PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

ROSENDO AMARO
G.R. No. 199100 July 18, 2014
PEREZ, J.:
For consideration is the appeal by appellant Rosendo Amaro from the Decision 1 dated 30 March 2011 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-I-IC No. 02801, affirming the 26 February 2007 Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Palawan and Puerto Princesa City, Branch 50, which found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of forcible
abduction with rape.
On 26 May 1998, appellant was charged with the crime of forcible abduction with rape committed as follows:
That on or about the 26th day of March, 1998 at more or less 5:00 in the afternoon in front of Boots & Maya located at
Mal var Street, Puerto Princesa City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, by means of deceit atthe beginning and of force and intimidation later and with lewd designs, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously abduct one [AAA], 3 a seven (7) year old girl, by forcing her and took her to his
house at Bgy. Tagburos, Puerto Princesa City and without any justifiable reason, accused detained and deprived her
of her liberty for a period of twenty eight (28) [sic] days; that while she is being detained accused ROSENDO AMARO
had carnal knowledge of said AAA all committed against her will. 4
Appellant pleaded not guilty. Trial then proceeded. AAA, who was then only 7 years old,testified that she was walking
on her way home from school when she passed by Boots & Maya store. She met a man, whom she later identified in
court as the appellant, who asked her to buy cigarettes. After buying the cigarettes and handing it to appellant, the
latter gave her bread and banana cue. After eating them, she suddenly became dizzy and passed out. AAA was
brought to the house of appellant. When she regained consciousness, she saw appellant naked. Appellant then
undressed her, kissed her on the lips and neck, and inserted his penis into her vagina, causing her to feel pain. AAA
cried but appellant covered her mouth with his hand. AAA was detained for six (6) days and was raped five (5) times
by appellant. AAA clarified thatappellant’s penis touched the outer portion of her vagina.
During the cross-examination, AAA admitted that she voluntarily went with appellant because the latter promised to
bring her home.5
On the last day of her detention, AAA and appellant went out of the house. On their way to San Jose, a certain Aunt
Ruthie saw AAA walking and immediately picked her up and brought her to the police station. Appellant noticed AAA
being taken away but he did nothing.6
The prosecution also presented AAA’s mother, BBB, to corroborate her daughter’s testimony. BBB narrated that on 26
March 1998, she was in the house when AAA came home at around noon time to eat. Thereafter, AAA told BBB that
she had to go backto school. At around 5:00 p.m. when AAA had not come home, BBB went to the school to look for
her. When the teacher told BBB that that school children had already been sent home, she proceeded to the police
station to report her missing daughter. After six (6) days, AAA was found by BBB’s former employer who brought her to
the police. Upon receiving a call from the police, BBB immediately went to the police station and saw her daughter.
BBB observed that AAA was still in shock and could not walk properly so she was brought to the doctor on the
following day. She only learned that her daughter was raped after the medical examination.
Appellant testified on his behalf. He denied abducting and raping AAA but admitted that he brought the latter to his
house when AAA approached him asking for bread first, before begging him to take her with him because she was
always being scolded by her parents. Upon reaching his house, appellant entrusted AAA to the care of Florante
Magay’s sister. Appellant then went back to town to attend to his work as a mason. He only decided to go back home
when he heard his name on the radio in connection with the disappearance of a girl. He picked up the child in
Barangay Tagburos and brought her to her house in Buncag. AAA walked alone towards her house. 7
On 26 February 2007, the trial court rendered judgment in this wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused ROSENDO AMARO GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Forcible Abduction with Rape, as defined and penalized under Article 342
and Article266-B of the Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 8353 in relation to Article 48 thereof. The accused is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay the costs. He is likewise ordered to
pay the complainant-victim [AAA] the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND (₱50,000.00) PESOS as civil indemnity and
FIFTY THOUSAND (₱50,000.00) PESOS as moral damages.8
The trial court found AAA’s testimony as credible and straightforward and supported by medical findings.
From the aforesaid decision, appellant appealed to the Court of Appeals.
On 30 March 2011, the Court of Appeals promulgated a Decision affirming the ruling of the RTC. Both parties opted
not to file their Supplemental Briefs and instead adopted their Briefs filed before the appellate court. 9
In this appeal, appellant contendsthat the prosecution’s evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. According to
appellant, he did not rape AAA because the latter was not in his custody at the time said incident allegedly happened.
Appellant adds that he entrusted AAA to the custody of Florante Magay’s sister because he was working. Appellant
also insists that AAA voluntarily went with him to his house.
Thus, the resolution of this case hinges on whether or not the prosecution was able to establish from the testimony of
the complainant the guilt of the accused for the crime offorcible abduction with rape beyond reasonable doubt.
The elements of the crime of forcible abduction, as defined in Article 342 of the Revised Penal Code, are: (1) that the
person abducted is any woman, regardless of her age, civil status, or reputation; (2) that she is taken against her will;
and (3) that the abduction is with lewd designs. On the other hand, rape under Article 266-A is committed by having
carnal knowledge of a woman by: (1) force or intimidation, or(2) when the woman is deprived of reason or is
unconscious, or (3) when she is under twelveyears of age.
The prosecution was able to prove all these elements in this case. The victim, AAA was a seven (7) year-old girl who
was taken against her will by appellant who told her thathe knew her mother and that he would bring her home. 10 At
her tender age, AAA could have easily been deceived by appellant. The employment of deception suffices to
constitute the forcible taking, especially since the victim is an unsuspecting young girl. It is the taking advantage of
their innocence that makes them easy culprits of deceiving minds. 11 The presence of lewd designs in forcible
abduction is established by the actual rape of the victim. 12
During the direct examination, AAA recounted the rape incident and positively identified appellant as the perpetrator,
thus:
Q: When Rosendo undressed himself what happened next?
xxxx
A: He undressed me.
PROSECUTOR SENA:
(to witness)
Q: And after you were undressed by Rosendo what happened next? A: He kissed me.
Q: Where were you kissed by Rosendo?
A: In lips, Sir.
Q: Only your lips was kissed by Rosendo?
A: On my neck.
Q: Aside by being kissed by Rosendo, what else did he do to you?
A: He inserted his penis to my vagina.
Q: What do you mean by "totoy?"
(No answer)
PROSECUTOR SENA:
(to Court)
May I change the question, Your Honor.
COURT:
All right.
PROSECUTOR SENA:
(to witness)
Q: [AAA], in what part of the body of Rosendo can you find that totoy that you said?
(Witness pointed to her private part)
Q: And that bilalaythat you mentioned in what part of your body can you find that?
(The same, witness pointed to her private part)
Q: Were you able to see that totoyof Rosendo?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: And how big was that?
(witness demonstrated the length more or less 5 inches)
Q: About how – the diameter, how big is the diameter?
COURT:
It is not necessary to prove that, the size.
PROSECUTOR SENA:
Just to prove.
(to witness)
Q: When the penis of Rosendo was being tried by Rosendo to penetrate your vagina[,] what did you feel?
A: Painful, Sir.13
The fact of sexual intercourse is corroborated by the medical findings that the victim suffered from laceration on the
upper and lower part of the introitus.14
Appellant was properly charged of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape. AAA’s abduction was a
necessary means to commit rape. Sexual intercourse with AAA was facilitated and ensured by her abduction. 15
In the prosecution of rape cases, conviction or acquittal depends on the complainant's testimony because of the fact
that usually only the participants are witnesses to their occurrences. The issue therefore boils down to credibility.
Significantly, findings of fact of the trial court should not be disturbed on appeal since conclusions as to the credibility
of witnesses in rape cases lie heavily on the sound judgment of the trial court which is in a better position to decide the
question, having heard the witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of testifying. 16
Testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, since when a girl, particularly if she is a minor,
saysthat she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show thatrape has in fact been committed.
When the offended party is of tender age and immature, courts are inclined to give credit to her account of what
transpired, considering not only her relative vulnerability but also the shame to which she would be exposed if the
matter to which she testified is not true. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity. 17Moreover,
AAA testified in a straightforward manner.
On the other hand, appellant set-up the defense of denial and alibi.1âwphi1 It is jurisprudential that denial and alibi are
intrinsically weak defenses which must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility. Mere
denial, without any strong evidence to support it, can scarcely overcome the positive declaration by the child-victim of
the identity of the appellant and his involvement in the crime attributed to him. 18 Alibi is evidence negative in nature
and self-serving and cannot attain more credibility than the testimonies of prosecution witnesses who testify on clear
and positive evidence.19
The appellate court is correct in affirming the imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetuaby ratiocinating, to wit:
The presence of lewd intentions is established by the conduct of the accused during the abduction. When the girl is
defiled, the forcible abduction becomes the means to commit the rape, and since rape is the more serious offense,
under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape is committed and
penalized by reclusion perpetua, the penalty proper to rape. 20
For clarity, the lower courts should have emphasized that reclusion perpetuaas the proper penalty for the crime of
statutory rape was imposed in lieu of death penalty pursuant to Republic Act No. 7659. When Republic Act No. 9346
prohibited the imposition ofdeath penalty, persons convicted of offenses punished with death penalty will now be
reduced to reclusion perpetua. And in line withour recent ruling in People v. Gambao 21 where we order an increase in
the amount ofdamages to ₱100,000.00 each for civil indemnity, moral and exemplary damages,we deem it necessary
to increase the amount of damages accordingly.
In addition, interest at the rate of 6% per annum shall be imposed on all damages awarded from date of finalityof this
judgment until fully paid.22
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 30 March 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC
No. 02801 is AFFIRMED, subject to the MODIFICATION that ROSENDO AMARO shall pay ₱100,000.00 as civil
indemnity, ₱100,000.00 as moral damages and ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages, plus interest of 6% per annum
on the amount of damages, reckoned from the finality of this decision until full payment.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARVIN CAYANAN
G.R. No. 200080 September 18, 2013
REYES, J.:
Accused-appellant Marvin Cayanan (Cayanan) seeks a review of the Decision 1 dated July 14, 2011 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 04256 affirming with modifications the Consolidated Decision 2 dated June 16,
2009 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos City, Bulacan, Branch 77. The RTC decision convicted Cayanan of
the crimes of Qualified Rape (Criminal Case No. 1499-M-200 1) and Forcible Abduction with Qualified Rape (Criminal
Case No. 1498-M-200 I), and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each crime without
eligibility for parole.
The CA, however, increased the award of damages originally awarded by the RTC: (1) in Criminal Case No. 1499-M-
2001, from ₱50,000.00 to₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity; and (2) in Criminal Case No. 1498-M-2001,from ₱50,000.00
to ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity and from ₱50,000.00 to₱75,000.00 as moral damages. The CA also awarded an
additional₱75,000.00 as moral damages in Criminal Case No. 1499-M-2001 and₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages in
both criminal cases.3
The prosecution established that Cayanan took advantage of 15-year old AAA 4 on February 1, 2001 while the victim
was alone inside her house in x x x, Bulacan. Cayanan is the victim’s brother-in-law, being married to her older sister,
and the couple lived in a nearby house. AAA was asleep when she felt someone caressing her. It turned out to be
Cayanan. He then started kissing her and told her to remove her shorts. When she refused, Cayanan forcibly took it
off and after the latter took off his own under garment, he inserted his organ into her genitalia. Cayanan, who had a
knife with him, threatened to kill AAA if she resisted and informed anybody of the incident.
On February 26, 2001, AAA was about to enter the school campus with her friend Armina Adriano (Adriano) when
Cayanan arrived on a tricycle driven by his uncle, Boy Manalastas. Cayanan then pulled AAA towards the tricycle. She
tried shouting but he covered her mouth. They alighted somewhere and boarded a jeep. He brought her to a dress
shop in x x x, Bulacan where he asked someone to give her a change of clothes as she was in her school uniform and
later to a Jollibee outlet. He then brought her to his sister’s house in x x x where he raped her inside a bedroom.
Afterwards, a certain couple Putay and Tessie talked to Cayanan and she was brought to the barangay office where
she was asked to execute a document stating that she voluntarily went with Cayanan. It was the latter’s mother and
sister-in-law who brought her home later that evening. She told her mother and brother of the incidents only after her
classmate Adriano informed her family of what happened in school and of the rape incidents. AAA testified that she did
not immediately tell her family because she was still in a state of shock. 5
Adriano and the victim’s mother corroborated her testimony. A resident psychiatrist at the National Center for Mental
Health also testified that AAA was suffering from mental depressive symptoms/chronic symptoms and presence of
sexual abuse.6
Cayanan interposed the sweetheart defense. The RTC, however, did not give credit to his defense, ruling that it is a
weak defense and does not rule out the use of force given the prosecution’s evidence. He also failed to establish the
genuineness and authenticity of the love letters allegedly written by AAA. 7
The CA sustained the ruling of the RTC.8
A review of the CA decision shows that it did not commit any reversible error in affirming Cayanan’s conviction. Record
shows that Cayanan forced AAA to have sex with him on February 1, 2001 and threatened her and her family with
physical harm. The testimony of Adriano, meanwhile, corroborated AAA’s testimony that Cayanan forcibly took her by
the school campus gate on February 26, 2001 and thereafter raped her.1âwphi1 The defense failed to show any
reason why the prosecution’s evidence should not be given weight or credit.
Moreover, the claim that they were sweethearts does not justify the commission of the crimes. For the Court to even
consider giving credence to the sweetheart defense, it must be proven by compelling evidence. The defense cannot
just present testimonial evidence in support of the theory. Independent proof is required ― such as tokens, mementos,
and photographs.9 And while Cayanan produced two love letters allegedly written by AAA, the CA correctly sustained
the finding of the RTC that these letters were unauthenticated and therefore, bereft of any probative value.
The Court, however, finds that Cayanan should be convicted only of Qualified Rape in Criminal Case No. 1498-M-
2001. Forcible abduction is absorbed in the crime of rape if the real objective of the accused is to rape the victim. 10In
this case, circumstances show that the victim’s abduction was with the purpose of raping her. Thus, after Cayanan
dragged her into the tricycle, he took her to several places until they reached his sister’s house where he raped her
inside the bedroom. Under these circumstances, the rape absorbed the forcible abduction. 11
Finally, the CA did not commit any reversible error in increasing the amount of civil indemnity and moral damages
awarded in Criminal Case No. 1498-M-2001, and in awarding additional ₱75,000.00 as moral damages in Criminal
Case No. 1499-M-2001 and₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages in both criminal cases, as these are accord with
prevailing jurisprudence.12
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 14, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 04256 is MODIFIED
in that accused appellant Marvin Cayanan is found guilty of Qualified Rape in Criminal Case No. 1498-M-2001. In all
other respects, the CA Decision is AFFIRMED in toto.
Interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be imposed on all the damages awarded, to earn from the date
of the finality of this judgment until fully paid, in line with prevailing jurisprudence. 13
SO ORDERED.

JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SHIRLEY TISMO-CAPILI
G.R. No. 183805 July 3, 2013
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the
Decision1 dated February 1, 2008 and Resolution2 dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR
No. 30444.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
On June 28, 2004, petitioner was charged with the crime of bigamy before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig
City in an Information which reads:
On or about December 8, 1999, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused being
previously united in lawful marriage with Karla Y. Medina-Capili and without said marriage having been legally
dissolved or annulled, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with Shirley
G. Tismo, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.
Contrary to law.3
Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings alleging that: (1) there is a pending civil case for
declaration of nullity of the second marriage before the RTC of Antipolo City filed by Karla Y. Medina-Capili; (2) in the
event that the marriage is declared null and void, it would exculpate him from the charge of bigamy; and (3) the
pendency of the civil case for the declaration of nullity of the second marriage serves as a prejudicial question in the
instant criminal case.
Consequently, the arraignment and pre-trial were reset by the RTC of Pasig City, in view of the filing of the Motion to
Suspend Proceedings filed by petitioner.
In the interim, the RTC of Antipolo City rendered a decision declaring the voidness or incipient invalidity of the second
marriage between petitioner and private respondent on the ground that a subsequent marriage contracted by the
husband during the lifetime of the legal wife is void from the beginning.
Thereafter, the petitioner accused filed his Manifestation and Motion (to Dismiss) praying for the dismissal of the
criminal case for bigamy filed against him on the ground that the second marriage between him and private
respondent had already been declared void by the RTC.
In an Order4 dated July 7, 2006, the RTC of Pasig City granted petitioner’s Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss, to wit:
The motion is anchored on the allegation that this case should be dismissed as a decision dated December 1, 2004
had already been rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 72 in Civil Case No. 01-6043 (entitled:
"Karla Medina-Capili versus James Walter P. Capili and Shirley G. Tismo," a case for declaration of nullity of marriage)
nullifying the second marriage between James Walter P. Capili and Shirley G. Tismo and said decision is already final.
In the opposition filed by the private prosecutor to the motion, it was stated, among others, that the issues raised in the
civil case are not similar or intimately related to the issue in this above-captioned case and that the resolution of the
issues in said civil case would not determine whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
WHEREFORE, after a judicious evaluation of the issue and arguments of the parties, this Court is of the humble
opinion that there is merit on the Motion to dismiss filed by the accused as it appears that the second marriage
between James Walter P. Capili and Shirley G. Tismo had already been nullified by the Regional Trial Court, Branch
72 of Antipolo City which has declared "the voidness, non-existent or incipient invalidity" of the said second marriage.
As such, this Court submits that there is no more bigamy to speak of.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, private respondent filed an appeal before the CA.
Thus, in a Decision5 dated February 1, 2008, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC’s decision. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Order dated 07 July 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch
152 in Crim. Case No. 128370 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings. No costs.
SO ORDERED.6
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration against said decision, but the same was denied in a Resolution[ 7]
dated July 24, 2008.
Accordingly, petitioner filed the present petition for review on certiorari alleging that:
THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO DISREGARD EXISTING
JURISPRUDENCE PRONOUNCED BY THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT AND TO REVERSE THE
ORDER DATED JULY 7, 2006 OF THE TRIAL COURT (REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, PASIG CITY, BRANCH
152) ISSUED IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 128370 GRANTING THE MOTION TO DISMISS THE CASE OF
BIGAMY AGAINST PETITIONER, INASMUCH AS THE ISSUANCE OF THE SAID ORDER IS BASED ON
THE FINDINGS AND/OR FACTS OF THE CASE IN THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
ANTIPOLO CITY, BRANCH 72, IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-6043 AND THE CONCLUDING AND DISPOSITIVE
 PORTION IN THE SAID DECISION WHICH STATES THAT, AFTER PERUSAL OF THE EVIDENCE ON
RECORD AND THE TESTIMONIES OF WITNESSES X X X, THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER
JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT SHIRLEY G. TISMO, IS HEREBY NULL AND
VOID.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT THE DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE BETWEEN
PETITIONER JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI AND SHIRLEY G. TISMO BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
ANTIPOLO CITY, BRANCH 72 IN ITS DECISION IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-6043, IS ON THE GROUND THAT
IT IS BIGAMOUS IN NATURE, DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF ANY SUCH FINDINGS OR FACTS ON WHICH
IT IS BASED IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 14 OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, AND IN
CONCLUDING THAT THE SAID DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE IS NOT A GROUND FOR
DISMISSAL OF THE BIGAMY CASE AGAINST THE PETITIONER, WHICH RULING IS NOT IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE FACTS OF THE CASE OF THE SAID DECISION AND WHICH IS CONTRARY
TO APPLICABLE LAWS AND ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE.
THE CASE OF TENEBRO V. COURT OF APPEALS SPEAKS FOR ITSELF. IT IS AN EXCEPTION TO
EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE INVOLVING DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE AND IS
APPLICABLE ONLY TO THE SET OF FACTS IN THE SAID CASE, AND THE GROUND FOR DECLARATION
OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE IS PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY, HENCE, THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS
FOR ABANDONING EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE AS WHERE IN THE INSTANT CASE THE GROUND FOR
DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE IS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 3 IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 4
OF THE FAMILY CODE.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE USE BY RESPONDENT
SHIRLEY G. TISMO OF THE SURNAME "CAPILI" IS ILLEGAL INASMUCH AS THE DECISION OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO CITY, BRANCH 72 IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-6043 DECLARING
NULL AND VOID THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI AND SHIRLEY G. TISMO HAD
LONG BECOME FINAL AND UNAPPEALABLE AS OF THE DATE OF THE SAID DECISION ON
DECEMBER 1, 2004 AND DULY RECORDED IN THE RECORDS OF ENTRIES IN THE CORRESPONDING
BOOK IN THE OFFICE OF THE CIVIL REGISTRAR OF PASIG CITY AND THE NATIONAL STATISTICS
OFFICE.8
In essence, the issue is whether or not the subsequent declaration of nullity of the second marriage is a ground for
dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy.
We rule in the negative.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes the crime of bigamy as follows:
Art. 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy, therefore, are: (1) the offender has been legally married; (2) the marriage has
not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead
according to the Civil Code; (3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or
subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. 9
In the present case, it appears that all the elements of the crime of bigamy were present when the Information was
filed on June 28, 2004.
It is undisputed that a second marriage between petitioner and private respondent was contracted on December 8,
1999 during the subsistence of a valid first marriage between petitioner and Karla Y. Medina-Capili contracted on
September 3, 1999. Notably, the RTC of Antipolo City itself declared the bigamous nature of the second marriage
between petitioner and private respondent. Thus, the subsequent judicial declaration of the second marriage for being
bigamous in nature does not bar the prosecution of petitioner for the crime of bigamy.
Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that the accused may still be charged with the crime of bigamy, even if
there is a subsequent declaration of the nullity of the second marriage, so long as the first marriage was still subsisting
when the second marriage was celebrated.
In Jarillo v. People,10 the Court affirmed the accused’s conviction for bigamy ruling that the crime of bigamy is
consummated on the celebration of the subsequent marriage without the previous one having been judicially declared
null and void, viz.:
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration
of nullity, the crime had already been consummated. Moreover, petitioner’s assertion would only delay the prosecution
of bigamy cases considering that an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and
invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to [private complainant] had no bearing upon the
determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the
charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.
Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in
a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void
ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled. 11
In like manner, the Court recently upheld the ruling in the aforementioned case and ruled that what makes a person
criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid
first marriage. It further held that the parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity,
for the same must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so
declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage
exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of the first marriage assumes the
risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.12
Finally, it is a settled rule that the criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the commission of the offense, and
from that instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by law. 13 It is clear then that the crime of
bigamy was committed by petitioner from the time he contracted the second marriage with private respondent. Thus,
the finality of the judicial declaration of nullity of petitioner’s second marriage does not impede the filing of a criminal
charge for bigamy against him.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated February 1, 2008 and Resolution
dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30444 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF PHILIPPINES vs. EDGARDO V. ODTUHAN

G.R. No. 191566 July 17, 2013
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner People of the
Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, against respondent Edgardo V. Odtuhan assailing the
Court of Appeals Decision1 dated December 17, 2009 and Resolution2 dated March 4, 2010 in CA-G.R. SP No.
108616. The assailed decision granted the petition for certiorari filed by respondent, and ordered the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 27, to give due course to and receive evidence on respondent's motion to quash and
resolve the case with dispatch, while the assailed resolution denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The facts of the case follow:
On July 2, 1980, respondent married Jasmin Modina (Modina). 3 On October 28, 1993, respondent married Eleanor A.
Alagon (Alagon).4 Sometime in August 1994, he filed a petition for annulment of his marriage with Modina. 5 On
February 23, 1999, the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 70 granted respondent’s petition and declared his marriage with
Modina void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage license. 6 On November 10, 2003, Alagon died. In the meantime, in
June 2003, private complainant Evelyn Abesamis Alagon learned of respondent’s previous marriage with Modina. 7She
thus filed a Complaint-Affidavit8 charging respondent with Bigamy.
On April 15, 2005, respondent was indicted in an Information 9 for Bigamy committed as follows:
That on or about October 28, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused being then legally married to
JASMIN MODINA and without such marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously contract a second or subsequent marriage with ELEANOR A. ALAGON, which second/subsequent
marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
Contrary to law.10
On February 5, 2008, respondent filed an Omnibus Motion 11 praying that he be allowed to present evidence to support
his motion; that his motion to quash be granted; and that the case be dismissed. Respondent moved for the quashal
of the information on two grounds, to wit: (1) that the facts do not charge the offense of bigamy; and (2) that the
criminal action or liability has been extinguished.12
On September 4, 2008, the RTC13 issued an Order14 denying respondent’s Omnibus Motion. The RTC held that the
facts alleged in the information – that there was a valid marriage between respondent and Modina and without such
marriage having been dissolved, respondent contracted a second marriage with Alagon – constitute the crime of
bigamy. The trial court further held that neither can the information be quashed on the ground that criminal liability has
been extinguished, because the declaration of nullity of the first marriage is not one of the modes of extinguishing
criminal liability. Respondent’s motion for reconsideration was likewise denied in an Order 15 dated February 20, 2009.
Aggrieved, respondent instituted a special civil action on certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court 16 before the
CA, assailing the denial of his motion to quash the information despite the fact that his first marriage with Modina was
declared null and void ab initio prior to the filing of the bigamy case. 17
On December 17, 2009, the CA rendered the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The RTC, Branch 27,
Manila is hereby ordered to give due course to and receive evidence on the petitioner’s motion to quash and resolve
the case with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.18
The CA applied the conclusion made by the Court in Morigo v. People, 19 and held that there is cogent basis in looking
into the motion to quash filed by respondent, for if the evidence would establish that his first marriage was indeed void
ab initio, one essential element of the crime of bigamy would be lacking. 20 The appellate court further held that
respondent is even better off than Morigo which thus calls for the application of such doctrine, considering that
respondent contracted the second marriage after filing the petition for the declaration of nullity of his first marriage and
he obtained the favorable declaration before the complaint for bigamy was filed against him. 21 The CA thus concluded
that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying respondent’s motion to quash the information, considering that
the facts alleged in the information do not charge an offense. 22
With the denial of the motion for reconsideration before the CA, petitioner filed a petition before the Court in this
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court based on the following grounds:
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RENDERED ITS DECISION DATED
DECEMBER 17, 2009 GRANTING RESPONDENT’S PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND THE RESOLUTION DATED
MARCH 4, 2010 DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, CONSIDERING THAT:
I.
THE INFORMATION CHARGING RESPONDENT OF BIGAMY SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGES ALL THE ELEMENTS
CONSTITUTING SAID OFFENSE.
II.
THE SUBSEQUENT COURT JUDGMENT DECLARING RESPONDENT’S FIRST MARRIAGE VOID AB INITIO DID
NOT EXTINGUISH RESPONDENT’S CRIMINAL LIABILITY WHICH ALREADY ATTACHED PRIOR TO SAID
JUDGMENT.23
The petition is meritorious.
The issues are not novel and have been squarely ruled upon by this Court in Montañez v. Cipriano, 24 Teves v.
People,25 and Antone v. Beronilla.26
In Montañez, respondent Cipriano married Socrates in April 1976, but during the subsistence of their marriage on
January 24, 1983, respondent married Silverio. In 2001, respondent filed a petition for the annulment of her marriage
with Socrates on the ground of psychological incapacity which was granted on July 18, 2003. On May 14, 2004,
petitioner filed a complaint for bigamy against respondent. The latter, however, moved for the quashal of the
information and dismissal of the criminal complaint alleging that her first marriage had already been declared void ab
initio prior to the filing of the bigamy case.
In Teves, petitioner married Thelma on November 26, 1992. During the subsistence of their marriage on December 10,
2001, he again married Edita. On May 4, 2006, petitioner obtained a declaration of her marriage with Thelma null and
void on the ground that the latter is physically incapacitated to comply with her marital obligations. On June 8, 2006,
an Information for Bigamy was filed against petitioner. The court eventually convicted petitioner of the crime charged.
In Antone, petitioner married respondent in 1978, but during the subsistence of their marriage, respondent contracted
a second marriage in 1991. On April 26, 2007, respondent obtained a declaration of nullity of her first marriage which
decision became final and executory on May 15, 2007. On June 21, 2007, the prosecution filed an information for
bigamy against respondent which the latter sought to be quashed on the ground that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense.
The present case stemmed from similar procedural and factual antecedents as in the above cases. As in Antone and
Montañez, respondent moved to quash the information on the grounds that the facts do not charge the offense of
bigamy and that his criminal liability has been extinguished both because of the declaration of nullity of the first
marriage. The RTC refused to quash the information. On petition for certiorari, the CA, however, reached a different
conclusion.
As defined in Antone, "a motion to quash information is the mode by which an accused assails the validity of a criminal
complaint or information filed against him for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which are apparent
in the face of the information." It is a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the information. The fundamental
test in determining the sufficiency of the material averments in an Information is whether or not the facts alleged
therein, which are hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime defined by law.
Evidence aliunde or matters extrinsic of the information are not to be considered. 27 To be sure, a motion to quash
should be based on a defect in the information which is evident on its fact. 28 Thus, if the defect can be cured by
amendment or if it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the prosecution is given
by the court the opportunity to correct the defect by amendment. 29 If the motion to quash is sustained, the court may
order that another complaint or information be filed 30 except when the information is quashed on the ground of
extinction of criminal liability or double jeopardy.31
An examination of the information filed against respondent, however, shows the sufficiency of the allegations therein to
constitute the crime of bigamy as it contained all the elements of the crime as provided for in Article 349 32 of the
Revised Penal Code, to wit:
(1) That the offender has been legally married;
(2) That the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
(3) That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
(4) That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. 33
Here, the information contained the following allegations: (1) that respondent is legally married to Modina; (2) that
without such marriage having been legally dissolved; (3) that respondent willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
contracted a second marriage with Alagon; and (4) that the second marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
Respondent’s evidence showing the court’s declaration that his marriage to Modina is null and void from the beginning
because of the absence of a marriage license is only an evidence that seeks to establish a fact contrary to that alleged
in the information that a first valid marriage was subsisting at the time he contracted the second marriage. This should
not be considered at all, because matters of defense cannot be raised in a motion to quash. 34It is notproper, therefore,
to resolve the charges at the very outset without the benefit of a full blown trial. The issues require a fuller examination
and it would be unfair to shut off the prosecution at this stage of the proceedings and to quash the information on the
basis of the document presented by respondent.35 With the presentation of the court decree, no facts have been
brought out which destroyed the prima facie truth accorded to the allegations of the information on the hypothetical
admission thereof.
Respondent’s motion to quash was founded on the trial court’s declaration that his marriage with Modina is null and
void ab initio. He claims that with such declaration, one of the elements of the crime is wanting. Thus, the allegations
in the information do not charge the offense of bigamy, or at the very least, such court decree extinguished his criminal
liability. Both respondent and the CA heavily relied on the Court’s pronouncement in Morigo v. People 36where the
accused therein was acquitted because the elements of the crime of bigamy were incomplete. In said case, the first
marriage was declared null and void, because the parties only signed the marriage contract without the presence of a
solemnizing officer. Considering, therefore, that the declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage, the
Court held that there was no marriage to speak of when the accused contracted the second marriage. Logically, the
accused was acquitted.
The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter.1âwphi1 A declaration of the
absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. 37 It has
been held in a number of cases that a judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage can
be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and immoral. 38
What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of a valid marriage.39 Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for
the same must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so
declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration, the presumption is that the marriage
exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. 40 If we allow respondent’s line of defense and the CA’s ratiocination,
a person who commits bigamy can simply evade prosecution by immediately filing a petition for the declaration of
nullity of his earlier marriage and hope that a favorable decision is rendered therein before anyone institutes a
complaint against him.41
Respondent, likewise, claims that there are more reasons to quash the information against him, because he obtained
the declaration of nullity of marriage before the filing of the complaint for bigamy against him. Again, we cannot sustain
such contention. In addition to the discussion above, settled is the rule that criminal culpability attaches to the offender
upon the commission of the offense and from that instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by
law and that the time of filing of the criminal complaint or information is material only for determining prescription. 42
Thus, as held in Antone:
To conclude, the issue on the declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent only after the
latter contracted the subsequent marriage is, therefore, immaterial for the purpose of establishing that the facts
alleged in the information for Bigamy does not constitute an offense. Following the same rationale, neither may such
defense be interposed by the respondent in his motion to quash by way of exception to the established rule that facts
contrary to the allegations in the information are matters of defense which may be raised only during the presentation
of evidence.43
In view of the foregoing, the CA erred in granting the petition for certiorari filed by respondent. The RTC did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in denying his motion to quash and to allow him to present evidence to support his omnibus
motion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated December 17, 2009 and
Resolution dated March 4, 2010 in CA-G.R. SP No. 108616 are SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 05-235814 is
REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 27 for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.

CELERINA J. SANTOS v. RICARDO T. SANTOS

G.R. No. 187061, October 08, 2014
LEONEN, J.:
The proper remedy for a judicial declaration of presumptive death obtained by extrinsic fraud is an action to annul the
judgment. An affidavit of reappearance is not the proper remedy when the person declared presumptively dead has
never been absent.

This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Celerina J. Santos, assailing the Court of Appeals' resolutions dated
November 28, 2008 and March 5, 2009. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for the annulment of the trial
court's judgment declaring her presumptively dead.

On July 27, 2007, the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City declared petitioner Celerina J. Santos (Celerina)
presumptively dead after her husband, respondent Ricardo T. Santos (Ricardo), had filed a petition for declaration of
absence or presumptive death for the purpose of remarriage on June 15, 2007.1 Ricardo remarried on September 17,
2008.2chanrobleslaw

In his petition for declaration of absence or presumptive death, Ricardo alleged that he and Celerina rented an
apartment somewhere in San Juan, Metro Manila; after they had gotten married on June 18, 1980. 3 After a year, they
moved to Tarlac City. They were engaged in the buy and sell business. 4chanrobleslaw

Ricardo claimed that their business did not prosper. 5 As a result, Celerina convinced him to allow her to work as a
domestic helper in Hong Kong.6 Ricardo initially refused but because of Celerina's insistence, he allowed her to work
abroad.7 She allegedly applied in an employment agency in Ermita, Manila, in February 1995. She left Tarlac two
months after and was never heard from again.8chanrobleslaw

Ricardo further alleged that he exerted efforts to locate Celerina. 9 He went to Celerina's parents in Cubao, Quezon
City, but they, too, did not know their daughter's whereabouts. 10 He also inquired about her from other relatives and
friends, but no one gave him any information.11chanrobleslaw

Ricardo claimed that it was almost 12 years from the date of his Regional Trial Court petition since Celerina left. He
believed that she had passed away.12chanrobleslaw

Celerina claimed that she learned about Ricardo's petition only sometime in October 2008 when she could no longer
avail the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief, or other appropriate remedies. 13chanrobleslaw

On November 17, 2008, Celerina filed a petition for annulment of judgment 14 before the Court of Appeals on the
grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. She argued that she was deprived her day in court when Ricardo,
despite his knowledge of her true residence, misrepresented to the court that she was a resident of Tarlac
City.15 According to Celerina, her true residence was in Neptune Extension, Congressional Avenue, Quezon
City.16 This residence had been her and Ricardo's conjugal dwelling since 1989 until Ricardo left in May 2008. 17 As a
result of Ricardo's misrepresentation, she was deprived of any notice of and opportunity to oppose the petition
declaring her presumptively dead.18chanrobleslaw

Celerina claimed that she never resided in Tarlac. She also never left and worked as a domestic helper
abroad.20 Neither did she go to an employment agency in February 1995. 21 She also claimed that it was not true that
she had been absent for 12 years. Ricardo was aware that she never left their conjugal dwelling in Quezon City. 22 It
was he who left the conjugal dwelling in May 2008 to cohabit with another woman. 23 Celerina referred to a joint
affidavit executed by their children to support her contention that Ricardo made false allegations in his
petition.24chanrobleslaw

Celerina also argued that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over Ricardo's petition because it had never been
published in a newspaper.25 She added that the Office of the Solicitor General and the Provincial Prosecutor's Office
were not furnished copies of Ricardo's petition.26chanrobleslaw

The Court of Appeals issued the resolution dated November 28, 2008, dismissing Celerina's petition for annulment of
judgment for being a wrong mode of remedy.27 According to the Court of Appeals, the proper remedy was to file a
sworn statement before the civil registry, declaring her reappearance in accordance with Article 42 of the Family
Code.28chanrobleslaw

Celerina filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals' resolution dated November 28, 2008. 29 The Court
of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration in the resolution dated March 5, 2009. 30chanrobleslaw

Hence, this petition was filed.

