G.R. No. 162368 July 17, 2006 Case No.
1 After considering the arguments of both the petitioner
MA. ARMIDA PEREZ-FERRARIS, petitioner,
vs.
BRIX FERRARIS, respondent.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This resolves the motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioner Ma. Armida Perez-Ferraris of the
Resolution dated June 9, 2004 denying the petition
for review on certiorari of the Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated April 30,
2003 and February 24, 2004, respectively, for failure
of the petitioner to sufficiently show that the Court of
Appeals committed any reversible error.
On February 20, 2001, the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City, Branch 151 rendered a Decision1 denying
the petition for declaration of nullity of petitioner's
marriage with Brix Ferraris. The trial court noted that
suffering from epilepsy does not amount to
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Civil
Code and the evidence on record were insufficient to
prove infidelity. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was denied in an Order2 dated April
20, 2001 where the trial court reiterated that there
was no evidence that respondent is mentally or
physically ill to such an extent that he could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given valid assumption thereof.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which
affirmed3 in toto the judgment of the trial court. It
held that the evidence on record did not convincingly
establish that respondent was suffering from
psychological incapacity or that his "defects" were
incurable and already present at the inception of the
marriage.4 The Court of Appeals also found that Dr.
Dayan's testimony failed to establish the substance of
respondent's psychological incapacity; that she failed
to explain how she arrived at the conclusion that the
respondent has a mixed personality disorder; that she
failed to clearly demonstrate that there was a natal or
supervening disabling factor or an adverse integral
element in respondent's character that effectively
incapacitated him from accepting and complying with
the essential marital obligations.5
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was
denied6 for lack of merit; thus, she filed a petition for
review on certiorari with this Court. As already
stated, the petition for review was denied for failure
of petitioner to show that the appellate tribunal
committed any reversible error.
Petitioner filed the instant motion for
reconsideration.7 The Court required respondent Brix
Ferraris to file comment8but failed to comply; thus,
he is deemed to have waived the opportunity to file
comment. Further, the Court directed the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) to comment on
petitioner's motion for reconsideration which it
complied on March 2, 2006.
and the OSG, the Court resolves to deny petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.
The issue of whether or not psychological incapacity
exists in a given case calling for annulment of
marriage depends crucially, more than in any field of
the law, on the facts of the case.9 Such factual issue,
however, is beyond the province of this Court to
review. It is not the function of the Court to analyze
or weigh all over again the evidence or premises
supportive of such factual determination.10 It is a
well-established principle that factual findings of the
trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
are binding on this Court,11 save for the most
compelling and cogent reasons, like when the
findings of the appellate court go beyond the issues
of the case, run contrary to the admissions of the
parties to the case, or fail to notice certain relevant
facts which, if properly considered, will justify a
different conclusion; or when there is a
misappreciation of facts,12 which are unavailing in
the instant case.
The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground
for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness
afflicting a party even before the celebration of the
marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as
to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about
to assume.13 As all people may have certain quirks
and idiosyncrasies, or isolated characteristics
associated with certain personality disorders, there is
hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has
been to confine the meaning of "psychological
incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.14 It is for this reason that
the Court relies heavily on psychological experts for
its understanding of the human personality. However,
the root cause must be identified as a psychological
illness and its incapacitating nature must be fully
explained,15 which petitioner failed to convincingly
demonstrate.
As aptly held by the Court of Appeals:
Simply put, the chief and basic consideration
in the resolution of marital annulment cases
is the presence of evidence that can
adequately establish respondent's
psychological condition. Here, appellant
contends that there is such evidence. We do
not agree. Indeed, the evidence on record did
not convincingly establish that respondent
was suffering from psychological incapacity.
There is absolutely no showing that his
"defects" were already present at the
inception of the marriage, or that those are
incurable.
Quite apart from being plainly self-serving,
petitioner's evidence showed that respondent's alleged
failure to perform his so-called marital obligations
was not at all a manifestation of some deep-seated,
grave, permanent and incurable psychological
malady. To be sure, the couple's relationship before
the marriage and even during their brief union (for
well about a year or so) was not all bad. During that
relatively short period of time, petitioner was happy
and contented with her life in the company of
respondent. In fact, by petitioner's own reckoning,
respondent was a responsible and loving husband. x x
x. Their problems began when petitioner started
doubting respondent's fidelity. It was only when they
started fighting about the calls from women that
respondent began to withdraw into his shell and
corner, and failed to perform his so-called marital
obligations. Respondent could not understand
petitioner's lack of trust in him and her constant
naggings. He thought her suspicions irrational.
Respondent could not relate to her anger, temper and
jealousy. x x x.
At any rate, Dr. Dayan did not explain how she
arrived at her diagnosis that respondent has a mixed
personality disorder called "schizoid," and why he is
the "dependent and avoidant type." In fact, Dr.
Dayan's statement that one suffering from such mixed
personality disorder is dependent on others for
decision x x x lacks specificity; it seems to belong to
the realm of theoretical speculation. Also, Dr.
Dayan's information that respondent had extramarital
affairs was supplied by the petitioner herself.
Notably, when asked as to the root cause of
respondent's alleged psychological incapacity, Dr.
Dayan's answer was vague, evasive and inconclusive.
She replied that such disorder "can be part of his
family upbringing" x x x. She stated that there was a
history of respondent's parents having difficulties in
their relationship. But this input on the supposed
problematic history of respondent's parents also came
from petitioner. Nor did Dr. Dayan clearly
demonstrate that there was really "a natal or
supervening disabling factor" on the part of
respondent, or an "adverse integral element" in
respondent's character that effectively incapacitated
him from accepting, and, thereby complying with, the
essential marital obligations. Of course, petitioner
likewise failed to prove that respondent's supposed
psychological or mental malady existed even before
the marriage. All these omissions must be held up
against petitioner, for the reason that upon her
devolved the onus of establishing nullity of the
marriage. Indeed, any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the validity of the marriage and the
indissolubility of the marital vinculum.16
We find respondent's alleged mixed personality
disorder, the "leaving-the-house" attitude whenever
they quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic
attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment and
lack of support, and his preference to spend more
time with his band mates than his family, are not
rooted on some debilitating psychological condition
but a mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals,17 where therein
respondent preferred to spend more time with his
friends than his family on whom he squandered his
money, depended on his parents for aid and
assistance, and was dishonest to his wife regarding
his finances, the Court held that the psychological
defects spoken of were more of a "difficulty," if not
outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of
some marital obligations and that a mere showing of
irreconcilable differences and conflicting
personalities in no wise constitute psychological
incapacity; it is not enough to prove that the parties
failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as
married persons; it is essential that they must be
shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some
psychological, not physical, illness.
