sender of the telegram, was coming to Iloilo City,
and, when informed that she was arriving, he waited for her. True
enough Mrs. Soriano saw the respondent in the afternoon of that same
day and informed him that she was personally present when one
Albert, a tenant of the complainant, accompanied by several armed
men, went to the landholdings of the Aglinao brothers and, against the
objections of the latter, harvested the palay crop thereon, and that
upon her inquiry, she was informed that they were acting upon orders
of the complainant.
Considering that the foregoing information which impelled the
respondent to file the questioned motion for contempt, was obtained
by him first-hand from someone who claimed to have actually
witnessed the incident in question, coupled with the complainants own
admission that the Albert referred to by Mrs. Soriano was indeed a
helper of Carlos Fuentes, one of the tenants whom she had illegally
placed once on the landholdings of the Aglinao brothers, it was not
unseemly for the respondent to assume that Albert did act at the
behest of the complainant. After all, the complainant had, in the past,
committed the same forcible act of entering the said landholdings on
June 18, 1963, only two days after she had assured the agrarian court
that she would not disturb or interfere with the Aglinao brothers'
possession, pending final resolution of the petitions filed by them
against her. In truth it is precisely such forcible entry into the said
lands that precipitated the issuance of the very interlocutory order
dated June 21, 1962 which the respondent accused her of disobeying
in his motion for contempt. Unquestionably, the aforenarrated
circumstances provided the respondent a probable cause for belief in
the truthfulness of the allegations which he couched in rather
intemperate language in his motion for contempt. He had merely acted
in righteous indignation over the wrong supposedly done to his
aggrieved clients — believing as he did in the truth of his charges —
without deliberate intention whatsoever to malign and villify the
complainant.
The doctrine of privileged communication is not an idle and empty
principle. It has been distilled from wisdom and experience. "The
privilege is not intended so much for the protection of those engaged
in the public service and in the enactment and administration of law,
as for the promotion of the public welfare, the purpose being that
members of the legislature, judges of courts, jurors, lawyers, and
witnesses may speak their minds freely and exercise their respective
functions without incurring the risk of a criminal prosecution or an
action for the recovery of damages." 6Lawyers, most especially, should
be allowed a great latitude of pertinent comment in the furtherance of
the causes they uphold, and for felicity of their clients they may be
pardoned some infelicities of language. 7
The object of a disbarment proceeding is not so much to punish the
individual attorney himself, as to safeguard the administration of
justice by protecting the court and the public from the misconduct of
officers of the court, and to remove from the profession of law persons
whose disregard for their oath of office have proved them unfit to
continue discharging the trust reposed in them as members of the
bar. 8 Thus, the power to disbar attorneys ought always to be exercised
with great caution, and only in clear cases of misconduct which
seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer
of the court and member of the bar. 9

In this case, there is no evidence whatsoever tending to prove

unfitness of the respondent to continue in the practice of law and
remain an officer of the court.

ACCORDINGLY, the administrative complaint against the respondent

is hereby dismissed.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez,

Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.

A.M. No. 936 July 25, 1975

FERMINA LEGASPI DAROY, LYDIA LEGASPI and AGRIPINO

LEGASPI, complainants,
vs.
ATTORNEY RAMON CHAVES LEGASPI, respondent.

AQUINO, J.:

Fermina Legazpi-Daroy, Lydia Legaspi-Acha and Agripino Legaspi of

Iligan City, in a verified complaint dated March 10, 1970, charged
Attorney Ramon Chaves Legaspi of Cagayan de Oro City with
malpractice for having misappropriated the sum of four thousand
pesos which he had collected for them. They prayed that the
respondent be disbarred.1 (He was 59 years old in 1974. He passed
the 1954 bar examinations with a rating of 75.75%).