The issue for resolution is whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing Celerina's petition for annulment of
judgment for being a wrong remedy for a fraudulently obtained judgment declaring presumptive death.
Celerina argued that filing an affidavit of reappearance under Article 42 of the Family Code is appropriate only when
the spouse is actually absent and the spouse seeking the declaration of presumptive death actually has a well-
founded belief of the spouse's death.31 She added that it would be inappropriate to file an affidavit of reappearance if
she did not disappear in the first place.32 She insisted that an action for annulment of judgment is proper when the
declaration of presumptive death is obtained fraudulently. 33chanrobleslaw

Celerina further argued that filing an affidavit of reappearance under Article 42 of the Family Code would not be a
sufficient remedy because it would not nullify the legal effects of the judgment declaring her presumptive
death.34chanrobleslaw

In Ricardo's comment,35 he argued that a petition for annulment of judgment is not the proper remedy because it
cannot be availed when there are other remedies available. Celerina could always file an affidavit of reappearance to
terminate the subsequent marriage. Ricardo iterated the Court of Appeals' ruling that the remedy afforded to Celerina
under Article 42 of the Family Code is the appropriate remedy.

The petition is meritorious.

Annulment of judgment is the remedy when the Regional Trial Court's judgment, order, or resolution has become final,
and the "remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief (or other appropriate remedies) are no longer available
through no fault of the petitioner."36chanrobleslaw

The grounds for annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. 37 This court defined extrinsic fraud
in Stilianopulos v. City of Legaspi:38chanrobleslaw
For fraud to become a basis for annulment of judgment, it has to be extrinsic or actual. It is intrinsic when the
fraudulent acts pertain to an issue involved in the original action or where the acts constituting the fraud were or could
have been litigated, It is extrinsic or collateral when a litigant commits acts outside of the trial which prevents a parly
from having a real contest, or from presenting all of his case, such that there is no fair submission of the
controversy.39 (Emphasis supplied)

Celerina alleged in her petition for annulment of judgment that there was fraud when Ricardo deliberately made false
allegations in the court with respect to her residence. 40 Ricardo also falsely claimed that she was absent for 12 years.
There was also no publication of the notice of hearing of Ricardo's petition in a newspaper of general
circulation.41 Celerina claimed that because of these, she was deprived of notice and opportunity to oppose Ricardo's
petition to declare her presumptively dead.42chanrobleslaw

Celerina alleged that all the facts supporting Ricardo's petition for declaration of presumptive death were
false.43 Celerina further claimed that the court did not acquire jurisdiction because the Office of the Solicitor General
and the Provincial Prosecutor's Office were not given copies of Ricardo's petition. 44chanrobleslaw

These are allegations of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Celerina alleged in her petition with the Court of
Appeals sufficient ground/s for annulment of judgment.

Celerina filed her petition for annulment of judgment 45 on November 17, 2008. This was less than two years from the
July 27, 2007 decision declaring her presumptively dead and about a month from her discovery of the decision in
October 2008. The petition was, therefore, filed within the four-year period allowed by law in case of extrinsic fraud,
and before the action is barred by laches, which is the period allowed in case of lack of jurisdiction. 46chanrobleslaw

There was also no other sufficient remedy available to Celerina at the time of her discovery of the fraud perpetrated on
her.

The choice of remedy is important because remedies carry with them certain admissions, presumptions, and
conditions.

The Family Code provides that it is the proof of absence of a spouse for four consecutive years, coupled with a well-
founded belief by the present spouse that the absent spouse is already dead, that constitutes a justification for a
second marriage during the subsistence of another marriage. 47chanrobleslaw

The Family Code also provides that the second marriage is in danger of being terminated by the presumptively dead
spouse when he or she reappears. Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Article 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall be automatically terminated by the
recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the previous
marriage or declaring it void ab initio.

A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry of the
residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested person, with due notice to the
spouses of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice to the fact of reappearance being judicially determined in
case such fact is disputed. (Emphasis supplied)

In other words, the Family Code provides the presumptively dead spouse with the remedy of terminating the
subsequent marriage by mere reappearance.

The filing of an affidavit of reappearance is an admission on the part of the first spouse that his or her marriage to the
present spouse was terminated when he or she was declared absent or presumptively dead.

Moreover, a close reading of the entire Article 42 reveals that the termination of the subsequent marriage by
reappearance is subject to several conditions: (1) the non-existence of a judgment annulling the previous marriage or
declaring it void ab initio; (2) recording in the civil registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage of
the sworn statement of fact and circumstances of reappearance; (3) due notice to the spouses of the subsequent
marriage of the fact of reappearance; and (4) the fact of reappearance must either be undisputed or judicially
determined.

The existence of these conditions means that reappearance does not always immediately cause the subsequent
marriage's termination. Reappearance of the absent or presumptively dead spouse will cause the termination of the
subsequent marriage only when all the conditions enumerated in the Family Code are present.

Hence, the subsequent marriage may still subsist despite the absent or presumptively dead spouse's reappearance
(1) if the first marriage has already been annulled or has been declared a nullity; (2) if the sworn statement of the
reappearance is not recorded in the civil registry of the subsequent spouses' residence; (3) if there is no notice to the
subsequent spouses; or (4) if the fact of reappearance is disputed in the proper courts of law, and no judgment is yet
rendered confirming, such fact of reappearance.

When subsequent marriages are contracted after a judicial declaration of presumptive death, a presumption arises
that the first spouse is already dead and that the second marriage is legal. This presumption should prevail over the
continuance of the marital relations with the first spouse. 48 The second marriage, as with all marriages, is presumed
valid.49 The burden of proof to show that the first marriage was not properly dissolved rests on the person assailing the
validity of the second marriage.50chanrobleslaw

This court recognized the conditional nature of reappearance as a cause for terminating the subsequent marriage
in Social Security System v. Vda. de Bailon.51 This court noted52 that mere reappearance will not terminate the
subsequent marriage even if the parties to the subsequent marriage were notified if there was "no step . . . taken to
terminate the subsequent marriage, either by [filing an] affidavit [of reappearance] or by court action[.]" 53 "Since the
second marriage has been contracted because of a presumption that the former spouse is dead, such presumption
continues inspite of the spouse's physical reappearance, and by fiction of law, he or she must still be regarded as
legally an absentee until the subsequent marriage is terminated as provided by law."54chanrobleslaw

The choice of the proper remedy is also important for purposes of determining the status of the second marriage and
the liabilities of the spouse who, in bad faith, claimed that the other spouse was absent.

A second marriage is bigamous while the first subsists. However, a bigamous subsequent marriage may be
considered valid when the following are present:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1) The prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years;
2) The spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead;
3) There must be a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse; and
4) There is a court declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse. 55

A subsequent marriage contracted in bad faith, even if it was contracted after a court declaration of presumptive
death, lacks the requirement of a well-founded belief56 that the spouse is already dead. The first marriage will not be
considered as. validly terminated. Marriages contracted prior to the valid termination of a subsisting marriage are
generally considered bigamous and void.57 Only a subsequent marriage contracted in good faith is protected by law.

Therefore, the party who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith is also not immune from an action to declare
his subsequent marriage void for being bigamous. The prohibition against marriage during the subsistence of another
marriage still applies.58chanrobleslaw

If, as Celerina contends, Ricardo was in bad faith when he filed his petition to declare her presumptively dead and
when he contracted the subsequent marriage, such marriage would be considered void for being bigamous under
Article 35(4) of the Family Code. This is because the circumstances lack the element of "well-founded belief under
Article 41 of the Family Code, which is essential for the exception to the rule against bigamous marriages to
apply.59chanrobleslaw

The provision on reappearance in the Family Code as a remedy to effect the termination of the subsequent marriage
does not preclude the spouse who was declared presumptively dead from availing other remedies existing in law. This
court had, in fact, recognized that a subsequent marriage may also be terminated by filing "an action in court to prove
the reappearance of the absentee and obtain a declaration of dissolution or termination of the subsequent
marriage."60chanrobleslaw

Celerina does not admit to have been absent. She also seeks not merely the termination of the subsequent marriage
but also the nullification of its effects. She contends that reappearance is not a sufficient remedy because it will only
terminate the subsequent marriage but not nullify the effects of the declaration of her presumptive death and the
subsequent marriage.

Celerina is correct. Since an undisturbed subsequent marriage under Article 42 of the Family Code is valid until
terminated, the "children of such marriage shall be considered legitimate, and the property relations of the spouse[s] in
such marriage will be the same as in valid marriages." 61 If it is terminated by mere reappearance, the children of the
subsequent marriage conceived before the termination shall still be considered legitimate. 62 Moreover, a judgment
declaring presumptive death is a defense against prosecution for bigamy. 63chanrobleslaw

It is true that in most cases, an action to declare the nullity of the subsequent marriage may nullify the effects of the
subsequent marriage, specifically, in relation to the status of children and the prospect of prosecuting a respondent for
bigamy.

However, "a Petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages may be filed solely by the husband or
wife."64 This means that even if Celerina is a real party in interest who stands to be benefited or injured by the
outcome of an action to nullify the second marriage, 65 this remedy is not available to her.

Therefore, for the purpose of not only terminating the subsequent marriage but also of nullifying the effects of the
declaration of presumptive death and the subsequent marriage, mere filing of an affidavit of reappearance would not
suffice. Celerina's choice to file an action for annulment of judgment will, therefore, lie.

WHEREFORE, the case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for determination of the existence of extrinsic fraud,
grounds for nullity/annulment of the first marriage, and the merits of the petition.

SO ORDERED.

LEONILA G. SANTIAGO vs. PEOPLEOF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 200233 JULY 15, 2015
SERENO, CJ:
We resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Leonila G. Santiago from the Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 33566. 1 The CA affirmed the Decision and Order of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 7232 2 convicting her of bigamy.
THE FACTS
Four months after the solemnization of their marriage on 29 July 1997, 3 Leonila G. Santiago and Nicanor F. Santos
faced an Information 4 for bigamy. Petitioner pleaded "not guilty," while her putative husband escaped the criminal
suit. 5
The prosecution adduced evidence that Santos, who had been married to Estela Galang since 2 June 1974, 6 asked
petitioner to marry him. Petitioner, who 'was a 43-year-old widow then, married Santos on 29 July 1997 despite the
advice of her brother-in-law and parents-in-law that if she wanted to remarry, she should choose someone who was
"without responsibility." 7
Petitioner asserted her affirmative defense that she could not be included as an accused in the crime of bigamy,
because she had been under the belief that Santos was still single when they got married. She also averred that for
there to be a conviction for bigamy, his second marriage to her should be proven valid by the prosecution; but in this
case, she argued that their marriage was void due to the lack of a marriage license.
Eleven years after the inception of this criminal case, the first wife, Estela Galang, testified for the
prosecution.1âwphi1 She alleged that she had met petitioner as early as March and April 1997, on which occasions
the former introduced herself as the legal wife of Santos. Petitioner denied this allegation and averred that she met
Galang only in August and September 1997, or after she had already married Santos.
THE RTC RULING
The RTC appreciated the undisputed fact that petitioner married Santos during the subsistence of his marriage to
Galang. Based on the more credible account of Galang that she had already introduced herself as the legal wife of
Santos in March and April 1997, the trial court rejected the affirmative defense of petitioner that she had not known of
the first marriage. It also held that it was incredible for a learned person like petitioner to be easily duped by a person
like Santos. 8
The RTC declared that as indicated in the Certificate of Marriage, "her marriage was celebrated without a need for a
marriage license in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code, which is an admission that she cohabited with
Santos long before the celebration of their marriage." 9Thus, the trial court convicted petitioner as follows: 10
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds the accused Leonila G. Santiago GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Bigamy, defined and penalized under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code and imposes
against her the indeterminate penalty of six ( 6) months and one (1) day of Prision Correctional as minimum to six ( 6)
years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as maximum.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. She contended that her marriage to Santos was void ab initio for having been
celebrated without complying with Article 34 of the Family Code, which provides an exemption from the requirement of
a marriage license if the parties have actually lived together as husband and wife for at least five years prior to the
celebration of their marriage. In her case, petitioner asserted that she and Santos had not lived together as husband
and wife for five years prior to their marriage. Hence, she argued that the absence of a marriage license effectively
rendered their marriage null and void, justifying her acquittal from bigamy.
11
The RTC refused to reverse her conviction and held thus:
Accused Santiago submits that it is her marriage to her co-accused that is null and void as it was celebrated without a
valid marriage license x x x. In advancing that theory, accused wants this court to pass judgment on the validity of her
marriage to accused Santos, something this court cannot do. The best support to her argument would have been the
submission of a judicial decree of annulment of their marriage. Absent such proof, this court cannot declare their
marriage null and void in these proceedings.
THE CA RULING
On appeal before the CA, petitioner claimed that her conviction was not based on proof beyond reasonable doubt.
She attacked the credibility of Galang and insisted that the former had not known of the previous marriage of Santos.
Similar to the RTC, the CA gave more weight to the prosecution witnesses' narration. It likewise disbelieved the
testimony of Santos. Anent the lack of a marriage license, the appellate court simply stated that the claim was a vain
attempt to put the validity of her marriage to Santos in question. Consequently, the CA affirmed her conviction for
bigamy. 12
THE ISSUES
Before this Court, petitioner reiterates that she cannot be a co-accused in the instant case, because she was not
aware of Santos's previous marriage. But in the main, she argues that for there to be a conviction for bigamy, a valid
second marriage must be proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
Citing People v. De Lara, 13 she contends that her marriage to Santos is void because of the absence of a marriage
license. She elaborates that their marriage does not fall under any of those marriages exempt from a marriage license,
because they have not previously lived together exclusively as husband and wife for at least five years. She alleges
that it is extant in the records that she married Santos in 1997, or only four years since she met him in 1993. Without
completing the five-year requirement, she posits that their marriage without a license is void.
In the Comment 14 filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), respondent advances the argument that the
instant Rule 45 petition should be denied for raising factual issues as regards her husband's subsequent marriage. As
regards petitioner's denial of any knowledge of Santos' s first marriage, respondent reiterates that credible testimonial
evidence supports the conclusion of the courts a quo that petitioner knew about the subsisting marriage.
The crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage
before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively
dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
In Montanez v. Cipriano, 15 this Court enumerated the elements of bigamy as follows:
The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been legally married; (b) the marriage has not been
legally dissolved x x x; (c) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (d) the second or subsequent
marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second
marriage or subsequent marriage. It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage,
having all the essential requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage. (Emphasis
supplied)
For the second spouse to be indicted as a co-accused in the crime, People v. Nepomuceno, Jr. 16 instructs that she
should have had knowledge of the previous subsisting marriage. People v. Archilla 17 likewise states that the
knowledge of the second wife of the fact of her spouse's existing prior marriage constitutes an indispensable
cooperation in the commission of bigamy, which makes her responsible as an accomplice.
THE RULING OF THE COURT
The penalty for bigamy and petitioner's knowledge of Santos's first marriage
The crime of bigamy does not necessary entail the joint liability of two persons who marry each other while the
previous marriage of one of them is valid and subsisting. As explained in Nepomuceno: 18
In the crime of bigamy, both the first and second spouses may be the offended parties depending on the
circumstances, as when the second spouse married the accused without being aware of his previous marriage. Only if
the second spouse had knowledge of the previous undissolved marriage of the accused could she be included in the
information as a co-accused. (Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, the lower courts correctly ascertained petitioner's knowledge of Santos's marriage to Galang. Both courts
consistently found that she knew of the first marriage as shown by the totality of the following circumstances: 19 (1)
when Santos was courting and visiting petitioner in the house of her in-laws, they openly showed their disapproval of
him; (2) it was incredible for a learned person like petitioner to not know of his true civil status; and (3) Galang, who
was the more credible witness compared with petitioner who had various inconsistent testimonies, straightforwardly
testified that she had already told petitioner on two occasions that the former was the legal wife of Santos.
After a careful review of the records, we see no reason to reverse or modify the factual findings of the R TC, less so in
the present case in which its findings were affirmed by the CA. Indeed, the trial court's assessment of the credibility of
witnesses deserves great respect, since it had the important opportunity to observe firsthand the expression and
demeanor of the witnesses during the trial. 20
Given that petitioner knew of the first marriage, this Court concurs with the ruling that she was validly charged with
bigamy. However, we disagree with the lower courts' imposition of the principal penalty on her. To recall, the RTC,
which the CA affirmed, meted out to her the penalty within the range of prision correctional as minimum to prision
mayor as maximum.
Her punishment as a principal to the crime is wrong. Archilla 21 holds that the second spouse, if indicted in the crime of
bigamy, is liable only as an accomplice. In referring to Viada, Justice Luis B. Reyes, an eminent authority in criminal
law, writes that "a person, whether man or woman, who knowingly consents or agrees to be married to another
already bound in lawful wedlock is guilty as an accomplice in the crime of bigamy." 22 Therefore, her conviction should
only be that for an accomplice to the crime.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for a principal in the crime of bigamy is prision
mayor, which has a duration of six years and one day to twelve years. Since the criminal participation of petitioner is
that of an accomplice, the sentence imposable on her is the penalty next lower in degree, 23 prision correctional, which
has a duration of six months and one day to six years. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance,
this penalty shall be imposed in its medium period consisting of two years, four months and one day to four years and
two months of imprisonment. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, 24 petitioner shall be entitled to a minimum
term, to be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, arresto mayor, which has a duration of one month and one
day to six months imprisonment.
The criminal liability of petitioner resulting from her marriage to Santos
Jurisprudence clearly requires that for the accused to be convicted of bigamy, the second or subsequent marriage
must have all the essential requisites for validity. 25 If the accused wants to raise the nullity of the marriage, he or she
can do it as a matter of defense during the presentation of evidence in the trial proper of the criminal case. 26 In this
case, petitioner has consistently27 questioned below the validity of her marriage to Santos on the ground that
marriages celebrated without the essential requisite of a marriage license are void ab initio. 28
Unfortunately, the lower courts merely brushed aside the issue. The RTC stated that it could not pass judgment on the
validity of the marriage.1âwphi1 The CA held that the attempt of petitioner to attack her union with Santos was in vain.
On the basis that the lower courts have manifestly overlooked certain issues and facts, 29 and given that an appeal in a
criminal case throws the whole case open for review, 30 this Court now resolves to correct the error of the courts a quo.
After a perusal of the records, it is clear that the marriage between petitioner and Santos took place without a
marriage license. The absence of this requirement is purportedly explained in their Certificate of Marriage, which
reveals that their union was celebrated under Article 34 of the Family Code. The provision reads as follows:
No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife
for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the
foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall
also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties are found no legal impediment to
the marriage.31
Here, respondent did not dispute that petitioner knew Santos in more or less in February 1996 32 and that after six
months of courtship,33 she married him on 29 July 1997. Without any objection from the prosecution, petitioner testified
that Santos had frequently visited her in Castellano, Nueva Ecija, prior to their marriage. However, he never cohabited
with her, as she was residing in the house of her in-laws, 34 and her children from her previous marriage disliked
him.35 On cross examination, respondent did not question the claim of petitioner that sometime in 1993, she first met
Santos as an agent who sold her piglets.36
All told, the evidence on record shows that petitioner and Santos had only known each other for only less than four
years. Thus, it follows that the two of them could not have cohabited for at least five years prior to their marriage.
Santiago and Santos, however, reflected the exact opposite of this demonstrable fact. Although the records do not
show that they submitted an affidavit of cohabitation as required by Article 34 of the Family Code, it appears that the
two of them lied before the solemnizing officer and misrepresented that they had actually cohabited for at least five
years before they married each other. Unfortunately, subsequent to this lie was the issuance of the Certificate of
Marriage, 37 in which the solemnizing officer stated under oath that no marriage license was necessary, because the
marriage was solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code.
The legal effects in a criminal case of a deliberate act to put a flaw in the marriage
The Certificate of Marriage, signed by Santos and Santiago, contained the misrepresentation perpetrated by them that
they were eligible to contract marriage without a license. We thus face an anomalous situation wherein petitioner
seeks to be acquitted of bigamy based on her illegal actions of (1) marrying Santos without a marriage license despite
knowing that they had not satisfied the cohabitation requirement under the law; and (2) falsely making claims in no
less than her marriage contract.
We chastise this deceptive scheme that hides what is basically a bigamous and illicit marriage in an effort to escape
criminal prosecution. Our penal laws on marriage, such as bigamy, punish an individual's deliberate disregard of the
permanent and sacrosanct character of this special bond between spouses. 38 In Tenebro v. Court of Appeals,39 we had
the occasion to emphasize that the State's penal laws on bigamy should not be rendered nugatory by allowing
individuals "to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the
consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity
and commitment."
Thus, in the case at bar, we cannot countenance petitioner's illegal acts of feigning a marriage and, in the same
40
breath, adjudge her innocent of the crime. For us, to do so would only make a mockery of the sanctity of marriage.
Furthermore, it is a basic concept of justice that no court will "lend its aid to x x x one who has consciously and
voluntarily become a party to an illegal act upon which the cause of action is founded." 41 If the cause of action
appears to arise ex turpi causa or that which involves a transgression of positive law, parties shall be left unassisted
by the courts. 42 As a result, litigants shall be denied relief on the ground that their conduct has been inequitable, unfair
and dishonest or fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy in issue. 43
Here, the cause of action of petitioner, meaning her affirmative defense in this criminal case of bigamy, is that her
marriage with Santos was void for having been secured without a marriage license. But as elucidated earlier, they
themselves perpetrated a false Certificate of Marriage by misrepresenting that they were exempted from the license
requirement based on their fabricated claim that they had already cohabited as husband and wife for at least five
years prior their marriage. In violation of our law against illegal marriages, 44 petitioner married Santos while knowing
full well that they had not yet complied with the five-year cohabitation requirement under Article 34 of the Family Code.
Consequently, it will be the height of absurdity for this Court to allow petitioner to use her illegal act to escape criminal
conviction.
The applicability of People v. De Lara
Petitioner cites De Lara as the relevant jurisprudence involving an acquittal for bigamy on the ground that the second
marriage lacked the requisite marriage license. In that case, the Court found that when Domingo de Lara married his
second wife, Josefa Rosales, on 18 August 1951, the local Civil Registrar had yet to issue their marriage license on 19
August 1951. Thus, since the marriage was celebrated one day before the issuance of the marriage license, the Court
acquitted him of bigamy.
Noticeably, Domingo de Lara did not cause the falsification of public documents in order to contract a second
marriage. In contrast, petitioner and Santos fraudulently secured a Certificate of Marriage, and petitioner later used
this blatantly illicit act as basis for seeking her exculpation. Therefore, unlike our treatment of the accused in De Lara,
this Court cannot regard petitioner herein as innocent of the crime.
No less than the present Constitution provides that "marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of
the family and shall be protected by the State." 45 It must be safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the
contracting parties. 46 in keeping therefore with this fundamental policy, this Court affirms the conviction of petitioner
for bigamy
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Leonila G. Santiago is DENIED. The Decision
and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 33566 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. As modified,
petitioner Leonila G. Santiago is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy as an
accomplice. She is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six months of arresto mayor as minimum to four
years of prision correctional as maximum plus accessory penalties provided by law.
SO ORDERED.

NOEL A. LASANAS vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 159031 June 23, 2014
BERSAMIN, J.:
Any person who contracts a second marriage without first having a judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her first
marriage, albeit on its face void and in existent for lack of a marriage license, is guilty of bigamy as defined and
penalized by Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Case
The accused seeks the reversal of the decision promulgated on August 29, 2002, 1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA)
affirmed his conviction for bigamy under the judgment rendered on October 30, 2000 in Criminal Case No. 49808 by
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 38, in Iloilo City.
Antecedents
2
On February 16, 1968, Judge Carlos B. Salazar of the Municipal Trial Court of San Miguel, Iloilo solemnized the
marriage of accused Noel Lasanas and Socorro Patingo 3 without the benefit of a marriage license.4 The records show
that Lasanas and Patingo had not executed any affidavit of cohabitation to excuse the lack of the marriage
license.5 On August 27, 1980, Lasanas and Patingo reaffirmed their marriage vows in a religious ceremony before Fr.
Rodolfo Tamayo at the San Jose Church in Iloilo City. 6 They submitted no marriage license or affidavit of cohabitation
for that purpose.7 Both ceremonies were evidenced by the corresponding marriage certificates. 8 In 1982, Lasanas and
Patingo separated de facto because of irreconcilable differences. 9
On December 27, 1993, the accused contracted marriage with Josefa Eslaban in a religious ceremony solemnized by
Fr. Ramon Sequito at the Sta. Maria Church in Iloilo City. Their marriage certificate reflected the civil status of the
accused as single.10
On July 26, 1996, the accused filed a complaint for annulment of marriage and damages against Socorro in the RTC
in Iloilo City,11 which was docketed as Civil Case No. 23133 and raffled to Branch 39 of the RTC. The complaint
alleged that Socorro had employed deceit, misrepresentations and fraud in securing his consent to their marriage; and
that subsequent marital breaches, psychological incompatibilities and her infidelity had caused him to suffer mental
anguish, sleepless nights and social humiliation warranting the award of damages. In support of his complaint, he
further alleged, among others, that:
He was married to the defendant on February 16, 1968 which marriage was officiated by Hon. Carlos B. Salazar,
Municipal Judge of San Miguel, Iloilo. Machine copy of the Marriage Contract is herewith attached as Exhibit "A" and
made part hereof; which marriage was ratified by a wedding at San Jose Church, Iloilo City on August 27, 1980 and
registered at the office of Iloilo City Registrar. Machine copy of the Marriage Contract is herewith attached as Annex
"B";
Plaintiff and defendant have no children and have no properties except some personal belongings;
Plaintiff met the defendant sometime in the middle of 1967 at the house of Mr. Raul L. Cataloctocan in Burgos Street,
Lapaz, Iloilo City wherein the purpose of their meeting was for the plaintiff to consult and seek treatment by the
defendant because the latter was a "babaylan": Plaintiff was treated by the defendant and the subsequent treatments
were performed by the defendant at her residence in Barangay, Banga, Mina, Iloilo, the treatment made being on a
continuing basis;
xxxx
On February 16, 1968, defendant asked the plaintiff to come with her to Iloilo City. They went to Dainty Restaurant at
J.M. Basa Street. Plaintiff saw several persons therein. After eating plaintiff was made to sign the marriage contract,
which was null and void for lack of marriage license and based on a false affidavit of cohabitation. After their marriage,
they went home to Barangay Bangac, Mina, Iloilo, which marked the start of a married life rocked with marital
differences, quarrels and incompatibilities, without love, but under the uncontrollable fear of harm that should befall
him should he not follow her;
xxxx
During the period the parties are living together defendant would nag the plaintiff, fabricate stories against him and
displayed her fit of jealousy, neglect her marital obligations even committed infidelity, which psychological
incompatibilities and marital breaches have forced the petitioner to live separately from defendant since 1982 up to the
present.12
In October 1998, Socorro charged the accused with bigamy in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iloilo City. 13 After
due proceedings, the accused was formally indicted for bigamy under the information filed on October 20, 1998 in the
RTC, viz:
That on or about the 27th day of December, 1993 in the City of Iloilo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Court, said accused, Noel Lasanas being previously united in a lawful marriage with Socorro Patingo and without the
said marriage having been legally dissolve (sic) or annulled, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
contract a second or subsequent marriage with Josefa Eslaban.
CONTRARY TO LAW.14
The criminal case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 49808, was raffled to Branch 38 of the RTC in Iloilo City. The
accused pleaded not guilty at his arraignment,15 and trial ensued in due course.
In the meanwhile, on November 24, 1998, the RTC (Branch 39) rendered its judgment in Civil Case No. 23133
dismissing the accused’s complaint for annulment of marriage, and declaring the marriage between him and Socorro
valid and legal, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the complaint filed by the plaintiff Noel
Arenga Lasanas against the defendant, Socorro Patingo, considering that the marriage between them is valid and
legal.
The plaintiff Noel Lasanas is hereby ordered to give monthly support to his wife, the defendant in this case, Ma.
Socorro Patingo in the amount of ₱3,000.00 a month, from the time that she filed her answer with counterclaim on
February 3, 1997, pursuant to Article 203 of the Family Code and every month thereafter. Costs against the plaintiff.
SO ORDERED.16
The accused appealed to the CA.17
Ruling of the RTC
On October 30, 2000, the RTC (Branch 38) rendered its assailed decision in Criminal Case No. 49808, disposing
thusly:
WHEREFORE, finding accused NOEL LASANAS guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of BIGAMY
punishable under Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Code, judgment is hereby entered ordering him to serve an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to
eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.
The accused is entitled to the privileges extended to him under Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
SO ORDERED.18
Decision of the CA Aggrieved, the accused appealed his conviction to the CA, insisting that the RTC thereby erred in
finding that he had legally married Socorro despite the absence of the marriage license, affidavit of cohabitation and
affidavit of the solemnizing officer.
The accused contended that because he had not been legally married to Socorro, the first element of bigamy was not
established; that his good faith and the absence of criminal intent were absolutory in his favor; and that he had been of
the honest belief that there was no need for a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage before he could
contract a subsequent marriage.19
On August 29, 2002, however, the CA promulgated its challenged decision, decreeing: WHEREFORE, for lack of
merit, the Court DISMISSES the appeal and AFFIRMS the appealed Decision.
SO ORDERED.20
Issues
Hence, the accused has appealed by petition for review on certiorari. 21 He argues that the RTC and the CA incorrectly
applied the provisions of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, 22 asserting that the civil law rule embodied in Article
40 of the Family Code requiring a judicial declaration of nullity before one could contract a subsequent marriage
should not apply in this purely criminal prosecution;23 that even if Article 40 of the Family Code was applicable, he
should still be acquitted because his subsequent marriage was null and void for being without a recorded judgment of
nullity of marriage, as provided in Article 53 in relation to Article 52 of the Family Code; 24 that, consequently, an
essential element of the crime of bigamy, i.e. that the subsequent marriage be valid, was lacking; 25and that his good
faith and lack of criminal intent were sufficient to relieve him of criminal liability. 26
Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
The law on bigamy is found in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:
Article 349. Bigamy. — The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy are as follows: (1) that the offender has been legally married; (2) that the
marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be
presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he or she contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (4)
that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. 27
The CA specifically observed:
This Court concedes that the marriage between accused-appellant Lasanas and private complainant Patingo was void
because of the absence of a marriage license or of an affidavit of cohabitation. The ratificatory religious wedding
ceremony could not have validated the void marriage. Neither can the church wedding be treated as a marriage in
itself for to do so, all the essential and formal requisites of a valid marriage should be present. One of these requisites
is a valid marriage license except in those instances when this requirement may be excused. There having been no
marriage license nor affidavit of cohabitation presented to the priest who presided over the religious rites, the religious
wedding cannot be treated as a valid marriage in itself.
But then, as the law and jurisprudence say, petitioner should have first secured a judicial declaration of the nullity of
his void marriage to private complainant Patingo before marrying Josefa Eslaban. Actually, he did just that but after his
marriage to Josefa Eslaban. Consequently, he violated the law on bigamy.
Accused’s reliance on the cases of People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845 and People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033 is
misplaced because the ruling in these cases have already been abandoned per Relova v. Landico, supra, and Wiegel
v. Sempio-Diy, 143 SCRA 499. The petitioner also cited Yap v. Court of Appeals, 145 SCRA 229 which resurrected the
Aragon and Mendoza doctrine but Yap’s ruling too had been overtaken by Art. 40 of the Family Code and by Domingo
v. Court of Appeals and Te v. Court of Appeals, supra.
Regarding accused-appellant’s defense of good faith, the same is unavailing pursuant to Mañozca v. Domagas, 248
SCRA 625.
This Court, therefore concludes that the appealed Decision is correct in all respect. 28
Decision of the CA
Aggrieved, the accused appealed his conviction to the CA, insisting that the RTC thereby erred in finding that he had
legally married Socorro despite the absence of the marriage license, affidavit of cohabitation and affidavit of the
solemnizing officer.
The accused contended that because he had not been legally married to Socorro, the first element of bigamy was not
established; that his good faith and the absence of criminal intent were absolutory in his favor; and that he had been of
the honest belief that there was no need for a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage before he could
contract a subsequent marriage.19
On August 29, 2002, however, the CA promulgated its challenged decision, decreeing: WHEREFORE, for lack of
merit, the Court DISMISSES the appeal and AFFIRMS the appealed Decision.
SO ORDERED.20
Issues
Hence, the accused has appealed by petition for review on certiorari. 21 He argues that the RTC and the CA incorrectly
applied the provisions of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, 22 asserting that the civil law rule embodied in Article
40 of the Family Code requiring a judicial declaration of nullity before one could contract a subsequent marriage
should not apply in this purely criminal prosecution;23 that even if Article 40 of the Family Code was applicable, he
should still be acquitted because his subsequent marriage was null and void for being without a recorded judgment of
nullity of marriage, as provided in Article 53 in relation to Article 52 of the Family Code; 24 that, consequently, an
essential element of the crime of bigamy, i.e. that the subsequent marriage be valid, was lacking; 25and that his good
faith and lack of criminal intent were sufficient to relieve him of criminal liability. 26
Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
The law on bigamy is found in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:
Article 349. Bigamy. — The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy are as follows: (1) that the offender has been legally married; (2) that the
marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be
presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he or she contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (4)
that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. 27
The CA specifically observed:
This Court concedes that the marriage between accused-appellant Lasanas and private complainant Patingo was void
because of the absence of a marriage license or of an affidavit of cohabitation. The ratificatory religious wedding
ceremony could not have validated the void marriage. Neither can the church wedding be treated as a marriage in
itself for to do so, all the essential and formal requisites of a valid marriage should be present. One of these requisites
is a valid marriage license except in those instances when this requirement may be excused. There having been no
marriage license nor affidavit of cohabitation presented to the priest who presided over the religious rites, the religious
wedding cannot be treated as a valid marriage in itself.
But then, as the law and jurisprudence say, petitioner should have first secured a judicial declaration of the nullity of
his void marriage to private complainant Patingo before marrying Josefa Eslaban. Actually, he did just that but after his
marriage to Josefa Eslaban. Consequently, he violated the law on bigamy.
Accused’s reliance on the cases of People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845 and People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033 is
misplaced because the ruling in these cases have already been abandoned per Relova v. Landico, supra, and Wiegel
v. Sempio-Diy, 143 SCRA 499. The petitioner also cited Yap v. Court of Appeals, 145 SCRA 229 which resurrected the
Aragon and Mendoza doctrine but Yap’s ruling too had been overtaken by Art. 40 of the Family Code and by Domingo
v. Court of Appeals and Te v. Court of Appeals, supra.
Regarding accused-appellant’s defense of good faith, the same is unavailing pursuant to Mañozca v. Domagas, 248
SCRA 625.
This Court, therefore concludes that the appealed Decision is correct in all respect. 28
Based on the findings of the CA, this case has all the foregoing elements attendant.
The first and second elements of bigamy were present in view of the absence of a judicial declaration of nullity of
marriage between the accused and Socorro. The requirement of securing a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage
prior to contracting a subsequent marriage is found in Article 40 of the Family Code, to wit:
Article 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely
of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. (n)
The reason for the provision was aptly discussed in Teves v. People: 29
x x x The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the
absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. Where the
absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole
basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the
previous marriage void.
The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision Committee which drafted what is now the Family
Code of the Philippines took the position that parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their
marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage
before they can be allowed to marry again.
In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the spouse who,
believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or
her marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy.
In numerous cases, this Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid
subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and immoral.
If petitioner’s contention would be allowed, a person who commits bigamy can simply evade prosecution by
immediately filing a petition for the declaration of nullity of his earlier marriage and hope that a favorable decision is
rendered therein before anyone institutes a complaint against him. We note that in petitioner’s case the complaint was
filed before the first marriage was declared a nullity. It was only the filing of the Information that was overtaken by the
declaration of nullity of his first marriage. Following petitioner’s argument, even assuming that a complaint has been
instituted, such as in this case, the offender can still escape liability provided that a decision nullifying his earlier
marriage precedes the filing of the Information in court. Such cannot be allowed. To do so would make the crime of
bigamy dependent upon the ability or inability of the Office of the Public Prosecutor to immediately act on complaints
and eventually file Informations in court. Plainly, petitioner’s strained reading of the law is against its simple letter.
Pursuant to Teves, the accused’s conviction for bigamy is affirmed.1âwphi1 The crime of bigamy was consummated
from the moment he contracted the second marriage without his marriage to Socorro being first judicially declared null
and void, because at the time of the celebration of the second marriage, his marriage to Socorro was still deemed
valid and subsisting due to such marriage not being yet declared null and void by a court of competent
jurisdiction.30"What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy," according to People v. Odtuhan: 31
x x x is when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage. Parties to the
marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of
competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it beheld as void, and so long as there
is no such declaration, the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage
before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
The accused’s defense of acting in good faith deserves scant consideration especially because the records show that
he had filed a complaint for the annulment of his marriage with Socorro prior to the institution of the criminal complaint
against him but after he had already contracted his second marriage with Josefa. But even such defense would
abandon him because the RTC (Branch 39) dismissed his complaint for annulment of marriage after the information
for bigamy had already been filed against him, thus confirming the validity of his marriage to Socorro. Considering that
the accused’s subsequent marriage to Josefa was an undisputed fact, the third element of bigamy was established.
Nonetheless, he submits that his marriage to Josefa was invalid because of lack of a recorded judgment of nullity of
marriage. Such argument had no worth, however, because it was he himself who failed to secure a judicial declaration
of nullity of his previous marriage prior to contracting his subsequent marriage. In Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, 32 the
Court has explained that "[s]ince a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically
void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy.
x x x A plain reading of [Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code], therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes
the mere act of contracting a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage." 33
The Court has further observed in Nollora, Jr. v. People:34 x x x Nollora may not impugn his [subsequent] marriage to
Geraldino in order to extricate himself from criminal liability; otherwise, we would be opening the doors to allowing the
solemnization of multiple flawed marriage ceremonies. As we stated in Tenebro v. Court of Appeals:
There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still
produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold
otherwise would render the State's penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately
ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting
multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity and commitment.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for bigamy is prision mayor. With neither an aggravating nor
a mitigating circumstance attendant in the commission of the crime, the imposable penalty is the medium period of
prision mayor,35 which ranges from eight years and one day to 10 years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
the minimum of the indeterminate sentence should be within the range of prision correccional, the penalty next lower
than that prescribed for the offense, which is from six months and one day to six years. Accordingly, the indeterminate
sentence of two years and four months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight years and one day of prision
mayor as maximum, as imposed by the RTC, was proper.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on August 29, 2002; and
ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