Also, we held in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals18 that
habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion,
and abandonment do not by themselves constitute
grounds for declaring a marriage void based on
psychological incapacity.
While petitioner's marriage with the respondent failed
and appears to be without hope of reconciliation, the
remedy however is not always to have it declared
void ab initio on the ground of psychological
incapacity. An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is
not a null and void marriage.19 No less than the
Constitution recognizes the sanctity of marriage and
the unity of the family; it decrees marriage as legally
"inviolable" and protects it from dissolution at the
whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are
to be "protected" by the state.20
Thus, in determining the import of "psychological
incapacity" under Article 36, it must be read in
conjunction with, although to be taken as distinct
from Articles 35,21 37,22 38,23 and 4124 that would
likewise, but for different reasons, render the
marriage void ab initio, or Article 4525 that would
make the marriage merely voidable, or Article 55 that
could justify a petition for legal separation. Care must
be observed so that these various circumstances are
not applied so indiscriminately as if the law were
indifferent on the matter.26 Article 36 should not to be
confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital
bond at the time the causes therefor manifest
themselves.27 Neither it is to be equated with legal
separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted
in psychological incapacity but on physical violence,
moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction,
drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity,
abandonment and the like.28
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion
for reconsideration of the Resolution dated June 9,
2004 denying the petition for review on certiorari for
failure of the petitioner to sufficiently show that the
Court of Appeals committed any reversible error,
is DENIED WITH FINALITY.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 133778 March 14, 2000 Case No. 2
ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as
Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE
NIÑAL, INGRID NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL &
PEPITO NIÑAL, JR., petitioners,
vs.
NORMA BAYADOG, respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for
the declaration of nullity of his marriage after his
death?
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on
September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born
herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito
resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year
and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986,
Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married
without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito
and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11,
1986 stating that they had lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt
from securing a marriage license. On February 19,
1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their
father's death, petitioners filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to
Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for
lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under
the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the
second marriage would affect petitioner's
successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss
on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action
since they are not among the persons who could file
an action for "annulment of marriage" under Article
47 of the Family Code.
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial
Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissed the
petition after finding that the Family Code is "rather
silent, obscure, insufficient" to resolve the following
issues:
(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of
action against defendant in asking for the
declaration of the nullity of marriage of their
deceased father, Pepito G. Niñal, with her
specially so when at the time of the filing of
this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Niñal
is already dead;
(2) Whether or not the second marriage of
plaintiffs' deceased father with defendant is
null and void ab initio;
(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped
from assailing the validity of the second
marriage after it was dissolved due to their
father's death. 1
Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should
have filed the action to declare null and void their
father's marriage to respondent before his death,
applying by analogy Article 47 of the Family Code
which enumerates the time and the persons who
could initiate an action for annulment of
marriage. 2 Hence, this petition for review with this
Court grounded on a pure question of law.
This petition was originally dismissed for non-
compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, and because "the
verification failed to state the basis of petitioner's
averment that the allegations in the petition are "true
and correct"." It was thus treated as an unsigned
pleading which produces no legal effect under
Section 3, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules. 3 However, upon
motion of petitioners, this Court reconsidered the
dismissal and reinstated the petition for review. 4
The two marriages involved herein having been
solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code
(FC), the applicable law to determine their validity is
the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time
of their celebration. 5 A valid marriage license is a
requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil
Code, 6 the absence of which renders the
marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) 7 in
relation to Article 58. 8 The requirement and issuance
of marriage license is the State's demonstration of its
involvement and participation in every marriage, in
the maintenance of which the general public is
interested. 9 This interest proceeds from the
constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the
sanctity of family life and of affording protection to
the family as a basic "autonomous social
institution." 10 Specifically, the Constitution considers
marriage as an "inviolable social institution," and is
the foundation of family life which shall be protected
by the State. 11 This is why the Family Code
considers marriage as "a special contract of
permanent union" 12 and case law considers it "not
just an adventure but a lifetime commitment." 13
However, there are several instances recognized by
the Civil Code wherein a marriage license is
dispensed with, one of which is that provided in
Article 76, 14 referring to the marriage of a man and a
woman who have lived together and exclusively with
each other as husband and wife for a continuous and
unbroken period of at least five years before the
marriage. The rationale why no license is required in
such case is to avoid exposing the parties to
humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant
with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a
valid marriage due to the publication of every
applicant's name for a marriage license. The publicity
attending the marriage license may discourage such
persons from legitimizing their status. 15 To preserve
peace in the family, avoid the peeping and suspicious
eye of public exposure and contain the source of
gossip arising from the publication of their names,
the law deemed it wise to preserve their privacy and
exempt them from that requirement.
There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners'
father to respondent Norma was celebrated without
any marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed
an affidavit stating that "they have attained the age of
majority, and, being unmarried, have lived together
as husband and wife for at least five years, and that
we now desire to marry each other." 16 The only issue
that needs to be resolved pertains to what nature of
cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the
Civil Code to warrant the counting of the five year
period in order to exempt the future spouses from
securing a marriage license. Should it be a
cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated to
marry each other during the entire five-year
continuous period or should it be a cohabitation
wherein both parties have lived together and
exclusively with each other as husband and wife
during the entire five-year continuous period
regardless of whether there is a legal impediment to
their being lawfully married, which impediment may
have either disappeared or intervened sometime
during the cohabitation period?
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma
have lived together as husband and wife for five
years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year
period should be computed on the basis of a
cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only
missing factor is the special contract of marriage to
validate the union. In other words, the five-year
common-law cohabitation period, which is counted
back from the date of celebration of marriage, should
be a period of legal union had it not been for the
absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be
the years immediately before the day of the marriage
and it should be a period of cohabitation
characterized by exclusivity — meaning no third
party was involved at anytime within the 5 years and
continuity — that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that
continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without
any distinction as to whether the parties were
capacitated to marry each other during the entire five
years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality
and encouraging parties to have common law
relationships and placing them on the same footing
with those who lived faithfully with their spouse.
