PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
RONNIE ABOLIDOR, CLAUDIO BARCIMO, Issue:
JR. and FRANCISCO COMODA
G.R. No. 147231, February 18, 2004
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Facts:
Thelma Subosa, was the mother of 14 children with her deceased husband,
Primo Subosa. Subsequently, she cohabited with her common-law husband Warlito
Huesca and lived together with some of her children in Brgy. Janipa-an, Oeste, New
Lucena, Ilo-ilo. Thereafter, Warlito Huesca also died.
In morning of June 14, 1993, a day after Warlito was buried, the victim, Thelma
and her children namely, Ellyn, Roselyn, Evelyn, Manilyn, Leopoldo and Lilibeth, and
Milagros Huesca, the younger sister of Warlito Huesca, were awakened by the
forcible opening of the door of their house. Four men entered the house and declared
a hold up. Ronnie Abolidor tied her mouth with a handkerchief to silence her. Then
Claudio Barcimo, Jr. shot the victim several times causing her instantaneous death.
Witnesses Ellyn and Roselyn testified that they knew Ronnie Abolidor because
he was their neighbor for several years, and Claudio Barcimo, Jr. because he was a
friend of their deceased stepfather. Francisco Comoda was later identified by the
witnesses at the police station.
Claudio Barcimo, Jr. denied any participation in the killing of Thelma Subosa
and claimed that he could not have done it because he was a good friend of Warlito
Huesca; that on June 13, 1993, at around 4:00 p.m., he was with Brgy. Capt. Buol in
a celebration at the house of Brgy. Capt. Gerardo Paniza at Brgy. Dawis. He had
dinner and watched game of mahjong; that at around 10:00 p.m., he went to sleep on
the sofa near the mahjong table; that the mahjong game lasted until 4:00 a.m. the
following day; that he and Capt. Buol went back to New Lucena at about 6:00 a.m. of
June 14, 1993; and on the next day, he left for Manila for treatment of tuberculosis.[8]
After trial, the trial court convicted the three accused of the offense of murder
on January 31, 2000.
Only Claudio Barcimo, Jr. appealed the decision.
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Whether or not the accused is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender.
Held:
To benefit an accused, the following requisites must be proven, namely: (1) the
offender has not actually been arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a
person in authority; and (3) the surrender was voluntary. A surrender to be voluntary
must be spontaneous, showing the intent of the accused to submit himself
unconditionally to the authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt, or he
wishes to save them the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search and
capture. Voluntary surrender presupposes repentance.
In the case at bar, appellant surrendered to the authorities after more than one
year had lapsed since the incident and in order to disclaim responsibility for the killing
of the victim. This neither shows repentance or acknowledgment of the crime nor
intention to save the government the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his
search and capture. Besides, at the time of his surrender, there was a pending
warrant of arrest against him.[24] Hence, he should not be credited with the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender.
Thus, appellant is guilty of Murder, qualified by treachery, for the killing of
Thelma Sobusa. Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, imposes the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for Murder.
INTOD ET. AL. v CA (215 SCRA 52) G.R. No. 103119
Intod fired at Palangpangan's room, although in reality, the latter was not present in
his room; thus, Intod failed to kill him. The factual situation in the case at bar
presents an inherent impossibility of accomplishing the crime. Under Article 4,
paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act an
impossible crime.
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts even if completed, would not
amount to a crime.
PEOPLE v PANCHO (416 SCRA 506) November 27, 2003 G.R. 136592-93
Under Art. 6, in relation to Art. 335, of the Revised Penal Code, rape is attempted
when the offender commences the commission of rape directly by overt acts, but does
not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the crime of rape by reason
of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. There is no
attempted rape in this case because the accused just dragged the victim and held her
feet, which are not indicative of an intent or attempt to rape the victim.
PEOPLE v CASTROMERO (280 SCRA 421) G.R. No. 118992
The rape victim jumped from a window of her house to escape from the accused; as
a result, she suffered serious physical injuries specifically a broken vertebra which
required medical attention and surgery for more than ninety days. Here, the rape was
complexed with the crime of serious physical injuries, in accordance with the settled
principle that a person who creates in another’s mind an immediate sense of danger
that causes the latter to try to escape is responsible for whatever injuries the other
person may consequently suffer.
PEOPLE v APOLINAR C.A., 38 O.G. 2870
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The accused, while looking over his land and believing that the victim had stolen his
palay, shouted for the latter to stop, fired his gun in the air and then at the victim,
causing the latter’s death. Defense of property is not of such importance as the right
to life and it can be invoked only as a justifying circumstance when it is coupled with
an attack on the person of the one entrusted with the said property.