RENE RONULO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 182438 July 2, 2014
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari 1 filed by petitioner Fr. Rene Ronulo challenging the April 3, 2008
decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31028 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial
Court, (RTC) Branch 18, Batac, Ilocos Norte.
The Factual Antecedents
3
The presented evidence showed that Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to marry each other on
March 29, 2003 at the Sta. Rosa Catholic Parish Church of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. However, on the day of the
wedding, the supposed officiating priest, Fr. Mario Ragaza, refused to solemnize the marriage upon learning that the
couple failed to secure a marriage license. As a recourse, Joey, who was then dressed in barong tagalong,and Claire,
clad in a wedding gown, together with their parents, sponsors and guests, proceeded to the Independent Church of
Filipino Christians, also known as the Aglipayan Church. They requested the petitioner, an Aglipayan priest, to perform
a ceremony to which the latter agreed despite having been informed by the couple that they had no marriage
certificate.
The petitioner prepared his choir and scheduled a mass for the couple on the same date. He conducted the ceremony
in the presence of the groom, the bride, their parents, the principal and secondary sponsors and the rest of their
invited guests.4
An information for violation of Article 352 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, was filed against the
petitioner before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Batac, Ilocos Norte for allegedly performing an illegal marriage
ceremony.5
The petitioner entered the plea of "not guilty" to the crime charged on arraignment.
The prosecution’s witnesses, Joseph and Mary Anne Yere, testified on the incidents of the ceremony. Joseph was the
veil sponsor while Mary Anne was the cord sponsor in the wedding. Mary Anne testified that she saw the bride walk
down the aisle. She also saw the couple exchange their wedding rings, kiss each other, and sign a document. 6She
heard the petitioner instructing the principal sponsors to sign the marriage contract. Thereafter, they went to the
reception, had lunch and took pictures. She saw the petitioner there. She also identified the wedding invitation given to
her by Joey.7
Florida Umadac, the mother of Joey, testified that she heard the couple declare during the ceremony that they take
each other as husband and wife.8 Days after the wedding, she went to the municipal local civil registrar of San
Nicolas, Ilocos Norte with Atty. Mariano R. Nalupta Jr. where she was given a certificate that no marriage license was
issued to the couple.9
The petitioner, while admitting that he conducted a ceremony, denied that his act of blessing the couple was
tantamount to a solemnization of the marriage as contemplated by law. 10
The MTC Judgment
The MTC found the petitioner guilty of violation of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, and imposed on him a
₱200.00 fine pursuant to Section 44 of Act No. 3613. It held that the petitioner’s act of giving a blessing constitutes a
marriage ceremony as he made an official church recognition of the cohabitation of the couple as husband and
wife.11 It further ruled that in performing a marriage ceremony without the couple’s marriage license, the petitioner
violated Article 352 of the RPC which imposes the penalty provided under Act No. 3613 or the Marriage Law. The MTC
applied Section 44 of the Marriage Law which pertinently states that a violation of any of its provisions that is not
specifically penalized or of the regulations to be promulgated, shall be punished by a fine of not more than two
hundred pesos or by imprisonment of not more than one month, or both, in the discretion of the court.
The RPC is a law subsequent to the Marriage Law, and provides the penalty for violation of the latter law. Applying
these laws, the MTC imposed the penalty of a fine in the amount of ₱200.00. 12
The RTC Ruling
The RTC affirmed the findings of the MTC and added that the circumstances surrounding the act of the petitioner in
"blessing" the couple unmistakably show that a marriage ceremony had transpired. It further ruled that the positive
declarations of the prosecution witnesses deserve more credence than the petitioner’s negative statements. 13 The
RTC, however, ruled that the basis of the fine should be Section 39, instead of Section 44, of the Marriage Law.
The CA Decision
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling. The CA observed that although there is no prescribed form or religious
rite for the solemnization of marriage, the law provides minimum standards in determining whether a marriage
ceremony has been conducted, viz.: (1) the contracting parties must appear personally before the solemnizing officer;
and (2) they should declare that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of at least two witnesses of
legal age.14 According to the CA, the prosecution duly proved these requirements. It added that the presence of a
marriage certificate is not a requirement in a marriage ceremony. 15
The CA additionally ruled that the petitioner’s criminal liability under Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, is not
dependent on whether Joey or Claire were charged or found guilty under Article 350 of the same Code. 16
The CA agreed with the MTC that the legal basis for the imposition of the fine is Section 44 of the Marriage Law since
it covers violation of regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities such as the RPC.
 The Petition
The petitioner argues that the CA erred on the following grounds: First, Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, is vague
and does not define what constitutes "an illegal marriage ceremony." Assuming that a marriage ceremony principally
constitutes those enunciated in Article 55 of the Civil Code and Article 6 of the Family Code, these provisions require
the verbal declaration that the couple take each other as husband and wife, and a marriage certificate containing the
declaration in writing which is duly signed by the contracting parties and attested to by the solemnizing officer. 17 The
petitioner likewise maintains that the prosecution failed to prove that the contracting parties personally declared that
they take each other as husband and wife.18 Second, under the principle of separation of church and State, the State
cannot interfere in ecclesiastical affairs such as the administration of matrimony. Therefore, the State cannot convert
the "blessing" into a "marriage ceremony."19
Third, the petitioner had no criminal intent as he conducted the "blessing" in good faith for purposes of giving moral
guidance to the couple.20
Fourth, the non-filing of a criminal case against the couple in violating Article 350 of the RPC, as amended, should
preclude the filing of the present case against him. 21
Finally, Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not provide for a penalty. The present case is not covered by
Section 44 of the Marriage Law as the petitioner was not found violating its provisions nor a regulation promulgated
thereafter.22
THE COURT’S RULING:
We find the petition unmeritorious.
The elements of the crime punishable under Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, were proven by the prosecution
Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, penalizes an authorized solemnizing officer who shall perform or authorize any
illegal marriage ceremony. The elements of this crime are as follows: (1) authority of the solemnizing officer; and (2)
his performance of an illegal marriage ceremony. In the present case, the petitioner admitted that he has authority to
solemnize a marriage. Hence, the only issue to be resolved is whether the alleged "blessing" by the petitioner is
tantamount to the performance of an "illegal marriage ceremony" which is punishable under Article 352 of the RPC, as
amended.
While Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not specifically define a "marriage ceremony" and what constitutes its
"illegal" performance, Articles 3(3) and 6 of the Family Code are clear on these matters. These provisions were taken
from Article 5523 of the New Civil Code which, in turn, was copied from Section 3 24 of the Marriage Law with no
substantial amendments. Article 625 of the Family Code provides that "[n]o prescribed form or religious rite for the
solemnization of the marriage is required. It shall be necessary, however, for the contracting parties to appear
personally before the solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that
they take each other as husband and wife."26 Pertinently, Article 3(3)27 mirrors Article 6 of the Family Code and
particularly defines a marriage ceremony as that which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties
before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the
presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.
Even prior to the date of the enactment of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, the rule was clear that no prescribed
form of religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required. However, as correctly found by the CA, the law
sets the minimum requirements constituting a marriage ceremony: first, there should be the personal appearance of
the contracting parties before a solemnizing officer; and second, heir declaration in the presence of not less than two
witnesses that they take each other as husband and wife.
As to the first requirement, the petitioner admitted that the parties appeared before him and this fact was testified to by
witnesses. On the second requirement, we find that, contrary to the petitioner’s allegation, the prosecution has proven,
through the testimony of Florida, that the contracting parties personally declared that they take each other as husband
and wife.
The petitioner’s allegation that the court asked insinuating and leading questions to Florida fails to persuadeus. A
judge may examine or cross-examine a witness. He may propound clarificatory questions to test the credibility of the
witness and to extract the truth. He may seek to draw out relevant and material testimony though that testimony may
tend to support or rebut the position taken by one or the other party. It cannot be taken against him if the clarificatory
questions he propounds happen to reveal certain truths that tend to destroy the theory of one party. 28
At any rate, if the defense found the line of questioning of the judge objectionable, its failure to timely register this bars
it from belatedly invoking any irregularity.
In addition, the testimonies of Joseph and Mary Anne, and even the petitioner’s admission regarding the
circumstances of the ceremony, support Florida’s testimony that there had indeed been the declaration by the couple
that they take each other as husband and wife. The testimony of Joey disowning their declaration as husband and wife
cannot overcome these clear and convincing pieces of evidence. Notably, the defense failed to show that the
prosecution witnesses, Joseph and Mary Anne, had any ill-motive to testify against the petitioner.
We also do not agree with the petitioner that the principle of separation of church and State precludes the State from
qualifying the church "blessing" into a marriage ceremony. Contrary to the petitioner’s allegation, this principle has
been duly preserved by Article 6 of the Family Code when it provides that no prescribed form or religious rite for the
solemnization of marriage is required. This pronouncement gives any religion or sect the freedom or latitude in
conducting its respective marital rites, subject only to the requirement that the core requirements of law be observed.
We emphasize at this point that Article 1529 of the Constitution recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution
and that our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the
State is vitally interested. The State has paramount interest in the enforcement of its constitutional policies and the
preservation of the sanctity of marriage. To this end, it is within its power to enact laws and regulations, such as Article
352 of the RPC, as amended, which penalize the commission of acts resulting in the disintegration and mockery of
marriage.
From these perspectives, we find it clear that what the petitioner conducted was a marriage ceremony, as the
minimum requirements set by law were complied with. While the petitioner may view this merely as a "blessing," the
presence of the requirements of the law constitutive of a marriage ceremony qualified this "blessing" into a "marriage
ceremony" as contemplated by Article 3(3) of the Family Code and Article 352 of the RPC, as amended.
We come now to the issue of whether the solemnization by the petitioner of this marriage ceremony was illegal.
Under Article 3(3) of the Family Code, one of the essential requisites of marriage is the presence of a valid marriage
certificate. In the present case, the petitioner admitted that he knew that the couple had no marriage license, yet he
conducted the "blessing" of their relationship.
Undoubtedly, the petitioner conducted the marriage ceremony despite knowledge that the essential and formal
requirements of marriage set by law were lacking. The marriage ceremony, therefore, was illegal. The petitioner’s
knowledge of the absence of these requirements negates his defense of good faith.
We also do not agree with the petitioner that the lack of a marriage certificate negates his criminal liability in the
present case. For purposes of determining if a marriage ceremony has been conducted, a marriage certificate is not
included in the requirements provided by Article 3(3) of the Family Code, as discussed above.
Neither does the non-filing of a criminal complaint against the couple negate criminal liability of the petitioner. Article
352 of the RPC, as amended, does not make this an element of the crime. The penalty imposed is proper
On the issue on the penalty for violation of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, this provision clearly provides that it
shall be imposed in accordance with the provision of the Marriage Law. The penalty provisions of the Marriage Law
are Sections 39 and 44 which provide as follows: Section 39 of the Marriage Law provides that:
Section 39. Illegal Solemnization of Marriage – Any priest or minister solemnizing marriage without being authorized
by the Director of the Philippine National Library or who, upon solemnizing marriage, refuses to exhibit the
authorization in force when called upon to do so by the parties or parents, grandparents, guardians, or persons having
charge and any bishop or officer, priest, or minister of any church, religion or sect the regulations and practices
whereof require banns or publications previous to the solemnization of a marriage in accordance with section ten, who
authorized the immediate solemnization of a marriage that is subsequently declared illegal; or any officer, priest or
minister solemnizing marriage in violation of this act, shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one month
nor more than two years, or by a fine of not less than two hundred pesos nor more than two thousand pesos.
[emphasis ours]
On the other hand, Section 44 of the Marriage Law states that:
Section 44. General Penal Clause – Any violation of any provision of this Act not specifically penalized, or of the
regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities, shall be punished by a fine of not more than two hundred
pesos or by imprisonment for not more than one month, or both, in the discretion of the court. [emphasis ours]
From a reading of the provisions cited above, we find merit in the ruling of the CA and the MTC that the penalty
imposable in the present case is that covered under Section 44, and not Section 39, of the Marriage Law.
The penalized acts under Section 39 of Act No. 3613 do not include the present case.1âwphi1 As correctly found by
the MTC, the petitioner was not found violating the provisions of the Marriage Law but Article 352 of the RPC, as
amended. It is only the imposition of the penalty for the violation of this provision which is referred to the Marriage
Law. On this point, Article 352 falls squarely under the provision of Section 44 of Act No. 3613 which provides for the
penalty for any violation of the regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities; Article 352 of the RPC, as
amended, which was enacted after the Marriage Law, is one of such regulations.
Therefore, the CA did not err in imposing the penalty of fine of ₱200.00 pursuant to Section 44 of the Marriage Law.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 3, 2008 in CA-G.R.
CR. No. 31028.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE ALEMANIA BUATIS, JR. vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ATTY. JOSE J. PIERAZ
G.R. NO. 142509 March 24, 2006
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Jose Alemania Buatis, Jr. (petitioner) seeking to set aside the
Decision1 dated January 18, 2000 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR. No. 20988 which affirmed the decision
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 167 of Pasig City, convicting him of the crime of libel. Also assailed is the
appellate court’s Resolution2 dated March 13, 2000 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
The facts of the case, as summarized by the appellate court, are as follows:
On August 18, 1995, the wife of private-complainant Atty. Jose J. Pieraz (Atty. Pieraz), retrieved a letter from their
mailbox addressed to her husband. The letter was open, not contained in an envelope, and Atty. Pieraz’ wife put it on
her husband’s desk. On that same day, Atty. Pieraz came upon the letter and made out its content. It reads:
DON HERMOGENES RODRIGUEZ Y REYES ESTATE
Office of the Asst. Court Administrator
No. 1063 Kamias St., Bgy. Manggahan, Pasig City,
Metro Manila
August 18, 1995
ATTY. JOSE J. PIERAZ
Counsel for Benjamin A. Monroy
#8 Quirino St., Life Homes Subdivision
Rosario , Pasig City, Metro Manila
Subject: Anent your letter dated August 18, 1995
addressed to one Mrs. Teresita Quingco
Atty. Pieraz:
This has reference to your lousy but inutile threatening letter dated August 18, 1995, addressed to our client; using
carabao English.
May we remind you that any attempt on your part to continue harassing the person of Mrs. Teresita Quingco of No.
1582 Mngo St., Bgy. Manggahan, Pasig City, Metro Manila---undersigned much to his regrets shall be
constrained/compelled to file the necessary complaint for disbarment against you.
You may proceed then with your stupidity and suffer the full consequence of the law. Needless for you to cite specific
provisions of the Revised Penal Code, as the same is irrelevant to the present case. As a matter of fact, the same
shall be used by no other than the person of Mrs. Quingco in filing administrative charge against you and all persons
behind these nefarious activities.
Finally, it is a welcome opportunity for the undersigned to face you squarely in any courts of justice, so as we can
prove "who is who" once and for all.
Trusting that you are properly inform (sic) regarding these matters, I remain.
Yours in Satan name;
(Signed)
JOSE ALEMANIA BUATIS, JR.
Atty-in- Fact of the present
Court Administrator of the entire
Intestate Estate of Don Hermogenes
Rodriguez Y. Reyes.
Copy furnished:
All concerned.
Not personally knowing who the sender was, Atty. Pieraz, nevertheless, responded and sent a communication by
registered mail to said Buatis, Jr., accused-appellant. In reply, Buatis, Jr. dispatched a second letter dated August 24,
1995 to Atty. Pieraz.
Reacting to the insulting words used by Buatis, Jr., particularly: "Satan, senile, stupid, [E]nglish carabao," Atty. Pieraz
filed a complaint for libel against accused-appellant. Subject letter and its contents came to the knowledge not only of
his wife but of his children as well and they all chided him telling him: "Ginagawa ka lang gago dito."
Aside from the monetary expenses he incurred as a result of the filing of the instant case, Atty Pieraz’ frail health was
likewise affected and aggravated by the letter of accused-appellant.
The defense forwarded by accused-appellant Buatis, Jr. was denial. According to him, it was at the behest of the
president of the organization "Nagkakaisang Samahan Ng Mga Taga Manggahan" or NASATAMA, and of a member,
Teresita Quingco, that he had dictated to one of his secretaries, a comment to the letter of private-complainant in the
second week of August 1995.
Initially during his testimony, Buatis, Jr. could not recall whether he had signed that letter-comment or if it was even
addressed to Atty. Pieraz. Neither could he remember if he had made and sent another letter, this time dated August
24, 1995, to Atty. Pieraz. Confronted in court with the counter-affidavit which he filed before the Pasig City
Prosecutor’s Office, however, Buatis, Jr. could not deny its contents, among which was his admission that indeed, he
had sent subject letter of August 18 and the letter dated August 24, 1995 to Atty. Pieraz. 3
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision dated April 30, 1997 4 finding petitioner guilty of the crime of
libel, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Jose Alemania Buatis, Jr. GUILTY of the crime of
LIBEL defined in Art. 353 and penalized under Art. 355 of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of Four (4) Months and One (1) Day, as minimum, to Two (2) Years, Eleven
(11) Months and Ten (10) Days, as maximum; to indemnify the offended party in the amount of P20,000.00, by way of
compensatory damages; the amount of P10,000.00, as and for moral damages, and another amount of P10,000.00,
for exemplary damages; to suffer all accessory penalties provided for by law; and, to pay the costs. 5
The trial court ruled that: calling a lawyer "inutil", stupid and capable of using only carabao English, is intended not
only for the consumption of respondent but similarly for others as a copy of the libelous letter was furnished all
concerned; the letter was prejudicial to the good name of respondent and an affront to his standing as a lawyer, who,
at the time the letter was addressed to him, was representing a client in whose favor he sent a demand letter to the
person represented by petitioner; the letter is libelous per se since a defect or vice imputed is plainly understood as
set against the entire message sought to be conveyed; petitioner failed to reverse the presumption of malice from the
defamatory imputation contained in the letter; the letter could have been couched in a civil and respectful manner, as
the intention of petitioner was only to advice respondent that demand was not proper and legal but instead petitioner
was seething with hate and contempt and even influenced by satanic intention.
The RTC also found that since the letter was made known or brought to the attention and notice of other persons other
than the offended party, there was publication; and that the element of identity was also established since the letter
was intended for respondent. It rejected petitioner’s stance that the libelous letter resulted from mistake or negligence
since petitioner boldly admitted that he had to reply to respondent’s letter to Mrs. Quingco, it being his duty to do as
the latter is a member of petitioner’s association.
The RTC found respondent entitled to recover compensatory damages as the immediate tendency of the defamatory
imputation was to impair respondent’s reputation although no actual pecuniary loss has in fact resulted. It also
awarded moral damages as well as exemplary damages since the publication of the libelous letter was made with
special ill will, bad faith or in a reckless disregard for the rights of respondent.
Subsequently, petitioner appealed the RTC’s decision to the CA which, in a Decision dated January 18, 2000, affirmed
in its entirety the decision of the trial court.
The CA found that the words used in the letter are uncalled for and defamatory in character as they impeached the
good reputation of respondent as a lawyer and that it is malicious. It rejected petitioner’s claim that the letter is a
privileged communication which would exculpate him from liability since he failed to come up with a valid explanation
as to why he had to resort to name calling and downgrading a lawyer to the extent of ridiculing him when he could
have discharged his so called "duty" in a more toned down fashion. It found also that there was publication of the
letter, thus, it cannot be classified as privileged.
The CA denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in a Resolution dated March 13, 2000.
Hence the instant petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner, raising the following issues:
A. CAN THERE BE MALICE IN FACT, AS ONE OF THE ELEMENTS OF LIBEL, ATTRIBUTED TO A
RESPONDING URBAN POOR LEADER ACTING AS COUNSEL, DEFENDING A MEMBER OF AN
ASSOCIATION UNDER THREAT OF EJECTMENT FROM HER DWELLING PLACE?
B. WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE ALLEGED LIBELOUS
LETTER AS ONE OF THOSE FALLING UNDER THE PURVIEW OF PRIVILEGE (sic) COMMUNICATION?
C. WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT: THE PETITIONER CAN
NOT BE MADE TO ACCEPT FULL RESPONSIBILITY THAT WHAT HE DID IS A CRIME? 6
The Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment in behalf of the People and respondent filed his own Comment
praying for the affirmance of the CA decision. As required by us, the parties submitted their respective memoranda.
The principal issue for resolution is whether or not petitioner is guilty of the crime of libel.
In his Memorandum, petitioner claims that: the CA failed to apply the ruling in People v. Velasco7 that "if the act/matter
charged as libelous is only an incident in [an] act which has another objective, the crime is not libel;" when he made
his reply to respondent’s letter to Mrs. Quingco making a demand for her to vacate the premises, his objective was to
inform respondent that Mrs. Quingco is one of the recognized tenants of the Rodriguez estate which is claiming
ownership over the area of Brgy. Manggahan, Pasig City, and petitioner is the attorney-in-fact of the administrator of
the Rodriquez estate; communication in whatever language, either verbal or written of a lawyer under obligation to
defend a client’s cause is but a privileged communication; the instant case is a qualified privileged communication
which is lost only by proof of malice, however, respondent failed to present actual proof of malice; the existence of
malice in fact may be shown by extrinsic evidence that petitioner bore a grudge against the offended party, or there
was ill will or ill feeling between them which existed at the time of the publication of the defamatory imputation which
were not at all indicated by respondent in his complaint; contrary to the findings of the CA, there was justifiable motive
in sending such a letter which was to defend the vested interest of the estate and to abate any move of respondent to
eject Mrs. Quingco.
Petitioner further argues that if the words used in the libelous letter-reply would be fully scrutinized, there is
justification for the use of those words, to wit: "lousy but inutile threatening letter…using carabao English" was due to
the fact that the demand letter was indeed a threatening letter as it does not serve its purpose as respondent’s client
has no legal right over the property and respondent did not file the ejectment suit; that respondent is just making a
mockery out of Mrs. Quingco, thus he is stupid; that the words "Yours in Satan name" is only a complementary
greeting used in an ordinary communication letter, which is reflected to the sender but not to the person being
communicated and which is just the reverse of saying "Yours in Christ".
We deny the petition.
Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code defines libel as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or
defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor,
discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.
For an imputation to be libelous, the following requisites must concur: (a) it must be defamatory; (b) it must be
malicious; (c) it must be given publicity; and (d) the victim must be identifiable. 8
The last two elements have been duly established by the prosecution. There is publication in this case. In libel,
publication means making the defamatory matter, after it is written, known to someone other than the person against
whom it has been written.9 Petitioner’s subject letter-reply itself states that the same was copy furnished to all
concerned. Also, petitioner had dictated the letter to his secretary. It is enough that the author of the libel complained
of has communicated it to a third person.10 Furthermore, the letter, when found in the mailbox, was open, not
contained in an envelope thus, open to public.
The victim of the libelous letter was identifiable as the subject letter-reply was addressed to respondent himself.
We shall then resolve the issues raised by petitioner as to whether the imputation is defamatory and malicious.
In determining whether a statement is defamatory, the words used are to be construed in their entirety and should be
taken in their plain, natural and ordinary meaning as they would naturally be understood by persons reading them,
unless it appears that they were used and understood in another sense. 11
For the purpose of determining the meaning of any publication alleged to be libelous, we laid down the rule in Jimenez
v. Reyes,12 to wit:
In Tawney vs. Simonson, Whitcomb & Hurley Co. (109 Minn., 341), the court had the following to say on this point: "In
determining whether the specified matter is libelous per se, two rules of construction are conspicuously applicable: (1)
That construction must be adopted which will give to the matter such a meaning as is natural and obvious in the plain
and ordinary sense in which the public would naturally understand what was uttered. (2) The published matter alleged
to be libelous must be construed as a whole."
In applying these rules to the language of an alleged libel, the court will disregard any subtle or ingenious explanation
offered by the publisher on being called to account. The whole question being the effect the publication had upon the
minds of the readers, and they not having been assisted by the offered explanation in reading the article, it comes too
late to have the effect of removing the sting, if any there be, from the words used in the publication. 13
Gauging from the above–mentioned tests, the words used in the letter dated August 18, 1995 sent by petitioner to
respondent is defamatory. In using words such as "lousy", "inutile", "carabao English", "stupidity", and "satan", the
letter, as it was written, casts aspersion on the character, integrity and reputation of respondent as a lawyer which
exposed him to ridicule. No evidence aliunde need be adduced to prove it. As the CA said, these very words of
petitioner have caused respondent to public ridicule as even his own family have told him: "Ginagawa ka lang gago
dito."14
Any of the imputations covered by Article 353 is defamatory; and, under the general rule laid down in Article 354,
every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive
for making it is shown. Thus, when the imputation is defamatory, the prosecution need not prove malice on the part of
petitioner (malice in fact), for the law already presumes that petitioner’s imputation is malicious (malice in law). 15 A
reading of petitioner’s subject letter-reply showed that he malevolently castigated respondent for writing such a
demand letter to Mrs. Quingco. There was nothing in the said letter which showed petitioner’s good intention and
justifiable motive for writing the same in order to overcome the legal inference of malice.
Petitioner, however, insists that his letter was a private communication made in the performance of his moral and
social duty as the attorney-in-fact of the administrator of the Rodriguez estate where Mrs. Quingco is a recognized
tenant and to whom respondent had written the demand letter to vacate, thus in the nature of a privileged
communication and not libelous.
We are not persuaded.
Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 354. Requirement for publicity.─ Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no
good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases:
1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral, or social
duty; and
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative, or
other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report, or speech delivered
in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.
Clearly, the presumption of malice is done away with when the defamatory imputation is a qualified privileged
communication.
In order to prove that a statement falls within the purview of a qualified privileged communication under Article 354,
No. 1, as claimed by petitioner, the following requisites must concur: (1) the person who made the communication had
a legal, moral, or social duty to make the communication, or at least, had an interest to protect, which interest may
either be his own or of the one to whom it is made; (2) the communication is addressed to an officer or a board, or
superior, having some interest or duty in the matter, and who has the power to furnish the protection sought; and (3)
the statements in the communication are made in good faith and without malice. 16
While it would appear that the letter was written by petitioner out of his social duty to a member of the association
which he heads, and was written to respondent as a reply to the latter’s demand letter sent to a member, however, a
reading of the subject letter-reply addressed to respondent does not show any explanation concerning the status of
Mrs. Quingco and why she is entitled to the premises as against the claim of respondent’s client. The letter merely
contained insulting words, i.e, "lousy" and "inutile letter using carabao English", "stupidity", and "satan", which are
totally irrelevant to his defense of Mrs. Quingco’s right over the premises. The words as written had only the effect of
maligning respondent’s integrity as a lawyer, a lawyer who had served as legal officer in the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources for so many years until his retirement and afterwards as consultant of the same
agency and also a notary public. The letter was crafted in an injurious way than what is necessary in answering a
demand letter which exposed respondent to public ridicule thus negating good faith and showing malicious intent on
petitioner’s part.
Moreover, the law requires that for a defamatory imputation made out of a legal, moral or social duty to be privileged,
such statement must be communicated only to the person or persons who have some interest or duty in the matter
alleged, and who have the power to furnish the protection sought by the author of the statement. 17 A written letter
containing libelous matter cannot be classified as privileged when it is published and circulated among the public. 18 In
this case, petitioner admitted that he dictated the letter to one of her secretaries who typed the same and made a print
out of the computer.19 While petitioner addressed the reply-letter to respondent, the same letter showed that it was
copy furnished to all concerned. His lack of selectivity is indicative of malice and is anathema to his claim of privileged
communication.20 Such publication had already created upon the minds of the readers a circumstance which brought
discredit and shame to respondent’s reputation.
Since the letter is not a privileged communication, malice is presumed under Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code.
The presumption was not successfully rebutted by petitioner as discussed above.
Thus, we find that the CA did not commit any error in affirming the findings of the trial court that petitioner is guilty of
the crime of libel.
An appeal in a criminal case throws the entire case for review and it becomes our duty to correct any error, as may be
found in the appealed judgment, whether assigned as an error or not. 21 We find that the award of P20,000.00 as
compensatory damages should be deleted for lack of factual basis. To be entitled to actual and compensatory
damages, there must be competent proof constituting evidence of the actual amount thereof. 22 Respondent had not
presented evidence in support thereof.
Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code penalizes libel by means of writings or similar means with prision correccionalin
its minimum and medium periods or a fine ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both, in addition to the civil action
which may be brought by the offended party.
The courts are given the discretion to choose whether to impose a single penalty or conjunctive penalties; that is,
whether to impose a penalty of fine, or a penalty of imprisonment only, or a penalty of both fine and imprisonment.
In Vaca v. Court of Appeals,23 where petitioners therein were convicted of B.P. 22 which provides for alternative
penalties of fine or imprisonment or both fine and imprisonment, we deleted the prison sentence imposed upon
petitioners and instead ordered them only to pay a fine equivalent to double the amount of the check. We held:
Petitioners are first-time offenders. They are Filipino entrepreneurs who presumably contribute to the national
economy. Apparently, they brought this appeal, believing in all good faith, although mistakenly, that they had not
committed a violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Otherwise, they could simply have accepted the judgment of the trial court and
applied for probation to evade prison term. It would best serve the ends of criminal justice if in fixing the penalty within
the range of discretion allowed by §1, par. 1, the same philosophy underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law is
observed, namely, that of redeeming valuable human material and preventing unnecessary deprivation of personal
liberty and economic usefulness with due regard to the protection of the social order. 24
In the subsequent case of Lim v. People,25 we did the same and deleted the penalty of imprisonment and merely
imposed a fine for violation of B.P. 22, concluding that such would best serve the ends of criminal justice.
Adopting these cases, we issued Administrative Circular No. 12-2000. On February 14, 2001, we issued
Administrative Circular 13-2001 which modified Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 by stressing that the clear tenor of
Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is not to remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty, but to lay down a rule of
preference in the application of the penalties provided for in B.P. 22.
While Vaca case is for violation of B.P. 22, we find the reasons behind the imposition of fine instead of imprisonment
applicable to petitioner’s case of libel. We note that this is petitioner’s first offense of this nature. He never knew
respondent prior to the demand letter sent by the latter to Mrs. Quingco who then sought his assistance thereto. He
appealed from the decision of the RTC and the CA in his belief that he was merely exercising a civil or moral duty in
writing the letter to private complainant. In fact, petitioner could have applied for probation to evade prison term but he
did not do so believing that he did not commit a crime thus, he appealed his case. We believe that the State is
concerned not only in the imperative necessity of protecting the social organization against the criminal acts of
destructive individuals but also in redeeming the individual for economic usefulness and other social
ends.26Consequently, we delete the prison sentence imposed on petitioner and instead impose a fine of six thousand
pesos.
This is not the first time that we removed the penalty of imprisonment and imposed a fine instead in the crime of libel.
In Sazon v. Court of Appeals,27 petitioner was convicted of libel and was meted a penalty of imprisonment and fine;
and upon a petition filed with us, we affirmed the findings of libel but changed the penalty imposed to a mere fine.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that, in lieu of
imprisonment, the penalty to be imposed upon the petitioner shall be a fine of Six Thousand (P6,000.00) Pesos with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The award of compensatory damages is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.

ERWIN TULFO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND ATTY. CARLOS T. SO

[G.R. NO. 161032, September 16, 2008]
x---------------x
SUSAN CAMBRI, REY SALAO, JOCELYN BARLIZO, AND PHILIP PICHAY v. COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, AND CARLOS SO,
[G.R. NO. 161176]
VELASCO JR., J.:
The freedom of the press is one of the cherished hallmarks of our democracy; but even as we strive to protect and
respect the fourth estate, the freedom it enjoys must be balanced with responsibility. There is a fine line between
freedom of expression and libel, and it falls on the courts to determine whether or not that line has been crossed.
The Facts
On the complaint of Atty. Carlos "Ding" So of the Bureau of Customs, four (4) separate informations were filed on
September 8, 1999 with the Regional Trial Court in (RTC) Pasay City. These were assigned to Branch 112 and
docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 99-1597 to 99-1600, and charged petitioners Erwin Tulfo, as author/writer, Susan
Cambri, as managing editor, Rey Salao, as national editor, Jocelyn Barlizo, as city editor, and Philip Pichay, as
president of the Carlo Publishing House, Inc., of the daily tabloid Remate, with the crime of libel in connection with the
publication of the articles in the column "Direct Hit" in the issues of May 11, 1999; May 12, 1999; May 19, 1999; and
June 25, 1999.1 The four informations read as follows:
Criminal Case No. 99-1598
th
That on or about the 11 day of May, 1999 in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another,
being then the columnist, publisher and managing editor, respectively of "REMATE", a tabloid published daily and of
general circulation in the Philippines, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with malicious intent to
discredit or dishonor complainant, ATTY. CARLOS "DING" SO, and with the malicious intent of injuring and exposing
said complainant to public hatred, contempt and ridicule, write and publish in the regular issue of said publication on
May 11, 1999, its daily column "DIRECT HIT", quoted hereunder, to wit:
PINAKAMAYAMAN SA CUSTOMS
Ito palang si Atty. Ding So ng Intelligence Division ng Bureau of Customs and [sic] pinakamayaman na yata na
government official sa buong bansa sa pangungurakot lamang diyan sa South Harbor.

Hindi matibag ang gagong attorney dahil malakas daw ito sa Iglesia ni Kristo.