Marriage being a special relationship must be
respected as such and its requirements must be
strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is
based on the approximation of the requirements of
the law. The parties should not be afforded any
excuse to not comply with every single requirement
and later use the same missing element as a pre-
conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage.
There should be no exemption from securing a
marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall
within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted
that a license is required in order to notify the public
that two persons are about to be united in matrimony
and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of
any impediment to the union of the two shall make it
known to the local civil registrar. 17 The Civil Code
provides:
Art. 63: . . . This notice shall request all
persons having knowledge of any
impediment to the marriage to advice the
local civil registrar thereof. . . .
Art. 64: Upon being advised of any alleged
impediment to the marriage, the local civil
registrar shall forthwith make an
investigation, examining persons under oath.
...
This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:
Art. 17 provides in part: . . . This notice shall
request all persons having knowledge of any
impediment to the marriage to advise the
local civil registrar thereof. . . .
Art. 18 reads in part: . . . In case of any
impediment known to the local civil
registrar or brought to his attention, he shall
note down the particulars thereof and his
findings thereon in the application for a
marriage license. . . .
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or
present, absolutely prohibited the concurrence of
multiple marriages by the same person during the
same period. Thus, any marriage subsequently
contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall
be illegal and void, 18 subject only to the exception in
cases of absence or where the prior marriage was
dissolved or annulled. The Revised Penal Code
complements the civil law in that the contracting of
two or more marriages and the having of extramarital
affairs are considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and
concubinage and adultery. 19 The law sanctions
monogamy.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's
marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with
each other as husband and wife for at least five years
prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepito's
first marriage was dissolved to the time of his
marriage with respondent, only about twenty months
had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first
wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito
and respondent had started living with each other that
has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that
their five-year period cohabitation was not the
cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the
nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law
but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the
marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at
the time when he started cohabiting with respondent.
It is immaterial that when they lived with each other,
Pepito had already been separated in fact from his
lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even
where there was actual severance of the filial
companionship between the spouses cannot make any
cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as
being one as "husband and wife".
Having determined that the second marriage involved
in this case is not covered by the exception to the
requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab
initio because of the absence of such element.
The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have
the personality to file a petition to declare their
father's marriage void after his death?
Contrary to respondent judge's ruling, Article 47 of
the Family Code 20 cannot be applied even by analogy
to petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. The
second ground for annulment of marriage relied upon
by the trial court, which allows "the sane spouse" to
file an annulment suit "at anytime before the death of
either party" is inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the
grounds, periods and persons who can file an
annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity of
marriage. The Code is silent as to who can file a
petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable
and void marriages are not identical. A marriage that
is annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the
court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is
considered as having never to have taken place 21 and
cannot be the source of rights. The first can be
generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or
prescription while the other can never be ratified. A
voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally
except in a direct proceeding while a void marriage
can be attacked collaterally. Consequently, void
marriages can be questioned even after the death of
either party but voidable marriages can be assailed
only during the lifetime of the parties and not after
death of either, in which case the parties and their
offspring will be left as if the marriage had been
perfectly valid. 22 That is why the action or defense
for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable
marriages where the action prescribes. Only the
parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any
proper interested party may attack a void marriage.
Void marriages have no legal effects except those
declared by law concerning the properties of the
alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or
ownership through actual joint contribution, 23 and its
effect on the children born to such void marriages as
provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44
as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code.
On the contrary, the property regime governing
voidable marriages is generally conjugal partnership
and the children conceived before its annulment are
legitimate.
Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the death of
petitioner's father extinguished the alleged marital
bond between him and respondent. The conclusion is
erroneous and proceeds from a wrong premise that
there was a marriage bond that was dissolved
between the two. It should be noted that their
marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it never
existed at all and the death of either extinguished
nothing.
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no
judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the
nullity of a marriage. 24 "A void marriage does not
require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their
original rights or to make the marriage void but
though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely
necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of
society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is
expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be
ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of
competent jurisdiction." 25 "Under ordinary
circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as
concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the
parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken
place. And therefore, being good for no legal
purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any
proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be
material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court
between any parties at any time, whether before or
after the death of either or both the husband and the
wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such
marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as
non-existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable
marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked except
in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of
the parties so that on the death of either, the marriage
cannot be impeached, and is made good ab
initio. 26 But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly
provides that there must be a judicial declaration of
the nullity of a previous marriage, though void,
before a party can enter into a second marriage 27 and
such absolute nullity can be based only on a final
judgment to that effect. 28 For the same reason, the
law makes either the action or defense for the
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
imprescriptible. 29 Corollarily, if the death of either
party would extinguish the cause of action or the
ground for defense, then the same cannot be
considered imprescriptible.
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no
judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an
absolute nullity.1âwphi1 For other purposes, such as
but not limited to determination of heirship,
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of
estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal
case for that matter, the court may pass upon the
validity of marriage even in a suit not directly
instituted to question the same so long as it is
essential to the determination of the case. This is
without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the
case. When such need arises, a final judgment of
declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose
is other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a
final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that
such final judgment need not be obtained only for
purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court, Toledo
City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-
639, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said case
is ordered REINSTATED.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995 Case No. 4
LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND
JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS, respondents.
VITUG, J.:
Concededly a highly, if not indeed the most likely,
controversial provision introduced by the Family
Code is Article 36 (as amended by E.O. No. 227
dated 17 July 1987), which declares:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at
the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
The present petition for review on certiorari, at the
instance of Leouel Santos ("Leouel"), brings into fore
the above provision which is now invoked by him.
Undaunted by the decisions of the court a quo1 and
the Court of Appeal,2 Leouel persists in beseeching
its application in his attempt to have his marriage
with herein private respondent, Julia Rosario Bedia-
Santos ("Julia"), declared a nullity.
