Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
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A DISSERTATION
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Field of Radio/Television/Film
By
EVANSTON, ILLINOIS
DECEMBER 2003
1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction 4
Film and Media Studies 7
Film, History, and Science 10
Defining Terms 14
A Note on Method and Style 18
Overview 20
2
Chapter Five: The Theory and Practice of Film History 154
Realism in Film Theory 156
Theory Versus Practice 163
Conclusion 178
Further Research 194
Bibliography 199
3
Introduction
In the May-June 1996 issue of the academic magazine Lingua Franca, New
had hoaxed the cultural studies journal Social Text. Sokal had submitted an essay
assertions.” While it might not be remarkable that a physicist could fool non-
1
physicists with scientific jargon and a serious tone, the edition of Social Text that
included Sokal’s essay was a special issue dedicated to the “Science Wars.” The
which was the subject of the special issue and thus the subject in which the
What might have been a minor academic incident became a national news
story that was featured, among other places, on the front page of the New York
Times on May 18, 1996. The appeal of the story was not hard to understand. One
practical joke that anyone could understand without reading the actual pieces.
a practicing scientist. The critical theory at issue here was also within the grasp of
readers of a newspaper like the Times, whose Arts & Ideas and Book Review
epistemology. Over the next few weeks Sokal’s hoax was described in dozens of
1
Sokal, “Revelation,” 51.
4
American and international newspapers, and responses to the hoax from the
postmodern notions too divorced from everyday reality. Some academics replied
in op-ed columns, arguing the Sokal and those who supported him had misread
submission. That idea, that science and the knowledge it produces are social
2
slippery than is first apparent. In fact, few of the participants in the debate could
agree on exactly what the terms were. To Sokal, the issue was clear. At the
beginning of his hoax essay, he had stated the social constructivist position, as he
The first line of this paragraph was evidently intended as an intellectual dare.
Sokal invited those who accepted that physical reality was a social and linguistic
2
A virtually complete selection of the criticism of the Sokal hoax is maintained by Alan Sokal on
his website: www.physics.nyu.edu/faculty/sokal/. A useful and representative sample is
available in the collection The Sokal Hoax: The Sham That Shook The Academy.
3
Sokal, “Transgressing,” 12.
5
construct to test the construction of gravity from his 21 floor apartment
st
window. 4
The editors of Social Text and others who responded to this hoax did not
article did not necessarily imply agreement with its every statement. Stanley Fish,
writing in the New York Times, argued that the social constructivist position was
being overstated and that the common position was much more moderate
and did not
challenge the notion that there was a physical reality. He also accused Sokal of
objecting to the idea of sociology of science and of misreading the field’s goals. 5
What was fascinating about the Sokal hoax was the way in which a debate
standards in the academic humanities. The hoax created a good deal of ill will in
the academic humanities, and the editors of Social Text in particular were
unapologetic about their actions or position. The papers in the special issue were
later published, with Sokal removed, as the collection Science Wars. The lack of
In the intervening years since the hoax has faded from public discussion,
there has been surprisingly little consideration of the ideas at stake in the debate
4
Sokal, “Revelation,” 50.
5
Fish, “Professor Sokal’s Bad Joke.”
6
about social constructionism. Such silence covers an intriguing contradiction. On
one hand, social constructionism is widely accepted and is easily the hegemonic
position in the humanities. On the other, there is little agreement about what
extremes not far from what Sokal parodied to more common moderate positions
intellectual position that is central to the academic project. It also allows all of the
Sorting and clarifying these competing ideas is one of the primary goals of
this dissertation. I will also, using film and media studies as my example,
examine the epistemology that guides the practice of knowledge gathering in the
positions.
discipline of film and media studies. There are numerous reasons for this
approach. The primary one is that issues of reality and the representation of
reality have been central to film from its earliest days. One of the many
7
of Eadweard Muybridge. In the twentieth century, debates about the possibility
and desirability of realism in film have been central to the development of the
film theories of Siegfried Kracauer, André Bazin, and many others. Questions
about the ability of film to represent reality have direct correlation to the
two inter-related sub-disciplines: film theory and criticism considers the aesthetic,
social and political implications of film, while film history concerns itself
primarily with archival research that traces the development of the medium
since the late nineteenth century. Film historians are generally theory literate,
inquiry. Still, these two facets of the discipline of film studies draw on different
disciplinary perspectives and the work involved in them can differ remarkably.
This binary aspect of the discipline creates an inherent tension between the
cultural nature of knowledge and truth claims. At the same time, film historians
still tend to conduct their research based on a realist paradigm that involves
accurately as possible.
While this tension exists in film studies, and will be the subject of a later
theory and practice in film studies as an essential tension of the discipline that, as
8
I noted above, has its roots in original debates about the realist potential of film.
Film studies sits between the discipline of history itself and the rest of the
humanities, an ideal vantage point from which to consider larger debates. The
1970s to a more historically focused discipline today, also allows us to trace the
Film and media are also ideal examples for these debates because they
have tremendous societal influence. In the sections that deal with historical films,
fact influence what the public sees in the cinema, and often what the public
knows about American or international history. Film and television can and do
have significant societal impacts. One of the films considered here, D.W.
Griffith’s The Birth of a Nation, was instrumental in the resurgence of the Ku Klux
Klan in the 1920s. The public controversy over Oliver Stone’s JFK in the early
6
the assassination. 7
On another level, film and media studies serve as a case study in the uses
of social constructionism in the humanities. While I argue that film and media
studies are in some ways uniquely situated to consider larger debates, I also
want to emphasize that film studies is, in some sense, a representative sample of
contemporary academic discourse is the sheer scope of the issue. Considering the
6
This assertion, often anecdotal, is confirmed by Maxim Simcovitch in “The Impact of Griffith’s
Birth of a Nation on the Modern Ku Klux Klan.”
7
Toplin, Oliver Stone’s USA, 12.
9
lines could be the life’s work of more than one scholar. Focusing on one
might be. Even so, I am well aware that the scope of the questions about
here may be generally applicable in these and other areas with suitable
specific work. It would seem that the same tension between literary theory and
literary historical practice exists here as it does in film studies. A key difference is
that the history of literature, being much more developed and complete, is a
necessary to consider debates about realism in both science and history as part of
the background of social constructionism in film and media studies. The reasons
10
for this necessity are complex, but they primarily derive from the
Some are drawn from history and historiography while others are rooted in
science studies and the philosophy of science. Almost all of the arguments are
filtered through the lens of cultural studies, which has focused on the political
cultural studies has long been part of film and media studies, and many of the
popular culture – have been influential in film and media studies. These
science.
Since debates about social constructionism in film and media studies are
not often at the forefront of the discipline, it becomes necessary to trace and
summarized this debate in film or media studies, and neither are there clear
arguments on either side that sum up part of the case. There are few examples of
already the default position and has become the default position with very little
debate, my task will be to lay out the range of influences that make this position
Film studies’ status as a young and often interdisciplinary field means that, even
more than other fields, it is influenced by all that goes on around it. This melting
pot of ideas and ideals, some related to cultural studies and some not, means that
11
this project must be inherently interdisciplinary. There are no neat lines of
argument to follow. Instead, this project calls for the tracing of intellectual
threads as well as the clear rebuttal of the most prominent social constructionist
disciplines (science studies and historiography) are not as different as they first
appear. Both concern the epistemological status of evidence and the influence of
essence, the key question in both of these fields is the central question of social
Michel Foucault, who are cited across disciplines. The work of these writers
and knowledge that are in the service of power rather than the betterment of
humanity. 8
history has been that a scientist can conduct an experiment while a historian can
not. There is no way to re-run a historical event, nor can one test a hypothesis
against a control group where the factor under study turns out differently. Even
8
See, for example Foucault’s Power/Knowledge and The Archaeology of Knowledge, also the essay
“What is Enlightenment?” See also Derrida’s Of Grammatology.
12
like a particular voyage using presumably available materials and technology, it
scientist in a lab, the historian seems to be at the mercy of his or her evidence and
lacking the control that the scientific method evidently provides. If scientists
laboratory with carefully measured ingredients and control groups only applies
to some fields – for example chemistry, medicine, and some types of physics. For
a range of other scientific disciplines, such experiments are almost never possible.
scientists work much as historians do, gathering the traces of the past that exist
in the present. Granted, a scientist studying the past can generally assume that
basic processes of biology, physics and chemistry have remained constant over
motivation. But this is a much smaller divide than that between experimental
and non-experimental research. Scientists who study the natural past use
methods very much like historians, and concerns about method that affect one of
these groups should affect the other. Both Michael Shermer and Jared Diamond
make convincing cases for the intermingling of scientific and historical methods
in works that combine the best of both ideals. If the methods are not so different,
9
9
Jared Diamond, Guns, Germs and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies. Diamond’s work is an
attempt to explain why human societies have developed at such different paces without resorting
to racist assumptions about European superiority or European thirst for conquest. Although
Diamond is a scientist and most of his evidence is scientific, he obviously depends greatly on
historical accounts of intercultural encounters. Michael Shermer, Denying History: Who Says the
Holocaust Never Happened and Why Do They Say It? Shermer argues for a historical method that
draws from the scientific method, and while this assertion reads as naïve in the face of most
13
we should be looking to combine the study of method rather than considering
All of these similarities are but small support of my larger point, that the
range of influences on film and media studies makes the consideration of science
studies and historiography necessary. For the purposes of this project they will
arguments on one branch can be considered relevant on the other. At the close of
this project, the similarities in the arguments across disciplines and the
Defining Terms
study, it is necessary for me to define the terms of the debate as I will be using
them. Many of the terms in epistemology have adapted over time, so that while
there might be dictionary definitions available for these words, not every critic
understands them in precisely the same way. Thus, although my definitions are
the modern scientific epistemology that holds that knowledge of the real world is
future. At the same time, it holds that the limitations of our present knowledge
recent critical theory and historiography, his use of this ideal in the service of completely
undermining the evidence and methods of Holocaust deniers makes his claim more convincing.
14
are defined by the scope of our inquiry and the tools we have invented to
realism is Karl Popper, who defined scientific knowledge as being subject to the
rule of falsifiability – that there exists for all scientific knowledge the possibility
separates science from religion and other types of belief in which the
fundamental tenets of the belief system cannot be challenged. The key here is
10
acquired reflects the real world, and provides a solid foundations for our
decisions.
The tenets of realism apply to the historian’s project as well. All historical
as objective as possible, with the awareness that this is impossible for any single
Lorraine Daston points out that there are a number of ways in which the term objectivity is
11
used, and calls the sense that I am using it in “aperspectival objectivity,” the sense in which
objectivity depends on the exchange of ideas between researchers as a way of eradicating
15
Hegelian aspect of realism, in which conflict between opposing views leads us
closer to truth.
us toward truth, in the sense that truth is objective awareness of the outside
while denying this link to a world outside of our experience. Early ancestors of
philosophy we need. This means that our knowledge is guided by our goals, and
our subjective desires for happiness. If we are unable to make claims about the
world outside our experience, then there are no fundamental rules on which to
base our decisions, even as we recognize the rules of our own society. In other
work within it, but is always aware of the construct of that worldview, to the
point that it is not possible to argue that other political views are less valid. With
outside world. Social and political influences are key here too, but they are often
individual or small group idiosyncrasies. She traces this idea to the nineteenth century
development of communication mechanisms that allowed scientists to share ideas across
geographical and political boundaries. In turn, she suggests that the uniformity of nature is in
some ways a social production of this change in scientific practice. While I accept her account of
the development of communication and its effect on scientific perspectives, I would suggest that
the cause-effect relationship is impossible to demonstrate, and could as easily be read as one set
of technological developments making other scientific advances possible, a typical narrative of
scientific progress. Daston, “Objectivity and the Escape from Perspective,” 609.
16
considered as elements of the structure of language. Since language is so
social constructivists emphasize the cultural and political ideals that influence
scientific and historical research, to the point that these endeavors can be
political beliefs of the practitioners rather than of any objective reality. Social
constructionism is not the banal claim that social and political factors influence
the choice of questions asked or the type of work funded. I take this as so
line between two positions using part of David Hess’s definition of “moderate
constructionism.” Hess suggests that those who believe that science is shaped by
natural and social factors can avoid relativism by evaluating science on a case-
political movements focused on race, gender and sexual orientation have made
constructionism have become linked to the idea that science and history reflect a
12
Hess, Science Studies, 35.
17
white, male and Euro-centric perspective, and that this perspective goes to the
root of the scientific and realist world view. Since traditional science has a great
deal of power in Western society, this power is linked to the power of whites and
men over racial minorities and women. Partly because the superiority of whites
and men was once considered “natural,” social constructivists are suspicious of
the long and disturbing history of the use of “scientific” arguments in the service
evidence for the idea that science reflects and justifies the political desires of a
culture, rather than being a dispassionate compiler of facts about the natural
world. Thus, social constructionism has three strong roots – a pragmatist belief in
power of language, and a practical focus on the ways in which science and
history can be used (and have been used) in the service of political exploitation. I
will examine these three roots in the first two chapters of this dissertation, while
in Chapter Three I will consider key theorists who try to mitigate the weaknesses
of social constructionism while maintaining its core arguments. In the last two
undercurrent in film and media studies, rather than a direct and cohesive
18
debates that are situated in film, history, science studies, cultural studies, and
other related fields. It is not my intention to elide the distinctions between these
fields, only to note that there is considerable interplay between disciplines within
the humanities and that film studies, as a young discipline, is particularly prone
film studies, reactions to the work of other scholars is often framed in terms of an
argument that a previous critic has made a valuable contribution, but has failed
to “fully consider” the details of some particular subject. This is but one example
where it is common to argue that another’s work has a fundamental logical flaw
and is thus invalid from its very premise. Since I am dealing with epistemology,
it has been necessary at times to adopt this latter style in an attempt to make clear
that is not my intention. Throughout this work, I have attempted to argue with
those whose writings are the most compelling and meticulous expressions of the
19
Overview
social and political movements that developed in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
these debates are reinforced by the work of such French theorists as Jacques
Derrida and Michel Foucault, who examine the foundations of knowledge both
structures of language and culture that help define the limits of the knowable.
This work coincided with both the student-led revolts in Paris in 1968 and the
broader social movements that developed in the West around the same time.
borrowed from and reinforced the development of theories that emphasized the
individual problems.
20
Chapter Two recounts the specific ways that social constructionism has
been part of the history of film studies, most noticeably in the rise of structuralist
and semiotic theories of cinema in the 1970s. The “turn to history” in subsequent
years is, I argue, a reflection of the ways in which film studies has largely
rejected social constructionism as a core element of its theory, while at the same
time paying lip service to the idea that science, and especially history, are social
constructions. The influence of cultural studies in film studies since the 1980s has
meant that these debates continue to be topical within film studies, even if the
concerned with science, but whose arguments have been widely cited across
disciplines. Bruno Latour is best known for his work Laboratory Life, where he
Latour’s work is an attempt to view science more skeptically, and to reveal the
belief systems and everyday practices that are as much or more important to
scientific work than the scientific method. Latour’s work has been widely cited in
cultural studies as a type of subcultural research that in some sense validates one
objectivity into question. Given the status that scientists have in Western society,
it would seem a useful project to attempt to strip away the veil and get at the
way that science “really” works. Latour’s portraits of working scientists are at
like on any given day. By documenting the ordering of materials, the processing
and cultural practice, far removed from the cultural stereotype of a lone scientist
21
in search of eureka moments. I examine a number of Latour’s pieces, and take
issue only partially with his observations. Instead, I argue that the conclusions
providing evidence for that view. The result of Latour’s attempts to write as a
mystery, and she is intent on revealing her insider knowledge and the
sophisticated theoretical conclusions she has drawn from them. A widely cited
science that relates to both power and gender. She is sympathetic to strong social
constructivist positions while quick to point out their limitations. She attempts to
reconcile social constructionism with her politics, and is rightfully concerned that
the two may not be compatible, even as she proposes a middle ground that
Richard Rorty is less often cited in cultural studies or film studies, but he
is the philosopher that critics in science studies are most likely to turn to. Rorty
William James, John Dewey, and Charles Sanders Pierce. By labeling himself a
or leftist politics, and feels that pragmatism is compatible with those views, he is
aware that his philosophy is not a compelling argument for his politics. Rorty’s
22
sophisticated defense of pragmatism is also, in my view, a compelling argument
have pointed out, social constructionism and pragmatism have distinct roots and
subtly different aims, I primarily cite Rorty’s work from the substantial areas
where the two philosophies overlap. Since I am concerned with the link between
epistemology and politics, I will focus on the works by Rorty that consider these
specifically, and move the discussion of epistemology away from science and
into history. Here I examine two meta-historians whose work has been
influential – Michel de Certeau and Hayden White. Both are concerned with
research. De Certeau argues for a recognition of the power structures that help
determine what stories get told and from whose perspective. He sees a direct link
commissioned their own stories to the modern power of the university as the
investigation of the power structures that influence history, with the dual goal of
re-writing history from the outside and acknowledging the biases that
of both language and form on the writing of history. White points out the
Since these forms are so similar in structure, it is obvious that the history we
23
write is influenced by our ideals of narrative. Not only are we selecting data that
fits a narrative pattern, we are inevitably shaping that data with both our
language and the imposition of a story structure that requires dramatic tension,
conflict, and boundaries of beginning and end. In later writings, White argues
that since our history is written according to the ideals of fiction, it might be
better served by the model of postmodern narrative, which has the benefit of
well be in a form in which the reader is constantly reminded that they are
lack of unity and illusion in postmodern narrative might be better able to reflect
complexity and non-linearity of the event itself. The gap between the messiness
of actual history and the linearity of written history is thus minimized to the
that emphasize their constructedness. He sees in film a medium that has less of
the baggage of realism and is better able to acknowledge its biases and influences.
The incompleteness of filmic images calls attention to the way in which our
Rosenstone, is a link in this project to the discussion of films that attempt to make
historical arguments that can be taken seriously by the public and by historians.
Historical films are nearly as old as filmmaking itself, D.W. Griffith’s The
Birth of a Nation, one of the earliest features, was an attempt at historical narrative.
24
Griffith envisioned that films such as his might one day replace textbooks, and
boasted of the school principals who sought to book his film for their students. 13
medium for telling history have thus been controversial since the NAACP and
other African American groups attempted to have the film banned. The primary
for individual and cultural bias in historical storytelling, The Birth of a Nation
offers a challenge to the link between social constructionism and leftist politics.
Griffith for distorting the historical record. The production and reception of this
much more self-aware film that similarly caused controversy upon its release for
being a distortion of history. The film JFK and the story that it attempts to relate
compelling argument for such a position. Both the film and the critical reception
Griffith makes the comparison to textbooks: “The time will come, and in less than ten years…
13
where the children in public schools will be taught practically everything by moving pictures.
Certainly they will never be obliged to read history again.” Reprinted in Geduld, Focus on D.W.
Griffith, 34. In a letter to the New York Globe, he boasts “I have in my possession applications for
reservations from the principals of ten schools, who having seen the picture, are desirous of
bringing their pupils to view it for its historic truths.” Reprinted in Lang, The Birth of a Nation,
169.
25
these films exemplify the complexity of debates about epistemology and realism
in film.
In the fifth and final chapter, I consider the deeper implications of social
practice. Interestingly, despite the fact that it is the hegemonic position in the
humanities, it has had very little influence on the practice of historical research.
The reasons for this limitation are not self-evident, but I consider the possibilities
writing on film, I consider the ways in which such writing signposts its own
within a realist framework. The goal is to determine why debates over theory
have had few implications for practice and what this illuminates about our
theories. The focus on practice is, I argue, the most forceful and compelling
argument for realism. At the same time, I want to emphasize the ways in which
the goals of social constructionism can be incorporated into realism without the
To that end, in my conclusion I make the case for a skeptical realism that
a place for real knowledge about the natural world and historical events. I wish
26
without the pragmatist emphasis on the gaps between our consciousness and the
outside world. Such a system is a better basis for leftist or progressive politics
difficult to provide a compelling answer to those that leftists want to argue with.
I believe that realism has the inherent potential to be politically useful, as it has
been in the past, and I want to re-emphasize that political potential in a way that
does not try to erase or reverse the theoretical developments of the past thirty
politics and our epistemology. Thus, the reasons to endorse realism are both
27
Chapter One – The Roots of Social Constructionism
philosophy of language, and social politics. These three roots interact in complex
ways, so that it is not always possible to draw a clear line from one theorist to the
next. And yet, there are a number of fundamental ideas that reappear again and
replaced or was formulated to answer. Thus this section attempts to trace the
also aware that the starting point of any history is always artificial to some extent,
It is these three main roots of social constructionism that are most relevant
to our discussion, and to the context of film studies in the humanities. They
The philosophy of knowledge root is divided into two main threads. The first is
the history of pragmatism, the late nineteenth and early twentieth century
philosophy primarily associated with William James, John Dewey, and Charles
knowledge and the ways in which human contexts intrude on the gathering and
28
assessment of information. In this way it is an important pre-echo of social
practice provided the groundwork for later critiques that contrasted the idealized
scientific method with the actual working methods of scientists. The explanation
epistemology that can reasonably be traced all the way back to Plato. In order to
deal with the relevant cases in depth, I have elected not to recount much of this
history, even as I attempt to place both pragmatism and Kuhn in their larger
philosophical context.
work of Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, and others who are often cited as
the ways in which the structures of language both reflect and control political
assumptions has been particularly influential. The idea that language creates a
human knowledge within which our notions of the “real world” are constructed.
of that period. While some of this work, particularly Foucault’s, seems at points
29
important to note the critical and philosophical antecedents of this work that
preceded 1968. In particular the positivist and formalist currents in science and
many late-1960s and 1970s critics were responding. Derrida and Foucault have
also been more broadly influential in the humanities than either the pragmatists
or Kuhn. The political implications of Derrida and Foucault’s work also cement
their relationship to the third root of social constructionism, the social and
The civil rights movement, the “second wave” of feminism and the
nascent gay rights movement transformed Western societies from the 1960s on.
Their influence in the humanities is substantial. This new politics challenged the
and males and quickly turned, in academic hands, into a critique of the
previous social realm, in which the white man’s experience stood in for the
that worldview, a foundation that posited the distanced Cartesian subject at the
center of the natural world. There could be little doubt that the biases of earlier
critiques, in the form of New Criticism, meant that artistic critiques were to be
their internal coherence as works as art. This critical paradigm was, at its core,
with political power, the gender, racial, and queer theory critiques of the late
30
knowledge to be situated in the experience of those who held it. Knowledge, in
the new social constructivist paradigm was a product of both individual and
social factors, contingent on the relative power dynamics within societies and
between societies.
discarded in contemporary film scholarship. While each of these roots has had
significant influence on the development of film scholarship, their effects are not
equal at this point in the discipline’s development. In fact, one of the key
arguments of this dissertation is that film studies has adopted the political
politics that have been at the center of the academic humanities since the 1960s
are better served by the realist epistemology they have retained in practice if not
constructivist work undermines the real world basis for progressive politics. At
the same time, social constructionism seems like the most politically viable
response to the dominant paradigm of the 1950s and 1960s. In order to better
understand that paradigm, and the social constructivist positions that reacted to
31
it, it will be necessary to consider at least some of the philosophical debates that
occurred before and laid the groundwork for more radical positions.
