respondent for investigation and report.

In his Answer,[18] respondent denied the allegations and

ACHERNAR B. TABUZO, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. JOSE
On August 15, 2014, the respondent issued a Report and contended that they were not only false and an unfortunate
ALFONSO M. GOMOS, RESPONDENT.
Recommendation[4] recommending that complainant be misappreciation of the laws, facts and circumstances but also an
reprimanded for the impropriety of talking to Sillo, without her act of harassment. He countered that it was complainant who
RESOLUTION
counsel, prior to the calling of their case for mediation caused the delay of the resolution of the case because of the
conference, and for the abusive, offensive or improper language numerous motions and pleadings she filed. Also, the report and
GESMUNDO, J.: used in the pleadings she filed in the said case. recommendation was based on facts, law and jurisprudence
which was adopted and approved by the IBP Board. If
The filing of an administrative complaint against an adjudicator
The report and recommendation was adopted and approved by complainant felt aggrieved by the report and recommendation,
is not the proper remedy for assailing the legal propriety of an
the IBP Board of Governors (Board) in its Resolution No. she could have filed a motion for reconsideration of the Board's
adverse decision, order, resolution or recommendation, in the
XXI-2015-074, dated January 31, 2015.[5] January 31, 2015 Resolution.
case of administrative complaints against lawyers. More
importantly, the reckless practice of filing baseless administrative
Hence, this administrative complaint. In Reply,[19] complainant claimed that the only proof that the
complaints against fellow lawyers undeniably degrades rather
report and recommendation was adopted and approved by the
than cleanses the ranks of the legal profession.
Complainant alleged that respondent violated the Constitution, Board was the Notice of Resolution; and when she asked for a
the Rules of Procedure of the IBP-Commission on Bar copy of the transcript and resolution of the case, she was
The Antecedents:
Discipline (Commission), Rule 139-B of the Rules Court and informed by the head of the records section that it was
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713[6] when he failed to act on her confidential and that she should file a manifestation to secure a
Before the Court is a Verified Complaint[1] filed by Atty.
pleadings with dispatch and for issuing his report and copy. Furthermore, complainant argued that it was respondent
Achernar B. Tabuzo (complainant) against Atty. Jose Alfonso M.
recommendation on August 15, 2014 or 174 days from the who was guilty of singling her out when he reprimanded her for
Gomos (respondent)[2] who was then a Commissioner of the
submission of the last pleading.[7] alleged belligerence in her pleadings and papers, and maintained
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), for allegedly committing
that respondent was grossly ignorant, inefficient and had no
the following acts:
Complainant averred that respondent was very cruel and regard for due process of law.
heartless to an inexperienced lawyer when he mutilated
Violation of the Constitution of the Republic of statements
the made in her pleadings in CBD Case No. 12-3457; and The Report and Recommendation of the IBP
Philippines, the Rules of Procedure of the Commission onthat
Bar he maliciously cropped and pasted portions of
2.1 Discipline, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court and Republiccomplainant's
Act statement in her position paper to give the wrong
6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public impression before the IBP-Board of Governors (Board) that the In its Report and Recommendation,[20] the Commission
[O]fficials and Employees; introductory heading was an act of name calling against recommended the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit. It
respondent, thereby violating Rules 1.01[8] and 1.02[9] of Canon ratiocinated that complainant's allegations while seemingly
Violation of Canon[s] 1 and 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
1 and Rules 3.01,[10] 3.02,[11] and 3.04[12] of Canon 3 of the couched as acts of misconduct, actually assails the report and
2.2 and the Guidelines for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions of Code the of Judicial Conduct.[13] recommendation of respondent as investigating commissioner in
Commission on Bar Discipline; CBD Case No. 12-3457. The Commission stated that it would be
Complainant asserted that respondent committed nonfeasance irregular and improper to review such findings because it would
Nonfeasance in deliberately refusing to institute disciplinary
for deliberately refusing to institute disciplinary action against a be tantamount to reopening matters and issues that have been
action for serious violations of duties owed to the Courtslawyer
and for serious violation of duties owed to the Court and the passed upon and approved by the IBP Board. The Commission
2.3 the Legal Profession committed by a lawyer, despite repeated
legal profession despite several notices. She alleged that as early agreed with the respondent that if complainant felt aggrieved by
notice, and contrary to the mandate of his office andasthe December 2013, respondent was aware that Atty. Alan R. such findings, her option would have been to file a motion for
Integrated Bar of the Philippines; Bulawan committed forum shopping and other grave reconsideration or some other appropriate remedy, but not an
malpractices but respondent refused to institute disciplinary administrative case against the investigating commissioner.
2.4Gross Ignorance of the Law; action reasoning that there should first be a verified complaint
before he could act on it. Complainant claimed that respondent's On August 27, 2016, the Board, in its Resolution No.
All the foregoing were aggravated by: a) patterninaction of was a violation of Section 1,[14] Rule 139-B of the Rules XXII-2016-468, adopted the Commission's report and
misconduct; b) multiple offenses; [c)] substantial experience
of Court and Sec. 13[15] of the IBP's By-Laws.[16] recommendation dismissing the complaint.
2.5 in the practice of law; and [d)] betrayal of the trust of his
office as Commissioner of the Honorable Commission onLastly,
Bar complainant posited that respondent was grossly ignorant Undeterred, complainant filed a Motion for
Discipline.[3] of the rules on privileged communication, on evidence, on the Reconsideration[21] insisting that respondent, as an
crime of perjury, and on forum shopping when he failed to investigating commissioner, has an accountability to the legal
dismiss the present administrative case outright because it had profession separate and distinct from that of the IBP Board and
The controversy stemmed from an administrative complaint filed no merit and when he ignored the perjury and forum shopping such accountability is not a mere administrative matter inside
by Lucille G. Sillo (Sillo) against complainant before the IBP, committed by Sillo.[17] the IBP-Commission. Complainant insisted that respondent could
docketed as CBD Case No. 12-3457. The case was assigned to
be held accountable independently of the Board or the staff
assigned to him when he issued a late report and
recommendation and issued it without the mandatory
conference being held, and with no actual admissions or
stipulations of facts and no definition of issues. Complainant
averred that respondent cannot choose his deadline for
submitting a report and recommendation, and his failure to
decide a case within the required period constitutes gross
inefficiency.[22]
Complainant posited that respondent could be held
administratively liable because he was a quasi-judicial officer
performing functions delegated by the Court, hence, a public
officer.[23]
On February 23, 2017, respondent filed his Comment[24] stating
that the complainant's motion for reconsideration was a mere
rehash of the arguments raised in her complaint and position
paper. Respondent reiterated that he immediately acted on the
administrative case filed against complainant as soon as he
received the records of the case; and that the cause of delay was
due to the several motions filed by complainant instead of just
filing the required position paper. The respondent emphasized
that the report and recommendation was a product of a
conscientious study of all the pleadings submitted by the parties
and application of the law and jurisprudence.
Respondent added that complainant's inordinate liberty in
calling him "grossly ignorant" and "grossly inefficient" at
practically every tum or page of her pleadings notably
characterizes her penchant for name-calling her adversaries. He
believed that he was clearly being harassed and singled out
considering that his report and recommendation was approved
by the majority members of the Board.
In its Resolution No. XXII-2017-1120[25] dated May 27, 2017, the
Board denied the motion for reconsideration.
On February 5, 2018, the IBP transmitted before the Court the
records of the case for final disposition.[26]
The issues to be resolved are: (1) whether respondent may be
held administratively liable in the same manner as judges and
other government officials; and (2) whether respondent may be
held administratively liable for rendering an alleged adverse
judgment in his capacity as an investigating commissioner of the
IBP.
The Court's Ruling
On the Respondent's Ascription of
Liability in the Same Manner as appropriated, to carry out the purposes of
Judges or Other Government this Act. Thereafter, such sums as may be
Officials Due to His Position as necessary for the same purpose shall be
Commissioner on Bar Discipline: included in the annual appropriations for the
Supreme Court.
In order to have a meaningful understanding of the nature of the
functions and accountabilities of an IBP Commissioner, it is Section 3. This Act shall take effect upon its
necessary to first identify the character of the IBP as an approval. (emphasis supplied)
organization. To do this, the Court deems it imperative to dig
deep and trace its legislative and jurisprudential background.
The IBP's existence traces its roots to Sec. 13, Article VIII of the
Meanwhile, the 1973 Constitution was ratified wherein Sec. 5(5)
1935 Constitution which stated that:
of Art. X enumerated the powers of this Court, thus:
Section 13. The Supreme Court shall have
Promulgate rules concerning pleading,
the power to promulgate rules concerning
practice, and procedure in all courts, the
pleading, practice, and procedure in all
admission to the practice of law, and the
courts, and the admission to the practice of
integration of the bar, which, however, may
law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts
be repealed, altered or supplemented by
of the same grade and shall not diminish,
the Batasang Pambansa. Such rules shall
increase, or modify substantive rights. The
provide a simplified and inexpensive
existing laws on pleading, practice, and
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases,
procedure are hereby repealed as statutes,
shall be uniform for all courts of the same
and are declared Rules of Courts, subject to
grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or
the power of the Supreme Court to alter and
modify substantive rights. (emphasis
modify the same. The Congress shall have
supplied)
the power to repeal, alter or supplement
the rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure, and the admission to the
practice of law in the Philippines. (emphases
supplied) Finally, the legal quandary pertaining to the integration of the
Philippine Bar culminated in the promulgation of In the Matter
of the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines[28] where the
Court upheld the integration of the Philippine Bar on the ground
that it was sanctioned by Sec. 13, Art. VIII of the 1935
In view of this provision, Congress enacted R.A. No.
Constitution.