It was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who then held the
rank of First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, first
met Julia. The meeting later proved to be an eventful
day for Leouel and Julia. On 20 September 1986, the
two exchanged vows before Municipal Trial Court
Judge Cornelio G. Lazaro of Iloilo City, followed,
shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. Leouel and
Julia lived with the latter's parents at the J. Bedia
Compound, La Paz, Iloilo City. On 18 July 1987,
Julia gave birth to a baby boy, and he was christened
Leouel Santos, Jr. The ecstasy, however, did not last
long. It was bound to happen, Leouel averred,
because of the frequent interference by Julia's parents
into the young spouses family affairs. Occasionally,
the couple would also start a "quarrel" over a number
of other things, like when and where the couple
should start living independently from Julia's parents
or whenever Julia would express resentment on
Leouel's spending a few days with his own parents.
On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United
Sates of America to work as a nurse despite Leouel's
pleas to so dissuade her. Seven months after her
departure, or on 01 January 1989, Julia called up
Leouel for the first time by long distance telephone.
She promised to return home upon the expiration of
her contract in July 1989. She never did. When
Leouel got a chance to visit the United States, where
he underwent a training program under the auspices
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines from 01 April
up to 25 August 1990, he desperately tried to locate,
or to somehow get in touch with, Julia but all his
efforts were of no avail.
Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home,
Leouel filed with the regional trial Court of Negros
Oriental, Branch 30, a complaint for "Voiding of
marriage Under Article 36 of the Family Code"
(docketed, Civil Case No. 9814). Summons was
served by publication in a newspaper of general
circulation in Negros Oriental.
On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her answer
(through counsel), opposed the complaint and denied
its allegations, claiming, in main, that it was the
petitioner who had, in fact, been irresponsible and
incompetent.
A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a
decree of nullity of their marriage was ruled out by
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (in its report
to the court).
On 25 October 1991, after pre-trial conferences had
repeatedly been set, albeit unsuccessfully, by the
court, Julia ultimately filed a manifestation, stating
that she would neither appear nor submit evidence.
On 06 November 1991, the court a quo finally
dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.3
Leouel appealed to the Court of Appeal. The latter
affirmed the decision of the trial court.4
The petition should be denied not only because of its
non-compliance with Circular 28-91, which requires
a certification of non-shopping, but also for its lack of
merit.
Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home,
or at the very least to communicate with him, for
more than five years are circumstances that clearly
show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter
into married life. In his own words, Leouel asserts:
. . . (T)here is no leave, there is no affection for (him)
because respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos failed
all these years to communicate with the petitioner. A
wife who does not care to inform her husband about
her whereabouts for a period of five years, more or
less, is psychologically incapacitated.
The family Code did not define the term
"psychological incapacity." The deliberations during
the sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee,
which has drafted the Code, can, however, provide an
insight on the import of the provision.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from
the beginning:
Art. 36. (7) Those marriages contracted by any party
who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in
the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand
the essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to
discharge the essential marital obligations, even if
such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the
celebration.
On subparagraph (7), which as lifted from the Canon
Law, Justice (Jose B.L.) Reyes suggested that they
say "wanting in sufficient use," but Justice (Eduardo)
Caguioa preferred to say "wanting in the sufficient
use." On the other hand, Justice Reyes proposed that
they say "wanting in sufficient reason." Justice
Caguioa, however, pointed out that the idea is that
one is not lacking in judgment but that he is lacking
in the exercise of judgment. He added that lack of
judgment would make the marriage voidable. Judge
(Alicia Sempio-) Diy remarked that lack of judgment
is more serious than insufficient use of judgment and
yet the latter would make the marriage null and void
and the former only voidable. Justice Caguioa
suggested that subparagraph (7) be modified to read:
"That contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
discharge the essential marital obligations, even if
such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the
celebration."
Justice Caguioa explained that the phrase "was
wanting in sufficient use of reason of judgment to
understand the essential nature of marriage" refers to
defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent,
which is not the idea in subparagraph (7), but lack of
appreciation of one's marital obligations.
Judge Diy raised the question: Since "insanity" is also
a psychological or mental incapacity, why is
"insanity" only a ground for annulment and not for
declaration or nullity? In reply, Justice Caguioa
explained that in insanity, there is the appearance of
consent, which is the reason why it is a ground for
voidable marriages, while subparagraph (7) does not
refer to consent but to the very essence of marital
obligations.
Prof. (Araceli) Baviera suggested that, in
subparagraph (7), the word "mentally" be deleted,
with which Justice Caguioa concurred. Judge Diy,
however, prefers to retain the word "mentally."
Justice Caguioa remarked that subparagraph (7)
refers to psychological impotence. Justice (Ricardo)
Puno stated that sometimes a person may be
psychologically impotent with one but not with
another. Justice (Leonor Ines-) Luciano said that it is
called selective impotency.
Dean (Fortunato) Gupit stated that the confusion lies
in the fact that in inserting the Canon Law annulment
in the Family Code, the Committee used a language
which describes a ground for voidable marriages
under the Civil Code. Justice Caguioa added that in
Canon Law, there are voidable marriages under the
Canon Law, there are no voidable marriages Dean
Gupit said that this is precisely the reason why they
should make a distinction.
Justice Puno remarked that in Canon Law, the defects
in marriage cannot be cured.
Justice Reyes pointed out that the problem is: Why is
"insanity" a ground for void ab initio marriages? In
reply, Justice Caguioa explained that insanity is
curable and there are lucid intervals, while
psychological incapacity is not.
On another point, Justice Puno suggested that the
phrase "even if such lack or incapacity is made
manifest" be modified to read "even if such lack or
incapacity becomes manifest."
Justice Reyes remarked that in insanity, at the time of
the marriage, it is not apparent.
Justice Caguioa stated that there are two
interpretations of the phrase "psychological or
mentally incapacitated" — in the first one, there is
vitiation of consent because one does not know all
the consequences of the marriages, and if he had
known these completely, he might not have
consented to the marriage.
Prof. Bautista stated that he is in favor of making
psychological incapacity a ground for voidable
marriages since otherwise it will encourage one who
really understood the consequences of marriage to
claim that he did not and to make excuses for
invalidating the marriage by acting as if he did not
understand the obligations of marriage. Dean Gupit
added that it is a loose way of providing for divorce.
Justice Caguioa explained that his point is that in the
case of incapacity by reason of defects in the mental
faculties, which is less than insanity, there is a defect
in consent and, therefore, it is clear that it should be a
ground for voidable marriage because there is the
appearance of consent and it is capable of
convalidation for the simple reason that there are
lucid intervals and there are cases when the insanity
is curable. He emphasized that psychological
incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has
nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations
attendant to marriage.