Pragmatism
Charles Sanders Pierce, William James, and John Dewey, among others. 14
with the idea that we build the philosophy that we need, and this in turn is and
should be the guide to our actions, institutions, and laws. Pragmatism has
undergone a revival since the 1960s; particularly because it matches so well with
many senses, the writings of James and Dewey seem to be premonitions of much
later concerns, even though their ideas largely fell out of favor in the middle part
of this century. In particular, James calls for a philosophy that is engaged with
15
the real world: “What you want is a philosophy that will not only exercise your
powers of intellectual abstraction, but that will make some positive connexion
with this actual world of finite human lives.” This “positive connexion” is not
16
You want a system that will combine both things, the scientific loyalty to
facts and willingness to take account of them, the spirit of adaptation and
For an introduction to pragmatism, see the collections of William James’ writing titled
14
Pragmatism and The Meaning of Truth. See also John Dewey’s Experience and Nature, originally
published in 1929. A useful overview of pragmatism is Morris Dickstein’s introduction to The
Revival of Pragmatism.
15
Dickstein, “Introduction: Pragmatism Then and Now,” 8-9.
16
James, Pragmatism, 17.
32
accommodation, in short, but also the old confidence in human values and the
attempt to find a “third way” between the cold rationality of science and the
generally don’t frame this dichotomy in terms of religion, but similarly attempt
to chart a path away from scientific realism without falling into relativism. We
be at least partly what he had in mind. He quotes Pierce as arguing “that our
beliefs are really rules for action,” and that “to develop a thought’s meaning, we
need only determine what conduct it is fitted to produce: that conduct is for us
its sole significance.” In other words, the practical effects of any epistemological
position on real people are what matters. It is not the position, nor its entirely
rational truth status that matters so much as its effect on our behaviour.
work backwards from the effects to the epistemology that best suits those effects.
That is not to say that the epistemology they end up with is the same in both
cases. There are key differences in the cohesiveness of the aims and the
17
Ibid., 17.
33
epistemological stance, which are primarily a result of the fact that the
springing from the work of a range of scholars with varying backgrounds and
goals. This alone does not mean that social constructionism is any weaker as an
epistemology, but it does mean that its practitioners often do not recognize the
limitations of their position in the way that contemporary heirs of the original
pragmatists do. So while the two positions have much in common, they are not
quite the same thing. Thus, it is important to recognize that the relationship
between the pragmatists and social constructivists is not a direct line of influence.
Rather, the connections between the philosophies means that the ideals of social
in a markedly different manner. Dewey had long been susceptible to the criticism
that, despite his hope that pragmatism be one of the roots of political
progressiveness, his theories could be used to justify all manner of evils. In the
eyes of his critics, the nightmares of the world wars and fascism exposed the
epistemology.
34
I am arguing that the less appealing aspects of social constructionism have
been ignored, also that progressive politics have once again been associated with
a position that offers no fundamental support for those politics, and only offers
structures of validation that can act conservatively to preserve the status quo.
medicine, appears at first to give consumers an advantage, since they now have a
greater range of options available to them, and can make the decisions with
which they are most comfortable. Indeed, this seems to be the motivation behind
the Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994 that freed alternative
medicine providers from the burdens of proof that govern traditional medicine.
The act allows alternative medicine a chance to be adopted by the public without
the expensive and time-consuming trials to which mainstream drugs are subject.
This allows for a range of decentralized health practices, many drawn from the
35
medicinal practices of other countries, to be made available to the public. This
would seem to be a victory for localized and non-western knowledges over the
companies that control the American marketplace for medicines. But this
advantage only lasts as long as the traditional vendors of medicine, the M.D.s
companies were allowed to work with the same rules as alternative medicine
providers and make similar claims about their products in the absence of
anything resembling scientific proof, this would be an absolute windfall for the
already wealthy drug companies, who would now be free to market anything in
any way with no regard for the consequences. Those who would suffer most
would be the least educated and least powerful members of society, those least
likely to be able to distinguish between legitimate medical claims and the wishful
apply based on the relative power of those claiming to provide medicines. If the
power.
36
science works. It posits a realist, logical practice of science versus a non-realist
alternative, and privileges the former. Social constructionism does not leave this
from work in the philosophy of science that challenges the realist conception of
science. The most influential work in this category is Thomas Kuhn’s The
the notion of a realist science that gradually uncovers more and more accurate
their image of the natural world in a punctuated but steady progression. While
that was better than the old, in the sense that it more accurately reflected an
external reality. This sense of scientific progress was inherently linked to the
better able to understand the world, but we would inevitably be able to solve
problems that had previously been thought unsolvable. This broader social
century by the two World Wars, but it continued to hold in science throughout
prior knowledge, substituting instead the idea that science moved through a
37
periods that precede and follow them. Kuhn posited that science goes through
stable periods in which the defining description is not progress but problem
solving. In these periods, scientists have defined the terms of their discussion
and set about filling in the details of that particular system. Results that do not fit
these anomalous results pile up until they can no longer be accounted for in such
a way, and they begin to challenge the foundations of the paradigm. At these
moments of crisis, the paradigm shifts to one that better accounts for the new
information, but is not necessarily more “true” than the previous paradigm.
There then follows a new period of relatively tranquility and problem solving
The most radical part of this argument is the claim that these paradigms
are fundamentally different in their conception of the world, so that they cannot
be compared to each other in any meaningful way. This means that one cannot
science as a field that uncovers truths about the world. Instead, science becomes
reading of the history of science that is often seems like the best “proof” of social
constructionism.
38
Kuhn himself attempted to temper the notion that his descriptions of
sketch out a middle ground that resembles pragmatism in its desire to limit
Kuhn also attempted to clarify his position in the essay “Objectivity, Value Judgement and
18
Theory Choice,” published in 1977. A useful examination of the implications of Kuhn’s position is
Ernan McMullin’s “Rationality and Paradigm Change in Science.” A challenge to Kuhn’s notion
of paradigm change is Larry Laudan’s “Dissecting the Holist Picture of Scientific Change.” See
also Laudan’s Science and Relativism.
Kuhn, Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 3 ed. 205-6.
19 rd
39
In the first half of this section, Kuhn endorses what seems like a
traditional notion of scientific progress, one that emphasizes the ways in which
this distinction is that Kuhn’s term “puzzle-solving” makes the process sound
more trivial than he believes it is. From this passage, he makes it clear that
puzzle-solving is both useful and progressive. In the second half of this section,
he endorses what is best described as a pragmatic view, one that stops short of
making ontological claims. Kuhn believes that science is useful and offers
fundamental truth claims, and argues that the fact that science “works” does not
prevented from knowing when we are close to reality not because we are bad at
science, but because we have no way to test definitively when we have it right.
Kuhn argues that it is not so much that we can’t access reality as it is that we do
not know when we are accessing it. The replacement of scientific knowledges
with competing paradigms means that our belief that we are moving closer to
practical value by giving it up. Instead we retain the benefits of science while
key elements – the focus on a practical philosophy and a sense that social
40
in philosophy. Kuhn’s theories in particular are widely cited, and a simplified
notion of the “paradigm” has entered the general consciousness. If Kuhn’s theory
of paradigm change argued persuasively that we can never know the real world,
philosophical theories of language that were developed in the 1960s and 1970s
solidified that notion by attempting to explain the nature of the gap between our
was based on a practical reading of the history of science, these theories were
than simply refusing to make the “ontological leap,” these theories attempted to
examined and then either found to be solid or refuted. This relationship between
argument and counter-argument is one of the many binarisms that Derrida seeks
decide whether they are valid but to draw ideas from and “play” with the texts,
revealing hidden and contradictory assumptions. This desire to work outside the
41
then it is not clear how to respond to the work. If other scholars either agree or
disagree with Derrida, they are in a sense working in the framework that he
rejects, and could be accused of missing the point. On the other hand, the
complexity of the work and its potential significance calls for a response. The
clearest summation of his work tends to come from interviews, when he has less
recourse to the play of language. In an early interview with Henri Ronse, he says:
I try to keep myself at the limit of philosophical discourse. I say limit and
not death, for I do not at all believe in what today is so easily called the
death of philosophy…. Thus, the limit on the basis of which philosophy
became possible, defined itself as the episteme, functioning within a system
of fundamental constraints, conceptual oppositions outside of which
philosophy becomes impracticable. 20
And,
There is a great deal to be drawn from these passages alone, and we will see how
various critics have responded to each of these ideas. Derrida seems to resist the
inside and the outside” of philosophy has been challenged as a rhetorical trick
Derrida, “Implications,” 6.
20
For further explanation and critique of the notion of deconstruction as destruction see
22
42
philosophy with “the West” has considerable importance for those who wish to
There are two facets to the potential relevance of Derrida for social
summarized by the positions of three scholars who have considered his writing.
Christopher Norris argues that Derrida does have a significant point, and that it
is a useful one for philosophy. Norris has also argued that Derrida has been
wants to rescue Derrida from the relativists who, he argues, have mislabeled the
philosopher’s work and misunderstood his intentions. John Searle is also a realist
but one who takes the opposite position on Derrida. Searle is dismissive of
Derrida’s work, attacking his central claims and arguing that Derrida is in fact a
refutation.
both take him seriously in the sense that they place his argument into a dialectic
of philosophical debate and then choose to support or refute it. Richard Rorty
Norris’s relevant works include What’s Wrong With Postmodernism: Critical Theory and the Ends of
23
Philosophy, 1990; Derrida, 1987; Uncritical Theory, 1992. The Truth About Postmodernism, 1993.
43
attempts to respect Derrida’s desire to remain outside this dialectic and so
argument. Like Searle, he does not agree with many of the foundational claims
that Derrida makes, but for very different reasons. As a pragmatist, Rorty is not
to take these critiques seriously he implies that both Searle and Norris are
missing the point. Derrida’s work is a play with language that, in Rorty’s
Norris’s reaction to Derrida is, like his subject, complex and prolific. His
primary aim is to separate Derrida from his relativist reputation, and in doing so
he makes arguments that are key to our discussion of social constructionism. His
epistemologies. Norris reads Derrida closely and focuses on the moments when
Derrida discusses the limits of his ideas and attempts to rein in the most radical
24
Norris, Derrida, 162.
44
deconstruction “sustains the impulse of enlightenment critique even while
the grain, he quotes passage after passage in which Derrida discusses the limits
I have never ‘put such concepts as truth, reference, and the stability of
interpretive contexts radically into question’ if ‘putting radically into
question’ means contesting that there are and that there should be truth,
reference, and stable contexts of interpretation. I have – but this is
something entirely different – posed questions that I hope are radical
concerning the possibility of these things, of these values, of these norms,
of this stability (which of its essence is always provisional and finite). This
discourse and the questioning attuned to its possibility… evidently no
longer belong simply, or homogeneously, to the order of truth, of
reference, or contextuality. But they do not destroy it or contradict it. 26
This passage, which Norris uses to support his reading of Derrida as a hard
that one might reasonably see how others could read it differently. And while
Norris is frustrated by simple readings of Derrida that focus on the idea that il
n’y a pas de hors-texte, it is difficult not to see some of the limits Derrida proposes
27
use Derrida to support his own realist project, but it is harder to accept that
Thus Norris’s reading of Derrida has two parts. In the first, he believes
that Derrida’s radical readings of philosophical texts are worth preserving. If not,
he would not go to such lengths to rescue those readings from those he disagrees
Derrida, Of Grammatology. 158. Translated as “There is nothing outside of the text.” Literally
27
“There is no outside-text.”
45
Norris plays down the rhetorical claims in favor of an emphasis on what Derrida
has to say about other philosophers. The second part is aligning Derrida with his
own realist project, one that seems reasonable from the evidence he provides,
even with the caveat that Derrida is notoriously hard to pin down to a singular
possible reading than to accept that it is the reading – in other words, that it is the
reading most in tune with Derrida’s intentions. In the end, he does much to
argued.
John Searle has a much more negative reaction to Derrida, and especially
to the rhetorical play that Norris works so hard to sort through. He recounts
expands: “The text is written so obscurely that you can’t figure out exactly what
the thesis is (hence: ‘obscurantisme’) and then when one criticizes it, the author
says, ‘Vous m’avez mal compris; vous êtes idiot’ (hence ‘terroriste’).” Labels aside,
28
Searle writes that “I believe that Derrida’s work… is not just a series of muddles
and gimmicks. There is in fact a large issue being addressed and a large mistake
being made.” That mistake, he goes on to argue, is the same mistake of classical
29
Derrida correctly sees that there aren’t any such foundations, but then he
makes the mistake that marks him as a classical metaphysician. The real mistake
of the classical metaphysician was not the belief that there were metaphysical
Searle, “The World Turned Upside Down,” 178-9. Derrida’s imagined response is “You have
28
46
foundations, but rather the belief that somehow or other such foundations were
necessary, the belief that unless there are foundations something is lost or
In this passage Searle sounds like more of a pragmatist than he really is.
While Searle takes issue with a number of the key arguments of Derrida
and his defenders, a couple of his points are particularly significant. He argues,
that the understanding of the phrase “the cat is on the mat” is dependent on its
difference from phrases like “the dog is on the mat” or “the cat is on the couch.”
Derrida uses this distinction to argue that each of these phrases and words in
thus infused with the alternate possibilities. As a result, none of the possibilities
can be said to be completely present or absent. All are present as traces by the
fact that their differences create the meaning of the sentence. Searle argues that,
Ibid., 181.
30
See, for example, Searle, The Construction of Social Reality, 1995. Mind, Brains and Science, 1984.
31
47
absence.” In other words, it is the presence of the word “cat” and the absence of
32
remarks that he repeatedly finds literary theorists who use Derrida making two
mistakes that, ironically, place them in the company of logical positivists. The
first is the assumption that, to be valid, any definition must have clearly defined
boundaries:
Many literary theorists fail to see, for example, that it is not an objection to
a theory of fiction that it does not sharply divide the metaphorical from
the nonmetaphorical. On the contrary, it is the condition of the adequacy
of a precise theory of an indeterminate phenomenon that it should
precisely characterize that phenomenon as indeterminate; and a
distinction is no less a distinction for allowing a family of related,
marginal, diverging cases.
People who try to hold the assumption that genuine distinctions must be
made rigid are ripe for Derrida’s attempt to undermine all such
distinctions.33
This is a key insight, I think, that marginal cases are consistently held up as proof
that a “binarism” is invalid, when such a claim rests on the assumption that all
The second, related, issue that Searle sees as part of the appeal of Derrida
to literary theory is the apparent belief that “concepts that apply to language and
literature, if they are to be truly valid, must admit of some mechanical procedure
subjected to a rigorous test that verifies our assumptions. We cannot figure out
32
Ibid., 177.
33
Ibid., 182.
48
…that there is no mechanical decision procedure for identifying an
author’s intentions, or for determining whether or not a work is a work of
fiction or whether an expression is used metaphorically – in no way
undermines the concepts of intention, fiction, or metaphor. … In general
these practices neither require nor admit of rigorous internal boundary
lines and simple mechanical methods of ascertaining the presence or
absence of a phenomenon. Again the crude positivism of these
assumptions I am criticizing is of a piece with Derrida’s assumption that
without foundations we are left with nothing but the free play of
signifiers.
34
foundations are significant. But these criticisms might be more suited for those
who try to apply Derrida’s work more than Derrida himself. It might be argued
that Searle is simply taking Derrida too seriously, looking for a rigorous
argument that is not there and not supposed to be there. If Derrida is trying to
makes little sense to treat him as if he is within it. The widespread influence of
Derrida’s writings over the past 30 years means that Searle’s arguments are
useful whether they are aimed at Derrida or those who apply his work to literary,
art, or film studies. At the same time, a case can be made that Searle is missing
the point of Derrida, and that case has primarily been made by Richard Rorty.
Rorty finds much to like about Derrida. In the first case, Rorty considers
Derrida’s thoughts for attacks on realism. However, for Rorty, this is not the
34
Ibid., 183.
49
strength of Derrida’s work – rather, it is Derrida’s play with terms and ideas that
and refutation, and thus refuses to engage him on those grounds. Rorty thus
argues explicitly against philosophers like Norris and Searle who attempt to deal
seems to be what he most enjoys about Derrida’s work. He sees him as “writing
for the delight of us insiders who share his background, who find the same
Derrida is a writer about philosophy who attempts to stand outside of it, and as
such he cannot be seen as a participant in that world: “The idea that there is
it.
Rorty moves on to further consider a key problem for those who wish to
35
Rorty, Richard. “Is Derrida a Transcendental Philosopher?” 137-139.
36
Ibid., 138
37
Ibid., 139
50
takes issue with the idea of considering language as a whole system, seeing this
as just a waste of time that has little practical use. In this instance, the gaps
between pragmatism and Derrida’s deconstruction are clearest. Rorty argues that
for nominalists like him, who “see language as just human beings using marks
Rorty is thus concerned with the usefulness of Derrida’s project given its
which the alternatives have no difference in their practical outcomes. This is the
difference is hardly absolute however. Rorty admits that Derrida’s writings have
enough internal contradictions to justify other readings of his work, and the
question of Derrida’s usefulness has been central to others who have considered
his writing.
purposes Derrida’s work can serve within philosophy, the broader discussion of
Derrida’s “usefulness” has centered largely on whether his work has political
implications. There are two facets to this discussion of the political implications
38
Ibid., 145
51
of Derrida that are relevant to the roots of social constructionism. One is the
timing of his early work, coinciding as it did with both the radical movements in
France in 1968 and the broader American social movements of the time that
focused on the politics of race, gender, and sexuality. Although that timing is
suggest that this relationship was purely coincidental. Instead, there are ways of
reading Derrida that make him useful to those looking for a philosophy of
radical politics. As we shall see, Derrida has been at time reluctant to make the
politics of his philosophy explicit, perhaps because the connection between his
In a work that examines the potential uses of Derrida for radical political
movements, Nancy Fraser points out that debates about Derrida’s usefulness are
complicated by both the intricacies of his position and his relative silence on
political questions. To sum up the opposing positions, she calls on the work of
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak and Jacob Rogozinski, who tackled the question of
Derrida’s politics beginning in the early 1980s. She cites Spivaks’s use of a quote
from Derrida’s 1968 essay “The Ends of Man” a call for a “radical shake-up
[ebranlément], [which] can come only from the outside [and which] takes place [se
military – between all of the West and its other.” Such apparently direct call for
39
39
Spivak is quoted by Fraser in “The French Derrideans,” 53. This is Fraser’s translation of
Spivak’s quote in French. The essay is published in English as “The Ends of Man” in Margins of
Philosophy and translated by Alan Bass, 134-5. Bass’s translation of the passage reads: “A radical
trembling can only come from the outside. Therefore, the trembling of which I speak derives no
more that any other from some spontaneous decision or philosophical thought after some violent
maturation of its history. This trembling is played out in the violent relationship of the whole of
the West to its other, whether a “linguistic” relationship… or ethnological, economic, political,
military, relationships, etc.”
52
and language is a constant, but the link to broader politics is rarely explicit. At
epistemology. Given the extent to which Derrida challenges our sense of what
we think we know, it is difficult not to see the potential links between this
position and radical politics. But one must read “between the lines” of his
writing to get a clear call to politics. Even “The Ends of Man” is not primarily
concerned with radical politics. Much of it, including the section Spivak refers to,
is concerned with the questions of how to work both inside and outside of
Breaks are always, and fatally, reinscribed in an old cloth that must continually,
Political, founded in France in 1980 a few months after the conference at Cerisy
where Spivak and Rogozinski presented their competing views. The Center, run
explore the nature of the political from a deconstructivist perspective, and was
Spivak and Rogozinski. The problem was that there was a limited amount of
exploration that could be done without lapsing into real political questions, at
40
Derrida, “Semiology and Grammatology: Interview with Julia Kristeva,” Positions. 24.
53
which point the question of which side of political debates deconstruction comes
down on could not be avoided. The Center ceased operation in 1984. Such an
example does not illustrate that deconstruction is not political, but that Derrida’s
insistence on playing inside and outside without falling into the binarisms of
The Center was an attempt to create a space for critical inquiry outside of the
While this is but one example of the potential political uses of Derrida, it is
supported by short passages isolated from their convoluted context, reveal the
difficulty of getting a clear reading on any of Derrida’s positions, let alone those
that deal with issues external to philosophy. The primary usefulness of Derrida
he refrained from dealing directly with the relationship between Marxism and
Marxism and did not want to give Marxism’s critics any further ammunition. 41
This balance between supporting progressive politics and not speaking publicly
41
See Fraser, 52.
54
has allowed Derrida to become part of the framework of social constructionism
Michel Foucault
examining the bases of knowledge in the West and asking hard questions about
the influences of cultural ideas on science, history and philosophy. His project is
generally less esoteric than Derrida’s. Foucault is concerned more with a reading
of history to determine the ways in which cultural values shape the possibilities
and the foundations upon which power structures are built. Foucault’s work is
the more political of the two, and also more willing to deal in the specifics of real
world cases. Though dense, his writing is comparatively clear, which makes it
easier to get a sense of his overall project, even if it took numerous forms over the
periods, in order to ascertain the ways in which the limits of knowledge shape
our culture has made manifest the existence of order, and… what
modalities of order have been recognized, posited, linked with space and
time, in order to create the positive basis of knowledge as we find it
employed in grammar and philology, in natural history and biology, in
the study of wealth and political economy. Quite obviously, such an
analysis does not belong to the history of ideas or of science: it is rather an
inquiry whose aim is to rediscover on what basis knowledge and theory
55
became possible; within what space of order knowledge was constituted;
on the basis of what historical a priori, and in the element of what
positivity, ideas could appear, sciences be established, experience be
reflected in philosophies, rationalities be formed… 42
Foucault is concerned with the context of knowledge, and with tracing the
is unclear how much he believes that these contexts influence the core of science.
The scope of his project means that he can only examine select examples to make
his case, and so in some sense it is up to his reader to decide whether these
Here Foucault posits that the vision of science and progressing toward an
objectivity is an overly simple picture of its history. At the same time, he does not
intellectual and political culture: “In short, the question of ideology that is asked
42
Foucault, The Order of Things, xxi-xxii.
43
Ibid., xxii
56
of science is not the question of situations or practices that it reflects more or less
consciously; nor is it the question of the possible use or misuse to which it could
and a lack of objectivity.” At the same time, science cannot undo its relationship
45
to ideology no matter the levels of rigour it instills in its practice: “The role of
ideology does not diminish as rigour is increased and error is dissipated.” In his46
and does not allow scientific discourses a special status separate from these
influences.