6397[27] which gave this Court the facility to initiate the
integration process of the Philippine Bar; the provisions of which
Following this judicial pronouncement, Presidential
read:
Decree (P.D.) No. 181[29] was enacted formally creating the IBP
and vesting it with corporate personality. Sec. 2 of the law states:
Section 1. Within two years from the
approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may
Section 2. The Integrated Bar shall have
adopt rules of court to effect the integration
perpetual succession and shall have all legal
of the Philippine Bar under such conditions
powers appertaining to a juridical
as it shall see fit in order to raise the
person, particularly the power to sue and be
standards of the legal profession, improve
sued; to contract and be contracted with; to
the administration of justice, and enable the
hold real and personal property as may be
bar to discharge its public responsibility more
necessary for corporate purposes; to
effectively.
mortgage, lease, sell, transfer, convey and
otherwise dispose of the same; to solicit and
Section 2. The sum of five hundred thousand
receive public and private donations and
pesos is hereby appropriated, out of any
contributions; to accept and receive real and
funds in the National Treasury not otherwise
 personal property by gift, devise or bequest;
to levy and collect membership dues and
special assessments from its members; to
adopt a seal and to alter the same at
pleasure; to have offices and conduct its
affairs in the Greater Manila Area and
elsewhere; to make and adopt by-laws, rules
and regulations not inconsistent with the
laws of the Philippines or the Rules of Court,
particularly Rule 139-A thereof; and generally
to do all such acts and things as may be
necessary or proper to carry into effect and
promote the purposes for which it was
organized. (emphasis supplied)
Significantly, Section 6[30] of P.D. No. 181 still recognized this
Court's constitutional power to promulgate rules concerning the
IBP, and such power of the Court was also institutionalized and
carried into the present Constitution in which Sec. 5(5), Art. VIII
now reads:
Promulgate rules concerning the protection
and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts, the admission to the practice of
law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance
to the under-privileged. Such rules shall
provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases,
shall be uniform for all courts of the same
grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or
modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure
of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies
shall remain effective unless disapproved by
the Supreme Court. (emphasis supplied)
Now, given the IBP's statutory and jurisprudential background,
the Court proceeds to answer the question: What branch of
government created the IBP? More importantly: Is the IBP
strictly a public office or a private institution?
To answer both questions, the Court highlights its observations
regarding the important segments of the legal history which led
to the grant of the IBP's juridical personality, viz:
Firstly, both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions gave the Court and
the Legislature the concurrent power to regulate the practice of
law. In other words, the overlapping and coequal powers of both
branches of government to regulate the practice of law became
the initial bases for the IBP's establishment.
Secondly, Sec. 1 of R.A. No. 6397 used the phraseology "to effect
the integration" which means that Congress, though it also had
the power to enact laws affecting the practice of law under the
1935 Constitution, had acknowledged the Court's rightful (and
primary) prerogative to adopt measures to raise the standard of
the legal profession.[31] At that time, only this Court had the
power to "promulgate" rules concerning the practice of law
while Congress may only "repeal, alter or supplement" these
promulgated rules. That may be the apparent reason why
Congress only appropriated (and allowed for subsequent
appropriations of) the necessary funds to assist this Court in
attaining the objective of initiating the integration of the
Philippine Bar.
Thirdly, the Court had ordained the integration of the Philippine
Bar to: a) assist in the administration of justice; b) foster and
maintain on the part of its members high ideals of integrity,
learning, professional competence, public service and conduct; c)
safeguard the professional interests of its members; d) cultivate
among its members a spirit of cordiality and brotherhood; e)
provide a forum for the discussion of law, jurisprudence, law
reform, pleading, practice and procedure, and the relations of
the Bar to the Bench and to the public, and publish information
relating thereto; f) encourage and foster legal education; g)
promote a continuing program of legal research in substantive
and adjective law, and make reports and recommendations
thereon; h) enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility
effectively; i) render more effective assistance in maintaining the
Rule of Law; j) protect lawyers and litigants against the abuse of
tyrannical judges and prosecuting officers; k) discharge, fully and
properly, its responsibility in the disciplining and/or removal of
incompetent and unworthy judges and prosecuting officers; l)
shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself
except within its own forum, from the assaults that politics and
self-interest may level at it, and assist it to maintain its integrity,
impartiality and independence; m) have an effective voice in the
selection of judges and prosecuting officers; n) prevent the
unauthorized practice of law, and break up any monopoly of
local practice maintained through influence or position; o)
establish welfare funds for families of disabled and deceased
lawyers; p) provide placement services, and establish legal aid
offices and set up lawyer reference services throughout the
country so that the poor may not lack competent legal service; q)
distribute educational and informational materials that are
difficult to obtain in many of our provinces; r) devise and
maintain a program of continuing legal education for practicing
attorneys in order to elevate the standards of the profession
throughout the country; s) enforce rigid ethical standards, and
promulgate minimum fees schedules; t) create law centers and
establish law libraries for legal research; u) conduct campaigns to
educate the people on their legal rights and obligations, on the
importance of preventive legal advice, and on the functions and
duties of the Filipino lawyer; and v) generate and maintain
pervasive and meaningful country-wide involvement of the
lawyer population in the solution of the multifarious problems
that afflict the nation.[32]
Fourthly, P.D. No. 181 endowed the IBP with the attributes of
perpetual succession and, more importantly, "all legal powers
appertaining to a juridical person." It means that the IBP had
corporate attributes which gave it the ability to pursue desired
activities on its own, subject only to the Court's administrative
supervision.
Lastly, the present Constitution's acknowledgment of the
"integrated bar" as one of the subjects of this Court's power to
promulgate rules relative to the practice of law cements the IBP's
existence as a juridical person.
The aforementioned observations indubitably establish that the
collaborative enactments of the Court, the Congress (and the
President exercising legislative powers in the case of P.D. No.
181), and the present Constitution all contributed to the
emergence of the IBP's juridical personality. Due to this peculiar
manner of creation, it now becomes reasonable for the Court to
conclude that the IBP is a sui
generis public[33] institution deliberately organized, by both the
legislative and judicial branches of government and recognized
by the present and past Constitutions, for the advancement of
the legal profession. At this juncture, the Court needs to
determine whether the IBP's officers, especially the IBP
Commissioners, are considered as public officers under the
purview of the law.
Presently, the IBP as an organization has as its members all
lawyers coming from both the public and private sectors who are
authorized to practice law in the Philippines. However, Section
4[34] of the IBP's By-Laws allows only private practitioners to
occupy any position in its organization. This means that only
individuals engaged in the private practice are authorized to be
officers or employees and to perform acts for and in behalf of
the IBP. Hence, the IBP Commissioners, being officers of the
IBP, are private practitioners performing public
functions delegated to them by this Court in the exercise of its
constitutional power to regulate the practice of law. This was
aptly described in Frias v. Atty. Bautista-Lozada[35] where the
Court declared that:
The [IBP CBD] derives its authority to take
cognizance of administrative complaints
 against lawyers from this Court which has On the Alleged Delay of interrogatories to previous Commissi
the inherent power to regulate, supervise the Resolution of CBD Complanant Lucille denied by curren
and control the practice of law in the Case No. 12-3457: Sillo Commissioner
Philippines. Hence, in the exercise of its Ignored by previo
delegated power to entertain administrative Sec. 1, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the IBP-CBD provides Commissioner an
complaints against lawyers, the [IBP-CBD] that "[t]he only pleadings allowed are verified complaint, granted by curre
should be guided by the doctrines and verified answer and verified position papers and motion for Commissioner on
principles laid down by this Court. (emphasis reconsideration of a ground that "compl
supplied) resolution."[46] Such restrictive enumeration is consistent with for disbarment
Motion to Sever 349 days
the summary nature of disciplinary proceedings as well as the suspension or fo
basic tenets of practical expediency encouraged by Sec. 5(5), Art. discipline of attorn
VIII of the Constitution which mandates this Court to adopt such are to be institute
rules for a "simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy before this Commis
Even if the afore-cited case did not expound in what way the
disposition of cases." Relatedly, this is also the reason why a by filing six (6) copie
IBP-Commission is to be "guided by the doctrines and principles
party has to first ask for a leave of court before filing any a verified Complai
laid down by this Court," it can be reasonably inferred that the
pleading which is not expressly sanctioned by applicable rules of Ignored by previo
IBP-CBD's delegated function of entertaining complaints
procedure. Such practice is intended to alert litigants that the Commissioner an
against lawyers is public in nature; but the responsible officer
resolution of unsanctioned motions and other pleadings seeking deemed by curre
performing such function is a private individual—not a public
for affirmative reliefs is discretionary on the part of the courts Commissioner as fo
officer.Consequently, it also follows that IBP Commissioners
(including quasi-judicial bodies or investigatory administrative "Let it be placed o
are not "public officers" in context of Sec. 3(b)[36] of R.A. No. Motion to Inhibit 384 days
agencies). This is because these unsanctioned pleadings clutter record that
6713, Art. 203 the Revised Penal Code,[37] Sec. 4(e)[38] R.A. No.
up court (or any administrative quasi-adjudicative or Commissioner Irving
9485,[39] or even Sec. 2(b)[40] of R.A. No. 3019.[41] Especially in
investigative body) records and tend to impede the speedy Corvera may now
the context of R.A. No. 6713, they are not "public officials" as
disposition of cases. be deemed to ha
they are not elective or appointive officials of the "government"
inhibited himself x
as defined by Sec. 3(a)[42] of the same law. Moreover, it is also
Concomitantly, it is settled that considering the serious
obvious that IBP Commissioners cannot be held liable for
consequences of the disbarment or suspension of a member of
violation of Sec. 15(1),[43] Art. VIII of the Constitution because
the Bar, the Court has consistently held that preponderant These charted allegations show that the complainant had filed
they are neither members of the Judiciary in the context of the
evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of administrative several pleadings which are not among those that are explicitly
Constitution or statutory provisions organizing lower collegiate
penalty on a member of the Bar.[47] Here, preponderance of enumerated in Sec. 1, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the
and trial courts nor quasi-judicial officers in the context of
evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a IBP-CBD. The rule uses the term "only" which is patently
applicable laws creating quasi-judicial agencies. Finally, IBP
whole, superior to or has greater weight than that of the other indicative that the enumeration is tightly restrictive. Clearly, the
Commissioners cannot be held administratively liable for
or that which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief respondent had no positive duty at all to act on these
malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance in the framework of
than that which is offered in opposition thereto.[48]Conversely, unsanctioned pleadings, especially in a manner favorable to the
administrative law because they cannot strictly be considered as
bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not complainant. The complainant cannot blame respondent for not
being "employed" with the government or of any subdivision,
equivalent to proof.[49] acting on prohibited or unsanctioned pleadings. Her insistence in
agency or instrumentality including government-owned or
having the aforementioned motions resolved despite not being
controlled corporations.[44]
In this case, the source of the complainant's main gripe against mentioned as among the pleadings allowed by Sec. 1, Rule III of
the respondent is the supposed delay in the resolution of the the Rules of Procedure of the IBP-CBD actually contributed to the
Nonetheless, IBP Commissioners and other IBP officers may be
following motions as alleged[50] in the complaint, to wit: delay of the whole proceedings in CBD Case No. 12-3457.