On psychological incapacity, Prof. (Flerida Ruth P.)
Romero inquired if they do not consider it as going to
the very essence of consent. She asked if they are
really removing it from consent. In reply, Justice
Caguioa explained that, ultimately, consent in general
is effected but he stressed that his point is that it is
not principally a vitiation of consent since there is a
valid consent. He objected to the lumping together of
the validity of the marriage celebration and the
obligations attendant to marriage, which are
completely different from each other, because they
require a different capacity, which is eighteen years
of age, for marriage but in contract, it is different.
Justice Puno, however, felt that psychological
incapacity is still a kind of vice of consent and that it
should not be classified as a voidable marriage which
is incapable of convalidation; it should be
convalidated but there should be no prescription. In
other words, as long as the defect has not been cured,
there is always a right to annul the marriage and if the
defect has been really cured, it should be a defense in
the action for annulment so that when the action for
annulment is instituted, the issue can be raised that
actually, although one might have been
psychologically incapacitated, at the time the action
is brought, it is no longer true that he has no concept
of the consequence of marriage.
Prof. (Esteban) Bautista raised the question: Will not
cohabitation be a defense? In response, Justice Puno
stated that even the bearing of children and
cohabitation should not be a sign that psychological
incapacity has been cured.
Prof. Romero opined that psychological incapacity is
still insanity of a lesser degree. Justice Luciano
suggested that they invite a psychiatrist, who is the
expert on this matter. Justice Caguioa, however,
reiterated that psychological incapacity is not a defect
in the mind but in the understanding of the
consequences of marriage, and therefore, a
psychiatrist will not be a help.
Prof. Bautista stated that, in the same manner that
there is a lucid interval in insanity, there are also
momentary periods when there is an understanding of
the consequences of marriage. Justice Reyes and
Dean Gupit remarked that the ground of
psychological incapacity will not apply if the
marriage was contracted at the time when there is
understanding of the consequences of marriage.5
Judge Diy proposed that they include physical
incapacity to copulate among the grounds for void
marriages. Justice Reyes commented that in some
instances the impotence that in some instances the
impotence is only temporary and only with respect to
a particular person. Judge Diy stated that they can
specify that it is incurable. Justice Caguioa remarked
that the term "incurable" has a different meaning in
law and in medicine. Judge Diy stated that
"psychological incapacity" can also be cured. Justice
Caguioa, however, pointed out that "psychological
incapacity" is incurable.
Justice Puno observed that under the present draft
provision, it is enough to show that at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, one was psychologically
incapacitated so that later on if already he can comply
with the essential marital obligations, the marriage is
still void ab initio. Justice Caguioa explained that
since in divorce, the psychological incapacity may
occur after the marriage, in void marriages, it has to
be at the time of the celebration of marriage. He,
however, stressed that the idea in the provision is that
at the time of the celebration of the marriage, one is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations, which incapacity
continues and later becomes manifest.
Justice Puno and Judge Diy, however, pointed out
that it is possible that after the marriage, one's
psychological incapacity become manifest but later
on he is cured. Justice Reyes and Justice Caguioa
opined that the remedy in this case is to allow him to
remarry.6
Justice Puno formulated the next Article as follows:
Art. 37. A marriage contracted by any party who, at
the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated, to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage shall likewise be void from
the beginning even if such incapacity becomes
manifest after its solemnization.
Justice Caguioa suggested that "even if" be
substituted with "although." On the other hand, Prof.
Bautista proposed that the clause "although such
incapacity becomes manifest after its solemnization"
be deleted since it may encourage one to create the
manifestation of psychological incapacity. Justice
Caguioa pointed out that, as in other provisions, they
cannot argue on the basis of abuse.
Judge Diy suggested that they also include mental
and physical incapacities, which are lesser in degree
than psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa
explained that mental and physical incapacities are
vices of consent while psychological incapacity is not
a species of vice or consent.
Dean Gupit read what Bishop Cruz said on the matter
in the minutes of their February 9, 1984 meeting:
"On the third ground, Bishop Cruz indicated that the
phrase "psychological or mental impotence" is an
invention of some churchmen who are moralists but
not canonists, that is why it is considered a weak
phrase. He said that the Code of Canon Law would
rather express it as "psychological or mental
incapacity to discharge . . ."
Justice Caguioa remarked that they deleted the word
"mental" precisely to distinguish it from vice of
consent. He explained that "psychological incapacity"
refers to lack of understanding of the essential
obligations of marriage.
Justice Puno reminded the members that, at the last
meeting, they have decided not to go into the
classification of "psychological incapacity" because
there was a lot of debate on it and that this is
precisely the reason why they classified it as a special
case.
At this point, Justice Puno, remarked that, since there
having been annulments of marriages arising from
psychological incapacity, Civil Law should not
reconcile with Canon Law because it is a new ground
even under Canon Law.
Prof. Romero raised the question: With this common
provision in Civil Law and in Canon Law, are they
going to have a provision in the Family Code to the
effect that marriages annulled or declared void by the
church on the ground of psychological incapacity is
automatically annulled in Civil Law? The other
members replied negatively.
Justice Puno and Prof. Romero inquired if Article 37
should be retroactive or prospective in application.
Justice Diy opined that she was for its retroactivity
because it is their answer to the problem of church
annulments of marriages, which are still valid under
the Civil Law. On the other hand, Justice Reyes and
Justice Puno were concerned about the avalanche of
cases.
Dean Gupit suggested that they put the issue to a
vote, which the Committee approved.
The members voted as follows:
(1) Justice Reyes, Justice Puno and Prof. Romero
were for prospectivity.
(2) Justice Caguioa, Judge Diy, Dean Gupit, Prof.
Bautista and Director Eufemio were for retroactivity.
(3) Prof. Baviera abstained.
Justice Caguioa suggested that they put in the
prescriptive period of ten years within which the
action for declaration of nullity of the marriage
should be filed in court. The Committee approved the
suggestion.7
It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code
Revision Committee in ultimately deciding to adopt
the provision with less specificity than expected, has
in fact, so designed the law as to allow some
resiliency in its application. Mme. Justice Alicia V.
Sempio-Diy, a member of the Code Committee, has
been quoted by Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo
in Salita vs. Hon. Magtolis (G.R. No. 106429, 13
June 1994); thus:8
The Committee did not give any examples of
psychological incapacity for fear that the giving of
examples would limit the applicability of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis.