The key limits to Foucault’s work are the extent to which his examples are
representative of the history of science more generally, and the extent to which
his observations are relevant to current scientific practice. On the first point,
Foucault’s focus on clinical medical practice, the point where science and culture
interact, creates a divide between this type of “science” and the type that is
practiced in laboratories, often (but not always) farther from social taboos about
the human body or the limits of insanity. Foucault is well aware of this division,
and that clinical medical practice hardly meets the usual definitions of a science.
He makes the argument that ideology extends into physics and astronomy, but
the bulk of his carefully considered examples are from the places where science
44
Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, 185.
45
Ibid., 186.
46
Ibid., 186.
57
and culture interact most explicitly in terms of both content and practice. These
to science more generally. On the second point, it would be foolish to argue that
since Foucault frequently deals with historical examples that his findings are
discusses. However, despite his questioning of the model that science progresses
by improving on its mistakes, there is little room for the idea that scientific
practice might improve over time. This is not to argue that at some point in the
recent past, science was able to magically remove the ideology from its practice,
only that a dichotomy of ideological/not ideological does not create a space for
differing levels of infiltration. Foucault may argue that science and knowledge
practice might differ substantially over time and across place, especially as,
particularly because, like Kuhn, he is arguing from historical example and not
simply from theory. Thus, his work has been widely influential both in terms of
its findings and for the model of inquiry it represents. The work of Derrida and
Foucault focuses on the context of knowledge claims and the ways in which
idea comes from and how it can be perceived as having solid foundations that
are both theoretical and historical. I would argue that, regardless of the actual
58
solidity of these arguments, a third factor has been crucial in their diffusion and
acceptance. The social movements that took place at about the same time as
many of these ideas were being published provided the context in which Kuhn,
important of the three, although it is also the more difficult to document. The
social movements that developed in the 1960s and 1970s have been a key part of
the motivation for social constructionism and key to its longstanding appeal. It is
doubtful whether these epistemologies would have held critical favour for as
long as they have if they were not associated with important social movements.
shall see in Chapter Four, this rebellion was important for Michel De Certeau
The social movements that are crucial here though are grassroots political
movements that largely take place outside the world of intellectuals. Three
primary movements developed in the 1960s and 1970s, although all obviously
have much earlier roots. The civil rights movement of the 1960s is tied to the long
history of racial struggle in the United States, but it received a boost in the
aftermath of the Second World War, when black servicemen returning from the
war were unwilling to return to second class citizen status in the country they
59
had recently been defending in the name of freedom. When the movement
challenge to the social structure of the United States, and other countries with
discrimination and violence based on silence and the illusion of peace. Thus, this
was not just the boiling over of a long standing dispute, but the disruption of a
longstanding social system that depended on denial and was not being
questioned openly and angrily. Since the system of racial equality had depended
the culture’s way of dealing with problems. That act of questioning and
women’s roles in society changed substantially in the first half of the century,
public and professional life. Coupled with the civil rights movement, the feminist
this shift, so that the fundamental shift was not just from a lack of equality to
60
greater equality, but from a system of acceptance to one of challenging the status
quo.
The last of the three social movements of this period is of course the gay
rights movement. Often marked as beginning with the riots that followed a raid
on the Stonewall Inn in New York City in June of 1969, the gay rights movement
also had roots in many years of discrimination. In some ways, the gay rights
conservatives to accept that women’s roles within that binarism have had to
change. They seem unable to accept that gender roles are more mutable than this.
Indeed, the entrenched and legal homophobia that exists to this day is a
reminder of the depth of the challenge gay rights present. In the academy too,
queer theory has not been as mainstream as theories based on race and gender
have been.
I have focused on these social movements and not more obvious political
movements of the period such as opposition to the Vietnam war for two reasons.
The first is that the movements based on personal identity are a more substantial
and longstanding change in the societal fabric. In this way, the opposition to the
substantial shift on its own. The second, and simpler, reason is that the protests
are a time-limited issue that ended with the war, while the social movements
61
conditions of a time period largely determined what arguments would be
acceptable, the social movements that develop in the 1960s provide the political
knowledge had not developed. The fact that many archaic and biased societal
assumptions above race, gender, and sexuality had been reinforced by scientists
made it logical that science should come under scrutiny for the ways in which it
had reinforced bias and bigotry. Critics of science, both internal and external,
have re-visited much traditional work on race, gender and sexuality and
persuasively argued that it was rooted in societal biases and not objective
knowledge about the world. They have challenged the notion of any sort of
understanding the debate about social construction in the present day. On one
hand, the attention to the ways in which science has been implicated in various
fact socially constructed and the ways in which the respect and power afforded
scientists can be implicated in more general societal power structures that exploit
marginalized people. On the other hand, the fact that examinations of science’s
racism have come from scientists as well as scholars outside of science seems to
indicate that science can self-correct, and implies that science can move from
62
would like to believe that the present scientific support for racial and gender
the previous notions that men and whites were naturally more intelligent or that
individual cases in which social bias is evident and broader view that science is
individual cases and the general practice of science has been lost in charged
optimistic view of science, in which cases of bias are viewed as anomalies, and a
more pessimistic view, in which these cases are viewed as typical, is difficult in
light of the political implications of each view. In Chapter Three, I will consider
three contemporary theorists who offer the most compelling arguments for the
more pessimistic view. First though, in Chapter Two, I consider in great depth
47
There are, of course, those who still try to make “scientific” arguments for racial superiority or
homosexuality as an illness. The best known example in the former category is Hernstein and
Murray, The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life. While arguments such as
these get a considerable amount of play in the mainstream press and thus help fulfill their
authors’ desire to convey the impression that they are taking part in a legitimate scientific debate,
such arguments are dismissed by the mainstream scientific community. See Steven Jay Gould’s
review of The Bell Curve in the New Yorker (“Curveball” November 28, 1994). For an overview of
the ways in which scientific illiteracy in media allows fringe arguments to appear mainstream,
see Robert Park’s Voodoo Science: The Road From Foolishness to Fraud or Michael Shermer’s Why
People Believe Weird Things.
63
Chapter Two - Social Constructionism in Film Studies
has it roots in the late 1960s, hits a peak in the 1970s and declines in the 1980s
and 1990s. In concert with the theoretical and political changes of the 1960s and
70s that I outlined with the previous chapter, the film studies of that time
period in which film studies was dominated by film theory. In the 1980s, the
but one that is, I think, the standard picture of the ways in which film studies has
developed.
In this chapter, I would like to re-examine this shift from the film theory to
that the development of film studies over the past thirty years has been overtly
constructionism has been little remarked upon within film studies. What I am
instead arguing is that the changes in film studies from, in one sense, theory to
practice, are reflective of the ways in which social constructionism has fallen off
endorsed within the discipline. In short, film scholars have ceased being social
64
epistemology, there are significant differences between these two ideas that
makes an extended comparison of them less than useful. The similarities are that
explaining reality and both thus inherently posit the existence of a reality while
recognizing that there are substantial difficulties in approaching this reality. This
filmic realism to reinforce an argument about the differences between filmic and
written history, but here I will focus on later arguments that are not based in
the 1970s, I will be focusing on what are the most significant and high profile
endorsed by the journal Screen in a key period from about 1973 to 1978. During
these years, the editors and contributors of the magazine, particularly Colin
MacCabe, Ben Brewster, and Stephen Heath, undertook the building and defense
establishment of a viable and “scientific” film theory. At the same time that
science was used as a model for the construction of film theory, science was seen
65
as a construction that is no more real than a film itself. Thus, in a manner of
speaking film studies was elevated to the level of science as science was brought
down to earth. This is not the contradiction it seems at first glance. The editors
were borrowing from science a sense of rigour and thoroughness that they were
adapting to their attempt to build a complete film theory that accounted for film
in total. At the same time, they had no use for science’s ontological claims to be
there is no dilemma over whether film scholars are making ontological claims
about the real world. They were able to adapt what they saw as valuable in
science without the ontological baggage that came with a traditional scientific
worldview.
theory is their special double issue on Cinema Semiotics and the Work of
Christian Metz, published in 1973. In this issue, the editors attempt to introduce
Metz’s work for an English speaking audience, as very little of it had been
translated from French at that point. Introducing the issue, an editorial written
by Paul Willemen explains the context for their endorsement of Metz. The first
goal is to force a radical break with traditional film theory, represented in this
and spark off a whole series of texts à-la-Mitry, a rather dismal prospect.” The
66
development.” Throughout this issue, there is a strong sense of film studies as a
48
young discipline that can still be defined and shaped by coherent arguments. The
reason for supporting Metz is that his “intervention” in the theory of cinema
countered the tendency of film criticism to be “an excuse to talk about something
else, usually the moral views, the political beliefs and other prejudices of the
film criticism. Willemen writes that “This is not to say that one has to sweep
many of their ideas (on condition that one re-defines and re-locates them) are still
of an attempt to re-create film theory from the broken shards of what came
before.
precisely because it seems detached from political concerns in its creation, even if
it has political implications of its own. The basis for semiotics is both a desire for
scientific rigour and a belief in line with social constructionism that such a
science can be constructed: “What is required first of all, if the semiology of film
Moreover, since Kant we know that the object of a science is not a given but that
48
Willemen, “Editorial,” 2
49
Ibid., 2.
50
Ibid., 2.
67
resemblance to a science – it has a distinct object, a theory and a technique. 51
science is purely a social practice, but one whose practice is useful and can be
it offers theories that may or may not be useful to a particular patient (or critic),
So the attempts of Willemen and the Screen editors to found a new film theory is
been demystified and its tools can be borrowed by film scholars who wish to
of a basis in reality. Willemen writes that an article by Julia Kristeva has been
included so that “one can see that this science [semiology] not only presents a
rigorous theoretical framework, but that it constantly questions its own discourse
in its very formation: being the science of signification, its own discourse
necessarily forms part of its object.” Thus, semiology avoids the blind spots of
52
traditional science by questioning its own methods and ideas constantly. In this
Willemen quotes Althusser, Louis. “Freud and Lacan” Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays.
51
London, 1971. 184. In Ben Brewter’s later translation of Althusser’s For Marx he added a glossary
of Althusser’s terms for English readers that was approved by Althusser. In it, science is defined
in terms of ideology and practice. Science is differentiated from ideology in terms of its emphasis
on knowledge, as opposed to ideology’s emphasis on the “practico-social.” This definition is
supported by Althusser’s extensive descriptions in the text of the varieties of theory. Althusser,
For Marx, 252.
Willemen, “Editorial,” 5
52
68
conception, traditional science seems naïve by comparison, and it is not difficult
to see the influence of the critical theory I outlined in the previous chapter, in
The temptation to build a film theory that does not examine its own
“semiology as critical science does not – need it be said? – imply the discovery of
some ‘total discourse’ (Metz’s term) of the type spun out week after week by a
film criticism that is written by the ideology whose films it sells” This total
53
discourse, a marker of the film criticism Heath is countering, also includes the
the process of its production as signifying system.” Thus, the context of the
54
relation to other films. More importantly, Heath and other Screen critics call for a
film theory that positions the filmmaker in context. This is a frontal attack on the
auteur theory, especially the position they attribute to the French journal Cahiers
53
Heath, “Introduction: Questions of Emphasis,” 10.
54
Ibid., 11.
69
of signifying system, in a multiplicity of structures…, dispersed, in
Foucault’s words, in ‘a plurality of possible positions and functions’. 55
By drawing on Foucault and questioning the idea of the unified subject, Heath
links the idea of social constructionism – that individuals are inevitably actors of
scientist cannot stand outside social relations to make claims about the natural
world, a filmmaker cannot produce a film out of his own consciousness that does
not bear the marks of his social and political context. Not only do both of these
actors reflect their social context, but this context is seen, in line with Foucault, as
being of primary influence and interest. Heath is not simply arguing that film
the notion of the unified subject that underlies any description of films as the
overcome the limitations of the theory, since it leaves intact the coherent subject
response by Ben Brewster to the now famous Cahiers du cinéma article on John
Ford’s Young Mr. Lincoln, which was translated and reprinted in Screen. Brewster
critiques the Cahiers du cinéma work as superficial and insufficient. Auteur theory
potentially posits a cohesive and detached subject that is the opposite of the
socially constructed filmmaker that Screen is arguing for. From the Cahiers du
Cinéma article though, it is clear that the French critics are not arguing for a
55
Ibid., 11.
70
films to the codes (social, cultural…) for which they are a site of
intersection, and to other films, themselves held in an inter-textual space:
therefore, the relation of these films to the ideology which they convey, a
particular ‘phase’ which they represent, and to the events (present, past,
historical, mythical, fictional) which they aimed to represent. 56
Despite this emphasis on context, Brewster is unconvinced that this will not just
be another ideological reading that fails to develop a critique beyond the surface
of the work. He wants to critique the notion of an “active” reading of the film:
Thus, for the Screen critics, dealing with the filmmaker’s social context is
about erasing the potential bias of a limited auteur theory that separates a
filmmaker from his or her context, but seems to be about undermining the notion
of a subject that underlies both the French critics’ notion of the filmmaker and
in tone, suggesting that deconstruction can define the elements of a work “once
and for all” – attempting to reduce a work to a kind of filmic first principles. In
more faith than Derrida does that it is possible to determine the structural
foundations and codes of the object – film, perhaps because we are still dealing
Editors of Cahiers du cinéma, ‘John Ford’s Young Mr. Lincoln.’ 5-6. Quoted in Brewster, “Notes
56
on the Text ‘John Ford’s Young Mr. Lincoln’ by the Editors of Cahiers du Cinema,” 29
Brewster. “Notes on the Text” 29.
57
71
with an object that we can see, rather than with a concept that depends overtly
on definitions.
At the same time, Brewster’s search for the implicit codes of a filmic text
echoes the concerns of the Russian formalists, and their influence in the rise of
New Criticism in the 1950s and 1960s. He writes that any number of readings of
if it is true that there is some way of reading this film text which is
pertinent for the poetician of film, this must lie in the object of film poetics, ie, in
this case, in the film itself; there must be a reading implicit in the text, or its
unique context, and hence something that Paul Willemen has called the ‘implicit
reader’. 58
What are we to make of this combination of social construction theory and the
formalism that social construction is in key ways the opposite of and a reaction
to? It should not be surprising that any theory has elements of a number of ideas
that came before it. In this case, it is not hard to see formalism as a type of
precursor to structuralism. Both methods are concerned with finding the ways in
which meaning is inherently encoded in a text. At the same time, the Screen
formalism. Their work is based in Marxism, and they make extensive use of
Brecht and Althusser, among other Marxist theorists. Their work is occasionally
blind to the other political movements of the time, particularly the social
movements based on race, gender, and sexual orientation I discussed in the last
chapter. This is important because it lays the groundwork for a division between
58
Ibid., 31.
72
the Screen version of 70s film theory and competing impulses that are more
directly political.
Responses to Screen
An article by Jump Cut co-editor Julia Lesage illustrates this division well.
The article was reprinted and critiqued in Screen. In it, Lesage takes the Screen
59
editors to task for their dependence on concepts of psychoanalysis that are, she
outlines some of the key problems with basic Freudian theories that have been
referenced without critique in Screen. She castigates the editors for not examining
the assumptions about sexuality and gender roles upon which these theories are
based, pointing out that they would not reprint similar theories about race, and
that these omissions are significant given their claim to be examining the
psychoanalytic theory constitute a significant blind spot. And while some of the
articles in Screen in this period deal with gender and psychoanalysis (most
notably Laura Mulvey’s “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema”), the bulk of
the semiotic work ignores issues of gender. To make matters worse, in the
response to Lesage’s piece signed by MacCabe, Heath, and Brewster, they begin
with a dismissive tone, writing that “If there are errors in our work, it may be
that they stem from significant problems which, however inadequately for the
moment, we are trying to resolve and which more ‘rage’ is unlikely to help us to
59
Lesage, “The Human Subject – You, He, or Me? (Or, the Case of the Missing Penis).”
73
clarify.” The film theory which MacCabe, Heath and Brewster are trying to
60
invent may involve politics at the level of theory, but seems unwilling to
consider them more directly, and even more unwilling to allow for the influence
of political movements that are in some sense “grassroots” and not confined to
academics. Ironically, they seem at times to be protecting their work, like a good
science, from the taint of outside influence. Given the politics of the time, and the
theoretical alternatives presented by Lesage and Jump Cut, this attempt to keep
film theories of the 1970s as methodological theories, and defines them against
psychoanalysis and use that to better understand film. This is a useful division,
but it downplays the ways in which methodological theories could become all-
not about film, then at least about film theory. This occasional rigidity made
Screen had come under attack from a variety of fronts. The first is more directly
political critiques like the one mentioned above. The second was from theorists
who posited other positions like cognitivism, which contradicted semiotic and
Mystifying Movies: Fads and Fallacies in Contemporary Film Theory is a near point by
60
Brewster, Heath and MacCabe. “Comment on ‘The Human Subject – You, He, or Me?” 84.
74
The Rise of Cultural Studies
It seems as though, in the 1980s and 1990s, the more directly political
cultural studies, an interdisciplinary field that grew from the work of the Center
readings of identity, and takes as its object a wide range of popular culture, with
the aim of examining the politics that permeate societies. The influence of
cultural studies in the academic humanities has been substantial, even as it has
been controversial and has generally not developed into a discipline that has
departmental status at very many universities, at least in the United States. The 61
argument here is that cultural studies in effect provided a channel for the
political concerns of film studies, the concerns that the Screen theorists were not
very good at addressing. Cultural studies did not just provide a better way for
film scholars to talk about politics (although it certainly did that). More
theory. I do not mean to infer that these concerns are not peripheral, only to echo
third generation of theories after the ontological theories of Bazin and the
methodological theories of Metz and Screen. Casetti labels these theories “field
theories” and emphasizes the ways in which they examine specific problems
practitioners who which to avoid the trappings of disciplinarity. For a further discussion of this
phenomenon, see McEwan, “Cultural Studies as a Hidden Discipline.”
75
without trying to re-define cinema in the mode of the earlier theories. So they
62
are not central in the sense that they are not trying to define what cinema is or
even what film theory must be. Cultural studies’ goals are no less significant, but
they occupy a different position in relation to film texts and film studies. Political
concerns have primacy in cultural studies, and the focus is on the ways in which
cultural objects figure in the complex interactions of culture and politics. Thus
cultural studies is well suited to deal with the politics of film and media objects,
and its practitioners have taken over the primary responsibility for doing so.
constructionism. It might be argued that this is the area in which such theories
have the most significant acceptance. The journal that Alan Sokal hoaxed, Social
Text, is a cultural studies journal, and cultural studies has been at the center of
debates about the social construction of science and history. If cultural studies is
influential in film studies, it should make sense that the social constructionism
that is part of cultural studies would also have an influence. It does of course, but
influence in cultural studies. There are numerous reasons for this. The first is that,
as Casetti’s distinctions illustrate, field theories like cultural studies are neither
concerned with defining the center of film studies nor occupying that center (if
indeed there is center). The key insight in Casetti’s description is that film theory
has splintered in numerous directions, so that film scholars are now less likely to
be speaking to the same issues at the same time than they might have been in the
1970s. So cultural studies and social constructionism are an influence, but not the
62
Casetti, Theories of Cinema, 15-16.
76
center of the discipline. That fact is not just because of the splintering of film
theory, but because of the division between film theory and film history.
The most significant development in film studies in the 1980s and 1990s
was the rise of history. In this period, more significant than the changes in film
theory was the renewed emphasis on exploring the still largely unwritten history
the early and silent film periods means that much film scholarship is divorced
from present day political concerns. This is not to suggest that this work is
concern for the politics of race, gender and sexuality that is manifest whenever
relevant to the films or filmmakers under study. At the same time, the attention
to the past means at least some division from the more immediate concerns of
cultural studies. Perhaps more significantly, film history has adopted the
documents whenever possible – and these practices are infused with realist
explore these expectations in considerable detail. Here I simply want to note that
the pull of history means that whatever center film studies presently has has
been pulled in a direction that is away from the socially constructed theory of the
Screen authors and from the directly political concerns of cultural studies.
influenced by the social and political movements of the 1960s and 1970s and
contains the traces of theories defended and confronted throughout the history of
77
film studies. It is continually influenced by the concerns of cultural studies and
borrows from that field its concern with filmmakers and film experiences that are
influenced by the effects of sexual and racial identity. At the same time, the need
to discern the most basic facts of the history of cinema means that it cannot
completed. We still need to know a lot of things about what actually happened in
the past, and a realist historical practice allows us to do that. In Chapter Four, I
tie the discussions of meta-historians Hayden White and Michel de Certeau into
an analysis of films that are based on historical events and try to reconcile our
Although there also is some tension between the more radical positions of
film theory and the realism of film practice (see Chapter Five), film studies is in a
sense an ideal example of the blending of the numerous concerns that have
confronted critical theory in the past forty years. It is concerned with the politics
of race, gender, and capitalism but it does not forgo the best possible
constructionism, that appears to offer support for radical politics but does not.
The attempt, outside of film studies, to clarify that link between politics and
78
Chapter Three: The Social Construction of Science
The first two chapters of this work traced the development and influences
theorists who have, in one way or another, attempted to navigate some kind of
middle ground between realism and social constructionism (Bruno Latour and
Donna Haraway) or pragmatism (Richard Rorty). All are concerned with trying
same time, all three are trying in some way to maintain the political and
the strengths and weaknesses of a range of positions, and carefully argue for
their alternatives. I have chosen to argue with social constructivists who have the
in that forum that the substantial and fundamental arguments have taken place.
The analogies to the discussion of history I undertake in the next two chapters
should be clear. The primary subjects of this section are Bruno Latour, Donna
Haraway and Richard Rorty. Only the latter has been the focus of sustained and
Three notable examples, two from well-known scholars, the other from a lesser known one:
63
Stanley Aronowitz’s Science As Power is motivated by a desire to question the uses of technology,
and asks legitimate and interesting questions. At the same time, he fails to connect his arguments
to a coherent epistemology. Aronowitz was an editorial board member of Social Text at the time
of the Sokal hoax. His fellow editorial board member, Andrew Ross, is similarly motivated by the
desire to question the service of science to both militarism and capitalism. While he is right that
many of these connections have not been fully explored and deserve to be, he seems to disregard
the significant epistemological questions at stake here. See, for example, his “Cultural Studies
and the Challenge of Science” 177. As part of an otherwise interesting collection entitled Wild
Science, Jennifer Daryl Slack and M. Medhi Semati present the social constructivist case so badly
that I briefly entertained the possibility this was another hoax (“The Politics of the ‘Sokal
Affair.’”)
79
thorough criticism already, so in his case I will deal with a couple of significant
issues that he and his critics have overlooked, issues that tie into my discussion
of the other two and the rest of this work. In the case of the first two writers, I
will deal with their primary works and counter the arguments that are central to
their projects.