Hoy, So! . . nakakahiya ka sa mga INC, ikaw na yata ang pinakagago at magnanakaw na miyembro nito.

Balita ko, malapit ka nang itiwalag ng nasabing simbahan dahil sa mga kalokohan mo.

Abangan bukas ang mga raket ni So sa BOC.

WHEREIN said complainant was indicated as an extortionist, a corrupt public official, smuggler and having illegally
acquired wealth, all as already stated, with the object of destroying his reputation, discrediting and ridiculing him
before the bar of public opinion.2
Criminal Case No. 99-1599
th
That on or about the 12 day of May, 1999 in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another,
being then the columnist, publisher and managing editor, respectively of "REMATE", a tabloid published daily and of
general circulation in the Philippines, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with malicious intent to
discredit or dishonor complainant, ATTY. CARLOS "DING" SO, and with the malicious intent of injuring and exposing
said complainant to public hatred, contempt and ridicule, write and publish in the regular issue of said publication on
May 12, 1999, in daily column "DIRECT HIT", quoted hereunder, to wit:
SI ATTY. SO NG BOC

"LINTEK" din sa pangungurakot itong Ding So ng Bureau of Customs Intelligence Unit sa South Harbor.

Daan-daang libong piso ang kinikita ng masiba at matakaw na si So sa mga importer na ayaw ideklara ang totoong
laman ng mga container para makaiwas sa pagbayad ng malaking customs duties at taxes.

Si So ang nagpapadrino sa mga pag-inspection ng mga container na ito. Siyempre-binibigyan din niya ng salapi yung
ibang mga ahensiya para pumikit na lang at itikom ang kanilang nga [sic] bibig diyan sa mga buwayang taga BOC.

Awang-awa ako sa ating gobyerno. Bankrupt na nga, ninanakawan pa ng mga kawatan tulad ni So.

Ewan ko ba rito kay Atty. So, bakit hindi na lang tumayo ng sarili niyang robbery-hold-up gang para kumita ng mas
mabilis.
Hoy So.. hindi bagay sa iyo ang pagiging attorney . . . Mas bagay sa iyo ang pagiging buwayang naka korbata at
holdaper. Magnanakaw ka So!!"
WHEREIN said complainant was indicated as an extortionist, a corrupt public official, smuggler and having illegally
acquired wealth, all as already stated, with the object of destroying his reputation, discrediting and ridiculing him
before the bar of public opinion.3
Criminal Case No. 99-1600

That on or about 19th day of May, 1999 in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another,
being then the columnist, publisher and managing editor, respectively of "REMATE", a tabloid published daily and of
general circulation in the Philippines, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with malicious intent to
discredit or dishonor complainant, ATTY. CARLOS "DING" SO, and with the malicious intent of injuring and exposing
said complainant to public hatred, contempt and ridicule, write and publish in the regular issue of said publication on
May 19, 1999, in daily column "DIRECT HIT", quoted hereunder, to wit:
xxxx

"Tulad ni Atty. Ding So ng Bureau of Customs Intelligence Division, saksakan din ng lakas itong si Daniel Aquino ng
Presidential Anti-Smuggling Unit na nakatalaga sa South Harbor.

Tulad ni So, magnanakaw na tunay itong si Aquino.

Panghihingi ng pera sa mga brokers, ang lakad nito.

Pag hindi nagbigay ng pera ang mga brokers, maiipit ang pagre-release ng kanilang kargamento."
WHEREIN said complainant was indicated as an extortionist, a corrupt public official, smuggler and having illegally
acquired wealth, all as already stated, with the object of destroying his reputation, discrediting and ridiculing him
before the bar of public opinion.4
Criminal Case No. 99-1597

That on or about 25th day of June, 1999 in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another,
being then the columnist, publisher and managing editor, respectively of "REMATE", a tabloid published daily and of
general circulation in the Philippines, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with malicious intent to
discredit or dishonor complainant, ATTY. CARLOS "DING" T. SO, and with the malicious intent of injuring and
exposing said complainant to public hatred, contempt and ridicule, write and publish in the regular issue of said
publication on June 25, 1999, its daily column "DIRECT HIT", quoted hereunder, to wit:

xxxx
Nagfile ng P10 M na libel suit itong si Atty. Carlos So ng Bureau of Customs laban sa inyong lingkod at ilang opisyales
ng Remate sa Pasay City Court. Nagalit itong tarantadong si Atty. So dahil binanatan ko siya at inexpose ang
kagaguhan niya sa BOC.

Hoy, So . . . dagdagan mo pa ang pagnanakaw mo dahil hindi kita tatantanan. Buhay ka pa sinusunog na ang iyong
kaluluwa sa impyerno.
WHEREIN said complainant was indicated as an extortionist, a corrupt public official, smuggler and having illegally
acquired wealth, all as already stated, with the object of destroying his reputation, discrediting and ridiculing him
before the bar of public opinion.5
On November 3, 1999, Tulfo, Salao, and Cambri were arraigned, while Barlizo and Pichay were arraigned on
December 15, 1999. They all pleaded not guilty to the offenses charged.

At pre-trial, the following were admitted by petitioners: (1) that during the four dates of the publication of the
questioned articles, the complaining witness was not assigned at South Harbor; (2) that the accused and complaining
witness did not know each other during all the time material to the four dates of publication; (3) that Remate is a
newspaper/tabloid of general circulation in the Philippines; (4) the existence and genuineness of
the Remate newspaper; (5) the column therein and its authorship and the alleged libelous statement as well as the
editorial post containing the designated positions of the other accused; and (6) the prosecution's qualified admission
that it is the duty of media persons to expose corruption. 6

The prosecution presented four witnesses, namely: Oscar M. Ablan, Atty. James Fortes, Jr., Gladys Fontanilla, and
complainant Atty. So. The prosecution presented documentary evidence as well.

Ablan testified that he had read the four columns written by Tulfo, and that the articles were untrue because he had
known Atty. So since 1992 and had worked with him in the Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service Division of
the Bureau of Customs. He further testified that upon reading the articles written by Tulfo, he concluded that they
referred to Atty. So because the subject articles identified "Atty. Carlos" as "Atty. `Ding' So" of the Customs Intelligence
and Investigation Service Division, Bureau of Customs and there was only one Atty. Carlos "Ding" So of the Bureau of
Customs.7

Fontanilla, Records Officer I of the Bureau of Customs, testified that she issued a certification in connection with these
cases upon the request of Atty. So.8 This certification stated that as per records available in her office, there was only
one employee by the name of "Atty. Carlos T. So" who was also known as "Atty. Ding So" in the Intelligence Division of
the Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service or in the entire Bureau of Customs. 9

Atty. Fortes testified that he knew Atty. So as a fellow member of the Iglesia Ni Kristo and as a lawyer, and that having
read the articles of Tulfo, he believed that these were untrue, as he knew Atty. Carlos "Ding" So. 10

Atty. So testified that he was the private complainant in these consolidated cases. He further testified that he is also
known as Atty. "Ding" So, that he had been connected with the Bureau of Customs since October 1981, and that he
was assigned as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service Division at the Manila
International Container Port since December 27, 1999. He executed two complaint-affidavits, one dated June 4, 1999
and the other dated July 5, 1999, for Criminal Case Nos. 99-1598 to 99-1600. Prior to this, he also filed 14 cases of
libel against Raffy Tulfo, brother of petitioner Erwin Tulfo. He testified that petitioner Tulfo's act of imputing upon him
criminality, assailing his honesty and integrity, caused him dishonor, discredit, and contempt among his co-members in
the legal profession, co-officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, co-members and peers in the Iglesia ni Kristo,
his co-officers and employees and superior officers in the Bureau of Customs, and among ordinary persons who had
read said articles. He said it also caused him and his family sleepless nights, mental anguish, wounded feelings,
intrigues, and embarrassment. He further testified that he included in his complaint for libel the officers
of Remate such as the publisher, managing editor, city editor, and national editor because under Article 360 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), they are equally responsible and liable to the same extent as if they were the author of
the articles. He also testified that "Ding" is his nickname and that he is the only person in the entire Bureau of Customs
who goes by the name of Atty. Carlos T. So or Atty. Carlos "Ding" So. 11

In his defense, petitioner Tulfo testified that he did not write the subject articles with malice, that he neither knew Atty.
So nor met him before the publication of the articles. He testified that his criticism of a certain Atty. So of the South
Harbor was not directed against the complainant, but against a person by the name of Atty. "Ding" So at the South
Harbor. Tulfo claimed that it was the practice of certain people to use other people's names to advance their corrupt
practices. He also claimed that his articles had neither discredited nor dishonored the complainant because as per his
source in the Bureau of Customs, Atty. So had been promoted. He further testified that he did not do any research on
Atty. So before the subject articles, because as a columnist, he had to rely on his source, and that he had several
sources in the Bureau of Customs, particularly in the South Harbor. 12

Petitioner Salao testified that he came to know Atty. Carlos "Ding" So when the latter filed a case against them. He
testified that he is an employee of Carlo Publishing House, Inc.; that he was designated as the national editor of the
newspaper Remate since December 1999; that the duties of the position are to edit, evaluate, encode, and supervise
layout of the news from the provinces; and that Tulfo was under the supervision of Rey Briones, Vice President for
Editorial and Head of the Editorial Division. Salao further testified that he had no participation in the subject articles of
Tulfo, nor had he anything to do with the latter's column. 13

Petitioner Cambri, managing editor of Remate, testified that she classifies the news articles written by the reporters,
and that in the Editorial Division, the officers are herself; Briones, her supervisor; Lydia Bueno, as news and city
editor; and Salao as national editor. She testified that petitioner Barlizo is her subordinate, whose duties and
responsibilities are the typesetting, editing, and layout of the page assigned to her, the Metro page. She further
testified that she had no participation in the writing, editing, or publication of the column of Tulfo because the column
was not edited. She claimed that none among her co-accused from the Remate newspaper edited the columns of
Tulfo, that the publication and editing of the subject articles were the responsibility of Tulfo, and that he was given
blanket authority to write what he wanted to write. She also testified that the page wherein Tulfo's column appeared
was supervised by Bueno as news editor. 14

Petitioner Pichay testified that he had been the president of Carlo Publishing House, Inc. since December 1998. He
testified that the company practice was to have the columnists report directly to the vice-president of editorials, that
the columnists were given autonomy on their columns, and that the vice-president for editorials is the one who would
decide what articles are to be published and what are not. He further testified that Tulfo was already a regular
contributor.15
The Ruling of the RTC
In a Decision dated November 17, 2000, the RTC found petitioners guilty of the crime of Libel. The dispositive portion
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused ERWIN TULFO, SUSAN CAMBRI, REY SALAO, JOCELYN BARLIZO and
PHILIP PICHAY guilty beyond reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of the crime of LIBEL, as defined in Article 353 of
the Revised Penal Code, and penalized by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, or a fine ranging
from P200.00 Pesos to P6,000.00 Pesos or both, under Article 355 of the same Code.

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court hereby sentences EACH of the accused to suffer imprisonment
of SIX (6) MONTHS of arresto mayor, as minimum, to FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS of prision
correccional, as maximum, for EACH count with accessory penalties provided by law.

Considering that the accused Erwin Tulfo, Susan Cambri, Rey Salao, Jocelyn Barlizo and Philip Pichay wrote and
published the four (4) defamatory articles with reckless disregard, being, in the mind of the Court, of whether it was
false or not, the said articles libelous per se, they are hereby ordered to pay, jointly and severally, the sum of EIGHT
HUNDRED THOUSAND (P800,000.00) PESOS, as actual damages, the sum of ONE MILLION PESOS
(P1,000,000.00), as moral damages, and an additional amount of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P500,000.00), by way of exemplary damages, all with subsidiary imprisonment, in case of insolvency, and to pay the
costs. SO ORDERED.16
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Before the Court of Appeals (CA), Tulfo assigned the following errors:
1. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE UNREBUTTED TESTIMONY OF THE APPELLANT THAT
HE DID NOT CRITICIZE THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT WORKING AT THE NAIA. HE CRITICIZED
ANOTHER PERSON WORKING AT THE SOUTH HARBOR. HENCE, THE ELEMENT OF IDENTITY IS
LACKING.
2. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE LACK OF THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF DISCREDIT
OR DISHONOR, AS DEFINED BY JURISPRUDENCE.
3. THERE WAS NO MALICE AGAINST THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT ATTY. CARLOS "DING" SO. 17
His co-accused assigned the following errors:
A. The trial court seriously erred in holding accused Susan Cambri, Rey Salao, Jocelyn Barlizo and Philip Pichay liable
for the defamations contained in the questioned articles despite the fact that the trial court did not have any finding as
to their participation in the writing, editing and/or publication of the questioned articles.
B. The trial court seriously erred in concluding that libel was committed by all of the accused on the basis of its finding
that the elements of libel have been satisfactorily established by evidence on record.
C. The trial court seriously erred in considering complainant to be the one referred to by Erwin Tulfo in his articles in
question.18
In a Decision19 dated June 17, 2003, the Eighth Division of the CA dismissed the appeal and affirmed the judgment of
the trial court. A motion for reconsideration dated June 30, 2003 was filed by Tulfo, while the rest of his co-accused
filed a motion for reconsideration dated July 2, 2003. In a Resolution dated December 11, 2003, both motions were
denied for lack of merit.20
Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45

Tulfo brought this petition docketed as G.R. No. 161032, seeking to reverse the Decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CR No.
25318 which affirmed the decision of the RTC. Petitioners Cambri, Salao, Barlizo, and Pichay brought a similar
petition docketed as G.R. No. 161176, seeking the nullification of the same CA decision.

In a Resolution dated March 15, 2004, the two cases were consolidated since both cases arise from the same set of
facts, involve the same parties, assail the same decision of the CA, and seek identical reliefs. 21
Assignment of Errors

Petitioner Tulfo submitted the following assignment of errors:

I. Assuming that the Prosecution presented credible and relevant evidence, the Honorable CA erred in not declaring
the assailed articles as privileged; the CA erred in concluding that malice in law exists by the court's having incorrectly
reasoned out that malice was presumed in the instant case.
II. Even assuming arguendo that the articles complained of are not privileged, the lower court, nonetheless, committed
gross error as defined by the provisions of Section 6 of Rule 45 by its misappreciation of the evidence presented on
matters substantial and material to the guilt or innocence of the petitioner. 22
Petitioners Cambri, Salao, Barlizo, and Pichay submitted their own assignment of errors, as follows:
A - The Court of Appeals Seriously Erred In Its Application of Article 360 Of The Revised Penal Code By Holding
Cambri, Salao And Barlizo Liable For The Defamatory Articles In The May 11, 12, 19 And June 25, 1999 Issues Of
Remate Simply Because They Were Managing Editor, National Editor And City Editor Respectively Of Remate And By
Holding Pichay Also Liable For Libel Merely Because He Was The President Of Carlo Publishing House, Inc. Without
Taking Into Account The Unrebutted Evidence That Petitioners Had No Participation In The Editing Or Publication Of
The Defamatory Articles In Question.

B - The Court Of Appeals Committed Grave Abuse Of Discretion In Manifestly Disregarding The Unrebutted Evidence
That Petitioners Had No Participation In The Editing Or Publication Of The Defamatory Articles In Question.

C - The Court Of Appeals Seriously Misappreciated The Evidence In Holding That The Person Referred To In The
Published Articles Was Private Complainant Atty. Carlos So.23
Our Ruling

The petitions must be dismissed.

The assignment of errors of petitioner Tulfo shall be discussed first.

In his appeal, Tulfo claims that the CA erred in not applying the ruling in Borjal v. Court of Appeals.24 In essence, he
argues that the subject articles fall under "qualifiedly privileged communication" under Borjaland that the presumption
of malice in Art. 354 of the RPC does not apply. He argues that it is the burden of the prosecution to prove malice in
fact.

This case must be distinguished from Borjal on several points, the firstbeing that Borjal stemmed from a civil action for
damages based on libel, and was not a criminal case. Second, the ruling in Borjal/i> was that there was no sufficient
identification of the complainant, which shall be differentiated from the present case in discussing the second
assignment of error of Tulfo. Third, the subject in Borjal was a private citizen, whereas in the present case, the subject
is a public official. Finally, it was held in Borjal that the articles written by Art Borjal were "fair commentaries on matters
of public interest"25 It shall be discussed and has yet to be determined whether or not the articles fall under the
category of "fair commentaries."

In passing, it must be noted that the defense of Tulfo's articles being qualifiedly privileged communication is raised for
the first time in the present petition, and this particular issue was never brought before either the RTC or the CA.
Thus, neither the RTC nor the CA had a chance to properly consider and evaluate this defense. Tulfo now draws
parallels between his case and that of Art Borjal, and argues that the prosecution should have proved malice in fact,
and it was error on the part of the trial and appellate courts to use the presumption of malice in law in Art. 354 of the
RPC. This lays an unusual burden on the part of the prosecution, the RTC, and the CA to refute a defense that Tulfo
had never raised before them. Whether or not the subject articles are privileged communications must first be
established by the defense, which it failed to do at the level of the RTC and the CA. Even so, it shall be dealt with now,
considering that an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review.

There is no question of the status of Atty. So as a public official, who served as the OIC of the Bureau of Customs
Intelligence and Investigation Service at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) at the time of the printing of the
allegedly libelous articles. Likewise, it cannot be refuted that the goings-on at the Bureau of Customs, a government
agency, are matters of public interest. It is now a matter of establishing whether the articles of Tulfo are protected as
qualified privileged communication or are defamatory and written with malice, for which he would be liable.
Freedom of the Press v. Responsibility of the Press

The Court has long respected the freedom of the press, and upheld the same when it came to commentaries made on
public figures and matters of public interest. Even in cases wherein the freedom of the press was given greater weight
over the rights of individuals, the Court, however, has stressed that such freedom is not absolute and unbounded. The
exercise of this right or any right enshrined in the Bill of Rights, indeed, comes with an equal burden of responsible
exercise of that right. The recognition of a right is not free license for the one claiming it to run roughshod over the
rights of others.

The Journalist's Code of Ethics adopted by the National Union of Journalists of the Philippines shows that the press
recognizes that it has standards to follow in the exercise of press freedom; that this freedom carries duties and
responsibilities. Art. I of said code states that journalists "recognize the duty to air the other side and the duty to
correct substantive errors promptly." Art. VIII states that journalists "shall presume persons accused of crime of being
innocent until proven otherwise."

In the present case, it cannot be said that Tulfo followed the Journalist's Code of Ethics and exercised his journalistic
freedom responsibly.
In his series of articles, he targeted one Atty. "Ding" So of the Bureau of Customs as being involved in criminal
activities, and was using his public position for personal gain. He went even further than that, and called Atty. So an
embarrassment to his religion, saying "ikaw na yata ang pinakagago at magnanakaw sa miyembro nito."> 26 He
accused Atty. So of stealing from the government with his alleged corrupt activities. 27 And when Atty. So filed a libel
suit against him, Tulfo wrote another article, challenging Atty. So, saying, "Nagalit itong tarantadong si Atty. So dahil
binabantayan ko siya at in-expose ang kagaguhan niya sa [Bureau of Customs]"28

In his testimony, Tulfo admitted that he did not personally know Atty. So, and had neither met nor known him prior to
the publication of the subject articles. He also admitted that he did not conduct a more in-depth research of his
allegations before he published them, and relied only on his source at the Bureau of Customs.

In his defense before the trial court, Tulfo claimed knowledge of people using the names of others for personal gain,
and even stated that he had been the victim of such a practice. He argued then that it may have been someone else
using the name of Atty. So for corrupt practices at the South Harbor, and this person was the target of his articles. This
argument weakens his case further, for even with the knowledge that he may be in error, even knowing of the
possibility that someone else may have used Atty. So's name, as Tulfo surmised, he made no effort to verify the
information given by his source or even to ascertain the identity of the person he was accusing.

The trial court found Tulfo's accusations against Atty. So to be false, but Tulfo argues that the falsity of contents of
articles does not affect their privileged character. It may be that the falsity of the articles does not prove malice.
Neither did Borjal give journalists carte blanche with regard to their publications. It cannot be said that a false article
accusing a public figure would always be covered by the mantle of qualified privileged communication. The portion
of Borjal cited by Tulfo must be scrutinized further:
Even assuming that the contents of the articles are false, mere error, inaccuracy or even falsity alone does not prove
actual malice. Errors or misstatements are inevitable in any scheme of truly free expression and debate. Consistent
with good faith and reasonable care, the press should not be held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest
mistakes or imperfections in the choice of language. There must be some room for misstatement of fact as well as for
misjudgment. Only by giving them much leeway and tolerance can they courageously and effectively function as
critical agencies in our democracy. In Bulletin Publishing Corp. v. Noel we held -
A newspaper especially one national in reach and coverage, should be free to report on events and developments in
which the public has a legitimate interest with minimum fear of being hauled to court by one group or another on
criminal or civil charges for libel, so long as the newspaper respects and keeps within the standards of morality and
civility prevailing within the general community.
To avoid the self-censorship that would necessarily accompany strict liability for erroneous statements, rules
governing liability for injury to reputation are required to allow an adequate margin of error by protecting some
inaccuracies. It is for the same reason that the New York Times doctrinerequires that liability for defamation of a public
official or public figure may not be imposed in the absence of proof of "actual malice" on the part of the person making
the libelous statement.29 (Emphasis supplied.)
Reading more deeply into the case, the exercise of press freedom must be done "consistent with good faith and
reasonable care." This was clearly abandoned by Tulfo when he wrote the subject articles. This is no case of mere
error or honest mistake, but a case of a journalist abdicating his responsibility to verify his story and instead
misinforming the public. Journalists may be allowed an adequate margin of error in the exercise of their profession,
but this margin does not expand to cover every defamatory or injurious statement they may make in the furtherance of
their profession, nor does this margin cover total abandonment of responsibility.

Borjal may have expanded the protection of qualified privileged communication beyond the instances given in Art. 354
of the RPC, but this expansion does not cover Tulfo. The addition to the instances of qualified privileged
communications is reproduced as follows:
To reiterate, fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action
for libel or slander. The doctrine of fair comment means that while in general every discreditable imputation publicly
made is deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false
imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in
his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order that such discreditable imputation to a public official
may be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition. If the
comment is an expression of opinion, based on established facts, then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be
mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred from the facts. 30 (Emphasis supplied.)
The expansion speaks of "fair commentaries on matters of public interest." While Borjal places fair commentaries
within the scope of qualified privileged communication, the mere fact that the subject of the article is a public figure or
a matter of public interest does not automatically exclude the author from liability. Borjal allows that for a discreditable
imputation to a public official to be actionable, it must be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false
supposition. As previously mentioned, the trial court found that the allegations against Atty. So were false and that
Tulfo did not exert effort to verify the information before publishing his articles.
Tulfo offered no proof for his accusations. He claimed to have a source in the Bureau of Customs and relied only on
this source for his columns, but did no further research on his story. The records of the case are bereft of any showing
that Atty. So was indeed the villain Tulfo pictured him to be. Tulfo's articles related no specific details or acts
committed to prove Atty. So was indeed a corrupt public official. These columns were unsubstantiated attacks on Atty.
So, and cannot be countenanced as being privileged simply because the target was a public official. Although wider
latitude is given to defamatory utterances against public officials in connection with or relevant to their performance of
official duties, or against public officials in relation to matters of public interest involving them, such defamatory
utterances do not automatically fall within the ambit of constitutionally protected speech. 31 Journalists still bear the
burden of writing responsibly when practicing their profession, even when writing about public figures or matters of
public interest. As held in In Re: Emil P. Jurado:
Surely it cannot be postulated that the law protects a journalist who deliberately prints lies or distorts the truth; or that
a newsman may ecape liability who publishes derogatory or defamatory allegations against a person or entity, but
recognizes no obligation bona fide to establish beforehand the factual basis of such imputations and refuses to submit
proof thereof when challenged to do so. It outrages all notions of fair play and due process, and reduces to
uselessness all the injunctions of the Journalists' Code of Ethics to allow a newsman, with all the potential of his
profession to influence popular belief and shape public opinion, to make shameful and offensive charges destructive
of personal or institutional honor and repute, and when called upon to justify the same, cavalierly beg off by claiming
that to do so would compromise his sources and demanding acceptance of his word for the reliability of those
sources.32
The prosecution showed that Tulfo could present no proof of his allegations against Atty. So, only citing his one
unnamed source. It is not demanded of him that he name his source. The confidentiality of sources and their
importance to journalists are accepted and respected. What cannot be accepted are journalists making no efforts to
verify the information given by a source, and using that unverified information to throw wild accusations and besmirch
the name of possibly an innocent person. Journalists have a responsibility to report the truth, and in doing so must at
least investigate their stories before publication, and be able to back up their stories with proof. The rumors and
gossips spread by unnamed sources are not truth. Journalists are not storytellers or novelists who may just spin tales
out of fevered imaginings, and pass them off as reality. There must be some foundation to their reports; these reports
must be warranted by facts.

Jurado also established that the journalist should exercise some degree of care even when writing about public
officials. The case stated:
Clearly, the public interest involved in freedom of speech and the individual interest of judges (and for that matter, all
other public officials) in the maintenance of private honor and reputation need to be accommodated one to the other.
And the point of adjustment or accommodation between these two legitimate interests is precisely found in the norm
which requires those who, invoking freedom of speech, publish statements which are clearly defamatory to identifiable
judges or other public officials to exercise bona fide care in ascertaining the truth of the statements they publish. The
norm does not require that a journalist guarantee the truth of what he says or publishes. But the norm does prohibit
the reckless disregard of private reputation by publishing or circulating defamatory statements without any bona
fide effort to ascertain the truth thereof. That this norm represents the generally accepted point of balance or
adjustment between the two interests involved is clear from a consideration of both the pertinent civil law norms and
the Code of Ethics adopted by the journalism profession in the Philippines. 33
Tulfo has clearly failed in this regard. His articles cannot even be considered as qualified privileged communication
under the second paragraph of Art. 354 of the RPC which exempts from the presumption of malice "a fair and true
report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings
which are not of confidential nature, or any statement, report, or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other
act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions." This particular provision has several elements
which must be present in order for the report to be exempt from the presumption of malice. The provision can be
dissected as follows:
In order that the publication of a report of an official proceeding may be considered privileged, the following conditions
must exist:
(a) That it is a fair and true report of a judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings which are not of confidential
nature, or of a statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by a
public officer in the exercise of his functions;
(b) That it is made in good faith; and
(c) That it is without any comments or remarks.34
The articles clearly are not the fair and true reports contemplated by the provision. They provide no details of the acts
committed by the subject, Atty. So. They are plain and simple baseless accusations, backed up by the word of one
unnamed source. Good faith is lacking, as Tulfo failed to substantiate or even attempt to verify his story before
publication. Tulfo goes even further to attack the character of the subject, Atty. So, even calling him a disgrace to his
religion and the legal profession. As none of the elements of the second paragraph of Art. 354 of the RPC is present in
Tulfo's articles, it cannot thus be argued that they are qualified privileged communications under the RPC.
Breaking down the provision further, looking at the terms "fair" and "true," Tulfo's articles do not meet the standard.
"Fair" is defined as "having the qualities of impartiality and honesty" 35 "True" is defined as "conformable to fact;
correct; exact; actual; genuine; honest"36 Tulfo failed to satisfy these requirements, as he did not do research before
making his allegations, and it has been shown that these allegations were baseless. The articles are not "fair and true
reports," but merely wild accusations.

Even assuming arguendo that the subject articles are covered by the shield of qualified privileged communication, this
would still not protect Tulfo.

In claiming that his articles were covered by qualified privileged communication, Tulfo argues that the presumption of
malice in law under Art. 354 of the RPC is no longer present, placing upon the prosecution the burden of proving
malice in fact. He then argues that for him to be liable, there should have been evidence that he was motivated by ill
will or spite in writing the subject articles.

The test to be followed is that laid down in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,37 and reiterated in Flor v. People, which
should be to determine whether the defamatory statement was made with actual malice, that is, with knowledge that it
was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. 38

The trial court found that Tulfo had in fact written and published the subject articles with reckless disregard of whether
the same were false or not, as proven by the prosecution. There was the finding that Tulfo failed to verify the
information on which he based his writings, and that the defense presented no evidence to show that the accusations
against Atty. So were true. Tulfo cannot argue that because he did not know the subject, Atty. So, personally, there
was no malice attendant in his articles. The test laid down is the "reckless disregard" test, and Tulfo has failed to meet
that test.

The fact that Tulfo published another article lambasting respondent Atty. So can be considered as further evidence of
malice, as held in U.S. vs. Montalvo,39 wherein publication after the commencement of an action was taken as further
evidence of a malicious design to injure the victim. Tulfo did not relent nor did he pause to consider his actions, but
went on to continue defaming respondent Atty. So. This is a clear indication of his intent to malign Atty. So, no matter
the cost, and is proof of malice.

Leaving the discussion of qualified privileged communication, Tulfo also argues that the lower court misappreciated
the evidence presented as to the identity of the complainant: that Tulfo wrote about Atty. "Ding" So, an official of the
Bureau of Customs who worked at the South Harbor, whereas the complainant was Atty. Carlos So who worked at the
NAIA. He claims that there has arisen a cloud of doubt as to the identity of the real party referred to in the articles.

This argument is patently without merit.

The prosecution was able to present the testimonies of two other witnesses who identified Atty. So from Tulfo's
articles. There is the certification that there is only one Atty. So in the Bureau of Customs. And most damning to Tulfo's
case is the last column he wrote on the matter, referring to the libel suit against him by Atty. So of the Bureau of
Customs. In this article, Tulfo launched further attacks against Atty. So, stating that the libel case was due to the
exposés Tulfo had written on the corrupt acts committed by Atty. So in the Bureau of Customs. This last article is an
admission on the part of Tulfo that Atty. So was in fact the target of his attacks. He cannot now point to a putative
"Atty. Ding So" at South Harbor, or someone else using the name of Atty. So as the real subject of his attacks, when
he did not investigate the existence or non-existence of an Atty. So at South Harbor, nor investigate the alleged
corrupt acts of Atty. So of the Bureau of Customs. Tulfo cannot say that there is doubt as to the identity of the Atty. So
referred to in his articles, when all the evidence points to one Atty. So, the complainant in the present case.

Having discussed the issue of qualified privileged communication and the matter of the identity of the person referred
to in the subject articles, there remains the petition of the editors and president of Remate, the paper on which the
subject articles appeared.

In sum, petitioners Cambri, Salao, Barlizo, and Pichay all claim that they had no participation in the editing or writing
of the subject articles, and are thus not liable.

The argument must fail.

The language of Art. 360 of the RPC is plain. It lists the persons responsible for libel:
Art. 360. Persons responsible.--Any person who shall publish, exhibit, or cause the publication or exhibition of any
defamation in writing or by similar means, shall be responsible for the same.

The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a daily newspaper, magazine or
serial publication, shall be responsible for the defamations contained therein to the same extent as if he were the
author thereof.
The claim that they had no participation does not shield them from liability. The provision in the RPC does not provide
absence of participation as a defense, but rather plainly and specifically states the responsibility of those involved in
publishing newspapers and other periodicals. It is not a matter of whether or not they conspired in preparing and
publishing the subject articles, because the law simply so states that they are liable as they were the author.

Neither the publisher nor the editors can disclaim liability for libelous articles that appear on their paper by simply
saying they had no participation in the preparation of the same. They cannot say that Tulfo was all alone in the
publication of Remate, on which the subject articles appeared, when they themselves clearly hold positions of
authority in the newspaper, or in the case of Pichay, as the president in the publishing company.

As Tulfo cannot simply say that he is not liable because he did not fulfill his responsibility as a journalist, the other
petitioners cannot simply say that they are not liable because they did not fulfill their responsibilities as editors and
publishers. An editor or manager of a newspaper, who has active charge and control of its management, conduct, and
policy, generally is held to be equally liable with the owner for the publication therein of a libelous article. 40 On the
theory that it is the duty of the editor or manager to know and control the contents of the paper, 41 it is held that said
person cannot evade responsibility by abandoning the duties to employees, 42 so that it is immaterial whether or not
the editor or manager knew the contents of the publication. 43 In Fermin v. People of the Philippines,44 the Court held
that the publisher could not escape liability by claiming lack of participation in the preparation and publication of a
libelous article. The Court cited U.S. v. Ocampo, stating the rationale for holding the persons enumerated in Art. 360 of
the RPC criminally liable, and it is worth reiterating:
According to the legal doctrines and jurisprudence of the United States, the printer of a publication containing libelous
matter is liable for the same by reason of his direct connection therewith and his cognizance of the contents thereof.
With regard to a publication in which a libel is printed, not only is the publisher but also all other persons who in any
way participate in or have any connection with its publication are liable as publishers.

xxxx

In the case of State vs. Mason (26 L.R.A., 779; 26 Oreg., 273, 46 Am. St. Rep., 629), the question of the responsibility
of the manager or proprietor of a newspaper was discussed. The court said, among other things (pp. 782, 783):

"The question then recurs as to whether the manager or proprietor of a newspaper can escape criminal responsibility
solely on the ground that the libelous article was published without his knowledge or consent. When a libel is
published in a newspaper, such fact alone is sufficient evidence prima facie to charge the manager or proprietor with
the guilt of its publication.

"The manager and proprietor of a newspaper, we think ought to be held prima facie criminally for whatever appears in
his paper; and it should be no defense that the publication was made without his knowledge or consent, x x x.

"One who furnishes the means for carrying on the publication of a newspaper and entrusts its management to
servants or employees whom he selects and controls may be said to cause to be published what actually appears,
and should be held responsible therefore, whether he was individually concerned in the publication or not, x x x.
Criminal responsibility for the acts of an agent or servant in the course of his employment necessarily implies some
degree of guilt or delinquency on the part of the publisher; x x x.

"We think, therefore, the mere fact that the libelous article was published in the newspaper without the knowledge or
consent of its proprietor or manager is no defense to a criminal prosecution against such proprietor or manager."

In the case of Commonwealth vs. Morgan (107 Mass., 197), this same question was considered and the court held
that in the criminal prosecution of a publisher of a newspaper in which a libel appears, he is prima facie presumed to
have published the libel, and that the exclusion of an offer by the defendant to prove that he never saw the libel and
was not aware of its publication until it was pointed out to him and that an apology and retraction were afterwards
published in the same paper, gave him no ground for exception. In this same case, Mr. Justice Colt, speaking for the
court, said:

"It is the duty of the proprietor of a public paper, which may be used for the publication of improper communications, to
use reasonable caution in the conduct of his business that no libels be published." (Wharton's Criminal Law, secs.
1627, 1649; 1 Bishop's Criminal Law, secs. 219, 221; People vs. Wilson, 64 Ill., 195; Commonwealth vs. Damon, 136
Mass., 441.)

The above doctrine is also the doctrine established by the English courts. In the case of Rex vs. Walter (3 Esp., 21)
Lord Kenyon said that he was "clearly of the opinion that the proprietor of a newspaper was answerable criminally as
well as civilly for the acts of his servants or agents for misconduct in the management of the paper."

This was also the opinion of Lord Hale, Mr. Justice Powell, and Mr. Justice Foster.

Lofft, an English author, in his work on Libel and Slander, said:

"An information for libel will lie against the publisher of a papers, although he did not know of its being put into the
paper and stopped the sale as soon as he discovered it."

In the case of People vs. Clay (86 Ill., 147) the court held that -

"A person who makes a defamatory statement to the agent of a newspaper for publication, is liable both civilly and
criminally, and his liability is shared by the agent and all others who aid in publishing it" 45
Under Art. 360 of the RPC, as Tulfo, the author of the subject articles, has been found guilty of libel, so too must
Cambri, Salao, Barlizo, and Pichay.

Though we find petitioners guilty of the crime charged, the punishment must still be tempered with justice. Petitioners
are to be punished for libel for the first time. They did not apply for probation to avoid service of sentence possibly in
the belief that they have not committed any crime. In Buatis, Jr. v. People,46 the Court, in a criminal case for libel,
removed the penalty of imprisonment and instead imposed a fine as penalty. In Sazon v. Court of Appeals,47 the
accused was merely fined in lieu of the original penalty of imprisonment and fine. Freedom of expression as well as
freedom of the press may not be unrestrained, but neither must it be reined in too harshly. In light of this, considering
the necessity of a free press balanced with the necessity of a responsible press, the penalty of a fine of PhP 6,000 for
each count of libel, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, should suffice. 48 Lastly, the responsibilities of
the members of the press notwithstanding, the difficulties and hazards they encounter in their line of work must also
be taken into consideration.