held administratively liable for violation of the rules promulgated
by this Court relative to the integrated bar and to the practice of
Even if the Court were to consider the aforementioned pleadings
law. Even if they are not "public officers" in the context of their
as not prohibited for the sake of argument, the complainant
employment relationship with the government, they are still
never attached in her complaint or adduced during the hearings
"officers of the court" and "servants of the law" who are Motion/Pleading Approximate Days
Remarks before the IBP-Commission certified true copies of the same
expected to observe and maintain the rule of law and to make Filed Unresolved
documents to show the dates of actual filing so the periods to
themselves exemplars worthy of emulation by others.[45] Most Motion for the
act on them may be fairly reckoned. She also failed to submit
importantly, no less than Sec. 5(5) of the Constitution placed Issuance of a Ignored by
copies of respondent's supposed resolutions denying or granting
them under the Court's administrative supervision. Therefore, Subpoena Duces previous Commissioner,
529 days these motions to show the date on when they were actually
IBP Commissioners may be held administratively liable only in Tecum and denied by current
rendered or issued. These material omissions leave this Court
relation to their functions as IBP officers—not as government Subpoena Ad Commissioner
unable to verify with certainty or to determine with practical
officials. Testificandum
accuracy the existence of delay. The only basis of the
Respondent's 529 days Ignored by
complainant in imputing delay on the part of the respondent was
her Position Paper[51] which merely alleged the existence of her
motions in CBD Case No. 12-3457 and their supposedly tarried
resolution. Undeniably, the complainant failed to offer any
preponderant proof of respondent's supposed delay in the
resolutions of her motions in CBD Case No. 12-3457 and merely
relied on bare allegations and factual conclusions to support her
administrative complaint. Clearly, the quantum of proof required
in disbarment or administrative disciplinary cases was not
satisfied by the complainant. Therefore, contrary to the
complainant's hasty imputation of delay, it only appears that
respondent merely disregarded the unsanctioned pleadings filed
pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the
IBP-CBD and prudently proceeded to render the report and
recommendation thereby belying the allegations of nonfeasance.
At any rate, the Court evinces its observation that the
complainant's charge of delay in the resolution of the subject
unsanctioned pleadings of the complainant appears to be a mere
retaliation on the adverse Resolution No. XXI-205-074 dated
January 31, 2015 in CBD Case No. 12-3457. The Court had
already declared that an administrative complaint is not the
appropriate remedy for every act of a judge deemed aberrant or
irregular where a judicial remedy exists and is
available.[52] Similarly, an administrative complaint is not the
proper remedy for an adverse decision, order or resolution of an
administrative adjudicator deemed by a complaining party as
erroneous; especially when there are other remedies under the
ordinary course of law such as a motion for reconsideration.
Thus, a party who has lost his or right to appeal a decision,
resolution or order of a court or quasi-judicial body (including
administrative offices or agencies empowered to conduct
investigations) cannot re-litigate the same matters in another
administrative case filed against the adjudicator.
On the Respondent's Comments
Against the Complainant in the
Report and Recommendation
for Her Behavior:
The Court has, in some instances, even conceded that "a lawyer
may think highly of his [or her] intellectual
endowment."[53] Such observation is but a moderate and fair
commentary to remind members of the legal profession to
espouse humility in all their dealings not only with their clients
and with their fellow lawyers but also against their adversaries.
The respondent's comment, that the complainant "must have
thought so highly of herself that...she finds it necessary to
declare that [Sillo's words] are not words a graduate of the only
Pontifical University in Asia and a law school ran by monks would
use," is merely a fair and realistic observation. Clearly, an
academic slur implicating incompetence on a person's
intellectual capabilities due to his or her scholastic background
simply amounts to an intemperate language on the
complainant's part. It finds no place in decent legal
argumentation and debate. Besides, lawyers should not be too
onion-skinned and should be tolerant of criticisms (especially
those which are fair or mild) against them as litigation is
inherently a hostile endeavor between adverse or contending
parties. Hence, it was proper on the part of Commissioner
Limpingco to recommend for the dismissal of the complainant's
charges of impropriety for the respondent merely made a fair
comment.
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:
CANON 8 – A lawyer shall conduct himself
with courtesy, fairness and candor toward
his professional colleagues, and shall avoid
harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
(emphasis supplied)
Obviously, the filing of baseless and unfounded administrative
complaints against fellow lawyers is antithetical to conducting
oneself with courtesy, fairness and candor. It reduces the Bar's
disciplinary process into an avenue for childish bickering and
trivial catfights. Realistically, filing harassment administrative
complaints definitely causes undue anxiety and considerable
psychological stress on wrongly charged respondents. Thus, it
should be understood that the aforementioned Canon proscribes
the filing of frivolous administrative complaints against fellow
members of the legal profession to prevent exploitative lawyers
from abusing the disciplinary process. Besides, an important
portion of the Lawyer's Oath which should be the guiding beacon
of every member of the legal profession states: "I will not
wittingly nor willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or
unlawful suit, or give aid nor consent to the same."
Here, the Court cannot help but notice that even a cursory
reading of the complainant's pleadings exhibits her propensity
for filing baseless complaints and penchant for hurling
denigrating allegations against her adversaries. Moreover, the
instant affidavit complaint contains a smorgasbord of violations
ascribed to the respondent which the complainant had
inaccurately and miserably failed to substantiate. Worse, the
complaint's pointless perplexity was compounded by convoluted
allegations which made it laborious for the Court to make
coherent sense. Accordingly, the Court deems it proper to
sternly warn the complainant and her collaborating counsel, Atty.
Barboza, to refrain from filing and maintaining baseless
administrative suits against fellow lawyers under pain of
administrative sanctions.
Final Note
Lawyers are reminded to treat their fellow members of the legal
profession and even their non-lawyer adversaries with utmost
candor, respect and dignity. More importantly, the primary
purpose of administrative disciplinary proceedings against
delinquent lawyers is to uphold the law and to prevent the ranks
of the legal profession from being corrupted by unscrupulous
practices—not to shelter or nurse a wounded ego. Such is the
reason why lawyers should always set a good example in not
using the law and the rules as weapons or tools of malicious
vindication during petty squabbles as it degrades the credibility
of the legal profession and tarnishes its integrity.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the
Court AGREES with the Report and Recommendation of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines – Committee on Bar Discipline
adopted by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines – Board of
Governors, and DISMISSESthe administrative complaint filed
against Atty. Jose Alfonso M. Gomos.
Furthermore, the Court STERNLY WARNS Atty. Achernar B.
Tabuzo and her collaborating counsel Atty. Gaudencio A. Barboza,
Jr. to REFRAIN from abusing the disciplinary proceedings thru
filing and maintaining frivolous administrative complaints against
fellow members of the Bar. A repetition of the same or
commission of similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
IN RE: SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW IN THE
TERRITORY OF GUAM OF ATTY. LEON G. MAQUERA
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
May a member of the Philippine Bar who was disbarred or
suspended from the practice of law in a foreign jurisdiction
where he has also been admitted as an attorney be meted the
same sanction as a member of the Philippine Bar for the same
infraction committed in the foreign jurisdiction? There is a Rule
of Court provision covering this cases central issue. Up to this
juncture, its reach and breadth have not undergone the test of
an unsettled case.
In a Letter dated August 20, 1996,[1] the District Court of
Guam informed this Court of the suspension of Atty. Leon G.
Maquera (Maquera) from the practice of law in Guam for two (2)
years pursuant to the Decision rendered by the Superior Court of
Guam on May 7, 1996 in Special Proceedings Case No.
SP0075-94,[2] a disciplinary case filed by the Guam Bar Ethics
Committee against Maquera.
The Court referred the matter of Maqueras suspension in
Guam to the Bar Confidant for comment in its Resolution dated
November 19, 1996.[3] Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised
Rules of Court, the disbarment or suspension of a member of the
Philippine Bar in a foreign jurisdiction, where he has also been
admitted as an attorney, is also a ground for his disbarment or
suspension in this realm, provided the foreign courts action is by
reason of an act or omission constituting deceit, malpractice or
other gross misconduct, grossly immoral conduct, or a violation
of the lawyers oath.
In a Memorandum dated February 20, 1997, then Bar
Confidant Atty. Erlinda C. Verzosa recommended that the Court
obtain copies of the record of Maqueras case since the
documents transmitted by the Guam District Court do not
contain the factual and legal bases for Maqueras suspension and
are thus insufficient to enable her to determine whether
Maqueras acts or omissions which resulted in his suspension in
Guam are likewise violative of his oath as a member of the
Philippine Bar.[4]
Pursuant to this Courts directive in its Resolution dated
March 18, 1997,[5] the Bar Confidant sent a letter dated
November 13, 1997 to the District Court of Guam requesting for
certified copies of the record of the disciplinary case against
Maquera and of the rules violated by him.[6]
The Court received certified copies of the record of
Maqueras case from the District Court of Guam on December 8,
1997.[7]
Thereafter, Maqueras case was referred by the Court to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation report
and recommendation within sixty (60) days from the IBPs receipt
of the case records.[8]
The IBP sent Maquera a Notice of Hearing requiring him to
appear before the IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline on July 28,
1998.[9] However, the notice was returned unserved because
Maquera had already moved from his last known address in
Agana, Guam and did not leave any forwarding address.[10]
On October 9, 2003, the IBP submitted to the Court
its Report and Recommendation and its Resolution No.
XVI-2003-110, indefinitely suspending Maquera from the
practice of law within the Philippines until and unless he updates
and pays his IBP membership dues in full.[11]
The IBP found that Maquera was admitted to the
Philippine Bar on February 28, 1958. On October 18, 1974, he
was admitted to the practice of law in the territory of Guam. He
was suspended from the practice of law in Guam for misconduct,
as he acquired his clients property as payment for his legal
services, then sold it and as a consequence obtained an
unreasonably high fee for handling his clients case.[12]
In its Decision, the Superior Court of Guam stated that on
August 6, 1987, Edward Benavente, the creditor of a certain
Castro, obtained a judgment against Castro in a civil
case. Maquera served as Castros counsel in said case. Castros
property subject of the case, a parcel of land, was to be sold at a
public auction in satisfaction of his obligation to
Benavente. Castro, however, retained the right of redemption
over the property for one year. The right of redemption could be
exercised by paying the amount of the judgment debt within the
aforesaid period.[13]
At the auction sale, Benavente purchased Castros property
for Five Hundred U.S. Dollars (US$500.00), the amount which
Castro was adjudged to pay him.[14]
On December 21, 1987, Castro, in consideration of
Maqueras legal services in the civil case involving Benavente,
entered into an oral agreement with Maquera and assigned his
right of redemption in favor of the latter.[15]
On January 8, 1988, Maquera exercised Castros right of
redemption by paying Benavente US$525.00 in satisfaction of
the judgment debt. Thereafter, Maquera had the title to the
property transferred in his name.[16]
On December 31, 1988, Maquera sold the property to C.S.