The evidence shows that the complainants hired the respondent in

May, 1962 to represent them in the intestate proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the spouses Aquilino Gonzaga and Paz
Velez-Gonzaga. The complainants, together with their brother,
Vivencio, who was abroad, were adjudged as one of the six groups of
heirs of the late Gonzaga spouses, their deceased mother, Consuelo
Gonzaga-Legaspi, being a daughter of the spouses. The heirs in a joint
petition dated April 11, 1969, which the respondent signed as counsel
for the complainants, agreed that the coconut land left by the
decedents would be divided into six equal parts, that the administrator
be authorized to sell the land, and that, after payment of the
obligations of the estate, the net proceeds would be distributed among
the six groups of heirs. The probate court approved that agreement in
its order of April 29, 1969 (Spec. Proc. Nop. 640 of the Misamis Oriental
CFI, Exh. A).
The land was sold. Fermina Legaspi-Daroy came to know of the sale
only when the respondent wrote a note dated November 28, 1969 to
her father, Teofilo Legaspi, wherein he stated "that the money we have
deposited may be withdrawn on December 8, 1969 at 9:00 o'clock".
The respondent advised Teofilo Legaspito see him on that date so that
the money could be withdrawn (Exh. B).
The complainants were not able to get the money on December 8
because the respondent on December 7 sent to Mrs. Daroy a telegram
countermanding his prior advice and directing here to go to Cagayan de
Oro City on December 10, a Wednesday, to receive the money (Exh. C).
On December 9, a certain Atty. Sugamo sent a handwritten note to Mrs.
Daroy advising her not to go to Cagayan de Oro City on December 10
because according to the respondent "his postdated checks can be paid
and/or collected either Thursday or Friday yet" (Exh. D).
In the afternoon of that same day, December 9, Mrs. Daroy received
another note, this time from the respondent himself, "Cousin Ramon".
The note contained the disturbing intelligence that Mrs. Daroy's
"Cousin Ramon" had withdrawn the money amounting to P4,000 and
had spent it. The letter, a sort of extrajudicial confession or mea
culpa on respondent's part, reads as follows (Exh. E):
Dear Fermina,
I wrote this letter with the hope that you will understand me. I have
received P4,000.00 our share in the case filed and is now in my
custody.
Previous (sic) I have a case wherein I was forced to use our money to
solve my problem.
Now to pay the amount I have used, I sold my jeep to Mr. Ricarte
Gorospe, an Employee of the BIR here in Cag. But I am not paid as yet.
So, I am waiting as he will pay at 3:00 p.m. today and it's close as I
have promised to give it on the 10th, I mean our money.
Kindly help me, defer the giving you of the sum or at least until
Thursday or Friday, I bring it to you.
I know, my responsibility on this matter.
Thanks
Cousin
Ramon
It turned out that on October 20, 1969 the respondent, as to "counsel
for Fermina Daroy et al.", received from Deputy Provincial Sheriff Jose
V. Yasay the said sum of P4,000 as "one (1) share in participation of my
clients Fermina Daroy et al. in connection with (the) order of Judge B. K.
Gorospe" in the aforementioned intestate proceeding. The respondent
signed a receipt for that amount (Exh. L-1). The sheriff paid to
Attorneys Angel Quimpo, Leovigildo Tandog, Jr. and Teogenes Velez, Jr.
the respective shares of the other groups of heirs also in the sum of
P4,000 for each group. Those lawyers turned over the amounts
withdrawn to their respective clients (Exh. L).
It is evident that the respondent, in writing on November 28, 1969 to
Teofilo Legaspi that the money deposited could be withdrawn on
December 8, 1969, acted in bad faith. He had already withdrawn the
money before that date. He concealed that fact from the complainants.
Before the disbarment complaint was filed several demands were made
upon the respondent to pay to the complainants the amount which he
had misappropriated. He repeatedly broke his promises to make
payment. As complainants' patience was already exhausted, they filed
their complaint for disbarment on March 13, 1970.2
Atty. Alfredo R. Busico, the lawyer for the complainants, in a letter to
this Court's Clerk of Court dated May 26, 1970, expressed the hope
that preferential attention would be given to the case. He said that he
had "reliable information from Cagayan de Oro City" that the
respondent "has been bragging that nothing will happen to this case"
(p. 20, Rollo).1äwphï1.ñët
The case was referred to the Solicitor General for investigation, report
and recommendation. In 1973 he requested the City Fiscal of Iligan
City to conduct the investigation. 3 After the investigation was finished,
the case was set for hearing. The respondent did not appear at the
hearing.
Respondent Legaspi in his testimony admitted that he received the
said sum of P4,000 as shown in the receipt, Exhibit D dated October 20,
1969. He said that after receiving it he immediately wired Teofilo
Legaspi at Iligan City to see him (the respondent) in his office at
Cagayan de Oro City so that Teofilo Legaspi could tell him "the proper
disposal" of that amount.
Teofilo Legaspi supposedly went to see him on October 21, 1969 and
at their conference they supposedly agreed that the sum of P700
would be deducted from the P4,000 to cover the expenses which he
(Legaspi) described as "expenses involved from the parties litigants,
expenses seeking evidence and other expenses relevant to the case"
and "major expenses" in the case (sic); that his attorney's fees would
be equivalent "to a share of the petitioners", an agreement which was
later placed in formal form (referring to 1968 extrajudicial settlement
attached to his answer); that the balance of P3,300 would be divided
into six equal parts (six because of the four Legaspi children, the father
Teofilo Legaspi and the lawyer Ramon C. Legaspi); that under such
division each participant would receive P412 each (P3,300 divided by
six gives a quotient of P550 not P412), and that he gave Teofilo the
sum of P412. The respondent did not present any receipt to prove that
alleged payment.
He said that at first Teofilo Legaspi told him to keep the share of
Vivencio Legaspi, who was abroad, but at the end of October or the
first week of November, 1969 Teofilo got from him (the respondent)
Vivencio's share. Again, the respondent did not ask Teofilo to sign a
receipt for Vivencio's share. After paying the shares of Teofilo and
Vivencio, the balance of the amount left in respondent's possession
amounted to P2,476.
According to respondent's version, the complainants "refused
consistently to receive" the said balance from him because they
wanted the full amount of P4,000. He said that he had already paid to
them the sum of P2,000 and that only the sum of P476 was left in his
custody. He did not present any receipt to prove the alleged payment
of P2,000. He said that he could deliver that amount of P476 to the
complainants.
Mrs. Daroy, in rebuttal, denied that her father, Teofilo Legaspi,
received the sum of P412 from the respondent. She said that her
father never went to Cagayan de Oro City to confer with the
respondent. She said that there was no agreement that the
respondent would participate like an heir in the partition of the sum of
P4,000. She denied that the respondent offered to pay her and her
brother and sister the sum of P2,746. She denied that the respondent
paid to the complainants P2,000.
After a careful examination of the evidence, we find that respondent's
testimony cannot be given any credence. In his memorandum he
stated that after he received from the sheriff "on October 29, 1969"
the sum of P4,000, he "immediately wired" his kinsman, Teofilo
Legaspi, to come to Cagayan de Oro City and that Teofilo "came
on October 21, 1969". Respondent meant October 20, 1969, the date
of the receipt, Exhibit L-1.
The truth is that he did not send any such wire. The statement of the
sheriff and respondent's office clerk in their affidavits of March 18, 1975
that such a wire was sent is false. What he sent to Teofilo Legaspi was
a handwritten note dated November 28, 1969 (Exh. B) wherein the
respondent made it appear that the said sum of P4,000 was going to be
withdrawn on "December 8, 1969 at nine o'clock". That the respondent
in his testimony and memorandum forgot that note, which is Annex C
of the complaint for disbarment and which he admitted in paragraph 4
of his answer, is an indication that he does not know the facts of his
own case and that he had no scruples in trying to mislead and deceive
this Court.
That note of respondent to Teofilo Legaspi, his telegram and his letter
(already quoted) to Mrs. Daroy dated December 7 and 9, 1969,
respectively (Exh. B, C and E) overwhelmingly belie his fabricated
theory that he conferred with Teofilo Legaspi at the end of October or
in the first week of November, 1969. He was tempted to concoct a
story as to his alleged payments to Teofilo Legaspi because the latter is
dead and could not refute him. However, complainants' documentary
evidence refutes his prevarications, distortions and fabrications.
He attached to his memorandum (of which he did not furnish
complainants a copy) his Exhibit 2, a supposed typewritten claim
against him which totalled P10,406.05. Exhibit 2 does not bear any
signature. The respondent wants to imply that the complainants were
trying to blackmail him. No probative value can be given to Exhibit 2.
The flimsiness and incredible character of respondent's defense are
discernible in his Exhibit 1, which he attached to his answer to the
original complaint.
Exhibit 1 as a carbon copy of a supposed extrajudicial partition executed in 1968
by the four children of Consuelo Gonzaga, by her surviving husband, Teofilo
Legaspi and by the respondent, Atty. Legaspi, all the six being described in the
document as "the legitimate children and sole heirs of Consuelo Gonzaga, who
died on March 12. 1941". Why the respondent was an heir of Consuelo Gonzaga
was not explained.
In that curious instrument, the spaces for the day and month when it was signed
and acknowledged before a notary, the spaces for the description of the fourth
parcel of land, the spaces for the shares adjudicated to the heirs, the spaces for
the instrumental witnesses and the spaces for the numbers of the residence
certificates and the dates and places of issue were left blank. Yet the instrument
was signed by the above six persons and duly notarized by a notary whose
signature is illegible.
In that extrajudicial partition Consuelo Gonzaga was alleged to have left four
parcels of land located at Barrio Maputi, Initao, Misamis Oriental which she
inherited from her father Aquilino Gonzaga. However, in the order of the Court
of First Instance of Misamis Oriental dated April 29, 1969 Consuelo Gonzaga
inherited only a one-sixth share in a parcel of land located at Maputi, Initao,
Misamis Oriental.
How Vivencio Legaspi, who, according to the instrument, was a resident of
Alameda, California, was able to sign it and to appear before a notary was not
explained.
The incomplete document, far from being of any help to respondent Legaspi,
casts a reflection on his competency and integrity as a lawyer and on the
competency and integrity of the notary before whom it was acknowledged. As
already noted, it was made to appear herein that respondent Legaspi was an
heir of Consuelo Gonzaga when, obviously, he did not possess that status. The
document does not even mention whether the deceased died intestate.
That document has no connection with the P4,000 and does not justify the
misappropriation or breach of trust committed by the respondent.
A lawyer, under his oath, pledges himself not to delay any man for money or
malice and is bound to conduct himself with all good fidelity to his clients. He is
obligated to report promptly the money of his clients that has come into his
possession. He should not commingle it with his private property or use it for his
personal purposes without his client's consent. He should maintain a reputation
for honesty and fidelity to private trust (Pars. 11 and 32, Canons of Legal
Ethics).
Money collected by a lawyer in pursuance of a judgment in favor of his clients is
held in trust and must be immediately turned over to them (Aya vs. Bigornia, 57
Phil. 8, 11).1äwphï1.ñët
Section 25, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that when an attorney
unjustly retains in his hands money of his client after it has been demanded, he
may be punished for contempt as an officer of the court who has misbehaved in
his official transactions and he is liable to a criminal prosecution.
A lawyer may be disbarred for any deceit, malpractice or other gross
misconduct in his office as attorney or for any violation of the lawyer's oath
(Ibid, sec. 27).
"The relation between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in its nature
and of a very delicate, exacting and confidential character, requiring a high
degree of fidelity and good faith" (7 Am. Jur. 2d 105). In view of that special
relationship, "lawyers are bound to promptly account for money or property
received by them on behalf of their clients and failure to do so constitutes
professional misconduct. The fact that a lawyer has a lien for fees on money in
his hands collected for his clients does not relieve him from the duty of promptly
accounting for the funds received." (Syllabus, In re Bamberger, 49 Phil. 962).
The conversion of funds entrusted to an attorney is a gross violation of general
morality as well as professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal
profession, "It deserves severe punishment" (Sturr vs. State Bar of California,
52 Cal. 2d 125, 338 Pac. 2d 897).1äwphï1.ñët
A member of the bar who converts the money of his client to his own benefit
through false pretenses is guilty of deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct in
his office of lawyer. The attorney, who violates his oath of office, betrays the
confidence reposed in him by a client and practices deceit cannot be permitted
to continue as a law practitioner. Not alone has he degraded himself but as an
unfaithful lawyer he has besmirched the fair name of an honorable profession
(In re Paraiso, 41 Phil. 24, 25; In re David, 84 Phil. 627; Manaloto vs. Reyes,
Adm. Case No. 503, October 29, 1965, 15 SCRA 131; See Cabigao and
Yzquierdo vs. Fernando Rodrigo, 57 Phil. 20).
We find respondent Legaspi guilty of deceit, malpractice and professional
misconduct for having misappropriated the funds of his clients. His
manufactured defenses, his lack of candor and his repeated failure to appear at
the investigation conducted by the City Fiscal of Iligan and at the hearings
scheduled by this Court, thus causing this proceeding to drag on for a long time,
demonstrate his unworthiness to remain as a member of the noble profession
of law. (See Capulong vs. Aliño, Adm. Case No. 381, February 10, 1968, 22
SCRA 491).
Taking into account the environmental circumstances of the case, we hold that
the proper disciplinary action against the respondent is disbarment. Its salutary
purpose is to protect the court and the public from the misconduct of an officer
of the court. It is premised on the assumption that a member of the bar should
be competent, honorable and reliable, a person in whom courts and clients may
repose confidence (In re MacDougall, 3 Phil. 70, 78).
Its objectives are to compel the lawyer to deal fairly and honestly with his client
and to remove from the profession a person whose misconduct has proven him
unfit for the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney (6
Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed., p. 242).1äwphï1.ñët
The prayer of the complainants that the respondent be ordered to pay them the
said amount of P4,000 plus attorney's fees and miscellaneous expenses
incurred in the prosecution of this case amounting to more than P1,000 cannot
be granted in this disbarment proceeding. That amount should be recovered in
an ordinary action.WHEREFORE, the respondent is disbarred. The Clerk of
Court is directed to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys.
A.C. No. 2033 May 9, 1990
E. CONRAD and VIRGINIA BEWLEY GEESLIN, complainants,
vs.
ATTY. FELIPE C. , respondent.
A.C. No. 2148 May 9, 1990
ATTY. FRANCISCO ORTIGAS, JR. and ATTY. EULOGIO R.
RODRIGUEZ, complainants,
vs.
ATTY. FELIPE C. NAVARRO, respondent.
Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Valmonte, Peña & Marcos for complainants
in AC No. 2033.
Felipe C. Navarro for and in his own behalf.
PER CURIAM:
We write this finale to the dispiriting charges filed by complainants
Francisco Ortigas, Jr. and Eulogio R. Rodriguez in Administrative Case
No. 2148 1 and by spouses E. Conrad and Virginia Bewley Geeslin in
Administrative Case No. 2033 2 seeking the disbarment of respondent
Atty. Felipe C. Navarro for malpractice and gross misconduct.
In our resolution dated May 5, 1980, issued consequent to the Report
and Recommendation of the Office of the Solicitor General submitted to
this Court on April 21, 1980, we ordered the suspension of respondent
Navarro from the practice of law during the pendency of these cases. 3
The investigative phase was conducted by said office pursuant to our
resolutions of February 14, 1975 and September 13, 1976 in G.R. Nos.
L- 39386 and L-39620-29, entitled "Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer
vs. Court of Appeals, et al." With commendable thoroughness and
attention to detail, two reports were submitted which, in order to
vividly portray the scope and magnitude of respondent's operations
and how he was able to perpetrate the anomalous transactions
complained of, we quote extensively from said reports which are
sustained by the evidence of record.
I. The antecedent facts on which Administrative Case No. 2148 is
premised are reported by then Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, as
follows:
PREPATORY STATEMENT
This unnumbered administrative case against respondent Atty. Felipe C.
Navarro (hereinafter called respondent NAVARRO, for short) originally
stemmed from the letter of a certain Angelito B. Cayanan to the
Honorable Supreme Court dated January 25, 1975 which reads as
follows:
xxx xxx xxx
I wish to respectfully inform your good office that I bought a few lots
on installment basis from Atty. Felipe C. Navarro of Ruby Hills
Subdivision as evidenced by the attached OR Nos. 0512 and 0519 and a
"Contract of Sale".
Atty. Navarro, some officials and representative of the said company
claim that although there is a pending case No. L-39386 under Decree
No. 1425 on the property being sold, the case is almost won in their
favor and are just waiting for your final decision within a couple of
months or even less.
In this connection, I am respectfully writing you this letter in order to
bring to your attention this transaction and to protect my rights in the
event that any unfavorable circumstances may arise in the future.
xxx xxx xxx
Acting on the aforesaid letter, the Supreme Court, per Resolution dated
February 14, 1975, referred the copy of Mr. Cayanan's letter to the
Solicitor General for "investigation of the existence of sufficient ground
to proceed with the prosecution of Atty. Felipe C. Navarro (whose
address of record is No. 66 Azucena, Roxas District, Quezon City) for
suspension or removal from the office of attorney and for appropriate
action." The resolution reads as follows:
L-39386 and L-39620-29 (Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer vs. Court
of Appeals, et al.) The court NOTED the letter dated January 25, 1975
of Mr. Angelito B. Cayanan with its attachments (copy thereof has
been furnished Atty. Felipe C. Navarro, counsel for respondents) and
RESOLVED to instruct the Clerk of Court to inform him of the status of
the cases at bar.
It appearing from said letter that Atty. Felipe C. Navarro has been
selling the lots in litigation herein on installment basis to the public
(among them, Mr. Cayanan) as "absolute owner by virtue of this
contract of legal services in Civil Case No. 8321, etc. of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Pasig" (see Ruby Hills Subdivision Contract of
Sale), which lots are titled in the name of herein petitioner and not in
Atty. Navarro's name and that the unwarranted claim is made on his
behalf that 'the case is almost won in their favor' (see Mr. Cayanan's
letter), the Court RESOLVED FURTHER to refer copy of Mr. Cayanan's
said letter with its attachments to the Solicitor General under Rule 139,
Sections 1, 3, 4 and 5 for investigation of the existence of sufficient
ground to proceed with the prosecution of Atty. Felipe C. Navarro
(whose address of record is No. 66 Azucena, Roxas District, Quezon
City) for suspension or removal from the office of attorney and for
appropriate action.
Aside from Mr. Cayanan, the Solicitor General is directed to
communicate in the premises with Atty. Eulogio R. Rodriguez of the
law firm of Ortigas & Ortigas (with address at 10th Floor, Ortigas Bldg.
Ortigas Ave., Pasig, Rizal), who under letter of June 10, 1974 on file in
Administrative Case No. 1154 has offered to make available
documents in their possession showing other sales made by Atty.
Navarro of properties titled in the name of other persons, involving a
total selling price of P75 million and down payments of almost P 0.6
million.
On April 4, 1975, Assistant Solicitor General (now Justice of the Court
of Appeals) Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr. wrote Mr. Angelito B. Cayanan
asking him to submit his affidavit embodying the circumstances
surrounding the matters contained in his letter dated January 25, 1975,
especially the second paragraph thereof. The letter was sent to Mr.
Cayanan by registered mail but the same was returned unserved for
the reason that the addressee had moved to another address.
On the same date, April 4, 1975, Assistant Solicitor General Gutierrez,
Jr. also wrote to Atty. Eulogio R. Rodriguez requesting him for copies
of the documents evidencing the sales made by respondent Navarro.
On February 13, 1976, this Honorable Court issued a Resolution in
L-39386 and L-39620-29 (Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer vs. Court
of Appeals, et al.) referring the letter of Atty. Francisco Ortigas, Jr.
dated January 13, 1976 "for investigation of the existence of sufficient
grounds for the prosecution of Atty. Felipe C. Navarro for suspension
or removal from office and for appropriate action" and directing "Mr.
Ortigas, Jr., to furnish the Office of the Solicitor General for the
purpose with a copy of said letter and all its pertinent attachments."
The aforementioned letter of Atty. Francisco Ortigas, Jr. dated January
13, 1976 reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
Dear Justice Teehankee,
This is to apprise your Office of the latest activities of Atty. Felipe C.
Navarro who has previously been reported to the Supreme Court as
selling properties titled in the name of this Company.
We have just secured a new "subdivision plan" of Atty. Navarro
showing that the lots he is now selling to the public include those titled
in the names of the heirs of the late Don Vicente Madrigal and this
Company in Quezon City. Atty. Navarro has thus expanded his
activities despite recent detention by the Military. As could be seen
from the attached "plan", Navarro claims to be the owner of that huge
property (actually titled in the name of the Madrigals and this Company)
bounded by Ortigas Avenue, E. delos Santos Avenue, White Plains
Road and R. Rodriguez Avenue, comprising approximately of 260
hectares.
As reported in our previous letters to the Court, Navarro claims to be
the owner of some 4,000 hectares of land in the Greater Manila Area in
virtue of his handling the case of some squatters on a 1.2-hectare lot in
Mandaluyong, Rizal owned by Dona Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer.
He contends that whereas his squatters-clients occupy only about a
hectare, he has become, in virtue of his contract of legal services' with
them, the owner of thousands of hectares of land as these are
allegedly0 covered by void titles. Navarro thus started to openly sell
these properties.
Navarro's Ruby Hills and Bluehills Subdivisions, for instance, cover
properties already with buildings and other improvements. He has
nevertheless been quite successful in selling portions thereof, as when
he sold lots within the De La Salle College, Wack-Wack Golf & Country
Club, ABM Sison Hospital, etc. His modus operandi is described in this
Company's letter complaint dated April 8, 1974 to Gen. Prospero Olivas,
copy of which is attached hereto for ready reference.
Navarro continues to defy the authorities, for only after a brief lull he is
now again openly selling titled properties of other persons. We have
provided more than sufficient documentary evidence to the Court and
the Solicitor General and we hope that formal administrative charges
can now be filed against Navarro to prevent him from further
perpetrating a large scale fraud upon the public.
xxx xxx xxx
Thereafter, hearings were conducted on various dates.
COMPLAINANTS' EVIDENCE
The evidence for the complainants consist mainly of documents, most
of which were presented in Criminal Cases Nos. 3158 and 3159 of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal and in the various civil cases before the
said court involving Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer. Complainants'
sole witness, Reynaldo Morallos, merely identified the various
documentary exhibits presented by the complainants.
From the evidence adduced by the complainants, it appears that a
certain Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer (hereinafter called HABERER,
for short) filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal twenty-two (22)
cases for recovery of possession of her 1.2 hectare property in
Mandaluyong, Rizal titled in her name, and to eject the twenty-two (22)
families squatting thereat. Eleven (11) of these cases were raffled to
Judge Emilio Salas, while the other eleven (11) cases were assigned to
Judge Pedro Navarro. All the twenty-two (22) defendants-squatters
were represented by respondent NAVARRO. On behalf of his clients,
respondent NAVARRO interposed as principal defense, the alleged
nullity of the HABERER'S title, claiming that the mother title from which
it emanated actually originated from Decree No. 1425 issued in G.L.R.O.
Record No. 917, which he claims to be non-existent.
The two sets of cases were decided differently. In the first set of eleven
(11) cases, Judge Salas rendered a decision on August 31, 1970
sustaining the validity of the HABERER'S title and ordering the eviction
of the defendants-squatters clients of respondent NAVARRO (Exhibit
W). In finding for the plaintiff, Judge Salas stated as follows:
After due consideration of the evidence adduced by both parties, this
Court finds that most of the documentary evidence submitted by
defendants are irrelevant to the case since they pertain to defendants
claim of ownership over 10,000 hectares of land when the area of the
property subject matter of the complaint is only 12,700 square meters.
This Court also believes that the above-mentioned claims of defendants
are untenable.
Plaintiffs ownership over the property in question is evidenced by the
issuance in her name, since 1929, of Transfer Certificate of Title No.
15043. It is a settled rule in this jurisdiction that a certificate of title
serves as evidence of an indefeasible title to the property in favor of
the person whose name appears therein. After the expiration of the
one-year period from the issuance of the decree of registration upon
which it is based, it becomes incontrovertible (see case of Pamintuan
vs. San Agustin, 43 Phil. 558; Reyes & Nadres vs. Borbon & Director of
Lands, 50 Phil. 791; Manuel Sy Juco, et al. vs. Luis Francisco, 53 O.G.,
p. 2186, April 15,1957; Brizuela et al. vs. Ciriaco Vda. de Vargas, 53
O.G., p. 2822, May 15, 1957).
Defendants' claim that they became owners of the land in question by
adverse possession is without merit considering that title to land
becomes non-prescriptible Sec. 42 of Act No. 496 provides that no title
to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession (Corporation de Pp.
Agustines vs. Crisostomo, 42 Phil. 427). A title once registered cannot
be defeated even by adverse, open and notorious possession.
Registered title under the Torrens System cannot be defeated by
prescription. The title, once registered, is notice to the World. All
persons must take notice. No one can plead ignorance of registration
(Legarda vs. Saleeby, 3 Phil. 590, 595).
Further, defendants recognized plaintiffs ownership over the property
in question when they filed a petition with the People's Homesite &
Housing Corporation wherein they sought the latter's intervention for
the acquisition of the property and for the subdividing thereof into
small lots to be sold to them at nominal cost. In said petition
defendants not only named the plaintiff as the owner of the property in
question but they also indicated therein her title to the land as Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 15043 of the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Rizal.
We quote hereunder the pertinent facts and data concerning the
property in question in defendants' petition submitted to the General
Manager of the People's Homesite & Housing Corporation, as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
1) Location of land: Barrio Burol, Mandaluyong, Rizal
2) Name of registered owner: Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer
3) Address of owner: 1288 Burgos St., Paco, Manila, or c/o Bausa,
Ampil, & Suarez Law Offices, Madrigal Bldg., Manila
4) Certificate of Title No. (attach photostatic copy): 15043
5) Area of land, Lot & Block & Survey Nos. 12,700 square meters(Exh
G).
As regards defendants' claim that Transfer Certificate of Title No.
15043 issued since 1929 in the name of plaintiff is null and void, this
Court is of the opinion that defendants cannot assail the validity of said
title in this proceeding, which is for recovery of possession. Any attack
on the decree of registration of title must be direct and not by
collateral proceeding. The title which may be issued in pursuance of
said decree cannot be changed, altered, modified, enlarged or
diminished in a collateral proceeding (Legarda, et al. vs. Saleeby, 31
Phil. 590). In the case of Director of Land vs. Gan Tan, G.R. No. L-2664,
May 30, 1951, our Supreme Court, in reversing the decision of the trial
court where the registered owner was considered disqualified to
acquire land under the Constitution and consequently was denied the
right to constitute his title, said: "That the disqualification raised by the
Court is untenable in the light of the theory that a Torrens title cannot
be collateraly attacked. That issue can only be raised in an action
instituted expressly for that purpose". (See also Ramon Chua Yu Sun
vs. The Hon. Ceferino de los Santos, et al., G.R. No. 4347, November
23,1951; James (sic) G.R. No. L-4013, Dec. 29,1951; Samonte, et al.
vs. Descallar et al., No. L-12964, Feb. 29,1960).
In view of the above-mentioned ruling of the Supreme Court, it is our
opinion that there is no need to discuss the merits of the reasons
claimed by defendants why Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043 in
the name of plaintiff is null and void. (Exh. W) Decision in Civil Cases
Nos. 8322, 8323, 8327, 8370, 8375, 8374, 8382, 8691, 8693, 8696 &
8699, at pages 6-7; 9-10).
In the second set of eleven (11) cases, Judge Pedro Navarro decided in
favor of the defendants-squatters clients of respondent NAVARRO. In
his decision dated May 26, 1971, dismissing the complaints, Judge
Navarro stated as follows:
Plaintiff claims to be the registered owner of a parcel of land containing
an area of 12,000 square meters situated at the corner of A. Luna,
Harapin Ang Bukas and J.C. Zuluete Streets, Mandaluyong, Rizal, which
is covered by, and more particularly described in, Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 15043 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal and indicated in the
sketch plan attached to the complaint as Annex A.
xxx xxx xxx
It likewise appears that ejectment proceedings have been filed in the
Municipal Court of Pasig, Rizal, and in the City Court of Quezon City
against several persons occupying other parcels by Ortigas and
Company, Limited Partnership, where decisions have been rendered in
favor of said Partnership. In order to forestall executions of these
decisions defendants in said ejectment cases filed class suit before this
Court by the occupants of the land which was heard and tried before
Branch XV in which the Director of Lands was impleaded as a
party-defendant. The decision of Branch XV in said class suit is made
part of the evidence of these defendants in the herein eleven cases for
whatever the same may be worth as aid in the determination of the
merits of the issues raised herein.
As may be gleaned from said decision of Branch XV plaintiff therein
assailed the validity of Decree No. 1425 as null and void and or fictitious
and the proceedings in GLRO Rec. No. 917 upon which the decree was
based as also null and void. The Court sustained the herein plaintiffs
claim and rendered judgment declaring (1) the proceedings in GLRO
Rec. No. 917 null and void; (2) the Decree No. 1425 null and void; (3)
all original certificates of title issued by virtue of and pursuant to the
judgment in GLRO Rec. No. 917 and Decree No. 1425 utter nullities; (4)
all transfer certificates of title derived from the original certificates of
title declared void under No. 3 above, particularly but not exclusively,
Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 77652 and 77653 of the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City and 126575 and its derivative Transfer Certificate
of 'title No. 135879 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal, null and void; (5)
that the rightful owners of the litigated lands covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 77652, 77653, 126575 (or 135879) are the
herein plaintiffs . . . and so forth.
The Court has read copy of this decision of our Branch XV and observed
findings of facts too ponderous to be ignored.
That case before Branch XV directly assails the nullity of the
proceedings leading to the proceedings in GLRO Record No. 917 and,
as an inevitable corollary, the nullity of Decree No. 1425 issue by virtue
of such void proceedings as well as the original certificates of title
issued as consequence thereof.
In said proceeding before Branch XV the Court, among other things,
found that while the decision in GLRO 917 was supposedly rendered on
April 25, 1905, the survey of the property subject matter of therein
application was not made until June 16 to August 16, 1906, or some
one year after the decision. It found no proof of initial hearing of the
application for registration being published as required by law without
which the Land Registration Court could not have acquired jurisdiction
over the case. Said decision also made inference that since the survey
of the property was not made until a year after the rendition of the
judgment the technical descriptions appearing in the original
certificates of title issued under GLRO Rec. No. 917 Decree No. 1425,
could not have been those appearing in the notice of initial hearing, if
any. Publication of accurate technical description being an essential
jurisdictional requirement which cannot be dispensed with and
non-compliance with this requirement renders the proceedings and the
decision and decree and titles issued arising therefrom null and void.
The same decision of Branch XV also made its findings that James Ross
who was said to have penned the decision in GLRO Rec. No. 917,
never was a judge of the Court of Land Registration at the time the
decision was supposedly rendered because the Gaceta Official for the
year 1905 does not show that James Ross was listed as Judge of the
Land Registration Court or that he was ever appointed in that capacity.
Furthermore, the Court found that while J.C. Welson was the Clerk of
Court on April 26, 1905, one A.K. Jones issued the decree and he
signed it as Clerk of Court. The Court even found the supposed
decision in that proceedings missing and made its conclusion that since
the decree which was supposedly issued by a person who was not the
Clerk of Court at the time and which decree did not contain the
description of the property ordered in the decision to be rendered
because the survey of the property was only made some one year later
and that said decree cannot now even be found, the decision rendered
therein is void for lack of jurisdiction.
Now, as we have said, the foregoing findings of facts are too
ponderous to be ignored. It is indeed a truism that a void original
certificate of title cannot be the source of a valid transfer certificate of
title and a void judgment is, in the eyes of the law, inexistent and
cannot give source to any legal right.
The evidence now shows that the plaintiffs in said Civil Case No.
7-M(10339) before Branch XV of this Court are also the defendants in
the herein eleven cases in which their properties are also involved.
Since the case before Branch XV directly assails the nullity of the
proceedings by virtue of which Decree No. 1425 and the alleged title of
the plaintiff over the parcels of land occupied by the herein eleven
defendants is a derivative from such decree, it is the considered
opinion of this Court that until and unless the decision of Branch XV of
this Court is reversed or set aside by final judgment, plaintiffs prayer to
order the herein eleven defendants in these eleven cases to vacate the
parcels which they occupy and on which their respective houses are
built has become premature. It goes without saying that if said
decision of Branch XV will be finally affirmed, or that the same
becomes final and executory, all the claims of rights to ownership and
possession of properties embraced in the decision in GLRO Rec. No.
917 and Decree No. 1425 shall become absolute nullities. Possessions
by actual occupants of all these properties had better be maintained
until after final decision in Civil Case No. 7-M(10339) shall have been
rendered. (Exh. R, Decision in Civil Cases Nos. 8320, 8321, 8326, 8369,
8379, 8383, 8385, 8386, 8387 and 8700, at pp. 2, 5-9).
On June 21, 1971, Judge Navarro, acting on the motion filed by
respondent NAVARRO, issued an order cancelling HABERER's title over
her property in question and directing the issuance of a new title in lieu
thereof in favor of respondent's clients Thus —
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
dismissing the complaints in the above-entitled cases (Nos. 8320, 8321,
8326, 8329, 8376, 8379, 8383, 8386, 8685, 8687 and 8700) all with
costs against the plaintiff and hereby ordering the Register of Deeds of
Rizal to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043 of the Register of
Deeds of Rizal issued in favor of the plaintiff Florentina Nuguid Vda. de
Haberer and in view thereof issue new certificates of title in favor of
the defendants subject to the lien for attorney's fees in favor of
Attorney Felipe Navarro in accordance with the terms of the
"Kasunduan Hinggil sa Serbisyo ng Abogado" which is quoted in
his ex-parte motion for clarification and/or modification of the
decision.
As so modified the decision stands in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.
(Exhibit S, pp. 4-5).
On July 23, 1971, HABERER filed a motion for reconsideration of the
aforesaid order, and on September 15, 1972, Judge Navarro issued the
following order:
In the order dated July 17, 1971, the Court had occasion to reiterate
that its decision in this case was mainly predicated on the decision of
Branch XV of this Court that the certificate of title emanating from the
proceedings in GLRO Record No. 917 were null and void and plaintiffs
title happened to be one of them. The Court opined that until said
decision is reversed the actual occupants had better be maintained in
their possessions of the land.
Pursuant to the same order the motion for reconsideration and new
trial was set only for reception of alleged newly discovered evidence.
The Court now understands that the decision of Branch XV is now
under review by order of our Appellate Court.
It has also come to the understanding of the Court that the order of
June 21, 1971, sought to be reconsidered insofar as it ordered the
cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043 in favor of the
plaintiff, also adversely affects the interests of other persons and
entities like the Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership, which is not a
party herein, because the certificate of title of the plaintiff is also a
derivative of GLRO 917 and Decree No. 1425 from which Ortigas and
Company, Limited Partnership, derives titles over wide tracts of land.
Since Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership, is not a party in this
case whatever orders or decisions are made in this case cannot be
made to affect the said company. Decisions and orders can only affect
parties to the case.
The Court therefore arrives at the conclusion that the order dated June
21, 1971, must be reconsidered on two grounds (1) because the
decision of Branch XV is now being the subject of further proceedings
and (2) because it has the effect of adversely affecting the interest of
Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership, which is not even a party
herein.
WHEREFORE, as prayed, the order dated June 21, 1971, is set aside.
However, the decision dated May 26, 1971, insofar as it denies the
ejectment of the present occupants of the land as stated in the decision
stands.
SO ORDERED.
(Exhibit T, at pp. 2-3).
HABERER appealed from the decision of Judge Navarro while the
defendants-clients of respondent NAVARRO appealed from the decision
of Judge Salas. The Navarro order of June 21, 1971 was not appealed
by respondent NAVARRO's clients.
After the rendition of the Navarro decision which made reference to the
decision rendered by Judge Vivencio Ruiz of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal, Branch XV, respondent NAVARRO published in the Manila
Times on July 4, 1971 the following:
LEGAL NOTICE TO ALL THOSE INVOLVED:
PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF LAW AS INTERPRETED BY OUR
SUPREME COURT RESPECTING A VAST TRACT OF LAND LATIFUNDIO
COVERING MANDALUYONG, SAN JUAN, PASIG, MARIKINA, AND
QUEZON CITY, THE DECISION DATED MAY 26, 1971 REITERATING
AND REPEATING THE DECLARATION AND ORDER THAT ALL
ORIGINAL AND TRANSFER CERTIFICATES OF TITLE DERIVED FROM
DECREE NO. 1425 ARE NULL AND VOID AB INITIO RENDERED BY THE
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL IN FAVOR OF THE MYRIAD
CLIENTS OF THE UNDERSIGNED HAS AUTOMATICALLY BY MERE
LAPSE OF THE REGLEMENTARY PERIOD) BECOME FINAL AND
EXECUTORY.
But to every possessor in good faith there comes a time when he is
considered a possessor in bad faith. When the owner or possessor with
a better right comes along, when he becomes aware that what he had
taken for granted is at least doubtful, and when he learns the grounds
in support of the adverse contention, good faith ceases. The possessor
may still believe that his right is more secure, because we resign
ourselves with difficulty to the sight of our vanishing hopes, but when
the final judgment of the court deprives him of the possession, all
illusion necessarily disappears. (Tacas vs. Robon, 53 Phil. 356,
361-362 citing Manresa and Articles 528, 545, and 1123 of our present
Civil Code).
He who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses
what is built, planted or sown without right to indemnity (Art 449, Civil
Code)
HOWEVER, IT IS NOT THE DESIRE OF THE UNDERSIGNED
PREVAILING PARTY AND SUCCESSOR BY TITLE ACQUIRED AFTER
THE ACTIONS WERE BEGUN BY VIRTUE OF HIS CONTRACT OF LEGAL
SERVICES TO DEMAND FOR THE DEMOLITION OR REMOVAL OF THE
IMPROVEMENTS AT THE EXPENSE OF THE POSSESSOR IN BAD FAITH
FOR:
The Civil Code confirms certain time-honored principles of the law of
property. One of those is the principle of accession whereby the owner
of property acquires not only that which it produces but that which it
united to it either naturally or artificially. Whatever is built, planted or
sown on the land of another, and the improvements or repairs made
thereon, belong to the owner of the land. Where however, the planter,
builder or sower has acted in good faith, a conflict of rights arises
between the owners and it becomes necessary to protect the owner of
the improvements without causing injustice to the owner of the land.
In view of the impracticability of creating what Manresa calls a state of
"forced co-ownership" (Vol. 3, 4th ed., p. 213), the law has provided a
just and equitable solution by giving the owner of the land the option
to acquire the improvements after the payment of the proper
indemnity or to oblige the builder or planter to pay for the land and the
sower to pay the proper rent. It is the owner of the land who is allowed
to exercise the option because his right is older and because, by the
principle of accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the accessory
thing." Bernardo vs. Bataclan, 66 Phil. 598, 602; see also Filipinas
Colleges, Inc. vs. Garcia Timbang, et al., 106 Phil. 247, 254).
So caveat emptor (buyers beware) of possesors in bad faith as we are
ready to ask for the execution of the decision pursuant to law and
avoid a scire facias Ordinary prudence requires that those involved
may please make some kind of arrangements with the undersigned
before execution by calling through the following telephones:
xxx xxx xxx
BY THE WAY, YOU ARE ALL INVITED TO JOIN THEMOTORCADE OF
OUR PEOPLE'S VICTORY WHICH WILL PASS THROUGH THE
PRINCIPAL STREETS OF MANDALUYONG, SAN JUAN, PASIG,
MARIKINA, AND QUEZON CITY FROM 9 A.M. TO 12 NOON TODAY,
SUNDAY, JULY 4, 1971, THE MOTORCADE WILL BEGIN FROM NO. 61
AMADO T. REYES STREET, BARRIO BUROL, MANDALUYONG, RIZAL
RETURNING TO THE SAME PLACE AT NOON FOR LUNCH
CELEBRATING TILL MIDNIGHT.
(Sgd.) FELIPE C. NAVARRO
Counsel for the Defense
60 Azucena, Roxas District, Quezon City
(Exhibit D, at pages 6-8).
Thereafter, respondent NAVARRO claimed ownership of properties
originally covered by Decree 1425 including the parcels of land owned
by Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership (hereinafter called
ORTIGAS, for short), and started selling them.
In view of the aforementioned publication, panic ensued among the lot
buyers of ORTIGAS and among the property owners whose titles were
derived from Decree No. 1425. As a counter measure to allay the fears
of the panicky lot buyers and owners, ORTIGAS caused the publication
in the Manila Times on July 19 and 17, 1971 the following:
WARNING
SO THE PUBLIC MAY KNOW
In reply to numerous inquiries received by Ortigas & Company, Limited
Partnership with reference to an advertisement published in the Manila
Times on July 4, 1971 supposedly affecting the validity of all original
certificates of title and transfer certificates of title derived from Decree
No. 1425, Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership wishes to announce
that it is not a party to ANY case allegedly decided on May 26, 1971 by
the Supreme Court or any other court and therefore ALL ITS TITLES
DERIVED FROM DECREE NO. 1425 ARE NOT IN ANY WAY AFFECTED
BY SAID DECISION.
The public is hereby requested to be wary of any person selling lands
and/or rights to lands belonging to and in the name of Ortigas &
Company, Limited Partnership.
The public is also warned to be wary of MISLEADING adverstisements
and/or persons basing their rights to lands of Ortigas & Company,
Limited Partnership on such "decision" of May 26, 1971 which is
claimed to be "final and executory."
ORTIGAS & COMPANY, LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
(Exhibit D, at pages 4-5).
After the publication of the foregoing notices, respondent NAVARRO
filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch VIII, two (2)
complaints for libel against the officers of ORTIGAS and the officials of
the defunct Manila 'times. Respondent NAVARRO sought to recover in
said cases damages allegedly sustained by him on account of his failure
to consummate thousands of sales by reason of the publication of the
above notice. In support of his allegation, respondent NAVARRO
presented 169 deeds of sale over lots in his various subdivisions, the
locations of which overlap the properties owned by ORTIGAS (marked
as Exhibit F, F-1 to F-168 in the instant proceedings).
On December 13, 1971, Judge Benjamin H. Aquino dismissed these
two cases for libel for lack of merit (Exhibit D).
Apart from the documents pertaining to the HABERER cases and the
libel cases, the complainants also presented documents relating to Civil
Case No. 7-M(10339), Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XV,
entitled "Pedro del Rosario, et al. vs. Ortigas & Company, Limited
Partnership, et al." and Civil Case No. Q-16265, Court of First Instance
of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch XVI, entitled "Ortigas & Company, Limited
Partnership vs. Felipe C. Navarro."
In Civil Case No. 7-M (10339), the plaintiffs therein sought to enjoin
ORTIGAS from ejecting them. Judge Vivencio M. Ruiz decided in favor
of the plaintiffs, arguing that (1) there was no publication for the Notice
of Initial Hearing set in 1905; (2) there was no survey of the property
sought to be registered; (3) the judge presiding over the defunct Court
of Land Registration was fake; and (4) the Clerk of Court of the said
Court was also fake. The dispositive portion of the Ruiz decision reads
as follows:
WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing, the Court hereby
declares and/or orders:
1. That the proceedings in G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 917 are null and void;
2. That Decree No. 1425 is null and void and/or fictitious;
3. That all the original certificates of title issued by virtue of and
pursuant to the judgments in G.L.R.0 Rec. No. 917 and Decree No.
1425 were utter nullities;
4. That all transfer certificates of title derived from the original
certificates of title declared void under No. (3) above, particularly but
not exclusively, Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 77652 and 77653 of
the Register of Deeds of Quezon City and 126575 and its derivative
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 135879 of the Register of Deeds of
Rizal, were and are null and void;
5. That the rightfully (sic) owners of the litigated lands covered by
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 77652, 77653, 126575 (or 135879)
are the herein plaintiffs, the portions owned by them being as
indicated in Exhibit P;
6. That the defendant Partnership cease and desist from molesting the
plaintiffs in the enjoyment and peaceful possession of their respective
landholdings;
7. That the Hon. Andres Siochi, as Presiding Judge, Municipal Court,
Pasig, Rizal, and Hon. Ricardo Tensuan, as Presiding Judge, Branch II,
City Court of Quezon City, and the defendant Ortigas and Company,
Limited Partnership, their agents, representatives and any and all
persons acting in their behalves, refrain and desist absolute (sic) and
perpetually from proceeding with or taking any action on Civil Cases
Nos. 1134, II 13865, II-13869, II-13877, II-13913, and II-13921 filed
by the herein defendant Partnership against some of the herein
plaintiffs;
8. That the case be dismissed as against defendant Director of Lands;
9. That the defendant Partnership pay to the plaintiffs the sum of
P50,000.00 as and for attorney's fees;
10. That the defendant Partnership pay to the plaintiffs the costs of the
suit; and
Defendant Partnership's counterclaim is hereby dismissed for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
(Exhibit EE at pages 5-6).
ORTIGAS appealed the Ruiz decision to the Court of Appeals. On
November 21, 1971, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision setting
aside the decision of Judge Ruiz and ordering a new trial to enable the
petitioner to introduce newly discovered evidence. The case was then
remanded to the lower Court. On November 3, 1973, Judge Arsenio A.
Alcantara, who took the place of Judge Ruiz who was separated from
the service by the President of the Philippines, rendered a decision the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendant,
Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership, as against the plaintiffs:
1. Dismissing the amended complaint;
2. Confirming the validity of Decree No. 1425, issued in Expediente
917 and all titles emanating therefrom;
3. Directing each of the plaintiffs to individually pay the defendant
Company:
(a) P30.00 per month as rental of the premises occupied by them from
the time of the filing of the complaint on October 20, 1967, with legal
rate of interest, until they surrender the possession thereof to
defendant Company;
(b) P5,000.00 as attorney's fees.
(4) Ordering plaintiff and their successors-in-interest, agents or any
person or persons acting in their behalf, who are found to be in
possession of defendant company's land to vacate the same and
remove and demolish their improvements thereon at plaintiffs
expenses;
(5) Ordering Atty. Emilio D. Castellanes to return the attorney's fees in
the amount of P 1,030.00 he prematurely collected from defendant
company, with interest; and
(6) To pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
(Exhibit DD at pages 44-45).
The aforesaid decision was appealed. During the pendency of the
approval of the record on appeal, ORTIGAS filed a motion for
immediate execution of judgment. After exchange of pleadings by the
parties, the trial court presided by Judge Alcantara granted the motion
and ordered the issuance of a writ of execution in favor of Ortigas upon
filing a bond in the amount of P250,000.00. Del Rosario, et al. filed a
motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order. Despite opposition by
Ortigas, Judge Florellana Castro-Bartolome, who was appointed to
Branch XV vice Judge Alcantara, granted the motion for reconsideration
and set aside the order of Judge Alcantara. Ortigas contested the order
of Judge Bartolome through a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction, docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP-04060.
On September 1, 1975, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision in