The award of damages by the lower court must be modified. Art. 2199 of the Civil Code provides, "Except as provided
by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as
he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages." There was no showing of
any pecuniary loss suffered by the complainant Atty. So. Without proof of actual loss that can be measured, the award
of actual damages cannot stand.

In Del Mundo v. Court of Appeals, it was held, as regards actual and moral damages:
A party is entitled to an adequate compensation for such pecuniary loss actually suffered by him as he has duly
proved. Such damages, to be recoverable, must not only be capable of proof, but must actually be proved with a
reasonable degree of certainty. We have emphasized that these damages cannot be presumed, and courts, in making
an award must point out specific facts which could afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory or actual
damages are borne.

Moral damages, upon the other hand, may be awarded to compensate one for manifold injuries such as physical
suffering, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social humiliation. These
damages must be understood to be in the concept of grants, not punitive or corrective in nature, calculated to
compensate the claimant for the injury suffered. Although incapable of exactness and no proof of pecuniary loss is
necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded, the amount of indemnity being left to the sound discretion of
the court, it is imperative, nevertheless, that (1) injury must have been suffered by the claimant, and (2) such injury
must have sprung from any of the cases expressed in Article 2219 and Article 2220 of the Civil Code. A causal
relation, in fine, must exist between the act or omission referred to in the Code which underlies, or gives rise to, the
case or proceeding on the one hand, and the resulting injury, on the other hand; i.e. the first must be the proximate
cause and the latter the direct consequence thereof. 49
It was the articles of Tulfo that caused injury to Atty. So, and for that Atty. So deserves the award of moral damages.
Justification for the award of moral damages is found in Art. 2219(7) of the Civil Code, which states that moral
damages may be recovered in cases of libel, slander, or any other form of defamation. As the cases involved are
criminal cases of libel, they fall squarely within the ambit of Art. 2219(7).

Moral damages can be awarded even in the absence of actual or compensatory damages. The fact that no actual or
compensatory damage was proven before the trial court does not adversely affect the offended party's right to recover
moral damages.50

And while on the subject of moral damages, it may not be amiss to state at this juncture that Tulfo's libelous articles
are abhorrent not only because of its vilifying and demeaning effect on Atty. So himself, but also because of their
impact on members of his family, especially on the children and possibly even the children's children.

The Court can perhaps take judicial notice that the sense of kinship runs deeply in a typical Filipino family, such that
the whole family usually suffers or rejoices at the misfortune or good fortune, as the case may be, of any of its
member. Accordingly, any attempt to dishonor or besmirch the name and reputation of the head of the family, as here,
invariably puts the other members in a state of disrepute, distress, or anxiety. This reality adds an imperative
dimension to the award of moral damages to the defamed party.

The award of exemplary damages, however, cannot be justified. Under Art. 2230 of the Civil Code, "In criminal
offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be imposed when the crime was committed with one
or more aggravating circumstances. Such damages are separate and distinct from fines and shall be paid to the
offended party." No aggravating circumstances accompanied the commission of the libelous acts; thus, no exemplary
damages can be awarded.
Conclusion

The press wields enormous power. Through its widespread reach and the information it imparts, it can mold and
shape thoughts and opinions of the people. It can turn the tide of public opinion for or against someone, it can build up
heroes or create villains.

It is in the interest of society to have a free press, to have liberal discussion and dissemination of ideas, and to
encourage people to engage in healthy debate. It is through this that society can progress and develop.

Those who would publish under the aegis of freedom of the press must also acknowledge the corollary duty to publish
responsibly. To show that they have exercised their freedom responsibly, they must go beyond merely relying on
unfounded rumors or shadowy anonymous sources. There must be further investigation conducted, some shred of
proof found to support allegations of misconduct or even criminal activity. It is in fact too easy for journalists to destroy
the reputation and honor of public officials, if they are not required to make the slightest effort to verify their
accusations. Journalists are supposed to be reporters of facts, not fiction, and must be able to back up their stories
with solid research. The power of the press and the corresponding duty to exercise that power judiciously cannot be
understated.

But even with the need for a free press, the necessity that it be free does not mean that it be totally unfettered. It is still
acknowledged that the freedom can be abused, and for the abuse of the freedom, there must be a corresponding
sanction. It falls on the press to wield such enormous power responsibly. It may be a cliché that the pen is mightier
than the sword, but in this particular case, the lesson to be learned is that such a mighty weapon should not be
wielded recklessly or thoughtlessly, but always guided by conscience and careful thought.

A robust and independently free press is doubtless one of the most effective checks on government power and
abuses. Hence, it behooves government functionaries to respect the value of openness and refrain from concealing
from media corruption and other anomalous practices occurring within their backyard. On the other hand, public
officials also deserve respect and protection against false innuendoes and unfounded accusation of official
wrongdoing from an abusive press. As it were, the law and jurisprudence on libel heavily tilt in favor of press freedom.
The common but most unkind perception is that government institutions and their officers and employees are fair
game to official and personal attacks and even ridicule. And the practice on the ground is just as disconcerting.
Reports and accusation of official misconduct often times merit front page or primetime treatment, while defenses set
up, retraction issued, or acquittal rendered get no more, if ever, perfunctory coverage. The unfairness needs no
belaboring. The balm of clear conscience is sometimes not enough.

Perhaps lost in the traditional press freedom versus government impasse is the fact that a maliciously false imputation
of corruption and dishonesty against a public official, as here, leaves a stigmatizing mark not only on the person but
also the office to which he belongs. In the ultimate analysis, public service also unduly suffers.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petitions in G.R. NOS. 161032 and 161176 are DISMISSED. The CA
Decision dated June 17, 2003 in CA-G.R. CR No. 25318 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that in lieu
of imprisonment, the penalty to be imposed upon petitioners shall be a fine of six thousand pesos (PhP 6,000) for
each count of libel, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, while the award of actual damages and
exemplary damages is DELETED. The Decision dated November 17, 2000 of the RTC, Branch 112 in Pasay City in
Criminal Case Nos. 99-1597 to 99-1600 is modified to read as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused ERWIN TULFO, SUSAN CAMBRI, REY SALAO, JOCELYN BARLIZO,
and PHILIP PICHAY guilty beyond reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of the crime of LIBEL, as defined in Article 353
of the Revised Penal Code, and sentences EACH of the accused to pay a fine of SIX THOUSAND PESOS (PhP
6,000) per count of libel with subsidiary imprisonment, in case of insolvency.

Considering that the accused Erwin Tulfo, Susan Cambri, Rey Salao, Jocelyn Barlizo, and Philip Pichay wrote and
published the four (4) defamatory articles with reckless disregard whether it was false or not, the said articles being
libelous per se, they are hereby ordered to pay complainant Atty. Carlos T. So, jointly and severally, the sum of
ONE MILLION PESOS (PhP 1,000,000) as moral damages. The claim of actual and exemplary damages is
denied for lack of merit. Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED.
MEDELARNALDO B. BELEN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 211120 February 13, 2017
PERALTA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision 1dated
April 12, 2013 of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Decision 2 dated June 2, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court of
San Pablo City, Branch 32, in Criminal Case No. 15332-SP, convicting petitioner Medel Arnaldo B. Belen of the crime
of libel.
On March 12, 2004, petitioner, then a practicing lawyer and now a former Judge, 3 filed a criminal complaint for estafa
against his uncle, Nezer D. Belen, Sr. before the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of San Pablo City, which was
docketed as LS. No. 04-312 and assigned to then Assistant City Prosecutor (ACP) Ma. Victoria Sufiega-Lagman for
preliminary investigation. With the submission of the parties' and their respective witnesses' affidavits, the case was
submitted for resolution.
In order to afford himself the opportunity to fully present his cause, petitioner requested for a clarificatory hearing.
Without acting on the request, ACP Sufiega-Lagman dismissed petitioner's complaint in a Resolution dated July 28,
2004. Aggrieved by the dismissal of his complaint, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion (for Reconsideration &
Disqualify),4 the contents of which later became the subject of this libel case.
Petitioner furnished copies of the Omnibus Motion to Nezer and the Office of the Secretary of Justice, Manila. The
copy of the Omnibus Motion contained in a sealed envelope and addressed to the Office of the City Prosecutor of San
Pablo City was received by its Receiving Section on August 27, 2004. As a matter of procedure, motions filed with the
said office are first received and recorded at the receiving section, then forwarded to the records section before
referral to the City Prosecutor for assignment to the handling Investigating Prosecutor.
ACP Suñega-Lagman first learned of the existence of the Omnibus Motion from Michael Belen, the son of Nezer who
is the respondent in the estafa complaint. She was also informed about the motion by Joey Flores, one of the staff of
the OCP of San Pablo City. She then asked the receiving section for a copy of the said motion, and requested a
photocopy of it for her own reference.
On September 20, 2004, ACP Suñega-Lagman filed against petitioner a criminal complaint for libel on the basis of the
allegations in the Omnibus Motion (for Reconsideration & Disqualify). The complaint was docketed as LS. No. 04-931
before the OCP of San Pablo City.
Since ACP Suñega-Lagman was then a member of its office, the OCP of San Pablo City voluntarily inhibited itself from
conducting the preliminary investigation of the libel complaint and forwarded all its records to the Office of the
Regional State Prosecutor.
On September 23, 2004, the Regional State Prosecutor issued an Order designating State Prosecutor II Jorge D.
Baculi as Acting City Prosecutor of San Pablo City in the investigation of the libel complaint.
On December 6, 2004, State Prosecutor Baculi rendered a Resolution finding probable cause to file a libel case
against petitioner. On December 8, 2004, he filed an Information charging petitioner with the crime of libel, committed
as follows:
That on or about August 31, 2004, in the City of San Pablo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, a member of the Philippine Bar with Attorney Roll No. 32322, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, and with malicious intent of impeaching, defaming and attacking the honesty, competence,
integrity, virtue and reputation of Ma. Victoria Suñega-Lagman as an Assistant City Prosecutor of the Office of the City
Prosecutor of San Pablo City and for the further purpose of dishonoring, injuring, defaming and exposing said Ma.
Victoria Suñega-Lagman to public hatred, contempt, insult, calumny and ridicule, wrote, correspond, published and
filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of San Pablo City an undated "OMNIBUS MOTION (FOR
RECONSIDERATION & DISQUALIFY) in the case entitled "MEDEL B. BELEN, Complainant vs. NEZER D. BELEN
SR., Respondent, "for Estafa docketed as I.S. No. 04-312, the pertinent and relevant portions are quoted hereunder,
to wit:
In the instant case, however, the Investigating Fiscal was not impartial and exhibited manifest bias for 20,000
reasons. The reasons were not legal or factual. These reasons were based on her malicious and convoluted
perceptions. If she was partial, then she is stupid. The Investigating Fiscal's stupidity was clearly manifest in
her moronic resolution to dismiss the complaint because she reasoned out that: (1) the lease started in 1983 as the
number 9 was handwritten over the figure "8" in the lease contract; (2) no support for accounting was made for the first
five (5) years; and (3) the dismissal of IS No. 03-14-12 covered the same subject matter in the instant case. Thus, the
instant complaint should be dismissed.
Unfortunately, the Investigating Fiscal's wrongful assumption were tarnished with silver ingots. She is also an
intellectually infirm or stupidly blind. Because it was just a matter of a more studious and logical appraisal and
examination of the documents and affidavits submitted by respondent's witnesses to establish that the lease started in
1993. All respondent's supporting affidavits of Mrs. Leyna Belen-Ang; Mr. Demetrio D. Belen and Mr. Silvestre D.
Belen (all admitted that the lease started in 1993). Secondly, had she not always been absent in the preliminary
investigation hearings and conducted a clarificatory questioning as requested by herein complainant, as her secretary
was the only one always present and accepted the exhibits and affidavits, there would have been a clear deliverance
from her corrupted imagination. Firstly, complainant was married to his wife on August 15, 1987. Thus, it would be
physically and chronologically inconceivable that the lease for the subject lanzones be entered by complainant and his
wife, whom he met only in 1987, with respondent and his siblings in 1983. Secondly, the payments were made in 1993
and 1994, these were admitted by respondent's witnesses in their affidavits. Thus, it would be a height of stupidity for
respondent and his witnesses to allow complainant to take possession and harvest the lanzones from 1983 to 2002
without any payment. Lastly, the only defense raised in the respondents witnesses' affidavits was the lease period was
only from 1993 to 1998. Thus, this is a clear admission that the lease started in 1993. Despite all these matters and
documents, the moronic resolution insisted that the lease started in 1983. For all the 20,000 reasons of the
Investigating Fiscal, the slip of her skirt shows a corrupted and convoluted frame of mind - a manifest
partiality and stupendous stupidity in her resolution.
Furthermore, Investigating Fiscal 's 2nd corrupted reason was the failure of complainant to render an accounting on
the 5-year harvest from 1993 to 1998. Sadly, the Investigating Fiscal was manifestly prejudiced and manifestly
selective in her rationale. Firstly, the issue of non-presentation of accounting for the first 5 years was not raised in any
of the witnesses' affidavits. A careful perusal of all their affidavits clearly shows that the issue of accounting for the first
5-year (1993-1999) harvest was never a defense because respondent and his witnesses knew and were informed that
the lanzones harvest from 1993 to 1999 was less than 200,000. Secondly, during the respondent's 2002 visit from
USA in a meeting at the house of Mrs. Leyna Belen Agra, complainant advised respondent of this matter and
respondent acknowledged the fact that the 5-year harvest from 1993 to 1998 was abundantly inadequate to pay the
principal sum of 300,000. Thirdly, all the numbers and figures in the Lease Contract indicated 1993 and/or 1994 - a
clear indicia that the transaction covered by the instrument started in 1993. Fourthly, the correction was made by
respondent or one of his siblings, which can easily be shown by the penmanship. Lastly, the letters of complainant to
respondent clearly advised of the non-payment of the principal and interest for the 1st 5-year. For this reason,
complainant had repeatedly agreed to the request of respondent's wife, Lourdes B. Belen and younger son, Nezer
Belen, Jr. in 2003 for meetings for resolution of the matter. But respondent's wife and younger son repeatedly
cancelled these meetings. All these factual circumstances are undeniable but were presented because the issue of
accounting was never raised.
Lastly, the invocation of the dismissal of I.S. No. 03-1412 was a nail in the coffin for the idiocy and imbecility of
the Investigating Fiscal. It was her fallacious rationale that because No. 03-14-12 covered the same subject, the
instant case should also be dismissed. Unfortunately, she showed her glaring ignorance of the law. Firstly, there is no
res judicata in a preliminary reinvestigation. Secondly, the dismissal of a complaint shall not bar filing of another
complaint because upon completion of the necessary documentary exhibits and affidavits to establish probable cause
another case could be filed. Thirdly, the cause of action in the instant case is totally different vis-a-vis that in I.S. No.
03-1412. Fourthly, the complainant is filing the instant case in his own personal capacity as "lessee" over the entire
property from 1993 to 2013. In other words, the Investigating Fiscal's invocation of the dismissal of I.S. No. 03-
1412 was clearly imbecilic and idiotic.
All these matters could have been easily established. All the idiotic and corrupted reason of the Investigating
Fiscal manifestly exposed, had the Investigating Fiscal exercised the cold partiality of a judge and calendared the
instant case for clarificatory questions. In fact, she deliberately ignored complainant's request for, such setting despite
the established doctrine in preliminary investigation that the "propounding of clarificatory questions is an important
component of preliminary investigation, more so where it is requested in order to shed light on the affidavits >>>"
(Mondia v. Deputy OmbudsmanNisayas Are, 346 SCRA 365) Unfortunately, the Investigating Fiscal, despite the
letter-request for clarificatory question to shed lights of all the transaction and facts under investigation,
chose to be guided by her manifest partiality and stupendous stupidity. As a reminder to the Investigating Fiscal,
Justice Oscar Herrera, Sr., in his treatise, I Remedial Law 2000 ed., succinctly explained the underlying principle of
fair play and justice in the just determination of every action and proceedings is that the rules of procedure should be
viewed as mere tools designed to aid the Courts in the speedy, just and inexpensive determination of cases before the
court.
In totality, the dismissal of the instant case was based on reasons that were never raised by the respondent. Reasons
dictate and due process of law mandates that complainant be afforded opportunity to rebut issues raised. In the
instant case, manifestly established is the corrupted penchant of the Investigating Fiscal to assume matters and
presume issues not raised and decide, without affording complainant the due process, matters totally extraneous and
not raised. Thus, contrary to the due process requirement of law, the Investigating Fiscal rendered a resolution on a
matter not raised. The question, therefore, is her reason in adjudicating without affording complainant the opportunity
of rebuttal, a matter not raised. She never ever asked these questions. She deliberately and fraudulently concealed
her biased reasoning to prevent complainant to rebut this matter. She sideswiped complainant on matters not raised in
the pleading. She was a partial and interested investigator with clear intent to dismiss the case. This is an implied
lawyering for the respondent. Thus, she should resign from the prosecutorial arm of the government and be a
defense counsel. Then her infirmed intellectual prowess and stupid assumptions be exposed in trial on the
merits under which complainant is afforded the due process requirement of the law. At that stage of trial, she
would be exposed as a fraud and a quack bereft of any intellectual ability and mental honesty.
It is a sad day for a colleague in the practice of law to call for a disqualification of an Investigating Fiscal. The
circumstances of the instant case, leave no recourse for complainant but the option, in his quest for justice and fair
play and not for corrupted and convoluted 20,000 reasons, to strongly ask for the disqualification of Fiscal Suñega-
Lagman in the resolution of the instant motion.
In the resolution for this motion for reconsideration, the sole issue is whether based on the affidavits and evidence
adduced by the complainant probable cause exist to file a case against respondent. The answer is YES because, all
law students and lawyers, except Fiscal Suñega-Lagman, know">>> the preliminary investigation should determine
whether there is a sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the
respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. (Webb vs. Visconde, August 23, 1995, 63 SCAD
916, 247 SCRA 652) And if the evidence so warrants, the investigating prosecutor is duty bound to file the
corresponding information. (Meralco vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115835, July 5, 1996, 71 SCAD 712, 258 SCRA
280). Thus, preliminary investigation is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of
determining whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. A probable cause merely
implies probability of guilt and should be determined in a summary manner ... "
That the article in question had for its object to appear and made it understood, as was in effect understood and
interpreted by the public or person/s who read it, that Ma. Victoria Suñega-Lagman is an inept, ignorant, dishonest,
corrupt, undeserving, unjust, unfair and incompetent prosecutor of the Office of the City Prosecutor of San Pablo City.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
Upon arraignment, petitioner refused to make a plea; hence, the trial court entered a plea of "NOT GUILTY." Trial on
the merits ensued. The prosecution presented four (4) witnesses, namely: (1) complainant ACP Suñega-Lagman, (2)
Michael Belen, the son and representative of respondent Nezer in the estafa complaint; and (3) Joey R. Flores and
Gayne Garno Enseo, who are part of the administrative staff of the OCP of San Pablo City. For its part, the defense
presented the accused petitioner as its sole witness.
After trial, the trial court found petitioner guilty of libel and sentenced him to pay a fine of ₱3,000.00, with no
pronouncement as to damages on account of ACP Suñega-Lagman's reservation to file an independent civil action
against him.
The trial court stressed that the following allegations and utterances against ACP Suñega-Lagman in petitioner's
Omnibus Motion are far detached from the controversy in the estafa case, thereby losing its character as absolutely
privileged communication: (1) "manifest bias for 20,000 reasons"; (2) "the Investigating Fiscal 's wrongful assumptions
were tarnished in silver ingots"; (3) "the slip of her skirt shows a corrupted and convoluted frame of mind"; (4)
"corrupted and convoluted 20,000 reasons"; (5) "moronic resolution"; (6) "intellectually infirm or stupid blind"; (7)
"manifest partiality and stupendous stupidity"; (8) "idiocy and imbecility of the Investigating Fiscal"; and (9) "a fraud
and a quack bereft of any intellectual ability and mental honesty." On the element of publication, the trial court noted
that the Omnibus Motion was not sent straight to ACP Suñega-Lagman, but passed through and exposed to be read
by third persons, namely: prosecution witnesses Flores and Enseo who are the staff in the receiving section of the
OCP of San Pablo City, as well as Michael Belen, the son and representative of Nezer in the estafa case.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court's decision. On the claimed lack of publication, the CA pointed out that the
defamatory matter was made known to third persons because prosecution witnesses Flores and Enseo, who are the
staff in the OCP of San Pablo City, were able to read the Omnibus Motion filed by petitioner, as well as Michael, son
and representative of Nezer in the estafa case then being investigated by ACP Suñega-Lagman, was furnished copy
of the motion. Anent the applicability of the rule on absolutely privileged communication, the CA ruled in the negative
because the subject statements were unnecessary or irrelevant in determining whether the dismissal of the estafa
case filed by petitioner against Nezer was proper, and they were defamatory remarks on the personality, reputation
and mental fitness of ACP Suñega-Lagman.
In her Dissenting Opinion, Justice Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela stated that petitioner could not be convicted of libel
because the statements in his Omnibus Motion, while couched in intemperate, acrid and uncalled-for language, are
relevant to the dismissal of his estafa case, and thus falls under the concept of absolutely privileged communication.
She also said that the element of publication is absent, because with respect to Nezer, Michael is not a "third
person," i.e., a person other than the person to whom the defamatory statement refers, but a "representative of his
father." She added that while Flores and Enseo, who are staff of the OCP of San Pablo City, had read the Omnibus
Motion, they are not "third persons" since they had a legal duty to perform with respect to the said motion filed in their
office.
In a Resolution dated January 10, 2014, the CA denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition for
review on certiorari.
In seeking his acquittal of the crime charged, petitioner argues that the CA erred (1) in finding him guilty of libel despite
the absence of the element of publication; (2) in ruling that the privileged communication rule is inapplicable; and (3) in
relying on the opinion of ordinary witnesses to show the presence of malicious imputations. 6
The petition lacks merit.
On the absence of the element of publication, petitioner contends that in serving and filing the Omnibus Motion
enclosed in sealed envelopes, he did not intend to expose it to third persons, but only complied with the law on how
service and filing of pleadings should be done. He asserts that the perusal of the said motion by Michael, the duly
authorized representative and son of the respondent in the estafa case, as well as the two staff of the OCP - Flores
and Enseo - did not constitute publication within the meaning of the law on libel because they cannot be considered as
"third persons to whom copies of the motion were disseminated." With respect to Flores and Enseo, petitioner insists
that they were both legal recipients as personnel in the OCP where the motion was addressed and had to be filed.
Stating that the absence of publication negates malice, petitioner posits that he could not have intended to injure the
reputation of ACP Suñega-Lagman with the filing of the Omnibus Motion since it was never published, but was sent to
its legal recipients.
Publication in libel means making the defamatory matter, after it has been written, known to someone other than the
person to whom it has been written.7 A communication of the defamatory matter to the person defamed alone cannot
injure his reputation though it may wound his self-esteem, for a man's reputation is not the good opinion he has of
himself, but the estimation in which other hold him. 8 In the same vein, a defamatory letter contained in a closed
envelope addressed to another constitutes sufficient publication if the offender parted with its possession in such a
way that it can be read by person other than the offended party. 9 If a sender of a libelous communication knows or has
good reasons to believe that it will be intercepted before reaching the person defamed, there is sufficient
publication.10 The publication of a libel, however, should not be presumed from the fact that the immediate control
thereof is parted with unless it appears that there is reasonable probability that it is hereby exposed to be read or seen
by third persons.11
In claiming that he did not intend to expose the Omnibus Motion to third persons, but only complied with the law on
how service and filing of pleadings should be done, petitioner conceded that the defamatory statements in it were
made known to someone other than the person to whom it has been written. Despite the fact that the motion was
contained in sealed envelopes, it is not unreasonable to expect that persons other than the one defamed would be
able to read the defamatory statements in it, precisely because they were filed with the OCP of San Pablo City and
copy furnished to Nezer, the respondent in the estafa complaint, and the Office of the Secretary of Justice in Manila.
Then being a lawyer, petitioner is well aware that such motion is not a mere private communication, but forms part of
public record when filed with the government office. Inasmuch as one is disputably presumed to intend the natural and
probable consequence of his act,12 petitioner cannot brush aside the logical outcome of the filing and service of his
Omnibus Motion. As aptly noted by the trial court:
x x x The Omnibus Motion although contained in a sealed envelope was addressed to the Office of the City
Prosecutor, San Pablo City.1âwphi1 As such, the accused fully well knows that the sealed envelope will be opened at
the receiving section, and will be first read by the staff of the Office before the private complainant gets hold of a copy
thereof. In fine, the Omnibus Motion was not sent straight to the private complainant - the person [to] whom it is
written, but passed through other persons in the Office of the City Prosecutor. At the time the accused mailed the
sealed envelope containing the Omnibus Motion addressed to the Office of the City Prosecutor, he knew that there
exists not only a reasonable but strong probability that it will be exposed to be read or seen by third persons. 13
It is not amiss to state that generally, the requirement of publication of defamatory matters is not satisfied by a
communication of such matters to an agent of the defamed person. 14 In this case, however, the defamatory statement
was published when copy of the Omnibus Motion was furnished to and read by Michael, the son and representative of
respondent Nezer in the estafa complaint, who is clearly not an agent of the defamed person, ACP Suñega-Lagman.
Petitioner then argues that there is no publication as to Flores and Enseo, the staff of the OCP of San Pablo City, who
had read the contents of the Omnibus Motion. In support thereof, he cites the settled rule that "when a public officer, in
the discharge of his or her official duties, sends a communication to another officer or to a body of officers, who have a
duty to perform with respect to the subject matter of the communication, such communication does not amount to
publication."15 Petitioner's argument is untenable. As mere members of the administrative staff of the OCP of San
Pablo City, Flores and Enseo cannot be said to have a duty to perform with respect to the subject matter of his motion,
which is to seek reconsideration of the dismissal of his Estafa complaint and to disqualify ACP Suñega-Lagman from
the preliminary investigation of the case. Their legal duty pertains only to the clerical procedure of transmitting the
motions filed with the OCP of San Pablo City to the proper recipients.
Petitioner also avers that the alleged defamatory statements in his Omnibus Motion passed the test of relevancy,
hence, covered by the doctrine of absolutely privileged communication. He asserts that the statements contained in
his motion are relevant and pertinent to the subject of inquiry, as they were used only to highlight and emphasize the
manifestly reversible errors and irregularities that attended the resolution rendered by ACP Suñega-Lagman.
Petitioner's contentions fail to persuade.
A communication is absolutely privileged when it is not actionable, even if the author has acted in bad faith. This class
includes allegations or statements made by parties or their counsel in pleadings or motions or during the hearing of
judicial and administrative proceedings, as well as answers given by the witness in reply to questions propounded to
them in the course of said proceedings, provided that said allegations or statements are relevant to the issues, and
the answers are responsive to the questions propounded to said witnesses. 16
The reason for the rule that pleadings in judicial proceedings are considered privileged is not only because said
pleadings have become part of public record open to the public to scrutinize, but also to the undeniable fact said
pleadings are presumed to contain allegations and assertions lawful and legal in nature, appropriate to the disposition
of issues ventilated before the courts for proper administration of justice and, therefore, of general public concern.
Moreover, pleadings are presumed to contain allegations substantially true because they can be supported by
evidence in good faith, the contents of which would be under scrutiny of courts and, therefore, subject to be purged of
all improprieties and illegal statements contained therein. 17 In fine, the privilege is granted in aid and for the advantage
of the administration of justice.18
While Philippine law is silent on the question of whether the doctrine of absolutely privileged communication extends
to statements in preliminary investigations or other proceedings preparatory to trial, the Court found as persuasive in
this jurisdiction the U.S. case of Borg v. Boas19 which categorically declared the existence of such protection:
It is hornbook learning that the actions and utterances in judicial proceedings so far as the actual participants therein
are concerned and preliminary steps leading to judicial action of an official nature have been given absolute
privilege. Of particular interest are proceedings leading up to prosecutions or attempted prosecutions for crime xxx
[A] written charge or information filed with the prosecutor or the court is not libelous although proved false and
unfounded. Furthermore, the information given to a prosecutor by a private person for the purpose of initiating a
prosecution is protected by the same cloak of immunity and cannot be used as a basis for an action for defamation. 20
The absolute privilege remains regardless of the defamatory tenor and the presence of malice, if the same are
relevant, pertinent or material to the cause in and or subject of the inquiry. 21 Sarcastic, pungent and harsh allegations
in a pleading although tending to detract from the dignity that should characterize proceedings in courts of justice, are
absolutely privileged, if relevant to the issues.22 As to the degree of relevancy or pertinency necessary to make the
alleged defamatory matter privileged, the courts are inclined to be liberal. The matter to which the privilege does not
extend must be so palpably wanting in relation to the subject matter of the controversy that no reasonable man can
doubt its irrelevancy and impropriety.23 In order that a matter alleged in the pleading may be privileged, it need not, in
any case, be material to the issue presented by the pleadings; however, it must be legitimately related thereto or so
pertinent to the subject of the controversy that it may become the subject of inquiry in the course of the trial. 24 What is
relevant or pertinent should be liberally considered to favor the writer, and the words are not be scrutinized with
microscopic intensity,25 as it would defeat the protection which the law throws over privileged communication. 26
The statements in petitioner's Omnibus Motion filed before the OCP of San Pablo City as a remedy for the dismissal of
his estafa complaint during preliminary investigation, fall short of the test of relevancy. An examination of the motion
shows that the following defamatory words and phrases used, even if liberally construed, are hardly 'material or
pertinent to his cause, which is to seek a reconsideration of the dismissal of his estafa complaint and the
disqualification of ACP Suñega-Lagman from further acting on the case: (1) "manifest bias for 20,000
reasons"; (2) "the Investigating Fiscal's wrongful assumptions were tarnished in silver ingots"; (3) "the slip of
her skirt shows a corrupted and convoluted frame of mind"; (4) "corrupted and convoluted 20,000
reasons"; (5) "moronic resolution"; (6) "intellectually infirm or stupid blind"; (7) "manifest partiality and
stupendous stupidity"; (8) "idiocy and imbecility of the Investigating Fiscal"; and (9) "a fraud and a quack
bereft of any intellectual ability and mental honesty." These statements are neither relevant grounds for a motion
for reconsideration nor valid and justifiable reasons for disqualification. These diatribes pertain to ACP Suñega-
Lagman's honor, reputation, mental and moral character, and are no longer related to the discharge of her official
function as a prosecutor. They are devoid of any relation to the subject matter of petitioner's Omnibus Motion that no
reasonable man can doubt their irrelevancy, and may not become the subject of inquiry in the course of resolving the
motion. As fittingly ruled by the trial court:
This Court has no problem with legitimate criticisms of the procedures taken during the preliminary investigation and
accused's comments pointing out flaws in the ruling of the private complainant. They should ever be constructive and
should pave the way at correcting the supposed errors in the Resolution and/or convincing the private complainant to
inhibit, as she did, from the case. Unfortunately, the Omnibus Motion, or the questioned allegations contained therein,
are not of this genre. On the contrary, the accused has crossed the lines as his statements are baseless, scurrilous
attacks on the person of the .private complainant. The attacks did nothing but damage the integrity and reputation of
the private complainant. In fact, the attacks undermined in no small measure the faith and confidence of the litigants in
the prosecutorial service.27
Petitioner should bear in mind the rule that the pleadings should contain but the plain and concise statements of
material facts and not the evidence by which they are to be proved. If the pleader goes beyond the requirements of
the statute, and alleges an irrelevant matter which is libelous, he loses his privilege. 28 The reason for this is that
without the requirement of relevancy, pleadings could be easily diverted from their original aim to succinctly inform the
court of the issues in litigation and pervaded into a vehicle for airing charges motivated by a personal rancor. 29Granted
that lawyers are given great latitude or pertinent comment in furtherance of the causes they uphold, and for the felicity
of their clients, they may be pardoned some infelicities of language, 30 petitioner would do well to recall that the Code of
Professional Responsibility31 ordains that a lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings use language which is
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper. After all, a lawyer should conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor
toward his professional colleagues,32 and use only such temperate but strong language in his pleadings or arguments
befitting an advocate.
There is also no merit in petitioner's theory that the test of relevancy should be liberally construed in his favor,
especially because "in the information for libel, there was no allegation of irrelevancy or impertinency of the
questioned statements to the cause"33 or the subject of the inquiry, the estafa complaint in I.S. No. 04-312. It bears
emphasis that while the relevancy of the statement is a requisite of the defense of absolutely privileged
communication, it is not one of the elements of libel. Thus, the absence of an allegation to the effect that the
questioned statement is irrelevant or impertinent does not violate the right of the accused to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him.·As the party raising such defense, petitioner has the burden of proving that
his statements are relevant to the subject of his Omnibus Motion. For its part, the prosecution only has to prove
beyond reasonable doubt the presence of all the elements of libel as defined in Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code,
namely: (1) imputation of a crime, vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition status or
circumstance; (2) publicity or publication; (3) malice; (4) direction of such imputation at a natural or juridical person;
and (5) tendency to cause the dishonour, discredit or contempt of the person defamed. 34
Meanwhile, petitioner's reliance on People v. Andres35 is misplaced. In that case, the prosecution argued that the trial
court erred in dismissing the case on a mere motion to quash, contending that the judge's conclusion on the face of
the information that the defendant was prompted only by good motives assumes a fact to be proved, and that the
alleged privileged nature of defendant's publication is a matter of defense and is not a proper ground for dismissal of
the libel complaint. The Court sustained the trial court in dismissing the libel case on a mere motion to quash in this
wise:
While there is some point in this contention, yet when in the information itself it appears, as it does in the present
case, that the communication alleged to be libelous is contained in an appropriate pleading in a court proceeding, the
privilege becomes at once apparent and defendant need to wait until trial and produce evidence before he can raise
the question of privilege. And if added to this, the questioned imputations appear, as they seem, in this case, to be
really pertinent and relevant to defendant's plea for reconsideration based on complainant's supposed partiality and
abuse of power from which defendant has a right to seek relief in vindication of his client's interest as a litigant in
complainant's court, it would become evident that the fact thus alleged in the information would not constitute an
offense of libel.
As has already been said by this Court: "As to the degree of relevancy or pertinency necessary to make an alleged
defamatory matter privileged, the courts are inclined to be liberal. The matter to which the privilege does not extend
must be so palpably wanting in relation to the subject matter of the controversy that no reasonable man can doubt its
irrelevancy and impropriety." Having this in mind, it can not be said that the trial court committed reversible error in this
case in finding that the allegations in the information itself present a case of an absolutely privileged communication
justifying the dismissal of the case. Note that the information does not contain any allegation of irrelevancy and
impertinency to counteract the quotations from the motion for reconsideration in question. 36
In stark contrast to People v. Andres, even on the face of the allegations in the information, the defamatory statements
in petitioner's Omnibus Motion fail the test of relevancy in order to be considered an absolutely privileged
communication, because they are neither relevant grounds for a motion for reconsideration nor valid or justifiable
reasons for disqualification of ACP Suñega-Lagman.
Finally, petitioner argues that the reliance of the CA on the statements of ordinary witnesses like Michael, Flores and
Enseo is contrary to Sections 4837 and 5038 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, because they are incompetent to testify
on whether the statements against ACP Suñega-Lagman in the Omnibus Motion constituted malicious imputations
against her person.
As a rule, the opinion of a witness is inadmissible because a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of
his own personal knowledge39 and it is for the court to draw conclusions from the facts testified to. Opinion evidence or
testimony refers to evidence of what the witness thinks, believes or infers in regard to facts in dispute, as distinguished
from his personal knowledge of the facts themselves.40 In this case, however, prosecution witnesses Michael, Flores
and Enseo barely made a conclusion on the defamatory nature of the statements in petitioner's Omnibus Motion, but
merely testified on their own understanding of what they had read.
In Buatis, Jr. v. People,41 the Court stated the twin rule for the purpose of determining the meaning of any publication
alleged to be libelous: (1) that construction must be adopted which will give to the matter such a meaning as is natural
and obvious in the plain and ordinary sense in which the public would naturally understand what was uttered; and (2)
the published matter alleged to libelous must be construed as a whole. "In applying these rules to the language of an
alleged libel, the court will disregard any subtle or ingenious explanation offered by the publisher on being called to
account. The whole question being the effect the publication had upon the minds of the readers, and they not having
been assisted by the offered explanation in reading the article, it comes too late to have the effect of removing the
sting, if any there be from the words used in the publication." 42 As the persons who, aside from ACP Suñega-Lagman,
had also read the Omnibus Motion, prosecution witnesses Michael, Flores and Enseo are competent to testify on their
own understanding of the questioned statements, and their testimonies are relevant to the trial court's determination of
the defamatory character of such statements.
At any rate, even if petitioner's objections to the admissibility of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as to their
supposed opinions on his statements against ACP Suñega-Lagman were to be sustained, the trial court still correctly
determined the statements to be defamatory based on its own reading of the plain and ordinary meanings of the
words and phrases used in the Omnibus Motion, thus:
Based on the above testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and on this Court's own assessment, the statements
above-quoted disturb one's sensibilities. There is evident imputation of the crime of bribery to the effect that the private
complainant may have received money in exchange for the dismissal of the accused's complaint against his uncle
Nezer Belen. There is likewise an imputation against the private complainant as an "idiot", "imbecile" and with
"stupendous stupidity". An "idiot" as defined in Meriam-Webster Collegiate Thesaurus, 1988 Edition, p. 380, as a
"fool", "moron, "stupid", "nincompoop", "ignoramus", "simpleton", "dummy", or "imbecile". On the other hand, an
"imbecile" means "retarded", "dull" or "feeble minded. "Stupid" means lacking in or exhibiting a lack of power to absorb
ideas or impressions, or dumb. "Stupendous" means marvelous, astounding, monstrous, monumental and
tremendous. Thus, "stupendous stupidity" simply means tremendous or monstrous dumbness. Indeed, accused's
characterization of the private complainant is unkind, to say the least, which should not be found a pleading written by
a lawyer."43
Given the settled rule that an appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case open for review, and it becomes the
duty of the appellate court to correct such errors as may be found in the judgment appealed from, whether or not they
are made the subject of assignment of errors,44 the Court finds it proper to modify the penalty of fine of Three
Thousand Pesos (₱3,000.00) imposed upon petitioner.
Apropos is Administrative Circular No. 08-2008, or the Guidelines in the Observance of a Rule of Preference in the
Imposition of Penalties in Libel Cases,45 where the Supreme Court cited cases46 of libel, indicating an emergent rule
of preference for the imposition of fine only rather than imprisonment in such cases under the circumstances therein
specified. The Administrative Circular sets down the rule of preference on the matter of imposition of penalties for the
crime of libel bearing in mind the following principles:
1. This Administrative Circular does not remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty for the crime of libel under
Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code;47
2. The Judges concerned may, in the exercise of sound discretion, and taking into consideration the peculiar
circumstances of each case, determine whether the imposition of a fine alone would best serve the interests of justice
or whether forbearing to impose imprisonment would depreciate the seriousness of the offense, work violence on the
social order, or otherwise be contrary to the imperative of justice;
3. Should only a fine be imposed and the accused be unable to pay the fine, there is no legal obstacle to the
application of the Revised Penal Code provision on subsidiary imprisonment.
The penalty for the crime of libel under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is prision correccional in
its minimum and medium periods or a fine ranging from ₱200.00 to ₱6,000.00, or both, in addition to the civil action
which may be brought by the offended party. The Court finds it appropriate to increase the fine imposed upon
petitioner from Three Thousand Pesos (₱3,000.00) to Six Thousand Pesos (₱6,000.00), considering the following
peculiar circumstances of the case: (1) then a practicing lawyer himself, petitioner ignored the rules that in his
professional dealings, a lawyer shall not use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper, and should
treat other lawyers with courtesy, fairness and candor; (2) the barrage of defamatory statements in his Omnibus
Motion are utterly irrelevant to his prayers for a reconsideration of the dismissal of his estafa case and for the
disqualification of ACP Suñega-Lagman from further acting thereon; (3) the baseless and scurrilous personal attacks
in such public document do nothing but damage the integrity and reputation of ACP Suñega-Lagman, as well as
undermine the faith and confidence of litigants in the prosecutorial service; and (4) the lack of remorse on his part, as
shown by his unfounded claim that he filed the Omnibus Motion· in self-defense to ACP Suñega-Lagman's supposed
imputation of falsification against him without due process of law.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED, and the Decision dated April 12,
2013 and the Resolution dated January 10, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32905,
are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, increasing the penalty imposed upon petitioner Medel Arnaldo B. Belen to Six
Thousand Pesos (₱6,000.00), with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
SO ORDERED.