Chang and C.C. Chang for Three Hundred Twenty Thousand U.S.
Dollars (US$320,000.00).[17]
On January 15, 1994, the Guam Bar Ethics Committee
(Committee) conducted hearings regarding Maqueras alleged
misconduct.[18]
Subsequently, the Committee filed a Petition in the
Superior Court of Guam praying that Maquera be sanctioned for
violations of Rules 1.5[19] and 1.8(a)[20] of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct (Model Rules) in force in Guam. In its
Petition, the Committee claimed that Maquera obtained an
unreasonably high fee for his services. The Committee further
alleged that Maquera himself admitted his failure to comply with
the requirement in Rule 1.8 (a) of the Model Rules that a lawyer
shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or
knowingly acquire a pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless
the transaction and the terms governing the lawyers acquisition
of such interest are fair and reasonable to the client, and are
fully disclosed to, and understood by the client and reduced in
writing.[21]
The Committee recommended that Maquera be: (1)
suspended from the practice of law in Guam for a period of two
[2] years, however, with all but thirty (30) days of the period of
suspension deferred; (2) ordered to return to Castro the
difference between the sale price of the property to the Changs
and the amount due him for legal services rendered to Castro; (3)
required to pay the costs of the disciplinary proceedings; and (4)
publicly reprimanded. It also recommended that other
jurisdictions be informed that Maquera has been subject to
disciplinary action by the Superior Court of Guam.[22]
Maquera did not deny that Castro executed a quitclaim
deed to the property in his favor as compensation for past legal
services and that the transaction, except for the deed itself, was
oral and was not made pursuant to a prior written
agreement. However, he contended that the transaction was
made three days following the alleged termination of the
attorney-client relationship between them, and that the
property did not constitute an exorbitant fee for his legal
services to Castro.[23]
On May 7, 1996, the Superior Court of Guam rendered
its Decision[24] suspending Maquera from the practice of law in
Guam for a period of two (2) years and ordering him to take the
Multi-State Professional Responsibility Examination (MPRE)
within that period. The court found that the attorney-client
relationship between Maquera and Castro was not yet
completely terminated when they entered into the oral
agreement to transfer Castros right of redemption to Maquera
on December 21, 1987. It also held that Maquera profited too
much from the eventual transfer of Castros property to him since
he was able to sell the same to the Changs with more than
US$200,000.00 in profit, whereas his legal fees for services
rendered to Castro amounted only to US$45,000.00. The court
also ordered him to take the MPRE upon his admission during
the hearings of his case that he was aware of the requirements
of the Model Rules regarding business transactions between an
attorney and his client in a very general sort of way.[25]
On the basis of the Decision of the Superior Court of Guam,
the IBP concluded that although the said court found Maquera
liable for misconduct, there is no evidence to establish that
[Maquera] committed a breach of ethics in the
Philippines.[26] However, the IBP still resolved to suspend him
indefinitely for his failure to pay his annual dues as a member of
the IBP since 1977, which failure is, in turn, a ground for removal
of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of
Attorneys under Section 10, Rule 139-A of the Revised Rules of
Court.[27]
The power of the Court to disbar or suspend a lawyer for
acts or omissions committed in a foreign jurisdiction is found in
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended
by Supreme Court Resolution dated February 13, 1992, which
states:
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme
Court, grounds therefor.A member of the bar may be disbarred
or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court
for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such
office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of
a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the
oath which he is required to take before admission to practice,
or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party to
a case without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases
at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine
Bar by a competent court or other disciplinatory agency in a
foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an
attorney is a ground for his disbarment or suspension if the
basis of such action includes any of the acts hereinabove
enumerated.
The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or
disciplinary agency shall be prima facie evidence of the ground
for disbarment or suspension (Emphasis supplied).
The Court must therefore determine whether Maqueras
acts, namely: acquiring by assignment Castros right of
redemption over the property subject of the civil case where
Maquera appeared as counsel for him; exercising the right of
redemption; and, subsequently selling the property for a huge
profit, violate Philippine law or the standards of ethical behavior
for members of the Philippine Bar and thus constitute grounds
for his suspension or disbarment in this jurisdiction.
The Superior Court of Guam found that Maquera acquired
his clients property by exercising the right of redemption
previously assigned to him by the client in payment of his legal
services. Such transaction falls squarely under Article 1492 in
relation to Article 1491, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. Paragraph 5 of Article 1491[28] prohibits the lawyers
acquisition by assignment of the clients property which is the
subject of the litigation handled by the lawyer. Under Article
1492,[29] the prohibition extends to sales in legal redemption.
The prohibition ordained in paragraph 5 of Article 1491
and Article 1492 is founded on public policy because, by virtue of
his office, an attorney may easily take advantage of the credulity
and ignorance of his client[30] and unduly enrich himself at the
expense of his client.
The case of In re: Ruste[31] illustrates the significance of the
aforementioned prohibition. In that case, the attorney acquired
his clients property subject of a case where he was acting as
counsel pursuant to a deed of sale executed by his clients in his
favor. He contended that the sale was made at the instance of
his clients because they had no money to pay him for his
services. The Court ruled that the lawyers acquisition of the
property of his clients under the circumstances obtaining therein
rendered him liable for malpractice. The Court held:
Whether the deed of sale in question was executed at the
instance of the spouses driven by financial necessity, as
contended by the respondent, or at the latters behest, as
contended by the complainant, is of no moment. In either case
an attorney occupies a vantage position to press upon or dictate
his terms to a harassed client, in breach of the rule so amply
protective of the confidential relations, which must necessarily
exist between attorney and client, and of the rights of both.[32]
The Superior Court of Guam also hinted that Maqueras
acquisition of Castros right of redemption, his subsequent
exercise of said right, and his act of selling the redeemed
property for huge profits were tainted with deceit and bad faith
when it concluded that Maquera charged Castro an exorbitant
fee for his legal services. The court held that since the
assignment of the right of redemption to Maquera was in
payment for his legal services, and since the property redeemed
by him had a market value of US$248,220.00 as of December 21,
1987 (the date when the right of redemption was assigned to
him), he is liable for misconduct for accepting payment for his
legal services way beyond his actual fees which amounted only
to US$45,000.00.
Maqueras acts in Guam which resulted in his two (2)-year
suspension from the practice of law in that jurisdiction are also
valid grounds for his suspension from the practice of law in the
Philippines. Such acts are violative of a lawyers sworn duty to act
with fidelity toward his clients. They are also violative of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically, Canon 17 which
states that [a] lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and
shall be mindful the trust and confidence reposed in him; and
Rule 1.01 which prohibits lawyers from engaging in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The requirement of
good moral character is not only a condition precedent to
admission to the Philippine Bar but is also a continuing
requirement to maintain ones goods standing in the legal
profession.[33]
It bears stressing that the Guam Superior Courts judgment
ordering Maqueras suspension from the practice of law in Guam
does not automatically result in his suspension or disbarment in
the Philippines. Under Section 27,[34] Rule 138 of the Revised
Rules of Court, the acts which led to his suspension in Guam are
mere grounds for disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction,
at that only if the basis of the foreign courts action includes any
of the grounds for disbarment or suspension in this
jurisdiction.[35] Likewise, the judgment of the Superior Court of
Guam only constitutes prima facie evidence of Maqueras
unethical acts as a lawyer.[36] More fundamentally, due process
demands that he be given the opportunity to defend himself and
to present testimonial and documentary evidence on the matter
in an investigation to be conducted in accordance with Rule
139-B of the Revised Rules of Court. Said rule mandates that a
respondent lawyer must in all cases be notified of the charges
against him. It is only after reasonable notice and failure on the
part of the respondent lawyer to appear during the scheduled
investigation that an investigation may be conducted ex parte.[37]
The Court notes that Maquera has not yet been able to
adduce evidence on his behalf regarding the charges of unethical
behavior in Guam against him, as it is not certain that he did
receive the Notice of Hearing earlier sent by the IBPs
Commission on Bar Discipline. Thus, there is a need to ascertain
Maqueras current and correct address in Guam in order that
another notice, this time specifically informing him of the
charges against him and requiring him to explain why he should
not be suspended or disbarred on those grounds (through
this Resolution), may be sent to him.
Nevertheless, the Court agrees with the IBP that Maquera
should be suspended from the practice of law for non-payment
of his IBP membership dues from 1977 up to the
present.[38]Under Section 10, Rule 139-A of the Revised Rules of
Court, non-payment of membership dues for six (6) months shall
warrant suspension of membership in the IBP, and default in
such payment for one year shall be ground for removal of the
name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.[39]
WHEREFORE, Atty. Leon G. Maquera is required to SHOW
CAUSE, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Resolution,
why he should not be suspended or disbarred for his acts which
gave rise to the disciplinary proceedings against him in the
Superior Court of Guam and his subsequent suspension in said
jurisdiction.
The Bar Confidant is directed to locate the current and
correct address of Atty. Maquera in Guam and to serve upon him
a copy of this Resolution.
In the meantime, Atty. Maquera is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR or until he shall have paid his
membership dues, whichever comes later.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to Atty. Maqueras
personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies be
furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and to all courts in the land.
SO ORDERED.
Dela Fuente Torres v. Dalangin A.C. No. 10758, 5
December 2017
Facts: Atty. Dalangin was accused of maintaining an illicit and
immoral affair with one Julita Pascual, a clerk at the Public
Attorney’s Office (PAO) in Talavera, Nueva Ecija. Upon review,
however, the alleged amorous relationship was not adequately
proved (The quantum of proof in administrative cases is
substantial evidence). Also, Atty. Dalangin was said to be
misquoting jurisprudence in a pleading he filed in court. In
addition, he took an immediate recourse to the Court via a
petition for review that questioned the IBP Board of Governors’
resolve to affirm the Investigating Commissioner’s
recommendation on his administrative liability, notwithstanding
the fact that the Court had not yet taken a final action on the
complaints.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Dalangin should be held
administratively liable.