the aforesaid case, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted. The order of the
respondent Judge dated February 25, 1975, is hereby annulled and set
aside and the order of Judge Arsenio Alcantara, granting immediate
execution, is hereby revived, with instructions to the respondent judge
to fully implement the latter order, including the approval of the
petitioner's bond and the issuance of the necessary writ or writs of
execution. The restraining order issued at the inception of this action is
hereby (sic) permanent.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
(Exhibit EE at pages 50-51).
This decision was the subject of a petition for review filed by
respondents Del Rosario, et al., but the same was denied. So also with
the motion for reconsideration filed with the Supreme Court (Annex "A"
of Exhibit FF)
In order to stop respondent NAVARRO from selling its titled properties,
ORTIGAS also filed Civil Case No. Q-16265, Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Quezon City Branch XVI, entitled "Ortigas & Company, Limited
Partnership vs. Felipe C. Navarro.
On December 16, 1972, Judge Sergio A.F. Apostol rendered a decision
in favor of Ortigas as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
It having been found that defendant was guilty of bad faith and fraud in
claiming and selling plaintiff's land, plaintiff is entitled to attomey's fees.
This court finds the amount of attorney's fees in the sum of P50,000.00
to be fair and reasonable considering the extent and value of the
property involved and the nature of the case.
Defendant, in his answer and motion to dismiss, alleged that as a
result of the issuance of the restraining order, he suffered damages in
the amount of Pl,000,000.00 daily.
Firstly, the same was not raised as a counterclaim. Therefore, this
court can only treat it as an affirmative defense.
Secondly, no evidence was submitted to prove this claim of damages.
Under the same authorities cited in support of the denial of plaintiffs
claim for damages, therefore, he has failed to establish what damages
he had suffered.
Lastly, the court has found that plaintiff is entitled to the injunction
prayed for. It follows, therefore, that the issuance of the restraining
order was proper and, hence, can not be the basis for a claim for
damages.
This court cannot help but end this decision with a note of admonition
and hope. The people who will ultimately suffer the most from
defendant's acts in question are his buyers, who in all probability are
middle class people who themselves wanted to make money out of the
apparent sad predicament that defendant had brought upon the
plaintiff. It is the fervent hope of this court, therefore, that with the
advent of the NEW SOCIETY defendant will turn a new page and make
a fresh start in life.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Upholding the validity and indefeasibility of plaintiffs Transfer
Certificates of Title over the land in question;
2. As a consequence thereof, forever enjoining and barring the
defendant, his successors-in-interest, assigns, agents or any person or
persons acting for or in his behalf, from selling and advertising,
verbally, or in writing, the sale of the lands in question and from
asserting any claim or dominion or possession whatsoever on or over
the said property, directly or indirectly, adverse to the plaintiff; and
3. Ordering the defendant to pay attorney's fees in the sum of
P50,000.00 plus cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.
(Exhibit II-I-a, at pages 409-411 of Exhibit II).
The afore-quoted decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals,
docketed as CA-G.R. No. L-53125-R.
On December 13, 1978, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision
in the aforesaid case affirming the decision of Judge Apostol.
Respondent NAVARRO elevated the case to this Honorable Tribunal
(G.R. No. L-50156). Again, his petition was denied for lack of merit. His
subsequent motion for reconsideration was also denied. Consequently,
the issue brought forth in the sala of Judge Apostol has now been laid
to rest.
EVIDENCE FOR THE RESPONDENT
Respondent NAVARRO presented both testimonial and documentary
evidence. His testimonial evidence consist of his testimony and those
of Atty. Eulogio R. Rodriguez, one of the complainants; and Arsenio de
Guzman, Chief of Section of the Bureau of Lands. His documentary
evidence consist of Exhibits 1 to 13, inclusive.
On direct examination, respondent NAVARRO testified that the present
charges are the same as the charges in administrative Case No. 1154,
entitled, "In Re: Atty. Felipe C. Navarro, respondent", which was na walang karampatang titulo o mabuting hangarin ay gumaganap ng
referred to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation. He sapat na titulo upang makuha ang pag-aari ng lupaing tangan
further declared that this Honorable Court deferred action on the said sapagkat ang lampas-bisa o ang panahong itinakda ng batas sa
administrative case until such time that G.R. Nos. L-42699-42709, the pamamagitan ng pamumusisyon ng mahigit na tatlumpung (30) taon
heirs of the late Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer vs. Court of Appeals, ay tiyakang hadlang na maging ang pinakamahusay na titulo na
et al. is terminated. Respondent's direct testimony dwelt only on these kinikilala ng batas ay hindi makatitinag o makapangingibabaw (Kincaid
two matters and on the identification of his Exhibits 1 to 9. vs. Cabututan, 35 Phil. 383).' Hindi maaring sabihin o ipagmalakdan ng
mga nangamkam na sa pamamagitan ng kanilang huwad na titulo ay
On cross-examination, respondent NAVARRO testified that he is the naangkin na nila ang lupain o di kayay gawing batayan ang kanilang
counsel for the defendants in the twenty-two (22) cases before Judge huwad na titulo upang masabing sila ay nagmamay-ari ng lupa. Hindi
Pedro Navarro and Judge Emilio Salas of the Court of First Instance of ito maaring maganap sapagkat ang krimen at panlilinlang ay hindi
Rizal; that he became the owner of the lands not occupied by his clients maaring maging batayan ng panimula ng ay isang tunay at mabisang
by virtue of his contract of legal services signed by them (pp. 76-78, titulo kahit na ipinagbili at nabili sa isang mabuti ang hangarin ng
t.s.n., July 7, 1977; pp. 7-10, t.s.n., Sept. 9, 1977). Said contract for bumili ng karampatang halaga ng lupain (Levin vs. Bass, 91 Phil. 419,
legal services, which appears on pages 224-232 of Exhibit "1", reads as 439). Dahil sa itinuring ng batas na sila ay 'constructive trustees,
follows: lamang kaya hindi maganap ang lampas-bisa (Gayondato vs.
Treasurer of the Philippine Islands, 49 Phil. 244-249). Subali't dahilan
sa ilang katiwalian ng katotohanan na di nabatid ng mga nakalagda sa
KASUNDUAN HINGGIL SA SERBISYO NG ABOGADO SA MGA
KINAUUKULAN NA ANG MGA BAGAY NA ITO AY MALAMAN AT ibaba ng kasunduang ito na di-umano'y siyang naganap na pangyayari
ngunit ang tunay na katotohanan ay di naman ito naganap at naliligaw
MAKARATING
sa paniniwalang nararapat silang nagbayad ng rentas o alkila at ang
ilan ay binili ang lupain gayong ang katotohanan ay sila ang nararapat
Itong kasulatan na ito ay nagpapatibay at nagbibigay-bisa hinggil sa
at tunay na may-ari sa di-umano'y Kautusan Blg. 1425 (Decree No.
serbisyo ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro tungkol sa aming karapatan sa
1425) ng defunct Court of Land Registration na nagbunga ng
lupaing nasasakop ng diumanoy Kautusan-Blg. 1425 (Decree No. 1425)
gawa-gawang titulo na sumasakop sa buong kalawakan ng humigit
sa diumanoy Usapin Blg. 699, 875, 917, aip (Cases Nos. 699, 875, 917,
kumulang ng 4,000 hectares na samakatuwid ay apatnapung (40)
etc.) sa dating Hukuman ng Pagpapatala ng Lupain defunct Court of
milyong metro kuwadrado ng lupaing ngayon ay matatagpuan sa
Land Registration) na ang nasabing diumano'y Kautusan Blg. 1425 na
buong bayan ng Mandaluyong, ang buong bayan ng San Juan
siyang pinagbatayan ng ipinapatalang gawagawang dalawanput anim
sapagkat sakop ito noon ng bayan San Felipe Neri ayon sa Act No. 942,
(26) ng mga Original Certificates of Title ng Register of Deeds ng Pasig
ang bahagi ng Punta sa Maynila sapagkat sakop ito noon ng
at nagbunga ito ng maraming Transfer Certificates of Title na sa
Mandaluyong na ngayon, kalahati ng bayan ng Pasig, kalahati ng
kasalukuyan iginigiit ng mga mayhawak ngunit yan ay wala namang
bayang Mariquina, at kalahati ng Lungsod ng Quezon sapagka't pinilas
bisa at katuturan (Viz., City of Manila vs. Lack, 19 Phil. 324, 340) dahil
lamang ito buhat sa bayan ng Mariquina, Pasig, San Juan at
sa kapaltosan ng nasabing diumano'y Kautusan Blg. 1425 na sa mula't
Mandaluyong sa pamamagitan ng Commonwealth Act No. 502 na
sapul magpahanggang ngayon sa kasalukuyan ay iginigiit sa mga
pinagtibay noong Oktubre 12, 1939 at sang-ayon sa mga paglalarawan
nakalagda sa ibaba ng kasunduang ito kasama na rin ang mga dati at
ng di-umano'y pagsusukat o survey nagsimula sa Maytunas creek
ibang mga kliyente ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro na ngayon ay siyang
patungong ilog ng San Juan patungong dakong ibaba ng agos ng ilog
nararapat maging kalahok sa animnapung usapin na sa kasalukuyang
ng San Juan hanggang sa bahaging matatagpuan ang ilog ng Pasig sa
hawak ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro (Civil Cases Nos. 8322, etc. of the
Punta, Maynila at lumilisya sa patungong itaas ng agos ng ilog Pasig na
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branches I, II, and VI contesting the
nababanggit ang sapa ng Buayang Bato sa Namayan, Mandaluyong
genuineness and due execution of Decree No. 1425 of the defunct
pagkatapos ay pabalik sa ilog Pasig sa dakong pataas ng agos ng ilog
Court of Land Registration) upang mabigyan ang mga nakalagda sa
hanggang sa ilog ng Mariquina at pagsunod sa dakong pataas ng agos
ibaba ng mga kanikaniyang katibayan o kung sila man ay mayhawak ng
ng ilog ng Mariquina hanggang sa sapa ng Pinagpatayang Buaya at
titulo na sakup ng diumano'y Kautusan Blg. 1425 ay babagohin iyan o
lumalakdaw hanggang sa pinagmulan ng sapa ng Diliman na umaagos
mapapalitan ng maybisa galing sa Hukuman upang matahimik at
ng pababa patungong ilog ng San Juan at pabalik sa sapa ng Maytunas
mapayapa ang dahilan paninirahan kanilang mula't sapul ay kanila
na ang nasabing baybay-sukat o survey sa abot makakaya ng sino
nang pinamamayanan sa buong kaalaman ng sambayanan at walang
mang may sapat ng kakayahang agrimensor (surveyor) ay di makabuo
paglilihim ng kanilang mapayapang pagmamay-ari ng mga lupain na sa
ng ni isa man lamang maramihang-gilid na hugis o anyo (polygon).
mula't sapul ay pinaninirahan ng mga nakalagda sa ibaba ng
kasunduang ito at ng kanilang ninuno o nagpamana
Dahilan sa mga nabanggit na pangyayari, ang mga nakalagda sa ibaba
(predecessors-in-interest) na siyang mga pangyayari ay sapat na
ng Kasunduang ito ay sumasang-ayon na kasunduin ang paglilingkod
upang maigawad ang mabisang titulo sapagkat ang nasabing lupain
ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro ng No. 66 Azucena, Roxas District, Quezon
kailanmay di naging pambayan kungdi pribado o di kaya'y sariling
City upang gumawa ng karampatang hakbang sa Hukuman ng Unang
pag-aari ng nakalagdang may-ari sa ibaba ng kasunduang ito, dahil sa
Dulungan ng Rizal pati Quezon City hanggang sa Corte Suprema kung
mga nabanggit ng mga pangyayari na 'natamo sa pamamagitan ng
kinakailangan at gawin ang anumang paraang isinasaisip niyang
pagbibigay-bisa ng batas di lamang ng karapatan sa pag-aangkin ng
tumpak at nararapat gawin sang-ayon sa batas upang matamo ng mga
lupain kungdi maging ang karapatang ipinagkaloob sa kanila ng
makalagda sa ibaba ng kasunduang ito ang kani-kaniyang titulo ayon
pamahalaan ay nagsasaad na ang aktuwal na pagkakaloob sa kanila ng
sa paraang minamarapat ng batas at kaming mga nakalagda sa ibaba
pamahalaan ng titulo ay di na kinakailangan upang ang nasabing
ng kasunduang ito ay nagkakaloob ng buong kapangyarihan kay Atty.
karapatan ay di kilanlin o pagtibayin ng Hukuman (Susi vs. Razon and
Felipe C. Navarro na ilagay sa kanyang pangalan at kung sa kanino
Director of Lands, 48 Phil. 242; Director of Lands vs. Abaldonado
man niya naising ipagkaloob ang ibang bahagi ng lupain na aming
CA-G.R. No. 177-R, Jan. 12, 1948, 45 Off. Gaz 2188). Ngunit sa
minana o pinagsundan (predecessors-in-interest) nguni't ipinaubaya
dahilang mayroon huwad na titulo ang mga nag-aangkin ng mga lupain
na namin kay Atty. Felipe C. Navarro bilang bahagi ng buong
at nararapat iharap sa Hukuman ang bagay na ito upang ang Hukuman
kabayaran ng kanyang serbisyo at karapatang maangkin niya
magpatibay at magbigay-bisa ng mga titulo sa mga nakalagda sa ibaba
sangayon sa mga inilalahad ng kasunduang ito maliban na lamang
ng kasunduang ito ayon sa Section 10 ng Rule 39 ng Rules of Court.
doon sa bahagi ng lupaing nais naming mapatituluhan sa ilalim ng
Sapagkat ang pamumusisyon sa isang bagay ang batayang di
aming kani-kaniyang pangalan at sumasangayon kami sa pagbabayad
mapagtatalunan hinggil sa kalaunan ng pagmamay-ari nito ng
makalipas ang mahabang panahong takda ng batas, maging ito man ay ng karampatang halaga sa paglilingkod ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro nang
naayon sa isinasaad ng kasunduang ito. Na sa bawa't kilos na
walang karampatang titulo o mabuting hangarin ay nagpapahina at
magaganap sa pagpapatitulo ng aming mga ariarian ang mamamahala
sumisira sa saklaw-bisa at halaga ng pinakamahusay na titulo na
sa mga gastos o kabayaran ay si Atty. Felipe C. Navarro na ang ibig
maaring nasa bagay na iyon na pinanghahawakan ng taong hindi
sabihin na mula sa pagpapasukat (survey) ng mga ari-arian hanggang
nagmamay-ari. Bunga nito, ang pamumusisyon ng mahigit sa
sa pagbibigay ng mga plano ng mga sukat upang mapagtibay ito ng
tatlumpung (30) taon na tinatamasa ng isang tao bilang may-ari kahit
Kagawaran ng Lupain (Bureau of Lands), paghahanda at pagnonotaryo
ng mga affidavit' ng pagmay-ari, pagkuha ng mga katibayan ng
pagkamayari, bayad sa pagpasok sa husgado (filing fees), pagpapatala
(registration), paggawa ng mga kasulatan (documentation), pagsalin
ng mga rekord (transcripts), pagpapatunay (certifications) at iba pang
mga kinakailangang bayaran at pagkagastuhan ay nasa kalayaan na ni
Atty. Felipe C. Navarro na pagpasiyahan ng naaayon sa kaniyang
sariling kagustuhan na ang nilalayon sa bandang huli at ang tunay na
hangarin ay ang mapatituluhan ng ayon sa batas ang aming
kani-kaniyang mga lupain sa aming kani-kaniyang pangalan na sa
pamamagitan ng mga tungkuling iniatang namin kay Atty. Felipe C.
Navarro sa pamamagitan ng kasunduang ito, sumasang-ayon kami at
natatalian o nabibigkisan ng kasunduang ito na magbayad ng halagang
Dalawampu't Limang Piso (P25.00) sa bawat metro kuwadrado ng
lupaing matitituluhan sa aming pangalan bilang kabayaran sa serbisyo
o paglilingkod ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro; ang halagang Sampung Piso
(P10.00) sa bawat metro kuwadrado ay aming magiging
paunang-bayad upang ang proyektong ito ay mapanimulan kaagad sa
lalong madaling panahon at ang matitirang dapat bayarang halaga na
Labing-limang Piso (P15.00) bawa't metro kuwadrado ay aming
babayaran kapag naipagkaloob na ang titulo ng lupa sa amin sa
kasunduang kapag buhat sa isang taon mula sa petsang ipinagkaloob
ang titulo ng lupa ay hindi kami nakababayad ng buo sa halagang
natitira o balanse na Labing-limang Piso (P15.00) sa bawat metro
kuwadrado, ang titulo ng lupain ay mapupunta sa pangalan ni Atty.
Felipe C. Navarro nguni't ang kasunduang ito na isang taong
pagbibigay-palugit ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro upang siya ay mabigyan
ng kabuuang kabayaran sa kanyang mga paglilingkod sa usaping ito at
sumasang-ayon si Atty. Felipe C. Navarro na kami ay pahintulutang
isangla ang aming mga ari-ariang may karampatang titulo na di huwad
at pinagtibay ng batas sa alinmang bangko upang ito ang magsilbing
bayad sa mga paglilingkod ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro sa usaping ito at
iyon lamang ang natatanging sandali o panahong kami ay mawawalan
na ng obligasyon o tungkuling bayaran ang Dalawampu't Limang Piso
(P25.00) sa bawat metro kuwadrado ng lupaing ikinasundo namin ang
serbisyo ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro upang matituluhan nang naayon sa
batas. Sumasang-ayon din si Atty. Felipe C. Navarro na ang sinuman sa
aming nakalagda sa ibaba ng kasunduang ito na hindi kayang
magbayad ng paunang-halaga na Sampung Piso (P10.00) sa bawa't
metro kuwadrado ay bibigyan ng karampatang magbayad ng
makahalintulad na halaga sa bawa't buwan sa loob ng sampu (10) o
dalawampung (20) taon sang-ayon sa mga hinihingi ng pangyayari,
ang titulo ng lupain ay ipagkakaloob lamang sa nagnanais umangkin
nito kung mababayaran na ang kabuuan ng paglilingkod ni Atty. Felipe
C. Navarro kasama na ang "legal interest" at ang amortization nito
ngunit kinakailangan magbigay sila ng paunang bayad na Limangpung
Piso (P50.00) upang panimulan ang pagbabayad buwan-buwan
(monthly installment condition) at magiging mabisa lamang ito kung
matutupad ng buong katapatan ang pagbabayad ng hulugang
buwan-buwan (monthly installment) na maaring magbuhat sa
halagang Limang Piso (P5.00) hanggang Limangpung Piso (P50.00) sa
bawat buwan nang naayon sa laki o kalawakan ng lupaing nararapat na
mapasa-amin ayon sa batas. Sa dahilang ang buhay ng tao ay walang
katiyakang magtatagal na habang panahon ay isinasalin namin ang
aming mga karapatan at tungkulin sa aming tagapagmana lamang at
gayon din si Atty. Felipe C. Navarro na maaring manahin ang kanyang
karapatan sa kasunduang ito sa mga tagapagmana lamang niya upang
itaguyod nila ang paglilingkod sa anumang paraan ayon sa batas.
SA KATUNAYAN AT KATIBAYAN NG LAHAT NG NABANGGIT NA
KASUNDUANG ITO
ay lumalagda kami sa kasunduang ito na aming tutuparin ang lahat ng
isinasaad sa kasunduang ito na sinasang-ayunan din ni Atty. Felipe C.
Navarro na kanyang tuparin ang kanyang tungkulin bilang
manananggol na tutulong sa amin upang kami ay mapagkalooban ng
Hukuman ng titulo sa aming kani-kaniyang lupain ng naayon sa batas
at siyang isinasaad din ng kasunduang ito at kasama ng paglagda ng
aming mga pangalan na siyang nais naming pangalang lumitaw sa
titulo, ang aming kani-kaniyang tirahan, kalawakan ng lupain, paraang
pagbabayad at petsa na kami'y lumagda sa kasunduang ito bilang
pagpapatunay sa aming taos-pusong pagsang-ayon at hangarin
tumupad sa lahat ng napapaloob sa KASULATANG ITO.
In the course of the proceedings, respondent NAVARRO admitted that
he has sold, and is still selling, properties covered by Torrens titles in
the names of ORTIGAS & CO., Madrigal, and others, but he claims that
the titles of said parties are null and void because they emanated from
Decree No. 1425; that he has no title over the properties sold by him
except the contract of legal services which his clients allegedly signed;
that he has no approved plans for the various subdivisions allegedly
owned by him; that he has not obtained any certificate of registration
or license to sell from the National Housing Authority; that he has not
declared for taxation purposes the thousands of hectares of prime
lands in Mandaluyong, San Juan, Pasig, Quezon City and Marikina,
allegedly owned by him; and that he has not filed any case directly
attacking the title of ORTIGAS and others (pp. 7-33, t.s.n., Sept. 9,
1977; Exhibit J).
Respondent NAVARRO also admits that he is the defendant in the
"25-Billion-peso-case" before Judge Sergio Apostol, docketed as Civil
Case No. Q-16265, entitled "Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership vs.
Felipe C. Navarro's Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVI, Quezon
City"; that said case covers lands in Mandaluyong, San Juan, Pasig,
Marikina and Quezon City including those involved in the present case
(pp. 8-21, t.s.n., July 7, 1977; Exhibits F, F-I to F-168).
Despite the decision of Judge Apostol upholding the validity of the
Ortigas Transfer Certificate of Title and enjoining respondent
NAVARRO from selling lots covered by said title, NAVARRO still
continued selling properties covered by the injunction claiming that the
said decision is ineffectual because the same has been appealed. (pp.
33-34, t.s.n., Sept. 9, 1977). 4
On the basis of the foregoing report, the Solicitor General filed a
complaint with Francisco Ortigas, Jr. as complainant, praying that
respondent Navarro be disbarred, that his name be stricken from the
roll of attorneys, and that his certificate of admission to the bar be
recalled.
On May 23, 1980, respondent Navarro filed his answer with prayer to
lift the order of suspension. 5 Complainant Ortigas, Jr. filed an
opposition to said motion to lift suspension .6 Respondent Navarro
reiterated his plea in his manifestation dated August 8, 1980. 7 In a
resolution dated September 2, 1980, this Court denied the motion to
lift the order of suspension. 8
On October 29, 1980, respondent Navarro filed an urgent ex
parte motion praying for the lifting of the order of suspension 9 which
was denied by this Court on November 13, 1980. 10 He reiterated his
prayer in another motion filed on January 5, 1981 11 but the same was
likewise denied in our resolution of January 22, 1981. 12
II. Administrative Case No. 2033 arose from a letter-complaint, dated
March 13, 1979, filed by the spouses E. Conrad and Virginia Geeslin
with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, charging respondent
Navarro with deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct in office, and
blatant violation of the Attorney's Oath. Said letter was thereafter
referred to this Court by Integrated Bar of the Philippines President
(now Chief Justice) Marcelo B. Fernan for appropriate action. 13
Pursuant to our resolution of June 4, 1979, 14 respondent Navarro filed
his answer with motion to dismiss on June 29, 1979. 15 The
corresponding
reply 16 and rejoinder 17 were subsequently filed. In a resolution of this
Court dated October 1, 1985, the case was referred to the Office of the
Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. 18
On August 28, 1989, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted its
report, with the following findings and recommendation:
CHARGES
In their Complaint dated March 13, 1979, complainants charged
respondent with deceit, malpractice and gross conduct in office, and
blatant violation of the Attorney's Oath, for having deliberately
misrepresented the facts and the law while acting as counsel for the
defendants in the following civil cases:
a. His insistence that our clients are no longer owners of the land
subject of the cases mentioned above; he falsely alleged that to his
personal knowledge the title to the land is in the name of one Leopoldo
Cojuangco. This false allegation was made despite the final decision of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVII, in Civil Case No.
Q-18221 entitled "E Conrad and Virginia B. Geeslin vs. Leopoldo
Cojuangco, et al." (1) declaring the transfer of the lot to Leopoldo
Cojuangco was fraudulent and had been effected thru falsification; and,
(2) ordering the cancellation of the title issued to Cojuangco and the
reversion of the title to our clients. Copies of the Complaint and the
Decision in said case are hereto attached as Annexes "B" and "C",
respectively.
b. Mr. Navarro persisted and still persists in representing that our
clients' title was rendered null and void by virtue of the expiration of the
Parity Amendment and the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of
Quasha vs. Republic, 46 SCRA 160. Our clients' title to the aforesaid
property was acquired by hereditary succession from the late Dr.
Luther Bewley who acquired said land in 1925. The ownership
therefore of our clients is protected both under the 1935 and 1972
Constitutions. Any lawyer, even a law student, knows that the Parity
Amendment and the decision in the Quasha case, supra, covers cases
where property was acquired by virtue of the Parity Amendment. Mr.
Navarro is either guilty of abysmal ignorance of the law or of complete
and unabashed contempt for facts, the law of the land and for the
Courts.
c. Mr. Navarro persists in misrepresenting to the Court that the title
covering the land subject of the above cases had been declared null
and void in the "final and executory" decision of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch II. He deliberately omits to give the title of the
case and its docket number for the obvious and malicious reason that
the case he relies upon (Heirs of Nuguid vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
42699-42709) is still pending resolution before the Supreme Court and
hence cannot be "final and executory."
d. He misrepresents to the Court that the land subject of the cases
heretofore enumerated is not within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Quezon City Court and hence the court has no jurisdiction. Further, that
title thereto having described the land to be part of the Municipality of
San Juan del Monte, is void. He cannot disclaim knowledge however of
the fact that the area in the vicinity of Santolan Road in Quezon City
was originally part of the Municipality of San Juan del Monte territory of
Quezon City when the latter was created on 14 June 1950. In the light
of this fact, Mr. Navarro's representation is false and malicious.
e. Mr. Navarro has shown a complete and total disregard for basic
norms of honesty and decency in that having prejudiced the interest of
his clients because of his gross neglect to appeal in a timely manner
from the decision of the court and having adopted the wrong remedy,
in complete ignorance of the law, he had influenced his clients into
commencing a case before the Tanod Bayan against the Presiding
Judge of the City Court of Quezon City, Branch 1, and Hon. Minerva
Genovea The case is obviously calculated to harrass and coerce the
Honorable Presiding Judge. Mr. Navarro's conduct speaks ill of his
respect for the law and the courts.
f. The penchant of Mr. Navarro to misrepresent and deceive did not
stop before the City Court of Quezon City. He continues to do so in the
petition he filed before the Honorable Court of Appeals docketed as
CA-G.R. No. S.P. 08928 entitled "Adolfo Corpus, et al. 'vs. Hon. Minerva
Genovea et al." Copies of the Petition and the undersigned attorney's
Comments thereto are hereto attached as Annexes "D" and "E",
respectively. (pp. 2-4, Record)
RESPONDENTS ANSWER
In his Answer dated June 29, 1979, respondent averred:
1. From the face of the Resolution itself showing that the undersigned
respondent was never furnished with a copy of the complaint, it can be
gathered therefrom that the complaint is clearly intended to prevent
the undersigned respondent to proceed in defending his clients' cause
in CA-G.R. No. SP-08928 (Adolfo M. Corpuz, et al. vs. Hon. Minerva C.
Genovea, the Spouses Conrad E. Geeslin and Virginia Bewley Geeslin,
et al.) still pending at this writing before the Court of Appeals. To allow
complainants to harass respondent while the case (is) still pending in
our courts of justice is an act in contempt of court for which
complainants and their counsel is (sic) liable.
2. Undersigned respondent as counsel for the defendants Adolfo
Corpuz, et al. gave his entire devotion to the interest of his clients,
warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of their rights and the
exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be
taken or be withheld from his clients, save by the rules of law, legally
applied; for his clients are entitled to the benefit of any and every
remedy and defense that is authorized by law as was done by the
undersigned respondent in the ejectment case filed by the
complainants Conrad E. Geeslin and Virginia B. Geeslin against the
several clients of the undersigned. (pp. 42-43, Record)
After complainants filed a Reply dated July 17, 1979 pointing out that
respondent's Answer does not deny any of the six (6) counts of
charges specified in the Complaint, respondent filed a Rejoinder dated
September 7, 1979, wherein he averred:
1. The complainants alien spouses Conrad E. Geeslin and Virginia B.
Geeslin who are citizens of the United States of America held TCT No.
153657 which was cancelled on December 31, 1970 by TCT No.
180231 issued in the name of Leopoldo A. Cojuangco both of which
TCTs are described to be located at Santolan Road, Municipality of San
Juan, Province of Rizal, (now part of Metro-Manila) filed ejectment
proceedings before the City Court of Quezon City against my clients
Victorino Manaois and Adolfo Corpuz and twenty others in Civil Case
Nos. I-29872 to I-29931 which later were elevated to the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-08928 entitled Adolfo M. Corpuz, et
al. vs. Hon. Minerva C.Genovea the Spouses Conrad E. Geeslin and
Virginia Bewley Geeslin, et al.
2. Undersigned respondent being retained as counsel for the
defendants Victorino Manaois and Adolfo Corpuz and the twenty (20)
other defendants did his bounden duty in defense of their rights and
exerted his utmost learning and ability within what the law allows that
at this stage, the controversy is still under litigation before the courts
as stated above.
3. Under the foregoing circumstances, the administrative action must
have been resorted to by the complainants at the instigation of their
counsel who failed in wanting to defeat the defendants of their
God-given rights to the land in litigation that there can be no other
conclusion left but that the administrative complaint against the
respondent is 'pure' harassment. (pp. 53-54, Record)
FINDINGS
When the case was set for hearing by the Office of the Solicitor
General, the parties agreed that there is no dispute as to the fact of the
case. Hence, they were granted a period of thirty (30) days within
which to file their respective memoranda, if they so desire, after which
the case will be considered submitted for resolution.
Since respondent did not deny the allegations of the Complaint, and in
fact admitted during the hearing of the case set by the Office of the
Solicitor General that there is no dispute as to the facts of this case, it
follows that the specifications of the charges against him, which are
duly supported by documents, are deemed sufficiently proven.
The only justification invoked by respondent is that he "gave his entire
devotion to the interest of his clients" and that he "did his bounden
duty in defense of their rights and exerted his utmost learning and
ability.
Consequently, respondent is deemed to have committed the
misrepresentations specified by complainants, as quoted above.
RECOMMENDATION
Respondent was also charged in Administrative Case No. 2148
entitled Ortigas vs. Navarro and has been suspended from the practice
of law since May 5, 1980. His suspension is still in effect.
The acts complained of in the present case also warrant the suspension
of respondent from the practice of law.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that respondent Atty.
Felipe C. Navarro be likewise suspended from the practice of law.
Makati, for Manila, August 17, 1989. 19
No justiciable issue was raised in Administrative Case No. 2033 as
respondent Navarro failed to deny the material allegations in the
complaint of the spouses E. Conrad and Virginia B. Geeslin.
The two main issues raised by the Solicitor General in Administrative
Case No. 2148 are:
1. Whether or not respondent Navarro sold properties titled in the
names of other persons without the consent of the latter; and
2. If in the affirmative, whether or not such acts constitute sufficient
grounds for suspension or disbarment.
Respondent reiterated in his answer that the transfer certificates of title
of Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership and Florentina Nuguid Vda.
de Haberer were declared null and void in the decision dated March 31,
1970 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XV, in Civil Case No.
7-M (10339) entitled "Pedro del Rosario, et al. vs. Ortigas & Co., Ltd.
Partnership, et al.," and in the order dated June 21, 1971 of the Court
of First Instance of Rizal, Branch II, in Civil Cases Nos. 8320, 8321,
8326, 8369, 8376, 8379, 8383, 8685, 8686 and 8700 entitled
"Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer vs. Federico Martinez, et al."
Respondent likewise reiterated his claim of ownership over all parcels
of land (including those of Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership and
Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer) covered by Decree No. 1425,
G.L.R.O. Record No. 917, which was declared null and void in the
decision dated March 31, 1970 of Branch XV of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal. 20 Furthermore, he asserts ownership over the
subject properties as payment for his legal services rendered in the
ejectment cases filed against his clients in Branches I and II of the
former Court of First Instance of Rizal.
1. To clarify, Civil Case No. 7-M(10339)filed before Branch XV of the
then Court of First Instance of Rizal directly assailed the nullity of the
proceedings in G.L.R.O. Record No. 917 by virtue of which Decree No.
1425 was issued, as well as the original certificates of title issued as a
consequence thereof. These original certificates of title include the
properties belonging to Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership and
Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer. On March 31, 1970, Judge Vivencio
M. Ruiz then presiding over said Branch XV rendered a decision
declaring Decree No. 1425, as well as the original certificates of title
issued pursuant thereto, null and void. Ortigas appealed the Ruiz
decision to the Court of Appeals which set the same aside and
remanded the case to Branch XV for new trial. On November 3, 1973,
Judge Arsenio A. Alcantara, who replaced Judge Ruiz, rendered a
decision confirming the validity of Decree No. 1425 and all titles
emanating therefrom. The said decision was pending appeal with the
Court of Appeals when the investigation of respondent by the Solicitor
General was conducted.
We take judicial notice of the fact that on December 29, 1983, the
Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming in toto the November 3,
1973 decision of Judge Alcantara, which became final and executory
on May 25, 1984 insofar as plaintiffs-appellants Pascual Santos, et al.
are concerned. The plaintiffs-appellants Pedro del Rosario, et al.
appealed to the Supreme Court in a petition for review
on certiorari which was, however, denied on February 18, 1985. The
denial became final and executory on April 10, 1985. Thereafter, the
records of the case were remanded to Branch XV of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal for execution.
The records further show that the March 31, 1970 decision of Branch
XV in Civil Case No. 7-M (10339) became the basis of the decision
rendered by Judge Pedro Navarro of Branch II on May 21, 1971 which
dismissed the complaint for ejectment filed by Haberer against the
clients of respondent Navarro. However, Judge Navarro in his decision
categorically stated that "it is the considered opinion of this court that
until and unless the decision of Branch XV of this court is reversed or
set aside by final judgment, plaintiffs prayer to order the herein eleven
defendants in these eleven cases to vacate the parcels which they
occupy and on which their respective houses are built has become
premature." This condition was reiterated in Judge Navarro's order of
September 15, 1972 wherein he stated that:
In the order dated July 17, 1971, the Court had occasion to reiterate
that its decision in this case was mainly predicated on the decision of
Branch XV of this Court that the certificate of title emanating from the
proceedings in GLRO Record No. 917 were null and void and plaintiffs
title happened to be one of them. The Court opined that until said
decision is reversed the actual occupants had better be maintained in
their possessions of the land. 21
However, to repeat, the March 31, 1970 decision of Branch XV was set
aside by the Court of Appeals which remanded the case for new trial
and another one was rendered, this time by a different judge on
November 3, 1973 upholding the validity of Decree No. 1425 and all
titles issued as a consequence thereof. Respondent cannot feign
ignorance of the November 3, 1973 decision, which superseded the
March 31, 1970 decision, for the simple reason that it was his clients
who appealed the former decision to the Court of Appeals. In spite
thereof and indicative of his bad faith, he stubbornly continues to
invoke the decision of March 31, 1970 as the source of his alleged
ownership rights over the Ortigas properties.
2. In the order of June 21, 1971, Judge Pedro Navarro of Branch II
ordered the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043
issued in the name of Haberer and the issuance of new titles in the
name of the defendants, subject to the lien for attorney's fees in favor
of respondent pursuant to the terms of the contract for his legal
services. However, the same judge issued an amendatory order dated
September 15, 1972, which provides in part that:
It has also come to the understanding of the Court that the order of
June 21, 1971, sought to be reconsidered insofar as it ordered the
cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043 in favor of the
plaintiff, also adversely affects the interests of other persons and
entities like the Ortigas and Company, Limited Partnership, which is
not a party herein, because the certificate of title of the plaintiff is also
a derivative of GLRO 917 and Decree No. 1425 from which Ortigas &
Company, Limited Partnership, derives titles over wide tracts of land.
Since Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership, is not a party in this
case whatever orders of decisions are made in this case cannot be
made to affect the said company. Decisions and orders can only affect
parties to the case.
The Court therefore arrives at the conclusion that the order dated June
21, 1971, must be reconsidered on two grounds (1) because the
decision of Branch XV is now being the subject of further proceedings
and (2) because it has the effect of adversely affecting the interest of
Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership, which is not even a party
herein.
WHEREFORE, as prayed, the order dated June 21, 1971, is set aside.
However, the decision dated May 26, 1971, insofar as it denies the
ejectment of the present occupants of the land as stated in the decision
stands. (Emphasis supplied) 22
It is apparent, therefore, that since the order of June 21, 1971, was set
aside, the inescapable conclusion is that Transfer Certificate of Title No.
15043 stands and remains in the name of Florentina Nuguid Vda. de
Haberer. Consequently, the defendants therein never acquired title to
the property covered by the title of Haberer. And, since respondent
Navarro merely derives his supposed title to the properties as a mere
transferee, with more reason can he not validly become the owner of
the above properties.
3. Respondent intransigently relies on his contract for legal services
executed with his clients, the defendants in the Haberer case, as
another basis of his claim of ownership over the entire property
covered by Decree No. 1425. It must be noted that the said contract
was executed pursuant to the ejectment cases filed against respondent
Navarro's clients which involve only the property covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 15043 containing an aggregate area of 12,700
square meters, more or less. It appears that the defendants assigned
rights to respondent Navarro over properties which they did not
actually occupy and which virtually extended to all the properties
covered by titles issued under Decree No. 1425. As correctly observed
by the Solicitor General, said defendants have not presented any
document evidencing their ownership of the parcels of land they
assigned to their lawyer.
From the foregoing considerations, it is incontrovertible that
respondent's pretended ownership rights over the parcels of land
covered by Decree No. 1425 have no bases whatsoever, either in fact
or in law, and it is an assault on credulity to assume that he was not
aware of the vacuity of his pretensions and misrepresentations.
In resolving this disbarment case, we must perforce initially focus on
the degree of integrity and respectability required and expected of the
law profession. There is no denying that membership in the legal
profession is achieved only after a long and laborious study. By years of
patience, zeal and ability the attorney acquires a fixed means of
support for himself and his family. This is not to say, however, that the
emphasis is on the pecuniary value of this profession but rather on the
social prestige and intellectual standing necessarily arising from and
attached to the same by reason of the fact that everyone is deemed an
officer of the court. 23
The importance of the dual aspects of the legal profession has been
judiciously stated by Chief Justice Marshall of the United States
Supreme Court in this wise:
On one hand, the profession of an Atty. is of great importance to an
individual and the prosperity of his life may depend on its exercise. The
right to exercise it ought not to be lightly or capriciously taken from him.
On the other hand, it is extremely desirable that the respectability of
the Bar should be maintained and that its harmony with the bench
should be preserved. For these objects, some controlling power, some
discretion, ought to be exercised with great moderation and judgment,
but it must be exercised. 24
In a number of cases, we have repeatedly explained and stressed that
the purpose of disbarment is not meant as a punishment to deprive an
attorney of a means of livelihood but is rather intended to protect the
courts and the public from the misconduct of the officers of the court
and to ensure the proper administration of justice by requiring that
those who exercise this important function shall be competent,
honorable and trustworthy men in whom courts and clients may repose
confidence. 25 Its objectives are to compel the lawyer to deal fairly and
honestly with his client and to remove from the profession a person
whose misconduct has proven him unfit for the duties and
responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney. 26
As a rule, an attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent
of the charges until the contrary is proved, and that, as an officer of
the court, he has performed his duty in accordance with his
oath. 27 Therefore, in disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof
rests upon the complainant 28, and for the court to exercise its
disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be
established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. 29
We have painstakingly scrutinized and evaluated the records of these
two administrative cases and we cannot but find that strong and
unassailable evidence exist to render it our irremissible duty to impose
the ultimate sanction of disbarment on respondent.
Respondent's defense is anchored primarily on the contract for legal
services, executed by his clients whom he represented in the
twenty-two ejectment cases filed before Branches I and II of the
former Court of First Instance of Rizal, and quoted in full in the earlier
part of this discussion.
It is extremely relevant to note that both of the aforesaid two branches
of the trial court made no finding as to the validity of the claim of
ownership favorable to the defendants therein. On the contrary, Judge
Salas of Branch I found for the plaintiff and ordered the defendants,
clients of respondent, to vacate the premises.
In the case before Judge Navarro of Branch II, the complaint was
dismissed merely on the ground that "since the evidence is
uncontroverted that the defendants in all these eleven cases have
been in open, continuous, and adverse possession of their respective
parcels dating back since their predecessors in interest, their
possession must be maintained and respected. 30
Thereafter, on June 21, 1971, the aforesaid judgment of dismissal
dated May 26, 1971 was modified, and the Register of Deeds was
thereafter ordered to cancel the transfer certificate of title issued in
favor of plaintiff and to issue new titles in the name of defendants
subject to the lien for attorney's fees in favor of herein respondent in
accordance with the contract for legal services hereinbefore discussed.
Eventually, however, this subsequent order was reconsidered and set
aside in the order of September 15, 1972, "because it has the effect of
adversely affecting the interest of Ortigas & Co., Ltd. Partnership,
which is not even a party herein," but it reinstated the decision of May
26, 1971 insofar as it denied the ejectment of the present occupants.
As earlier noted, there is nothing in the records to show that the
defendants in the ejectment cases were declared the true owners of
the land subject of said cases. Only the fact of possession was ruled
upon, and what the courts recognized was merely the defendants'
right of possession. They, therefore, never become the owners of the
subject lots in any sense of the word in the absence of any declaration
to that effect, by reason of which they could not have legally
transmitted any ownership rights or interests to herein respondent.
Furthermore, we have seen that any further claim of ownership on
their part was finally settled by the order of September 15, 1972,
setting aside the order of June 21, 1971, wherein the trial court
correctly held that the earlier order unjustifiedly affected adversely the
rights of Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership. In addition, said
court specifically excluded the title of said partnership from the effects
of its decision.
Pursuant to the provisions of the contract of legal services, the
defendants-clients agreed to convey to respondent whatever
properties may be adjudicated in their favor in the event of their failure
to pay the attorney's fees agreed upon. As hereinbefore stated, there
was nothing awarded to the said defendants except the right to
possess for the nonce the lots they were occupying, nothing more.
That respondent acquired no better right than the defendants from
whom he supposedly derived his claim is further confirmed in the order
of Judge Navarro, dated June 21, 1971, denying the issuance of new
certificates of title to herein respondent who, to further stress the
obvious, was not even a party but only a lawyer of the defendants
therein. It follows that his act of selling the Ortigas properties is
patently and indisputably illegal.
Respondent admits that he has no Torrens title but insists on the
puerile theory that his title is his contract of legal
services. 31 Considering that the effectivity of the provisions of that
contract is squarely premised on the award of said properties to the
therein defendants, and since there was no such adjudication,
respondent's pretense is unmasked as an unmitigated deception.
Furthermore, it will be recalled that the land involved in the two
ejectment cases consists of only 1.2 hectares whereas respondent is
claiming ownership over thousands of hectares of land, the sheer
absurdity of which he could not be unaware.
Respondent further admits that he has been and is continuously selling,
up to the present, the entirety of the land covered by Decree No.
1425 32 pursuant to the decision of Branch XV of the then Court of First
Instance of Rizal, dated March 31, 1970, declaring the said decree null
and void as well as the titles derived therefrom.
It must nonetheless be remembered that the decision of Judge Navarro
recognizing the defendants' right of possession is subject to the final
outcome of the March 31, 1970 decision of Branch XV which nullified
Decree No. 1425. The latter decision, at the time the decision of Judge
Navarro was rendered, was pending appeal. This is precisely the reason
why Judge Navarro had to amend his decision a third time by setting
aside the order of registration of the land in the name of the
defendants. He could not properly rule on the ownership rights of
defendants therein pending a final determination of the validity of said
decree, which thus prompted him to find merely on the fact of
possession. Besides, a mere declaration of nullity cannot, per se justify
the performance of any act of ownership over lands titled in the name
of other persons pursuant to said decree. To cap it all, as earlier
discussed, that decision dated March 31, 1970 has been reversed and
set aside, and a new one entered confirming the validity of Decree No.
1425, which latter decision has long become final and executory.
In Civil Case No. Q-16265, entitled "Ortigas and Co., Ltd. Partnership vs.
Navarro," herein respondent was enjoined from selling, offering for
sale and advertising properties of the plaintiff therein. We have seen
that a decision was subsequently rendered therein on December 16,
1972 by Branch XVI of the Court of First Instance of Rizal upholding the
validity of the transfer certificates of title issued in the name of Ortigas
and Co., Limited Partnership which became final and executory after
respondent's petition for review was denied by this Court. However,
respondent continued to sell properties belonging to Ortigas in blatant
disregard of said decision. This was categorically admitted by
respondent himself during the investigation conducted by the Solicitor
General. 33
Respondent avers that the said decision cannot be enforced during the
pendency of the appeal therefrom. Even if this were true, the fact that
respondent was enjoined by the court from selling portions of the
Ortigas properties is compelling reason enough for him to desist from
continuing with his illegal transactions.
As correctly observed by the Solicitor General:
Respondent Navarro knew that the decision of Judge Vivencio Ruiz
declaring as null and void certificates of titles emanating from Decree
No. 1425 was reversed and set aside. He knew that Judge Pedro
Navarro of the Rizal Court of First Instance exempted Ortigas &
Company from the effects of his decision. He also knew that Judge
Sergio Apostol of the Rizal Court of First Instance in Quezon City had
upheld the validity of the certificates of title of Ortigas & Company.
Despite all these pronouncements and his awareness thereof,
respondent NAVARRO still continued to sell properties titled in the
name of Ortigas & Company and the Madrigals. 34
Lastly, the motion to dismiss filed by respondent should be, as it is
hereby, denied for lack of merit. Respondent inexplicably posits that
the charges against him should be dismissed on the ground that his
suspension was automatically lifted by virtue of our resolution, dated
June 30, 1980, which merely reads:
The manifestation of counsel for respondent stating among other
things that the complaint against respondent could not prosper if
respondent's manifestation dated March 3, 1980 in G.R. No.
L-42699-42709 and his request for certification by the Chief Justice to
the effect that the petition in G.R. Nos. L-42699-42709 is deemed
dismissed pursuant to Sec. 11(2) of Art. X of the Constitution are
granted, are NOTED.
There is absolutely nothing in the resolution to support respondent's
typical distortion of facts. On the contrary, our resolutions dated
September 2, 1980, November 8, 1980, and January 22, 1981
repeatedly denied respondent's motions for the lifting of his
suspension.
It further bears mention at this juncture that despite the suspension of
respondent Navarro from the practice of law, he continues to do so in
clear violation and open defiance of the original resolution of
suspension and the aforestated resolutions reiterating and maintaining
the same. Thus, the records of this Court disclose that in G.R. No.
L-78103, entitled "Jose de Leon, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.," a
Second Division case filed on April 25, 1987, counsel for private
respondents therein questioned herein respondent Navarro's
personality to intervene in the case since he was under suspension, to
which respondent Navarro rejoined by insisting that his suspension
had allegedly been lifted already. In G.R. No. 85973, entitled "Hilario
Abalos vs. Court of Appeals, et al.," the petition wherein was filed on
December 2, 1988 and assigned to the First Division, respondent
Navarro also appeared as counsel for therein petitioner. Said petition
was denied since the same was prepared, signed and verified by
respondent Navarro, a suspended member of the Philippine Bar. Over
his expostulation that his suspension had already been lifted, the Court
directed the Bar Confidant to take appropriate action to enforce the
same. Again, in G.R. No. 90873, entitled "Matilde Cabugwang et al. vs.
Court of Appeals, et al.," the Second Division, in a resolution dated
January 31, 1990, imposed a fine of P1,000.00 upon said respondent
for appearing therein as counsel for petitioner which fine he paid on
February 5, 1990.
In at least three (3) other cases in the Second Division, respondent
Navarro appeared before the Court as counsel for petitioners
therein, viz: (1) G.R. No. L-74792 (Lorenzo Valdez, et al., vs
Intermediate Appellate Court, et al.), filed on June 11, 1986 and
decided on December 7, 1986; (2) G.R. No.
L-76589 (Atty. Felipe C. Navarro, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.),
filed on November 28, 1986 and decided on May 4,1987; and (3) G.R.
No. 81482 (Ricardo Rasalan vs. Flaviano Pascua, et al.), filed on
January 30, 1988 and decided on February 15, 1988. The rollos in said
cases show that he also appeared as counsel for the petitioners in the
Court of Appeals, but since the lower courts' original records were not
forwarded to this Court, said rollos do not reflect whether he also
appeared before the different courts a quo.
Such acts of respondent are evidential of flouting resistance to lawful
orders of constituted authority and illustrate his incorrigible
despiciency for an attorney's duty to society. Verily, respondent has
proven himself unworthy of the trust and confidence reposed in him by
law and by this Court, through his deliberate rejection of his oath as an
officer of the court.
WHEREFORE, respondent Felipe C. Navarro is hereby DISBARRED and
his name is ordered STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of
this resolution be furnished to the Bar Confidant and the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and spread on the personal records of
respondent. This resolution is immediately executory.
A.C. No. 126 October 24, 1952