JASON IVLER y AGUILAR vs. HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, Judge of the Metropolitan Trial
Court, Branch 71, Pasig City, and EVANGELINE PONCE
G.R. No. 172716 November 17, 2010
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
The petition seeks the review1 of the Orders2 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City affirming sub-silencio a lower
court’s ruling finding inapplicable the Double Jeopardy Clause to bar a second prosecution for Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property. This, despite the accused’s previous conviction for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries arising from the same incident grounding the second prosecution.
The Facts
Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged before the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 (MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight
Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No. 82367) for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent
Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property (Criminal Case No. 82366) for
the death of respondent Ponce’s husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce’s vehicle. Petitioner
posted bail for his temporary release in both cases.
On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367 and was meted out the
penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No.
82366 for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.
The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases. 3
After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 157 (RTC), in a petition for certiorari (S.C.A. No. 2803). Meanwhile, petitioner sought from the MeTC the
suspension of proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366, including the arraignment on 17 May 2005, invoking S.C.A.
No. 2803 as a prejudicial question. Without acting on petitioner’s motion, the MeTC proceeded with the arraignment
and, because of petitioner’s absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest. 4 Seven days later, the MeTC issued a
resolution denying petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedings and postponing his arraignment until after his
arrest.5 Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the motion remained unresolved.
Relying on the arrest order against petitioner, respondent Ponce sought in the RTC the dismissal of S.C.A. No. 2803
for petitioner’s loss of standing to maintain the suit. Petitioner contested the motion.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In an Order dated 2 February 2006, the RTC dismissed S.C.A. No. 2803, narrowly grounding its ruling on petitioner’s
forfeiture of standing to maintain S.C.A. No. 2803 arising from the MeTC’s order to arrest petitioner for his non-
appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366. Thus, without reaching the merits of S.C.A. No. 2803, the
RTC effectively affirmed the MeTC. Petitioner sought reconsideration but this proved unavailing. 6
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner denies absconding. He explains that his petition in S.C.A. No. 2803 constrained him to forego participation
in the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner distinguishes his case from the line of jurisprudence
sanctioning dismissal of appeals for absconding appellants because his appeal before the RTC was a special civil
action seeking a pre-trial relief, not a post-trial appeal of a judgment of conviction. 7
Petitioner laments the RTC’s failure to reach the merits of his petition in S.C.A. 2803. Invoking jurisprudence,
petitioner argues that his constitutional right not to be placed twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense
bars his prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366, having been previously convicted in Criminal Case No. 82367 for
the same offense of reckless imprudence charged in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner submits that the multiple
consequences of such crime are material only to determine his penalty.
Respondent Ponce finds no reason for the Court to disturb the RTC’s decision forfeiting petitioner’s standing to
maintain his petition in S.C.A. 2803. On the merits, respondent Ponce calls the Court’s attention to jurisprudence
holding that light offenses (e.g. slight physical injuries) cannot be complexed under Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code with grave or less grave felonies (e.g. homicide). Hence, the prosecution was obliged to separate the charge in
Criminal Case No. 82366 for the slight physical injuries from Criminal Case No. 82367 for the homicide and damage to
property.
In the Resolution of 6 June 2007, we granted the Office of the Solicitor General’s motion not to file a comment to the
petition as the public respondent judge is merely a nominal party and private respondent is represented by counsel.
The Issues
Two questions are presented for resolution: (1) whether petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief in S.C.A. 2803
when the MeTC ordered his arrest following his non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366; and
(2) if in the negative, whether petitioner’s constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.
The Ruling of the Court
We hold that (1) petitioner’s non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 did not divest him of
personality to maintain the petition in S.C.A. 2803; and (2) the protection afforded by the Constitution shielding
petitioner from prosecutions placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense bars further
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.
Petitioner’s Non-appearance at the Arraignment in
Criminal Case No. 82366 did not Divest him of Standing
to Maintain the Petition in S.C.A. 2803
Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellant’s escape from custody or violation of the terms of his bail bond are
governed by the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 124, 8 in relation to Section 1, Rule 125, of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure authorizing this Court or the Court of Appeals to "also, upon motion of the appellee or motu
proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign
country during the pendency of the appeal." The "appeal" contemplated in Section 8 of Rule 124 is a suit to review
judgments of convictions.
The RTC’s dismissal of petitioner’s special civil action for certiorari to review a pre-arraignment ancillary question on
the applicability of the Due Process Clause to bar proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 finds no basis under
procedural rules and jurisprudence. The RTC’s reliance on People v. Esparas9 undercuts the cogency of its ruling
because Esparas stands for a proposition contrary to the RTC’s ruling. There, the Court granted review to an appeal
by an accused who was sentenced to death for importing prohibited drugs even though she jumped bail pending trial
and was thus tried and convicted in absentia. The Court in Esparas treated the mandatory review of death sentences
under Republic Act No. 7659 as an exception to Section 8 of Rule 124. 10
The mischief in the RTC’s treatment of petitioner’s non-appearance at his arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 as
proof of his loss of standing becomes more evident when one considers the Rules of Court’s treatment of a defendant
who absents himself from post-arraignment hearings. Under Section 21, Rule 114 11 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the defendant’s absence merely renders his bondsman potentially liable on its bond (subject to
cancellation should the bondsman fail to produce the accused within 30 days); the defendant retains his standing and,
should he fail to surrender, will be tried in absentia and could be convicted or acquitted. Indeed, the 30-day period
granted to the bondsman to produce the accused underscores the fact that mere non-appearance does not ipso facto
convert the accused’s status to that of a fugitive without standing.
Further, the RTC’s observation that petitioner provided "no explanation why he failed to attend the scheduled
proceeding"12 at the MeTC is belied by the records. Days before the arraignment, petitioner sought the suspension of
the MeTC’s proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 in light of his petition with the RTC in S.C.A. No. 2803. Following
the MeTC’s refusal to defer arraignment (the order for which was released days after the MeTC ordered petitioner’s
arrest), petitioner sought reconsideration. His motion remained unresolved as of the filing of this petition.
Petitioner’s Conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367
Bars his Prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366
The accused’s negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense"13protects him from, among others, post-conviction prosecution for the same offense, with the prior verdict
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid information. 14 It is not disputed that petitioner’s conviction in
Criminal Case No. 82367 was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid charge. Thus, the case turns
on the question whether Criminal Case No. 82366 and Criminal Case No. 82367 involve the "same offense." Petitioner
adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases concern the same offense of reckless imprudence. The
MeTC ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely separate
offense from Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property "as the [latter] requires proof of an
additional fact which the other does not."15
We find for petitioner.
Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime,
its Consequences on Persons and
Property are Material Only to Determine
the Penalty
The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the same provision of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses. The text of the
provision reads:
Imprudence and negligence. — Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been
intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its
minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor
in its maximum period shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would otherwise constitute a grave
felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less
serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed.
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the property of another, the
offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said damages to three times such
value, but which shall in no case be less than twenty-five pesos.
A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person who, by simple imprudence
or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously, would have constituted a light felony.
In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their sound discretion, without regard to the rules
prescribed in Article sixty-four.
The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:
1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those provided in the first two
paragraphs of this article, in which case the court shall impose the penalty next lower in degree than that
which should be imposed in the period which they may deem proper to apply.
2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the Automobile Law, to death of a person shall be
caused, in which case the defendant shall be punished by prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods.
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material
damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform
such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other
circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which the damage impending to be
caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest.
The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall be imposed upon the offender who fails to
lend on the spot to the injured parties such help as may be in this hand to give.
Structurally, these nine paragraphs are collapsible into four sub-groupings relating to (1) the penalties attached to the
quasi-offenses of "imprudence" and "negligence" (paragraphs 1-2); (2) a modified penalty scheme for either or both
quasi-offenses (paragraphs 3-4, 6 and 9); (3) a generic rule for trial courts in imposing penalties (paragraph 5); and (4)
the definition of "reckless imprudence" and "simple imprudence" (paragraphs 7-8). Conceptually, quasi-offenses
penalize "the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the
imprudencia punible,"16 unlike willful offenses which punish the intentional criminal act. These structural and
conceptual features of quasi-offenses set them apart from the mass of intentional crimes under the first 13 Titles of
Book II of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of crime, separately defined
and penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing new. As early as the middle of the last century, we
already sought to bring clarity to this field by rejecting in Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of Pampanga the proposition
that "reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it x x x" 17 on three points of analysis:
(1) the object of punishment in quasi-crimes (as opposed to intentional crimes); (2) the legislative intent to treat quasi-
crimes as distinct offenses (as opposed to subsuming them under the mitigating circumstance of minimal intent) and;
(3) the different penalty structures for quasi-crimes and intentional crimes:
The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that "reckless imprudence" is not a crime in itself but
simply a way of committing it and merely determines a lower degree of criminal liability is too broad to deserve
unqualified assent. There are crimes that by their structure cannot be committed through imprudence: murder,
treason, robbery, malicious mischief, etc. In truth, criminal negligence in our Revised Penal Code is treated as a mere
quasi offense, and dealt with separately from willful offenses. It is not a mere question of classification or terminology.
In intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is principally penalized is the mental
attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible. x x
xx
Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of felonies, operating only to reduce the penalty therefor,
then it would be absorbed in the mitigating circumstances of Art. 13, specially the lack of intent to commit so grave a
wrong as the one actually committed. Furthermore, the theory would require that the corresponding penalty should be
fixed in proportion to the penalty prescribed for each crime when committed willfully. For each penalty for the willful
offense, there would then be a corresponding penalty for the negligent variety. But instead, our Revised Penal Code
(Art. 365) fixes the penalty for reckless imprudence at arresto mayor maximum, to prision correccional [medium], if the
willful act would constitute a grave felony, notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter could range all the way from
prision mayor to death, according to the case. It can be seen that the actual penalty for criminal negligence bears no
relation to the individual willful crime, but is set in relation to a whole class, or series, of crimes. 18 (Emphasis supplied)
This explains why the technically correct way to allege quasi-crimes is to state that their commission results in
damage, either to person or property.19
Accordingly, we found the Justice of the Peace in Quizon without jurisdiction to hear a case for "Damage to Property
through Reckless Imprudence," its jurisdiction being limited to trying charges for Malicious Mischief, an intentional
crime conceptually incompatible with the element of imprudence obtaining in quasi-crimes.
Quizon, rooted in Spanish law20 (the normative ancestry of our present day penal code) and since repeatedly
reiterated,21 stands on solid conceptual foundation. The contrary doctrinal pronouncement in People v. Faller 22 that
"[r]eckless impudence is not a crime in itself x x x [but] simply a way of committing it x x x," 23 has long been
abandoned when the Court en banc promulgated Quizon in 1955 nearly two decades after the Court decided Faller in
1939. Quizon rejected Faller’s conceptualization of quasi-crimes by holding that quasi-crimes under Article 365 are
distinct species of crimes and not merely methods of committing crimes. Faller found expression in post-Quizon
jurisprudence24 only by dint of lingering doctrinal confusion arising from an indiscriminate fusion of criminal law rules
defining Article 365 crimes and the complexing of intentional crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code which,
as will be shown shortly, rests on erroneous conception of quasi-crimes. Indeed, the Quizonian conception of quasi-
crimes undergirded a related branch of jurisprudence applying the Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses, barring
second prosecutions for a quasi-offense alleging one resulting act after a prior conviction or acquittal of a quasi-
offense alleging another resulting act but arising from the same reckless act or omission upon which the second
prosecution was based.
Prior Conviction or Acquittal of
Reckless Imprudence Bars
Subsequent Prosecution for the Same
Quasi-Offense
The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means to
commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same
quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded this Court’s unbroken chain of jurisprudence on
double jeopardy as applied to Article 365 starting with People v. Diaz, 25 decided in 1954. There, a full Court, speaking
through Mr. Justice Montemayor, ordered the dismissal of a case for "damage to property thru reckless imprudence"
because a prior case against the same accused for "reckless driving," arising from the same act upon which the first
prosecution was based, had been dismissed earlier. Since then, whenever the same legal question was brought
before the Court, that is, whether prior conviction or acquittal of reckless imprudence bars subsequent prosecution for
the same quasi-offense, regardless of the consequences alleged for both charges, the Court unfailingly and
consistently answered in the affirmative in People v. Belga 26 (promulgated in 1957 by the Court en banc, per Reyes,
J.), Yap v. Lutero27 (promulgated in 1959, unreported, per Concepcion, J.), People v. Narvas 28 (promulgated in 1960 by
the Court en banc, per Bengzon J.), People v. Silva 29 (promulgated in 1962 by the Court en banc, per Paredes, J.),
People v. Macabuhay30 (promulgated in 1966 by the Court en banc, per Makalintal, J.), People v. Buan 31 (promulgated
in 1968 by the Court en banc, per Reyes, J.B.L., acting C. J.), Buerano v. Court of Appeals 32 (promulgated in 1982 by
the Court en banc, per Relova, J.), and People v. City Court of Manila 33 (promulgated in 1983 by the First Division, per
Relova, J.). These cases uniformly barred the second prosecutions as constitutionally impermissible under the Double
Jeopardy Clause.
The reason for this consistent stance of extending the constitutional protection under the Double Jeopardy Clause to
quasi-offenses was best articulated by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Buan, where, in barring a subsequent prosecution
for "serious physical injuries and damage to property thru reckless imprudence" because of the accused’s prior
acquittal of "slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence," with both charges grounded on the same act, the Court
explained:34
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the
accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence
under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally
done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof.
The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of
the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one person or several
persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes and
prosecutions.35 x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Evidently, the Diaz line of jurisprudence on double jeopardy merely extended to its logical conclusion the reasoning of
Quizon.
There is in our jurisprudence only one ruling going against this unbroken line of authority. Preceding Diaz by more
than a decade, El Pueblo de Filipinas v. Estipona,36 decided by the pre-war colonial Court in November 1940, allowed
the subsequent prosecution of an accused for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property despite his
previous conviction for multiple physical injuries arising from the same reckless operation of a motor vehicle upon
which the second prosecution was based. Estipona’s inconsistency with the post-war Diaz chain of jurisprudence
suffices to impliedly overrule it. At any rate, all doubts on this matter were laid to rest in 1982 in Buerano. 37 There, we
reviewed the Court of Appeals’ conviction of an accused for "damage to property for reckless imprudence" despite his
prior conviction for "slight and less serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence," arising from the same act upon
which the second charge was based. The Court of Appeals had relied on Estipona. We reversed on the strength of
Buan:38
Th[e] view of the Court of Appeals was inspired by the ruling of this Court in the pre-war case of People vs. Estipona
decided on November 14, 1940. However, in the case of People vs. Buan, 22 SCRA 1383 (March 29, 1968), this
Court, speaking thru Justice J. B. L. Reyes, held that –
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the
accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence
under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally
done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof.
The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of
the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one person or several
persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes and
prosecutions.
xxxx
. . . the exoneration of this appellant, Jose Buan, by the Justice of the Peace (now Municipal) Court of Guiguinto,
Bulacan, of the charge of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for
serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in the Court of First Instance of the province, where both
charges are derived from the consequences of one and the same vehicular accident, because the second accusation
places the appellant in second jeopardy for the same offense.39 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, for all intents and purposes, Buerano had effectively overruled Estipona.
It is noteworthy that the Solicitor General in Buerano, in a reversal of his earlier stance in Silva, joined causes with the
accused, a fact which did not escape the Court’s attention:
Then Solicitor General, now Justice Felix V. Makasiar, in his MANIFESTATION dated December 12, 1969 (page 82 of
the Rollo) admits that the Court of Appeals erred in not sustaining petitioner’s plea of double jeopardy and submits that
"its affirmatory decision dated January 28, 1969, in Criminal Case No. 05123-CR finding petitioner guilty of damage to
property through reckless imprudence should be set aside, without costs." He stressed that "if double jeopardy exists
where the reckless act resulted into homicide and physical injuries. then the same consequence must perforce follow
where the same reckless act caused merely damage to property-not death-and physical injuries. Verily, the value of a
human life lost as a result of a vehicular collision cannot be equated with any amount of damages caused to a motors
vehicle arising from the same mishap."40 (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, we find merit in petitioner’s submission that the lower courts erred in refusing to extend in his favor the mantle
of protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause. A more fitting jurisprudence could not be tailored to petitioner’s
case than People v. Silva, 41 a Diaz progeny. There, the accused, who was also involved in a vehicular collision, was
charged in two separate Informations with "Slight Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence" and "Homicide with
Serious Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence." Following his acquittal of the former, the accused sought the
quashal of the latter, invoking the Double Jeopardy Clause. The trial court initially denied relief, but, on
reconsideration, found merit in the accused’s claim and dismissed the second case. In affirming the trial court, we
quoted with approval its analysis of the issue following Diaz and its progeny People v. Belga: 42
On June 26, 1959, the lower court reconsidered its Order of May 2, 1959 and dismissed the case, holding: —
[T]he Court believes that the case falls squarely within the doctrine of double jeopardy enunciated in People v. Belga,
x x x In the case cited, Ciriaco Belga and Jose Belga were charged in the Justice of the Peace Court of Malilipot,
Albay, with the crime of physical injuries through reckless imprudence arising from a collision between the two
automobiles driven by them (Crim. Case No. 88). Without the aforesaid complaint having been dismissed or otherwise
disposed of, two other criminal complaints were filed in the same justice of the peace court, in connection with the
same collision one for damage to property through reckless imprudence (Crim. Case No. 95) signed by the owner of
one of the vehicles involved in the collision, and another for multiple physical injuries through reckless imprudence
(Crim. Case No. 96) signed by the passengers injured in the accident. Both of these two complaints were filed against
Jose Belga only. After trial, both defendants were acquitted of the charge against them in Crim. Case No. 88.
Following his acquittal, Jose Belga moved to quash the complaint for multiple physical injuries through reckless
imprudence filed against him by the injured passengers, contending that the case was just a duplication of the one
filed by the Chief of Police wherein he had just been acquitted. The motion to quash was denied and after trial Jose
Belga was convicted, whereupon he appealed to the Court of First Instance of Albay. In the meantime, the case for
damage to property through reckless imprudence filed by one of the owners of the vehicles involved in the collision
had been remanded to the Court of First Instance of Albay after Jose Belga had waived the second stage of the
preliminary investigation. After such remand, the Provincial Fiscal filed in the Court of First Instance two informations
against Jose Belga, one for physical injuries through reckless imprudence, and another for damage to property
through reckless imprudence. Both cases were dismissed by the Court of First Instance, upon motion of the defendant
Jose Belga who alleged double jeopardy in a motion to quash. On appeal by the Prov. Fiscal, the order of dismissal
was affirmed by the Supreme Court in the following language: .
The question for determination is whether the acquittal of Jose Belga in the case filed by the chief of police constitutes
a bar to his subsequent prosecution for multiple physical injuries and damage to property through reckless
imprudence.
In the case of Peo[ple] v. F. Diaz, G. R. No. L-6518, prom. March 30, 1954, the accused was charged in the municipal
court of Pasay City with reckless driving under sec. 52 of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law, for having driven an
automobile in a ῾fast and reckless manner ... thereby causing an accident.’ After the accused had pleaded not guilty
the case was dismissed in that court ῾for failure of the Government to prosecute’. But some time thereafter the city
attorney filed an information in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, charging the same accused with damage to
property thru reckless imprudence. The amount of the damage was alleged to be ₱249.50. Pleading double jeopardy,
the accused filed a motion, and on appeal by the Government we affirmed the ruling. Among other things we there
said through Mr. Justice Montemayor —
The next question to determine is the relation between the first offense of violation of the Motor Vehicle Law
prosecuted before the Pasay City Municipal Court and the offense of damage to property thru reckless imprudence
charged in the Rizal Court of First Instance. One of the tests of double jeopardy is whether or not the second offense
charged necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information
(Rule 113, Sec. 9). Another test is whether the evidence which proves one would prove the other that is to say whether
the facts alleged in the first charge if proven, would have been sufficient to support the second charge and vice versa;
or whether one crime is an ingredient of the other. x x x
xxxx
The foregoing language of the Supreme Court also disposes of the contention of the prosecuting attorney that the
charge for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence could not have been joined with the charge for
homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in this case, in view of the provisions of Art. 48 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The prosecution’s contention might be true. But neither was the prosecution
obliged to first prosecute the accused for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence before pressing the
more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Having first prosecuted
the defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice of the Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the
defendant, the prosecuting attorney is not now in a position to press in this case the more serious charge of homicide
with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence which arose out of the same alleged reckless imprudence
of which the defendant have been previously cleared by the inferior court. 43
Significantly, the Solicitor General had urged us in Silva to reexamine Belga (and hence, Diaz) "for the purpose of
delimiting or clarifying its application."44 We declined the invitation, thus:
The State in its appeal claims that the lower court erred in dismissing the case, on the ground of double jeopardy,
upon the basis of the acquittal of the accused in the JP court for Slight Physical Injuries, thru Reckless Imprudence. In
the same breath said State, thru the Solicitor General, admits that the facts of the case at bar, fall squarely on the
ruling of the Belga case x x x, upon which the order of dismissal of the lower court was anchored. The Solicitor
General, however, urges a re-examination of said ruling, upon certain considerations for the purpose of delimiting or
clarifying its application. We find, nevertheless, that further elucidation or disquisition on the ruling in the Belga case,
the facts of which are analogous or similar to those in the present case, will yield no practical advantage to the
government. On one hand, there is nothing which would warrant a delimitation or clarification of the applicability of the
Belga case. It was clear. On the other, this Court has reiterated the views expressed in the Belga case, in the identical
case of Yap v. Hon. Lutero, etc., L-12669, April 30, 1959. 45 (Emphasis supplied)
Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized
Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
The confusion bedeviling the question posed in this petition, to which the MeTC succumbed, stems from persistent but
awkward attempts to harmonize conceptually incompatible substantive and procedural rules in criminal law, namely,
Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses and Article 48 on complexing of crimes, both under the Revised
Penal Code. Article 48 is a procedural device allowing single prosecution of multiple felonies falling under either of two
categories: (1) when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies (thus excluding from its
operation light felonies46); and (2) when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other. The legislature
crafted this procedural tool to benefit the accused who, in lieu of serving multiple penalties, will only serve the
maximum of the penalty for the most serious crime.
In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act defined as a felony but "the mental attitude x x x
behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight x x x," 47 a single mental attitude regardless of the
resulting consequences. Thus, Article 365 was crafted as one quasi-crime resulting in one or more consequences.
Ordinarily, these two provisions will operate smoothly. Article 48 works to combine in a single prosecution multiple
intentional crimes falling under Titles 1-13, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, when proper; Article 365 governs the
prosecution of imprudent acts and their consequences. However, the complexities of human interaction can produce a
hybrid quasi-offense not falling under either models – that of a single criminal negligence resulting in multiple non-
crime damages to persons and property with varying penalties corresponding to light, less grave or grave offenses.
The ensuing prosecutorial dilemma is obvious: how should such a quasi-crime be prosecuted? Should Article 48’s
framework apply to "complex" the single quasi-offense with its multiple (non-criminal) consequences (excluding those
amounting to light offenses which will be tried separately)? Or should the prosecution proceed under a single charge,
collectively alleging all the consequences of the single quasi-crime, to be penalized separately following the scheme of
penalties under Article 365?
Jurisprudence adopts both approaches. Thus, one line of rulings (none of which involved the issue of double jeopardy)
applied Article 48 by "complexing" one quasi-crime with its multiple consequences 48 unless one consequence amounts
to a light felony, in which case charges were split by grouping, on the one hand, resulting acts amounting to grave or
less grave felonies and filing the charge with the second level courts and, on the other hand, resulting acts amounting
to light felonies and filing the charge with the first level courts. 49 Expectedly, this is the approach the MeTC impliedly
sanctioned (and respondent Ponce invokes), even though under Republic Act No. 7691, 50 the MeTC has now
exclusive original jurisdiction to impose the most serious penalty under Article 365 which is prision correccional in its
medium period.
Under this approach, the issue of double jeopardy will not arise if the "complexing" of acts penalized under Article 365
involves only resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave felonies because there will be a single prosecution of all
the resulting acts. The issue of double jeopardy arises if one of the resulting acts is penalized as a light offense and
the other acts are penalized as grave or less grave offenses, in which case Article 48 is not deemed to apply and the
act penalized as a light offense is tried separately from the resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave offenses.
The second jurisprudential path nixes Article 48 and sanctions a single prosecution of all the effects of the quasi-crime
collectively alleged in one charge, regardless of their number or severity, 51 penalizing each consequence separately.
Thus, in Angeles v. Jose,52 we interpreted paragraph three of Article 365, in relation to a charge alleging "reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property and less serious physical injuries," as follows:
[T]he third paragraph of said article, x x x reads as follows:
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the property of another, the
offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said damage to three times such
value, but which shall in no case be less than 25 pesos.
The above-quoted provision simply means that if there is only damage to property the amount fixed therein shall be
imposed, but if there are also physical injuries there should be an additional penalty for the latter. The information
cannot be split into two; one for the physical injuries, and another for the damage to property, x x x. 53 (Emphasis
supplied)
By "additional penalty," the Court meant, logically, the penalty scheme under Article 365.
Evidently, these approaches, while parallel, are irreconcilable. Coherence in this field demands choosing one
framework over the other. Either (1) we allow the "complexing" of a single quasi-crime by breaking its resulting acts
into separate offenses (except for light felonies), thus re-conceptualize a quasi-crime, abandon its present framing
under Article 365, discard its conception under the Quizon and Diaz lines of cases, and treat the multiple
consequences of a quasi-crime as separate intentional felonies defined under Titles 1-13, Book II under the penal
code; or (2) we forbid the application of Article 48 in the prosecution and sentencing of quasi-crimes, require single
prosecution of all the resulting acts regardless of their number and severity, separately penalize each as provided in
Article 365, and thus maintain the distinct concept of quasi-crimes as crafted under Article 365, articulated in Quizon
and applied to double jeopardy adjudication in the Diaz line of cases.1avvphi1
A becoming regard of this Court’s place in our scheme of government denying it the power to make laws constrains us
to keep inviolate the conceptual distinction between quasi-crimes and intentional felonies under our penal code. Article
48 is incongruent to the notion of quasi-crimes under Article 365. It is conceptually impossible for a quasi-offense to
stand for (1) a single act constituting two or more grave or less grave felonies; or (2) an offense which is a necessary
means for committing another. This is why, way back in 1968 in Buan, we rejected the Solicitor General’s argument
that double jeopardy does not bar a second prosecution for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence
allegedly because the charge for that offense could not be joined with the other charge for serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence following Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code:
The Solicitor General stresses in his brief that the charge for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence
could not be joined with the accusation for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence, because Article 48
of the Revised Penal Code allows only the complexing of grave or less grave felonies. This same argument was
considered and rejected by this Court in the case of People vs. [Silva] x x x:
[T]he prosecution’s contention might be true. But neither was the prosecution obliged to first prosecute the accused for
slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence before pressing the more serious charge of homicide with serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Having first prosecuted the defendant for the lesser offense in the
Justice of the Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting attorney is not
now in a position to press in this case the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence which arose out of the same alleged reckless imprudence of which the defendant has been
previously cleared by the inferior court.
[W]e must perforce rule that the exoneration of this appellant x x x by the Justice of the Peace x x x of the charge of
slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence in the Court of First Instance of the province, where both charges are derived from the
consequences of one and the same vehicular accident, because the second accusation places the appellant in
second jeopardy for the same offense.54 (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, this is a constitutionally compelled choice. By prohibiting the splitting of charges under Article 365, irrespective
of the number and severity of the resulting acts, rampant occasions of constitutionally impermissible second
prosecutions are avoided, not to mention that scarce state resources are conserved and diverted to proper use.
Hence, we hold that prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge regardless of the number or
severity of the consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will do no more than apply the penalties under Article
365 for each consequence alleged and proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of charges under Article 365, and
only one information shall be filed in the same first level court. 55
Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and simpler protection of their
constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby denied the beneficent effect of the
favorable sentencing formula under Article 48, but any disadvantage thus caused is more than compensated by the
certainty of non-prosecution for quasi-crime effects qualifying as "light offenses" (or, as here, for the more serious
consequence prosecuted belatedly). If it is so minded, Congress can re-craft Article 365 by extending to quasi-crimes
the sentencing formula of Article 48 so that only the most severe penalty shall be imposed under a single prosecution
of all resulting acts, whether penalized as grave, less grave or light offenses. This will still keep intact the distinct
concept of quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the lenient schedule of penalties under Article 365, befitting crimes occupying a
lower rung of culpability, should cushion the effect of this ruling.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the Orders dated 2 February 2006 and 2 May 2006 of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157. We DISMISS the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 against
petitioner Jason Ivler y Aguilar pending with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 on the ground of
double jeopardy.
Let a copy of this ruling be served on the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.
SO ORDERED.