Held: Yes. While he vehemently denied any romantic
relationship with Pascual, he admitted demonstrating closeness
with the latter’s family, including her children. It was such display
of affection that could have sparked in the minds of observers
the idea of a wrongful relationship and belief that Julienne was a
product of the illicit affair. Atty. Dalangin should have been more
prudent and mindful of his actions and the perception that his
acts built upon the public, particularly because he and Pascual
were both married. The fault, nonetheless, does not warrant
Atty. Dalangin’s suspension, much less disbarment. An
admonition should suffice under the circumstances. Also, while
the Court detests Atty. Dalangin’s failure to properly indicate
that the statement was not a verbatim reproduction of the cited
jurisprudence and, accordingly, calls his attention on the matter,
it finds the admonition to be adequate. A suspension for the lone
incident would be too harsh a penalty. Lastly, the filing of the
petition for review on the issue of Atty. Dalangin’s suspension
from the practice of law was as yet not among his remedies,
considering that the Court still had to release its final action on
the matter.
Atty. Bayani P. Dalangin is ADMONISHED to be more prudent and
cautious in handling his personal affairs and dealings with courts
and the public, with a STERN WARNING that any repetition of the
same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more
severely.
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC)
and PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL – ARROYO
G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010
FACTS: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S.
Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs just days after the coming
presidential elections on May 10, 2010.
These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen
from the forthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief Justice
Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the presidential
election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII,
that “vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the
occurrence thereof” from a “list of at least three nominees
prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy.” Also
considering that Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department) of
the Constitution prohibits the President or Acting President from
making appointments within two months immediately before
the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term,
except temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety.
The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously
agreed to start the process of filling up the position of Chief
Justice.
Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC “automatically
considered” for the position of Chief Justice the five most senior
of the Associate Justices of the Court, namely: Associate Justice
Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C. Corona; Associate
Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J.
Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura.
However, the last two declined their nomination through letters
dated January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010, respectively.
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint
the next Chief Justice, because the prohibition under Section 15,
Article VII of the Constitution does not apply to appointments in
the Supreme Court. It argues that any vacancy in the Supreme
Court must be filled within 90 days from its occurrence, pursuant
to Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; that had the
framers intended the prohibition to apply to Supreme Court
appointments, they could have easily expressly stated so in the
Constitution, which explains why the prohibition found in Article
VII (Executive Department) was not written in Article VIII (Judicial
Department); and that the framers also incorporated in Article
VIII ample restrictions or limitations on the President’s power to
appoint members of the Supreme Court to ensure its
independence from “political vicissitudes” and its “insulation
from political pressures,” such as stringent qualifications for the
positions, the establishment of the JBC, the specified period
within which the President shall appoint a Supreme Court
Justice.
A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether
the JBC properly initiated the process, there being an insistence
from some of the oppositors-intervenors that the JBC could only
do so once the vacancy has occurred (that is, after May 17, 2010).
Another part is, of course, whether the JBC may resume its
process until the short list is prepared, in view of the provision of
Section 4(1), Article VIII, which unqualifiedly requires the
President to appoint one from the short list to fill the vacancy in
the Supreme Court (be it the Chief Justice or an Associate Justice)
within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.
ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint the
successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement.
HELD:
Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to
appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other
appointments to the Judiciary.
Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.
The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides:
Section 15. Two months immediately before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President
or Acting President shall not make appointments, except
temporary appointments to executive positions when continued
vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety.
The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states:
Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief
Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in
its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any
vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence
thereof.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Complainant then filed the present case, accusing the
Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the RESOLUTION respondents of making deceitful statements in said Resolution,
Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could committing gross misconduct and violating their Attorney's Oath
not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,[*] J.: for recommending her dismissal without just cause or due
would have easily and surely written the prohibition made process. Quoted hereunder is the aforesaid resolution with
explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the We resolve the administrative case for disbarment[1] filed by emphasis on the allegedly false statements:
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII complainant Judge Delfina Hernandez Santiago against
itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such respondents Atty. Zosimo Santiago and Atty. Nicomedes RESOLUTION
specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition Tolentino, charging them with deceit, gross misconduct and
This is a case involving Atty. Delfina H.
against the President or Acting President making appointments violating their oaths as members of the Bar.
Santiago, Asst. City Administrator, indorsed
within two months before the next presidential elections and up During the time when the material events transpired in this case,
to this office by the Hon. Mayor, Macario A.
to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not complainant was the City Personnel Officer of Caloocan City
Asistio, Jr. for appropriate action.
while respondents Santiago and Tolentino respectively held the
refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
positions of City Legal Officer and Legal Officer II in the City The facts of the case are as follows:
Government of Caloocan.
1. In 1972, Atty. Delfina H.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in
In 1988, complainant applied for, and was granted, a sick leave Santiago was, per court
Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the
of absence with commuted pay covering 240 days from January decision, dismissed
Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could
25 to December 31, 1988.[2] Sometime in February 1988, illegally as Asst. City
not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They
complainant received a Memorandum[3] from then Mayor Administrator on
would have easily and surely written the prohibition made
Macario A. Asistio, Jr., which cancelled all leaves of absence of Personal Matters.
explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the
city officials and employees. She also received a
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII 2. In 1976, Atty. Santiago,
memorandum,[4] detailing her to the Office of the Secretary to
itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such was appointed Chief,
the Mayor. Complainant apparently paid no heed to said
specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition Administrative Office, a
memoranda. She was later directed to return to work in a
against the President or Acting President making appointments position of lower rank.
letter[5]dated April 21, 1988 signed by respondent Tolentino,
within two months before the next presidential elections and up
which pertinently state:
to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not 3.In 1983, Atty. Santiago
On February 5, 1988 you were served with a was charged
refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
[Memorandum] from the Office of the Mayor administratively for
that all [leaves] of absence of city officials UNAUTHORIZED
Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same and employees were cancelled in the interest ABSENCES, in violation of
character, in that they affect the power of the President to of public service. [In spite] of the aforesaid Civil Service laws. Upon
appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to memo you did not return to work thereby, recommendation of the
appointments within the Executive Department renders ignoring the memo of the Hon. Mayor Office of the City Legal
conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive Macario A. Asistio, Jr. Office, Atty. Santiago was
Department. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that validly and lawfully
In this [regard], we are giving you another ordered to be dropped
every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to
five (5) days from receipt hereof to report for from the rolls which was
the context, i.e. that every part must be considered together
work, otherwise, the undersigned may be subsequently approved
with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent
constrained to take drastic action against and affirmed by the Civil
of the whole enactment. It is absurd to assume that the framers
you. Service Commission in
deliberately situated Section 15 between Section 14 and Section
Complainant replied with a handwritten note,[6] asking for ten the latter's order dated
16, if they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential
days within which to answer and/or act on the letter. She, October 1983 x x x.
appointments. If that was their intention in respect of
however, did not return to work. At the end of her leave, she
appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear,
tendered her resignation.[7] She subsequently received a xxxx
would have easily and surely inserted a similar prohibition in
memorandum[8] dated May 18, 1989 from Mayor Asistio
Article VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1) thereof. 4. In 1985, the Supreme
terminating her employment. Enclosed therewith was
a Resolution[9] dated December 19, 1988 signed by Court, in affirming an RTC
respondents Santiago and Tolentino, which recommended her decision, ordered the
DELFINA HERNANDEZ SANTIAGO, COMPLAINANT, V. ATTY. reinstatement of
ZOSIMO SANTIAGO AND ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO, dismissal from service.
Santiago as Asst. City
RESPONDENTS. Administrator on
Personal Matters and
 declaring the 1972
dismissal as illegal.
5. In 1986, Atty. Santiago
was appointed by Mayor
Martinez as Asst. City
Administrator, her former
position, pursuant to the
Supreme Court decision.
6. In January 1988 Atty.
Santiago filed a leave of
absence (Sick Leave &
Vacation Leave) on
advice of her Doctor, a
Med. Cert. was attached
thereto and the duration
of the leave was 240 days
starting January 25 up to
December 31, 1988.
The said leave of absence was initially
approved but later disapproved by the Hon.
Macario A. Asistio, Jr. when the latter issued
a Memorandum dated February 5, 1988
cancelling all leave of absence of which
Memo Atty. Santiago was duly served with.
However despite service of the said Memo to
Atty. Delfina H. Santiago she failed and
refused to report for work [continuously] up
to the present. There was not even a
semblance of showing that she would comply
with the memorandum.
At this juncture the office of the City Mayor
indorsed this case against Atty. Delfina H.
Santiago for appropriate action. This office
conducted an investigation and summoned
Atty. Delfina H. Santiago for several times to
appear before the undersigned; present her
evidence and explain her side in consonance
with the due process mandated by the
constitution. Despite several notice sent to
Delfina Santiago the latter did not heed the
said notices, thereby, leaving the
undersigned without any alternative but to
decide the case on the basis of the evidence
available and the records pertaining to Atty.
Delfina Santiago.
FINDINGS
The records disclosed that the memorandum
dated February 5, 1988 issued by the Hon.
City Mayor, Macario A. Asistio, Jr. to all
employees of the City Government cancelled
all leave of absences in the interest of service
effective 5 February 1988. There is no doubt
a so that Atty. Santiago was duly served with
the said memo as appearing on the said
memo is her signature, an evidence of
receipt thereof. Having received the said
memo Atty. Santiago was fully aware of the
cancellation of her leave of absence and
therefore as a prudent employee she should
have obeyed the memorandum of the City
Mayor by way of reporting for work as called
for. What happened instead was that Atty.
Santiago never showed-up, thereby,
neglecting her duty as Asst. City
Administrator and committed, in effect,
insubordination.
What is nagging and aggravates the
predicament of Atty. Santiago is that the
instant case is already her second violation
which places her in the category of
incorrigible employees. The first is when she
was charged of UNAUTHORIZED ABSENCES,
punished for said act and made to suffer the
corresponding penalty thereof.
Under the Civil Service Law, Art. 9, Section 36
Par. 3, "No office or employee in the Civil
Service shall be suspended except for the
cause as provided by law and after due
process".
The following shall be grounds for
disciplinary action:
x x x x 3. Neglect of Duty x x x
27. Insubordination
The actuations of the respondent Atty.
Santiago squarely falls on the aforequoted
grounds for dismissal as her failure to report
for work amounts to [willful] disobedience to
her superior officer. Nothing can be more
important to the upholding and maintenance
of the public service in its integrity and good
name than the enforcement of the
reasonable discipline of laws. In the
discharge of an official duty and obligation
Atty. Santiago as a government employee is
expected to obey the order and instruction of
the duly constituted authorities and she
should not ignore or disregard a legitimate
official order. Her act is inimical to the public
service. To tolerate Santiago to get away with
it would be tantamount to allowing her to act
as she suits and satisfies her personal
convenience in violation of her superior's
order. An act which would be certainly
demoralizing to the public service. As may be
gleaned from the foregoing discussions Atty.