In re: Atty. Tranquilino Rovero.

Tranquilino Rovero in his own behalf.

PARAS, C.J.:

The Solicitor General has filed the present complaint for disbarment
against Atty. Tranquilino Rovero, on the grounds that on March 31,
1947, "respondent Tranquilino Rovero, having been found in a final
decision rendered by then Insular Collector of Customs to have violated
the customs law by fraudulently concealing a dutiable importation, was
fined in an amount equal to three times the customs duty due on a
piece of jewelry which he omitted to declare and which was
subsequently found to be concealed in his wallet", and that on October
28, 1948, "respondent Tranquilino Rovero was convicted of smuggling
by final decision of the Court of Appeals in Criminal Case No. CA-G.R.
No. 2214-R, affirming a judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Manila sentencing him to pay a fine of P2,500 with subsidiary
A.C. No. 4748 August 4, 2000
imprisonment in case of insolvency, said case involving a fraudulent
practice against customs revenue, as defined and penalized by Section
VICTORIA V. RADJAIE, complainant,
2703 of the Revised Administrative Code." The respondents admits the
vs.
existence of the of the decision of the Collector of Customs, and his
ATTY. JOSE O. ALOVERA, respondent.
conviction by the Court of Appeals, but sets up the defense that they
are not sufficient to disqualify him from the practice of law, especially
because the acts of which he was found guilty, while at most merely DECISION
discreditable, had been committed by him as an individual and not in
pursuance or in the exercise of his legal profession. PER CURIAM:

Under section 25, Rule 127, of the Rules of court, a member of the bar
may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney for a
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, and this ground is apart
from any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in office as
lawyer. Moral turpitude includes any act done contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty or good morals. (In re Basa, 41 Phil., 275.)
Respondent's conviction of smuggling by final decision of the Court of
Appeals certainly involves an act done contrary at least to honesty or
good morals. The ground invoked by the Solicitor General is aggravated
by the fact that the respondent sought to defraud, not merely a private
person, but the Government.
Wherefore, the respondent Tranquilino Rovero is hereby disbarred
from the practice of law, and he is hereby directed to surrender to this
Court his lawyer's certificate within 10 days after this resolution shall
have become final.
Atty. Jose O. Alovera, former Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Roxas City, Branch 17, faces disbarment for having penned a
Decision1 dated January 30, 1995 long after his retirement from the
Judiciary on January 31, 1995 which ultimately divested complainant
Victoria V. Radjaie of her property in Panay, Capiz.
In an Affidavit-Complaint2 filed before the Office of the Bar Confidant
on April 21, 1997,3 complainant sought the disbarment of respondent
enumerating the following particulars to support her contention that
the questioned January 30, 1995 decision was prepared after the
retirement of respondent:
a) Almost all orders issued by then Judge Alovera prior to his
retirement bear the stamp "RECEIVED" by Branch 17 of RTC-Roxas
City, with the initial of the one who received it for filing with the
court-record except the Order of January 25, 1995 (p. 87 records)
admitting, and the Decision dated January 30, 1995 (pp. 88-93, ibid.).

So ordered. b) It can also be seen that all the orders issued prior to the retirement
were all type-written in the same type-[writer] except the January 25,
Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Jugo, Bautista Angelo and 1995 Order (p. 87) and the Decision (pp. 88-93) and these two (2)
Labrador, JJ., concur. documents appear to have been type-written on the same
type-[writer].
c) It is also a source of wonder why plaintiffs formally offered their
evidence one year after the last witness was presented last December
10, 1993.
xxx xxx xxx
Plaintiffs had until January 20, 1994 to formally offer their evidence but
it took them one (1) year and five (5) days to file such a simple
pleading. It goes against the normal human experience when plaintiffs
who are allowed to present evidence ex-parte are usually very quick in
having things done because there is no opposition but in this case it
took plaintiffs a while to formally rest which was only fifteen (15) days
prior to the retirement of Mr. Alovera. This timing is highly suspect.
d) Even plaintiffs' formal offer of evidence showed badges of fraud. It
was not received by the trial court. Page 67 shows this clearly. It would
not be surprising if the same was also inserted into the records on a
much later date and Atty. Alberto Villaruz must be made to explain this
too.
It was dated January 20, 1995 but the date of the Professional Tax
Receipt (PTR) of Atty. Alberto A. Villaruz, counsel for the plaintiffs, was
issued only on January 31, 1995. This is shown on Page 71 of the
records.
e) There is no showing that the January 25, 1995 Order (p. 87)
admitting the formal offer was even received by a Court staff for filing
with the records.
f) The same can be said of the January 30, 1995 Decision (pp. 88-93)
which was allegedly decided five (5) days after the Order admitting the
evidence (p. 87) was allegedly issued. What a swift action from a
retiring judge.
g) A copy of the Decision was not even sent to the counsel for the
plaintiffs but is shown to have been received by one of the plaintiffs
only on August 1, 1995 (p. 93).
h) Again, it is beyond the normal experience for a lawyer such as Atty.
Villaruz who is a practitioner in the locality and who is in Court almost
everyday that he will not follow up if there is already a decision
rendered in a case where he was allowed to present evidence ex-parte
or even be told about it.
i) The records show that all orders after the retirement of Mr. Alovera
bear the stamp "RECEIVED" by the Court staff who received them for
filing in the court records.
Traversing the allegations of the Affidavit-Complaint as purely
speculative and not based on personal knowledge, the respondent, in
his Comment4 dated August 20, 1997, further assailed as simply
self-serving complainant's Affidavit-Complaint alleging that a careful
scrutiny of the expediente of Civil Case No. V-6186 would reveal that
respondent observed due process when he resolved the said case
against complainant.5 It was only when Judge Julius Abela, who
succeeded him in RTC, Br. 17, Roxas City, annulled, through a
resolution, the questioned January 30, 1995 decision, which ostensibly
having become final was also executed, did the matter get out of
hand.6 His said decision, respondent argued, may only be impeached,
annulled or otherwise set aside under three (3) modes, 7 all of which
were either not availed of by complainant for lapse of time, or like an
action to annul the judgment, though still available, should not have
been filed in the same court, which rendered the questioned decision,
but should have been filed, instead, in the Court of Appeals.8 As to the
absence of stamp "RECEIVED" on the questioned decision, respondent
shifted the blame to the then OIC Clerk of Court of the said court, Mrs.
Nenita Aluad, contending that after the decision was rendered on
January 30, 1995, he lost control of it and he surmised that Mrs. Aluad,
who had the duty to receive and record the decision, might have lost it
"momentarily."9
In a Resolution10 dated October 22, 1997, this Court referred the
instant case to the Office of the Bar Confidant for investigation, report
and recommendation. While in the process of investigation, three (3)
incidents occurred, namely:
1. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Capiz Chapter,
approved Resolution No. 9, Series of 1997 on December 17, 1997,
questioning the order, dated November 28, 1997, of the Regional Trial
Court, Br. 17, Roxas City, which ordered the suspension from the
practice of law of herein respondent and Atty. Alberto Villaruz;
2. The Court En Banc, in its Resolution of December 22, 1997,
resolved to issue a temporary restraining order (TRO) in G.R. No.
131505, entitled "Atty. Alberto A. Villaruz vs. Honorable Julius L.
Abela," ordering the respondent judge therein to cease and desist from
enforcing and/or implementing his questioned order dated November
28, 1997 in Civil Case No. V-6186, which ordered the suspension of
Atty. Villaruz; and,
3. Respondent Alovera filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme
Court, entitled "Jose Alovera vs. Victoria Villariez-Radjaie and Judge
Julius L. Abela," under G.R. No. 131768, which, at the time was still
pending, questioning the Order of November 28, 1997 which ordered
respondent's suspension from the practice of law.
Thus, necessitated the filing of the Manifestation11 by the Office of the
Bar Confidant on January 27, 1998, inquiring from the Court whether
to proceed with the investigation of the case in view of the
aforementioned incidents.
On February 18, 1998, the Court directed the Office of the Bar
Confidant to proceed with the investigation of the instant case.12
Judge Julius Abela, Nenita M. Aluad, legal researcher, Teresita V.
Bauzon, court stenographer, Concepcion Alcazar, clerk-in-charge of
civil cases and special proceedings, all of Regional Trial Court, Br. 17,
Roxas City, Rosa Dapat, court stenographer of Regional Trial Court, Br.
15, Roxas City and the complainant herself testified as witnesses for
the complainant.
The respondent presented as his lone witness, Mrs. Rosa Dapat, who
merely testified on the January 10, 1993 proceedings inside his
chambers. Respondent himself did not testify and neither did any other
witness testify for him, despite the issuance of subpoena ad
testificandum on Ireneo Borres and Ludovico Buhat, who both failed to
appear at the investigation. In lieu of their oral testimonies,
respondent offered and presented their respective affidavits. 13
Complainant chose not to object thereto and even waived her right,
through her counsel, to cross-examine them.
The established facts, as quoted from the Report dated November 17,
1999 of the Office of the Bar Confidant, are as follows:
On July 2, 1992, the heirs of the late Faustina Borres, Segundina
Borres, Felisa Borres, Micaela Borres, Maria Bores, and Sixto Borres
(hereinafter "Borres heirs") through their counsel, Atty. Alberto A.
Villaruz, filed an action for Partition and Accounting, docketed as Civil
Case No. V-6186, with the Regional Trial Court, Br. 15, Roxas City,
against herein complainant, Victoria V. Radjaie, who was presumably
an heir of the late Faustina Borres. The action sought, among others,
the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-24150 in the
name of herein complainant covering a parcel of land with an area of
215,777 square meters situated in Panay, Capiz, and the declaration of
the said parcel of land as property commonly owned by the Borres
heirs.
On July 16, 1993, Br. 17, to which Civil Case No. V-6186 was re-raffled,
declared herein complainant in default and ordered the Borres heirs to
present their evidence on July 30, 1993.14
It was only after three (3) postponements that the Borres heirs were
able to start presenting their evidence ex-parte on October 8, 1993. For
lack of material time, however, the presentation of evidence was again
reset to November 22, 1993, which again was postponed and reset to
December 10, 1993.15
On December 10, 1993, there were several criminal and civil actions
scheduled for trial, which commenced at about 10:00 in the morning,
before Br. 17, including Civil Case No. V-6186, which was listed number
four in the court calendar. Judge Alovera presided over the hearing and
Teresita V. Bauzon, court stenographer of Br. 17, took down notes of
the Proceedings. Atty. Villaruz appeared for the accused in a criminal
case16 before Br. 17 at the time. The court had a recess at 11:10 and
resumed at 11:35 in the morning. After the hearing of criminal cases
was through, Civil Case No. V-6186 was called at about 11:55 in the
morning, but the plaintiffs as well as their counsel, Atty. Villaruz, were
no longer inside the courtroom. The session thus adjourned at 11:57 in
the morning without Civil Case No. V-6186 being heard.17
At about 11:30 in the morning of the same date, Atty. Villaruz
approached Rosa Dapat, who was the court stenographer at the time of
RTC, Br. 15, Roxas City, while she was in her office. Atty. Villaruz told
her that Judge Alovera was requesting her to assist in the proceedings
of Civil Case No. V-6186. At first she was hesitant to accede to the
request as Br. 17 had also its own court stenographer. She relented
though when told that Br. 17 as well as the other branches had no
available court stenographer. She then went to Br. 17 and saw Atty.
Villaruz standing by the door of the chambers of Judge Alovera. Atty.
Villaruz motioned her to enter the chambers, which is separate from
the courtroom. While inside the chambers, she saw Judge Alovera
behind his desk and other people whom she did not know. Upon being
told that Mrs. Dapat would be the stenographer, Judge Alovera told
Atty. Villaruz to start the proceedings. Following the manifestation
made by Atty. Villaruz, a witness, whom she later recognized to be Atty.
Arturo Agudo, was called. At that instant Judge Alovera stood up and
said, "All right, you just continue," and then went out of the
chambers.18 Judge Alovera would occasionally return to the chambers
in the course of the proceedings, but he would just sit down and listen
while Atty. Villaruz was conducting his direct examination of the
witness and presenting documentary evidence.19 The proceedings
lasted up to 12:10 in the afternoon, with Judge Alovera making only
two rulings in the course thereof, including the one he made at the end
when he ordered the plaintiffs to file their written offer of evidence on
January 20, 1994.20
From this point on, complainant would establish how the January 30,
1995 decision of Judge Alovera in Civil Case No. V-6186 came about.
Prior to his retirement from the judiciary on January 31, 1995, or on
January 5, 1995, Judge Alovera designated his legal researcher, Mrs.
Nenita Aluad, to be the OIC Branch Clerk of Court.21 As part of her
functions as such OIC, all decisions, orders and resolutions of Br. 17
would first be received by her from the judge, and would stamp them
"RECEIVED" and put thereon the date of receipt as well as her initial or
signature.22 This is in accordance with Sec. 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of
Court.23
Sometime in February of 1995, Mrs. Teresita V. Bauzon, court
stenographer of Br. 17 since 1993, was asked to type the draft decision
in Civil Case No. V-6186 in Judge Alovera's house. When she inquired if
he can still do it, Judge Alovera told her that he had one (1) year more
to decide cases. With this assurance, she typed the draft decision on a
single bond paper without a duplicate as Judge Alovera was dictating
it.24
On August 1, 1995 at about 9:30 in the morning, retired Judge Alovera
came to Br. 17, with a man and a woman, later identified as the
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. V-6186, behind him. While he was
approaching Nenita Aluad, he uttered to the latter, "Receive this,
receive this, " referring to the questioned January 30, 1995 decision,
which he was holding. As he spread the decision on her table, he
continued, "Because I will defend you even up to the Plaza Miranda.
And give copies to these two, pointing to the plaintiffs who were at his
back.25 Almost instantaneously, Mrs. Aluad replied, " I would not
receive it because it is already August 1, 1995," and she did not argue
with him anymore so as not to embarrass him for being her former
superior.26 She then went out of the office while retired Judge Alovera,
as well as the two plaintiffs were still inside.27 At about the same time,
Mrs. Concepcion Alcazar, another employee of Br. 17 and the
clerk-in-charge of civil cases and special proceedings therein, saw
Judge Alovera inside the office of Br. 17 while trying to have her
co-employees receive the questioned decision. Nobody, however,
received the same because it was already seven (7) months after his
retirement.28 A little later, she found the questioned decision, together
with the formal offer of exhibits of January 20, 1995 and the order of
January 25, 1995, on the top of her table. Although she noticed that
these records were not stamped "RECEIVED" as a matter of procedure,
she went on to attach the said records to the expediente of Civil Case
No. V-6186.29 She even gave a copy of the questioned decision to one
of the plaintiffs, Ireneo Borres, and to Atty. Villaruz, which was
received for him by Ireneo Borres.30 After keeping the expediente, she
then entered the questioned decision in her logbook.31
The Borres heirs succeeded in having the questioned decision
executed when, on January 31, 1996, the lessee of the property, which
is the subject matter of Civil Case No. V-6186, surrendered possession
of the said property in favor of the Borres heirs,32 Said transfer of
possession was made pursuant to the writ of execution issued on
January 19, 1996 by the Acting Presiding Judge of Br. 17, Hon. Delano
F. Villaruz, through Clerk of Court Susan Mendoza Arce.33
Meanwhile, complainant, who had been working in Japan together
with his husband who is employed at the Turkish Embassy in Tokyo,
Japan, learned of what happened to her property in Panay, Capiz. 34
She was thus prompted to come back to the Philippines, which
resulted in losing her job in Japan.
Back home, complainant, on March 5, 1996, filed a Petition for Relief
from Order, questioning the January 30, 1995 decision and the
January 19, 1996 Writ of Execution.35 She also prayed "that
disciplinary and contempt proceedings be taken against those involved
in the perfidious anomaly to tamper with the administration of
justice."36
Judge Julius L. Abela took cognizance of Civil Case No. V-6186 as he
was the acting presiding judge of Br. 17 at the time of the filing of said
petition for relief from order.37 In the course of the proceedings
thereof, he noticed that the Formal Offer of Exhibits purportedly filed
by the plaintiffs, i.e., Borres heirs, was dated January 20, 1995, while
the PTR of their counsel, Atty. Alberto Villaruz, was issued on January
31, 1995. He concluded then that the said offer could not have been
filed on January 20, 1995. When he asked Atty. Villaruz about it, the
latter refused to answer and just kept quiet.38 He likewise observed
that there was no order in Civil Case No. V-6186 submitting the same
for decision, except for the order made by Judge Alovera on December
10, 1993 during the "simulated proceedings" inside his chambers,
where he directed the counsel for the plaintiffs to file his offer of
exhibits.39 Mrs. Rosa Dapat, who took down notes during the said
proceedings and who was not a member of the staff of Br. 17, was not
even acknowledged on the records as the official stenographer in the
course thereof.40 Thus, in his resolution of September 25, 1997, Judge
Abela granted the petition for relief filed by complainant and the latter
was ordered reinstated to the possession of the property in question.
In the same resolution, Judge Abela declared the January 30, 1995
decision null and void, the same not being filed with the clerk of court
and not properly rendered in accordance with Section 1, Rule 36, Rules
of Court.41
Prompted by what he considered to be anomalous proceedings,
coupled with the prayer of complainant in her petition for relief "that
disciplinary and contempt proceedings be taken against those involved
in the perfidious anomaly to tamper with the administration of justice,"
Judge Abela conducted an investigation into the said anomaly.42 After
considering the testimonies of Misses Aluad, Dapat, Bauzon and
Alcazar during the investigation, together with the documentary
evidence presented, he concluded, thus:
From the foregoing facts and circumstances the following facts are
established that:
1) Civil Case No. V-6186 was not tried on December 10, 1993. What
transpired was a mock or simulated trial inside the chamber of Judge
Alovera where only Atty. Alberto Villaruz, the plaintiffs and Mrs. Rosa
Dapat, a court stenographer from another court, were present. No
Judge or RTC Branch 17 court personnel were present as there was
actual court session in open court going on at that time.
2) The records of Civil Case No. V-6186 were with Judge Jose O.
Alovera and remained with him even after his retirement on January 31,
1995. He did not return the record to Mrs. Concepcion Alcazar, Court
Clerk III in Charge of Civil Cases.
3) The record of Civil Case No. V-6186 turned up on the table of Mrs.
Alcazar together with the "Offer of Exhibits" of Atty. Villaruz dated
January 20, 1995 and the "Order" dated January 25, 1995, after the
retirement of Judge Alovera. Both the Offer and the Order admitting
the exhibits were not properly filed and do not bear markings of having
been received by the court.
4) The "decision" of Judge Jose O. Alovera, though dated January 30,
1995, was filed with the court on August 1, 1995 by former Judge
Alovera himself and because he was no longer a judge his submission
was refused.
- CONCLUSIONS -
The "Offer of Exhibits" of Atty. Alberto Villaruz though dated January 20,
1995 bears signature and PTR No. issued on January 31, 1995. This
simply means that the pleadings (were) ante dated. It is impossible for
Atty. Villaruz to affix his PTR No. dated January 31, 1995 or any date
prior to its issuance. The Offer of Exhibits could have been made only
on January 31, 1995 or later. Because this is so, the Order of Judge
Alovera dated January 25, 1995 is also ante dated and could have been
made only on a date beyond the filing of the Offer of Exhibits. So also
with the decision of former Judge Alovera dated January 30, 1995.
xxx xxx xxx
The Order admitting the exhibits and the decision were made after the
retirement of Judge Alovera. He was no longer a judge.
The acts of Attys. Alberto Villaruz and Jose O. Alovera constitute deceit,
malpractice, serious and grave misconduct as lawyer justifying their
suspension from the practice of law and ultimately their disbarment.43
Based on the foregoing findings, the Bar Confidant recommended the
disbarment of respondent, declaring that it found more than sufficient
evidence to sustain complainant's charge against respondent that,
indeed, the January 30, 1995 decision in Civil Case No. V-6186, which
divested complainant of her property in Panay, Capiz, was penned by
respondent after his retirement from the judiciary on January 31, 1995.
This Court finds the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant
to be well-taken. Respondent has thus sufficiently demonstrated that
he is morally and legally unfit to remain in the exclusive and honorable
fraternity of the legal profession.
In his long years as a lawyer, respondent has forgotten his sworn
pledge as a lawyer. It is time once again that the Court inculcate in the
hearts of all lawyers that pledge; thus -
LAWYER'S OATH
" I, x x x, do solemnly swear that I will maintain
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I will
support and defend its Constitution and obey the
laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities therein; I will do no
falsehood nor consent to its commission; I will not
wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless,
false or unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the
same; I will not delay any man's cause for money or
malice and will conduct myself as a lawyer according
to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all
good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients
and I impose upon myself this obligation voluntary,
without any mental reservation or purpose of
evasion.
SO HELP ME GOD.
This oath to which all lawyers have subscribed in solemn agreement to
dedicate themselves to the pursuit of justice, is not a mere ceremony
or formality for practicing law44 to be forgotten afterwards nor is it
mere words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that every lawyer
must uphold and keep inviolable at all times.45 This oath is firmly
echoed and reflected in the Code of Professional Responsibility, the
particular provisions of which are applicable to the case at bar, provide,
to wit:
CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the
land and promote respect for law and for legal processes.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at
defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
xxx xxx xxx
CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of
the legal profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects
on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or
private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
xxx xxx xxx
CANON 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the
court.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be
misled by any artifice.
All of these underscore the role of the lawyer as the vanguard of our
legal system.1âwphi1 When respondent took the oath as a member of
the legal profession, he made a solemn promise to so stand by his
pledge.46 In this covenant, respondent miserably failed.
The testimonies of Nenita M. Aluad, Teresita V. Bauzon and
Concepcion Alcazar were all quite telling on how respondent acted in a
grossly reprehensible manner in having the questioned decision dated
January 30, 1995 come to fore, leading ultimately to its execution
divesting the complainant of her property. Respondent gravely abused
his relationship with his former staff, pompously flaunting his erstwhile
standing as a judge. Respondent disregarded his primary duty as an
officer of the court, who is sworn to assist the courts and not to
impede or pervert the administration of justice to all and sundry.47 In
so doing, he made a mockery of the judiciary and eroded public
confidence in courts and lawyers.
This Court has been nothing short of exacting in its demand for
integrity and good moral character from members of the Bar. By
swearing the lawyer's oath, an attorney becomes a guardian of truth
and the rule of law, and an indispensable instrument in the fair and
impartial administration of justice - a vital function of democracy a
failure of which is disastrous to society. Any departure from the path
which a lawyer must follow as demanded by the virtues of his
profession shall not be tolerated by this Court as the disciplining
authority48 for there is perhaps no profession after that of the sacred
ministry in which a high-toned morality is more imperative than that of
law.49