REYNALDO S. MARIANO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 178145 July 7, 2014
BERSAMIN, J.:
The courts of law are hereby reminded once again to exercise care in the determination of the proper penalty
imposable upon the offenders whom they find and declare to be guilty of the offenses charged or proved. Their correct
determination is the essence of due process of law. The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan charged the
petitioner with frustrated murder for hitting and bumping Ferdinand de Leon while overtaking the latter's jeep in the
information filed in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 81, in Malolos, Bulacan (RTC), viz:
That on or about the 12th day of September, 1999, in the municipality of Angat, Province of Bulacan, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with the use of the motor vehicle he was then driving, with evident premeditation, treachery and abuse of
superior strength, hit, bump and run over with the said motor vehicle one Ferdinand de Leon, thereby inflicting upon
him serious physical injuries which ordinarily would have causedthe death of the said Ferdinand de Leon, thus
performing all the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of murder asa consequence, but
nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of his will, that is, by the timely and able medical
assistance rendered to said Ferdinand de Leon. Contrary to law. 1
The CA summarized the antecedent events as follows:
At about 6:30 in the evening of September 12, 1999, Ferdinand de Leon was driving his owner type jeep along
Barangay Engkanto, Angat, Bulacan. With him were his wife, Urbanita, and their two-year old son, as they just came
from a baptismal party. Luis de Leon, an uncle of Ferdinand, also came from the baptismal party and was driving his
owner type jeep. Accused-appellant Reynaldo Mariano was driving his red Toyota pick-up with his wife, Rebecca, and
their helper, Rowena Años, as passengers. They had just attendeda worship service in Barangay Engkanto.
The Toyota pick-up overtook the jeep of Ferdinand de Leon and almost bumped it. Ferdinand got mad, overtook the
pick-up and blocked its path. Reynaldo Mariano stopped the pick-up behind the jeep. Ferdinand alighted from his jeep
and approached Reynaldo. Ferdinand claimed that he and Reynaldo had an altercation. However, Reynaldo insisted
that he just stayed inside the pick-up and kept quiet while Ferdinand hurled invectives at him. Urbanita tried to pacify
Ferdinand and sought the assistance of Luis de Leon. Luis intervened and told Ferdinand and Reynaldo
"magpasensiyahan na lamang kayo at pagpasensiyahan mo si Ferdinand." Ferdinand and Reynaldo heeded the
advice of Luis and they went their separate ways.
Instead of proceeding to his house in Norzagaray, Ferdinand decided to drop by his mother’s house in San Roque,
Angat to pick up some items. He parked his jeep in front of the house of his mother and alighted therefrom. However,
hewas bumped by a moving vehicle, thrown four (4) meters away and lostconsciousness. Urbanita shouted, "Mommy,
Mommy, nasagasaan si Ferdie." She identified the fast moving vehicle that bumped Ferdinand as the same red Toyota
pick-up driven by Reynaldo.
On the other hand, Reynaldo and his wife, Rebecca, tried to show that the jeep of Ferdinand stopped on the road in
front of the house of the latter’s mother about five (5) to six (6) meters away from their pick-up. Reynaldo stopped the
pick-up as he saw an oncoming vehicle, which he allowed to pass. Thereafter, Reynaldo made a signal and overtook
the jeep of Ferdinand. However, Ferdinand suddenly alighted from his jeep, lost his balance and was sideswipedby
the overtaking pick-up. Reynaldo did not stop his pick-up and he proceeded on his way for fear that the bystanders
might harm him and his companions. After bringing his companions to their house in Marungko, Angat, Bulacan,
Reynaldo proceeded to Camp Alejo S. Santos in Malolos, Bulacan to surrender and report the incident.
Ferdinand was brought to the Sto. Niño Hospital in Bustos, Bulacan, where he stayed for two and a half days and
incurred medical expenses amounting to ₱17,800.00 OnSeptember 15, 1999, Ferdinand was transferred to St. Luke’s
Medical Center in Quezon City, where he stayed until September 25, 1999 and incurred medical expenses amounting
to ₱66,243.25. He likewise spent ₱909.50 for medicines, ₱2,900.00 for scanning, ₱8,000.00 for doctor’s fee and
₱12,550.00 for the services of his caregivers and masseur from September 12 to October 31, 1999. Ferdinand
suffered multiple facial injuries, a fracture of the inferior part of the right orbital wall and subdural hemorrhage
secondary to severe head trauma, as evidenced by the certification issued by Dr. Hernando L. Cruz, Jr. of St. Luke’s
Medical Center. Urbanita, received the amount of ₱50,000.00 from Reynaldo Mariano by way of financial assistance,
as evidenced by a receipt dated September 15, 1999. 2
Under its decision rendered on May 26, 2003 after trial, however, the RTC convicted the petitioner of frustrated
homicide,3 to wit:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, this Court hereby finds the accused Reynaldo Mariano GUILTYfor the lesser
offense of Frustrated Homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 50 thereof and is
hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of three (3) years and four (4) months of Prision Correccional as
minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as maximum and is hereby directed to pay the
complainant, Ferdinand de Leon, the amount of ₱196,043.25 less ₱50,000.00 (already given) as actual damages,
₱100,000.00 as moral damages, and the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.4
On appeal, the CA promulgated itsassailed decision on June 29, 2006, 5 modifying the felony committed by the
petitioner from frustrated homicide to reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries, ruling thusly:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is MODIFIEDand accused-appellant Reynaldo Mariano is found guilty of
the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries and is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty oftwo (2) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year, seven (7) months and eleven
(11) days of prision correccional, as maximum, and to indemnify Ferdinand de Leon in the amount of ₱58,402.75 as
actual damages and ₱10,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.6
In this appeal, the petitioner arguesthat his guilt for any crime was not proved beyond reasonable doubt, and claims
that Ferdinand’s injuries were the result of a mere accident. He insists that he lacked criminal intent; that he was not
negligent in driving his pick-up truck; and that the CA should have appreciated voluntary surrender asa mitigating
circumstance in his favor.
Ruling
We affirm the conviction of the petitioner for reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries.
The following findings by the CA compel us to affirm, to wit:
Reynaldo tried to show that he stopped his pick-up five (5) to six (6) meters behind the jeep of Ferdinand, as he
allowed an oncoming vehicle to pass. Thereafter, he overtook the jeep of Ferdinand. However, the fact that
Ferdinand’s body was thrown four (4) meters away from his jeep showed that Reynaldo was driving his pick-up at a
fast speed when he overtook the jeep of Ferdinand. It is worthy to note that Reynaldo admitted that he has known
Ferdinand and the latter’s family since 1980 because they have a store where he used to buy things. As aptly
observed by the OSG, Reynaldo should have foreseen the possibilitythat Ferdinand would alight from his jeep and go
inside the house of his mother where the store is also located.
xxxx
As aptly observed by the court a quo, only a vehicle that is moving beyond the normal rate of speed and within the
control of the driver’s hands could have caused Ferdinand’s injuries. The very fact of speeding is indicative of
imprudent behavior, as a motorist must exercise ordinary care and drive at a reasonable rate of speed commensurate
with the conditions encountered, which will enable him or her to keep the vehicle under control and avoid injury to
others using the highway. As held in People v. Garcia:
"A man must use common sense, and exercise due reflection in all his acts; it is his duty to be cautious, careful, and
prudent, if not frominstinct, then through fear of incurring punishment. He is responsible for such results as anyone
might foresee and for acts which no one would have performed except through culpable abandon. Otherwise his own
person, rights and property, all those of his fellow-beings, would ever be exposed to all manner of danger and injury."
Thus, had Reynaldo not driven his pick-up at a fast speed in overtaking the jeep of Ferdinand, he could have easily
stopped his pick-up or swerved farther to the left side of the road, as there was no oncoming vehicle, when he saw
that Ferdinand alighted from his jeep and lost his balance, in order to avoid hitting the latter or, at least, minimizing his
injuries.7
The findings by the CA are controlling on the Court. Indeed, the findings of both lower courts on the circumstances
that had led to the injuries of Ferdinand fully converged except for the RTC’s conclusion that malicious intent had
attended the commission of the offense. Such findings cannot be disturbed by the Court in this appellate review, for it
is a well-settled rule that the findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the CA, are binding and conclusive
upon the Court.8
"Reckless imprudence consists involuntary, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material
damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing of failing to perform
such act, taking intoconsideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other
circumstances regarding persons, time and place."9 To constitute the offense of reckless driving, the act must be
something more than a mere negligence in the operation of the motor vehicle, but a willful and wanton disregard of the
consequences is required.10 The Prosecution must further show the direct causal connection between the negligence
and the injuries or damages complained of. In Manzanares v. People, 11 the petitioner was found guilty of reckless
imprudence resulting in multiple homicide and serious physical injuries because of the finding that hehad driven the
Isuzu truck very fast before it smashed into a jeepney. In Pangonorom v. People, 12 a public utility driver driving his
vehicle very fast was held criminally negligent because he had not slowed down to avoid hitting a swerving car. In the
absence of any cogent reasons, therefore, the Court bows to the CA’s observations that the petitioner had driven his
pick-up truck at a fast speed in order to overtake the jeep of Ferdinand, and in so attempting to overtake unavoidably
hit Ferdinand, causing the latter’s injuries.
Contrary to the petitioner’s insistence, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender cannot be appreciated in his
favor. Paragraph 5 of Article 365, Revised Penal Code, expressly states that in the imposition of the penalties, the
courts shall exercise their sound discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed in Article 64 of the Revised Penal
Code. "The rationale of the law," according to People v. Medroso, Jr.: 13
x x x can be found in the fact thatin quasi-offenses penalized under Article 365, the carelessness, imprudence or
negligence which characterizes the wrongful act may vary from one situation to another, in nature, extent, and
resulting consequences, and in order that there may be a fair and just application of the penalty, the courts must have
ample discretion in its imposition, without being bound by what We may call the mathematical formula provided for
inArticle 64 of the Revised Penal Code. On the basis of this particular provision, the trial court was not bound to apply
paragraph 5 of Article 64 in the instant case even if appellant had two mitigating circumstances in his favor with no
aggravating circumstance to offset them.
Even so, the CA erred in imposing on the petitioner the penalty for reckless imprudence resulting in seriousphysical
injuries.1âwphi1 The error should be avoided because no person should be condemned tosuffer a penalty that the law
does not prescribe or provide for the offense charged or proved. Verily, anyone judicially declared guiltyof any crime
must be duly punished in accordance with the law defining the crime and prescribing the punishment. Injustice would
always result to the offender should the penalty exceed that allowed by the law. The imposition of the correct penalty
on the offender is the essence ofdue process of law.
The penalty for the offender guilty ofreckless imprudence is based on the gravity of the resulting injuries had his act
been intentional. Thus, Article 365 of the Revised Penal Codestipulates that had the act been intentional, and would
constitute a grave felony, the offender shall suffer arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccionalin its
medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, arresto mayorin its minimum and medium periods shall
be imposed; and if it would have constituted a light felony, arresto menorin its maximum period shall be imposed.
Pursuant to Article 9 of the Revised Penal Code, a grave felony is that to which the law attaches the capital
punishment or a penalty that in any of its periods is afflictivein accordance with Article 25 of theRevised Penal Code; a
less grave felony is that which the law punishes with a penalty that is correctionalin its maximum period in accordance
with Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code; and a light felony is an infraction of law for the commission of which a
penalty of either arresto menoror a fine not exceeding ₱200.00, or both is provided.
In turn, Article 25 of the Revised Penal Codeenumerates the principal afflictive penaltiesto be reclusion perpetua,
reclusion temporal, andprision mayor; the principal correctional penaltiesto beprision correccional, arresto mayor,
suspension and destierro; and the light penalties to be arresto menorand fine not exceeding ₱200.00. Under this
provision, death stands alone as the capital punishment.
The Revised Penal Codeclassifies the felony of serious physical injuries based on the gravity ofthe physical injuries, to
wit:
Article 263. Serious physical injuries. — Any person who shall wound, beat, or assault another, shall be guilty of the
crime of serious physical injuries and shall suffer:
1. The penalty of prision mayor, if in consequence of the physical injuries inflicted, the injured person shall
become insane, imbecile, impotent, or blind;
2. The penalty of prision correccionalin its medium and maximum periods, if in consequence ofthe physical
injuries inflicted, the person injured shall have lost the use of speech or the power to hear or to smell, or shall
have lost an eye, a hand, a foot, an arm, or a leg or shall have lost the use of any such member, or shall have
become incapacitated for the work in which he was therefor habitually engaged;
3. The penalty of prision correccionalin its minimum and medium periods, if in consequence of the physical
injuries inflicted, the person injured shall have become deformed, orshall have lost any other part of his body,
or shall have lost the use thereof, or shall have been ill or incapacitated for the performance of the work in
which he as habitually engaged for a period of more than ninety days;
4. The penalty of arresto mayorin its maximum period to prision correccionalin its minimum period, if the
physical injuries inflicted shall have caused the illness or incapacity for labor of the injured person for more
than thirty days.
If the offense shall have been committed against any of the persons enumerated in Article 246, or with attendance of
any of the circumstances mentioned in Article 248, the case covered by subdivision number 1 of this Article shall be
punished by reclusion temporalin its medium and maximum periods; the case covered by subdivision number 2 by
prision correccionalin its maximum period to prision mayorin its minimum period; the case covered by subdivision
number 3 by prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods; and the case covered by subdivision number 4
by prision correccionalin its minimum and medium periods.
The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not be applicable to a parent who shall inflict physical injuries upon
his child by excessive chastisement.
In its decision,14 the CA found that Ferdinand had sustained multiple facial injuries, a fracture of the inferior part of the
right orbital wall, and subdural hemorrhage secondary to severehead trauma; that he had become stuporous and
disoriented as to time, place and person. It was also on record that he had testified at the trial thathe was unable to
attend to his general merchandise store for three months due to temporary amnesia; and that he had required the
attendance of caregivers and a masseur until October 31, 1999.
With Ferdinand not becoming insane, imbecile, impotent, or blind, his physical injuries did not fall under Article 263, 1,
supra. Consequently, the CA incorrectly considered the petitioner’s act as a grave felony had it been intentional, and
should not have imposed the penalty at arresto mayorin its maximum period to prision correccionalin its medium
period. Instead, the petitioner’s act that caused the serious physical injuries, had it been intentional, would be a less
grave felonyunder Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code, because Ferdinand’s physical injuries were those under
Article 263, 3, supra, for having incapacitated him from the performance of the work in which he was habitually
engaged in for more than 90 days.
Conformably with Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the proper penalty is arresto mayorin its minimum and
medium periods, which ranges from one to four months. As earlier mentioned, the rules in Article 64 of the Revised
Penal Codeare not applicable in reckless imprudence, and considering further that the maximum term of imprisonment
would not exceed one year, rendering the Indeterminate Sentence Lawinapplicable, 15 the Court holds that the straight
penalty of two months of arresto mayorwas the correct penalty for the petitioner.
The Court agrees with the CA’s modification of the award of actual and moral damages amounting to ₱58,402.75 and
₱10,000.00, respectively.
Actual damages, to be recoverable, must not only be capable of proof, but must actually be proved with a reasonable
degree of certainty. This is because the courts cannot rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork in determining the
fact and amount of damages. To justify an award of actual damages, there must be competent proof of the actual loss
suffered, which should be based on the amounts actually expended by the victim, 16 or other competent proof. Here,
the receipts presented by the Prosecution proved the expenses actually incurred amounting to₱108,402.75, but such
aggregate was reduced by the victim’s earlier receipt of ₱50,000.00 from the petitioner in the form of financial
assistance. Hence, the victim should recover only the unpaid portion of ₱58,402.75.
Moral damages are given to ease the victim's grief and suffering. Moral damages should reasonably approximate the
extent of the hurt caused and the gravity of the wrong done. 17 Accordingly, the CA properly reduced to ₱10,000.00 the
moral damages awarded to Ferdinand. In addition, we impose an interest of 6% per annum on the actual and moral
damages reckoned from the finality of this decision until the full payment of the obligation. This is because the
damages thus fixed thereby become a forbearance. The rate of 6% per annum is pursuant to Circular No. 799, series
of 2013, issued by the Office of the Governor of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas on June 21, 2013, and the
pronouncement in Nacar v. Gallery Frames.18 WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on June
29, 2006, subject to the modifications that: (a) the penalty to be imposed on the petitioner shall be a straight penalty of
two months of arresto mayor; and (b) the awards for actual and moral damages shall earn 6% interest rate per annum
commencing from the finality of this decision until fully paid.
The petitioner shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

ROGELIO J. GONZAGA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 195671 January 21, 2015
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari 1 are the Decision2 dated September 18, 2009 and the Resolution3dated
January 26, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 00427-MIN, which affirmed the Decision 4dated July
31, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, Branch 10 (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 9832-99,
finding petitioner Rogelio J. Gonzaga (Rogelio) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Reckless Imprudence
Resulting to Homicide with Double Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to Property under Article 365 in relation to
Article 263 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The Facts
At around 6 o'clock in the morning of June 25, 1997, Dionesio Inguito, Sr. (Dionesio, Sr.) was driving his motorcycle
along Brgy. Kiara, Don Carlos, Bukidnon towards Brgy. Bocboc 5 of the same municipality, to bring his two (2) minor
children, Dionesio Inguito, Jr. (Dionesio, Jr.) and Cherry Inguito 6 (Cherry), to school.7 While they were ascending the
curving road going to Bocboc on their proper lane on the right side of the road, a Toyota Land Cruiser (Land
Cruiser)driven by Rogelio was swiftly descending the same lane from the opposite direction. Dionesio, Sr. blew the
horn of his motorcycle to signal the Land Cruiser to return to its proper lane but the Land Cruiser remained. 8 In order
to avoid collision, Dionesio, Sr. tried to swerve to the left, but the Land Cruiser suddenly swerved towards the same
direction and collided head-on with the motorcycle.9
As a result of the collision, Dionesio, Sr. and his 2 children were thrown off the motorcycle. Dionesio, Sr. was pinned
beneath the Land Cruiser,10 while Cherry and Dionesio, Jr. were thrown over the hood of the Land Cruiser and fell on
the side of the road,11 causing injuries to their legs. Siblings Rolf, Cherry, 12 and Jenny Ann Aquino, who were traversing
the same road aboard their own motorcycle, stopped to help and placed the victims together 13 on the rightmost side of
the road facing Brgy. Bocboc,14 while Rogelio remained inside the Land Cruiser.15
Rolf left the scene of the incident to seek further assistance, leaving his two (2) sisters to cater to the
victims.16Eventually, he chanced upon Kagawad Nerio Dadivas (Kgd. Dadivas), who had just opened his store, and
informed the latter of the vehicular accident. After reporting the incident to the police and getting his vehicle, Kgd.
Dadivas proceeded to the site and loaded the victims to his vehicle with Rolf’s assistance. 17 Meanwhile, Rolf went to
Brgy. Kawilihan to inform Dionesio, Sr.’s wife, Clemencia Inguito (Clemencia), of what had transpired. 18 Thereafter, the
victims were brought to the Emergency Hospital of Maramag where they were treated. 19 Operations were performed
on the legs of Dionesio, Jr. and Dionesio, Sr., but the latter eventually expired. Cherry’s leg was placed in a cast and
she was confined in the hospital, together with Dionesio, Jr., for more than one (1) month, or until July 26, 1997. 20 All
the expenses were shouldered by Clemencia.21
In view of the foregoing mishap, the provincial prosecutor filed an Information 22 charging Rogelio for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting to Homicide with Double Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to Property "with the
aggravating circumstance that accused failed to lend on the spot to the injured party such help that was in his hands
to give"23 before the RTC. Upon arraignment,24 Rogelio entered a plea of not guilty.25
In his defense, Rogelio claimed that he was driving the Land Cruiser on his proper lane along the descending curving
road towards the direction of Kalilangan, Bukidnon, when, from a distance of about 70 meters away, he saw the
motorcycles driven by Dionesio, Sr. and Rolf racing towards the curve from the opposite direction. 26 Dionesio, Sr. was
driving his motorcycle in a zigzag manner on the Land Cruiser’s lane while Rolf was on his proper lane. 27Undecided
which side of the road to take to avoid collision, Rogelio stopped the Land Cruiser but the motorcycle of Dionesio, Sr.,
nonetheless, bumped into it.28 As a result of the impact, Cherry and Dionesio, Jr. were thrown over the roof and the
hood of the Land Cruiser, respectively, and fell on the side of the road, while Dionesio, Sr. and the motorcycle were
pinned beneath the land Cruiser.29 With the use of a jack handle and the assistance of two (2) persons, i.e., Jose
Bacus and Reynaldo Quidato, who arrived at the scene, he was able to retrieve both Dionesio, Sr. and the motorcycle
from beneath the Land Cruiser. Thereafter, they loaded the victims on board the Land Cruiser so they may be brought
tothe hospital, but the vehicle turned out to have defective brakes, so he asked other persons to secure another
vehicle instead.30
The RTC Proceedings
In a Decision31 dated July 31, 2006 (July 31, 2006 Decision), the RTC found Rogelio guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide withDouble Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to
Property punishable under Article 365 in relation to Article 263 of the RPC. 32
It held that Rogelio’s act of driving very fast on the wrong side of the road was the proximate cause of the collision,
resulting to the death of Dionesio, Sr. and serious physical injuries to Dionesio, Jr. and Cherry. Considering further that
Rogelio failed to offer any help to the victims, 33 the RTC sentenced him to suffer a higher indeterminate penalty of four
(4) years, two (2) months of prision correccional maximum, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor medium, as maximum, and ordered him to pay the following civil liabilities: (a) ₱50,000.00 as moral damages
for the death of Dionesio, Sr.; (b) ₱30,000.00 as moral damages for the mental anguish suffered by the family; (c)
₱200,000.00 for the medical expenses incurred; (d) ₱25,000.00 for the expenses incurred during the wake and the
burial; (e) ₱30,000.00 for the damaged motorcycle; (f) ₱60,000.00 for the loss of earning capacity; and (g) ₱30,000.00
as attorney’s fees.34
Rogelio filed a motion for reconsideration35 which was partly granted in a Resolution36 dated February 22, 2007,
reducing the penalty to four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional, as maximum, with the same civil liabilities. The RTC reconsidered its opinion regarding
Rogelio’s claim of having extended aid to the victims, concluding that the jack handle that was used to get the body of
Dionesio, Sr. beneath the Land Cruiser could have been his in the absence of showing who owned the
same.37 Aggrieved, Rogelio appealed to the CA.
The CA Ruling
38
In a Decision dated September 18, 2009, however, the CA reinstated the RTC’s July 31, 2006 Decision, thereby
imposing on Rogelio the original indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months of prision correccional
maximum, as minimum, to eight(8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor medium, as maximum, and the same civil
liabilities,39 hence, this petition. The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not the CA correctly upheld Rogelio’s conviction in
accordance with the RTC’s July 31, 2006 Decision.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
Reckless imprudence, as defined in Article 36540 of the RPC, consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing
to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person
performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of
intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
In order to establish a motorist’s liability for the negligent operation of a vehicle, it must be shown that there was a
direct causal connection between such negligence and the injuries or damages complained of. To constitute the
offense of reckless driving, the act must be something more than a mere negligence in the operation of a motor
vehicle – a willful and wanton disregard of the consequences is required. 41 Willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the
safety of others within the meaning of reckless driving statutes has been held to involve a conscious choice of a
course of action which injures another, either with knowledgeof serious danger to others involved, or with knowledge
of facts which would disclose the danger to any reasonable person. Verily, it is the inexcusable lack of precaution or
conscious indifference to the consequences of the conduct which supplies the criminal intent and brings an act of
mere negligence and imprudence under the operation of the penal law, without regard to whether the private offended
party may himself be considered likewise at fault.42
In the present case, the RTC and the CA uniformly found that Rogelio’s act of driving very fast on the wrong side of
the road was the proximate cause of the collision, resulting to the death of Dionesio, Sr. and serious physical injuries
to Dionesio, Jr. and Cherry. Notably, the road where the incident occurred was a curve sloping upwards towards Brgy.
Bocboc where the Inguitos were bound and descending towards the opposite direction where Rogelio was going.
Indeed, the very fact of speeding, under such circumstances, is indicative of imprudent behavior. As a motorist,
Rogelio was bound to exercise ordinary care in such affair by driving at a reasonable rate of speed commensurate
with the conditions encountered, as this would enable him to keep the vehicle under control and avoid injury to others
using the highway.43 Moreover, it is elementary in traffic school that a driver slows down before negotiating a curve as
it may be reasonably anticipated that another vehicle may appear from the opposite direction at any moment. Hence,
excessive speed, combined with other circumstances such as the occurrence of the accident on or near a curve, as in
this case, constitutes negligence.44 Consequently, the Court finds that Rogelio acted recklessly and imprudently in
driving at a fast speed on the wrong side of the road while approaching the curve where the incident happened,
thereby rendering him criminally liable, aswell as civilly accountable for the material damages resulting therefrom.
Nonetheless, while the CA and the RTC concurred that the proximate cause of the collision was Rogelio’s reckless
driving, the CA Decision made no mention as to the presence or absence of the limiting element in the last paragraph
of Article 365 of the RPC, which imposes the penalty next higher in degreeupon the offender who "fails to lend on the
spot to the injured parties such help as may be in his hands to give." Based on case law, the obligation under this
paragraph: (a) is dependent on the means in the hands of the offender, i.e., the type and degree of assistance that
he/she, at the time and place of the incident, is capable of giving; and (b) requires adequate proof. 45
It is well to point out that the RTC’s July 31, 2006 Decision found that Rogelio failed to offer any help to the
victims46and, thus, imposed on him the penalty next higher in degree.However, upon Rogelio’s motion, the RTC
reconsidered its earlier conclusion, holding that the jack handle that was used to get the body of Dionesio,Sr. beneath
the Land Cruiser could have been his in the absence of showing who owned the same and, accordingly, reduced the
penalty.47 Nothing was said on this point by the CA which affirmed Rogelio’sconviction based on the RTC’s July 31,
2006 Decision.
The Court has perused the records and found contradictory testimonies presented by the prosecution and the defense
on this matter.1âwphi1 Considering however, that Cherry herself admitted that the victims were first loaded on the
Land Cruiser before they were transferred to Kgd. Dadivas’s vehicle, 48 the Court is inclined to sustain Rogelio’s claim
that he tried to extend help to the victims, but when hestarted the engine with the intention to go to the hospital, he
discovered that the vehicle had no brakes.49 Hence, in imposing the proper penalty on the accused, the qualifying
circumstance under the last paragraph of Article 365 of the RPC should not be considered.
Here, Rogelio was charged with the offense of Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide with Double Serious
Physical Injuries and Damage to Property under Article 365 in relation to Article 263 50 of the RPC, a complex crime.
Article 48 of the RPC provides that when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an
offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime, in this case, Reckless
Imprudence Resulting to Homicide, shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.
Under Article 365 of the RPC, when reckless imprudence in the use of a motor vehicle results in the death of a person,
as in this case, the accused shall be punished with the penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods, i.e., two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law,51 the minimum of said penalty should be taken from arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional
in its minimum period, or four (4) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months. Consequently, the
Court finds a need to modify the penalty to be imposed on Rogelio and thus, sentences him to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of two (2) years of prision correccional in its minimum, as minimum, to six years of prision correccional in its
maximum, as maximum.
As a final note, the Court clarifies that the order for the payment of "moral damages" in the amount of ₱50,000.00 for
the death of Dionesio, Sr. should be, properly speaking, denominated as one for the payment of "civil indemnity" as
they were not awarded under the parameters of the Civil Code relevant thereto, 52 but was one "given without need of
proof other than the fact of death as a result of the crime and proof of [the accused’s] responsibility for it." 53 This is a
palpable legal error which the Court should correct if only for terminological propriety. With the private complainant not
herein impleaded, the rest of the RTC’s July 31, 2006 Decision with respect to the civil liabilities awarded should
remain undisturbed. Note that, in line with existing jurisprudence, interest atthe rate of six percent (6) per annum shall
be imposed on all damages awarded from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid. 54
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated September 18, 2009 and the Resolution dated January
26, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 00427-MIN, finding petitioner Rogelio J. Gonzaga guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide with Double Serious Physical
Injuries and Damage to Property under Article 365 in relation to Article 263 of the Revised Penal Code are hereby
AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(a) Petitioner is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years of prision correccional in its
minimum, as minimum, to six (6) years of prision correccional in its maximum, as maximum; and
(b) The award of ₱50,000.00 for the death of Dionesio Inguito, Sr. in favor of his heirs is denominated as "civil
indemnity," instead of"moral damages."
(c) All monetary awards for damages shall bear interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the
date of finality of judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.

DR. JAIME T. CRUZ vs. FELICISIMO V. AGAS, JR.

G.R. No. 204095 June 15, 2015
MENDOZA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the May 22, 2012 Decision 1 and
October 18, 2012 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 111910, which affirmed the March 2,
20073 and September 23, 20094 Resolutions of the Secretary of Justice. The said resolutions let stand the February
16, 2004 Resolution of the Office of the Prosecutor of Quezon City, dismissing the complaint of petitioner Dr. Jaime T.
Cruz (Dr. Cruz) for Serious Physical Injuries through Reckless Imprudence and Medical Malpractice against
respondent, Dr. Felicisimo V. Agas, Jr. (Dr. Agas).
The Antecedents
5
In his Complaint-Affidavit for Serious Physical Injuries through Reckless Imprudence and Medical Malpractice against
Dr. Agas, Dr. Cruz alleged, among others, that sometime in May 2003, he engaged the services of St. Luke’s Medical
Center (SLMC)for a medical check-up; that after being admitted in SLMC on May 28, 2003,he underwent stool, urine,
blood, and other body fluid tests conducted by the employees and doctors of the said hospital; that on May 29, 2003,
he was sent to the Gastro-Enterology Department for a scheduled gastroscopy and colonoscopy; that because the
specialist assigned to perform the procedure was nowhere to be found, he gave the colonoscopy results to the
attending female anesthesiologist for the information and consideration of the assigned specialist; that, thereafter, he
was sedated and the endoscopic examination was carried out; that when he regained consciousness, he felt that
something went wrong during the procedure because he felt dizzy, had cold clammy perspiration and experienced
breathing difficulty; that he could not stand or sit upright because he felt so exhausted and so much pain in his
abdomen; that when he was about to urinate in the comfort room, he collapsed; that he tried to consult the specialist
who performed the colonoscopy but he was nowhere to be found; and that his cardiologist, Dra. Agnes Del Rosario,
was able to observe his critical condition and immediately referred him to the surgical department which suspected
that he had hemorrhage in his abdomen and advised him to undergo an emergency surgical operation.
Dr. Cruz further averred that he agreed to the operation and upon waking up at the ICU on May 30, 2003, he found out
that the doctors did an exploratory laparatomy because of the internal bleeding; that he learned that the doctors cut a
portion of the left side of his colon measuring 6-8 inches because it had a partial tear of the colonic wall which caused
the internal bleeding; that despite the painkillers, he was under tremendous pain in the incision area during his
recovery period in the ICU and had fever; and that he had intravenous tubes attached to his arms, subclavian artery
on the left part of his chest and a nasogastric tube through his nose.
Dr. Cruz claimed that Dr. Agas admitted that he was the one who performed the colonoscopy procedure but the latter
insisted that nothing went wrong. On June 7, 2003,he was discharged from SLMC. Nevertheless, he complained that
he had a hard time digesting his food; that he was frequently fed every two hours because he easily got full; that he
had fresh blood stools every time he moved his bowel; that he had lost his appetite and had gastric acidity; that he
slept most of the day; and that he was in good physical condition before the colonoscopy procedure. He asserted that
at the time of the filing of the complaint, he was still weak, tired and in pain.
Defense of Dr. Agas
Dr. Agas, on the other hand, countered that Dr. Cruz failed to prove the basic elements of reckless imprudence or
negligence. He averred that Dr. Cruz unfairly made it appear that he did not know that he would perform the
procedure. He explained that before the start of the colonoscopy procedure, he was able to confer with Dr. Cruz and
review his medical history which was taken earlier by a fellow gastrointestinal physician. He claimed that the
gastroscopy and colonoscopy procedures conducted on Dr. Cruz were completely successful considering that the
latter did not manifest any significant adverse reaction or body resistance during the procedures and that his vital
signs were normal throughout the procedure.6
Dr. Agas added that certifications and sworn statements were submitted by the Assistant Medical Director for
Professional Services, the Director of the Institute of Digestive Diseases, the anesthesiologist, and the hospital nurse
attesting to the fact that the intraperitonial bleeding which developed after the colonoscopy procedure, was
immediately recognized, evaluated, carefully managed, and corrected; that he provided an adequate and reasonable
standard of care to Dr. Cruz; that the endoscopist followed all precautionary measures; that the colonoscopy
procedure was done properly; that he was not negligent or reckless in conducting the colonoscopy procedure; that he
did not deviate from any standard medical norm, practice or procedure; and that he exercised competence and
diligence in rendering medical services to Dr. Cruz.7
Antecedents at the Prosecution Level
On February 16, 2004, the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) issued a resolution dismissing the complaint for
Serious Physical Injuries through Reckless Imprudence and Medical Malpractice. Aggrieved, Dr. Cruz filed a petition
for review with the Department of Justice (DOJ)but the same was dismissed in its March 2, 2007 Resolution. Dr. Cruz
filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the DOJ in its September 23, 2009 Resolution. 8
At the Court of Appeals
Not satisfied, Dr. Cruz filed a petition for certiorari before the CA questioning the unfavorable DOJ resolutions. On May
22, 2012, the CA rendered a decision affirming the said DOJ resolutions. The CA explained that, as a matter of sound
judicial policy, courts would not interfere with the public prosecutor’s wide discretion of determining probable cause in
a preliminary investigation unless such executive determination was tainted with manifest error or grave abuse of
discretion. It stated that the public prosecutor’s finding of lack of probable cause against Dr. Agas was in accordance
with law and that his alleged negligence was not adequately established by Dr. Cruz.
The CA also declared that Dr. Cruz failed to state in his Complaint-Affidavit the specific procedures that Dr. Agas failed
to do which a reasonable prudent doctor would have done, or specific norms he failed to observe which a reasonably
prudent doctor would have complied with. The CA pointed out that Dr. Agas was able to satisfactorily explain in his
Counter-Affidavit that the complications suffered by Dr. Cruz was not caused by his negligence or was the result of
medical malpractice. Dr. Agas explained as follows:
That the complication was due to the abnormal condition and configuration of the digestive system, colon in particular,
of the complainant and not from any negligent act in connection with the conduct of colonoscopy. The surgical findings
(xxx) revealed marked adhesions in the sigmoid colon which is not and never within my control. That the tear in the
serosa (the outermost layer of the colonic wall which has 4 layers) happened likely because of the marked interloop
adhesions and tortuousity of the sigmoid segment of the colon. These adhesions that connect the serosa to the
peritoneal lining of each loop detached from the serosa during the procedure. It is not possible to detect the presence
of marked adhesions prior to the endoscopic procedure because no clinical findings, laboratory tests or diagnostic
imaging such as x-ray, ultrasound or computed tomography (CT scan) of the abdomen can diagnose these conditions.
This can only be detected by surgically opening up the abdomen. Moreover, marked adhesions and serosal tear, in
particular, cannot likewise be detected by colonoscopy because they are in the outer wall of the colon and only the
inner lining of the colon is within the view of the colonoscope (camera). 9
The CA further wrote that the counter-affidavit of Dr. Agas was supported by the sworn affidavit of Dr. Jennifel S.
Bustos, an anesthesiologist at the SLMC and the affidavit of Evelyn E. Daulat, a nurse at SLMC, both swearing under
oath that Dr. Agas was not negligent in conducting a gastroscopy and colonoscopy procedure on Dr. Cruz and the
certification issued by the Hospital Ethics Committee which stated that Dr. Cruz was given an adequate and
reasonable standard of care; that Dr. Agas followed all precautionary measures in safeguarding Dr. Cruz from any
possible complications; and that the colonoscopy was done properly.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE
WHETHER OR NOT THE CA WAS CORRECT IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE DOJ THAT NO PROBABLE
CAUSE EXISTS FOR FILING AN INFORMATION AGAINST THE RESPONDENT, THAT THE RESPONDENT WAS
NOT NEGLIGENT AND THAT THERE WAS NO DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS.
Non-interference with Executive
Determination of Probable Cause
in Preliminary Investigations
Under the doctrine of separation of powers, courts have no right to directly decide on matters over which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the Executive Branch of the Government, or to substitute their own
judgment for that of the Executive Branch, represented in this case by the Department of Justice. The settled policy is
that the courts will not interfere with the executive determination of probable cause for the purpose of filing an
Information, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion. That abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in
contemplation of law, such as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion
or hostility.
Medical Negligence and
Malpractice Not Established
In the case at bench, Dr. Cruz failed to show that the DOJ gravely abused its discretion in finding that there was lack
of probable cause and dismissing the complaint against Dr. Agas for Serious Physical Injuries through Reckless
Imprudence and Medical Malpractice.
A medical negligence case can prosper if the patient can present solid proof that the doctor, like in this case, either
failed to do something which a reasonably prudent doctor would have done, or that he did something that a
reasonably prudent doctor would not have done, and such failure or action caused injury to the patient.
To successfully pursue this kind of case, a patient must only prove that a health care provider either failed to do
something which a reasonably prudent health care provider would have done, or that he did something that a
reasonably prudent provider would not have done; and that failure or action caused injury to the patient. Simply put,
the elements are duty, breach, injury and proximate causation. 10
In this case, Dr. Cruz has the burden of showing the negligence or recklessness of Dr. Agas. Although there is no
dispute that Dr. Cruz sustained internal hemorrhage due to a tear in the serosa of his sigmoid colon, he failed to show
that it was caused by Dr. Agas’s negligent and reckless conduct of the colonoscopy procedure. In other words, Dr.
Cruz failed to show and explain that particular negligent or reckless act or omission committed by Dr. Agas. Stated
differently, Dr. Cruz did not demonstrate that there was "inexcusable lack of precaution" on the part of Dr. Agas.
Res Ipsa Loquitur Doctrine
Not Applicable Against Respondent
Literally, res ipsa loquitur means the thing speaks for itself. It is the rule that the fact of the occurrence of an injury,
taken with the surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a presumption of negligence, or make out
a plaintiff’s prima facie case, and present a question of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation. 11
The requisites for the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are: (1) the occurrence of an injury; (2) the thing
which caused the injury was under the control and management of the defendant; (3) the occurrence was such that in
the ordinary course of things, would not have happened if those who had control or management used proper care;
and (4) the absence of explanation by the defendant. Of the foregoing requisites, the most instrumental is the control
and management of the thing which caused the injury. 12
In this case, the Court agrees with Dr. Agas that his purported negligence in performing the colonoscopy on Dr. Cruz
was not immediately apparent to a layman to justify the application of res ipsa loquitur doctrine.
Dr. Agas was able to establish that the internal bleeding sustained by Dr. Cruz was due to the abnormal condition and
configuration of his sigmoid colon which was beyond his control considering that the said condition could not be
detected before a colonoscopic procedure. Dr. Agas adequately explained that no clinical findings, laboratory tests, or
diagnostic imaging, such as x-rays, ultrasound or computed tomography (CT) scan of the abdomen, could have
detected this condition prior to an endoscopic procedure. Specifically, Dr. Agas wrote:
On the other hand, in the present case, the correlation between petitioner’s injury, i.e., tear in the serosa of sigmoid
colon, and the colonoscopy conducted by respondent to the petitioner clearly requires the presentation of an expert
opinion considering that no perforation of the sigmoid colon was ever noted during the laparotomy. It cannot be
overemphasized that the colonoscope inserted by the respondent only passed through the inside of petitioner’s
sigmoid colon while the damaged tissue, i.e., serosa, which caused the bleeding, is located in the outermost layer of
the colon. It is therefore impossible for the colonoscope to touch, scratch, or even tear the serosa since the said
membrane is beyond reach of the colonoscope in the absence of perforation on the colon. 13
Dr. Cruz failed to rebut this.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