The value of Bruno Latour’s work is that he spends vast amounts of time
observing how scientists actually go about their daily work. Latour is one of the
most commonly cited social constructivists who is also a major figure in the field
of science studies. Rather than trusting the idealized version of scientific practice
offered by the scientific method, Latour pays attention to scientists bound by the
he follows scientists into the field, observing the ways in which they gather
interested in the ways in which all of these apparently extra factors influence the
work produced, and argues that science is a complex interaction between natural
social factors on work, and argues that it is impossible to separate the results of
scientific work from the social factors that produce it. In some sense, he is an heir
to Thomas Kuhn, since he bases his work on scientific practice rather than theory,
64
See, for example, Latour and Woolgar. Laboratory Life: The Construction of Scientific Facts. 2nd ed.
80
but he also argues for his epistemology from a reading of Descartes and the
philosophy of knowledge.
well as Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont, most of these corrections have concerned
misunderstanding of the theory. Sokal and Bricmont similarly point out Latour’s
65
capable of separating fact from wishful fiction, there are limits to this approach. 66
Works such as Paul Gross & Norman Levitt’s Higher Superstition load ridicule on
many of those who have supported social constructionism, pointing out the
numerous scientific and logical errors, and I could add many offenders to the
lists they have created. In the end though such an approach seems unsatisfying,
version of an argument he or she wishes to contradict. Gross and Levitt are not at
fault for this choice of approach, since they are simply dealing with what is out
there, and they are correct in finding that most of the arguments can be
65
Huth, “Latour’s Relativity,” 181-92.
66
Brenkman, “Letter to the Editor of Lingua Franca,” 66.
81
I have ignored a number of others whose work does not stand up to sustained
inquiry. 67
others have noted. In particular, he calls attention to the ways in which the
practice of science determines the theory. In some sense, the contrast between
practice and theory he undertakes is not so different than the description of the
considering the relations between what scientists or historians say they do and
what they actually do. So while I agree with Latour’s project in many ways and
find his descriptions of everyday practice valuable, there are significant logical
The broadest examples of this rhetorical shifting and elision are found in
Latour’s most recent work, Pandora’s Hope: Essays on the Reality of Science Studies.
colleague who asks nervously: “Do you believe in reality?” This question has
Alan Sokal’s challenge that anyone who doubted the reality of the law of gravity
was welcome to test their position from the window of his Manhattan high-rise
3
For a broader approach, see Sokal and Bricmont’s Fashionable Nonsense or Gross and Levitt’s
Higher Superstition. See also the collection edited by Gross, Levitt, and Martin Lewis, The Flight
From Science and Reason. A collection that features contributions from scholars in science studies
and other humanities as well as scientists (including Alan Sokal) is Noretta Koertge’s A House
Built on Sand.
82
apartment. The answer that Latour provides (“of course”) is the obvious one, the
68
answer one could expect from all but the most radical social constructivists. As I
will demonstrate throughout this work, there is rarely a problem with social
problem lies, as it does for Latour, in bringing that belief into accordance with
their conviction that science is socially constructed and that they are equipped to
be the arbiter of what is politically produced and what might be given the status
of fact. Latour spends the bulk of this chapter dealing with what he identifies as
the two faults of traditional realism, the “mind-in-a-vat” problem and the fear of
mob rule. With these problems out of the way, he argues that he is free to believe
Latour’s Mind-in-a-vat
problem – the way in which realism treats the mind as something that is
detached from the surrounding world. The traditional split between subject and
object allows that the subject’s mind might be capable of understanding itself
and the subject. Thus, the metaphorical split between mind and body is
Latour is critical of this tradition, and he extends this analogy further, becoming
end he is in favour of a new approach that reflects his own work in science
studies.
68
Sokal, “A Physicist Experiments,” 50.
83
Latour traces the mind-in-a-vat theory to René Descartes, who is looking
for a way to have absolute certainty, and finds it only when knowledge comes
from God. Latour argues that later scholars abandoned the need for God but kept
the relationship of knowledge to an outside arbiter that fulfills the same function.
In this way, science and realism are compared to religion in that both appeal to a
higher power beyond the control of humans. (Richard Rorty makes this
comparison in more detail and will be the subject of a later section of this
chapter). The idea that society is a filter between the mind and the real world, a
position taken by most social constructivists, has little appeal for Latour. He sees
this as an even worse solution, since the mind is still detached and now is further
separated from nature by all sorts of filters. The next step in this chain of ideas
69
has still less appeal for Latour – the idea that this extraordinary distance between
the mind and the world is a good thing, or at least something we should resign
never escape, so we should not try, is the essence of this position as Latour sees it.
He argues that if we take this development all the way back to Descartes we can
undo all of the damage and escape the perils of all of these positions, freeing the
Latour wants to re-attach the mind to nature and to the body, to break
down the divide and free the mind from the vat. To do so he does not propose an
described in great detail, but involves “retrac[ing] our steps, retaining both the
history of humans’ involvement in the making of scientific facts and the sciences’
69
Latour, Pandora’s Hope, 7.
84
involvement in the making of human history.” This course of study includes the
70
in this collection and in some of his other works, most notably Laboratory Life.
scientists at work does not hold up in the context of his critique of realism and
western intellectual history. He proposes simply that the division between mind and
nature can be bridged by observing the ways that others attempt to bridge it. The first
obvious issue is that Latour (or whoever is doing the study) is now an observer
than they are. As an observer, Latour is subject to exactly the same concerns,
issues, and biases as any researcher. His conceit that his research is somehow
Constructivists argue that the biases in the work of others are overwhelming, but
then there is no way for researchers like Latour to provide an observed account
scientists at work and finds that they are clearly motivated by their own biases
and that they routinely disregard or reconstruct evidence to serve their needs,
then he has observed what can be called bad science. But he cannot use this type
70
Ibid., 10.
85
are exactly the methods of realism and science itself. If they do not work for
There are only two ways out of this conundrum. Latour can either invent
a new method of research, observation and argument that is not realism but can
still make believable truth claims, or he can simply claim that he is some sort of
privileged observer not subject to the same rules. The latter option is the far
poorer of the two, since it makes the problems Latour has with realism even
worse, amplifying the position of the researcher as someone above the fray
without even a normal panoply of biases. In one sense, it replaces the idea of
reason being above the fray with the idea that the researcher himself is the one
looking down from above. This weakness in Latour’s approach is clearly evident
in the latter chapters of Pandora’s Hope that deal with particular studies. But first,
let us turn our attention to what Latour calls the other structural feature of
Latour’s use of “mob rule” is interesting because it is easy to see its appeal
the colleague who asks, “Do you believe in reality?” is based on a fear that
haunts realism: the fear of mob rule. Realism and traditional science appeal to a
logic that is beyond the control of humans, and is thus able to act as a final
arbiter in the settling of disputes. The placement of logic and reason – which are
doesn’t that infer that the mob rules – that whatever the masses decide to be true
86
is the truth – and that there is nothing anyone can do to change it? Latour is right
that this is one of the concerns of realists and those who argue against social
constructionism. As we will see, both Haraway and Rorty consider this one of
the most significant problems with realism, both because it puts realism and
logic in a god-like position, and because of the obviously political notion of the
masses as a “mob,” which implies the need for strict control. Latour has no real
answer to this concern, but he elides it after a significant build up and then
moves on quickly, so quickly that one could be forgiven for not noticing that he
Latour traces the fear to Plato’s dialogue between Socrates and Callicles,
in which they discuss the ugly truth that the Athenian mob, untutored and
unfortunate amount of physical strength at its disposal. Reason and realism are,
in Latour’s conception, direct results of this need to place ideas beyond the reach
of the crowd. The two Athenian scholars in Plato’s dialogue make no attempt to
hide their disdain for the common people. In doing so, they provide a perfect
that they wish only to subjugate others. Modern realists, in Latour’s conception,
87
for us. We do not need a social world to break the back of objective reality,
nor an objective reality to silence the mob. It is quite simple, even though
it may sound incredible in these times of the science wars: we are not at
war. 71
The rhetorical shift here both misses the point and summarizes the extent of
Latour’s available responses. The only way to answer the fear of mob rule that is
part of realism is to claim that those with this fear seek the domination of the
masses. In this characterization, those who fear the potential violence of a mob
are rhetorically switched into the position of violator, one who seeks to
turned back not with appeals to reason, but with a much easier re-
will be enough to make people behave rationally. In Latour’s conception, the fear
of mob rule is always an attempt to subjugate and dominate, but this view misses
the possibilities of what the mob might represent. Latour overlooks the fact that
the angry mob might be a representative of any ideology. In other words, what
motivates the crowd may be a noble attempt to throw off tyranny or a vicious
position, since he has idealized the crowd without considering what carries it
into the streets in the first place. His view is reflexive rather than reflective. On
the other hand, a realism based on reasoning and evidence allows us to assess
the crowd’s motivations and, more importantly, allows the crowd the possibility
eager to see them as an innocent and liberatory force that he undermines their
71
Latour, Pandora’s Hope, 15.
88
status as subjects even as he grossly oversimplifies their motivations and
Thus this is his answer to the fear of mob rule: change the word “mob” to
“the people.” The political connotations of the position are changed and the
problem is solved. Except that even as he offers this solution to what he sees as
an unjustified fear based on politics, Latour himself is the one not seeing the
ignores the ways in which grassroots political power is just as likely, and
political movements from all ends of the political spectrum are, in various
contexts, supported by a popular will. In his zeal to idealize the masses he makes
the mistake of assuming they will automatically agree with his beliefs, when
Latour’s key argument throughout his work is the idea that science can
edge of the Amazon rain forest. The scientists are interested in whether or not the
boundary of the rain forest moves naturally and if so, in which direction. Either
the plains are encroaching on the forest or the forest in encroaching on the plains,
makes it the only place for the transition. Determining the direction and
89
mechanism of movement is extremely difficult, given that there are significant
immediately obvious explanation for these differences or the possibility that the
boundary is moving.
Latour offers what amount to a complex set of field notes for the time he
spends with this group, working closely enough with them that he is eventually
in a range of scientific disciplines and pays close attention to the ways in which
this description, Latour makes very few direct comments on the nature of the
work, and is certainly not openly critical of the ways in which the scientists and
technicians go about their tasks. His describes his goal, in his own words, thus:
“My friends want to know whether the forest advances or recedes, and I want to
know how the sciences can be at the same time realist and constructivist,
This is an interesting goal, but Latour doesn’t make his argument so much
of argument is fairly subtle. As in the earlier chapter, he makes his case as much
with a rhetoric of control and violation as he does with direct claims about the
realist who seeks to control the environment that Latour calls upon to argue that
these scientists are creating rather than discovering. In recounting the process by
which the group gathers specimens of plant life and returns them to a lab to be
72
Ibid., 30.
90
categorized and filed, he constantly uses metaphors that suggest a controlling,
nature:
The language here, and throughout the chapter, creates an image of the scientist
a method of action that calls to mind the worst aspects of colonialism and
perhaps even the slave trade, tearing these beings (they “find themselves”) from
their natural place in the world and subjecting them to domination. Identification
is always linked with control. But just when we feared that all was lost, the
Through metaphor, the gathering of data becomes an epic battle of man versus
73
Latour, Pandora’s Hope, 39. There is no translator credited to this book or Laboratory Life. Latour
either writes in English, translates his own books, or works closely enough with an outside
translator that the text can be considered his. Thus, the close attention to his language is justified.
74
Ibid., 39.
91
nature, according to Latour, is part of an inevitable distancing of evidence from
which this distance effects the work without writing directly about what those
the data gathered is distanced from the actual area under study, recounting both
the lab’s physical distance from the edge of the rainforest and the numerous
physical permutations the evidence goes through, such as those described above.
At times, he seems like a defense lawyer trying to point out the many places in
which bias could be introduced into a sample before the result is declared. In this
case though he has only the potential for bias, and that potential is simply that
the evidence is handled and organized. His overall point in emphasizing the
distance between forest and lab seems to be to re-iterate that the lab is not the
any evidence that any of the scientists involved in this project are confused about
this distinction. All seem quite aware that the lab is distant, physically and
ontologically, from the lab, and this is presumably why they introduce so much
order into the samples they collect. They need to be sure that the lab does not
intrude into their study of the forest too much, that substances and ideas in the
lab do not overly influence the samples themselves. Rather than trying to control
the forest by imposing order, the scientists use the order of their samples to allow
the forest a place in the lab and prevent outside influences from imposing
themselves on the dirt and leaves they have collected. Order preserves the forest
92
Latour’s work has considerable value as anthropology, since it recounts
the gathering of evidence in considerably more human terms than the passive
scientific paper would likely not include the details of the ordering system, and
performing them (“soil samples were tested,” etc). In contrast, Latour makes re-
evident that these actions are performed by people with personalities, desires,
and habits of action. More importantly, here, as elsewhere, he adds in that which
is usually missing from scientific accounts, the daily work that is usually
useful as a description, but his argument about the effects of all of this
background is rarely made explicit. There are plenty of points in the scientific
process Latour describes where bias might be introduced, but he never makes
clear when this has actually happened. He is arguing instead that the process of
complex social interactions between scientists whose methods are infused with
cultural values. But he is vague on what the effects of these values are.
more specific though, his argument often does not hold up under sustained
Laboratory Life
93
laboratory, and to meld those observations with arguments about the specific
ways in which science is socially constructed. Again, the most useful element of
his work is the portrait of the daily operation of the laboratory, especially the
between the scientists and numerous technical and support staff. The portrait is
documentation of its work. While Latour strips away some of the stereotypes
75
about the way science proceeds, he falters when he tries to make specific points
about the effects of these “industrial” relations on the results that are produced.
He emphasizes the ways in which many of the objects under study exist only
within the lab, and are only within machines and instruments that are
explains one of his key points, one that others have repeated:
Latour is right that many of the substances in this lab would not exist but for the
machines that construct them and the human work that goes into their creation.
75
Latour and Woolgar, Laboratory Life, 45-47.
76
Latour and Woolgar, Laboratory Life, 64.
94
In that way, they are fundamentally different from the materials other scientists
might work with. When a zoologist discovers a new species of mouse or monkey,
we generally assume that the species was always there. But in the case of the
bioassays prepared in this lab, that is not usually true. Where Latour goes wrong
is in his contrast in the last sentence quoted above – between objective entities
and constructed objects. These two things are not mutually exclusive. The
objective entities, in much the same way that a bridge or an office building or
anything else that is built by humans can be both “constructed” and objective.
The confusion here is over the double meaning of the word “constructed.“ In the
every day sense, it means “built,” and bridges and office buildings and bioassays
are all built. In Latour’s sense, and in the sense it has been used in science studies
and throughout this work, it also means “socially constructed,” that is, created
by social agreement of some kind and not existing objectively outside those
agreements. Latour obviously does not mean to use this word in the first sense
77
– to do so would be akin to pointing out that steel bridges are not a natural part
of the landscape – but he only offers us evidence for this first meaning. The
bioassays would not exist without the machines and/or people who create them
– true. Therefore, they are socially constructed and cannot be said to exist
objectively – false.
spectrometer, is a bit more complicated. The reading is not an object in the way
It is worth noting here that the second edition of Laboratory Life drops the word “social” from its
77
subtitle, which was “The Social Construction of Scientific Facts.” Latour argues in a postscript
that since it is implied that all interactions are social, the word is devoid of meaning.
Conveniently, it also makes it easier to slide between the meanings of “construction.”
95
that a bioassay or a bridge is. Rather, it is a measurement of some underlying
work the same way. The temperature cannot be said to exist as an object, it is
only one description of a type of energy in the air. The scale and numbers we use
to describe this energy are “social constructions” in one sense. We already use
three different scales for different reasons, and could easily come up with a
dozen more. For example, dividing the Celsius scale into 100 units between the
some fundamental relationship in nature. At the same time, the repeatability and
specific measuring system distorts our perception of the actual physical world,
but the mere fact that we invented the measuring system does not a priori do so.
Donna Haraway is likely the most frequently cited of the feminist social
solutions to the major problems to which social constructionism gives rise, even
concerned about the relativism that the position implies. She is also aware that
96
to this problem is what she calls “situated knowledges,” the subject of one her
Cyborgs and Women, is actually a compilation of essays written over many years,
it is difficult to get a coherent sense of her position, since it modifies over time. 78
There can be little doubt that Haraway is aware of the problems with social
credibility. She is someone who has observed science from the inside, and relies
She has worked extensively in the field of primatology, but became disillusioned,
both as a scientist and a feminist, with the work that she saw going on in her
field. So Haraway is not an outside observer of science but someone with direct
experience in science gives Haraway’s work a stature that the work of outsiders
might not have, it is also the source of one of the limits of her position. Haraway
recounts in detail in Simians, Cyborgs and Women the many ways in which
primatology was constructed by the social and political biases of those who
practiced it. In particular, she recounts the ways in which human gender biases
were projected onto apes, a phenomenon that becomes a feedback loop. Sexism is
projected onto apes, where that sexism is now seen as “natural” and thus not
An extended interview with Haraway conducted by Thyrza Nichols Goodeve and published
78
under the title How Like A Leaf summarizes many of the positions she has developed over time.
Much of Haraway’s writing on primatology is collected in the book Primate Visions.
79
97
that all of our worst tendencies are innate in us and perhaps even necessary for
our survival.
subjects of the study. In addition, these reflections were not politically neutral,
since they reinforced social and political biases that were harmful to women. I
take very little issue with her description of primatology, and trust that her
analysis of the field is more or less correct. The problem is that the results are
hardly surprising, and as such do not allow Haraway to make the larger claims
Many of the studies that, like Haraway’s, offer support for the prevalence
of racial and gender bias in science are studies of race and gender difference, or
easily. The sensation that apes are “like us” and share some of our social
relations is common to almost everyone who has ever seen one, even in a zoo.
We would expect that scientists who study these animals would be careful not to
anthropomorphize them and project human concerns onto them, and there are
probably many people, including scientists themselves, who believe this is both
the sectors of primatology she has been involved in, this has not traditionally
been the case. Scientists have all too easily fallen into the same trap as the zoo
98
easily, and it would seem that if they can do it in this field, why not in all of
The problem is that fields like race and gender difference or primatology
are exactly where we would expect societal biases to override any pretense of
realism. It might even be that realism is impossible in these fields, but I would
suggest that recent work that brings these biases to light makes scientists all the
more aware of the pitfalls of areas of research such as these. Studies of this type
of bias in science include two well-known texts, Stephen Jay Gould’s The
Mismeasure of Man and Carol Tavris’ The Mismeasure of Woman. Gould’s study
non-white races. Tavris’ work takes on the same task to illustrate the supposedly
scientific justifications for sexism and the ways in which these issues are
distorted in media. Although both of these works seem like ideal case studies of
the social construction of science, they do not offer support for social
organization dedicated to the defense of science and reason. The case studies
“pseudoscience,” categories recognized within science for work that loses any
claim to factual status because of the biases and desires of its authors.
Pseudoscience describes whole fields of study that are lacking in any kind of
scientific basis yet claim the status of science. By this definition, astrology might
99
pseudoscience since it uses the rhetoric and style of science to give credence to
purely religious claims. Bad science refers to work in any field that is usually
considered a scientific field, but the work is substandard or sloppy for any
number of reasons. These categories are not strict and can be combined when
someone, say, uses physiognomy (the study of the link between facial structure
genetics, to make the claim that a particular racial or ethnic group is intellectually
inferior.
The remarkable thing about the work Gould studies is that most of it
features egregious errors that can only be accounted for by the scientist’s desire
observer reveals that the evidence either does not support the claim or that the
evidence was fabricated in the first place. Most importantly, when data failed to
meet pre-arranged ideals, the scientists came up with more and more elaborate
There are two lessons in the biases discovered by Haraway, Gould, and
Tavris. This first is that fields of science that deal heavily in social considerations
are strongly subject to social biases. In all of these cases, the bias of the
researchers seems almost inevitable, given what they were studying. It is much
to the same problems. There is little social stake in the direct results of these
An interesting example of this phenomenon as applied to history was the recent libel trial in
80
Great Britain of Deborah Lipstadt, who was challenged by Holocaust denier David Irving over
the claim in her book, Denying the Holocaust: The Growing Assault on Truth and Memory, that he
was a racist. For further discussion of this trial, and its relation to postmodern epistemological
positions, see Chapter Four.
100
subjects. Even though they may have applications that have extraordinary social
and political impacts, the objects themselves, microbes and particles, have no
politics of their own. Even if the temptation to find what you wish to find is as
strong in this field as it is in the ones that involved social relations (as it most
likely is), it is much more difficult to manipulate the results. In the cases that
Gould considers, there was little work for the eugenicists to do, since they were
simply confirming the biases that people already held. In other words, their work
was unlikely to be subject to much scrutiny, and the people it affected most
directly – women and ethnic minorities – had little power to answer back or fight
against the results. In the case of a physicist’s claim that a new compound has
Microbes declared fit for human consumption will not obey the wishes of the
social constructionism, and she definitely wants the sureness of science when she
..recent social studies of science have made available a very strong social
constructionist argument for all forms of knowledge claims, most certainly
and especially scientific ones. In these tempting views, no insider’s
perspective is privileged, because all drawings of inside–outside
boundaries in knowledge are theorized as power moves, not moves
toward truth. 81
81
Haraway, Simians, Cyborgs, and Women, 184.
101
And,
The strong programme in the sociology of knowledge joins with the lovely
and nasty tools of semiology and deconstruction to insist on the rhetorical
nature of truth, including scientific truth. History is a story Western
culture buffs tell each other; science is a contestable text and a power field;
the content is the form. Period.82
As soon as Haraway has stated this position, she points out its weakness:
This is a terrifying view of the relationship of body and language for those
of us who would still like to talk about reality with more confidence then
we allow the Christian right’s discussion of the Second Coming and their
being raptured out of the final destruction of the world. We would like to
think our appeals to real worlds are more than a desperate lurch away
from cynicism and an act of faith like any other cult’s, no matter how
much space we generously give to all the rich and always historically
specific mediations through which we and everybody else must know the
world. 83
In other words, feminists and leftists still need to be able to claim that the
emancipatory politics they support are not simply a choice among many, with no
way to answer the conservatives who make their own truth claims. This is one of
which it removes the factual basis from the political goals of the very people who
endorse it. Haraway is aware of the political reasons why this position is adopted,
I, and others, started out wanting a strong tool for deconstructing the
truth claims of hostile science by showing the radical historical specificity,
and so contestability, of every layer of the onion of scientific and
technological constructions, and we end up with a kind of epistemological
electro-shock therapy, which far from ushering us into the high stakes
tables of the game of contesting public truths, lays us out on the table with
self-induced multiple personality disorder. We wanted a way to go
beyond showing bias in science (that proved too easy anyhow), and
beyond separating the good scientific sheep from the bad goats of bias and
misuse. It seemed promising to do this by the strongest possible
constructionist argument that left no cracks for reducing the issues to bias
versus objectivity, use versus misuse, science versus pseudo-science. We
82
Ibid., 185.