Despite the opportunities accorded to respondent to present

substantial defense to refute the charges against him, he failed neither
to do so nor to offer a valid explanation. When the integrity of a
member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the
charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the
evidence against him. He must show proof that he still maintains that
degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of him.50

Given the peculiar factual circumstances prevailing in this case, the

Court finds as appropriate the recommended penalty of the Office of
the Bar Confidant in its Report. Such gross misconduct of the
respondent brings intolerable dishonor to the legal profession and calls
for the severance of respondent’s privilege to practice law for life. December 7, 1928

WHEREFORE, respondent JOSE O. ALOVERA is hereby DISBARRED. In re FELIPE DEL ROSARIO

The Office of the Clerk of Court is directed to strike out his name from
the Roll of Attorneys and to inform all courts of this Decision. Felipe del Rosario in his own behalf.
City Fiscal Guevara for the Government.
SO ORDERED.

MALCOLM, J.:

The supplementary report on bar examination irregularities of the

fiscal of the City of Manila, dealing with the case of Felipe del Rosario,
has been laid before the court for consideration and action. It is
recommended by the city fiscal that Felipe del Rosario be ordered to
surrender his certificate of attorney and that he be forever prohibited
from taking the bar examination. An answer to the report has been
permitted to be made, in which the court is asked to disapprove the
report and to direct the setting aside of the suspension to practice law
by the respondent, heretofore ordered by the court.

Felipe del Rosario was a candidate in the bar examination who failed
for the second time in 1925. He presented himself for the succeeding
bar examination in 1926 and again was unable to obtain the required
rating. Then on March 29, 1927, he authorized the filing of a motion
for the revision of his papers for 1925 based on an alleged mistake in
the computation of his grades. The court, acting in good faith, granted
this motion, and admitted Felipe del Rosario to the bar, but with
justices dissenting. Subsequently, during the general investigation of
bar examination matters being conducted by the city fiscal, this case
was taken up, with the result that a criminal charge was lodged in the
Court of First Instance of Manila against Juan Villaflor, a former
employee of the court and Felipe del Rosario. Villaflor pleaded guilty to
the information and was sentenced accordingly. Del Rosario pleaded
not guilty, and at the conclusion of the trial was acquitted for lack of
evidence.

The acquittal of Felipe del Rosario upon the criminal charge is not a bar
to these proceedings. The court is now acting in an entirely different
capacity from that which courts assume in trying criminal cases. It is
asking a great deal of the members of the court to have them believe
that Felipe del Rosario was totally unaware of the illegal machinations
culminating in the falsification of public documents, of which he was
the sole beneficiary. Indeed, the conviction of Juan Villaflor in itself
demonstrates that Felipe del Rosario has no legal right to his attorney's
certificate. While to admit Felipe del Rosario again to the bar
examination would be tantamount to a declaration of professional
purity which we are totally unable to pronounce. The practice of the
law is not an absolute right to be granted every one who demands it,
but is a privilege to be extended or withheld in the exercise of a sound
discretion. The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by
conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of the
criminal law. It would be a disgrace to the Judiciary to receive one
whose integrity is questionable as an officer of the court, to clothe him
with all the prestige of its confidence, and then to permit him to hold
himself out as a duly authorized member of the bar. (In re Terrell
[1903], 2 Phil., 266; People ex rel. Colorado Bar Association vs. Thomas
[1906], 36 Colo., 126; 10 Ann. Cas., 886 and note; People vs. Macauley
[1907], 230 Ill., 208; Ex parte Wall [1882], 107 U. S., 265.)1awphi1.net
The recommendation contained in the special report pertaining to
Felipe del Rosario is approved, and within a period of ten days from
receipt of notice, the respondent shall surrender his attorney's
certificate to the clerk of this court.
Avanceña, C. J., Johnson, Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Romualdez and
Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 150910 February 6, 2006
BIENVENIDO GONZALUDO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Under consideration is this petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court to nullify and set aside the following issuances
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 22185, to wit:
1. Decision dated 19 July 2001,1 dismissing the appeal thereto taken by
the herein petitioner from a judgment of conviction promulgated by the
Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 50, in a criminal case for
estafa thru falsification of public document thereat commenced by the
People against four (4) accused, including the petitioner; and
2. Resolution dated 22 October 2001,2 denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.
The material facts may be briefly stated, as follows:
Before his death in 1992, one Ulysses Villaflor was a member of the
Bacolod City Police Office. On January 11, 1978, Ulysses married Anita
Manlangit in Bacolod City. Thereafter, the couple stayed with Ulysses’s
mother Anastacia Tobongbanua at the latter’s house at Purok 5,
Mansungay, Bacolod City.
Later, Ulysses was assigned to Pagadian City. However, he would often
go home to Bacolod City to supervise his tire-recapping business
thereat.
Meanwhile, his wife Anita secured a teaching job in Catubig, Samar
prompting her to leave Bacolod City and live in Samar.
After less than a year in Pagadian City, Ulysses was re-assigned to
Bacolod City. And, in December of 1978, he was able to buy for
₱1,500.00 a small house located near that of his mother at Purok 5,
Mansungay, Bacolod City.
Then, in 1985, Ulysses took one Rosemarie Gelogo as his mistress and
brought her into the house. In time, improvements were made on the
house, the most substantial of which were those introduced sometime
in March 1991. What used to be a small house, which Ulysses bought
for only ₱1,500.00, was thus transformed into a 2-storey structure
partially made of concrete hollow blocks and with galvanized iron
roofing which thereby enhanced its value to ₱200,000.00.
After Ulysses’s demise in January of 1992, his mistress Rosemarie
Gelogo offered to sell the 2-storey house for ₱80,000.00 to herein
petitioner Bienvenido Gonzaludo, a.k.a. Ben Gonzaludo, who lives just
nearby. Initially, petitioner was not interested to buy the house
because he already had one, let alone the fact that he did not have
enough money for the purpose. Nonetheless, since the house was
being sold for a cheap price, petitioner convinced the spouses Gregg
Canlas and Melba Canlas, to whom he is related by affinity, to buy the
same. Herein, petitioner introduced the Canlases to Rosemarie Gelogo.
On January 20, 1993, Rosemarie Gelogo and Gregg Canlas executed a
Deed of Sale,3 witnessed by petitioner. In that deed, Rosemarie
Gelogo signed as Rosemarie G. Villaflor and represented herself to be
the lawful owner of the 2-storey house. By virtue of the same deed,
vendee Gregg Canlas acquired all of Rosemarie’s rights and interest on
the subject house.
Later, upon complaint of Ulysses’s widow Anita Manlangit, an
Information dated May 31, 19944 was filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Bacolod City charging Rosemarie Gelogo, alias Rosemarie
Villaflor, the spouses Gregg Canlas and Melba Canlas and petitioner
with the crime of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Document allegedly
committed, as follows:
That on or about the 20th day of January, 1993 in the City of Bacolod,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
herein accused, conspiring, confederating and acting in concert, with
intent to gain, defrauded the herein offended party, Anita Manlangit
Vda. de Villaflor, herein represented by her mother-in-law and
Attorney-in-Fact, Anastacia Tobongbanua, in the following manner, to
wit: that accused Rosemarie Gelogo alias Rosemarie G. Villaflor being
the occupant of a house made of concrete materials with a floor area
of 40 ft. by 24 ft., with galvanized iron roofing, worth ₱200,000.00,
owned by the deceased Ulysses Villaflor, husband of the herein
offended party, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
commit acts of falsification by then and there preparing and/or causing
to be prepared a public document denominated as a Deed of Sale
dated January 20, 1993 entered as Doc. No. 402, Page No. 81, Book
No. XVII, Series of 1993 of the Notarial Register of Atty. Ramon B.
Clapiz, to the effect that she is the lawful owner of the said house and
affixing or causing to be affixed thereon her name and signature,
Rosemarie G. Villaflor, purportedly as wife of the deceased Ulysses
Villaflor, thus making untruthful statement in the narration of facts as
accused well know that such was not the case for the deceased
Ulysses Villaflor has a legal wife in the person of the herein offended
party, by reason of which accused was able to effect the sale and
eventual occupancy of the said house to the herein accused Sps.
Gregg Canlas and Melba Canlas who despite of their knowledge that
such house was not owned by Rosemarie Gelogo bought the same
from her in the amount of ₱80,000.00 and, herein accused Bienvenido
Gonzaludo alias "Ben", despite of his knowledge that such house was
not owned by Rosemarie Gelogo, participated in the commission of the
herein offense by causing his name and signature to be affixed in the
said Deed of Sale as witness to the fraudulent sale entered into by the
parties, to the damage and prejudice of the herein offended party in
the amount of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (₱200,000.00),
Philippine Currency.
Act contrary to law.
Docketed as Criminal Case No. 94-16532, the Information was raffled
to Branch 50 of the court.
Because accused Rosemarie Gelogo remained at large, only the
spouses Gregg Canlas and Melba Canlas and herein petitioner were
arraigned, all of whom entered a plea of "Not Guilty."
After due proceedings, the trial court, in a decision dated February 17,
1998,5 acquitted the Canlas spouses but convicted petitioner of the
complex crime of Estafa Thru Falsification of Public Document and
sentenced him accordingly. Dispositively, the decision reads:
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused Bienvenido
Gonzaludo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as a principal and
co-conspirator of the complex Crime of Estafa Thru Falsification of a
Public Document and there being no extenuating circumstances and
pursuant to the provision of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, he is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Temporal. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the accused is sentenced to a prison
term of Eight (8) years of Prision Mayor to Twenty (20) years of
Reclusion Temporal. By way of Civil Liability, the accused is sentenced
to pay the offended party the sum of ₱200,000.00, representing the
value of the house and the sum of ₱20,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
The case with respect to the accused-Spouses Gregg and Melba Canlas
is ordered dismissed as their guilt was not proved beyond reasonable
doubt.
Therefrom, petitioner went to the CA via ordinary appeal in CA-G.R. CR
No. 22185.
As stated at the outset hereof, the appellate court, in its decision dated
July 19, 2001, dismissed petitioner’s appeal for lack of merit and
affirmed the trial court’s judgment of conviction, thus:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the appeal is hereby
ordered DISMISSED, having no merit in fact and in law, and the
decision of the trial court AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
With his motion for reconsideration having been denied by the CA in its
resolution of October 22, 2001, petitioner is now with us via the present
recourse on his submissions that the CA erred when it -
I – xxx sustained the decision of the trial court convicting the petitioner
of the crime of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Document as defined
and punished under Paragraph 2(a), Article 315, Revised Penal Code
EVEN IF not any of the statutory elements of the crime herein charged
is present or has been proved and/or not all of the statutory elements
of the offense thus charged are present or have been proved beyond
reasonable doubt;
II – xxx sustained the conviction of your petitioner ALTHOUGH the
material allegations in the information filed below have not been
proved at all beyond reasonable doubt;
III – xxx sustained the conviction of herein petitioner of a crime not
properly charged in the information;
IV – xxx grossly misappreciated the facts and misapplied the law and
jurisprudence concerning the status of the house subject of this case as
to whether the same is totally a conjugal property of Ulysses and Anita
or the house wholly or substantially belongs to Rosemarie Gelogo a.k.a.
Rosemarie G. Villaflor.
The petition is partly impressed with merit.
Basic in this jurisdiction is the doctrine that in criminal cases, an appeal
throws the whole case wide open for review. Issues, whether raised or
not by the parties, may be resolved by the appellate court.6 The Court
is duty-bound to look into the validity of the factual and legal basis
relied upon by the two (2) courts below in convicting petitioner in this
case.
It is worthy to note that petitioner was convicted by the trial court of
the complex crime charged in the Information for allegedly having
conspired with Rosemarie Gelogo, who used the fictitious surname
"Villaflor" for the purpose of giving her a semblance of authority to sell
the house purportedly owned by her paramour, Ulysses Villaflor, who
was legally married to private complainant, Anita Villaflor.
First and foremost, therefore, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to
establish Rosemarie Gelogo’s criminal liability for the complex crime of
estafa through falsification of public document, and thereafter,
establish by proof beyond reasonable doubt that herein petitioner
conspired with Rosemarie in the commission of the same complex
crime. In other words, if Rosemarie cannot be held liable for the
complex crime of estafa through falsification of public document under
the Information filed in this case, with all the more reason should it be
for petitioner, as alleged co-conspirator.
For an accused to be convicted of the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of public document, all the elements of the two crimes of
estafa and falsification of public document must exist.
To secure conviction for estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of
the Revised Penal Code, the Court has time and again ruled that the
following requisites must concur:
(1) that the accused made false pretenses or fraudulent
representations as to his power, influence, qualifications, property,
credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions;
(2) that such false pretenses or fraudulent representations were made
prior to or simultaneous with the commission of the fraud;
(3) that such false pretenses or fraudulent representations constitute
the very cause which induced the offended party to part with his
money or property; and
(4) that as a result thereof, the offended party suffered
damage7 (Emphasis supplied).
There is no question that the first, second and fourth elements are
present: there was false or fraudulent misrepresentation by Rosemarie
Gelogo when she used the fictitious surname "Villaflor"; the
misrepresentation or false pretense was made prior to or simultaneous
with the commission of the fraud; and private complainant Anita
Manlangit’s right to the subject 2-storey house was lost or at the very
least prejudiced when Rosemarie sold it to the Canlases.
It is petitioner’s thesis, however, that there is here an absence of the
third element, i.e., "that such false pretenses or fraudulent
representations constitute the very cause which induced the offended
party to part with his money or property," contending that private
complainant Anita Manlangit, who was the offended party in this case,
was never induced to part with any money or property by means of
fraud, committed simultaneously with the false pretense or fraudulent
representation by Rosemarie.
We find merit in petitioner’s submission.
As early as in the 1903 case of U.S. vs. Mendezona, 8 we held that
therein accused may be convicted for estafa only when the deceit or
false pretenses, committed simultaneously with the fraud, were the
efficient cause or primary consideration which induced the offended
party to part with his money or property.
Thirty (30) years thereafter, the rule remains the same. In the 1933
case of People vs. Lilius,9 the Court, through then Chief Justice Ramon
Avanceña, acquitted the accused of estafa because the deceit did not
precede the defraudation, which means that the deceit was not the
cause which could have induced the damage or prejudice to or loss of
property suffered by the injured party.1avvphil.net
In the cases of People vs. Quesada,10 People vs. Fortuno,11 and People
vs. Sabio,12 which span more than another forty-five (45) years after
Lilius, the Court continued to apply the same principle in determining
criminal liability for estafa, i.e., that the deceit must have been
committed prior to or simultaneous with the fraudulent act because this
was the only way that said deceit could become the efficient cause or
primary consideration which could have induced the offended party to
part with his money or property.
The doctrine remains the same a hundred (100) years after the 1903
case of Mendezona. Thus, in the 2003 case of Alcantara vs. Court of
Appeals,13 this Court acquitted the therein accused of the crime of
estafa explaining, through Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., that the false
pretense or fraudulent act must be committed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, thus:
xxx fraud in its general sense is deemed to comprise anything
calculated to deceive, including all acts, omissions, and concealment
involving a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust, or confidence justly
reposed, resulting in damage to another, or by which an undue and
unconscientious advantage is taken of another. It is a generic term
embracing all multifarious means which human ingenuity can device,
and which are resorted to by one individual to secure an advantage
over another by false suggestions or by suppression of truth and
includes all surprise, trick, cunning, dissembling and. any unfair way by
which another is cheated. And deceit is the false representation of a
matter of fact whether by words or conduct, by false or misleading
allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been
disclosed which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he
shall act upon it to his legal injury. The false pretense or fraudulent act
must be committed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of
the fraud.
We find no cogent reason to depart from this settled principle that the
deceit, which must be prior to or simultaneously committed with the act
of defraudation, must be the efficient cause or primary consideration
which induced the offended party to part with his money or property
and rule differently in the present case.
While it may be said that there was fraud or deceit committed by Rosemarie in
this case, when she used the surname "Villaflor" to give her semblance of
authority to sell the subject 2-storey house, such fraud or deceit was employed
upon the Canlas spouses who were the ones who parted with their money when
they bought the house. However, the Information charging Rosemarie of estafa
in the present case, alleged damage or injury not upon the Canlas spouses, but
upon private complainant, Anita Manlangit. Since the deceit or fraud was not the
efficient cause and did not induce Anita Manlangit to part with her property in
this case, Rosemarie cannot be held liable for estafa. With all the more reason
must this be for herein petitioner.
The lack of criminal liability for estafa, however, will not necessarily absolve
petitioner from criminal liability arising from the charge of falsification of public
document under the same Information charging the complex crime of estafa
through falsification of public document. It is settled doctrine that –
When a complex crime has been charged in an information and the evidence
fails to support the charge on one of the component offenses, can the defendant
still be separately convicted of the other offense? The question has long been
answered in the affirmative. In United States vs. Lahoylahoy and Madanlog (38
Phil. 330), the Court has ruled to be legally feasible the conviction of an accused
on one of the offenses included in a complex crime charged, when properly
established, despite the failure of evidence to hold the accused of the other
charge.14
Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code punishes any private individual who shall
commit any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171 in any public or
official document or letter of exchange or any other kind of commercial
document. In turn, Article 171 of the same Code provides:
Art. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic
minister.- The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed ₱5,000 pesos
[sic] shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking
advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by committing any of
the following acts:1avvphil.net
1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric;
2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding
when they did not in fact so participate;
3. Attributing to persons who have participated in any act or proceeding
statements other than those in fact made by them;
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
5. Altering true dates;
6. Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes
its meaning;
7. Issuing in an authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of an
original document when no such original exists, or including in such a copy a
statement contrary to, or different from, that of the genuine original; or
8. Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof in a
protocol, registry, or official book.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any ecclesiastical minister who shall
commit any of the offenses enumerated in the preceding paragraphs of this
article, with respect to any record or document of such character that its
falsification may affect the civil status of persons. (Emphasis supplied)
As correctly found by the trial court, petitioner conspired with Rosemarie to
falsify, that is, by making untruthful statement in the narration of facts in the
deed of sale, by declaring Rosemarie to be the owner of the house subject of
such sale and signing as "Rosemarie Villaflor" instead of her real name,
Rosemarie Gelogo, in order to sell the same to the Canlas spouses. It is
established by evidence beyond reasonable doubt that Rosemarie committed
the crime of falsification of public document. Likewise, proof beyond reasonable
doubt has been duly adduced to establish conspiracy between Rosemarie and
petitioner who is the brother-in-law of Melba Canlas, one of the buyers of the
house in this case.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are
hereby MODIFIED. Petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED of the complex crime of
Estafa through Falsification of Public Document, but found GUILTY of the crime
of Falsification of Public Document and is accordingly imposed an indeterminate
sentence of 4 months and 1 day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to 2 years, 4
months and 1 day of prision correccional, as maximum, and to pay a fine of
₱5,000.00.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 289 November 29, 1962
MERCEDES AGDOMA, EUGENIA AGDOMA and PEDRO
AGDOMA, petitioners,
vs.
ATTY. ISAIAS A. CELESTINO, respondent.
PADILLA, J.:
This is a disbarment proceeding against Isaias A. Celestino for
malpractice and misconduct as a lawyer and notary public.
The complainants Mercedes Agdoma, Eugenia Agdoma and Pedro
Agdoma are aunts and uncle of respondent Isaias A. Celestino, his
deceased mother Eulogia Agdoma being the sister of the former. Both
the complainant and the respondent, in representation of his late
mother Eulogia, are the heirs of the late Julian Agdoma, the
complainants' father and the respondent's grandfather. Julian Agdoma
left a parcel of land situated in barrio San Juan, Alcala, Pangasinan,
registered in his name under original certificate of title No. 62507. On
23 July 19 Julian Agdoma died in Lambayong, Cotabato (Exhibits B-1
and B-2). On 9 March 1956 Anastasia Cabatic, Julian's wife, died in
Alcala, Pangasinan (Exhibit C).
On or after 16 August 1955 Isaias A. Celestino filed in the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan an ex-parte petition in behalf of the late Julian
Agdoma. In said petition he represented that his late grandfather was
alive and that the latter's copy of original certificate of title No. 62507
had been burned by fire that razed to the ground his (Julian's) house in
San Vicente, Alcala, Pangasinan and prayed that the Register of Deeds
in and for the province of Pangasinan be directed to issue another
duplicate copy thereof. (Exhibit E-1). The respondent supported the
petition by an affidavit purportedly subscribed and sworn to by the
deceased Julian Agdoma on 16 August 1955 before him (the
respondent) as notary public (Exhibit E-2). On 17 August 1955 Judge
Jesus P. Morfe of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan entered an
order granting the petition and directing the Register of Deeds in and
for the province of Pangasinan to issue another owner's duplicate of
certificate of title No. 62507 (Exhibit F).
Two days before the respondent filed the ex parte petition asking for a
new copy of original certificate of title No. 62507, it was made to
appear that for and in consideration of P1,000 Julian Agdoma had sold
the lot described in the original certificate of title No. 62507 to the
respondent in a deed of absolute sale (Exhibit C) purportedly
acknowledged before notary public Julio B. Pequet who, however,
turned out to be a fictitious or nonexistent notary public in and for the
province of Pangasinan (Exhibits I and J). By virtue of said sale, on 17
August 1955 the Register of Deeds in and for the province of
Pangasinan cancelled original certificate of title No. 62507 in the name
of Julian Agdoma and in lieu thereof issued transfer certificate of title
No. 18925 in the name of respondent Isaias A. Celestino (Exhibit H).
Afterwards, the respondent mortgaged the parcel of land for P425 to
the Dagupan City branch of the Philippine National Bank. Until now the
loan still is unpaid.
On 14 February 1957 the complainants filed in this Court a complaint
praying for the disbarment of Isaias A. Celestino. On 19 February 1957
this Court ordered the respondent to answer the complaint within ten
days from notice. On 15 March the respondent in his behalf filed an
answer denying all the material averments of the complaint. On 18
March this Court passed a resolution referring the case to the Solicitor
General for investigation, report and recommendation. On 30 April, the
Solicitor General forwarded the case to the Provincial Fiscal of
Pangasinan for investigation, report and recommendation.
The Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan set the hearing of the case for 26
April 1957, which was postponed to 9 May 1957. At the hearing held on
9 May, the respondent did not appear. The officer serving summons
and notices certified that the respondent refused to sign the notice.
The fiscal considered such refusal as a waiver by the respondent of his
right to be present at the investigation. When the fiscal was preparing a
report on case based on the evidence presented by the complainants,
Attorney Cipriano V. Abenojar of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, on 10 June
1957 formally entered his appearance for the respondent and
requested that the case be immediately set for hearing. The
respondent expressed in writing his consent to the appearance of and
motion by Attorney Abenojar to set the case for hearing. The fiscal
granted request and set the hearing for 26 July 1957 with a warning
that no further postponement would be granted. At the hearing held on
26 July, neither the respondent nor his counsel appeared. Instead, the
latter filed a motion for postponement, alleging that the respondent
and the complainants, being blood relatives, might settle amicably. This
last motion was granted and the fiscal set the investigation for 20
August 1957 with a warning of no further postponement. Again, the
respondent or lawyer did not appear at the hearing on 20 August.
Forthwith, the fiscal rendered a report finding the respondent Isaias A.
Celestino guilty of malpractice an commending to the Solicitor General
that the corresponding charges for disbarment be filed against him
(respondent Celestino).
On 22 June 1959, the Solicitor General filed in Court a formal complaint
against Isaias A. Celestino malpractice and breach of professional
ethics. Letters and communications sent by this Court to the
respondent directing him to answer the complaint filed by the Solicitor
General were all returned undelivered or unserved, because the
respondent could not be located at his given address at San Vicente,
Alcala, Pangasinan. His attorney of record in the Provincial Fiscal of
Pangasinan also required to answer, but instead of answering, he
requested that he be relieved as counsel for the respondent. At the
oral argument of the case before this Court on 14 December, Attorney
Cipriano V. Abenojar appeared the respondent. The Court ordered the
respondent self to submit a memorandum in lieu of oral
argumentation.
The oral and documentary evidence points unerringly to the guilt of
respondent Isaias A. Celestino as charged. The ex-parte petition
wherein he sought another owner's duplicate of original certificate of
title No. 62507 and presented himself as counsel for Julian Agdoma,
his grandfather, whom he knew had been dead since 23 July 1945,
and the affidavit which he (the respondent) represented to have been
subscribed and sworn to by Julian Agdoma before him (the respondent)
as notary public, thus making it appear that his late grandfather was
alive, and which he used to support the ex-parte petition, are clear
evidence that the respondent Isaias A. Celestino had committed a
wanton falsehood in court. And this wanton disregard for truth and
honesty is aggravated by his forging or simulating a deed of sale of the
parcel of land described in original certificate of title No. 62507
executed in his favor by his deceased grandfather Julian Agdoma when
he (the respondent) knew that his grandfather had been dead ten
years before and therefore could not have executed the deed of sale.
To lend to this concoction a semblance of legality, the respondent
made it appear that Julian Agdoma, appeared and acknowledged the
sale before one Julio B. Pequet supposedly a notary public. But it
clearly has been shown that said Julio B. Pequet was a non-existent or
fictitious notary public. The residence certificate No. A-3609899 issued
at Alcala, Pangasinan, on 14 February 1955, which the respondent
attributed to pertain to and to have been exhibited by the late Julian
Agdoma in swearing before him (the respondent) supporting affidavit
to the ex-parte petition seeking an owner's duplicate of the original
certificate of title No. 62507 and in acknowledging the deed of sale
before the fictitious notary public Julio B. Pequet is another evidence
showing the respondent's propensity to commit falsehood, because
the said residence certificate does not belong to Julian Agdoma but to
one Mrs. Angela Eslava of Alcala, Pangasinan (Exhibit A). The clinching
evidence of the respondent's guilt is the fact that after the ownership
to the parcel of land had been transferred to him, he mortgaged it for
P425 to the Philippine National Bank, Dagupan City branch.
The respondent avoided attending the hearings conducted by the
Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan. Even in this Court, his whereabouts are
totally unknown. His knowledge that a disbarment proceeding had
been file pending against him imposes upon him the duty to make
himself or his presence available to this Court for a trial. That he could
not be located at his known address without making his whereabouts
known implies that he had chosen to waive every right and opportunity
to put up his defense.
THEREFORE, the respondent Isaias A. Celestino is barred from the
practice of the legal profession.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L.,
Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
A.C. No. 3694 June 17, 1993
ALBERTO FERNANDEZ, ISABELO ONGTENGCO, ACHILLES
BARTOLOME, AND ST. LUKES MEDICAL CENTER, complainants,
vs.
ATTORNEY BENJAMIN M. GRECIA, respondent.
Norberto Gonzales for Fernandez.
Bu Castro for Ongtengco & Bartolome.
Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Peña & Nolasco for St. Luke's Hospital.
Joaquin P. Yuseco for respondent Benjamin Grecia.
PER CURIAM:
This disbarment complaint against Attorney Benjamin M. Grecia was
filed on August 20, 1991 by Doctors Alberto Fernandez, Isabelo
Ongtengco and Achilles Bartolome and the St. Luke's Medical Center
(hereafter "St. Luke's" for brevity) where they are accredited medical
practitioners. The respondent is charged with dishonesty and grave
misconduct in connection with the theft of some pages from a medical
chart which was material evidence in a damage suit filed by his clients
against the aforenamed doctors and St. Luke's.
Disciplinary proceedings like this one are in a class by themselves. As
we observed in In Re Almacen, 31 SCRA 562,600, they are neither
purely civil nor purely criminal. "Public interests is the primary objective,
and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney
is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such." The purpose is
"to protect the court and the public from the misconduct of officers of
the court" (In Re Montagne & Dominguez, 3 Phil. 577, 588), or to
remove from the profession a person whose misconduct has proved
him unfit to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging
to the office of an attorney (Ledesma vs. Climaco, 57 SCRA 473;
Atienza vs. Evangelista, 80 SCRA 338).
Disbarment is nothing new to respondent Grecia. On November 12,
1987, he was disbarred for his immoral complicity or "unholy alliance"
with a judge in Quezon City to rip off banks and Chinese business firms
which had the misfortune to be sued in the latter's court (Prudential
Bank vs. Judge Jose P. Castro and Atty. Benjamin M. Grecia [Adm. Case
No. 2756], 155 SCRA 604).
Three years later, on December 18, 1990, the Court, heeding his pleas
for compassions and his promise to mend his ways, reinstated him in
the profession. Only eight (8) months later, on August 20, 1991, he
was back before the court facing another charge of dishonesty and
unethical practice. Apparently, the earlier disciplinary action that the
Court took against him did not effectively reform him.
The complaint of St. Luke's against Attorney Grecia was referred by the
Court to Deputy Court of Administrator Juanito A. Bernad for
investigation, report and recommendation. The following are Judge
Bernad's findings:
The late Fe Linda Aves was seven (7) months pregnant when she was
admitted as a patient at St. Luke's Hospital on December 20, 1990. She
complained of dizziness, hypertension, and abdominal pains with
vaginal bleeding. Dr. Fernandez, head of the OB-GYNE Department of
St. Luke's, Dr. Ongtengco, Jr., a cardiologist, and Dr. Bartolome, a
urologist, examined Mrs. Aves and diagnosed her problem as mild
pre-eclampsia (p. 63, Rollo). Five (5) days later, on Christmas day,
December 25, 1990, Mrs. Aves was discharged from the hospital, to
celebrate Christmas with her family.
However, she was rushed back to the hospital the next day, December
26, 1990. On December 27, 1990, she died together with her unborn
child.
Blaming the doctors of St. Luke's for his wife's demise, Attorney
Damaso B. Aves, along with his three (3) minor children, brought an
action for damages against the hospital and the attending physicians
of his wife. Their counsel, respondent Attorney Benjamin Grecia, filed a
complaint entitled: "Attorney Damaso B. Aves, et al. vs. St. Luke's
Medical Center, Drs. Alberto Fernandez, Isabelo Ongtengco, Jr. and
Achilles Bartolome" in the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Bulacan,
where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 3548-V and assigned to
Branch 172, presided over by Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong.
On July 4, 1991, the medical records of Fe Linda Aves were produced
in court by St. Luke's, as requested by Attorney Grecia. The records
were entrusted to the Acting Branch Clerk of Court, Avelina Robles.
On July 16, 1991, between 8:30-9:00 o' clock in the morning, upon
arriving in court for another hearing of the case, Attorney Grecia
borrowed from Mrs. Robles the folder containing the medical records
of Mrs. Aves.
While leafing through the folder, Grecia surreptitiously tore off two (2)
pages of the medical records. The respondent's act was notified by Mrs.
Robles and Maria Arnet Sandico, a clerk. They saw Grecia crumple the
papers and place them inside the right pocket of his coat. He
immediately returned the folder to Mrs. Roblesa (who was
momentarily rendered speechless by his audacious act) and left the
office.
Mrs. Robles examined the medical chart and found pages "72" and
"73" missing. She ordered Sandico to follow the respondent. Sandico
saw Grecia near the canteen at the end of the building, calling a man
(presumably his driver) who was leaning against a parked car
(presumably Grecia's car). When the man approached, Grecia gave
him the crumpled papers which he took from his coatpocket. Sandico
returned to the office and reported what she had seen to Mrs. Robles.
The latter in turn reported it to Judge Capulong. The three of
them — Judge Capulong, Mrs. Robles and Ms. Sandico — went
downstairs. Ms. Sandico pointed to Judge Capulong the man to whom
Grecia had given the papers which he had filched from medical folder
of Linda Aves. Judge Capulong told Sandico to bring the man to her
chamber. On the way back to chamber, Judge Capulong saw the
plaintiff, Attorney Damaso Aves, and St. Luke's counsel, Attorney
Melanie Limson. She requested them to come to her office.
In the presence of Attorneys Aves and Limson, Mrs. Robles, Ms.
Sandico, and a visitor, Judge Capulong confronted the man and
ordered him to give her the papers which Grecia had passed on to him.
The man at first denied that he had the papers in his possession.
However, when Sandico declared that she saw Grecia hand over the
papers to him, the man sheepishly took them from his pants pocket
and gave them to Judge Capulong. When the crumpled pages "72" and
"73" of the medical folder were shown to Sandico, she identified them
as the same papers that she saw Grecia hand over to the man.
After the confrontation, Sandicio and Robles went back to their office.
Mrs. Robles collapsed in a dead faint and was rushed to the Fatima
Hospital where she later regained consciousness.
In the ensuing excitement and confusion of recovering the stolen
exhibits, no one thought of ascertaining the identity of the man from
whom they were recovered. Judge Capulong belatedly realized this, so
she directed the Valenzuela Police to find out who he was. She also
ordered Sandico to submit a formal report of the theft of the exhibits to
the police.
A police investigator, PO3 Arnold Alabastro, tried to ascertain the name
of Grecia's driver who was known only as "SID." He located Grecia's
house in Quezon City. Although he was not allowed to enter the
premises, he was able to talk with a house maid. He pretended to be a
cousin of "SID" and asked for the latter. The housemaid informed him
that "SID" was sent home to his province by Grecia.
He talked with Grecia himself but the latter denied that he had a driver
named "SID."
PO3 Alabastro also talked wit one of Grecia's neighbors across the
street. The neighbor confirmed that Grecia's driver was a fellow named
"SID".
The incident caused enormous emotional strain to the personnel of Judge
Capulong's court, so much so that the Acting Branch Clerk of Court, Avelina
Robles, was hospitalized. Because of the incident, Judge Capulong inhibited
herself from conducting the trial of Civil Case No. 3548-V.
On August 20, 1991, St. Luke's failed this disbarment case against Grecia.
At the investigation of the case by Judge Bernad, Attorney Damaso Aves, the
surviving spouse of the late Fe Linda Aves and plaintiff in Civil case No. 3548-V,
testified that it was Attorney Bu Castro, counsel of the defendants in said Civil
Case No. 3548-V, who lifted two pages from the medical folder which lay among
some papers on top of the table of Acting Branch Clerk of Court Robles. When
he allegedly went outside the courthouse to wait for Attorney Grecia to arrive,
he noticed Attorney Castro come out of the building and walk toward a man in
the parking lot to whom he handed a piece of paper. Afterward, Attorney Castro
reentered the courthouse.
Respondent Grecia denied any knowledge of the theft of the exhibits in the Aves
case. He alleged that the person who was caught in possession of the detached
pages of the medical record was actually "planted" by his adversaries to
discredit him and destroy his reputation.
He denied that he had a driver. He alleged that his car was out of order on July
16, 1991, so he was fetched by the driver of Attorney Aves in the latter's
"Maxima" car. He arrived in the courthouse at exactly 9:15 in the morning and
went straight to the courtroom on the second floor of the building. He did not
leave the place until his case was called at 9:40. Since it was allegedly a very
warm day, he wore a dark blue barong tagalog, not a business suit. He branded
the testimony of Ms. Sandico as an absolute falsehood. He alleged that he would
not have done the act imputed to him, because the medical chart was the very
foundation of the civil case which he filed against St. Luke's and its doctors. He
wondered why the man, alleged to be his driver, to whom he supposedly gave
the detached pages of the medical chart, was neither held nor arrested. His
identity was not even established.
He likewise branded the testimony of Police Investigator Alabastro as a
fabrication for he had never seen him before.
He underscored the fact that none of the lawyers in the courthouse, nor any of
the court personnel, accosted him about the purloined pages of the medical
record and he alleged that the unidentified man remained in the courtroom even
after the confrontation in the Judge's chamber.
In evaluating the testimonies of the witnesses, Judge Bernad found the court
employee, Maria Arnie Sandico, and Acting branch Clerk of Court Avelina Robles
entirely credible and "without any noticeable guile nor attempt at fabrication,
remaining constant even under pressure of cross examination" (p. 11, Judge
Bernad's Report).
That the Acting Branch Clerk of Court, Mrs. Robles, who is not even a lawyer,
and her lowly clerk, Ms. Sandico, did not promptly raise a hue and cry on seeing
Grecia tear off two pages of the medical record, was understandable for they
hesitated to confront a man of his stature. Nevertheless, they had the presence
of mind to immediately report the matter to their Judge who forthwith took
appropriate steps to recover the exhibits. Robles, Sandico and PO3 Alabastro
had absolutely no motive to testify falsely against the respondent.
While Judge Capulong took the blame for failing to ascertain the identity of
Attorney Grecia's "driver," her swift action in summoning and confronting him
led to the recovery of the stolen pages of the medical chart.
Unfortunately, the inquiry made by Police Investigation Arnold Alabastro into
identity of the man was fruitless for he was never seen again.
Attorney Aves' allegation that it was St. Luke's counsel, Attorney Castro, not
Grecia, who stole the pages from the medical folder and slipped them to an
unidentified man, is an incredible fabrication. Not only is it directly contradicted
by Mrs. Robles and Ms. Sandico, but, significantly, Attorney Aves failed to
mention it during the confrontation with the man inside Judge Capulong's
chamber where he (Attorney Aves) was present.
His other allegation that he saw the man inside the courtroom afterwards, is not
credible for he would have called the attention of Judge Capulong who, he knew,
had been looking for the man to ascertain his identity.
In view of his obvious bias for his counsel, Aves' testimony was properly
disregarded by the investigator, Judge Bernad. Likewise wanting in truth and
candor was Grecia's testimony. Judge Bernad noted that while Grecia was
punctilious when testifying on the hour of his arrival in court (9:15 A.M.) on July
16, 1991, and he even remembered that on that day he wore a dark blue
barong tagalog (an apparel that has no pockets), his memory was not sharp
when he was cross-examined regarding more recent events. For instance, he
insisted that Judge Bernad was absent on August 4, 1992, but the truth is that
a hearing was held on that date as shown by the transcript.
When he was confronted with exhibits "A" and "B," Grecia tried to make an
issue of the absence of a court order to deposit Linda Aves' medical chart in
court. He forgot that it was he who asked that the chart be left with the clerk of
court.
His allegation that he would be the last person to remove pages 72 and 73 of
the medical chart for the entries therein are favorable to his client's cause is
specious. As a matter of fact, the entries show that after Mrs. Aves was
readmitted to the hospital on December 26, 1990, the doctors were able to
stabilize her blood pressure with a normal reading of 120/80.
On the basis of the evidence presented before Judge Bernad, the Court is
convinced that the charge against Attorney Benjamin M. Grecia is true. By
stealing two pages from Linda Aves' medical chart and passing them on to his
driver, he violated Rule 1.01, canon 1 of the Rules of Professional Responsibility
as well as canon 7 thereof which provide that:
Canon 1. . . .
Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral and
deceitful conduct.
Canon 7. A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is "like the court itself, an instrument or
agency to advance the ends of justice" (People ex rel Karlin vs. Culkin, 60 A.L.R.
851, 855). An incorrigible practitioner of "dirty tricks," like Grecia would be
ill-suited to discharge the role of "an instrument to advance the ends of justice."
The importance of integrity and good moral character as part of a lawyer's
equipment in the practice of his profession has been stressed by this Court
repeatedly.
. . . The bar should maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as of
honesty and fair dealing. Generally speaking, a lawyer can do honor to the legal
profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts
and to his clients. To this end, nothing should be done by any member of the
legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the
public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the profession. (Marcelo vs. Javier,
Sr., A.C. No. 3248, September 18, 1992, pp. 13-14.)
. . . . The nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that he shall be a
person of good moral character. This qualification is not only a condition
precedent to admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also
essential for remaining in the practice of law, in the exercise of privileges of
members of the Bar. Gross misconduct on the part of a lawyer, although not
related to the discharge of professional duties as a member of the bar, which
puts his moral character in serious doubt, renders him unfit to continue in the
practice of law. (Melendrez vs. Decena, 176 SCRA 662, 676.)
. . . public policy demands that legal work in representation of parties litigant
should be entrusted only to those possessing tested qualifications and who are
sworn to observe the rules and the ethics of the profession, a s well as being
subject for judicial disciplinary control for the protection of court, clients and the
public. (Phil. Association of Free Labor Unions [PAFLU] vs. Binalbagan Isabela
Sugar Company, 42 SCRA 302, 305.)
By descending to the level of a common thief, respondent Grecia has demeaned
and disgraced the legal profession. He has demonstrated his moral unfitness to
continue as a member of the honorable fraternity of lawyers. He has forfeited
his membership in the BAR.
Generally, a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct,
whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting
in moral character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to
continue as an officer of the court, or an unfit or unsafe person to enjoy the
privileges and to manage the business of others in the capacity of an attorney,
or for conduct which tends to bring reproach on the legal profession or to injure
it in the favorable opinion of the public. (Marcelo vs. Javier, Sr., A.C. No. 3248, Complainants claim that respondent, after Florencia’s death,
September 18, 1992, p. 15.)
never informed them that he was in possession of the Owner’s