NAPOLEON D. SENIT vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 192914 January 11, 2016
REYES, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision 2dated
November 20, 2009 and the. Resolution3 dated June 17, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 00390-
MIN which affirmed with modification the Dedision4 dated April 26, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, Branch 10, in Criminal Case No. 10717-00 convicting Napoleon D. Senit (petitioner) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Reckless Imprudence resulting to Multiple Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to
Property.
The Antecedents
The facts as narrated are culled from the Comments5 of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and from the
assailed decision of the CA:
In the morning of September 2, 2000, private complainant Mohinder Toor, Sr. was driving north along Aglayan from the
direction of Valencia on board his Toyota pick-up with his wife Rosalinda Toor, their three-year-old son Mohinder Toor,
Jr., and househelper Mezelle Jane Silayan. He turned left and was coming to the center of Aglayan when a speeding
Super 5 bus driven by petitioner and coming from Malaybalay headed south towards Valencia, suddenly overtook a
big truck from the right side. Petitioner tried to avoid the accident by swerving to the right towards the shoulder of the
road and applying the brakes, but he was moving too fast and could not avoid a collision with the pick-up. The bus
crashed into the right side of private complainant’s pick-up at a right angle.
All passengers of the pick-up were injured and immediately brought to Bethel Baptist Hospital, Sumpong, Malaybalay
City. However, because of lack of medical facilities, they were transferred to the Bukidnon Doctor’s Hospital in
Valencia City, Bukidnon. Rosalinda Toor sustained an open fracture of the humerus of the right arm and displaced,
closed fracture of the proximal and distal femur of the right lower extremity which required two surgical operations.
She was paralyzed as a result of the accident and was unable to return to her job as the Regional Manager of
COSPACHEM Product Laboratories. Mohinder Toor, Sr. spent about P580,000.00 for her treatment and P3,000.00 for
Mezelle Jean Silayan, who suffered frontal area swelling as a result of the accident. Mohinder Toor, Sr. suffered a
complete fracture of the scapular bone of his right shoulder while his son Mohinder Toor, Jr. sustained abdominal
injury and a wound on the area of his right eye which required suturing. The damage sustained by the pick-up reached
P106,155.00.
Thus, on May 30, 2001, Carlo B. Mejia, City Prosecutor of Malaybalay City, charged petitioner with Reckless
Imprudence Resulting to Multiple Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to Property in an Amended Information which
was filed with Branch 10 of the [RTC] in Malaybalay City. The information reads:
"That on or about September 2, 2000 in the morning at [sic] Barangay Aglayan, Malaybalay City, Province of
Bukidnon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, and criminally in violation of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, in negligent, careless,
imprudent manner and without precaution to prevent accident [to] life and property, drive a Super Five Nissan Bus,
color white/red bearing plate No. MVD-776 owned by PAUL PADAYHAG of Rosario Heights, Iligan City, as a result hit
and bumped the [sic] motor vehicle, Toyota Pick-up color blue with plate No. NEF-266 driven and owned by
MOHINDER S. TOO[R,] SR., and with his wife Rosalinda Toor, son Mohinder Toor, Jr., 3 years old and househelp
Mezelle Jane Silayan, 17 years old, riding with him. The Toyota pick-up was damaged in the amount of [P]105,300.00
and spouses Mohinder Toor[,] Sr. and Rosalinda Toor, Mohinder Toor[,] Jr[.] and Mezelle Jane Silayan sustained the
following injuries to wit:
MOHINDER TOOR[,] SR.
= complete fracture of superior scapular bone right shoulder
MOHINDER TOOR[,] JR.
= MPI secondary to MVA r/o Blunt abdominal injury
= Saturing [sic] right eye area
ROSALINDA TOOR
= Fracture, open type 11, supracondylar, humerus right
= Fracture, closed, Complete, displaced, subtrochanter
= and supracondylar femur right
MEZELLE JANE SILAYAN
= Frontal area swelling 20 vehicular accident
to the damage and prejudice of the complainant victim in such amount that they are entitled to under the law.
CONTRARY TO and in Violation of Article 365 in relation to 263 of the Revised Penal Code. IN RELATION TO THE
FAMILY CODE."6 (Citations omitted)
Upon being arraigned on June 21, 2001, the petitioner, with the assistance of his counsel, pleaded not guilty to the
Information in this case.7
Trial ensued. However, after the initial presentation of evidence for the petitioner, he resigned from his employment
and transferred residence. His whereabouts allegedly became unknown so he was not presented as a witness by his
new counsel.8
On April 26, 2006, the RTC rendered its Decision in absentia convicting the petitioner of the crime charged.
The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered and finding the accused NAPOLEON SENIT y Duhaylungsod guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime as charged, he is hereby sentenced to an imprisonment of an indeterminate penalty of
Four [4] months and One [1] day of Arresto Mayor maximum as minimum and to Four [4] years and Two [2] months
Prision Correc[c]ional medium as maximum. The accused is further ordered to indemnify the private complainant the
amount of Fifty Thousand [P50,000.00] Pesos as moral damages, the amount of Four Hundred Eighty Thousand
[P480,000.00] [Pesos] for the expenses incurred in the treatment and hospitalization of Rosalinda Toor, Mohinder Toor,
Jr[.] and Mezelle Jean Silayan and the amount of Eighty Thousand [P80,000.00] [Pesos] for the expenses incurred in
the repair of the damaged Toyota pick-up vehicle.
SO ORDERED.9
The RTC issued a Promulgation10 dated August 4, 2006, which included an order for the arrest of the petitioner.
The petitioner then filed a motion for new trial via registered mail on the ground that errors of law or irregularities have
been committed during trial that are allegedly prejudicial to his substantial rights. He claimed that he was not able to
present evidence during trial because he was not notified of the schedule. Likewise, he mistakenly believed that the
case against him has been dismissed as private complainant Mohinder Toor, Sr. (Toor, Sr.) purportedly left the
country.11
On September 22, 2006, the public prosecutor opposed the motion for new trial filed by the petitioner. 12
On October 26, 2006, the motion for new trial was denied by the lower court pronouncing that notices have been duly
served the parties and that the reason given by the petitioner was self-serving. 13
Dissatisfied with the RTC decision, the petitioner filed his Notice of Appeal dated November 6, 2006 by registered mail
to the CA, on both questions of facts and laws.14
Ruling of the CA
On November 20, 2009, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC with modification as to the penalty imposed, the
dispositive portion thereof reads:
ACCORDINGLY, with MODIFICATION that [the petitioner] should suffer the penalty of three (3) months and one (1)
day of arresto mayor, the Court AFFIRMS in all other respects the appealed 26 April 2006 Decision of the [RTC] of
Malaybalay City, Branch 10, in Criminal Case No. 10717-00.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.15
In affirming with modification the decision of the RTC, the CA ratiocinated as follows: first, the evidence presented by
OSG overwhelmingly points to the petitioner as the culprit. A scrutiny of the records further reveals that the pictures
taken after the accident and the Traffic Investigation Report all coincide with the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses, which are in whole consistent and believable thus, debunking the claim of the petitioner that he was
convicted on the mere basis of allegedly biased and hearsay testimonies which do not establish his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. In addition, there was no existing evidence to show that there was an improper motive on the part
of the eyewitnesses.16
Second, it found the arguments of the petitioner to move for a new trial as baseless. 17
Lastly, it rendered that the proper imposable penalty is the maximum period of arresto mayor in its minimum and
medium periods that is – imprisonment for three (3) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor since the petitioner has,
by reckless imprudence, committed an act which, had it been intentional, would have constituted a less grave felony,
based on the first paragraph of Article 365 in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). 18
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the CA, in its Resolution 19 dated June 17, 2010.
As a final recourse, the petitioner filed the petition for review before this Court, praying that the applicable law on the
matter be reviewed, and the gross misappreciation of facts committed by the court a quo and by the CA be given a
second look.
The Issues
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC AND THE CA ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL OR TO RE-
OPEN THE SAME IN ORDER TO ALLOW THE PETITIONER TO PRESENT EVIDENCE ON HIS BEHALF; AND
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC ERRED IN CONVICTING THE PETITIONER DESPITE THE APPARENT FAILURE
ON THE PART OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE GUILT OF THE PETITIONER BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.20
 Ruling of the Court
The petition lacks merit.
The RTC and CA did not err in denying the petitioner’s motion for new trial or to re-open the same.
The Court finds that no errors of law or irregularities, prejudicial to the substantial rights of the petitioner, have been
committed during trial.
The petitioner anchors his motion for new trial on Rule 121, Section 2(a) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
to wit:
Sec. 2. Grounds for a new trial. – The Court shall grant a new trial on any of the following grounds:
(a) That errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused have been
committed during the trial;
(b) That new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not with reasonable
diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced and admitted would probably
change the judgment. (Emphasis ours)
To sum up the claims of the petitioner, he theorizes that there was an error of law or irregularities committed when the
RTC promulgated a decision in absentia and deemed that he had waived his right to present evidence resulting to
denial of due process, a one-sided decision by the RTC, and a strict and rigid application of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure against him.
First, it must be noted that the petitioner had already been arraigned and therefore, the court a quo had already
acquired jurisdiction over him. In fact, there was already an initial presentation of evidence for the defense when his
whereabouts became unknown.
The petitioner’s claims that he had not testified because he did not know the schedule of the hearings, and mistakenly
believed that the case had already been terminated with the departure of Toor, Sr., do not merit our consideration. 21
The holding of trial in absentia is authorized under Section 14(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution which provides
that after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly
notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.22 It is established that notices have been served to the counsel of the
petitioner and his failure to inform his counsel of his whereabouts is the reason for his failure to appear on the
scheduled date. Thus, the arguments of the petitioner against the validity of the proceedings and promulgation of
judgment in absentia for being in violation of the constitutional right to due process are doomed to fail. 23
In Estrada v. People,24 the Court ruled that:
Due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective
sides of the controversy.
In the present case, petitioner was afforded such opportunity. The trial court set a hearing on May 14, 1997 for
reception of defense evidence, notice of which was duly sent to the addresses on record of petitioner and her counsel,
respectively. When they failed to appear at the May 14, 1997 hearing, they later alleged that they were not notified of
said setting. Petitioner’s counsel never notified the court of any change in her address, while petitioner gave a wrong
address from the very beginning, eventually jumped bail and evaded court processes. Clearly, therefore, petitioner and
her counsel were given all the opportunities to be heard. They cannot now complain of alleged violation of petitioner’s
right to due process when it was by their own fault that they lost the opportunity to present evidence. 25 (Citation
omitted)
Similarly in the present case, the petitioner clearly had previous notice of the criminal case filed against him and was
given the opportunity to present evidence in his defense. The petitioner was not in any way deprived of his substantive
and constitutional right to due process as he was duly accorded all the opportunities to be heard and to present
evidence to substantiate his defense, but he forfeited this right, through his own negligence, by not appearing in court
at the scheduled hearings.26
The negligence of the petitioner in believing that the case was already terminated resulting to his failure to attend the
hearings, is inexcusable. The Court has ruled in many cases that:
It is petitioner’s duty, as a client, to be in touch with his counsel so as to be constantly posted about the case. It is
mandated to inquire from its counsel about the status and progress of the case from time to time and cannot expect
that all it has to do is sit back, relax and await the outcome of the case. It is also its responsibility, together with its
counsel, to devise a system for the receipt of mail intended for them. 27 (Citations omitted)
The Court finds that the negligence exhibited by the petitioner, towards the criminal case against him in which his
liberty is at risk, is not borne of ignorance of the law as claimed by his counsel rather, lack of concern towards the
incident, and the people who suffered from it. While there was no showing in the case at bar that the counsel of the
petitioner was grossly negligent in failing to inform him of the notices served, the Court cannot find anyone to blame
but the petitioner himself in not exercising diligence in informing his counsel of his whereabouts.
The Court also agrees with the Comment of the OSG that there is neither rule nor law which specifically requires the
trial court to ascertain whether notices received by counsel are sufficiently communicated with his client. 28
In GCP-Manny Transport Services, Inc. v. Judge Principe,29 the Court held that:
[W]hen petitioner is at fault or not entirely blameless, there is no reason to overturn well-settled jurisprudence or to
interpret the rules liberally in its favor. Where petitioner failed to act with prudence and diligence, its plea that it was
not accorded the right to due process cannot elicit this Court’s approval or even sympathy. It is petitioner’s duty, as a
client, to be in touch with his counsel so as to be constantly posted about the case. x x x. 30 (Citations omitted)
Even if the Court assumed that the petitioner anchors his claim on Section 2(b) of Rule 121 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the argument still has no merit.
"A motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence may be granted only if the following requisites are met: (a)
that the evidence was discovered after trial; (b) that said evidence could not have been discovered and produced at
the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or
impeaching; and (d) that the evidence is of such weight that, if admitted, it would probably change the judgment. It is
essential that the offering party exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to locate the evidence before or during trial
but nonetheless failed to secure it."31 The Court agrees with the CA in its decision which held that "a new trial may not
be had on the basis of evidence which was available during trial but was not presented due to its negligence.
Likewise, the purported errors and irregularities committed in the course of the trial against [the petitioner’s]
substantive rights do not exist."32
In Lustaña v. Jimena-Lazo,33 the Court ruled that:
Rules of procedure are tools designed to promote efficiency and orderliness as well as to facilitate attainment of
justice, such that strict adherence thereto is required. Their application may be relaxed only when rigidity would result
in a defeat of equity and substantial justice, which is not present here. Utter disregard of the Rules cannot just be
rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction. 34 (Citations omitted and italics in the original)
In the instant case, the Court finds no reason to waive the procedural rules in order to grant the motion for new trial of
the petitioner. There is just no legal basis for the grant of the motion for new trial. The Court believes that the petitioner
was given the opportunity to be heard but he chose to put this opportunity into waste by not being diligent enough to
ask about the status of the criminal case against him and inform his counsel of his whereabouts.
The RTC did not err in convicting the petitioner.
The law applicable to the case at bar is Article 365 of the RPC, which provides that:
Art. 365. Imprudence and negligence. – x x x.
xxxx
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material
damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform
such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other
circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
xxxx
The elements of reckless imprudence are: (1) that the offender does or fails to do an act; (2) that the doing or the
failure to do that act is voluntary; (3) that it be without malice; (4) that material damage results from the reckless
imprudence; and (5) that there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the offender, taking into consideration
his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition, and other circumstances regarding persons,
time, and place.35
All elements for the crime of reckless imprudence have been established in the present case.
The petitioner questions the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and claims that their testimonies are biased. He
also claims that Toor, Sr. is the real culprit when he turned left without looking for an incoming vehicle, thus violating
traffic rules resulting to the mishap.
The Court believes that the RTC and CA correctly appreciated the evidence and testimonies presented in the instant
case.
The Court agrees with the OSG that not only were the witnesses’ narrations of the accident credible and worthy of
belief, their accounts were also consistent and tallied on all significant and substantial points. 36 These witnesses’
testimonies are as follows:
PO3 Jesus Delfin testified that he investigated the accident at Aglayan. He made the following findings in his accident
report: the pick-up owned and driven by Toor, Sr., together with his family and a househelper as his passengers, was
turning left along Aglayan when it was hit at a right angle position by a Super 5 bus driven by the petitioner. He noted
skid marks made by the bus and explained that the petitioner was overtaking but was not able to do so because of the
pick-up. The petitioner could not swerve to the left to avoid the pick-up because there was a ten-wheeler truck. He
swerved to the right instead and applied breaks to avoid the accident. The investigator clearly testified that, on the
basis of data gathered, the collision was due to the error of the bus driver who was driving too fast, as evinced by the
distance from the skid marks towards the axle.37
Albert Alon testified that he saw Toor, Sr.’s pick-up turn left along Aglayan. He also saw a big truck and a Super 5 bus
both coming from Malaybalay. The truck was running slowly while the Super 5 bus was running fast and overtaking the
big truck from the right side. The bus crashed into the pick-up and pushed the smaller vehicle due to the force of the
impact. He went nearer the area of collision and saw that the four passengers of the pick-up were unconscious. 38
Mezelle Jane Silayan testified that while moving towards the center of Aglayan on board her employer’s pick-up, she
saw a Super 5 bus overtaking a big truck from the right side. Their vehicle was hit by the bus. She was thrown out of
the pick-up and hit her head on the ground.39
Toor, Sr. testified that while he was driving his pick-up at the corner of the center of Aglayan, a Super 5 bus, moving
fast, overtook a big truck from the right side. The bus then hit the pick up, injuring him and all his passengers. 40
Taken all together, the testimonies of the witnesses conclusively suggest that: (1) the Super 5 bus was moving fast; (2)
the bus overtook a big truck which was moving slowly from the right side; and (3) when the petitioner saw the pick-up
truck turning left, he applied the brakes but because he was moving fast, the collision became inevitable.
"Well-entrenched is the rule that the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses is entitled to great weight
and is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of
significance and influence. This rule is based on the fact that the trial court had the opportunity to observe the
demeanor and the conduct of the witnesses."41 The Court finds in the instant case that there is no reason for this Court
to deviate from the rule.
The Court finds the testimonies of the witnesses not biased. There was no evidence of ill motive of the witnesses
against the petitioner.
Lastly, the petitioner claims that Toor, Sr. committed a traffic violation and thus, he should be the one blamed for the
incident. The Court finds this without merit.1âwphi1
The prosecution sufficiently proved that the Super 5 bus driven by the petitioner recklessly drove on the right shoulder
of the road and overtook another south-bound ten-wheeler truck that slowed at the intersection, obviously to give way
to another vehicle about to enter the intersection. It was impossible for him not to notice that the ten-wheeler truck in
front and traveling in the same direction had already slowed down to allow passage of the pick-up, which was then
negotiating a left turn to Aglayan public market. Seeing the ten-wheeler truck slow down, it was incumbent upon the
petitioner to reduce his speed or apply on the brakes of the bus in order to allow the pick-up to safely make a left turn.
Instead, he drove at a speed too fast for safety, then chose to swerve to the right shoulder of the road and overtake
the truck, entering the intersection and directly smashing into the pick-up. In flagrantly failing to observe the necessary
precautions to avoid inflicting injury or damage to other persons and things, the petitioner was recklessly imprudent in
operating the Super 5 bus.42
In Dumayag v. People,43 the Court held:
Section 37 of R.A. No. 4136, as amended, mandates all motorists to drive and operate vehicles on the right side of the
road or highway. When overtaking another, it should be made only if the highway is clearly visible and is free from
oncoming vehicle. Overtaking while approaching a curve in the highway, where the driver's view is obstructed, is not
allowed. Corollarily, drivers of automobiles, when overtaking another vehicle, are charged with a high degree of
care and diligence to avoid collision. The obligation rests upon him to see to it that vehicles coming from the
opposite direction are not taken unaware by his presence on the side of the road upon which they have the
right to pass.44 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)
Thus, the petitioner cannot blame Toor, Sr. for not noticing a fast-approaching bus, as the cited law provides that the
one overtaking on the road has the obligation to let other cars in the opposite direction know his presence and not the
other way around as the petitioner suggests.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision dated November 20, 2009 and the Resolution dated
June 17, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 00390-MIN are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

VENANCIO M. SEVILLA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 194390 August 13, 2014
REYES, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul and set
aside the Decision2 dated February 26, 2009 and the Resolution3 dated October 22, 2010 of the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Case No. 27925, finding Venancio M. Sevilla (Sevilla) guilty of falsification of public documents through
reckless imprudence punished under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
 Antecedent Facts
Sevilla, a former councilor of Malabon City, was charged with the felony of falsification of public document, penalized
under Article 171(4) of the RPC, in an Information, 4 which reads:
That on or about 02 July 2001, or for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of Malabon, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Venancio M. Sevilla, a public officer, being
then a memberof the [S]angguniang [P]anlunsod of Malabon City, having been elected a [c]ouncilor thereof, taking
advantage of his official position and committing the offense in relation to duty, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully,
and feloniously make a false statement in a narration of facts, the truth of which he is legally bound to disclose, by
stating in his C.S. Form 212, dated 02 July 2001 or Personal Data Sheet, an official document, which he submitted to
the Office of the Secretariat, Malabon City Council and, in answer to Question No. 25 therein, he stated that no
criminal case is pending against him, when in fact, as the accused fully well knew, he is an accused in Criminal Case
No. 6718-97, entitled "People of the Philippines versus Venancio Sevilla and Artemio Sevilla", for Assault Upon
AnAgent Of A Person In Authority, pending before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Malabon City, Branch 55, thereby
perverting the truth.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
Upon arraignment, Sevillaentered a plea of not guilty. Trial on the merits ensued thereafter.
The prosecution alleged that on July 2, 2001, the first day of his term as councilor of the City of Malabon, Sevilla made
a false narration in his Personal Data Sheet (PDS).6 That in answer to the question of whether there is a pending
criminalcase against him, Sevilla marked the box corresponding to the "no" answer despite the pendency of a criminal
case against him for assault upon an agent ofa person in authority before the Metropolitan Trial Court ofMalabon City,
Branch 55.
Based on the same set of facts, anadministrative complaint, docketed as OMB-ADM-0-01-1520, was likewise filed
against Sevilla. In its Decision dated March 26, 2002, the Office of the Ombudsman found Sevilla administratively
liable for dishonesty and falsification of official document and dismissed him from the service. In Sevilla v.
Gervacio,7the Court, in the Resolution dated June 23, 2003, affirmed the findings of the Office of the Ombudsman as
regards Sevilla’s administrative liability.
On the other hand, Sevilla admitted that he indeed marked the box corresponding to the "no" answer vis-à-visthe
question on whether he has any pending criminal case. However, heaverred that he did not intend to falsify his PDS.
He claimed that it was Editha Mendoza (Mendoza), a member of his staff, who actually prepared his PDS.
According to Sevilla, on July 2, 2001,since he did not have an office yet, he just stayed in his house. Ataround two
o’clock in the afternoon, he was informed by Mendoza that he needs to accomplish his PDS and submit the same to
the personnel office of the City of Malabon before five o’clock that afternoon. He then instructedMendoza to copy the
entries in the previous copy of his PDS which he filed with the personnel office. After the PDS was filled up and
delivered to him by Mendoza, Sevilla claims that he just signed the same without checking the veracity of the entries
therein. That he failed to notice that, in answer to the question of whether he has any pending criminal case, Mendoza
checked the box corresponding to the "no" answer.
The defense likewise presented the testimony of Edilberto G. Torres (Torres), a former City Councilor. Torres testified
that Sevilla was not yet given an office space in the Malabon City Hall on July 2, 2001; that when the members of
Sevilla’s staff would then need to use the typewriter, they would just use the typewriter inside Torres’ office. Torres
further claimed that he saw Mendoza preparing the PDS of Sevilla, the latter having used the typewriter in his office.
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
On February 26, 2009, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision, 8 the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, accused VENANCIO M. SEVILLA is found GUILTY of Falsification of Public Documents Through
Reckless Imprudence and pursuant to Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code hereby imposes upon him in the absence
ofany modifying circumstances the penalty of four (4) months of arresto mayoras minimum to two (2) years ten (10)
months and twenty one (21) days of prision correccional as maximum, and to pay the costs.
There is no pronouncement as to civil liability as the facts from which it could arise do[es] not appear to be indubitable.
SO ORDERED.9
The Sandiganbayan found that Sevilla made an untruthful statement in his PDS, which is a public document,and that,
in so doing, he took advantage of his official position since he would not have accomplished the PDS if not for his
position as a City Councilor. That being the signatory of the PDS, Sevilla had the responsibility to prepare, accomplish
and submit the same. Further, the Sandiganbayan pointed out that there was a legal obligation on the part of Sevilla to
disclose in his PDS that there was a pending case against him. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan ruled that the
prosecution was able to establish all the elements of the felony of falsification of public documents.
Nevertheless, the Sandiganbayan opined that Sevilla cannot be convicted of falsification of public document under
Article 171(4)10 of the RPC since he did not act with maliciousintent to falsify the aforementioned entry in his PDS.
However, considering that Sevilla’s PDS was haphazardly and recklessly done, which resulted in the false entry
therein, the Sandiganbayan convicted Sevilla of falsification of public document through reckless imprudence under
Article 36511 of the RPC. Thus:
Moreover, the marking of the "no" box to the question on whether there was a pending criminal case against him was
not the only defect in his PDS. As found by the Office of the Honorable Ombudsman in its Resolution, in answer to
question 29 inthe PDS, accused answered that he had not been a candidate in any localelection (except barangay
election), when in fact he ran and served ascouncilor of Malabon from 1992 to 1998. Notwithstanding the negative
answer in question 29, in the same PDS, in answer to question 21, he revealed that he was a councilor from 1992 to
1998. Not to give premium to a negligent act, this nonetheless shows that the preparation of the PDS was
haphazardly and recklessly done.
Taking together these circumstances, this Court is persuaded that accused did not act with malicious intent to falsify
the document in question but merely failed to ascertain for himself the veracity of narrations in his PDS before affixing
his signature thereon. The reckless signing of the PDS without verifying the data therein makes him criminally liable
for his act. Accused is a government officer, who prior to his election as councilor in 2001, had already served as a
councilor of the same city. Thus, he should have been more mindful of the importance of the PDS and should have
treated the said public document with due respect.
Consequently, accused is convictedof Falsification of Public Document through Reckless Imprudence, as defined and
penalized in Article 171, paragraph 4, in relation to Article 365, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code. x x x. 12
Sevilla’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution 13 dated October 22, 2010.
Hence, this appeal.
In the instant petition, Sevilla asserts that the Sandiganbayan erred in finding him guilty of the felony of falsification of
public documents through reckless imprudence. He claims that the Information that was filed against him specifically
charged him with the commission of an intentional felony, i.e.falsification of public documents under Article 171(4) of
the RPC. Thus, he could not be convicted of falsification of public document through reckless imprudence under
Article 365 of the RPC, which is a culpable felony, lest his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him be violated.
Issue
Essentially, the issue for the Court’s resolution is whether Sevilla can be convicted of the felony of falsification of public
document through reckless imprudence notwithstanding that the charge against him in the Information was for the
intentional felony of falsification of public document under Article 171(4) of the RPC.
Ruling of the Court
The appeal is dismissed for lack of merit.
At the outset, it bears stressing that the Sandiganbayan’s designation of the felony supposedly committed by Sevilla is
inaccurate. The Sandiganbayan convicted Sevilla of reckless imprudence, punished under Article 365 of the RPC,
which resulted into the falsification of a public document. However, the Sandiganbayan designated the felony
committed as "falsification of public document through reckless imprudence." The foregoing designation implies that
reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself but simply a modality of committing it. Quasi-offenses under Article 365 of
the RPC are distinct and separatecrimes and not a mere modality in the commission of a crime.
In Ivler v. Modesto-San Pedro,14 the Court explained that:
Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of crime, separately defined
and penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing new. As early as the middle of the last century, we
already sought to bring clarity to this field by rejecting in Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of Pampangathe proposition
that "reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it x x x" on three points of analysis: (1)
the object of punishment in quasi-crimes (as opposed to intentional crimes); (2) the legislative intent to treat quasi
crimes as distinct offenses (as opposed to subsuming them under the mitigating circumstance of minimal intent) and;
(3) the different penalty structures for quasi-crimes and intentional crimes:
The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that "reckless imprudence" is not a crime in itself but
simply a way of committing it and merely determines a lower degree of criminal liability is too broad to deserve
unqualified assent. There are crimes that by their structure cannot be committed through imprudence: murder,
treason, robbery, maliciousmischief, etc. In truth, criminal negligence in our Revised Penal Code is treated as a mere
quasi offense, and dealt with separately from willful offenses. It is not a mere question of classification or terminology.
In intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence, what isprincipally penalized is the mental
attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible.x x
x
Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of felonies, operating only to reduce the penalty therefor,
then it would be absorbed in the mitigating circumstances of Art. 13, specially the lack of intent to commit so grave a
wrong as the one actually committed. Furthermore, the theory would require that the corresponding penalty should
befixed in proportion to the penalty prescribed for each crime when committed willfully. For each penalty for the willful
offense, there would then be a corresponding penalty for the negligent variety. But instead, our Revised Penal Code
(Art. 365) fixes the penalty for reckless imprudence at arresto mayor maximum, to prision correccional[medium], if the
willful act would constitute a grave felony, notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter could range all the way from
prision mayor to death, according to the case. It can be seen that the actual penalty for criminal negligence bears no
relation to the individual willful crime, but is set in relation to a whole class, or series, of crimes.(Emphasis supplied)
This explains why the technically correct way to allege quasicrimes is to state that their commission results in damage,
either to person or property.15 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)
Further, in Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation v. People, 16 the Court clarified that:
Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal negligence "is treated as a mere quasi offense, and dealt with
separately from willful offenses. It is not a question ofclassification or terminology. In intentional crimes, the act itselfis
punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act,
the dangerousrecklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible. Much of the confusion has arisen from
the common use of such descriptive phrase as ‘homicide through reckless imprudence’, and the like; when the strict
technical sense is, more accurately, ‘reckless imprudence resulting in homicide’; or ‘simple imprudence causing
damages to property’."
There is need, therefore, to rectify the designation of the offense without disturbing the imposed penaltyfor the
guidance of bench and bar in strict adherence to precedent. 17 (Emphasis ours) Thus, the proper designation ofthe
felony should be reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public documents and not falsification of public
documentsthrough reckless imprudence.
Having threshed out the proper designation of the felony committed by Sevilla, the Court now weighs the merit of the
instant appeal. Sevilla’s appeal is anchored mainly on the variance between the offense charged in the Information
that was filed against him and that proved by the prosecution. The rules on variance between allegation and proof are
laid down under Sections 4 and 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, viz:
Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. – When there is variance between the offense
charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily
includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense
charged, or of the offense charged which isincluded in the offense proved.
Sec. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. – An offense charged necessarily includes the offense
proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information,
constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved, when the essential
ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.
Accordingly, in case of variance between the allegation and proof, a defendant may be convictedof the offense proved
when the offense charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved.
There is no dispute that a variance exists between the offense alleged against Sevilla and that proved by the
prosecution – the Information charged him with the intentional felony of falsification of public document under Article
171(4) of the RPC while the prosecution was able to prove reckless imprudence resulting to falsification ofpublic
documents. Parenthetically, the question that has to be resolved then is whether reckless imprudence resulting to
falsification of public document is necessarily included in the intentional felony of falsification ofpublic document under
Article 171(4) of the RPC.
The Court, in Samson v. Court of Appeals,18 has answered the foregoing question in the affirmative. Thus:
It is however contended that appellant Samson cannot be convicted of the crime of estafathrough falsification by
imprudence for the reason that the information filed against him charges only a willful act of falsification and contains
no reference to any act of imprudence on his part. Nor can it be said, counsel argues, that the alleged imprudent act
includes or is necessarily includedin the offense charged in the information because a deliberate intent to do an
unlawful act is inconsistent with the idea of negligence.
xxxx
While a criminal negligent act is nota simple modality of a wilful crime, as we held in Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of
Bacolor, x x x, but a distinct crime in itself, designated asa quasi offense, in our Penal Code, it may however be said
that a conviction for the former can be had under an information exclusively charging the commission of a wilful
offense, upon the theory that the greater includes the lesser offense. This is the situation that obtains in the present
case. Appellant was charged with willful falsification but from the evidence submitted by the parties, the Court of
Appeals found thatin effecting the falsification which made possible the cashing of checks inquestion, appellant did not
act with criminal intent but merely failed to take proper and adequate means to assure himself of the identity of the
real claimants as an ordinary prudent man would do. In other words, the information alleges acts which charge willful
falsification but which turned out to be not willful but negligent. This is a case covered by the rule when there is a
variance between the allegation and proof, and is similar to some of the cases decided by this Tribunal. 19(Emphasis
ours)
Thus, Sevilla’s claim that his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him
was violated when the Sandiganbayan convicted him of reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public
documents, when the Information only charged the intentional felony of falsification of public documents, is untenable.
To stress, reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public documents is an offense that is necessarily included
in the willful act of falsification of public documents, the latter being the greater offense. As such, he can be convicted
of reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public documents notwithstanding that the Information only charged
the willful act of falsification of public documents.
In this regard, the Court’s disposition in Sarep v. Sandiganbayan 20 is instructive.1âwphi1 In Sarep, the petitioner
therein falsified his appointment paper which he filed with the CSC. An Information was then filed against him for
falsification of public document. Nevertheless, the Court convicted the accused of reckless imprudence resulting to
falsification of public document upon a finding that the accused therein did not maliciously pervert the truth with the
wrongful intent of injuring some person. The Court, quoting the Sandiganbayan’s disposition, held that:
We are inclined, however, to credit the accused herein with the benefit of the circumstance that he did not maliciously
pervert the truth with the wrongful intent of injuring some person (People vs. Reyes, 1 Phil. 341). Since he sincerely
believed that his CSC eligibility based on his having passed the Regional CulturalCommunity Officer (Unassembled)
Examination and educational attainment were sufficient to qualify him for a permanent position, then he should only be
held liable for falsification through reckless imprudence (People vs. Leopando, 36 O.G. 2937; People vs. Maleza, 14
Phil. 468; People vs. Pacheco, 18 Phil. 399).
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, which punishes criminal negligence or quasi-offenses, furnishes the middle
way between a wrongful act committed with wrongful intent, which gives rise to a felony, and a wrongful act committed
without any intent which may entirely exempt the doer from criminal liability. It is the duty of everyone to execute his
own acts with due care and diligence in order that no prejudicial or injurious results may be suffered by others from
acts that are otherwise offensive (Aquino, R.P.C. Vol. III, 1976, Ed., p. 1884). What is penalized is the mental attitude
orcondition behind the acts of dangerous recklessness and lack of care or foresight although such mental attitude
might have produced several effects or consequences (People vs. Cano, L 19660, May 24, 1966). 21
Anent the imposable penalty, under Article 365 of the RPC, reckless imprudence resulting in falsification of public
document is punishable by arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period. In this
case, taking into account the pertinent provisions of Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Sandiganbayan correctly
imposed upon Sevilla the penalty of four ( 4) months of arresto mayor as minimum to two (2) years ten ( 10) months
and twenty one (21) days of prision correccional as maximum.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated
February 26, 2009 and the Resolution dated October 22, 2010 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 27925 are
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.