Santiago had [willfully] ignored her
superior's order without any attempt to
comply with it and
therefore insubordination is clearly present
aside from neglect of duty.
RECOMMENDATION
WHEREFORE, the instant case being the
second [infraction] of the Civil Service law by
Atty. Santiago, it is respectfully.
recommended that the latter be dismissed
from service.[10] (Emphases and
underscoring supplied.)
Complainant contended that she was not administratively
charged for any offense in 1983 or in 1988. Thus, she was not an
incorrigible employee. Instead of being sent a notice or
summons, she received respondent Tolentino's letter dated April
21, 1988, but the same neither stated that an administrative case
had been filed against her nor did it require her to appear in any
investigation. Since she was on a sick leave of absence, not a
vacation leave, she could not be guilty of neglect of duty as she
had no duties to perform. She was also not in a position to defy
any lawful order, which would have amounted to
insubordination. Annexed to the complaint were copies of: (a)
the Resolution December 19, 1988; (b) Mayor Asistio's dismissal
order dated May 18, 1989; (c) complainant's resignation letter;
(d) her approved sick leave of absence application; and (e) the
commutation voucher showing the payment of her salaries.
In respondent Santiago's comment[11] to the complaint, he
argued that the allegedly deceitful statements in the above
Resolution were not malicious imputations of falsehoods. If the
statements were inaccurate, the same may have been caused by
a misappreciation of facts or evidence. As to whether
complainant was formally charged for unauthorized absences in
1983, the material point considered was that she was dismissed
because of unauthorized absences. It also did not matter that
she filed a sick leave of absence, not a. vacation and sick leave,
as the issue of the investigation was whether she was liable for
disobeying Mayor Asistio's directives.
Respondent Santiago further alleged that Mayor Asistio
indorsed[12] to the City Legal Office the matter of complainant's
noncompliance with the Mayor's return to work order and this
referral was equivalent to an administrative complaint.
Complainant was sent a notice regarding her failure to report for
work, thereby informing her that she could be subjected to
disciplinary action. Her failure to answer indicated her intent to
disregard Mayor Asistio's order and her option not to participate
in the investigation. Respondents' investigation proceeded ex
parte and the assailed Resolution was issued on the basis of the
evaluation of the evidence at hand. Without proof of bad faith or
adverse personal motives, respondents cannot be held
administratively liable for issuing the Resolution in the discharge
of their official duties even if the same turned out to be
erroneous.
In respondent Tolentino's comment,[13] he likewise argued that
Mayor Asistio's referral of the case to the City Legal Office was
treated as a complaint. Complainant was apprised of the nature
thereof and she even requested ten days within which to answer
the same. After the City Legal Office conducted an investigation
wherein complainant failed to participate, respondents decided
the case on the basis of records and evidence available. Anent
the charge that she was not administratively charged in 1983,
what was considered was that she did incur unauthorized
absences that led to her dropping from the rolls. That she filed a
sick leave of absence, not sick leave and vacation leave, was
immaterial as Mayor Asistio's memorandum did not qualify the
nature of the leaves of absence being cancelled.
Among the documents attached to respondent Tolentino's
comment were copies of: (a) Mayor Asistio's letter [14] to
complainant dated August 4, 1982 about her sick leave of
absence; (b) Mayor Asistio's letter[15] to complainant dated July
5, 1983 about her unauthorized absences; (c) letter[16] dated
August 4, 1982 of Administrative Officer Soriano to Mayor Asistio,
seeking advice on the action to be taken on complainant's
situation; (d) Mayor Asistio's indorsement[17] dated October 5,
1983 to the City Legal Office of complainant's case; (e) the
indorsement[18] from the City Legal Office dated October 6,
1983, recommending that complainant be dropped from the roll
of employees; (f) the order[19] of Mayor Asistio dated October
19, 1983 regarding complainant's separation from service; and (g)
the Orders[20] dated October 27, 1983 and November 3, 1983
from the office of the Regional Director of the Civil Service
Commission (CSC)-National Capital Region (NCR), approving the
complainant's dismissal.
Complainant insisted in her Consolidated Reply[21] that the
indorsement of Mayor Asistio was not at all signed by the Mayor
and it was merely an indorsement of documents for study and
recommendation. She was also not informed of said document.
She asked for a period of ten days within which to answer and/or
act on respondent Tolentino's letter dated April 21, 1988 and she
did report to Atty. Enrique Cube, the Mayor's secretary to
explain why she cannot go back to work yet. As no administrative
case was filed against her in 1988, there could not have been a
valid investigation under Presidential Decree No. 807.[22] Yet,
respondents made up fictitious statements of facts and
conclusions of law in recommending her dismissal.
The Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and
recommendation.[23]
The IBP Report and Recommendation
IBP Investigating Commissioner Mario V. Andres issued a Report
and Recommendation[24] dated April 4, 2008, which
recommended the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit.
Commissioner Andres found that complainant failed to present
convincing evidence that respondents acted in bad faith in
rendering the Resolution dated December 19, 1988. Thus, they
were held to be entitled to the legal presumption of innocence.
According to Commissioner Andres, respondents concluded that
complainant was previously charged for unauthorized absences
by relying on existing records that showed that she was dropped
from the rolls in 1983. Complainant's letter asking for a period of
ten days to reply to respondents' April 21, 1988 letter also meant
that she understood that an investigation was underway. When
she failed to respond, respondents assumed that she waived her
right to present evidence. Respondents may have only been
careless in their choice of words when they wrongly assumed
that complainant was administratively charged in 1983 and they
used the term summons in referring to the letter dated April 21,
1988. Still, respondents cannot be held liable for deceit without
proof that they deliberately worded their Resolution to mislead
Mayor Asistio into dismissing complainant.
Respondents were also not found guilty of misconduct as their
actions neither indicated moral depravity, nor did it affect their
qualifications as lawyers. Respondents may have erred in failing
to follow the procedure under Section 38[25] of Presidential
Decree No. 807 and they may be investigated for such lapses as
government officials before some other venue. However, absent
evidence showing respondents' moral depravity in issuing the
said Resolution, they cannot be penalized therefor as members
of the Bar.
Lastly, Commissioner Andres ruled that respondents did not
violate their oath as members of the Bar, particularly the oath to
"do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
court."[26] The falsehood contemplated in the Attorney's Oath is
one that is intentional or committed with malice. Although the
allegedly deceitful statements in respondents' Resolution may
not be wholly accurate, the same were found to be based on
documents and made in the discharge of respondents' official
functions as City Legal Officers.
In Resolution No. XVIII-2008-225[27] passed on May 22, 2008,
the IBP Board of Governors approved Commissioner Andres's
recommendation.
Complainant filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to
Vacate Resolution of the IBP,[28] which the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC) of the Supreme Court referred to the IBP for
appropriate action.[29]
In an Order[30] dated September 30, 2008, the IBP required the
respondents to comment on the above motion. Only respondent
Tolentino commented[31] thereon, praying that it be denied for
being a mere rehash of complainant's previous pleadings and
issues that had already been passed upon.
Complainant filed before this Court an Ex Parte Motion to Vacate
IBP Order dated September 30, 2008/to Declare this Case
Submitted for Decision,[32] arguing that the Court's referral of
her complaint to the IBP did not include the latter's authority to
decide it. She averred that the IBP was also not in a position to
take cognizance of her motion for reconsideration since the
pleading was not addressed to the latter. Moreover, since
respondents failed to present their case before the IBP, they
were allegedly precluded from presenting any evidence in their
behalf and any comment to complainant's motion for
reconsideration will not serve any purpose.
In a Resolution[33] dated March 11, 2009, the Court referred to
the IBP complainant's Motion for Reconsideration with Motion
to Vacate Resolution of the IBP and her Ex Parte Motion to
Vacate IBP Order dated September 30, 2008/to Declare this Case
Submitted for Decision.
In Resolution No. XIX-2011-413[34] passed on June 26, 2011, the
IBP Board of Governors denied complainant's motion for
reconsideration as it found no cogent reason to reverse its
previous ruling.
The IBP then transmitted the record of the case to the Court for
final action.
Undaunted, complainant filed with this Court a Motion to
Disregard IBP Resolution No. XIX-2011-413 dated June 26,
2011,[35] arguing that the IBP had no jurisdiction to dismiss her
complaint or to rule on her motion for reconsideration. She
insisted that the Resolution Nos. XVIII-2008-225 and
XIX-2011-413 of the IBP Board of Governors should have only
been recommendatory in nature and the IBP should not have
arrogated unto itself the power of the Court to decide on her
complaint.
The Ruling of the Court
The Court finds no merit in the complaint.
At the outset, we reject complainant's contention that the IBP
infringed on this Court's jurisdiction in dismissing her complaint
and denying her motion for reconsideration thereon.
The case was initiated upon the filing of the complaint for
disbarment with this Court and the same was subsequently
referred to the IBP for investigation, report, and
recommendation in accordance with Section 1, Rule 139-B[36] of
the Rules of Court. The Resolution Nos. XVIII-2008-225 and
XIX-2011-413 of the IBP Board of Governors embody their
recommendation to this Court. As succinctly stated in Cojuangco,
Jr. v. Palma[37] :
Clearly, the resolution of the IBP Board of
Governors is merely recommendatory. The
"power to recommend" includes the power
to give "advice, exhortation or indorsement,
which is essentially persuasive in character,
not binding upon the party to whom it is
made." Necessarily, the "final action" on the
resolution of the IBP Board of Governors still
lies with this Court. x x x (Citation omitted.)
Verily, there is nothing in the IBP resolutions that would suggest
that the same already constituted the final determination of the
case and were beyond the power of the Court to review.
After thoroughly reviewing the record of this case, the Court
affirms the recommendation of Commissioner Andres and the
IBP Board of Governors that the instant complaint should be
dismissed.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides for the
grounds for the imposition of the penalty of disbarment, to wit:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of
attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds
therefor. — A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in
such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the
oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice, or for a wilful
disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority so to do. x x x
In this case, complainant accused the respondents of deceit,
gross misconduct and of violating their Attorney's Oath in issuing
the Resolution dated December 19, 1988 that allegedly
contained false statements and which was arrived at without her
being informed of the charges or given the opportunity to
present evidence.