PEOPLE v PEREZ (83 PHIL 314)
7 counts of treason were filed against Perez for recruiting, apprehending and
commandeering numerous girls and women against their will for the purpose of using
them to satisfy the immoral purposes of Japanese officers. The Supreme Court held
that his "commandeering" of women to satisfy the lust of Japanese officers or men or
to enliven the entertainment held in their honor was not treason even though the
women and the entertainment helped to make life more pleasant for the enemies and
boost their spirit; he was not guilty any more than the women themselves would have
been if they voluntarily and willingly had surrendered their bodies or organized the
entertainment.
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PEOPLE v ADRIANO (78 PHIL 561)
Adriano was convicted for the crime of treason for being a member of the Makapili, a
military organization established and designed to assist and aid militarily the
Japanese Imperial forces in the Philippines in the said enemy's war efforts and
operations against the United States and the Philippines. The Supreme Court in
upholding the conviction held that the mere fact of having joined a Makapili
organization is evidence of both adherence to the enemy and giving him aid and
comfort and that being a Makapili is in itself constitutive of an overt act. Hence, it is
not necessary, except for the purpose of increasing the punishment, that the
defendant actually went to battle or committed nefarious acts against his country or
countrymen.
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PEOPLE v MANAYAO (78 PHIL 721)
Manayao argues that he cannot be charged with treason because he had already lost
his Filipino citizenship when he joined the Makapili, having considered himself a
member of the Japanese armed forces. Manayao cannot divest himself of his
Philippine citizenship, otherwise, his very crime would be the shield that would protect
him from punishment and would essentially place himself beyond the arm of our
treason law.
Macariola v Asuncion, 114 SCRA 77 (1982)
Spanish Code of Commerce Provision Disqualifying Judges from Engaging in
Commerce is Part of Spanish Political Law Abrogated by Change of Sovereignty
FACTS:
The complainant alleged that respondent judge of the CFI violated paragraphs 1 and
5, Article. 14 of the Code of Commerce (w/c prohibited judges, among others, from
engaging in commerce, either in person or in proxy or in the financial intervention
in commercial or industrial companies w/in the limits of the districts) when he
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associated himself w/ the Traders Manufacturing. & Fishing Industries, Inc. as a
stockholder and pres., said corp. having been organized to engage in business.
HELD:
Although this provision is incorporated in the Code of Commerce w/c is part of the
commercial laws of the Phils, it partakes of the nature of a political law as it regulates
the relationship between the government and certain public officers and employees,
like justices and judges. Political law has been defined as that branch of
public law w/c deals w/ the organization and operation of the governmental
organs of the State and defines the relations of the state w/ the inhabitants of
its territory. Specifically, Art. 14 of the Code of Commerce partakes more of the
nature of an administrative law bec. it regulates the conduct of certain public
officers and employees w/ respect to engaging in business; hence, political in
essence.
Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to US, and later on from US to the
Republic of the Philippines., Article 14 of the said Code must be deemed to
have been abrogated because where there is change of sovereignty, the political
laws of the former sovereign, whether compatible or not w/ those of the new
sovereign, are automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by
affirmative act of the new sovereign. There appears to be no enabling or affirmative
act. Consequently, Art. 14 of the Code of Commerce has no legal and binding effect
and cannot apply to respondent Judge.
LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ET. AL., petitioners, v. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT, ET. AL,
respondents.
G.R. No. L-63915. April 24, 1985
Facts:
The petitioners, Lorenzo M. Taňada, Abraham F. Sarmiento, and
Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI),
were seeking a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish,
and/or cause the publication of laws in the Official Gazette. However, respondents
through Solicitor General would have this case dismissed on the ground that
petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition.
Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua
non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their
own effectivity date.
They pleaded likewise that the date of publication is material in determining
the date of effectivity, that is, the fifteenth day following the publication, as provided
in Article 2 of the New Civil Code, but not when the law itself provides its own date of
effectivity. Otherwise, there would be no room for the application of the maxim
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“ignorantia legis non excusat,” for it prejudices the right of due process since these
presidential issuances are “of public nature” or “of general applicability.”
Issue:
Whether or not the publication of presidential issuances in the Official
Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity
Ruling:
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general
application, which have not been published, shall have no force and effect. The
enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is
an “operative fact which may have consequence which cannot be justly ignored.”
Wherefore, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all
unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application.