83
Ibid., 185.
102
unmasked the doctrines of objectivity because they threatened our
budding sense of collective historical subjectivity and agency and our
‘embodied’ accounts of the truth, and we ended up with one more excuse
for not learning any post-Newtonian physics and one more reason to drop
the old feminist self-help practices of repairing our own cars. They’re just
texts anyway, so let the boys have them back. 84
I have quoted this extraordinary passage at length because of the dual critical
constructionism causes and the potential effects of that loss on feminist politics.
At the same time, she seems to downplay that loss as an inconvenience, one
noted after the case is closed on the social construction of science. This misstep
informs the overly optimistic fix she prescribes in this chapter. Haraway depends
constructionism (as if there could be such a proof) when we have already seen
preserve the objective basis for progressive politics that Haraway desires is to
maintain exactly the distinctions between good and bad science, use and misuse,
and social constructionism that preserves the best features of both. She says
story that loses track of its mediations just where someone might be held
84
Ibid., 186.
85
Ibid., 187.
103
objectivity that can be “held responsible” has limits that Haraway does not
account for.
individual knowledge can be factual, and that by maintaining the link to the
that is just “out there,” separate from human connection, what Haraway calls the
we get to maintain a realism that can be used to argue with conservatives, while
problem with this approach. I think Haraway has the right idea about the kinds
impasse while avoiding the limitations of previous systems. But her system has a
system in my conclusion, the version she proposes here has only the promise of a
objectivity as individual systems that can be mediated across the divisions of race,
class, and gender. Each person is answerable for his or her view of the world. But
what happens when these two knowledges are at odds with one another? It is
86
Ibid., 199.
104
easy to imagine her system working on a small scale, where two people who
have conflicting views of an issue or idea attempt to reconcile their positions and
answer each other’s queries in good faith. We can imagine a good deal of mutual
understanding coming from the exchange that would be perfectly in line with
Haraway’s political goals. If instead we find that the positions are mutually
exclusive, we would assume that the participants maintain a respect for each
other’s position, or, in common parlance, “agree to disagree.” This is already the
person, this is the limit of the debate. If there is a pressing need to decide one
way or the other which of two proposed courses of action is the best one, the
be solved, since we have no other option. In other words, someone gives in either
because they are rhetorically persuaded or because they assume that their
If the debate is larger than two people, and involves social policy or
governmental decisions, the system seems impossible to put into useful practice.
We can listen to each other and agree to disagree, but we lose all of the
objectivity that Haraway wanted to maintain for political battles. How can we
out and informed, some less so but passionate, and some the result of whimsy or
objectivity that is greater than any individual or a relativism that decides the
correct course based on rhetoric or majority rule? The simple answer is that we
cannot.
105
The primary weakness of Haraway’s position is that her system of
“situated knowledges” is, ironically for a politically progressive position, far too
focused on the individual. She writes, “this chapter is an argument for situated
ways, all of them problematic. At face value, this concern with keeping
knowledge embodied means maintaining its tie to an actual person who can be
questioned and judged in relation to a position, idea or fact. If this is what she
means, and she appears to, Haraway confuses embodiment with responsibility
and the ability to question. These are not the same thing. She is right to be
not embodied can still be locatable. It might simply be located in the data of an
knowledge can still be located, pinned down, and questioned. We need not
both a person and a data set at the end of our search. Which is better to
investigate in order to challenge that claim? If we challenge the data and the
results, we have the chance to make a convincing counter claim based on the
he or she is, say, a scientist doing health research on behalf of a tobacco company.
But such questions would be irrelevant if we could not also challenge the data
87
Ibid., 191.
106
spent the last few pages ignoring Haraway’s arguments as presented in her
writing and instead attacked aspects of her personality. I do not need Haraway’s
Haraway might as well be an abstraction instead of a living person, for all the
interest if Donna Haraway turned out to be the pen name of a man or someone
knowledge as the key to responsibility raises the possibility that challenges to the
objectivity of another would be based more on whom that person is rather than
what he or she had to say. Immediately before the passage quoted above about
attempt to theorize grounds for trusting especially the vantage points of the
subjugated; there is good reason to believe vision is better from below the
within individuals and across societies. To pick only a simple example, what of
the exchange between a female western human rights worker and a man in a
third world country defending his culture’s absence of basic rights for women?
The man is probably more subjugated overall, but this is a gender issue, and he is
still a man. If their relative positions change over time, does that mean the other
88
Ibid., 190-1.
107
person’s perspective should now be given priority? This is exactly the kind of
relativism that Haraway sought to avoid in her position. We cannot answer our
political opponents if they might be able to demonstrate that they hold a superior
position over us. No matter what the criteria, whether it be subjugation status or
Let us consider the possibility that I am taking the argument for embodied
knowledge too literally, and that Haraway has a broader sense of embodiment in
then individuals. This might make sense based on Haraway’s argument above
about vision being “better from below.” Subjugated groups may have a
confrontation between a western woman and a third world man might become a
debate between groups of western women and the men who defend and enforce
the debate that would solve the problem of relativism based on subjugated
position.
become a synonym for answerable or locatable knowledge, and is now too broad
results of a piece of equipment. This is line with the realist scientific practice that
108
imagine what “unlocatable, and so irresponsible, knowledge claims” would 89
I do believe that Haraway is on the right track when she attempts to make
knowledge locatable and answerable, but she is not willing to give up on the
social constructionism that seems so appealing when she sets out. By dropping
the claim to the socially constructed nature of all science, she would be better
times. Haraway is hardly the only one to make this connection. It is one of the
more interesting issues raised by Richard Rorty, who has perhaps better
term pragmatist, which makes explicit his connection to the earlier American
Hope xvi). As we will see in our close analysis of Rorty’s position, the terms
89
Ibid., 191.
109
raises are complex, and many of them have been discussed in depth, so I will
focus on the issues that are most relevant to this argument. The first is the
much more frank about the limits of this link, but offers a sophisticated defense,
one that leads into his second major point, about the uses of objectivity to solve
political disputes. On this front he runs into many of the same issues as Haraway.
Last discussed here is his link between God and scientific objectivity, the same
connection made by Haraway and Latour, but with a much more sophisticated
criticism. 90
For detailed discussions of Rorty’s position, see Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature and
90
Objectivity, Relativism and Truth: Philosophical Papers Volume 1. Another useful introduction to
Rorty’s position is in the introduction to Philosophy and Social Hope, which also contains a number
of essays on political topics that confirm Rorty’s commitment to leftist political causes. A volume
of rebuttals to Rorty is Reading Rorty: Critical Responses to Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature
(and Beyond).
110
Those who find the pragmatist identification of truth with what is
good to believe morally offensive often say that Nietzsche, rather than
James and Dewey, drew the proper inference from the abandonment of
the idea of an object of knowledge that tells one how to rank human needs.
Those who think of pragmatism as a species of irrationalism, and of
irrationalism as selling the pass to fascism, say that James and Dewey
were blind to the antidemocratic consequences of their own ideas, and
naïve to think that one can be both a good pragmatist and a good
democrat.
Such critics make the same mistake that Nietzsche made. 91
inextricable from Platonism.” And Platonism, in this reasoning, is “the idea that
92
the will to truth is distinct from the will to happiness – or, to be a bit more precise,
the claim that human beings are divided between a quest for a lower, animal
attacking the position in which truth is seen as something outside of the human
desire for happiness, as well as the position, Nietzsche’s, in which that separation
allows one to dismiss the primacy of human happiness. In contrast, Rorty argues
that “once one sees no way of ranking human needs rather than playing them off
In fact,
Mill’s On Liberty provides all the ethical instruction you need – all the
philosophical advice you are ever going to get about your responsibilities
to other human beings. For human perfection becomes a private concern,
and our responsibility to others becomes a matter of permitting them as
much space to pursue these private concerns – to worship their own gods,
so to speak – as is compatible with granting an equal amount of space to
all. The tradition of religious toleration is extended to moral toleration.
95
91
Rorty, “Paragmatism as Romantic Polytheism,” 25.
92
Ibid., 25.
93
Ibid., 26.
94
Ibid., 24.
95
Ibid., 24.
111
This passage sounds in some ways like a defense of libertarianism, although I
collective political action. Instead, it is best summed up by its last line, a call for
96
call for the complete absence of moral rules, any more than Mill’s On Liberty is a
call for unfettered freedom. Both place important limits on tolerance based on the
happiness of others, and this is what confines our actions, rather than appeals to
So Rorty is aware that pragmatism offers no support for one political view
over another. In recognizing this, he sets himself apart from almost all of the
other social constructivists discussed here, and from the most common view in
the humanities outside of philosophy. But why would Rorty embrace such a
Throughout his paper, Rorty equates polytheism with pragmatism and realism
with monotheism, based on the link between religious tolerance and moral
tolerance described earlier. This is not quite a literal equation, since Rorty is
96
See, for example, “Back to Class Politics” in Philosophy and Social Hope.
97
Ibid., 27.
112
surely aware that polytheistic religions are perfectly capable of religious
monotheism and intolerance that causes Rorty to make some mistakes in a later
section.
result of democratic consensus” Rorty is in some ways playing the same kind of
language game that Latour uses in Pandora’s Hope, and equating reason with
control. He argues that it is this potential use of objectivity that is most likely to
be demonstrated in the public forum as a way to take away power from the
What makes his argument slightly more sophisticated is his use of the
term democratic consensus, which infers that we are not simply talking about
majority rule, and erases some of the fear that we are dealing with a mob.
liberty he borrows from Mill – is the sense that this is not straight majority rule.
We should assume instead that all sorts of minority positions have been taken
into account and considered in the final result – that is what would make it a
consensus. The problem with this even more generous view of the potential of
democracy is that consensus and majority rule are at times extremely difficult to
separate. Rorty’s view of democracy is still utilitarian in its implied goal of the
most happiness for the most people, including society’s subjugated peoples. But
113
there are still times where a utilitarian view of government does not protect
minorities at all, even when their suffering is immense. A government that rejects
take over the government is using a principled objection that may or may not be
version of pragmatism does not allow the invocation of higher reason to protect
that tiny minority from an otherwise democratic consensus, since that is his
primary rule. In confessing to this limitation, Rorty is being much more honest
with himself than either Latour or Haraway, but it still leaves us at the same
place, with minority rights in jeopardy. That Rorty is willing to accept this risk is
both a testament to his intellectual honesty and his overarching optimism. His
hope for pragmatism as a method of solving our disputes and allowing us to live
98
Ibid., 29.
114
everyone has to share the desire for democratic consensus in order for the system
to work. Pragmatism is thus an ideal system, with the same limit as Haraway’s –
the pragmatist might point out in rebuttal, it is not as though realism has been
with the claim that the fundamentalists have it wrong, not just that they don’t
have respect for democracy. Fundamentalists are likely to answer the latter
charge with the response that democracy is part of a humanist or liberal project
irresponsible is unlikely to have much effect, since they are likely to believe they
already have the moral high ground. In addition, Rorty has already called for a
“moral toleration,” but now wants a moral condemnation to be our best answer
fundamentalism, the debate between pragmatism and realism might still exist,
but without many consequences either way. In our world, this difference is
everything.
God = Science?
becomes evident that realism really is, as Rorty charges, arguing from the same
115
of knowledge that is beyond human scope and “unquestionable.” Where Rorty is
that is the result of his otherwise intriguing reading of the history of Christianity.
emphasis on human fraternity – the idea that for Christians there is neither Jew
nor Greek, and the related idea that love is the only law – might have been only
he means is that Christianity might have adopted the “love thy neighbour” edict
without the monotheism that has been its counterpoint. Such a church would
have avoided much of its problems through the centuries and preserved the best
A Christianity that was merely ethical – the sort Jefferson and other
Enlightenment thinkers commended and was later propounded by
theologians of the social gospel – might have sloughed-off exclusionism
by viewing Jesus as one incarnation of the divine among others. The
celebration of an ethics of love would have then taken its place within the
relatively tolerant polytheism of the Roman Empire, having disjoined the
idea of human brotherhood from the claim to represent the will of an
omnipotent and monopolistic Heavenly Father (not to mention the idea
that there is no salvation outside the Christian Church).
Had they preached such a merely moral and social gospel, the
Christians would never have bothered to develop a natural theology. So
thirteenth-century Christians would not have worried about whether the
Scriptures could be reconciled with Aristotle. Seventeenth-century
believers would not have worried about whether they could be reconciled
with Newton, nor those in the nineteenth century about whether they
could be reconciled with Darwin. These hypothetical Christians would
have treated Scripture as useful for purposes for which Aristotle, Newton,
and Darwin were useless, and as useless for purposes of prediction and
control of the environment. As things stood, however, the Christian
churches remained obsessed by the Platonic idea that both Truth and God
are One. So it was natural, when physical science began to make some
progress, that its practitioners should take over its rhetoric, and thereby
stir up a war between science and theology, between Scientific Truth and
Religious Faith.100
99
Ibid., 26.
100
Ibid., 26-7.
116
Most of this alternate history is dramatically appealing, offering the prospect of a
religion based on good deeds without the Crusades or the Inquisition. It is the
most compelling case for the link between religious fundamentalism and
scientific objectivity. In Rorty’s assessment, the latter is the direct result of the
former. If the church had not insisted that it held the only path to the truth,
that objectivity and realism are the only ways to counter fundamentalism, Rorty
would reply that this is exactly the problem. Rather than continue the charade,
science should admit that all truth is contingent and this would in turn undo the
of religion that follows the alternate path Rorty has sketched out. It is an
another kind of fundamentalism, he forgets to carry his analogy all the way
through to its logical conclusion. In his assessment of religion, Rorty says that it
could have adopted the useful parts (“love thy neighbour”) that are part of the
everyday action of the faith. In his view, there is a division between these
everyday ideals of the church, and the overarching monotheism that claims that
this is the only way to live. Similarly, science has everyday accomplishments that
are extraordinarily useful, and these might be separated from the “monotheism”
of science, the idea that science is the only way to look at the world. Rorty’s
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mistake is that although he envisions a religion that is “useful for purposes for
which Aristotle, Newton and Darwin [are] useless, and as useless for purposes of
prediction an control of the environment,” he does not allow for a science that is
useless for the purposes of ethical commandments, and recognizes that it is useless.
I would argue that modern science is well aware that it has areas in which it is
useful, like postponing death, and areas in which it is useless, like pondering the
of death is a good thing. In this way, science is not monotheistic in the sense that
Rorty supposes. He confuses objectivity on a small scale – the ability to claim that
certain things are true throughout the universe regardless of the observations or
desires of humans – with a claim that science can answer all of our questions
about everything. We can easily separate these two claims. For example, we are
quite capable of holding these two ideas about science in our head at the same
analyzing poetic imagery. Science can be objective within the realm of science,
and the fact that this realm has limitations has no consequences for this
trick. He misses the fact that one does not necessarily imply the other.
The fact that science cannot explain everything does not mean that all of
feel the need to knock science off its perch. It is this confusion that motivates
Haraway, who wants to preserve objectivity while attacking the paper tiger of
scientific monotheism. While there have been times in our history when it has
been regularly suggested that science will eventually solve all of the world’s
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problems, this is but a quirk of modernity that very quickly proved foolish. It
would be overkill to attack all of science for the actions of a few overeager
supporters whose work was not very convincing in the first place. We might
think it foolish to expect that science would eventually be able to explain our
reactions to painting, film, and other arts, replacing our more subjective critical
foundational claims are limited to one culture or historical period and not
mistake for a scientist to claim that science can explain ethics, religion, and art, it
is similarly foolish for a scholar of the humanities to claim that the tools of these
disciplines must be able to be applied to the sciences. Yet that is what many
social constructivists have in essence argued. In the next chapter, we will see
what happens when a scholar is too easily convinced that superficial analogies
between arts and sciences mean that the two fields work the same way. Like
enamoured of his tools to see that they are not appropriate for the task at hand.
119
Chapter Four: Film as History
Debates about the socially constructed nature of history are more directly
related to the development of film studies than similar debates about science.
Even though these controversies are closely related and draw from similar
philosophical and political perspectives, it makes sense that film studies would
draw more from the historical thread of the debate over social constructionism,
since historical research is an inherent part of film studies. This chapter thus
examines some of the key works in contemporary discussions about the social
which the political dimensions of social construction are not as clear as might
constructionism does not necessarily provide support for the political left. In this
chapter I will extend that debate to consider some of the ways in which social
constructionism could work against progressive politics and the sense of history
that is crucial to those politics. In addition, I will consider relevant film examples
that crystallize this debate and make clear the relevance of these historical
responses to two films that have been controversial for their apparent distortions
of historical events. The first film is Oliver Stone’s JFK (1991), which makes a
strong argument for the theory that the assassination of President John F.
Kennedy in 1963 was not the work of a single gunman, and was instead the
result of a complex conspiracy carried out to ensure that Kennedy would not be
able to pull American troops out of the Vietnam war, as Stone believes he was
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about to do. The film fits into a long tradition in the United States of skepticism
about the official version of events provided by the Warren Commission, which
concluded that Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone. When the film was released,
101
many media commentators and historians sharply criticized it for the way it
Supplement:
Grenier goes on to note that despite the chorus of criticism of this film
from numerous political commentators from all parts of the political spectrum,
film scholars have generally liked the movie. He concludes sarcastically that
“[p]erhaps one should not buy a used car from a film critic.” The implications of
Stone’s film for film studies and for social constructivist theory are complex and
Hayden White points out that the posters for Stone’s film listed it as JFK: The Story That Won’t
101
Go Away. White uses this to support his point that this part of a trauma that cannot be “precisely
remembered.” (“The Modernist Event,” 37, endnote) Another way of reading it is to see this
phrase as fitting the film into a long-standing discussion in American culture about who was
responsible for the President’s death. The “story” here is not the trauma of the assassination as
White asserts, but the conspiracy theories about who did it.
See, for example, the range of responses collected by Stone and Zachary Sklar in the published
102
121
In contrast to Stone’s JFK, D.W. Griffith’s The Birth of a Nation (1915) has
long been criticized for its clearly racist representation of the Reconstruction
period in the American south following the Civil War. Like Stone’s film,
controversy dogged this work as soon as it was released. The film was the subject
of protest by African Americans, and was banned in the state of Ohio. Film 104
scholars’ relationship to the film has been shifting and multi-faceted. Over the
years, many commentators focused on the film’s artistry and either downplayed
or gently excused the film’s racism. In recent years, the focus on racism has
of the film as both a work of artistic genius that is key to understanding the early
America’s) racism. Scott Simmon argues that few 20 century works of popular
th
art have had their meanings shift so completely. It is unlikely that anyone
105
would now apply a social constructivist argument to The Birth of a Nation. No one
would argue that Griffith’s distortions are irrelevant or that they are an equally
valid view of history. That most contemporary scholars are appalled by Griffith’s
version of history speaks to our discomfort with versions of history that differ
substantially from our own. How can we reconcile this discomfort with a social
constructivist view of history as contingent and subjective with our need to call
The Birth of a Nation was banned in Ohio with the support of Republican Governor Frank B.
104
Willis. Willis’s successor, James M. Cox, allowed the film to be shown for two years and then
banned it again in 1918, apparently in the name of wartime unity. One black newspaper reacted
to the second ban by asking “Are antagonisms to be permitted in times of peace, and prevented
only in times of war? Are the feelings of the colored man to be respected only so long as he is
fighting?” See “Gov. Cox Admits Birth of a Nation Unfit” and “ex-Gov. Willis Stands Vindicated”
The Ohio State Monitor. October 19, 1918. 3.
Simmon summarizes the history of apologies for the film’s racism, including some quite recent
105
attempts. He writes,” it can only muddle issues further to deny what is evident to all but the most
determined apologists: The Birth of a Nation has evolved into one of the ugliest artifacts of
American popular art” The Films of D.W. Griffith, 105
122
Griffith’s history wrong? That dilemma is central to this chapter. Since this
debate about the possibilities of historical objectivity is not specific to film studies,
we will begin by reviewing key arguments in the field. As in the earlier section, I
have chosen the best-argued examples of these perspectives, as well as those that
Michel de Certeau’s 1975 collection The Writing of History sums up much of the
values, able to conduct its work in positivist objectivity. De Certeau begins his
106
research, the split between subject and object. Historians immediately separate
the present from the past, and in doing so impose a subject/object split. In this
regard, history has much in common with medicine. Both disciplines “are born
almost simultaneously from the rift between the subject that is supposedly
that no such division is possible, since “while these discourses speak of history,
they are already situated in history.” In other words, the historian is no more
108
able than his object of study or anyone else of escaping the biases and
The term “positivism” refers, as David Hess points out, to a philosophical position that puts
106
substantial faith in the scientific method. Often parodied as a naïve version of realism, Hess
summarizes it as “I’m positive I’m right because my position is founded on science” (8).
De Certeau, The Writing of History, 3.
107
Ibid., 20.
108
123
philosophies of the period. De Certeau is particularly critical of the concept of the
discipline of history that refuses to examine the situation of its own writing, de
overstated however. Much of the rhetoric in the first sections of The Writing of
with a type of despotic royalty and we are encouraged to support the popular
will to counter this tyranny. De Certeau portrays the first historians as officials of
the prince, whose job is to tell the prince’s story – to be an observer of power
without actually sharing in power. He draws a direct line between the prince, the
state, the patron, and the thesis director who “designates the legitimizing place...
inside of which and through which analysis has its place.” The insinuation is
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fairly moderate call to be more aware of the social and cultural factors of writing
history. He is concerned that history without theory “will necessarily drift into
the dogmatism of ‘eternal values’ or into an apology for a ‘timelessness.’” Read 112
109
Ibid., 28.
110
Ibid., 29.
111
Ibid., 10.
112
Ibid., 57.
124
as a reaction to positivism, and to the general conservative tendency to argue
that the status quo is “natural” and “unchangeable,” de Certeau’s arguments are
a necessary counterpoint. They are less useful as support for the idea of history’s
At the end of the chapter ‘Making History,’ de Certeau says that he is attempting
to change the position of history from that of the king able to convince his public
he is dressed to that of the child who points out the lies of those in power. But for
the promise of rational and realist research. We must, in a sense, be able to argue
that the king really is naked. To argue instead that such judgments are subjective
Like those of de Certeau, the early writings of historian Hayden White can
comfortable with its own place. White sees history as situating itself between
science and art and claiming the best characteristics of both. It is this balance that
White attacks in Tropics of Discourse, arguing that history can claim to be the best
of neither science nor art. In his view, history borrows from models of science
113
and art that are vastly outdated. The models that history follows are late
White’s key works in this area are, in addition to Tropics of Discourse, Metahistory: The Historical
113
Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe and The Content of the Form. A useful overview of
Hayden White and Richard Rorty that situates them in relation to seminal debates about
objectivity that are usually traced to Edward Carr and Geoffrey Elton is Keith Jenkins’ On ‘What
is History?’ A frequently referenced text in historiography is Peter Novick’s That Noble Dream: The
“Objectivity Question” and the American Historical Profession.