As Commissioner Andres correctly ruled, deceit covers
intentional falsehoods or false statements and representations
that are made with malice or with the intent to do wrong. Gross
misconduct, on the other hand, is "any inexcusable, shameful or
flagrant unlawful conduct on the part of a person concerned
with the administration of justice; i.e., conduct prejudicial to the
rights of the parties or to the right determination of the cause.
The motive behind this conduct is generally a premeditated,
obstinate or intentional purpose."[38] Similarly, on the charge of
the alleged violation of the Attorney's Oath, the settled rule is
that:
The Code of Professional Responsibility does
not cease to apply to a lawyer simply
because he has joined the government
service. In fact, by the express provision of
Canon 6 thereof, the rules governing the
conduct of lawyers '"shall apply to lawyers in
government service in the discharge of their
official tasks." Thus, where a lawyer's
misconduct as a government official is of
such nature as to affect his qualification as a
lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then
he may be disciplined as a member of the
bar on such grounds. Although the general
rule is that a lawyer who holds a government
office may not be disciplined as a member of
the bar for infractions he committed as a
government official, he may, however, be
disciplined as a lawyer if his misconduct
constitutes a violation of his oath [as] a
member of the legal
profession.[39] (Citations omitted; emphasis
supplied.)
Before the Court may impose against respondents the severe
disciplinary sanction of disbarment, complainant must be able to
establish by substantial evidence the malicious and intentional
character of the misconduct complained of that evince the moral
delinquency of respondents. Substantial evidence is the amount
of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.[40]
Except for complainant's allegations, however, she failed to
present sufficient evidence to substantiate her complaint. The
Court agrees with the findings of Commissioner Andres that
complainant has not proffered any evidence that tended to show
that respondents intentionally and deliberately made false
statements in the Resolution dated December 19, 1988 in order
to deceive and induce Mayor Asistio to dismiss complainant from
service. She neither offered any documentary evidence to
buttress her arguments nor presented any witness to
corroborate her claims.
Quite the contrary, complainant herself revealed her lack of
certainty as to the malicious intent or other ill motives of
respondents when she made the following statements on her
Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Vacate Resolution of
the IBP before the Court:
[Respondents] knew that there was never a
first nor a second administrative case against
her. Yet they twisted their facts and language
to suit their purpose. Whether they misled
the Hon. Mayor Asistio to dismiss her from
the service, or they conspired to engineer
her removal from the service, or followed a
directive from Mayor Asistio to justify her
dismissal, she does not specifically know.
But certainly, their Resolution is not an
honest mistake of judgment, as shown by
the malicious warp and woof of the
Resolution itself.[41] (Emphasis supplied.)
We find such line of argumentation distinctly wanting.
Complainant cannot simply rely on speculations and suspicions,
no matter how deep-seated, without evidence to support the
same. We held in Osop v. Fontanilla[42] that charges meriting
disciplinary action against a lawyer generally involve the motives
that induced him to commit the act charged and that, to justifY
disbarment or suspension, the case against the lawyer must be
clear and free from doubt, not only as to the act charged but as
to his motive. Furthermore, in Cabas v. Sususco,[43] we ruled
that "mere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to
proof. Charges based on mere suspicion and speculation likewise
cannot be given credence."
As a final point, the Court deliberately dispensed with any
discussion regarding the validity of the Resolution dated
December 19, 1988. Commissioner Andres aptly pointed out that
complainant may file in the proper tribunal a separate case
against respondents, as City Legal Officers, for possible lapses in
the procedure undertaken by them in the administrative
investigation of the charge against her and/or the propriety of
her dismissal. On this matter, complainant admitted in her
complaint and consolidated reply that she had indeed filed
administrative cases against respondents before the CSC, as well
as a separate administrative case against Mayor Asistio, in order
to impugn the validity of her dismissal from service. However,
the specific details, stages and/or outcome of said cases were
not properly manifested before this Court. Complainant merely
stated that she was not satisfied with these other proceedings so
she opted to file the instant case for disbarment.[44]
The Court cannot allow this to be done.
What is at once clear is that this case for disbarment cannot be of the entire records of the case from Atty. Villanueva. Appellant's Brief also
resorted to as another remedy in order to attack the legality of within the same period.
said Resolution or to nullify its consequences. The only issue that Thereafter, respondent Atty. Claro Jordan M. Santamaria
should be determined in this case is whether respondents (respondent) submitted an Appellant's Brief[8] dated July 4, 2011.
Atty. Villanueva then filed a Manifestation with
committed misconduct that put into question their moral
Motion[10] dated August 31, 2011 explaining that he
character and moral fitness to continue in the practice of law. As In a Resolution[9] dated August 4, 2011, the CA directed Atty.
communicated with Ronnie and with appellants as well, but was
previously discussed, this issue had been answered in the Villanueva to submit proof of authority of Honnic to represent
informed that appellants were residing abroad (in Germany at
negative. appellants as their attorney-in-fact and the latter's conformity to
the time). He then requested for a period of 15 days, or until
Atty. Villanueva's Withdrawal of Appearance; in the san1e
Considering that complainant failed to discharge the burden of September 15, 2011, to comply with the CA's Resolution.
resolution, the CA also required respondent to submit his formal
proof to warrant the imposition of administrative penalty against Entry of Appearance, viz. :
respondents Santiago and Tolentino, we dismiss the complaint. On March 20, 2012, the CA issued a Resolution granting the
CA G.R. CV Sps. BAYANI P. PARTOZA and MYRNA M. PARTOZA
Manifestation and Motion filed by Atty. Villanueva, and ordered
No. 96282 vs. LILIA B. MONTANO and AMELIA T. SOLOMON
WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondents the latter to show cause, within 10 days from notice, why he
Atty. Zosimo Santiago and Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino is should not be cited in contempt for his failure to comply with the
Before acting on the
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. CA's Resolution of August 4, 2011; and why the Appellant's Brief
counsel for appellant's
filed by respondent should not be expunged from the rollo of the
SO ORDERED. Withdrawal of
case and the appeal dismissed for his failure to comply with the
Appearance, [Atty.
August 4, 2011 Resolution.
Villanueva] is directed to
submit within five (5)
On September 5, 2012 the CA, in another
DEL CASTILLO, J.: days from notice the
Resolution,[11] declared that: 1) as shown by the Registry Return
proof of authority of
A recalcitrant lawyer who defies the directives of the court "must Receipt dated April 4, 2012, respondent received the copy of its
Honnie M. Partoza to
deservedly end in tribulation for the lawyer and in victory for the March 20, 2012 Resolution; 2) on June 19, 2012, the Judicial
represent the appellants
higher ends of justice."[1] Records Division reported that no compliance with the March 20,
and to signify his
2012 Resolution had been filed by respondent; and 3)
conformity to the
The administrative liability of a lawyer who repeatedly ignores respondent was, for the last time, directed to comply with the
Withdrawal of
the directives of the Court of Appeals (CA) is properly resolved in March 20, 2012 Resolution within five days from notice and to
Appearance. In the
this case. show cause why he should not be cited for contempt for his
meantime, the Motion
failure to comply with the CA's Resolutions, dated August 4, 2011
for Extension of Time to
Factual Antecedents and March 20, 2012; and why the Appellant's Brief filed by him
File Appellants' Brief is
should not be expunged from the rollo of the case and the
granted in the interest of
A civil action for Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Real Estate appeal be dismissed.
justice.
Mortgage, Reconveyance of Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-710729 and Damages[2] was filed by the spouses Bayani and All these directives by the CA were ignored by the respondent.
[Respondent] is directed
Myrna M. Partoza (spouses Partoza) against Lilia B. Montano and to submit within five (5)
Amelia T. Solomon. Thus, in a Resolution[12] dated October 25, 2012, the CA cited
days from notice his
respondent in contempt of court and imposed on him a fine of
formal Entry of
The case was dismissed[3] by the Regional Trial Court. P5,000.00. In the same Resolution, the CA once again directed
Appearance as counsel
respondent: (1) to comply with requirements of a valid
for appellants and to
On November 25, 2010, a Notice of Appeal[4] was filed by the substitution of counsel and to file his formal Entry of Appearance
secure and submit to this
counsel on record, Atty. Samson D. Villanueva (Atty. Villanueva). within five days from notice; and (2) to show cause, within the
Court also within the
The appeal was docketed as CA G.R. CV No. 96282 and in a same period, why the Appellant's Brief filed should not be
same period the written
Notice[5] dated March 25, 2011, the CA required the submission expunged from the rollo of the case and the appeal be dismissed
conformity of his clients
of the Appellant's Brief pursuant to Rule 44, Section 7 of the for his failure to comply with the Rules of Court.
to his appearance as their
Rules of Civil Procedure. counsel. Likewise, said
Ultimately, in a Resolution dated April 11, 2013, the CA ordered
counsel is also directed to
On April 27, 2011, however, Atty. Villanueva filed his Withdrawal the Appellant's Brief filed by respondent expunged from
furnish this Court the
of Appearance;[6] subsequently, a Motion for Extension of Time the rollo and dismissed the appeal. More than that, the CA
assailed RTC Decision
to File Appellant's Brief[7] dated May 19, 2011, was also filed. directed respondent to explain why he should not be suspended
that should have been
Atty. Villanueva's Withdrawal of Appearance carried the from the practice of law for willful disobedience to the orders of
appended to the
conformity of the appellant's attorney-in-fact, Honnie M. Partoza the court.
(Honnie) who, on the same occasion, also acknowledged receipt
Respondent paid no heed to this Resolution.
So it was that the CA, in a Resolution[13] dated September 17,
2013, referred the unlawyerly acts of respondent to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report
and recommendation.
Report and Recommendation the Investigating Commissioner
In his Answer[14] of November 13, 2013, respondent contended:
(1) that the spouses Partoza sought his opinion regarding their
case and later on requested that he handle their appeal before
the CA; (2) that he advised the spouses Partoza to inform Atty.
Villanueva of their decision to engage the services of a new
counsel; (3) that he relied on the Withdrawal of Appearance filed
by Atty. Villanueva and then prepared the Appellant's Brief; (4)
that he was not aware of the authority of Honnie to represent
spouses Panoza as well as of Honnie's conformity to the
Withdrawal of Appearance by Atty. Villanueva; (5) that he
believed that he had no personality to represent the spouses
Partoza in the case, and to address the problems/compliances
pertaining to appellant's appeal; and (6) that it was still Atty.
Villanueva who should have continued to represent the spouses
Partoza.
The Investigating Commissioner Michael G. Fabunan
(Investigating Commissioner) found respondent liable for willful
disobedience to the lawful orders of the CA and recommended
that he be suspended from the practice of law for six months.