Rather, the Committee would like the judge to
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided
by experience, the findings of experts and researchers
in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of
church tribunals which, although not binding on the
civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the
provision was taken from Canon Law.
A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of
the New Code of Canon Law,9 which reads:
Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting
marriage:
1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of
judgment concerning essentila matrimonial rights and
duties, to be given and accepted mutually;
3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable
to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even
perhaps all that persuasive for having no juridical or
secular effect, the jurisprudence under Canon Law
prevailing at the time of the code's enactment,
nevertheless, cannot be dismissed as impertinent for
its value as an aid, at least, to the interpretation or
construction of the codal provision.
One author, Ladislas Orsy, S.J., in his
treaties, 10 giving an account on how the third
paragraph of Canon 1095 has been framed, states:
The history of the drafting of this canon does not
leave any doubt that the legislator intended, indeed,
to broaden the rule. A strict and narrow norm was
proposed first:
Those who cannot assume the essential obligations of
marriage because of a grave psycho-sexual anomaly
(ob gravem anomaliam psychosexualem) are unable
to contract marriage (cf. SCH/1975, canon 297, a new
canon, novus); then a broader one followed: . . .
because of a grave psychological anomaly (ob
gravem anomaliam psychicam) . . . (cf. SCH/1980,
canon 1049);
then the same wording was retained in the text
submitted to the pope (cf. SCH/1982, canon 1095, 3);
finally, a new version was promulgated:
because of causes of a psychological nature (ob
causas naturae psychiae).
So the progress was from psycho sexual to
psychological anomaly, then the term anomaly was
altogether eliminated. it would be, however, incorrect
to draw the conclusion that the cause of the
incapacity need not be some kind of psychological
disorder; after all, normal and healthy person should
be able to assume the ordinary obligations of
marriage.
Fr. Orsy concedes that the term "psychological
incapacity" defies any precise definition since
psychological causes can be of an infinite variety.
In a book, entitled "Canons and Commentaries on
Marriage," written by Ignatius Gramunt, Javier
Hervada and LeRoy Wauck, the following
explanation appears:
This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a
true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of
marriage. Some psychosexual disorders and other
disorders of personality can be the psychic cause of
this defect, which is here described in legal terms.
This particular type of incapacity consists of a
real inability to render what is due by the contract.
This could be compared to the incapacity of a farmer
to enter a binding contract to deliver the crops which
he cannot possibly reap; (b) this inability to commit
oneself must refer to the essential obligations of
marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life and
love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation
and education of offspring; (c) the inability must be
tantamount to a psychological abnormality. The mere
difficulty of assuming these obligations, which could
be overcome by normal effort, obviously does not
constitute incapacity. The canon contemplates a true
psychological disorder which incapacitates a person
from giving what is due (cf. John Paul II, Address to
R. Rota, Feb. 5, 1987). However, if the marriage is to
be declared invalid under this incapacity, it must be
proved not only that the person is afflicted by a
psychological defect, but that the defect did in
fact deprive the person, at the moment of giving
consent, of the ability to assume the essential duties
of marriage and consequently of the possibility of
being bound by these duties.
Justice Sempio-Diy 11 cites with approval the work of
Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the
Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic
Archdiocese of Manila (Branch 1), who opines that
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.
The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the
party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary
duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the
history of the party antedating the marriage, although
the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the
party involved.
It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing
disquisitions, including, and most importantly, the
deliberations of the Family Code Revision
Committee itself, that the use of the phrase
"psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the
Code has not been meant to comprehend all such
possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned
by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low
intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances
(cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's "Void and Voidable
Marriages in the Family Code and their Parallels in
Canon Law," quoting from the Diagnostic Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorder by the American
Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's
"Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases"). Article
36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed
independently of, but must stand in conjunction with,
existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus
correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer to
no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render
help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage. This
pschologic condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently
envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the
spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This
conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family
Code which considers children conceived prior to the
judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to
be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the
inception of marriage, like the state of a party being
of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction,
habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism,
merely renders the marriage
contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family
Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcholism,
lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only
during the marriage, they become mere grounds for
legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code.
These provisions of the Code, however, do not
necessarily preclude the possibility of these various
circumstances being themselves, depending on the
degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of
psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters
are established, every circumstance that may have
some bearing on the degree, extent, and other
conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be
carefully examined and evaluated so that no
precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily
decreed. The well-considered opinions of
psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with
expertise in psychological disciplines might be
helpful or even desirable.
Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime
commitment. We should continue to be reminded that
innate in our society, then enshrined in our Civil
Code, and even now still indelible in Article 1 of the
Family Code, is that —
Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent
union between a man a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of
conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the
family and an inviolable social institution whose
nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by
law and not subject to stipulation, except that
marriage settlements may fix the property relations
during the marriage within the limits provided by this
Code. (Emphasis supplied.)
Our Constitution is no less emphatic:
Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the
foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall
strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total
development.
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is
the foundation of the family and shall be protected by
the State. (Article XV, 1987 Constitution).
The above provisions express so well and so
distinctly the basic nucleus of our laws on marriage
and the family, and they are doubt the tenets we still
hold on to.
The factual settings in the case at bench, in no
measure at all, can come close to the standards
required to decree a nullity of marriage. Undeniably
and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even
desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably,
neither law nor society itself can always provide all
the specific answers to every individual problem.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997 Case No. 5
CHI MING TSOI, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-
TSOI, respondents.
TORRES, JR., J.:
Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to
steer a marriage in its journey over troubled waters.
Laws are seemingly inadequate. Over time, much
reliance has been placed in the works of the unseen
hand of Him who created all things.
Who is to blame when a marriage fails?
This case was originally commenced by a distraught
wife against her uncaring husband in the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 89) which
decreed the annulment of the marriage on the ground
of psychological incapacity. Petitioner appealed the
decision of the trial court to respondent Court of
Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 42758) which affirmed
the Trial Court's decision November 29, 1994 and
correspondingly denied the motion for
reconsideration in a resolution dated February 14,
1995.
The statement of the case and of the facts made by
the trial court and reproduced by the Court of
Appeals1 its decision are as follows:
From the evidence adduced, the following
acts were preponderantly established:
Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff
married the defendant at the Manila
Cathedral, . . . Intramuros Manila, as
evidenced by their Marriage Contract. (Exh.