125
nineteenth century social science and mid-19th century art. His objection to the
So on one hand we might read this argument as a reaction to historians who see
their work as simply objective, if such purebred positivists actually exist. On the
other, White is clearly wrong in his claim that “most scientists” reject objectivity.
The difficulty here is separating several interrelated ideas that White has
conflated. The first question we need to ask about historical or scientific research
is whether the choice of questions asked have an influence on the results. The
questions we do not ask. The problem with this question as asked lies in the
conception of the phrase “an influence” – the degree of influence is not specified,
and this is really what social constructivists and realists are arguing about much
of the time. Realists admit that the choice of question has an influence but
minimize the affect on outcome or hold that the degree of influence can be
assessed in the final product. Social constructivists argue essentially that such
If this difference of opinion seems narrow, it shrinks further when we leave the
114
White, Tropics of Discourse, 43.
126
If we recognize that the choice of questions has an influence on the results,
the next question is whether the choice of questions is a result of social and
political influences. The answer here would be a stronger yes, since despite the
social isolation of some scientific and historical research, the bulk of the work,
particularly in science, is determined by what can get funded. This often places a
when White argues that historians sometimes see their facts as “given,” he is
right in the sense that they have to be looked for, and the way in which we look
will obviously limit the potential results. It is his jump from this argument to a
greater skepticism about the potential for objectivity in historical research that is
a problem. This is more troubling because in this and other writings, White
up. This is evident in his discussion of the “art” of history and the
of art. By this he means that the narrative form of much written history owes its
structure to the novels of the period. The stories tend to be linear and relatively
clear with an organized structure. Since the mid-19th century, White notes, the
and character. White laments that history has restricted itself to old-fashioned
models, when there are so many interesting forms to try out. He seems to be
127
the goals of historical writing. These experiments with narrative might further
distance historical writing from any claim to objectivity but since, in White’s
view, this is an impossible goal anyway, we may as well have work that is
interesting to read.
115
Rosen, Change Mummified, 7.
116
White, “The Modernist Event,” 24.
128
This assessment of the disaster sets up a classic false dilemma. Since, in
the hours immediately following the accident, no one was able to explain exactly
what had caused the explosion, White argues that, in essence, all bets were off
when it came to describing the event. In doing so, he fails to consider possibilities
that lie between these theoretical extremes. In fact, in the immediate aftermath of
the event, the number of stories that could be told was quite small, hardly “any
number.” White’s mistake lies in his confusion over the meaning of “happened.”
He confuses the recounting of events – that, shortly after takeoff, still in view of
spectators and news cameras, the shuttle exploded – with the ability to explain
the causes of those events – it was not immediately obvious what had caused the
disaster. As far as the events are concerned – the shuttle exploded – there was
only one story. Even if we were to consider the initial explanations for the causes
of the disaster, information that was admittedly less definite in the hours after
the explosion, it was reasonably obvious that some sort of mechanical or human
error was to blame. The shuttle was not, for instance, shot down by MiG fighters
or space ships. While there was always the possibility of sabotage, there were in
fact an extremely limited number of possible stories one could tell about the
explosion. In his assessment, White implies that the absence of a singular master
narrative in the postmodern era means that anything goes – merely trading one
White spends the largest part of his essay considering the nature of
historical representation of the Holocaust, and argues that this, and other
129
in traditional narrative form. He argues, essentially, that the magnitude of these
117
events makes more fluid postmodern narratives both necessary and desirable, as
a way of reflecting that these events cannot simply be recounted. Again, White
falls into a mistake similar to the one he made with the Challenger disaster.
consciences are incredibly difficult to define. Entering into the realm of human
governments acted as they did. But the historical events themselves are
reasonably fixed. Our knowledge of them grows steadily through research, and
though accounts sometimes change based on new evidence, this is not the same
find out about them. To argue that realism is ill equipped to deal with the event
plays directly into the hands of those, like Holocaust deniers, who rely on slips in
that has no realistic basis. The subtler part of White’s argument is that the
recounting of the facts of the Holocaust implies some sort of mastery of the
events, an understanding that cuts off further questions. In other words, to think
that we can explain the events means that we assume we can explain the causes
as well. This is a useful warning, but unnecessary. The raw numbers of dead
118
and the details of the Holocaust raise more questions about the causes of the
event as they are recounted, not less. It is only because of the “hardness” of the
117
Ibid., 30.
118
Ibid., 32.
130
numbers and sureness of our history that we can begin to grapple with the “why.”
In one sense, White has the relationship backwards. He suggests that the
our ability to document the events. Rather, it should be clear that without a solid
events and the line between truth and fiction (while maintaining that he does not
want to undermine the factual nature of the Holocaust) that is most troubling. He
maintains that “facts are a function of the meaning assigned to events” while 119
arguing, unsurprisingly, that he does not want to say that these events did not
take place. He states explicitly that the “suggestion that the meanings of these
events… remain ambiguous… should not be taken to imply in any way that such
events never happened,” but he cannot escape the fact that his general theories
120
about the nature of historical fact endorse precisely that view. Unfortunately, this
belief in the socially constructed nature of historical facts corresponds all too well
emphatically not included in this group, I would argue that his position helps
119
Ibid., 21.
120
Ibid., 20.
131
Social Constructionism and Holocaust Denial
In the case of those who deny the standard historical account of the
the facts of the Holocaust, not the meanings of those facts. In other words, they
do not try to argue that the 6,000,000 deaths were justified (some people do of
course, but they are a separate, generally less sophisticated group). Instead they
argue that the deaths never happened at all, that the story of the Holocaust has
been made up to further the agenda of Jewish people and their sympathizers in
the modern era – an argument not so different from the idea that we write the
histories we want in the present rather than being bound by an actual past.
fixed in contemporary Western society (as an image of pure evil) that there is
little point in trying to affect it. This means the only way for anti-Semites to
challenge this horrific event is to argue that it did not, in fact, happen at all, or
that it has been greatly exaggerated. Since the meaning cannot be changed to fit
their ends, anti-Semites attempt to challenge the basic facts. Thus, the way in
which the meaning and status of the Holocaust are debated by those who deny it
and those who confront them completely contradicts both White’s view of the
event and his advice for dealing with it. Instead of being ambiguous, the event is
surprisingly fixed.
132
White does not see a conflict within his paper because it is obvious, in a
sense, that the Holocaust really happened and that only a fool or bigot would
argue otherwise. This is also “obvious” to most of his readers. The roots of this
agreement are difficult to assess, but it seems reasonable to suggest that the high
that consensus points are not questioned as often as they could or should be. This
might explain how a belief in the fluid nature of historical facts can be
words, since we all agree that we’re not denying the Holocaust, there is no need
to clarify the arguments themselves. But for the theory to be more widely
to apply widely, we must consider what happens when the theory slips outside
assume that it will be adopted by those who do not share our politics. And yet,
this has not been a major component of social constructivist debates to this point.
cultural studies, to mistake consensus for truth. This can be a problem in any
discipline but it has been particularly acute in fields that have politics as their
root. That no one has noticed the conflicts in theories like White’s seems to me
which undermine the notion of truth are just as damaging to progressive ideas as
133
undermines the Warren commission’s version of the Kennedy assassination, it
also undermines the standard account of the Holocaust. When we give up the
dissatisfaction with historical research and throwing open the doors to any
Deborah Lipstadt, who was challenged by Holocaust denier David Irving over
her book, Denying the Holocaust: The Growing Assault on Truth and Memory. In the
book, Lipstadt labeled Irving a racist, and he sued for defamation under the
United Kingdom’s relatively strict libel laws. The defense had the difficult task of
proving that Irving’s views on the Holocaust were not within the realm of
academic debate. The trial centered on the question of whether Irving’s conduct
in researching his many books could be construed as honest. The defense argued
that the only way for Irving to come to the conclusions that he did was to have
included in such an inquiry. Lipstadt won the case and destroyed Irving’s
implied link between postmodernism and Holocaust denial. He points out that
postmodernism does not cause Holocaust denial, which is true, but falters
Irving trial. Eaglestone spends some of his book attacking the idea of objectivity
in history for some of the same reasons as Hayden White, and he cites White
134
when the court finds that Irving violated the rules and standards of history,
Eaglestone agrees that Irving has done so but says that this is Irving failing to
follow the genre’s conventions. In other words, he agrees with the court that
Irving’s writings are not history, but disagrees with the court on what history is.
Importantly, he does not say that the court’s reasons for concluding that Irving’s
writing were “not history” are the wrong reasons. He agrees with these reasons
reading of the court’s judgement and find support for his case without actually
making it. Lest this seem harsh, a direct quote clarifies the point:
pretend that this judgement supports social constructionism. But the only way he
can make this case is if he has convinced us that these are the same thing.
Besides quoting White approvingly, there is nothing in this short book to do that.
He makes the usual mistakes of discounting the ways in which various accounts
of an event can minimize each other’s biases, and accusing traditional history of
writing signposts its evidence and conjecture in the language of the text (See
Chapter Five). Most importantly, at no point does he argue how this situated
121
Eaglestone, Postmodernism and Holocaust Denial, 59.
135
historian is. How can we condemn Irving as a non-historian or anti-Semite
without recourse to realist rules of fact and evidence? Eaglestone argues that we
can’t, but tries to get around this by again calling all of these rules genre
conventions.
are valuable, even if he insists that they have no basis other than convention. The
was not on trial in this case) for “violating genre conventions”? Irving lost his
case, even under Britain’s strict libel laws, because he offered accounts so
different from those supported by evidence that he could credibly be called a liar
and have his writing declared “untrue.” The court stuck to realism and could not
have decided as it did without it. Arguing that this decision is based on
rescue social constructionism from what Eaglestone openly admits is its most
Like Hayden White, Robert Rosenstone is a historian who has moved into
film studies, although he has done so to a much greater extent, publishing two
describes his journey from traditional historian to one who accepts a more
relativist postmodern position. This shift is inspired by theorists like White, but
122
also by an interest in films, and a desire to see films given a place as historical
works that can contribute to a dialogue about the past. The last part is a noble
122
Rosenstone, Visions of the Past, 1-16.
136
goal, but Rosenstone seems to believe that the only way for films to contribute to
In an article titled “The Future of the Past: Film and the Beginnings of
history over postmodernism and points out that for all of the attention paid to
the issue and the heated tone of the debate on both sides, very few works of
history have been produced that can actually be labeled postmodern. Critics of
postmodernism, he argues, point to the same handful of titles again and again,
traditional style of writing history even as they expand the subject matter of the
discipline by studying minorities, the poor, and “others” whose place in the past
study of history but one that has become firmly established over the past 30
looking at the past that foregrounds the uncertainty and tentativeness of facts or
evidence.
Rosenstone laments the fact that more postmodern histories have not been
written. He takes comfort though in the way that a number of films have been
number of these projects, such as Jill Godmilow’s Far From Poland, that are about
documentaries of some kind, and many of them are strong and innovative films
137
that deserve attention. The problem with Rosenstone’s analysis is that he
disregards the significant gaps between the works he labels postmodern history
and the general notion of what history is for. He is right that there are few books
that could be properly called postmodern history, primarily because such works
still expect that its conclusions are in line with what we already know about the
topic or that sufficient evidence for revision has been presented in the text. An
account that fictionalizes the past or openly re-imagines the past without
that refute or disprove previous notions. Rosenstone is aware that realism is the
123
to which realism is the basis of our conceptions of knowledge and the ability to
gather knowledge. It is not just the foundation for present historical practice, but
the foundation for the possibility of history. While the films he mentions might
be great films, and might also demonstrate some of the difficulties of historical
research, they do not substitute for an actual attempt to know the past. Far From
compelling argument about the difficulty of such projects and the relation of
123
Windschuttle, The Killing of History, 79.
138
filmic works whose purpose is to represent history as accurately as possible. So
while filmmakers are able to put into practice the theories of postmodernism in a
way that historians cannot, these works are not comparable in purpose or result.
Rosenstone thinks that there are so few postmodern histories because writers are
the controversy surrounding JFK and Hayden White’s reaction to it. She begins
by asking what makes JFK so unusual. Is it that the film dramatizes historical
history? As she argues using historical examples, these are all “normal media
practices.” In effect, Staiger argues that debates about JFK are not debates about
124
the possibility of representation, and thus the assassination does not fit White’s
out that critics of the film generally disagree with its argument. They are not
confused.
124
Staiger, “Cinematic Shots,” 49.
125
Ibid., 50.
139
Staiger differentiates between contesting historical narratives and “the radical
notion that history itself is fictional.” But she seems to place most postmodern
126
theories of history in the first half of this division, and here I would disagree. She
historical narratives are questioned, and takes this to mean that postmodernism
that the notion of contesting historical narratives has always been the realist
nomenclature.
Staiger points out that polls have found that 22% of American adults think
it is possible that the Holocaust never happened. She rightfully finds this
of history certainly did not cause this belief – if only because postmodernism is
only now spreading beyond the academy and Holocaust denial has a much
counter this belief. Postmodernism did not start this, but it makes it difficult to
end it and may eventually help it spread. Only a realist view of history, where
more accurate representation of what actually happened, can deal with these
126
Ibid., 51.
127
Ibid., 54.
140
issues. Traditional history has always been about revision in light of new
evidence. In recent years, much revision has been done as historians have moved
from focusing on “great men” to telling history from the bottom up, researching
the lives of those whose achievements and/or day to day existence has been
similar factual basis and draw primarily on evidence rather than theory.
In this section I will consider two case studies, and attempt to determine
how we might account for films that claim to tell historical stories. I have chosen
to center this debate on two films that are particularly suited for use in
Stone’s JFK and D.W. Griffith’s The Birth of a Nation have much in common as
historical fiction films that have been the focus of considerable controversy. Both
films can be viewed as significant formal achievements: Griffith’s work was the
films, while Stone’s film won a well-deserved Academy Award for Best Editing.
In each case, the style of the film was central to the effectiveness of its message.
In addition, both directors put considerable effort into claiming that their films
were historically accurate in the face of significant public criticism. Stone and
Stone in an annotated screenplay and Griffith in the intertitles of the film itself.
The films are each about a politically contested past that was relatively recent at
the time of release. Lastly, both of these films have been the subject of a
141
considerable amount of study by film scholars, which makes them useful for
examining the way questions of historical representation have been dealt with in
film studies. There are several books devoted to Oliver Stone’s films and their
it the subject of more scholarly attention than almost any other film.
see multiple views of history within the film itself or to read the film as one
version of history against the official version of events, and conclude that the
synthesize the opposing views. Indeed, given the range of accounts of President
attempt is Gerald Posner’s Case Closed, which relies on sound analysis technology
not previously available to argue that Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone. Posner
unlikely that his work will provide closure in this debate. Finality in this case is
Is the film, as Janet Staiger claims, part of a realist argument about the
on what you are looking for and how hard you try to get a cohesive message out
A CBS News Poll conducted for the 35 anniversary of the assassination in 1998 (five years after
128 th
Posner’s book) found that conspiracy theories still held sway with the American public. Did
Oswald Act Alone?: Yes 10%, No 76%. Was there an official cover-up?: Yes 74%, No 13%. Will we
ever know the truth?: Yes 19%, No 77%. CBS noted that a “majority of Americans have expressed
doubt about a single assassin at least since Gallup first asked the question in 1966.”
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of the film. At some points in the film the message is straightforward, most
Donald Sutherland. Stone uses this invented character to lay out the conspiracy
theory clearly from the mouth of one person. X tells Garrison that he is correct
that the president’s murder was part of a conspiracy, and explains the multiple
reasons for why this happened, most of which are attributable to the theory
(endorsed by Stone) that Kennedy would have pulled American forces out of
Vietnam. It is at this point that the message of the film is clearest. The message is
linear and verbal, with support from images of the key events X describes. At
However, the overall effect of the film by its end is not the reinforcement
of a single clear narrative like the one X recounts. The film offers a range of
possible culprits in the assassination, from anti-Castro Cubans and the CIA to
Lyndon Johnson, the Dallas police and the Mafia. It is never clear whether Stone
is arguing that all of these people were involved. At times he has various
characters ridicule elements of this conspiracy – even Garrison mocks the idea
that the Mafia has the power to pull off something of this magnitude. The film
never clearly fingers a distinct culprit or makes a case for a single possible series
the Warren commission’s version of the assassination. One might not leave the
film convinced of any one version of events, but it is difficult to accept any of the
film and still believe that Oswald acted alone. This is the “TKO” that Richard
Grenier described in his review. The film so overwhelms with its pace that one
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gives up hope of knowing the event. In this regard, JFK is a postmodern film, one
that argues against the possibility of knowing history and for the idea that any
power.
who believe the event is tellable, and at times Stone’s responses to his critics
seem to take place within a realist framework. When it came to specifics about
what did or did not happen, Stone was more than willing to present his evidence.
The overall effect of the film itself though is to argue against the possibility of
synthesis and our potential for knowing what “really” happened. This is largely
a result of its style, a series of quick cuts and changing film stocks that make this
likely the fastest moving three-hour film ever made. JFK does not allow time for
contemplation.
Stone’s characters, and Stone himself, do not seem to see history as unknowable
understand it. Evidence makes historical knowledge possible, but only if that
power argues that this boundary is not easily overcome. He seems to see it as a
nearly inevitable result of political power. The extent to which the inability to
know the past is tied to one’s lack of power in a society is the extent to which
specific limits on knowledge and assign blame. If Stone does not see this
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corruption as inevitable, and his hagiographic ideas about John F. Kennedy
suggest that he does not, then he could be viewed as a practical realist who still
Despite the volume of his writing on the subject, it is unclear exactly how
historian and dramatist of historical events, while leaning toward the latter. He
rejects the term “cinematic historian” as well as the idea that his work is “just a
claiming the right to have his ideas about history seriously considered by the
positions, the public debate about his films, JFK in particular, seems to be an
attempt to force him into one camp or the other. He must be either presenting his
merely making movies, meaning that he should avoid taking strong positions on
answer challenges about his films would seem to earn him some credit as a
filmmaker who thinks carefully about history. Indeed, his writings often seem
realist, it is clear that his films and their reception offer tacit approval to social
and the sheer range of opinions about the topics Stone tackles in his historical
See the collected criticism in Stone and Sklar’s annotated screenplay for JFK and Toplin’s Oliver
130
Stone’s USA.
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films seems to offer the clearest possible example that, regardless of the merits of
power and rejects master narratives. Indeed, as should be clear by know, I have
difficulty condemning Stone’s work or his methods based on the work he has
produced. I would maintain however, that this reluctance, on my part and on the
not have as much of a problem with Stone because the politics of his films either
and politics, it is necessary to choose a film that does not reflect mainstream
political views. The film that most challenges a social constructivist conception of
Reconstruction in the American south following the Civil War. In the 1915 film,
the white south is overrun by newly freed blacks and “carpetbaggers” from the
north. The climax of the film is the formation of the Ku Klux Klan, who terrorize
white Union soldiers and southerners unite in defense of their “Aryan birthright”
against marauding black soldiers, who are played by white actors in blackface. In
is interesting to consider the way in which one view of the film has steadily
replaced an earlier contradictory version. Scott Simmon points out that there are
few cultural artifacts whose meaning has shifted so completely over time, and
although controversy has followed this film from the time of its release, the
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critical perception of it has evolved more subtly. The filmic achievements of Birth
of a Nation were lauded at the time, and it was extremely popular, even at the
version of history was absolutely accurate, and that he had consulted numerous
The primary text of The Birth of A Nation was Thomas Dixon’s The
Clansman, a book that is even more racist in its accounts than Griffith’s film. He
substantial weight. From the numerous biographies and Griffith’s own writings,
his conviction that he told an accurate, if somewhat ugly, truth is what carries
him through much of the criticism the film evoked from the NAACP and others
pained by the condemnation of his film, and remarked that blacks seemed to him
like ungrateful children who had been given everything. It seems Griffith’s
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thesis of his film. Although the black and mulatto characters seem like symbols
of evil, pursuing and raping white women, Griffith argued later that they were
Some of Griffith’s responses are collected in the collections Focus on D.W. Griffith edited by
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Harry Geduld, and Focus on The Birth of a Nation, edited by Fred Silva. Biographers have tended
to downplay or excuse the racism of the film, especially those writing before about 1980. Strong
defenses of Griffith’s racism are Homer Croy’s Star Maker: The Story of D.W. Griffith (1959), and
William Everson’s American Silent Film (1978). More nuanced defenses are included in Richard
Schickel’s D.W. Griffith: An American Life (1984) and Martin Williams’ Griffith: First Artist of the
Movies (1980).
Williams, Griffith: First Artist of the Movies, 78.
132
147
not to blame, that it was white Northern carpetbaggers who had caused all of the
could reasonably maintain that his film was the truth as he saw it. The
widespread acceptance of the film suggests that, despite protests, the film was in
Wilson’s stature alone as both a source and endorser of the film gave the film
“establishment” credentials. Griffith was able to claim that those who criticized
his film were politically motivated and did not have facts to back themselves up.
He at times criticizes the actions of white politicians who condemned his film as
Both the implied divisions between “white” and “black” history and the
changing view of Birth’s history since 1915 seem like strong support for the idea
structure based on racism, in which the past must play a role in supporting the
present. History, in this case, has definitely been “written by the winners,” and
Griffith’s film plays a key role in justifying that victory. At the time, African
Americans and their supporters had an alternate view of history based on their
experience, which was also a view that had significant political ramifications.
The history of the exploitation and slavery that black Americans had endured for
133
See Griffith’s letter to the editor of the New York Globe in Lang, 169.
134
Griffith, “How I Made The Birth of a Nation,” 41.
148
centuries was as central to the nascent struggle for equality in 1915 as it was
during the 1960s. Thus, the political struggle of the time period virtually defines
the history of that time. These tensions would seem to be strong support for
social constructionism.
nearly ninety years later. If we recognize that both Griffith’s view of the
Reconstruction and our own present day view are social constructions of their
time of production, how can we have any confidence in our version of events?
Are both versions equally true? It is extremely difficult to endorse this type of
constructionism here seems to slip into a type of relativism, in which one version
way to declare one version of history incorrect, to support counter claims with
I would argue that few social constructivists really are relativists who
would support the notion that Griffith’s version of history is different but
Three, Donna Haraway hints at an awareness of this problem, but has difficulty
reconciling social constructionism with the need to be able to answer racists or,
in her example, the Christian right. I would argue that in contemporary accounts
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of Griffitth’s film and its racism, the argument that the history is wrong is
This simple argument for realism fails to account for the status of history
in 1915, relying as it does on our own distance from the making of the film. Any
epistemological theory must be able to account for the ways in which history has
been told in the past as well as providing verdicts in the present. Realist
historians would view Griffith’s version of history as “bad” history, one that
includes obvious distortions. In one sense, this response would not be very
different from academic historians’ reaction to many fiction films – pointing out
all of the places where the film has it wrong. But if some of the written histories
How does realism account for the change of perspectives over time? It
does so in two ways. The first is by assuming that change occurs because new
evidence has accrued – this is the optimism of realism I alluded to earlier. This
The Birth of a Nation does not seem attributable to lack of evidence. Even if
Griffith himself had had only racist sources from which to draw, we would still
have to account for those sources. The bias here is political and cultural, and
cannot be conceived as a simple lack of evidence. So the second way that realism
accounts for such histories is by writing those efforts off as bad history – in other
See, for example, the essays by Janet Staiger, and Michael Rogin collected in Lang.