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Attorney Benjamin Grecia guilty of grave Duplicate Copy of TCT No. 125017. As a result of such concealment,
misconduct, dishonesty, and grossly unethical behavior as a lawyer. Considering
that this is his second offense against the canons of the profession, the Court complainants executed an Affidavit of Loss of the document on the
resolved to impose upon him once more the supreme penalty of DISBARMENT. basis of which they filed a Verified Petition for the issuance of the
His license to practice law in the Philippines is hereby CANCELLED and the Bar
Confidant is ordered to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys.SO Owner’s Duplicate Copy before the RTC of Tarlac City. Respondent
ORDERED.
opposed the petition on the ground that he had the subject document
RE: REGIDOR R. in his possession allegedly because he bought part of the land from
TOLEDO,
RONALDO TOLEDO, AND Florencia. Thus, complainants withdrew the petition before the Tarlac
JOEFFREY TOLEDO* v. court.[4]
ATTY. JERRY
RADAM TOLEDO, RTC,
BRANCH Subsequently, respondent filed a petition for the settlement
259, PARAÑAQUE CITY.
of the intestate estate of Florencia before the RTC of Parañaque City,

Branch 260. He prayed therein that he be appointed as the

administrator of the estate. During the conferences to settle the case

A.M. No. P-07-2403 amicably, respondent proposed that he will give 7,681 sq. m. to
(formerly OCA IPI No.
07-2598-P) complainants, while 8,000 sq. m. will go to him and his

sisters. Complainants asked that they be given the bigger part instead
Present:
because there were more of them who will partition the property.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Respondent refused and said that complainants should be grateful for
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, the offer since the land had already been sold to him and his sisters.[5]
CORONA,**
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ. Complainants objected to the petition on the ground that the

Promulgated: alleged conveyances to respondent and his siblings were “very

questionable” and done without the knowledge and consent of

February 6, 2008
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- complainants who, except for Zenaida, have legitimes over the subject
---x estate.

RESOLUTION
They allege that the Deed of Sale presented by respondent
NACHURA, J.:
contains erasures. The Deed of Sale states that the date of the

consummation of the transaction is January 17, 2002 but Florencia’s

Before this Court is a Complaint[1] for violation of the lawyer’s
oath, violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, oppression,
dishonesty, harassment, and immorality against Atty. Jerry Radam
Toledo, Branch Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Branch
259, Parañaque City.
community tax certificate is dated July 18, 2002. On the later date
also, complainants allege, it was impossible for Florencia to have
obtained a CTC because she had been sick and was often in the
hospital during that period. They also question the fact that the Deed
of Sale was allegedly signed by the parties at complainants Regidor

and Zenaida’s house at Barangay Merville, Parañaque City, when

Complainants, all relatives of respondent, allege that the latter respondent has never been there.
is utilizing his profession as a lawyer and his position in the judiciary to

harass them and make them agree to an unequal distribution of the Complainants also point to a Sinumpaang
estate of the late Florencia R. Toledo.[2] Salaysay[6] executed by Florencia attesting to the fact that she was
made to sign by respondent’s father a document the contents of which
Florencia Toledo - mother of complainant Regidor, were unknown to her and that if any document she purportedly signed
mother-in-law of Zenaida, and grandmother of Ronaldo, Joeffrey, and conveying her remaining Tarlac property should be presented, the
respondent - was the registered owner of a parcel of land in Tarlac same is not true.
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 125017. She died

intestate on December 14, 2002.[3]

 On March 9, 2004, complainants filed a Petition for Annulment
of the Deed of Sale before the RTC of Parañaque City, Branch 257. The
case is still pending.[7]
On the other hand, on October 28, 2003, respondent filed a
criminal complaint for perjury against complainants Regidor, Ronaldo,
and Joeffrey, and another relative, Gladdys Toledo, before the
Prosecutor’s Office in Tarlac for having executed an Affidavit of Loss of
Owner’s Duplicate Copy of TCT No. T-125017. The case was
subsequently dismissed for lack of probable cause. Respondent’s
Motion for Reconsideration was denied. Respondent appealed the
same to the Department of Justice, with the endorsement of the
Regional State Prosecutor. Complainants filed their Comment
on January 5, 2005. At present, they no longer have any definite
information on the status of said appeal.[8]
Meanwhile, on November 28, 2003, respondent filed another
case against complainants Regidor and Zenaida, and yet another
relative, Cresencia Agduma, this time for violation of Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 651. The case arose when Florencia died and was to
be buried in San Clemente, Tarlac. Complainants had to secure her
death certificate, which they failed to obtain
in Parañaque City. Complainants sought advice from respondent, he
being the lawyer in the family, who advised them to get a permit from
the Local Civil Registrar in San Clemente. They followed his
advice. Because of this, a case for violation of PD No. 651 was filed
against the three.
On July 27, 2005, the 1st Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta.
Ignacia-Mayantoc-San Clemente-San Jose rendered its Decision
acquitting Regidor and Cresencia, but finding Zenaida guilty of violation
of PD No. 651 for signing the application for the death certificate.
Lastly, complainants accuse respondent of immorality. They
allege that they have personal knowledge of the fact that respondent is
living with his common-law wife, Normita, whom he allegedly treats as
a “maid servant.”[9] They further allege that during the hearings of
their cases, respondent was seen with a woman, not Normita, who was
always at his side, and they were very sweet to each other. They also
attribute his unruly and bullying behavior to his being a drunkard with a
fondness for the “night life.”[10]
The complainants filed the present petition praying that this
Court conduct a formal investigation of respondent’s actions and
impose on him the proper penalty which, they submit, should be the
dismissal of respondent from the service as Branch Clerk of Court.
In his Comment,[11] respondent calls the allegations “patently
malicious conjectures and surmises.”
He states that 15,000 of the 18,681 square meters of the San
Clemente property in dispute had already been sold by the decedent
herself. Further, what was left of the property, about 2,800 sq.m.,
had already been sold by complainants to several buyers. In fact, said
buyers are now occupying the land. To prevent further dissipation of
the estate, he was prompted to file a petition to settle the intestate
estate of Florencia.
He alleges that it is the complainants who have shown their
propensity for criminal activities as evidenced by their execution of an
Affidavit of Loss to obtain a second copy of TCT No. T-125017, and by
Zenaida’s declaration in Florencia’s death certificate that the latter died
in San Clemente, Tarlac. He also states that, contrary to
complainants’ assertion, the courts have painstakingly been trying to
have the parties amicably settle their cases.
As to the charges of immorality, he alleges that he has been
the sole breadwinner of their family, while Normita is in charge of the
household and taking care of their children. They have deferred their
“dream wedding” to give Normita the opportunity to advance her
career and to give way to the education of their children. In support of
this, he attached Normita’s Affidavit[12] where she states the
underlying reasons for their decision to remain unmarried, thus:
xxx
1. That I am the common-law wife of Jerry
R. Toledo by whom I have been blessed with three
(3) wonderful children;
2. That we have been happily living
together as a family at our home at the above given
address for twelve (12) years now and in the length
of time, we are extending to each other mutual love,
support, respect and understanding;
3. That taking into consideration the
financial burdens of having to provide quality and
efficient education for our children, Jerry and I have
decided to defer our dream wedding until it would
already be financially and economically feasible for
us to do so;
4. That I also wanted to postpone our
marriage to a later date as I have personal plans of
seeking employment abroad considering that I used
to work with an American computer manufacturer;
5. That it would be easier for me to land a
job abroad being single and considering further that
my father was a United States Army veteran and
also a former United States government employee
who used to work at the attached office of the
United States Embassy;
[6.] That we have already decided to have
our dream wedding (sic) when the time comes that
the financial constraints of providing for our
children’s quality education and support would have
already lessened and have save (sic) enough money
to do so;
 personnel who work thereat from
the judge to the lowest of its
He denies that he uttered malicious words to personnel. Court employees are
complainants. He also denies being a drunkard but admits to being a enjoined to adhere to the
exacting standards of morality
“moderate drinker.” He alleges that the complaint was filed merely to and decency in their professional
harass, malign, and annoy him, and to pressure him to accede to their and private conduct in order to
preserve the good name and
demands. integrity of the courts of
justice. The conduct of court
personnel must be free from any
Upon evaluation of the records of this case, the OCA whiff of impropriety, not only with
submitted the following recommendations: respect to their duties in the
judicial branch, but also to their
Complainants’ charges against the behavior outside the court as
respondent and the latter’s countercharges stem private individuals. There is no
from their dispute over the property left by their dichotomy of morality; a court
deceased relative, Florencia R. Toledo. In fact, an employee is also judged by his or
intestate proceeding to settle the estate of the above her private morals. (Court
named deceased among the complainants and the Employees of the Municipal
respondent has been filed in the RTC, Branch Circuit Trial Court, Ramon
260, Parañaque City. Respondent’s claim that he Magsaysay, Zamboanga del Sur
had bought a portion of the land left by the deceased vs. Earla C. Sy, A.M. No.
Florencia R. Toledo, which is the basis of his claim in P-93-808, November 25,
the intestate proceeding, is challenged by the 2005; Gamboa vs. Gamboa, A.M.
complainants who have filed an action to annul the No. P-04-1836, July 30, 2004,
alleged sale. There is also the perjury case against 435 SCRA 436).[”]
the complainants for their execution of an Affidavit of
Loss of Owner’s Duplicate Copy of TCT No. 125017. By living with a woman and begetting
children with her without the benefit of marriage,
The pendency of the aforesaid cases the respondent has breached the standards of
render[s] the charges hurled against respondent morality and uprightness expected from a court
Atty. Toledo beyond the ambit of administrative employee. The judiciary cannot afford to keep in its
inquiry. The issues raised involve judicial matters ranks one whose sense of propriety is highly
which should be addressed by the courts where they questionable. The respondent herein has to choose
are pending. between giving up his public position and legalizing
his relationship with the mother of his children by
Anent the charge of immorality ascribed to the bond of matrimony. He cannot at the same
respondent for maintaining a common-law wife, time stay in the service of the judiciary and maintain
although both respondent and his partner Normita an illicit relation with a woman who is not his wife.
are single, and do not appear to be suffering from
any impediment to marry, it is worth to note, RECOMMENDATION: We respectfully
however, that this arrangement was sought by them submit for the consideration of the Honorable Court
in order not to prejudice Normita’s employment our recommendation:
opportunities abroad, as stated in the latter’s
affidavit. (Annex “4”). In effect, the sacred institution 1) That the charges
of marriage was sacrificed for the “American of Violation of Attorney’s
Dream[,]” and this shows a personality that is Oath, Code of
unprincipled and undesirable. It is for this reason, Professional
not the relationship per se, that we fault him for Responsibility,
perpetuating such kind of love affair. While we are Oppression, Dishonesty
not in a position to dictate what his life agenda and Harassment against
should be, we can certainly prescribe the character Atty. Jerry Radam
of the personnel to man the frontlines in the Toledo of RTC, branch
dispensation of justice. As it is oft-repeated, a public 259, Parañaque City
office is a public trust and the conduct and behavior be DISMISSED for
of all those involved in the administration of justice – being premature;
from the presiding judge to the lowliest utility worker
– should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of 2) That respondent
responsibility, accountability, integrity, uprightness[,] Atty. Jerry Radam
and honesty (Violeta R. Villanueva vs. Armando T. Toledo
Milan, A.M. No. P-02-1642, September 27, be SUSPENDED for a
2002). As oft-stated by this Court: period of three (3)
months for conduct
“It must be stressed that unbecoming a public
while every office in the official and a court
government is a public trust, no employee; and
position exacts a greater demand
for moral righteousness and 3) That after serving
uprightness from an individual his suspension,
than in the judiciary. Indeed, the respondent Atty. Toledo
image of a court of justice is be given thirty (30) days
mirrored in the conduct of the to either marry his
 mistress (sic) and mother
unprincipled as to warrant disbarment or disciplinary action against a
of his children or resign
his position in the member of the Bar.[19]
judiciary. If he opts for
the former, he should
submit to the court a Based on the allegations in the Complaint and in respondent’s
certified xerox copy of his
marriage contract.[13] Comment, we cannot conclude that his act of cohabiting with a woman

and begetting children by her without the benefit of marriage falls

within the category of “grossly immoral conduct.”

We find the OCA’s report and recommendation partly

meritorious.
It is not unwarranted for us to take judicial notice of the fact

that more and more Filipinos are finding it necessary to seek

We agree with the OCA that the charges and counter-charges
employment abroad in order to provide their loved ones with better
pertaining to the sale and partition of the property or properties of
lives. We find nothing “unprincipled and undesirable” with seeking all
Florencia’s estate would best be ventilated in the cases already pending
means – within the bounds of law and reason – to uplift the lot of one’s
in the trial courts. Whether respondent’s claims are meritorious or
family. It is not for us to inquire into our personnel’s motivations for
frivolous will be determined after judgment on the merits has been
entering into such an arrangement or to judge how they plan to
rendered in each case.
accomplish their goals in life, unless it is shown that they are violating

the law in the process.