"A")
After the celebration of their marriage and
wedding reception at the South Villa,
Makati, they went and proceeded to the
house of defendant's mother.
There, they slept together on the same bed in
the same room for the first night of their
married life.
It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary
to her expectations, that as newlyweds they
were supposed to enjoy making love, or
having sexual intercourse, with each other,
the defendant just went to bed, slept on one
side thereof, then turned his back and went
to sleep. There was no sexual intercourse
between them during the first night. The
same thing happened on the second, third
and fourth nights.
In an effort to have their honeymoon in a
private place where they can enjoy together
during their first week as husband and wife,
they went to Baguio City. But, they did so
together with her mother, an uncle, his
mother and his nephew. They were all
invited by the defendant to join them. [T]hey
stayed in Baguio City for four (4) days. But,
during this period, there was no sexual
intercourse between them, since the
defendant avoided her by taking a long walk
during siesta time or by just sleeping on a
rocking chair located at the living room.
They slept together in the same room and on
the same bed since May 22, 1988 until
March 15, 1989. But during this period,
there was no attempt of sexual intercourse
between them. [S]he claims, that she did not:
even see her husband's private parts nor did
he see hers.
Because of this, they submitted themselves
for medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio
Macalalag, a urologist at the Chinese
General Hospital, on January 20, 1989.
The results of their physical examinations
were that she is healthy, normal and still a
virgin, while that of her husband's
examination was kept confidential up to this
time. While no medicine was prescribed for
her, the doctor prescribed medications for
her husband which was also kept
confidential. No treatment was given to her.
For her husband, he was asked by the doctor
to return but he never did.
The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is
impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not
show his penis. She said, that she had
observed the defendant using an eyebrow
pencil and sometimes the cleansing cream of
his mother. And that, according to her, the
defendant married her, a Filipino citizen, to
acquire or maintain his residency status here
in the country and to publicly maintain the
appearance of a normal man.
The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with
her husband.
On the other hand, it is the claim of the
defendant that if their marriage shall be
annulled by reason of psychological
incapacity, the fault lies with his wife.
But, he said that he does not want his
marriage with his wife annulled for several
reasons, viz: (1) that he loves her very much;
(2) that he has no defect on his part and he is
physically and psychologically capable; and,
(3) since the relationship is still very young
and if there is any differences between the
two of them, it can still be reconciled and
 that, according to him, if either one of them
has some incapabilities, there is no certainty
that this will not be cured. He further claims,
that if there is any defect, it can be cured by
the intervention of medical technology or
science.
The defendant admitted that since their
marriage on May 22, 1988, until their
separation on March 15, 1989, there was no
sexual contact between them. But, the
reason for this, according to the defendant,
was that everytime he wants to have sexual
intercourse with his wife, she always
avoided him and whenever he caresses her
private parts, she always removed his hands.
The defendant claims, that he forced his
wife to have sex with him only once but he
did not continue because she was shaking
and she did not like it. So he stopped.
There are two (2) reasons, according to the
defendant , why the plaintiff filed this case
against him, and these are: (1) that she is
afraid that she will be forced to return the
pieces of jewelry of his mother, and, (2) that
her husband, the defendant, will
consummate their marriage.
The defendant insisted that their marriage
will remain valid because they are still very
young and there is still a chance to
overcome their differences.
The defendant submitted himself to a
physical examination. His penis was
examined by Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr., for the
purpose of finding out whether he is
impotent . As a result thereof, Dr. Alteza
submitted his Doctor's Medical Report.
(Exh. "2"). It is stated there, that there is no
evidence of impotency (Exh. "2-B"), and he
is capable of erection. (Exh. "2-C")
The doctor said, that he asked the defendant
to masturbate to find out whether or not he
has an erection and he found out that from
the original size of two (2) inches, or five (5)
centimeters, the penis of the defendant
lengthened by one (1) inch and one
centimeter. Dr. Alteza said, that the
defendant had only a soft erection which is
why his penis is not in its full length. But,
still is capable of further erection, in that
with his soft erection, the defendant is
capable of having sexual intercourse with a
woman.
In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor
manifested that there is no collusion
between the parties and that the evidence is
not fabricated."2
After trial, the court rendered judgment, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby
rendered declaring as VOID the marriage
entered into by the plaintiff with the
defendant on May 22, 1988 at the Manila
Cathedral, Basilica of the Immaculate
Conception, Intramuros, Manila, before the
Rt. Rev. Msgr. Melencio de Vera. Without
costs. Let a copy of this decision be
furnished the Local Civil Registrar of
Quezon City. Let another copy be furnished
the Local Civil Registrar of Manila.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's decision.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of
Appeals erred:
I
in affirming the conclusions of the lower
court that there was no sexual intercourse
between the parties without making any
findings of fact.
II
in holding that the refusal of private
respondent to have sexual communion with
petitioner is a psychological incapacity
inasmuch as proof thereof is totally absent.
III
in holding that the alleged refusal of both the
petitioner and the private respondent to have
sex with each other constitutes
psychological incapacity of both.
IV
in affirming the annulment of the marriage
between the parties decreed by the lower
court without fully satisfying itself that there
was no collusion between them.
We find the petition to be bereft of merit.
Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil
Case No. Q-89-3141, private respondent has the
burden of proving the allegations in her complaint;
that since there was no independent evidence to prove
the alleged non-coitus between the parties, there
remains no other basis for the court's conclusion
except the admission of petitioner; that public policy
should aid acts intended to validate marriage and
should retard acts intended to invalidate them; that
the conclusion drawn by the trial court on the
admissions and confessions of the parties in their
pleadings and in the course of the trial is misplaced
since it could have been a product of collusion; and
that in actions for annulment of marriage, the
material facts alleged in the complaint shall always
be proved.3
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:
Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. —
Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or
otherwise admits the material allegations of
the adverse party's pleading, the court may,
on motion of that party, direct judgment on
such pleading. But in actions for annulment
of marriage or for legal separation the
material facts alleged in the complaint shall
always be proved.