135
I have not completed a detailed study of the written sources available to Griffith in 1915. We do
136
know that he had “reputable” sources available to him, including Wilson, and the point here is
that our conceptions of history do change over time, and realism needs to be able to account for
that change.
150
words, history that does not conform to the evidentiary standards of realism.
Thus, part of any realist historiography is the march toward greater realism.
Realism presumes that historians (if not societies) learn from their mistakes.
In this sense, realism itself is a closed system that accounts for its own
success by rules it has devised. Since it holds the concept of logic to be central to
the project, there is no way to logically destroy the system and little opportunity
recognize that realism is in some way self-justifying. What is crucial about this
paradox is the link to logic. Throughout this work I have been arguing that social
and logic are inherently linked, and though it easy to imagine the former as an
to shift the discussion to the question of the political usefulness of realism and
social constructionism. It is here that the debate has the most relevance for film
and media scholars. While realism might seem overly optimistic from a
political opinion. A social constructivist might hold that we can differ from
Griffith on the basis of politics, and that those politics are enough without
recourse to realism. This is essentially a pragmatic view, and one that can be
that our view is based on a political desire for equality, but how can we force that
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view on others who do not share that aim? From an epistemological perspective,
we cannot have a history dependent on politics without allowing others the same
luxury. The stakes in these debates are not academic. The Birth of a Nation had a
hand in the resurgence of the Ku Klux Klan in the late teens and 1920s. As
Maxim Simcovitch points out, the film became a Klan recruiting film from its
premiere in Atlanta, and was used by the KKK for years at meetings for new
a theory, but it is also a film that has been central to film studies for many years.
Our evolving responses to the film have been social and political, but in order to
inevitably realists. Our impulse to claim that “this did not happen” is entirely a
realist one. Both our contemporary position, and our sense of that position’s
relation to history, are realist. Some histories might be “socially constructed,” but
only realism allows us to properly account for those histories and divide them
In the next chapter, I consider the differences between filmic and written
histories by focusing on the differences between film theory and the practice of
film history. I draw this distinction to avoid arguing that films themselves must
always be a form of realist historical practice. None of this discussion means that
directors ought to stop making historical films until they can get all the details
right, or that they ought to sacrifice all narrative structure to the needs of the
137
Simcovitch, “The Impact of Griffith’s Birth of a Nation on the Modern Ku Klux Klan,” 75.
152
historical record. It simply means that filmmakers can continue to do what they
seem to know they are already doing – making films that dramatize the past, and
The motives for making historical films vary. In addition to the usual
attachment to the stories they tell, that they feel a particular story need to be
brought to light. Films like Glory and Malcolm X dramatize historical figures
largely absent from mainstream consciousness. Even if these films get some of
the details wrong, they can still be said to provide education as well as
entertainment. The audience walks out of the theatre knowing more about Black
union soldiers or the Nation of Islam than they did when they entered.
Essentially, filmmakers have the freedom to do what they like with the details of
history as they try to create art. To argue otherwise would be to place an unfair
limit on art. And while historical films skirt the boundary between the freedom
of art and the rigor of a historical argument, that boundary is still there.
authentic past, we have the right to critique their work as history. As we have
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Chapter Five: The Theory and Practice of Film History
film theory, which has ties to cultural studies, critical theory and textual analysis,
and film history, which involves the gathering of primary evidence to piece
together a story that still has significant gaps. When it comes to history, we are
divided between theory and practice, and this provides the perfect opportunity
While the relationship between theory and practice is the subject of study
between theory and practice in their most basic form. In film studies and some
practice in terms of some basic issues of epistemology. In short, the last forty
years have seen radical shifts in theories of knowledge from theories based on
constructedness of all knowledge. In that time though, little has changed in the
practice of research – certainly not enough to match the radical shifts in theory.
research in much the same way we always have. What then are the consequences
of this gap? How does this shift to relativism, much derided outside the
humanities, affect our practice? More importantly, how might our current
practice re-inform our theory? What do we gain or lose by keeping our theory
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separate and how does this affect our relationship to more empirical disciplines,
social and linguistic construct is a fairly radical claim in that it runs counter to
the basis of Enlightenment thought upon which both the sciences and humanities
are based. The key switch of the Enlightenment was a shift from a focus on the
knower to a focus on the knowledge. Statements became true because they could
be proven and supported with evidence, rather than because a king or priest
decreed them to be true. Of course, knowledge and truth claims have never
completely severed their link with power, but in general the Enlightenment
person making a claim still has a lot of weight, and we have only begun to shake
off the racial and gender beliefs that long excluded most of society from being
considered holders of valuable knowledge. I think we can make the case though
that this problem has been shrinking over time. So if the current claim of theory
is that the Enlightenment focus on knowledge is wrong, and that truth claims are
Despite the furor over the Sokal affair and some lingering bad feelings,
this shift has created surprisingly little debate within the humanities. This is
because the shift has overwhelmingly been a theoretical one, a change that has
not directly affected the daily practice of academics to the same extent. In the last
ten or fifteen years particularly, there has been an increasingly common tendency
to write one’s position into academic work in order to signpost one’s potential
biases. In general, we are more aware of our own biases now and less likely to
claim objectivity, but this is a more subtle shift than we realize, pre-supposing as
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it does an imaginary old class of positivists, declaring that their every
pronouncement was objective fact, a group we can now look smugly upon as
naive at best and corrupt at worst. In other words, our present practices only
the only ones who have been caricatured or misrepresented in this debate, and
this is partially because of the stakes of the debate, but also because little
attention has been paid to the gaps between theory and practice in this case, gaps
positions. To that end, let us consider several critical examples that illuminate the
gap between theory and practice in social constructivist debates, with the aim of
clarifying positions and determining exactly what the points of difference are.
And while Ian Hacking has undertaken a similar task in his book The Social
Construction of What?, his focus has been to untangle the theory of social
construction. Here I focus of the gap between theory and practice as the best way
constructionism in film theory. Here I consider its influence in the present day.
Before that, I trace a key distinction about realism from the work of André Bazin.
origins of this debate. Debates about realism are central to the development of
film studies, but the realism being discussed is only sometimes the same as the
epistemological realism we are talking about here. The two concepts are related,
but it will require a careful examination of key arguments in the history of filmic
156
realism to trace the thread of these debates into the discussion of epistemology.
The debate over filmic realism, its purpose and its value, is familiar to film
in film is as old as the division between Lumiere and Méliès. He argues that the
debates over neo-realism in Italy in the late 1940s crystallize the discussion, one
that is continued by both André Bazin and Siegfried Kracauer. Casetti argues
that the central tension over realism in cinema is exemplified by the perspectives
of Cesare Zavattini and Guido Aristarco. These two critics both argue for
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realism in the cinema, but disagree significantly over what that realism might
look like. Zavattini is in favour of a cinema that narrows the gap between the
filmic image and everyday reality. He argues “What we are really attempting is
not to invent a story that looks like reality, but to present reality as if it were a
story.” This is a documentary impulse, but one that is filtered through the
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influence of Italian neo-realist films, which retain the appearance of fiction films.
edited by David Overbey. None of the writings of Guido Aristarco have been translated into
English (nor, evidently, any other languages) so I am dependent on Casetti’s description.
Quoted in Casetti, 25. All citations of Zavattini and Aristarco, unless otherwise noted, are cited
139
157
from the idea of realism in literature, in which the author can help to get at
The ideas of the conquest of reality without any formula is replaced by the
idea that, while telling us about the world, cinema can and should take
advantage of the previous experience of great literature. In other words,
the aesthetics of shadowing is replaced by… an aesthetics of reconstruction.
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Aristarco writes: “There are many degrees of realism, just as there are many
to their inclination and capacity for examining it.” In short, the division
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Zavattini is looking for a scientific reflection of the world and Aristarco a more
complex than this, and we will need to consider related positions to get a better
difficult to fit into the continuum we have created between Zavattini and
Aristarco. Bazin’s cinematic realism is more ontological than either of the Italian
theorists – he sees the link between cinema and reality as being inherent in the
medium.
The photographic image is the object itself, the object freed from the
conditions of time and space that govern it. No matter how fuzzy,
distorted, or discolored, no matter how lacking in documentary value the
image may be, it shares, by virtue of the very process of its becoming, the
being of the model of which it is the reproduction; it is the model.
143
141
Ibid., 27.
142
Quoted in Casetti, 28
143
Bazin, What is Cinema?, I – 14.
158
Given this link, Bazin seems to allow for interpretation of reality in a manner
confusion between the aesthetic and the psychological; between true realism, the
need that is to give significant expression to the world both concretely and in its
essence, and the pseudorealism of a deception aimed at fooling the eye (or for
that matter the mind); a pseudorealism content in other words with illusory
appearances. 144
Casetti recognizes this allowance for interpretation, and contrasts it with the
aims to interact with and act upon the world (so much so that its representation
may disappear and become life itself); for Kracauer the medium must above all
analyze people and things, with the attitude of an explorer or scientist.” Given
145
again seem that we have an epistemological split, with Kracauer as the scientific
categorize.
clarification of the gap between subject and object. These debates over cinematic
realism deal with the gap between the cinematic image and the reality being
filmed – between camera and actor or camera and place. If we consider historical
144
Ibid., I – 12.
145
Casetti, 39.
159
actions and the actions themselves. Thus the cinematic image is doubly historical.
The actors and director recreate a historical event after that event has occurred.
Then the cinematic image captures that moment of recreation, and renders that
moment into the past, capturing, in Bazin’s phrase, “change mummified.” 146
drawn out by Philip Rosen in his book that takes Bazin’s above phrase as its title.
Bresson’s adaptation of the novel The Diary of a Country Priest. Since there is a
subjective relation to the novel. This relation is not the artistic subject of
preexisting reality, and he does not impose his own categorical preconceptions.
is a mode of abstraction aimed at minimizing the gap by evincing respect for the
prior, independent existence of the novel and through this subjective relation of
adaptation, there is an acknowledgement here of the ways in which the two gaps
between an object and its representation are inter-related. Indeed, Bazin seems to
blur the distinction between the two gaps in his discussion of Bresson. At the
very least, in numerous essays he moves from one to the other without making a
146
Bazin, I – 15.
147
Rosen, Change Mummified, 24-5.
160
distinction between them. In Bazin’s conception, cinema’s approach to a reality
that can be filmed “directly” and a reality that must be represented are one in the
same. In his treatment of Bresson, however, we might see a prescription for the
Thus the filmmaker has a responsibility to the source material of his or her film.
The filmmaker can never reproduce the original exactly, but must attempt to be
as faithful to the core of the original as possible within the structures and
filmmaking but places a strict limit on that interpretation. It does not allow for
important distinctions between the forms that are intrinsic to their nature. Just as
Bazin is arguing for an honesty in representation that respects the limits of what
film is and can do, we must adjust our theory to account for the characteristics of
148
Bazin, I – 26.
161
specificity, which he argues for repeatedly. When we try to gloss over the
film to written history, we are not only losing the distinction between fiction and
non-fiction forms, but between film and writing. In the process, even cinematic
realism becomes social constructionism because the ability of film to signpost its
studies is film theory itself, even when that theory attempts to be realist in the
filmic sense. I am not arguing that all realist film theories are in fact social
that make them appear so. In the difference between the specificity of film and
not the key influence on social constructionism in film and media studies, it
In the last chapter, I considered the ways in which two particular fiction
films attempted to tell history and the ways in which those attempts demonstrate
the limits of film as a historical medium. In this chapter I consider the ways in
which attempts to apply the standards of film to written work further identify
the disconnect between the two forms, and illustrate a gap between theory and
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Theory Versus Practice
constructivist theory and realist practice. In the introduction to this study of the
practice and rhetoric surrounding Hollywood epic films, Sobchack contrasts the
history told by the epic films themselves with academic writing that deals with
the films or with the time periods covered in the films. “In sum,” she argues,
‘truer’ than the other.” The rhetoric of this claim is interesting for its use of the
149
trained academic study and entertainment for profit to a kind of faceless, elitist
So while I might take issue with the broad strokes painted here and argue that
contrasts the general aims of two very different types of history. The problem is
149
Sobchack, 26.
150
Ibid.
163
that here, as elsewhere, Sobchack overlooks the differences in the epistemological
in time, but the steps they take to get there are very different, and these
crucial distinction between subjectivity and objectivity. To make the jump from a
one is extremely vague about what true means. Neither is more instinctual or
natural a mode of representation, but it is clear that each has different uses for
social and cultural factors, as well as by the need to impose a narrative on events,
among the conscious choices of filmmakers, while historians do not have that
luxury. While many of the choices made by academic historians about what to
include and presentation of evidence are indeed conscious, they are imbued with
they encounter or to make claims that are actively countered by existing evidence
without new evidence to replace it. The Hollywood filmmaker, on the other hand,
has much more freedom to dismiss or displace whatever he or she pleases. The
filmmaker is free to combine the clothing of one era with the ideas of another and
the events of a third, a freedom that seems to grow with the distance of the era
represented from the present day. These are exactly the kinds of “mistakes” that
historians have long pointed out in films about history, and almost no filmmaker
(Stone and Griffith are of course exceptions) presents his or her choices in these
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matters as being motivated by historical counter-evidence rather than the need to
between academic and filmic history further, into the realm of “truth,” when the
latter claim is not necessary to justify the former. It is perfectly reasonable, and a
admitting that some facts and evidence tend to get trampled in the process.
change elements of the story that leave the fundamental message intact.
Academic historians do not have this much freedom. While they must choose
fraud.
draws on many of the conventions of academic history to make its point. She
analyzes a promotional booklet for the film How The West Was Won to make an
argument about the ways in which the scope of the history is mirrored by the
emphasized the vast numbers of people, animals, and dollars utilized to bring
the film to the screen. From the simple facts Sobchack recounts, like the dates and
165
directors of films, to the more subjective analysis of the promotional book itself,
there is a careful consideration of evidence and a clear sense of what the evidence
for these claims looks like. Though its premise is analytical, this is a history and it
Sobchack has chosen the style of academic history to tell her story, but at
and filmic histories and her use of the former to make her argument. She has
pointed out that the two have different styles and chosen the one appropriate to
the context in which she is making her argument and in which it will be best
received by her peers. So while she moves from a critique of academic style into
that style, my purpose is not to argue that this particular prominent scholar has
are much more interesting questions at stake here: If the academic and filmic
ways of telling history are merely different but equal in terms of truth status,
why use the academic mode at all? What does the academic historical method
offer us, if not the claim to be closer to the truth than accounts designed
primarily for entertainment? If it is true that a method that aims to get as close as
possible to objective truth cannot get closer than a fictional movie (or novel), why
and an academic history, how can we distinguish the truth claims of differing
academic histories? What rules are in place within the “objectivist” study of
history that fall apart as soon as we leave this realm, and what good are rules
that do so?
our terms, and to illustrate some of the ways in which various levels of historical
166
inquiry –theoretical, methodological, epistemological and ontological – are
one example, I would like to consider another Sobchack essay, entitled “What Is
Film History?”
discussion of what history is, considering both film and in the study of film. Here
to one that is more cognizant of its biases, or more importantly, has a fuller
awareness of the many levels of mediation between the past event and historical
filmmaker and teacher Peter Brosnan of a curious historical artifact, the set for
Cecil B. Demille’s original 1923 silent version of The Ten Commandments, now
buried like a real Egyptian city in the sand dunes near Guadalupe, California.
Brosnan has been trying for ten years to gather enough money to do a proper
excavation of the site, which apparently included walls 110 feet high, 21 sphinx
statues and four 35-foot Pharaoh statues, all made out of plaster rather than
stone. 151
ground. Sobchack notes that this is a Hollywood recreation of history that now
has its own status as a lost city worthy of historical inquiry. She is also aware that
her recounting of Brosnan’s plans and difficulties over the past ten years is a very
traditional history within a paper that attempts to counter the tendencies of just
151
Sobchack, “What is Film History?,” 12.
167
My previous – and relatively traditional – history of DeMille’s buried
movie set and Brosnan’s desire to excavate and film it is at once both
fascinating and “merely history.” If I similarly had the time and
obsession of a DeMille or Brosnan, I might wander forever in the sand,
turning literally and troping figuratively among the site’s historical
fragments and heterogeneities, its murmurs, nostalgias, stories, myths,
its other episodes and histories. For example, as new historian Antonia
Lant has done in “The Curse of the Pharaoh, or How Cinema
Contracted Egyptomania,” I might turn in the direction of Egypt and
the discovery of King Tut’s tomb in 1922..., [or] the building of the
Egyptian Theatre in Hollywood where the film premiered, and held
sway over the American imagination and press for eight years. I might
also veer off to write a tangential history of the site which points
outward to other Egypto-Orientalist fantasies of the period, not only in
cinema, but also in painting, architecture, popular music, and
museology. 152
accounts, DeMille’s autobiography, and a web site, and the story is recounted as
and by the unspoken assumptions of her academic audience that she is being as
such. Even if readers are, like Sobchack, skeptical about objectivity in historical
writing, the constraints of academic writing are such that objectivity must be the
goal, even if it can never be the accomplishment. The options for further exploration
that she lists, while representative of varying methodologies, never challenge the
may or may not end up being a history at all, but might still provide fertile
152
Ibid., 20.
168
ground for cultural exploration. The second group is the specific alternate
histories might end up being very similar to the traditional histories Sobchack
these topics that makes them incapable of being considered within a realist
idea or an artistic trope. Even if the broad range of evidence such studies might
history over the past 30 years with an epistemological shift that has occurred in
name only. The perception that the broadening of historical objects – away from
the “great men” conception of history to one that includes many more histories
written “from the bottom up” to include the histories of subjugated groups –
entails a profound epistemological shift is common. But one does not inherently
153
imply the other. The broadening of scope is certainly a change in history at the
level of its theory, representing a new notion of what “history” is. This new
history includes all of a society rather than just its leaders and politicians. As the
theoretical shift has taken place, there have also been methodological shifts to
make this new history possible. In particular, the notion of what counts as
evidence has broadened, since one can not always rely on government
documents or preserved letters to tell the history of the poor. Because women’s
history is often a history of private life it has often had to depend on written
personal narratives that may not be verifiable in the way that those of public
153
For a discussion of this issue see Rosenstone, “The Future of the Past.”
169
figures are. In all of these new histories though, the attempt is still made to
recount the history that is as true as possible. As Keith Windschuttle points out,
the broadening of historical inquiry in recent years has been a tremendous boon
to the field, and offered historical underpinning for all kinds of progressive
causes. This is completely separate from arguments that history has shifted or
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should shift its goals from objectivity to subjectivity. Other than the fact that they
are both “traditional,” there is no inherent link between realism and the
easily as one can a rational, fact-based approach to the study of slaves’ lives. A
great number of new histories written in the last 30 years testify to the
In Film History: Theory and Practice, Robert Allen and Douglas Gomery
off the debate, they see realism as a system that compromises by allowing that
theories have a place in observation while maintaining that this does not mean
historians cannot tell the truth about the past. Rather, it means that “why
questions... require answers to how and what questions.” This might seem to us
155
like “common sense” as well, but it is important to recognize that realism allows
for the biases and interpretations of the historian doing the work. It does this not
154
Windschuttle, The Killing of History, 128-9.
155
Allen and Gomery, 15.
170
by erasing or hiding biases to pretend they do not exist, but rather by putting
introduction that one is writing from the perspective of, say, a “middle-class
white female” but a more subtle transparency within the prose of an argument.
Thus, the key facet of historical work in a realist framework is not the
erasure of bias or interpretation but the assurance that bias is made visible.
available for the various claims made. More importantly, the links that a
historian has drawn between points of evidence should be visible in the text.
Where the historian necessarily links documented factual events into a causal
narrative, the process must be clear in the finished text. These “links” between
that readers of history bring to a text, a set of conventions and codes that both
explicitly (with footnotes) and implicitly (with language choices) explain the path
the historian has followed to his or her conclusions. To clarify these expectations,
Universal’s 1929 version of Show Boat, partially because of studio head Carl
In 1929, Laemmle made his son Carl, Jr., head of production and there
was a marked upturn in ambition and quality. Junior Laemmle, as he
was called, started off with a magnificently produced musical
extravaganza, Broadway (dir. Fejos). While modern viewers are
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impressed with the technical virtuosity of Broadway, almost all of the
critics of the time compared the film unfavorably to its source, a
nightclub melodrama directed by George Abbott with a two year
broadway run behind it. “A good bit of a bore,” groused the Telegram.
The Daily Mirror and the World reviewers were among the few who
noticed Fejos’s gargantuan set and crane-mounted camera work. 156
from the evidence, and some that is informed opinion. At each level, the reader
has expectations about the evidence Crafton has assembled for this passage. If
we unpack and deconstruct the evidence presented and the rhetoric with which
questioning it – attacking the unity and sureness of its tone. But the keys to the
“deconstruct” in this case is not to damage but to read according to the clues and
guidelines given.
To begin with the simplest level, one assumes that the quotations from the
newspapers are accurate, and also that they represent the general tone of the
review, since Crafton specifically says they are negative (“groused the Telegram”).
We also assume, that since Crafton writes “almost all” of the reviews were
negative, that he has read a considerable number of them, and not just these
three. As for the power shift, the appointment of Carl Jr. as head of production
actually contributed to the production of Broadway. When Crafton writes that the
156
Crafton, The Talkies, 309.
172
look at the films before and after and come to a similar conclusion. When he
writes that “modern viewers are impressed” by the film, this is most likely a
purely critical remark, rather than, say, the results of an extensive audience
response survey.