However, as to the charge of immorality, we find the OCA’s

recommendations untenable.
While the Court has the power to regulate official conduct

and, to a certain extent, private conduct, it is not within our authority

This Court has previously defined immoral conduct as “that
to make, for our employees, decisions about their personal lives,
conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a
especially those that will so affect their and their family’s future, such
moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members
as whether they should or should not be married.
of the community.”[14]

There is no allegation that the two have been flaunting their

This Court has held that to justify suspension or disbarment
status as common-law husband and wife, or that their cohabitation is
the act complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly
attended by scandalous circumstances. Thus, the comportment of
immoral[15] and the same must be established by clear and convincing
respondent and his common-law wife cannot be characterized as
proof, disclosing a case that is free from doubt as to compel the
“willful, flagrant, shameless, or show[ing] a moral indifference to the
exercise by the Court of its disciplinary power. Likewise, the dubious
opinion of the good and respectable members of the community” as to
character of the act done as well as the motivation thereof must be
warrant the exercise of this Court’s disciplinary power.
clearly demonstrated.[16]

However, we take this occasion to remind the respondent of

Thus, to warrant disciplinary action, we must examine if
the high standards of conduct imposed upon lawyers in the
respondent’s relationship with his common-law wife qualifies as
judiciary. Lawyers in the government service are under an even
“grossly immoral conduct.”
greater obligation to observe the basic tenets of the legal profession

because public office is a public trust.[20] They should be more

In disbarment cases, this Court has ruled that the mere fact of
circumspect in their adherence to their professional obligations under
sexual relations between two unmarried adults is not sufficient to
the Code of Professional Responsibility, for their disreputable conduct
warrant administrative sanction for such illicit behavior.[17] Whether a
is more likely to be magnified in the public eye.[21]
lawyer’s sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the

benefit of marriage should be characterized as “grossly immoral

A clerk of court in particular, as an essential and ranking
conduct” will depend on the surrounding circumstances.[18]
officer of our judicial system who performs delicate administrative

functions vital to the prompt and proper administration of justice, must

This Court has further ruled that intimacy between a man and
be free from any form of impropriety. The conduct of court personnel
a woman who are not married, where both suffer from no impediment
must be free from any whiff of impropriety or scandal, not only with
to marry, voluntarily carried on and devoid of any deceit on the part of
respect to their duties in the judicial branch but also to their behavior
respondent, is neither so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act nor so

outside the court as private individuals; it is in this way that the
integrity and the good name of the courts of justice shall be
preserved.[22]
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the
complaint against Atty. Jerry Radam Toledo is DISMISSED. However,
he is REMINDED to be more circumspect in his public and private
dealings. Costs against complainants.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. P-11-2922 April 4, 2011
(formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 03-1778-P)
MARY JANE ABANAG, Complainant,
vs.
NICOLAS B. MABUTE, Court Stenographer I, Municipal Circuit
Trial Court (MCTC), Paranas, Samar,Respondent.
D E CI S I O N
BRION, J.:
We resolve the administrative case against Nicolas B. Mabute
(respondent), Court Stenographer I in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC) of Paranas, Samar, filed by Mary Jane Abanag (complainant)
for Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct.
In her verified letter-complaint dated September 19, 2003, the
complainant, a 23-year old unmarried woman, alleged that respondent
courted her and professed his undying love for her. Relying on
respondent’s promise that he would marry her, she agreed to live with
him. She became pregnant, but after several months into her
pregnancy, respondent brought her to a "manghihilot" and tried to
force her to take drugs to abort her baby. When she did not agree, the
respondent turned cold and eventually abandoned her. She became
depressed resulting in the loss of her baby. She also stopped schooling
because of the humiliation that she suffered.
In his comment on the complaint submitted to the Office of the Court
Administrator, the respondent vehemently denied the complainant’s
allegations and claimed that the charges against him were baseless,
false and fabricated, and were intended to harass him and destroy his
reputation. He further averred that Norma Tordesillas, the
complainant’s co-employee, was using the complaint to harass him.
Tordesillas resented him because he had chastised her for her
arrogant behavior and undesirable work attitude. He believes that the
complainant’s letter-complaint, which was written in the vernacular,
was prepared by Tordesillas who is from Manila and fluent in Tagalog;
the respondent would have used the "waray" or English language if
she had written the letter-complaint.
The complainant filed a Reply, insisting that she herself wrote the
letter-complaint. She belied the respondent’s claim that she was being
used by Tordesillas who wanted to get even with him.
In a Resolution dated July 29, 2005, the Court referred the
letter-complaint to then Acting Executive Judge Carmelita T. Cuares of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Catbalogan City, Samar for
investigation, report and recommendation.
The respondent sought Judge Cuares’ inhibition from the case, alleging
that the Judge was partial and had bias in favor of the complainant;
the complainant herself had bragged that she personally knew Judge
Cuares. The Court designated Judge Esteban V. dela Peña, who
succeeded Judge Cuares as Acting Executive Judge, to continue with
the investigation of the case.1 Eventually, Judge Agerico A. Avila took
over the investigation when he was designated the Executive Judge of
the RTC of Catbalogan City, Samar.
In his Report/Recommendation dated June 7, 2010,2 Executive Judge
Avila reported on the developments in the hearing of the case. The
complainant testified that she met the respondent while she was a
member of the Singles for Christ. They became acquainted and they
started dating. The relationship blossomed until they lived together in
a rented room near the respondent’s office.
The respondent, for his part, confirmed that he met the complainant
when he joined the Singles for Christ. He described their liaison as a
dating relationship. He admitted that the complainant would join him
at his rented room three to four times a week; when the complainant
became pregnant, he asked her to stay and live with him. He
vehemently denied having brought the complainant to a local
"manghihilot" and that he had tried to force her to abort her baby. He
surmised that the complainant’s miscarriage could be related to her
epileptic attacks during her pregnancy. The respondent further
testified that the complainant’s mother did not approve of him, but the
complainant defied her mother and lived with him. He proposed
marriage to the complainant, but her mother did not like him as a
son-in-law and ordered the complainant to return home. The
complainant obeyed her mother. They have separated ways since then,
but he pledged his undying love for the complainant.
The Investigating Judge recommends the dismissal of the complaint
against the respondent, reporting that:
Normally the personal affair of a court employee who is a bachelor and
has maintained an amorous relation with a woman equally unmarried
has nothing to do with his public employment. The sexual liaison is
between two consenting adults and the consequent pregnancy is but a
natural effect of the physical intimacy. Mary Jane was not forced to live
with Nicolas nor was she impelled by some devious means or
machination. The fact was, she freely acceded to cohabit with him.
The situation may-not-be-so-ideal but it does not give cause for
administrative sanction. There appears no law which penalizes or
prescribes the sexual activity of two unmarried persons. So, the
accusation of Mary Jane that Nicolas initiated the abortion was
calculated to bring the act within the ambit of an immoral, disgraceful
and gross misconduct. Except however as to the self-serving assertion
that Mary Jane was brought to a local midwife and forced to take the
abortifacient, there was no other evidence to support that it was in fact
so. All pointed to a harmonious relation that turned sour. In no small
way Mary Jane was also responsible of what befell upon her. 3
The Court defined immoral conduct as conduct that is willful, flagrant
or shameless, and that shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the
good and respectable members of the community.4 To justify
suspension or disbarment, the act complained of must not only be
immoral, but grossly immoral.5 A grossly immoral act is one that is so
corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or an act so
unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree.6
Based on the allegations of the complaint, the respondent’s comment,
and the findings of the Investigating Judge, we find that the acts
complained of cannot be considered as disgraceful or grossly immoral
conduct.
We find it evident that the sexual relations between the complainant
and the respondent were consensual.lawphi1 They met at the Singles
for Christ, started dating and subsequently became sweethearts. The
respondent frequently visited the complainant at her boarding house
and also at her parents’ residence. The complainant voluntarily yielded
to the respondent and they eventually lived together as husband and
wife in a rented room near the respondent’s office. They continued
their relationship even after the complainant had suffered a
miscarriage.
Mere sexual relations between two unmmaried and consenting adults
are not enough to warrant administrative sanction for illicit
behavior.7 The Court has repeatedly held that voluntary intimacy
between a man and a woman who are not married, where both are not
under any impediment to marry and where no deceit exists, is neither a
criminal nor an unprincipled act that would warrant disbarment or
disciplinary action.81avvphi1
While the Court has the power to regulate official conduct and, to a
certain extent, private conduct, it is not within our authority to decide
on matters touching on employees’ personal lives, especially those that
will affect their and their family’s future. We cannot intrude into the
question of whether they should or should not marry.9 However, we
take this occasion to remind judiciary employees to be more
circumspect in their adherence to their obligations under the Code of
Professional Responsibility. The conduct of court personnel must be
free from any taint of impropriety or scandal, not only with respect to
their official duties but also in their behavior outside the Court as
private individuals. This is the best way to preserve and protect the
integrity and the good name of our courts.10
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to DISMISS the present administrative
complaint against Nicolas B. Mabute, Stenographer 1 of the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, Paranas, Samar, for lack of merit. No costs.SO
ORDERED.
SBC Case No. 519 July 31, 1997
PATRICIA FIGUEROA, complainant,
vs.
SIMEON BARRANCO, JR., respondent.
RESOLUTION
ROMERO, J.:
In a complaint made way back in 1971, Patricia Figueroa petitioned
that respondent Simeon Barranco, Jr. be denied admission to the legal
profession. Respondent had passed the 1970 bar examinations on the
fourth attempt, after unsuccessful attempts in 1966, 1967 and 1968.
Before be could take his oath, however, complainant filed the instant
petition averring that respondent and she had been sweethearts, that a
child out of wedlock was born to them and that respondent did not
fulfill his repeated promises to many her.
The facts were manifested in hearings held before Investigator Victor F.
Sevilla in June and July 1971. Respondent and complainant were
townmates in Janiuay, Iloilo. Since 1953, when they were both in their
teens, they were steadies. Respondent even acted as escort to
complainant when she reigned as Queen at the 1953 town fiesta.
Complainant first acceded to sexual congress with respondent
sometime in 1960. Their intimacy yielded a son, Rafael Barranco, born
on December 11, 1964.1 It was after the child was born, complainant
alleged, that respondent first promised he would marry her after he
passes the bar examinations. Their relationship continued and
respondent allegedly made more than twenty or thirty promises of
marriage. He gave only P10.00 for the child on the latter's birthdays.
Her trust in him and their relationship ended in 1971, when she
learned that respondent married another woman. Hence, this petition.
Upon complainant's motion, the Court authorized the taking of
testimonies of witnesses by deposition in 1972. On February 18, 1974,
respondent filed a Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss the case
citing complainant's failure to comment on the motion of Judge Cuello
seeking to be relieved from the duty to take aforesaid testimonies by
deposition. Complainant filed her comment required and that she
remains interested in the resolution of the present case. On June 18,
1974, the Court denied respondent's motion to dismiss.
On October 2, 1980, the Court once again denied a motion to dismiss
on the ground of abandonment filed by respondent on September 17,
1979.2 Respondent's third motion to dismiss was noted in the Court's
Resolution dated September 15, 1982.3 In 1988, respondent repeated
his request, citing his election as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan
of Janiuay, Iloilo from 1980-1986, his active participation in civic
organizations and good standing in the community as well as the
length of time this case has been pending as reasons to allow him to
take his oath as a lawyer.4
On September 29, 1988, the Court resolved to dismiss the complaint
for failure of complainant to prosecute the case for an unreasonable
period of time and to allow Simeon Barranco, Jr. to take the lawyer's
oath upon payment of the required fees.5
Respondent's hopes were again dashed on November 17, 1988 when
the Court, in response to complainant's opposition, resolved to cancel
his scheduled oath-taking. On June 1, 1993, the Court referred the
case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation.
The IBP's report dated May 17, 1997 recommended the dismissal of
the case and that respondent be allowed to take the lawyer's oath.
We agree.
Respondent was prevented from taking the lawyer's oath in 1971
because of the charge of gross immorality made by complainant. To
recapitulate, respondent bore an illegitimate child with his sweetheart,
Patricia Figueroa, who also claims that he did not fulfill his promise to
marry her after he passes the bar examinations.
We find that these facts do not constitute gross immorality warranting
the permanent exclusion of respondent from the legal profession. His
engaging in premarital sexual relations with complainant and promises
to marry suggests a doubtful moral character on his part but the same
does not constitute grossly immoral conduct. The Court has held that
to justify suspension or disbarment the act complained of must not
only be immoral, but grossly immoral. "A grossly immoral act is one
that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so
unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree." 6 It
is a willful, flagrant, or shameless act which shows a moral indifference
to the opinion of respectable members of the community.7
We find the ruling in Arciga v. Maniwang8 quite relevant because mere
intimacy between a man and a woman, both of whom possess no
impediment to marry, voluntarily carried on and devoid of any deceit
on the part of respondent, is neither so corrupt nor so unprincipled as
to warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanction against him, even if
as a result of such relationship a child was born out of wedlock.9
Respondent and complainant were sweethearts whose sexual relations VICTORIANO P. RESURRECCION, complainant,
were evidently consensual. We do not find complainant's assertions vs.
that she had been forced into sexual intercourse, credible. She ATTY. CIRIACO C. SAYSON, respondent.
continued to see and be respondent's girlfriend even after she had
given birth to a son in 1964 and until 1971. All those years of amicable
and intimate relations refute her allegations that she was forced to
have sexual congress with him. Complainant was then an adult who
PER CURIAM:
voluntarily and actively pursued their relationship and was not an
innocent young girl who could be easily led astray. Unfortunately,
To say that lawyers must at all times uphold and respect the law is to
respondent chose to marry and settle permanently with another
state the obvious, but such statement can never be overemphasized.
woman. We cannot castigate a man for seeking out the partner of his
Considering that, "of all classes and professions, [lawyers are] most
dreams, for marriage is a sacred and perpetual bond which should be
sacredly bound to uphold the law, 1 it is imperative that they live by
entered into because of love, not for any other reason.
the law. Accordingly, lawyers who violate their oath and engage in
deceitful conduct have no place in the legal profession.
We cannot help viewing the instant complaint as an act of revenge of a
woman scorned, bitter and unforgiving to the end. It is also intended to
In a Complaint-Affidavit, Victoriano P. Resurreccion charged
make respondent suffer severely and it seems, perpetually, sacrificing
Respondent Atty. Ciriaco C. Sayson with acts constituting "malpractice,
the profession he worked very hard to be admitted into. Even assuming
deceit and gross misconduct in his office and a violation of his duties
that his past indiscretions are ignoble, the twenty-six years that
and oath as a lawyer." The Complaint arose from a homicide through
respondent has been prevented from being a lawyer constitute
reckless imprudence case, in which Complaint Resurreccion was the
sufficient punishment therefor. During this time there appears to be no
defendant and Respondent Sayson was the counsel for the offended
other indiscretion attributed to him.10 Respondent, who is now
party, Mr. Armando Basto Sr. The complaint alleged that, pursuant to
sixty-two years of age, should thus be allowed, albeit belatedly, to take
the amicable settlement previously reached by the parties, he gave
the lawyer's oath.
P2,500 to the respondent who, however, never gave the money to his
client. Thus, the complainant was compelled to give another P2,500 to
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Respondent
Mr. Basto as settlement of the case. The complainant then demanded
Simeon Barranco, Jr. is ALLOWED to take his oath as a lawyer upon
the return of the money from respondent, to no avail. Thus, the
payment of the proper fees.
Complaint for Disbarment.

SO ORDERED.
The records show that the Office of the Solicitor Genaral (OSG)
conducted several hearings on the matter, during which the
complainant was represented by Atty. Ronaldo Lopez. Although
respondent had been notified, he failed to attend a number of such
hearings. He eventually appeared through his new counsel, Atty.
Wenceslao Fajardo. Because respondent once again failed to attend
the next hearing, the OSG, in its September 4, 1973 Order,2deemed
the investigation of the case terminated. But upon the motion of the
respondent, the OSG on October 31, 1973, set aside its earlier Order
and once again set the case for a hearing of the former's evidence.
Since, then, however, it appears that the OSG has not been able to
submit its report and recommendation on the case.

In 1990, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) took cognizance of

the case,3 and tasked Commissioner Jesulito A. Manalo with the
investigation, of which both the complainant and the respondent were
duly notified. Complainant Resurreccion manifested his assent to the
pursuit of the matter, but Respondent Sayson could not be found.4 In
his Report, Commissioner Manalo presented the following facts.

Respondent, a member of the Philippine Bar was accused of having

converted and appropriated [for] his own personal benefit the amount
P2,500.00 representing the amount which was delivered by the
complainant to the respondent as compensation or settlement money
of a case for homicide thru reckless imprudence.

xxx xxx xxx

Complainat alleged that on 13 May 1970, he was involved in a

vehicular accident which occured at Epifanio delos Santos Avenue,
Quezon City which involved a boy [named] the name of Armando
Basto resulting [in] the death of the latter. By reason of the said
incident, complainant was accused of homicide thru reckless
imprudence before the City Fiscal's Office at Quezon City. In the
preliminary investigation, the father of the victim Mr. Armando Basto
Sr., was represented by Atty. Ramon Umali. The case for homicide thru
reckless imprudence was amicably settled on 8 August 1970 and
respondent received from the complainant the amount of P2,500.00.
Respondent allegedlly assured complainant that the sum [would] be
delivered to his client Mr. Armando Basto, Sr. Respondent
acknowledged in writing having received the amount of P2,500.00.

A.C. No. 1037 December 14, 1998

Contrary however, to the assurances of the respondent, he had not
delivered the said amount of P2,500.00 and the case was not dismissed
for which reason complainant was compelled to pay anew the heirs of
the victim the amount P2,500.00. Demands were made for the
respondent to return the said amount of P2,500.00 but the latter failed.
By reason thereof, complaint filed a complaint for estafa against the
respondent before the City Court of Quezon City which was docketed as
Criminal Case No. III-149358 entitled "People of the Philippines vs.
Ciriaco C. Sayson".
In the hearing held on 22 May 1973, complainant Victoriano P.
Resurrection appeared assisted by his counsel. There was however, no
appearance for the respondent Ciriaco C. Sayson. The investigator
declared his failure to appear as a waiver of his presence and Mr.
Armando Basto Sr. was presented as witness. He testified that he [was]
the father of Armando Basto Jr. who was ran over by a motor vehicle
then driven by the respondent. By reason of such death a case was
filed in court and he was represented by Atty. Ciriaco Sayson,
respondent in this case. A settlement arrangement was arrived at and
complainant entrusted the amount of P2,500.00 to the respondent for
the latter to turn over the same to his client. Atty. Ciriaco Sayson,
however, failed to turn over the said amount of P2,500.00 to his client
for which reason the case was not immediately dismissed. To effect
dismissal of the case, complainant was forced to pay anew the sum of
P2,500.00
Complainant was next presented as witness and the testified that on 30
May 1970, he was involved in a vehicular accident which resulted in the
death of one armando Basto, Jr. By reason thereof, he was accused of
homicide thru reckless imprudence [,] and to effect settlement of that
case he agreed to pay the amount of P2,500.00.
On 8 August 1970, complainant together with his counsel conferred
with [the] respondent in the latter's office at may Building, Rizal
Avenue, Manila and in a conference, a settlement was arrived at
whereby complainant [would] pay the amount of P2,500.00. This was
done and payment was delivered to the respondent who acknowledged
having received the said amount.
Subsequently, complaint learned that the said amount of P2,500,00
was not delivered by respondent to Mr. Armando Basto, Sr., the father
of the victim for which reason he was compelled to pay another amount
of P2,500.00 to the heirs of the victim.
Thereafter, he demanded [the] return of the said amount of P2,500.00
from the respondent. Despite visiting the latter fifteen or sixteen times,
Atty. Ciriaco C. Sayson still failed to return the money. Thus,
complainant filed a complaint for estafa which was elevated in Court
and docketed as Criminal Case No. 49358.
A Decision finding respondent guilty of [the] crime of estafa was
promulgated by the City Court of Quezon City.5
Commissioner Manalo then rendered his evaluation and
recommendation in this wise:
Complainant was able to establish by more than convincing that the
misappropriation was in fact committed by the respondent. This fact [is]
eloquently poroven by Exhibits "A" to "E", all of which were not
controverted by the respondent.
xxx xxx xxx
In view of the foregoing, undersigned Commissioner respectfully
recommends that the above-entitled case be endorsed by the
Honorable Board Governors to the Supreme Court with the
recommendation that the complain[ant be] disbarred and his name be
stricken off . . . the roll of attorneys.
xxx xxx x x x6
On February 28, 1998, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution
adopting and approving the report and recommendation of
Commissioner Manalo. The Resolution, signed by IBP National
Secretary Roland B. Inting and forwarded to this Court on March 28,
1998, is worded as follows:
RESOLUTION NO. XIII-97-202
Adm. Case No. 1037
Victoriano P. Resurreccion vs.
Atty. Ciriaco C. sayson
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED AND
APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution/Decision as Annex "A" and finding the recommendation
fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules, respondent Atty. Ciriaco C. Sayson is DISBARRED and . . . his
name . . . stricken from the Roll of Attorneys for having been found
guilty of Estafa promulgated by the City Court of Quezon City and
[which] complainant was able to establish by more convincing
evidences that misappropriation was in fact committed by the
respondent, all of which were not controverted by the respondent.7
The Court agrees with Commissioner Manalo's findings and conclusion,
as approved and adopted by the IBP Board of Governors. Atty. Ciriaco
C. Sayson must be disbarred.
Respondent Sayson was convicted of estafa by the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City on September 20, 1973.8Such conviction was affirmed
by the Court of Appeals9 and upheld by this Court. 10
In In re Vinzon,11 the Court disbarred a lawyer who had been
convicted of estafa and held that "moral turpitude includes everything
which is done contrary to justice, honesty or good morals. In essence
and in all respects, estafa, no doubt, is a crime involving moral
turpitude because the act is unquestionably against justice, honesty
and good morals.
In a more recent case,12 the Court upheld the recommendation of the
IBP Board of Governors to disbar a lawyer who had been convicted of
estafa through falsification of public documents, because the was
"totally unfit to be a member of the legal profession." In adopting, the
recommendation, we held that "good moral character is not only a
condition precedent to admission to the legal profession, but it must
also remain extant in order to maintain one's good standing in that
exclusive and honored fraternity.
True, the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and
only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing
and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and member of
the bar.13 Disbarment should never be decreed where any lesser
penalty, such as temporary suspension, would accomplish the end
desired.14 However, in the present case, the Court notes that even if
respondent's culpability for estafa has been indubitably established,
there is no indication that he has served sentence, returned to
complainant what was due him or showed any remorse for what he did.
The 27-year delay in the resolution of this case was, to a large extent,
caused by his failure to appear before the Office of the Solicitor
General and to inform the IBP of his change of address, a failure that
also indicated his lack of regard for the very serious charges brought
against him. Respondent Sayson, by his conduct, has shown that he is
not worthy to remain a member of the bar.
Law is a noble profession, and the privilege to practice it is bestowed
only upon individuals who are competent intellectually, academically
and, equally important, morally. Because they are vanguards of the
law and the legal system, lawyers must at all times conduct
themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients and the public
at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach.

WHEREFORE, Respondent Ciriaco C. Sayson is hereby DISBARRED.

The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out his name from the Roll of
Attorneys.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 6486 September 22, 2004

EMMA T. DANTES, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. CRISPIN G. DANTES, respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Despite variations in the specific standards and provisions, one

requirement remains constant in all the jurisdictions where the practice
of law is regulated: the candidate must demonstrate that he or she has
"good moral character," and once he becomes a lawyer he should
always behave in accordance with the standard. In this jurisdiction too,
good moral character is not only a condition precedent1 to the practice
of law, but an unending requirement for all the members of the bar.
Hence, when a lawyer is found guilty of grossly immoral conduct, he
may be suspended or disbarred.2

In an Affidavit-Complaint3 dated June 6, 2001, filed with the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Emma T. Dantes, sought the
disbarment of her husband, Atty. Crispin G. Dantes on the ground of
immorality, abandonment, and violation of professional ethics and law.
The case was docketed as CBD Case No. 01-851.

Complainant alleged that respondent is a philanderer. Respondent

purportedly engaged in illicit relationships with two women, one after
the other, and had illegitimate children with them. From the time
respondent’s illicit affairs started, he failed to give regular support to
complainant and their children, thus forcing complainant to work
abroad to provide for their children’s needs. Complainant pointed out
that these acts of respondent constitute a violation of his lawyer’s oath
and his moral and legal obligation to be a role model to the
community.

On July 4, 2001, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline issued

an Order4 requiring respondent to submit his answer to
the Affidavit-Complaint.

Respondent submitted his Answer5 on November 19, 2001. Though

admitting the fact of marriage with the complainant and the birth of
their children, respondent alleged that they have mutually agreed to
separate eighteen (18) years before after complainant had abandoned
him in their Balintawak residence and fled to San Fernando, Pampanga.
Respondent claimed that when complainant returned after eighteen
years, she insisted that she be accommodated in the place where he
and their children were residing. Thus, he was forced to live alone in a
rented apartment.

Respondent further alleged that he sent their children to the best

school he could afford and provided for their needs. He even bought
two lots in Pampanga for his sons, Dandelo and Dante, and gave
complainant adequate financial support even after she had abandoned
him in 1983.
Respondent asserted that complainant filed this case in order to force
him to remit seventy percent (70%) of his monthly salary to her.
Subsequently, the IBP conducted its investigation and hearings on the
complaint. Complainant presented her evidence, both oral and
documentary,6 to support the allegations in her Affidavit-Complaint.
From the evidence presented by the complainant, it was established
that on January 19, 1979, complainant and respondent were
married7 and lived with the latter’s mother in Balintawak. At that time,
respondent was just a fourth year law student. To make ends meet,
complainant engaged in the buy and sell business and relied on
dole-outs from the respondent’s mother.
Three children were born to the couple, namely, Dandelo, Dante and
Daisy, who were born on February 20, 1980, 8October 14, 19819 and
August 11, 1983,10 respectively. Complainant narrated that their
relationship was marred by frequent quarrels because of respondent’s
extra-marital affairs.11 Sometime in 1983, she brought their children to
her mother in Pampanga to enable her to work because respondent
had failed to provide adequate support. From 1986 to 2001,
complainant worked abroad as a domestic helper.
Denying that there was a mutual agreement between her and
respondent to live separately, complainant asseverated that she was
just compelled to work abroad to support their children. When she
returned to the Philippines, she learned that respondent was living with
another woman. Respondent, then bluntly told her, that he did not
want to live with her anymore and that he preferred his mistresses.
Complainant presented documentary evidence consisting of the birth
certificates of Ray Darwin, Darling, and Christian Dave, 12 all surnamed
Dantes, and the affidavits of respondent and his paramour13 to prove
the fact that respondent sired three illegitimate children out of his illicit
affairs with two different women. Letters of complainant’s legitimate
children likewise support the allegation that respondent is a
womanizer.14
In an Order dated April 17, 2002, respondent was deemed to have
waived his right to cross-examine complainant, after he failed to
appear during the scheduled hearings despite due notice. He, however,
submitted his Comment/Opposition to the Complainant’s Formal Offer
of Evidence with Motion to Exclude the Evidence from the Records of
the Proceedings15 on August 1, 2002.
Subsequently, on May 29, 2003, respondent submitted a Motion to
Adopt Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanism. Respondent’s motion
was denied because it was filed after the complainant had already
presented her evidence.16 Respondent was given a final chance to
present his evidence on July 11, 2003. Instead of presenting evidence,
respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Dismiss,
which was likewise denied for being a prohibited pleading under the
Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline. Respondent
submitted his Position Paper on August 4, 2003.
In respondent’s Position Paper,17 he reiterated the allegations in
his Answer except that this time, he argued that in view of the
resolution of the complaint for support with alimony pendente
lite18 filed against him by the complainantbefore the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City,19 the instant administrative case should be
dismissed for lack of merit.
On July 7, 2004, the IBP submitted to us through the Office of the Bar
Confidant its Report20 and Resolution No. XVI-2004-230 involving CBD
Case No. 01-851.21 The IBP recommended that the respondent be
suspended indefinitely from the practice of law.
Except for the penalty, we find the above recommendation well-taken.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
"Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct."
"Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of
the legal profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar."
"Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public
or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the
legal profession."
The Code of Professional Responsibility forbids lawyers from engaging
in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Immoral conduct
has been defined as that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or
shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and
respectable members of the community.22 To be the basis of
disciplinary action, the lawyer’s conduct must not only be immoral, but
grossly immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt as to constitute a
criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high
degree23 or committed under such scandalous or revolting
circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.24
In Barrientos vs. Daarol,25 we ruled that as officers of the court,
lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also
be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance
with the highest moral standards of the community. More specifically,
a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to
refrain from adulterous relationships or keeping mistresses but must
also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating
the belief that he is flouting those moral standards. If the practice of
law is to remain an honorable profession and attain its basic ideals,
those enrolled in its ranks should not only master its tenets and
principles but should also, in their lives, accord continuing fidelity to
them. The requirement of good moral character is of much greater
import, as far as the general public is concerned, than the possession
of legal learning.
It should be noted that the requirement of good moral character has
three ostensible purposes, namely: (i) to protect the public; (ii) to
protect the public image of lawyers; and (iii) to protect prospective
clients. A writer added a fourth: to protect errant lawyers from
themselves.26
Lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not only upon
admission to the Bar but also throughout their legal
career, in order to maintain their good standing in this exclusive and
honored fraternity.27 They may be suspended from the practice of law
or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his private
activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character,
honesty, probity or good demeanor.28
Undoubtedly, respondent’s acts of engaging in illicit relationships with
two different women during the subsistence of his marriage to the
complainant constitutes grossly immoral conduct warranting the
imposition appropriate sanctions. Complainant’s testimony, taken in
conjunction with the documentary evidence, sufficiently established
respondent’s commission of marital infidelity and immorality. Evidently,
respondent had breached the high and exacting moral standards set
for members of the law profession. He has made a mockery of
marriage which is a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity.29
In Toledo vs. Toledo,30 we disbarred respondent for abandoning his
lawful wife and cohabiting with another woman who had borne him a
child. Likewise, in Obusan vs. Obusan,31 we ruled that abandoning
one’s wife and resuming carnal relations with a paramour fall within
that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows
moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members
of the community.

We reiterate our ruling in Cordova vs. Cordova,32 that moral

delinquency which affects the fitness of a member of the bar to
continue as such, includes conduct that outrages the generally
accepted moral standards of the community as exemplified by behavior
which makes a mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage.