The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on the
pleadings. What said provision seeks to prevent is
annulment of marriage without trial. The assailed
decision was not based on such a judgment on the
pleadings. When private respondent testified under
oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by
oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by
the adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in
form of a testimony. After such evidence was
presented, it be came incumbent upon petitioner to
present his side. He admitted that since their marriage
on May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15,
1989, there was no sexual intercourse between them.
To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason
why, as stated by the petitioner, the Civil Code
provides that no judgment annulling a marriage shall
be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by
confession of judgment (Arts. 88 and 101[par. 2]) and
the Rules of Court prohibit such annulment without
trial (Sec. 1, Rule 19).
The case has reached this Court because petitioner
does not want their marriage to be annulled. This
only shows that there is no collusion between the
parties. When petitioner admitted that he and his wife
(private respondent) have never had sexual contact
with each other, he must have been only telling the
truth. We are reproducing the relevant portion of the
challenged resolution denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration, penned with magisterial lucidity by
Associate Justice Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes, viz:
The judgment of the trial court which was
affirmed by this Court is not based on a
stipulation of facts. The issue of whether or
not the appellant is psychologically
incapacitated to discharge a basic marital
obligation was resolved upon a review of
both the documentary and testimonial
evidence on record. Appellant admitted that
he did not have sexual relations with his
wife after almost ten months of cohabitation,
and it appears that he is not suffering from
any physical disability. Such abnormal
reluctance or unwillingness to consummate
his marriage is strongly indicative of a
serious personality disorder which to the
mind of this Court clearly demonstrates an
'utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage'
within the meaning of Article 36 of the
Family Code (See Santos vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4,
1995).4
Petitioner further contends that respondent court
erred in holding that the alleged refusal of both the
petitioner and the private respondent to have sex with
each other constitutes psychological incapacity of
both. He points out as error the failure of the trial
court to make "a categorical finding about the alleged
psychological incapacity and an in-depth analysis of
the reasons for such refusal which may not be
necessarily due to physchological disorders" because
there might have been other reasons, — i.e., physical
disorders, such as aches, pains or other discomforts,
— why private respondent would not want to have
sexual intercourse from May 22, 1988 to March 15,
1989, in a short span of 10 months.
First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor
the respondent court made a finding on who between
petitioner and private respondent refuses to have
sexual contact with the other. The fact remains,
however, that there has never been coitus between
them. At any rate, since the action to declare the
marriage void may be filed by either party, i.e., even
the psychologically incapacitated, the question of
who refuses to have sex with the other becomes
immaterial.
Petitioner claims that there is no independent
evidence on record to show that any of the parties is
suffering from phychological incapacity. Petitioner
also claims that he wanted to have sex with private
respondent; that the reason for private respondent's
refusal may not be psychological but physical
disorder as stated above.
We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner
could have discussed with private respondent or
asked her what is ailing her, and why she balks and
avoids him everytime he wanted to have sexual
intercourse with her. He never did. At least, there is
nothing in the record to show that he had tried to find
out or discover what the problem with his wife could
be. What he presented in evidence is his doctor's
Medical Report that there is no evidence of his
impotency and he is capable of erection.5 Since it is
petitioner's claim that the reason is not psychological
but perhaps physical disorder on the part of private
respondent, it became incumbent upon him to prove
such a claim.
If a spouse, although physically capable but
simply refuses to perform his or her essential
marriage obligations, and the refusal is
senseless and constant, Catholic marriage
tribunals attribute the causes to
psychological incapacity than to stubborn
refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is
equivalent to psychological incapacity.
Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to
have sexual intercourse with his or her
spouse is considered a sign of psychological
incapacity.6
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations
under the Family Code is "To procreate children
based on the universal principle that procreation of
children through sexual cooperation is the basic end
of marriage." Constant non- fulfillment of this
obligation will finally destroy the integrity or
wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the
senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties
to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to
psychological incapacity.
As aptly stated by the respondent court,
An examination of the evidence convinces
Us that the husband's plea that the wife did
not want carnal intercourse with him does
not inspire belief. Since he was not
physically impotent, but he refrained from
sexual intercourse during the entire time
(from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989) that
he occupied the same bed with his wife,
purely out of symphaty for her feelings, he
deserves to be doubted for not having
asserted his right seven though she balked
(Tompkins vs. Tompkins, 111 Atl. 599,
cited in I Paras, Civil Code, at p. 330).
Besides, if it were true that it is the wife was
suffering from incapacity, the fact that
defendant did not go to court and seek the
declaration of nullity weakens his claim.
This case was instituted by the wife whose
normal expectations of her marriage were
frustrated by her husband's inadequacy.
Considering the innate modesty of the
Filipino woman, it is hard to believe that she
would expose her private life to public
scrutiny and fabricate testimony against her
husband if it were not necessary to put her
life in order and put to rest her marital
status.
cared less." This is so because an ungiven self is an
unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In
the natural order, it is sexual intimacy which brings
spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a
gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It
is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation
and ensures the continuation of family relations.
It appears that there is absence of empathy between
petitioner and private respondent. That is — a shared
feeling which between husband and wife must be
experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual
intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion.
Marital union is a two-way process. An expressive
interest in each other's feelings at a time it is needed
by the other can go a long way in deepening the
marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for
children but for two consenting adults who view the
relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect,
sacrifice and a continuing commitment to
compromise, conscious of its value as a sublime
social institution.
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed
relationship in which the parties found themselves
trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and
unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less
but sustain the studied judgment of respondent
appellate court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES , the
assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated
November 29, 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED in all
respects and the petition is hereby DENIED for lack
of merit.
SO ORDERED.

We are not impressed by defendant's claim

that what the evidence proved is the
unwillingness or lack of intention to perform
the sexual act, which is not phychological
incapacity, and which can be achieved
"through proper motivation." After almost
ten months of cohabitation, the admission
that the husband is reluctant or unwilling to
perform the sexual act with his wife whom
he professes to love very dearly, and who
has not posed any insurmountable resistance
to his alleged approaches, is indicative of a
hopeless situation, and of a serious
personality disorder that constitutes
psychological incapacity to discharge the
basic marital covenants within the
contemplation of the Family Code.7

While the law provides that the husband and the wife
are obliged to live together, observe mutual love,
respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the
sanction therefor is actually the "spontaneous, mutual
affection between husband and wife and not any legal
mandate or court order" (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno 120
Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is shared with
another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act
of a partner in marriage is to say "I could not have