It is crucial that readers are aware of the process of writing history in the
final text. The success of the work depends on interpretation as much as on the
are aware of the places where interpretation has been necessary and accept that
others might come to a different conclusion. For example, it would not affect our
the facts. If we found no “upturn in ambition and quality” after the appointment
of Carl Jr. we might question the author’s critical judgment. If we found that the
Telegram was not in the majority opinion, it would call into question his research
skills, and thus, the status of the entire work. If we could not find any of the
All of these considerations are the assumptions that greet all historical
work, and are part of the complex reactions of readers and other scholars to new
research in our field. These expectations would change somewhat if the point
work, as our expectations increase. For the most part though, they are
evidence and clear rules about the uses of that evidence. All of these rules help
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while avoiding a dry and useless recounting of unlinked facts. They allow us to
understand history and make arguments about what happened in the past while
rules of evidence might become more fluid, more open to individual expression
and the play of words and theories. How might we make our practice reflect our
constructionism which has undermined our faith in the facts? The immediate
difficulty is that our practice already allows room for theory and argument, and
for a historian to confront the theories and arguments of others. At the other end
honesty the idea that a writer would quote from a newspaper article and be
purposely misleading or misquote it. In the middle, there might be some room
for play between evidence and conjecture, especially since there are plenty of
areas in film history where the lack of evidence means that historians must fill in
bigger gaps between smaller posts. But we would still expect in these cases that
we could reasonably ascertain where the evidence leaves off and the
matters as much as the fact that its boundaries are clear. Historians should not
pretend that there is solid evidence for events or causal chains that are actually
his or her educated guesses or wishes. Thus, our writing about the past is always
linked to realist notions of evidence and proof, even when little such evidence
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At this point it is perhaps obvious that, although we might argue that
realism is in itself a choice and not necessarily the best or only way to conduct
overwhelming. As soon as we lose the trust between historian and audience that
available evidence is being treated fairly, we lose the epistemological basis for
fit and present the results as supported by strong evidence, the subject loses
much of its interest, as gripping as some of the stories might be. In addition, our
To return to the first of the questions I posed (if academic and filmic ways
of telling history are merely different, but equal in terms of truth status, why use
the academic mode at all?) the answer is that the academic mode offers greater
transparency, the ability for writer and reader to communicate through the text
the levels of evidence for the claims made. It is this transparency that means the
two are not equal in terms of truth status, since film has no way to make such
epistemological statements clear in the text. On the screen the actions of the
actors are the actions of the historical people portrayed, and there is no intra-
textual way to distinguish between documented actions and the whims of the
and historical continuity that makes all ideas equal. The only way an audience
can tell fact from opinion is when extra-textual factors intrude – their own
previous knowledge, a written review, or in rare cases, the written claims of the
author. Oliver Stone has published annotated screenplays for both JFK and Nixon
that spell out what evidence came from where and exactly where Stone
combined characters or events for historical effect. His goal in doing this is to
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support his arguments about historical events by following the lead of academic
historians and making his choices visible. The only way he can do this though is
in writing. His films allow no such distinctions to be made while they make their
arguments on the screen. The isolated examples of silent films, like The Birth of a
Nation, that have footnotes on screen during the film, are the exception that
proves the rule. Not only would such notes be disruptive enough in films
without intertitles to make their use very difficult, they are still only able to
reference whole sections of the text, without the detailed rhetorical markers of
footnotes in The Birth of a Nation are the equivalent of a footnote in a book that
transparency and objectivity of written work that makes it powerful and likely to
be abused. To stay with the same film-related example, Griffith had no problem
finding books with which to footnote his film, books which presented white
supremacy as factual and glossed over the distinction between fact and opinion
just as much as his film did. This would have been part of the reason Griffith was
so adamant that his film was factual and not motivated by racism – he had the
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other’s work. In practice we make major distinctions between the truth status of
written and filmic works based on what we know about the way these forms
work. We recognize inherently the rules of “objectivist” history and are aware
that these rules are not and cannot be the same for filmic texts. The
epistemological status of the two forms is very different, and one has much more
emphasizing their links to power and tradition. The tools we use to understand
history and film are imperfect, but we have learned much with them so far.
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Conclusion
Perhaps the most negative aspect of the Sokal hoax is the fact that it
completely overshadowed the position of Alan Sokal himself. The reaction to the
hoax, the discussion of the ethics of such an endeavor, and the resultant
accusations of blame all made sure that serious discussion of the issues raised by
Sokal’s hoax never really took place. There was considerable press attention to
the affair, unusual for what seems at first like an academic dispute. Of course,
this might be the only type of academic dispute that makes sense to outside
observers, as it violates the rules of polite and boring discourse for which
academics are noted and usually ignored. Sokal certainly violated these rules
with his initial actions, which included a refusal to edit the piece for the Social
Text editors. In response, when the story broke, no one at Social Text was in a
methods, they attacked the reasoning behind his parody, generally arguing that
he had overstated the social constructivist position, and there was nothing
stating a radical constructivist position in the first page of his paper, and most of
That the Sokal hoax would turn out to be a national news story is not as
For a range of international responses to the Sokal Hoax, see The Sokal Hoax: The Sham That
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Shook the Academy, compiled by the editors of the now-defunct magazine Lingua Franca.
178
everyday common sense is a cliché of American film and television. The fact that
in this case the purveyor of everyday common sense was a physics professor
from New York University only made the story more interesting, not less.
Luckily for the nation’s newspaper editors, Sokal was standing up for a position
that was remarkably understandable and “common sense,” and stood in contrast
perhaps) were able to make complete sense of. The idea that science was a social
mock in the humanities, where obtuse and dense theory eventually leads to
counterintuitive positions in such a manner that the ideas can only be traced
back to their source with great difficulty. There can be little doubt that this
general lack of respect for the humanities in the culture at large was one of the
reasons the hoax played out so well, not just in the United States, but around the
world.
I would like to argue though that this lack of respect for the humanities is
also one of the reasons for the appeal of social constructionism. Scholars in the
humanities are well aware of the way their disciplines are viewed in relation to
the hard sciences. Scientists get more respect in the culture at large, and also
receive a lot more money, from both government and industry. The humanities
ways that the sciences almost never have to. For scholars in the humanities, it is
inevitable that a theory that attempts to redress this balance by undermining the
also relies on the connections between science and political power structures that
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Latour points out the numerous links between science and the Cold War power
structure, in an effort to both make science’s overall project suspect and to make
the case that science is simply looking for new enemies after the end of the Cold
can lead one to quickly accept positions that would be subject to more scrutiny if
they were not so agreeable. It should never have come to the point where an
argument. Even after the Social Text fiasco, there has still been little attention paid
abhor.
not as far from Donna Haraway’s as either of them would likely assume,
although all the adaptations to make their positions agree would have to be on
Haraway’s part. It is also not far from a position that David Hess labels moderate
more contemporary name. If that means that apparently disparate positions can
158
Reprinted as Latour, Bruno. “Is There Science After The Cold War?” 124-6.
180
Sokal’s position is best summed up in an article he published shortly after
his hoax was revealed. It is intended as an answer to both his critics and his
supporters, and is entitled “What the Social Text Affair Does and Does Not Prove.”
He admits up front that the hoax certainly does not prove that all of cultural
commentators had supposed. He says that the publication of his hoax proves
only that “the editors of one rather marginal journal were derelict in their
intellectual duty” (11). In other words, not much. Sokal is insistent though that
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the content of his parody reveals much more than this. By quoting the most
demonstrates the foolishness of the position, albeit in a less measured way than I
159
Sokal, 11.
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surprisingly, scientists tend to stress the “internal” factors while
sociologists tend to stress the “external” factors, if only because each
group tends to have a poor grasp of the other group’s concepts. But these
problems are perfectly amenable to rational debate.
3. There is nothing wrong with research informed by political
commitment as long as that commitment does not blind the researcher to
inconvenient facts. Thus, there is a long and honorable tradition of
sociopolitical critique of science, including antiracist critiques of
anthropological pseudoscience and eugenics and feminist critiques of
psychology and parts of medicine and biology. These critiques typically
follow a standard pattern: First, one shows, using conventional scientific
arguments, why the research in question is flawed according to the
ordinary canons of good science. Then – and only then – one attempts to
explain how the researchers’ social prejudices (which may well have been
unconscious) led them to violate these canons. Of course, each such
critique has to stand or fall on its own merits; having good political
intentions doesn’t guarantee that one’s analysis will constitute good
science, good sociology, or good history. But this general two-step
approach is, I think, sound; and empirical studies of this kind, if
conducted with due intellectual rigor, could shed useful light on the social
conditions under which good science (defined normatively as the search
for truths or at least approximate truths about the world) is fostered or
hindered.160
These statements appear noncontroversial, and I would argue that for the most
part they should be. However, they force social constructivists to give up most of
their ground, since they take for granted the possibility of realism and leave the
fundamentals of the scientific project intact. What they also leave intact is the
space for philosophers, historians, and others to study and critique science and
scientists. All of the questions laid out in number one above are broad issues that
have provided and still offer a great deal of fruitful territory for research. More
importantly, these are the issues with which politically progressive theorists
which scientific expertise is focused, and we should try to understand and take
160
Ibid., 10.
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An example will better illustrate the ground laid out in the first of Sokal’s
consider the Manhattan Project. At its most basic level, the attempt to build an
atomic bomb is a purely political project motivated by the desire to defeat the
Axis powers and win the Second World War. Even this simple statement reveals
a wealth of questions about the motivations of the military and opens up the
foreign population of civilians. From there, the choice of the scientists to take
part in the project was also presumably rife with social and political
considerations that had an effect on the finished product. For example, some of
the scientists had problems after the war with investigations about Communist
sympathies, investigations that questioned their patriotism and loyalty after they
had helped the United States win the war in the Pacific. Robert Oppenheimer, an
essential figure in the Manhattan Project, eventually lost his security clearance
Once the scientists were assembled to work on the project, there were
presumably all sorts of interesting social interactions that were based on their
relative social status, personalities, and politics. For example, Richard Feynman,
a future Nobel Prize winner, was a nervous graduate student worried about
offending his supervisors. How do such social roles affect the ways in which
research gets done? In general, this is the type of question Bruno Latour’s work
could answer.
Once the bombs were built, the social questions change somewhat, since
whether to use this weapon and on whom. The repercussions of the decision that
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was made have been subject to incredible scrutiny over the years, and they
should be. Arguments about the justifications for using the bomb on Hiroshima,
and the more difficult justifications for the second bomb dropped on Nagasaki,
What is not open to social or political question is the fact that the bombs
worked. Nor is the way in which they worked a political question. (The two
bombs used quite different mechanisms). The two atomic bombs built during the
Second World War really did blow up in exactly the way that atomic theory
predicted they would. They really were dropped in Japan and the people in
those cities really died. There is no way in which any of this knowledge is a
construction of someone with a political goal. In fact, the only reason any of the
above political and historical questions are remotely interesting is because of the
reality of the bombs and the destruction they caused. I must stress too that the
mechanics of the bombs, their use of plutonium and uranium to start atomic
reactions, is fact. The bombs were not willed to work. Only the collected
scientists’ mastery of the atom allowed them to build, after much effort, a
working bomb. That they figured it out creates one of the most interesting and
How, in considering the above example, could we argue that more of the
phenomenon than the areas I have outlined? It might very well be possible to
make the case that the bombs did not in fact work because of the scientists’
knowledge of the atom. Perhaps there was some other factor at work or a strange
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their design flaws. These seem like fanciful examples, but I do not want to claim
that scientists’ assessments of their own work are unquestionable. One might
certainly attack their scientific conclusions, mindful that they have powerful
other words, potential alternate explanations for how and why the bombs
worked are scientific debates first and foremost. We cannot challenge the science
The reason this is such a barrier is that it requires critics of science to know
science. While this certainly makes the task more difficult, it does not make it
which they are not familiar. When it comes to social constructionism though, this
has often not been the case. Even though the occasional arguments that those
who do not know science are actually better equipped to assess it can be
2
See, for example, the work of Arthur Fine, who has contributed to fundamental discussions on
the nature of quantum mechanics that have implications for science as much as philosophy.
See example in Wild Science cited earlier. That anyone would cite ignorance as an intellectual
162
185
points out, the Sokal Hoax does prove that the notion that there is a collective of
politics is a false one. The other crucial concern is raised by Donna Haraway,
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who admits that tagging science as male and socially constructed might mean
that feminists do not have to bother learning any. This would be a considerable
164
loss, to both feminism and science. Indeed, it would undermine the potential of
The fundamental point of Sokal’s three criteria for discussion and debate
is that the ability of science to discover facts about the world escapes unscathed.
No scientist should object to these criteria, and they leave plenty of space for
political and historical discussions. They maintain the distinction between good
and bad science that Haraway wanted to discard, and make it a challenging task
to prove that science is bad. It is not enough to challenge the person who makes a
knowledge claim; one has to challenge the knowledge itself. In this way,
of a statement. This last point should make realism more palatable to those who
For those in the humanities who are not as enamoured of science as Sokal
and other scientists might like you to be, I would like to suggest a less optimistic
version of realism that differs slightly in tone from what Sokal suggests. The
163
See The Sokal Hoax, 66.
164
Haraway, Simians, Cyborgs, and Women, 186.
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whose adherents must be willing to put in the effort to undermine those claims
and cynical or negative. Skeptics are not easily convinced and want to see
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evidence before believing in fantastic claims. They always ask who benefits from
knowledge but require the answer to that question to be the beginning of their
investigation and not the end. While most people who currently label themselves
skeptics do not have the political agenda of many in the humanities, I believe
that the appeal of social constructionism was that it appeared to be the quickest
and surest way to get at the socially constructed elements of science she saw and
attack, and it freed its adherents from the need to deal with the messiness of
individual cases. As an initial debate tactic it worked well, but such disregard for
the specificities of particular scientific practices has limited usefulness. Now, that
skepticism needs to be focused on individual cases and steered away from broad
power. Haraway admits that this is the problem with social constructionism, and
she wants a better tactic to argue with cultural conservatives than one that
Parts of this discussion of this form of skepticism come from the statement of purpose of the
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Skeptics society, a group dedicated to the use of science and scientific thinking (See Skeptic
magazine). I see no reason why this quite strict version of realism should not appeal to academics
in the humanities who mistrust science.
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in Chapter Three, Haraway’s solution to this problem is insufficient, but her aims
objectivity that avoids what she calls the “god-trick,” the ability to see with
certainty beyond one’s social and individual perspective. She also wants more
respect for the perspectives of subjugated peoples, but falters when she over-
debate trump card that can be employed reflexively to determine which of a set
data can at times be challenged and critiqued more effectively than a person can,
than the person making the truth claim. Better then to leave the challenging of
a set of principles that would be useful for critiquing “official” science while
individuals and groups, we might instead see it as one of the triggers of our
skepticism. That is, we are much more likely to question official knowledge
when it reinforces the existing power structure, but the power imbalance in an
issue is a starting point rather than an endpoint of the discussion. It initiates our
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skeptical response and spurs us to pay closer attention and subject a claim to
further scrutiny. In this way, our skepticism and motivation is political, but we
avoid the trap of making blanket accusations about scientific projects because we
do not like or fear the results. Progressive politics can spur scholars in science
realism, and with it, our faith in our own arguments and positions.
This position is similar in some ways to what David Hess calls “moderate
between good and bad science that Sokal is upholding and that is a fundamental
tenet of realism. Social constructionism is always a blanket claim that denies the
distinction between good and bad science, and holds that all science is subject to
the same inherent flaws. Any treatment of science that works case-by-case
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allows that some cases are going to be upheld as factual. These cases then fit the
skeptical realism are actually the same thing. Modifications in the social
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constructionism” differs only in emphasis from the form of skeptical realism I am
proposing. The former argues that science is often socially constructed but
reserves judgment on a case-by-case basis. The latter assumes that science can
build up objective knowledge about the world, and allows that there will be
that are contradicted by the evidence. Both of these scenarios actually allow for
the fact that science can gather true knowledge of the physical world. Both
positions emphasize that bias is possible and in fact common. Both allow one to
be more skeptical of knowledge that reinforces the political status quo, and in
doing so provide a place to challenge science and scientists whose biases appear
self-evident. Both use the idea of “situated knowledges” as a starting point for
the questioning of science, but inherently reject this concept as a final arbiter of
competing claims.
that this is likely a frequent working position in the humanities. The arguments
of constructivist theorists like Hayden White and Michel de Certeau are rarely
On the other hand, traditional realist historical study has always allowed for
“bad history” that takes the same form as bad science – the biases of the
researcher lead him or her to conclusions that are not reasonably supported by
the evidence. The method of dealing with this type of history is identical to the
method Sokal prescribed for science. First, one must show, using standard
historical evidence, how another scholar’s conclusions are wrong. Then, and only
then, does one set out to prove that the mistake was the result of social biases,
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which may have been unconscious. Again, the identification of potential or likely
bias in a historian is the starting point for further inquiry – the perception that
informs our skepticism. It is never the end of the discussion, and it is never
pseudo-historians who argue that the Holocaust never happened are wrong
because their work is not supported by the available evidence, not simply
because they are racist. It is likely the fact that they are racist that informs our
skepticism of their claims in the first place, and it is this that leads us to subject
their claims to close scrutiny. It would hardly be sufficient though to declare that
since they are anti-Semitic their claims are invalid and stop there. The
leads us to question it, but the argument still must be considered on its own. If
the argument was made by someone who harbored no racist sentiments yet still
believed erroneously that the Holocaust did not happen, the argument would
group can often be a good clue for our skeptical impulse, but it is never enough
providing a method for our own work, they are even less useful. For all the
writing about the social construction of science and history, there have been
precious few recommendations about how to carry out work that avoids the
incapable of being put into practice. The closest thing to a practice that any of the
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scholars considered here have proposed are the experimental documentaries
endorsed by Robert Rosenstone and the possibilities for historical theory writing
for the telling of history that these scholars are trying to critique. Historiography
is fundamental to the practice of history, but it is its own project. The proposals
than historical projects. Those that are historical projects would inevitably be
of our own positioning and biases. This is a valuable lesson, and one that history
and science needed to learn and still need. The tremendous developments in
gender theory and racial identity theory in the past 30 years have provided
which our position in social and political hierarchies coloured our perception of
facts and ideas. We are much more aware of how we are “situated” in relation to
others in our society and in other societies, and hesitant to privilege our
perspectives over those of others. All of these changes are valuable, because they
help minimize the biases of scientific and historical research by making the
more aware of how the positions of others – who may or may not share our
social group – might be influenced by their own social position. We are more
aware of others and of ourselves. We recognize that we all carry biases, that these
are our default settings, and that it requires constant effort to minimize their
effects.
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All of this, however, changes nothing about the possibility of objectivity in
historical and scientific research. We might recognize that reason and evidence
are not as transparent as we once believed, and that we have biases of which we
stringent about our own biases and those of others. It is a warning to not let
ourselves off too easily, to be alert and to accept that we must self-examine
tainted by social and political expectations, examples that are useful specifics to
the bar for objectivity in science and history by pointing out so many more ways
cannot celebrate our biases and allow them to overrun our work. We are unable
cannot accept research from historians or scientists without the unspoken claim
that the work is based on the best available evidence honestly gathered, even if
this unspoken claim is occasionally determined to be not true. That our practice
is still realist is both the single strongest argument against social constructionism
and the best defense against critics who view the humanities as soft. Our theory
must better respect our practice, since our practice is constrained and linked to
In the end, social constructionism reminds us that there are few shortcuts
in our argumentation, that we cannot lower our standards and assume that we
can tell the truth unproblematically. Taken this way, it is of considerable value. If
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avoid the tedious gathering of contradictory evidence in favour of making
Further Research
There are numerous specific areas of research that this project opens up
which are too substantial to be considered fully here, but I would like to explain
some of them briefly as a way to make a case for the numerous clarifications and
arguments I have offered thus far. One of the primary uses of this present project
both that significant disagreements are hidden and that, in some cases, what
appear to be radical differences of opinion are not that different in real terms. For
“science is a social construction” but that statement, as we have seen, can refer to
There are two other areas in film studies where a similar lack of clarity
about profound positions seems common, and both are linked more substantially
to the issues I have raised in this dissertation. The first has to do with what I
would call the “limits of interpretation.” By this I mean that the central question
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interpretations of the text and the notion that the audience is free to make its own
meanings of any particular text. This question has been central to cultural studies
work on the audience, from the influential studies of Ien Ang to the work of John
Fiske. I think it is safe to assume that virtually no one still subscribes to the
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notion that there is one correct interpretation of a text, while at the same time
between these two extremes, but the lack of clarification of where any particular
In an article on the Rodney King videotape, “I’ll See It When I Believe It,”
on the “multiple interpretations” side of this debate, and that this makes it
difficult to argue about real social issues and effects. He notes that a petition
circulated at the Society for Cinema Studies conference in April 1992 in response
to the recent “not guilty” verdict in the trial of the four officers accused of
beating motorist Rodney King after a high speed chase in Los Angeles. The trial 169
had attracted much attention, and had only occurred in the first place, because a
man named George Holliday captured the beating on videotape. To most this
seemed like an open and shut case of police brutality, finally some “proof” of the
type of treatment many felt had been going on and ignored for many years. In
the trial though, the defense attorneys for the police officers managed to
See, for example Ang’s Watching Dallas and Fiske’s Understanding Popular Culture.
167
For an overview of this argument, see Chuck Kleinhans, “Cultural Appropriation and
168
Subcultural Expression.”
Tomasulo, 79.
169
195
suspect. The jury bought this explanation, and acquitted the officers, touching off
days of rioting in Los Angeles that claimed 53 lives and caused $1 billion of
property damage. The petition circulated at the SCS conference condemned the
fact that the jury had refused to “‘see’ this visual evidence the way that most of
us – regardless of color – saw these images.” Tomasulo argues that the belief
170
that there was a singular reality in the video not subject to interpretation
contradicts virtually all recent film theory that emphasizes the multiplicity of
readings available in any filmic or televisual image. He holds that one cannot on
one hand argue for the textuality of everything and then claim access to a
interpretation and infinite interpretations is a false one. It is in fact the same false
event are possible and valid. This is the same kind of over generalization as the
in general not reflected by the practice. I would argue that in practice, film
responses to The Birth of a Nation. We would reject a reading of the film that
posited that it was actually about the Second World War or that it took place in
France. While these might seem like ridiculous examples, and they are, they raise
170
Ibid.
196
unreasonable? In other words, what are the limits of interpretation? To return to
The Birth of a Nation, at what point do we accept readings of the film that excuse
or even celebrate its racism as equally valid and simply different than our own?
This question might not seem of crucial importance until there are cases, like the
Rodney King beating, that clarify the importance of the question. Is the defense
attorneys’ reading of the videotape merely different or is it invalid? What are our
criteria for deciding what readings are or are not invalid? Until now, it seems
that various communities have, like SCS, decided them based on consensus. This
realism in documentary film. Enough questions have been raised about the
potential truth status seem hopelessly naïve. The argument that there is no
difference in the truth status of documentary and fiction film is yet another
raised throughout this work. As film scholars we are still able to recognize
differences between fiction film and documentary. We still note whether or not
other words, we are still cognizant of the complexities of truth status within
documentary and fiction film even as we often claim that there is little difference
epistemological difference are all that separates the two forms, and thus these
differences are central to the notion that the categories of documentary and
fiction film still exist. While much has been made of films that cross the
197
boundary between these forms, we still treat them as distinct forms. We need a
much more honest accounting of the ways in which documentary and fiction
films differ. The epistemologies of film and television images are complex and
198
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