The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and only in a
clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and
character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member of
the bar.33 Where a lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, could
accomplish the end desired, disbarment should never be
decreed.34 However, in the present case, the seriousness of the offense
compels the Court to wield its power to disbar as it appears to be the
most appropriate penalty.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing Atty. Crispin G. Dantes is

hereby DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from
the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the
respondent’s record as a member of the Bar, and notice of the same be
served on the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation

to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 7399 August 25, 2009

ANTERO J. POBRE, Complainant,

vs.
Sen. MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, Respondent.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

In his sworn letter/complaint dated December 22, 2006, with

enclosures, Antero J. Pobre invites the Court’s attention to the
following excerpts of Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago’s speech
delivered on the Senate floor:

x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am

homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I
am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in
a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief
Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I
am no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be
surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not
in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x.

To Pobre, the foregoing statements reflected a total disrespect on the

part of the speaker towards then Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban
and the other members of the Court and constituted direct contempt
of court. Accordingly, Pobre asks that disbarment proceedings or other
disciplinary actions be taken against the lady senator.

In her comment on the complaint dated April 25, 2007, Senator

Santiago, through counsel, does not deny making the aforequoted
statements. She, however, explained that those statements were
covered by the constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity,
being part of a speech she delivered in the discharge of her duty as
member of Congress or its committee. The purpose of her speech,
according to her, was to bring out in the open controversial anomalies
in governance with a view to future remedial legislation. She averred
that she wanted to expose what she believed "to be an unjust act of the
Judicial Bar Council [JBC]," which, after sending out public invitations
for nomination to the soon to-be vacated position of Chief Justice,
would eventually inform applicants that only incumbent justices of the
Supreme Court would qualify for nomination. She felt that the JBC
should have at least given an advanced advisory that non-sitting
members of the Court, like her, would not be considered for the
position of Chief Justice.
The immunity Senator Santiago claims is rooted primarily on the
provision of Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution, which provides:
"A Senator or Member of the House of Representative shall, in all
offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be
privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No member
shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for
any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee
thereof." Explaining the import of the underscored portion of the
provision, the Court, in Osmeña, Jr. v. Pendatun, said:
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a
fundamental privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of the
democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its purpose "is to
enable and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his
public trust with firmness and success" for "it is indispensably
necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech and that he
should be protected from resentment of every one, however, powerful,
to whom the exercise of that liberty may occasion offense."1
As American jurisprudence puts it, this legislative privilege is founded
upon long experience and arises as a means of perpetuating inviolate
the functioning process of the legislative department. Without
parliamentary immunity, parliament, or its equivalent, would
degenerate into a polite and ineffective debating forum. Legislators are
immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their legislative
duties, not for their private indulgence, but for the public good. The
privilege would be of little value if they could be subjected to the cost
and inconvenience and distractions of a trial upon a conclusion of the
pleader, or to the hazard of a judgment against them based upon a
judge’s speculation as to the motives.2
This Court is aware of the need and has in fact been in the forefront in
upholding the institution of parliamentary immunity and promotion of
free speech. Neither has the Court lost sight of the importance of the
legislative and oversight functions of the Congress that enable this
representative body to look diligently into every affair of government,
investigate and denounce anomalies, and talk about how the country
and its citizens are being served. Courts do not interfere with the
legislature or its members in the manner they perform their functions in
the legislative floor or in committee rooms. Any claim of an unworthy
purpose or of the falsity and mala fides of the statement uttered by the
member of the Congress does not destroy the privilege.3 The
disciplinary authority of the assembly4 and the voters, not the courts,
can properly discourage or correct such abuses committed in the name
of parliamentary immunity.5
For the above reasons, the plea of Senator Santiago for the dismissal of
the complaint for disbarment or disciplinary action is well taken. Indeed,
her privilege speech is not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary
proceeding under the Rules of Court. It is felt, however, that this could
not be the last word on the matter.
The Court wishes to express its deep concern about the language
Senator Santiago, a member of the Bar, used in her speech and its
effect on the administration of justice. To the Court, the lady senator
has undoubtedly crossed the limits of decency and good professional
conduct. It is at once apparent that her statements in question were
intemperate and highly improper in substance. To reiterate, she was
quoted as stating that she wanted "to spit on the face of Chief Justice
Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court," and calling
the Court a "Supreme Court of idiots."
The lady senator alluded to In Re: Vicente Sotto.6 We draw her
attention to the ensuing passage in Sotto that she should have taken
to heart in the first place:
x x x [I]f the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity
of this Court and believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom,
they might be driven to take the law into their own hands, and disorder
and perhaps chaos would be the result.1avvphi1
No lawyer who has taken an oath to maintain the respect due to the
courts should be allowed to erode the people’s faith in the judiciary. In
this case, the lady senator clearly violated Canon 8, Rule 8.01 and
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which respectively
provide:
Canon 8, Rule 8.01.––A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings,
use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
Canon 11.––A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to
the courts and to the judicial officers and should insist on similar
conduct by others.
Senator/Atty. Santiago is a cut higher than most lawyers. Her
achievements speak for themselves. She was a former Regional Trial
Court judge, a law professor, an oft-cited authority on constitutional
and international law, an author of numerous law textbooks, and an
elected senator of the land. Needless to stress, Senator Santiago, as a
member of the Bar and officer of the court, like any other, is
duty-bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court and to
maintain the respect due its members. Lawyers in public service are
keepers of public faith and are burdened with the higher degree of
social responsibility, perhaps higher than their brethren in private
practice.7Senator Santiago should have known, as any perceptive
individual, the impact her statements would make on the people’s faith
in the integrity of the courts.
As Senator Santiago alleged, she delivered her privilege speech as a
prelude to crafting remedial legislation on the JBC. This allegation
strikes the Court as an afterthought in light of the insulting tenor of
what she said. We quote the passage once more:
x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am
homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded.
And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle
years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of
Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme
Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I
was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another
environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x. (Emphasis
ours.)
A careful re-reading of her utterances would readily show that her
statements were expressions of personal anger and frustration at not
being considered for the post of Chief Justice. In a sense, therefore,
her remarks were outside the pale of her official parliamentary
functions. Even parliamentary immunity must not be allowed to be
used as a vehicle to ridicule, demean, and destroy the reputation of
the Court and its magistrates, nor as armor for personal wrath and
disgust. Authorities are agreed that parliamentary immunity is not an
individual privilege accorded the individual members of the Parliament
or Congress for their personal benefit, but rather a privilege for the
benefit of the people and the institution that represents them.
To be sure, Senator Santiago could have given vent to her anger
without indulging in insulting rhetoric and offensive personalities.
Lest it be overlooked, Senator Santiago’s outburst was directly
traceable to what she considered as an "unjust act" the JBC had taken
in connection with her application for the position of Chief Justice. But
while the JBC functions under the Court’s supervision, its individual
members, save perhaps for the Chief Justice who sits as the
JBC’s ex-officio chairperson,8 have no official duty to nominate
candidates for appointment to the position of Chief Justice. The Court is,
thus, at a loss to understand Senator Santiago’s wholesale and
indiscriminate assault on the members of the Court and her choice of
critical and defamatory words against all of them.
At any event, equally important as the speech and debate clause of Art.
VI, Sec. 11 of the Constitution is Sec. 5(5) of Art. VIII of the
Constitution that provides:
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of the law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance
to the underprivileged. (Emphasis ours.)
The Court, besides being authorized to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, exercises specific authority to promulgate
rules governing the Integrated Bar with the end in view that the integration of
the Bar will, among other things:
(4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself except within its
own forum, from the assaults that politics and self interest may level at it, and
assist it to maintain its integrity, impartiality and independence;
xxxx
(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards x x x.9
In Re: Letter Dated 21 February 2005 of Atty. Noel S. Sorreda,10 we reiterated
our pronouncement in Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer11 that the duty of
attorneys to the courts can only be maintained by rendering no service involving
any disrespect to the judicial office which they are bound to uphold. The Court
wrote in Rheem of the Philippines:
x x x As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces that "[i]t is the
duty of a lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the
sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance
of its supreme importance." That same canon, as a corollary, makes it peculiarly
incumbent upon lawyers to support the courts against "unjust criticism and
clamor." And more. The attorney’s oath solemnly binds him to a conduct that
should be "with all good fidelity x x x to the courts."
Also, in Sorreda, the Court revisited its holding in Surigao Mineral Reservation
Board v. Cloribel12 that:
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, "like the court itself, an instrument or
agency to advance the ends of justice." His duty is to uphold the dignity and
authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity, "not to promote distrust in the
administration of justice." Faith in the courts, a lawyer should seek to preserve.
For, to undermine the judicial edifice "is disastrous to the continuity of
government and to the attainment of the liberties of the people." Thus has it
been said of a lawyer that "[a]s an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral
duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard
towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice."13
The lady senator belongs to the legal profession bound by the exacting
injunction of a strict Code. Society has entrusted that profession with the
administration of the law and dispensation of justice. Generally speaking, a
lawyer holding a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the
Bar for misconduct committed while in the discharge of official duties, unless
said misconduct also constitutes a violation of his/her oath as a lawyer.14
Lawyers may be disciplined even for any conduct committed in their private
capacity, as long as their misconduct reflects their want of probity or good
demeanor,15 a good character being an essential qualification for the admission
to the practice of law and for continuance of such privilege. When the Code of
Professional Responsibility or the Rules of Court speaks of "conduct" or
"misconduct," the reference is not confined to one’s behavior exhibited in
connection with the performance of lawyers’ professional duties, but also
covers any misconduct, which––albeit unrelated to the actual practice of their
profession––would show them to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the
privileges which their license and the law invest in them.16
This Court, in its unceasing quest to promote the people’s faith in courts and
trust in the rule of law, has consistently exercised its disciplinary authority on
lawyers who, for malevolent purpose or personal malice, attempt to obstruct
the orderly administration of justice, trifle with the integrity of courts, and
embarrass or, worse, malign the men and women who compose them. We have
done it in the case of former Senator Vicente Sotto in Sotto, in the case of Atty.
Noel Sorreda in Sorreda, and in the case of Atty. Francisco B. Cruz in Tacordan
v. Ang17 who repeatedly insulted and threatened the Court in a most insolent
manner.
The Court is not hesitant to impose some form of disciplinary sanctions on
Senator/Atty. Santiago for what otherwise would have constituted an act of
utter disrespect on her part towards the Court and its members. The factual
and legal circumstances of this case, however, deter the Court from doing so,
even without any sign of remorse from her. Basic constitutional consideration
dictates this kind of disposition.
We, however, would be remiss in our duty if we let the Senator’s offensive and
disrespectful language that definitely tended to denigrate the institution pass by.
It is imperative on our part to re-instill in Senator/Atty. Santiago her duty to
respect courts of justice, especially this Tribunal, and remind her anew that the
parliamentary non-accountability thus granted to members of Congress is not
to protect them against prosecutions for their own benefit, but to enable
them, as the people’s representatives, to perform the functions of their office
without fear of being made responsible before the courts or other forums
outside the congressional hall.18 It is intended to protect members of Congress
against government pressure and intimidation aimed at influencing the
decision-making prerogatives of Congress and its members.
The Rules of the Senate itself contains a provision on Unparliamentary Acts and
Language that enjoins a Senator from using, under any circumstance,
"offensive or improper language against another Senator or against any
public institution."19 But as to Senator Santiago’s unparliamentary remarks,
the Senate President had not apparently called her to order, let alone referred
the matter to the Senate Ethics Committee for appropriate disciplinary action,
as the Rules dictates under such circumstance.20 The lady senator clearly
violated the rules of her own chamber. It is unfortunate that her peers bent
backwards and avoided imposing their own rules on her.
Finally, the lady senator questions Pobre’s motives in filing his complaint,
stating that disciplinary proceedings must be undertaken solely for the public
welfare. We cannot agree with her more. We cannot overstress that the
senator’s use of intemperate language to demean and denigrate the highest
court of the land is a clear violation of the duty of respect lawyers owe to the
courts.21
Finally, the Senator asserts that complainant Pobre has failed to prove that she
in fact made the statements in question. Suffice it to say in this regard that,
although she has not categorically denied making such statements, she has
unequivocally said making them as part of her privilege speech. Her implied
admission is good enough for the Court.
WHEREFORE, the letter-complaint of Antero J. Pobre against Senator/Atty.
Miriam Defensor-Santiago is, conformably to Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the
Constitution, DISMISSED.SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 389 January 31, 1972
IN RE: DISBARMENT OF ARMANDO PUNO. FLORA
QUINGWA, complainant,
vs.
ARMANDO PUNO, respondent.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.B.L., J.:p
Respondent Armando Puno, of Zamboanga City, in Administrative Case
No. 389, petitions for the lifting of the disbarment decree issued
against him by this Court in its decision of 28 February 1967,1 pleading
that since then he has striven to lead and has led a model and
exemplary life, despite the hardships undergone by him and his family.
His exemplary conduct since his disbarment is attested by public
officials and civic organizations of Zamboanga City, specially the local
chapters of the Jaycees and the Boy Scouts, the Family Workshop of
the Philippines, the Zamboanga City Amateur Athletic Federation and
the Amateur Basketball Association, in which he has served as officer
thereof. All of them have certified to this petitioner's proper and
irreproachable behaviour during the past four years.
Considering that the complainant has expressed no objection to his
reinstatement in the practice of the law, provided said respondent
supports his child by the aforesaid complainant, to which condition
respondent Armando Puno has expressly agreed: and considering that
this Court is now convinced that said respondent has evidenced his
moral reform and willingness to atone for the misconduct that led to his
exclusion from the bar, and will endeavor in the future to lead an
upright and irreproachable life, assiduously avoiding occasion to bring
the profession into disrepute.
As prayed for, respondent Armando Puno is ordered reinstated in the
practice of the law as a member of the Philippine Bar, subject to the
conditions that (1) he shall formally acknowledge his child, Armando
Puno, Jr., now in the care of the mother, complainant Flora Quingwa,
and (2) the said petitioner will provide a minimum amount of P125.00
per month for the support of said child starting from 31 January 1971.
Let the name of said respondent be restored to the roll of attorneys
upon his taking anew the corresponding oath of office before this Court,
and upon his submittal of the formal acknowledgment of his child. So
ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee,
Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
A.C. No. 270 March 29, 1974
In Re: Administrative Case Against Atty. Carlos C. Rusiana of
Cebu City.
RESOLUTION
ANTONIO, J.:p
On May 29, 1959, the Court, finding that respondent Atty. Carlos C.
Rusiana, who was admitted to the Philippine Bar on January 21, 1955,
committed acts of misconduct as a notary public and "has exhibited
such a frame of mind and observed such a norm of conduct as is
unworthy of a member of the legal profession," ordered his
disbarment.
Respondent has intermittently filed with this Court petitions for
re-admission, supported by resolutions from members of the Bench
and Bar, labor unions, newspaper editors and reporters, members of
professional and civic organizations of the Province of Cebu, attesting
to respondent's good conduct and moral character since his
disbarment, and petitioning for his reinstatement to the legal
profession.
The sole object of the Court upon an application for reinstatement to
practice, by one previously disbarred, is to determine whether or not
the applicant has satisfied and convinced the Court by positive
evidence that the effort he has made toward the rehabilitation of his
character has been successful, and, therefore, he is entitled to be
re-admitted to a profession which is intrinsically an office of trust.
The earlier petitions filed by respondent were denied. On June 13,
1972, he filed a verified petition for reinstatement, submitting proofs
of his honesty and integrity and other indications of his good moral
character (clearances from the City Courts and Court of First Instance
of Cebu, Police Department of Cebu City, testimonials on his character
by fiscals, lawyers, Judges of City Courts and of the Court of First
Instance, resolutions of the Cebu Lions Club, Sto. Rosario Council No.
5508 of the Knights of Columbus, Bar Association of Cebu, Cebu
Lawyers League, Inc.), and after the hearing on the petition for
reinstatement on July 18, 1972, the Court issued a resolution on July
20, 1972, to wit:
... [A]cting on the respondent's prayer for reinstatement as a member
of the Philippine Bar, and considering (a) that respondent movant had
been disbarred as of May 29, 1959; (b) that since then the said
respondent may be considered as having undergone adequate
punishment; (c) that he has observed exemplary conduct since then,
according to credible certifications attesting to his repentance for the
offense committed by him thirteen (13) years ago, and may be
reasonably expected to scrupulously observe the Canons of Legal
Ethics in the future; (d) but that, in view of the numerous changes in
the law since 1959, respondent movant should offer some guarantee
of his ability to render adequate service to his prospective clients; the
Court resolved that respondent movant Carlos C. Rusiana be, as he is
hereby required, to enroll in, and pass, regular fourth year review
classes in a recognized law school, and that upon his filing with the
Clerk of this Court of sworn certificates by the individual professors of
the review classes attesting to his having regularly attended and
passed their subjects, under the same conditions as ordinary students
said movant Carlos C. Rusiana be readmitted as a member of the
Philippine Bar, upon his taking anew the lawyer's oath and signing the
Roll of Attorneys in the custody of the Clerk of this Supreme Court.
Respondent has already complied with the requirements contained in the
Court's above-quoted resolution, as evidenced by the sworn certificates by the
individual professors of the review classes attended by him attesting to his
having regularly attended and passed their subjects under the same conditions
as ordinary students, and the separate letters, both dated February 25, 1974, of
the Registrar and the Dean of the Gullas Law School, of the University of the
Visayas, addressed to Atty. Luis Garcia, this Court's Deputy Clerk of Court and
Acting Bar Confidant, confirming the truth of the professors' statements.
WHEREFORE, conformably with the Court's resolution dated July 20, 1972,
respondent Carlos C. Rusiana is hereby allowed to take anew the lawyer's oath
and sign the Roll of Attorneys after paying to this court the requisite fees.
A.C. No. 2474 June 30, 2005
EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR., complainant,
vs.
ATTY. LEO J. PALMA, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Providing one’s children with a comfortable life and good education
does not render marriage a fait accompli. Leo J. Palma, respondent
herein, may have provided well for his children but this accomplishment
is not sufficient to wipe away the penalty for his transgression. He
ought to remember that before he became a father, he was a husband
first. As such, he should have loved, respected and remained faithful to
his wife.
At bar is respondent’s Motion to Vacate1 our Decision dated September
15, 2004 finding him guilty of grossly immoral conduct and violation of
his oath as a lawyer and imposing upon him the penalty of disbarment
from the practice of law.
In resolving the instant motion, a brief revisit of the facts is imperative.
On June 22, 1982, respondent, despite his subsisting marriage with
Elizabeth Hermosisima, married Maria Luisa Cojuangco, the 22-year old
daughter of complainant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. This prompted the
latter to file with this Court, on November 8, 1982, a complaint for
disbarment against respondent.
Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint.
In our Resolution2dated March 2, 1983, we referred the case to the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) for investigation, report and
recommendation. Then Assistant Solicitor General Oswaldo D. Agcaoili
heard the testimonies of the complainant and his witness in the
presence of respondent’s counsel.
On March 19, 1984, respondent filed with the OSG an urgent motion to
suspend proceedings3 on the ground that the final outcome of Civil
Case No. Pq–0401-P,4 for declaration of nullity of marriage between
him and his wife Lisa, poses a prejudicial question to the disbarment
proceeding. The motion was denied.
Respondent then filed with this Court an urgent motion for issuance of
a restraining order.5 On December 19, 1984, we issued a Resolution
enjoining the OSG from continuing the disbarment proceedings.6
In the interim, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court took effect. Hence, the
OSG transferred the disbarment case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP). On October 19, 1998, IBP Commissioner Julio C.
Elamparo required the parties to manifest within ten (10) days from
notice whether they are still interested in pursuing the case.7
In his manifestation,8 complainant confirmed his continuing interest in
prosecuting the case.
For his part, respondent moved to postpone the hearing eight (8) times.
In one of those instances, particularly on August 28, 2001, complainant
moved "that respondent be deemed to have waived his right
to present evidence and for the case to be deemed submitted
for resolution in view of his continuing failure to present his
evidence." However, complainant withdrew such motion upon the
promise of the respondent’s counsel that on the next hearing,
scheduled on October 4, 2001, he would definitely present his client’s
evidence. But even before that date, respondent already manifested
that he would not be able to return to the Philippines for his direct
testimony. Instead, he promised to submit his "direct testimony in
affidavit form."9 In an Order issued that day, the IBP Commissioner
reset the hearing for the last time on January 24, 2002 and warned
respondent that should he fail to appear or present his "direct
testimony in affidavit form," the case will be deemed submitted for
resolution.10On January 24, 2002, respondent neither appeared
nor presented his "direct testimony in affidavit form," hence,
the case was deemed submitted for resolution.11
On March 20, 2003, the IBP Commissioner submitted a Report and
Recommendation finding respondent guilty of gross immoral conduct
and violation of his oath as a lawyer and recommending that he be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the above Report
and Recommendation, but reduced the penalty of suspension to only
one (1) year.
On September 15, 2004, we rendered the assailed Decision.
In his motion for reconsideration, respondent raised the following
issues:
First, the complaint for disbarment was filed by an improper party,
complainant not being the offended party.
Second, he was denied due process because the case was
submitted for resolution on January 24, 2002 without his "direct
testimony in affidavit form."
Third, the disbarment proceedings before the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline is void because our Resolution dated December 19, 1984
restraining the OSG from continuing such proceedings has not been
lifted.
Fourth, our Decision is barred by laches because of the lapse of
almost fourteen (14) years from December 19, 1984, the date we
restrained the OSG from continuing the disbarment proceedings,
until October 19, 1998, the date the IBP Commissioner required the
parties to "manifest whether or not they are still interested in
prosecuting the case."
Fifth, the Resolution dated June 21, 2003 of the IBP Board of
Governors imposing upon him the penalty of one (1) year
suspension "has attained finality and should be deemed served
already."
And sixth, he acted under a "firm factual and legal conviction" in
declaring before the Hong Kong Marriage Registry that he is
a "bachelor" because his first marriage is void even if there is no
judicial declaration of nullity.
In his comment, complainant countered that: first, respondent cannot
claim denial of due process because his failure to adduce evidence was
due to his own fault; second, it is now too late to invoke this Court’s
Resolution of December 19, 1984 restraining the OSG from continuing
the disbarment proceedings; third, laches does not apply because the
14-year hiatus was brought about by the said Resolution; fourth, the
penalty of one-year suspension imposed by the IBP Board of
Governors cannot be deemed "final and served already" because it is a
mere recommendation to this Court; and fifth, although his previous
marriage was annulled, it can not erase the betrayal of trust and abuse
of confidence he committed against complainant.
Respondent’s motion is bereft of merit.
We observe that in his motion, respondent alleged new issues12 which
were not considered below. Nonetheless, in view of the caveat that the
power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, we shall resolve
all these new issues.
I - Improper Party
We find no merit in respondent’s contention that the complainant,
being the father of the offended party, does not have the standing to
file the instant complaint.
Disbarment proceedings are undertaken solely for public welfare. The
only question for determination is whether respondent is fit to be a
member of the Bar. The complainant or the person who called the
attention of this Court to the lawyer’s alleged misconduct is in no sense
a party and generally has no interest in the outcome except as all good
citizens may have in the proper administration of justice.13 Thus, this
Court may investigate charges against lawyers, regardless of
complainant’s standing. In fact, it can do so motu proprio. Our ruling
in Rayos-Ombac vs. Rayos14 applies four-square, thus:
"x x x A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed
regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant.
What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out
by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral
conduct has been duly proven. This rule is premised on the nature
of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment
is not in any sense a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and
the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings
involve no private interest and afford no redress for private
grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the
public welfare.They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving
courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to
practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his
conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who
called the attention of the court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is
in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome
except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of
justice. Hence, if the evidence on record warrants, the respondent may
be suspended or disbarred despite the desistance of complainant or his
withdrawal of the charges."
II – Due Process
Neither do we find merit in respondent’s claim that the IBP Commission
on Bar Discipline violated his right to due process when it considered
the case submitted for resolution on January 24, 2002 without his
"direct testimony in affidavit form." The records show that the case
dragged on for three (3) years after the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline resumed its investigation on October 19, 1998. Of the
fifteen15 (15) settings from February 2, 1999 to January 24, 2002,
respondent had the hearing postponed for eight (8) times.
Indisputably, it was respondent’s failure to submit his "direct testimony
in affidavit form" that caused delay. Since the proceedings had been
dragging on a lethargic course, the IBP Commissioner is correct in
considering the case submitted for resolution. At this juncture, it must
be stressed that the essence of due process in administrative
proceedings is the opportunity to explain one’s side or seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. As long as the
parties are given the opportunity to be heard before judgment is
rendered, the demands of due process are sufficiently met. 16 Here,
respondent was given sufficient opportunity to explain his side and
adduce his evidence. Despite his sudden "flight into oblivion," the IBP
Commissioner notified him of the proceedings. Significantly, he was
duly represented by a counsel who attended the hearings and
submitted manifestations and motions on his behalf, the latest of which
is the instant Motion to Vacate. In short, the active participation of his
lawyer in every stage of the proceedings rules out any badge of
procedural deficiency therein. Of course, we need not mention the fact
that respondent was able to file with this Court a motion to dismiss the
complaint, as well as to confront and cross-examine the complainant
and his witness during the investigation in the OSG.
III – Restraining Order
The restraining order was anchored on the ground that the final outcome of
Civil Case No. Pq–0401-P poses a prejudicial question to the disbarment
proceedings. It appears from complainant’s allegation, which respondent does
not deny, that Civil Case No. Pq–0401-P was dismissed without
prejudice.17 Necessarily, there is no more prejudicial question to speak
of.
IV - Laches
Respondent cannot find solace in the principle of laches. While it is true that
there was a hiatus or delay of 14 years before the IBP Commissioner resumed
the investigation, the same was pursuant to the said restraining order of
December 19, 1984.
V – Finality of the Penalty Imposed
by the IBP-Board of Governors
The penalty of one-year suspension imposed by the IBP Board of Governors
cannot attain finality. Section 12 of Rule 139-B provides:
"Section 12. Review and Decision by the Board of Governors.-
xxxxxx
(b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines
that the respondent should be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred,
it shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations which,
together with the whole record of the case shall forthwith be transmitted
to the Supreme Court for final action."
Clearly, the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors is merely recommendatory.
The "power to recommend" includes the power to give "advice, exhortation or
indorsement, which is essentially persuasive in character, not binding upon the
party to whom it is made."18 Necessarily, the "final action" on the resolution
of the IBP Board of Governors still lies with this Court. Obviously, respondent’s
argument that we affirmed such resolution when we "noted" it is certainly
misplaced. In Re: Problem of Delays in Cases Before the Sandiganbayan,19 we
held that the term "noted" means that the Court has merely taken cognizance
of the existence of an act or declaration, without exercising a judicious
deliberation or rendering a decision on the matter. It does not imply agreement
or approval. The power to disbar belongs to the Court alone.
VI - Good Faith
Respondent’s argument that he was of the "firm factual and legal conviction
when he declared before the Hong Kong authorities that he was a bachelor
since his first marriage is void and does not need judicial declaration of nullity"
cannot exonerate him. In Terre vs. Terre,20 the same defense was raised by
respondent lawyer whose disbarment was also sought. We held:
"x x x Respondent Jordan Terre, being a lawyer, knew or should have
known that such an argument ran counter to the prevailing case law
of this Court which holds that for purposes of determining whether a
person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial
declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is
essential. Even if we were to assume, arguendo merely, that Jordan Terre
held that mistaken belief in good faith, the same result will follow. For if we are
to hold Jordan Terre to his own argument, his first marriage to complainant
Dorothy Terre must be deemed valid, with the result that his second marriage
must be regarded as bigamous and criminal in character."
Before we write finis to this case, we find it necessary to stress certain points in
view of respondent’s additional reason why he should be exonerated – that he
loves all his children and has always provided for them. He may have indeed
provided well for his children. But this accomplishment is not sufficient to show
his moral fitness to continue being a member of the noble profession of law. It
has always been the duties of parents – e.g., to support, educate and instruct
their children according to right precepts and good example; and to give them
love, companionship and understanding, as well as moral and spiritual
guidance.21 But what respondent forgot is that he has also duties to his wife. As
a husband, he is obliged to live with her; observe mutual love, respect
and fidelity; and render help and support.22 And most important of all, he
is obliged to remain faithful to her until death.

The undeniable truth is that respondent married Lisa while his marriage with
Elizabeth Hermosisima was still subsisting. Such act constitutes grossly immoral
conduct, a ground for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised
Rules of Court. Obviously, he exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of
morality required of him as a member of the Bar. He made a mockery of
marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. In Cordova vs.
Cordova,23 we held that "The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a
member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct that outrages the
generally accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for instance,
which makes a mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage."

We also reiterate our ruling that respondent’s conduct speaks of a clear case of
betrayal of trust and abuse of confidence, thus:

"x x x. It was respondent’s closeness to the complainant’s family as well as the

latter’s complete trust in him that made possible his intimate relationship with
Lisa. When his concern was supposed to be complainant’s legal affairs only, he
sneaked at the latter’s back and courted his daughter. Like the proverbial thief in
the night, he attacked when nobody was looking. Moreover, he availed of
complainant’s resources by securing a plane ticket from complainant’s office in
order to marry the latter’s daughter in Hong Kong. He did this without
complainant’s knowledge. Afterwards, he even had the temerity to assure
complainant that "everything is legal." Clearly, respondent had crossed he limits
of propriety and decency.

Indeed, we are not prepared to exonerate respondent or reduce the penalty we

imposed on him as it will denigrate the standard of the law profession.

WHEREFORE, respondent’s Motion to Vacate our Decision dated September 15,

2004 is hereby DENIED.SO ORDERED.