The Investigating, Commissioner gave the reasons for the said
recommendation in his Report and Recommendation,[15] viz.:
The act of respondent in not filing any of the
compliances required of him in the 4 August
2011, 20 March 2012, 5 September 2012,
and 25 October 2012 Resolutions of the [CA]
despite due notice, emphasized his contempt
and total disregard of the legal proceedings,
for which he should be held liable.
xxxx
Granting that he [was] not aware of the
problem between Atty. Villanueva and
[Honnie], he could have explained this fact by
complying with the court resolutions and not
just ignored them on the premise that he has
no personality to represent the [spouses
Partoza]. The compliances required of the
respondent by the [CA] are provided under
the rules for a valid substitution of counsel
and validity of the appeal and may not be
disregarded.
The nonchalant attitude of the respondent
cannot be left unsanctioned. Clearly, his acts
constitute willful disobedience of the lawful
orders of the [CA], which under Section 27.
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is a sufficient
case for suspension. x x x
Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors
The IBP Board of Governors resolved[16] to adopt and approve
the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
In its Report[17] dated March 18, 2016, the Office of the Bar
Confidant informed this Court that no petition for review or
motion for reconsideration has been filed by either party. Thus,
pursuant to Section 12(c) of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, this
case is now before us for final action.
Issue
Whether or not respondent is administratively liable.
Our Ruling
This Court adopts the findings of fact of, and the penalty
recommended by, the IBP Board of Governors.
This Coutt explained the crucial role played by lawyers in the
administration of justice in Salabao v. Villaruel, Jr.,[18] viz.:
While it is true that lawyers owe 'entire
devotion' to the cause of their clients, it
cannot he emphasized enough that their first
and primary duty is not to the client but to
the administration or justice. Canon 12 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility slates
that 'A lawyer shall exert every effort and
consider it his duty to assist in the speedy
and efficient administration of justice.' x x x
This is a fundamental principle in legal ethics
and professional responsibility that has
iterations in various forms:
xxxx
Because a lawyer is an officer of the court
called upon to assist in the administration of
justice, any act of a lawyer that obstructs,
perverts, or impedes the administration of
justice constitutes misconduct and justifies
disciplinary action against him. (citations
omitted)
There is no dispute that respondent did not comply with five
Resolutions of the CA. His actions were definitely contumacious.
By his repeated failure, refusal or inability to comply with the CA
resolutions, respondent displayed not only reprehensible
conduct but showed an utter lack of respect for the CA and its
orders. Respondent ought to know that a resolution issued by
the CA, or any court for that matter, is not mere request that
may be complied with partially or selectively.
Lawyers are duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of
the court. In particular, Section 20(b), Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court states that it "is the duty of an attorney [t]o observe and
maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial
officers." In addition, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility mandates that "[a] lawyer shall uphold the
Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for
law and legal processes." Also, Canon 11 provides that a "lawyer
shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to
judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others."
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 27. Disbarment or suspension of
attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds
therefor. - A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in
such office, grossly immoral conduct or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the
oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice, or for a wilful
disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully
appealing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority [to do so]. The practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain,
either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis
supplied)
This Court, in Anudon v. Cefra[19] citing Sebastian v. Atty.
Bajar,[20] held that a lawyer's obstinate refusal to comply with
the Court's orders not only betrayed a recalcitrant flaw in his
character; it also underscored his disrespect towards the Court's
lawful orders which was only too deserving of reproof
"Lawyers are particularly called upon to obey court orders and
processes, and this deference is underscored by the fact that
willful disregard thereof may subject the lawyer not only to
punishment for contempt but to disciplinary sanctions as
well."[21] In this case, respondent deliberately ignored five CA
Resolutions, thereby violating his duty to observe and maintain
the respect due the courts.
In one case,[22] the Court suspended a lawyer from the practice
of law for one year for having ignored twelve (12) CA Resolutions.
The Court found that the said lawyer's conduct gave the
impression that he was above the duly constituted judicial
authorities of the land, and looked down on them with a
patronizing and supercilious attitude. In this case, we find the
penalty of suspension for six (6) months, as recommended by the
IBP, commensurate under the circumstances.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Claro Jordan M. Santamaria
is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months
effective upon his receipt of this Resolution. He is STERNLY
WARNED that repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt
with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to respondent's
personal records as attorney, and be furnished to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country through the
Office of the Court Administrator.
SO ORDERED.
ALICIAS, JR. v. ATTY. MACATANGAY
Eduardo R. Alicias, Jr. Vs. Atty. Myrna V. Macatangay,
et al.
A.C. No. 7478
January 11, 2017
FACTS:
A complaint was filed by Alicias, an Associate
Professor in the College of Education of the
University of the Philippines against Dean Leticia P.
Ho for violation of Republic Act No. 6713. CSC found
that the complaint was insufficient to support a
prima facie case against Ho and was dismissed. Alicia
did not receive a copy of the resolution. The records
show that it was mistakenly sent to his old
address. Alicias filed the administrative complaint
before the Court accusing Macatangay, Zerna,
Ronquillo and Buenaflor of violation of Lawyer’s Oath
or Code of Professional Responsibility, gross neglect
of duty, and gross ignorance of the law. The court
referred the case to the IBP for investigation, report
and recommendation.
Commissioner found that the complaint was baseless
and Alicias failed to show sufficient proof in support
of his claims, thus dismissing the complaint for lack
of merit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the IBP can exercise jurisdiction on
the administrative complaint?
RULING:
NO.
The IBP has no jurisdiction over the disbarment
complaint. The administrative complaint must be file
with the Office of the Ombudsman. The 1987
Constitution clothes the Office of the Ombudsman
with the administrative disciplinary authority to
investigate and prosecute and act or omission of any
government official when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.
The Office of the Ombudsman is the government
agency responsible for enforcing administrative, civil,
and criminal liability of government officials. “in
every case where the evidence warrants in order to
promote efficient service by the government to the
people.”
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This administrative case stemmed from an
affidavit-complaint[1] filed by complainant Romulo De Mesa
Festin (complainant) against respondent Atty. Rolando V. Zubiri
(respondent) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
for gross violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(CPR).
The Facts
Complainant alleged that he was elected as Mayor of the
Municipality of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro in the May 2013
elections. His opponent, Jose Tapales Villarosa (Villarosa), filed
an election protest against him before the Regional Trial Court of
San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, Branch 46 (RTC).[2] After deciding
in favor of Villarosa, the RTC issued an Order[3] dated January 15,
2014 (January 15, 2014 Order), granting his motion for execution
pending appeal, viz.:
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Execution
Pending Appeal is GRANTED.
The OIC-Branch Clerk of Court [(COC)] is
hereby directed to issue a Writ of Execution
Pending Appeal after the lapse of twenty (20)
working days to be counted from the time
[complainant's] counsel receives a copy of
this Special Order, if no restraining order or
status quo order is issued pursuant to
Section 11 (b),[4] Rule 14 of A.M. No.
07-4-15-SC.[5] (Emphasis supplied)
Distressed, complainant filed a petition for certiorari[6] before
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), seeking a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) against the issuance of the writ of
execution pending appeal.[7] In an Order[8] dated February 13,
2014, the COMELEC issued a TRO, directing Hon. Gay Marie F.
Lubigan-Rafael (RTC Judge), in her official capacity as Presiding
Judge of the RTC, to cease and desist from enforcing the January
15, 2014 Order, effective immediately.[9] Accordingly, the RTC
issued another Order[10]dated February 25, 2014 (February 25,
2014 Order), pertinent portion of which reads:
In view thereof, the OIC-Branch [COC] is
directed NOT TO ISSUE a Writ of Execution in
accordance with the [January 15, 2014]
Order until further notice.[11]
Despite the TRO and the RTC's February 25, 2014 Order,
respondent, as counsel of Villarosa, filed five (5)
manifestations[12] addressed to the COC insisting on the writ's
issuance. Notably, he did not serve copies of these
manifestations to the other party.[13]
In these manifestations, respondent claimed that his client
received the RTC's January 15, 2014 Order on January 18, 2014,
and counting from said date, the twenty-day period ended on
February 12, 2014.[14] Since the COMELEC only issued the TRO
on February 13, 2014, the TRO no longer had any effect.
Respondent further asserted that the TRO was addressed only to
the RTC Judge, and not to the COC; therefore, the COC is not
bound by the TRO. For these reasons, respondent insisted that
the COC could legally issue the writ of execution pending
appeal.[15]
The COC eventually issued a Writ of Execution Pending Appeal
addressed to the sheriff. However, complainant only found out
about respondent's manifestations when the sheriff attempted
to serve the writ on him.[16] Soon thereafter, complainant filed
the disbarment complaint.
In his complaint, complainant argued that respondent violated
his ethical duties when he misled and induced the COC to defy
lawful orders - particularly, the COMELEC's TRO and the RTC's
February 25, 2014 Order.[17] As a result, respondent allegedly
violated Canons 1, 10, 15, and 19 of the CPR.[18]
In his answer,[19] respondent claimed that, first, since the case
records had been transmitted to the COMELEC on January 31,
2014, the RTC was divested of jurisdiction over the case;
therefore, it had no more power to issue the February 25, 2014
Order.[20] Respondent put forward the same reason for filing
the five manifestations with the COC instead of the RTC
Judge.[21] Second, the manifestations contained no misleading
statements or factual deviations. He merely stated in his
manifestations his honest belief that the twenty-day period had
already lapsed when the COMELEC issued its TRO; hence, it no
longer had any binding effect. He explained that the filing of
manifestations to highlight his position did not violate any
rule.[22] Third, he allegedly filed those manifestations pursuant
to his duty under Canon 18 of the CPR to represent his client
with competence and diligence.[23]
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation[24] dated September 1, 2014,
the Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondent
be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months.[25] He
observed that by filing manifestations instead of motions,
respondent was able to disregard the rule that motions shall be
served on the other party and shall contain a notice of hearing.
In this regard, the Investigating Commissioner noted that a
manifestation merely informs the court about a certain matter
involving the case, and does not require affirmative action by the
court. In the present case, however, the manifestations filed by
respondent were actually motions as these contained arguments
to support his prayer for the issuance of a writ of execution
pending appeal. Moreover, the Investigating Commissioner also
held that respondent acted in bad faith when he convinced the
COC to disregard the COMELEC's TRO. He pointed out that when
the TRO enjoins the court, it includes the judge and all officers
and employees of the court, including the clerk of court. Hence,
respondent was unfair to the other party and employed deceit
when he filed the manifestations. As a result, the other party
was not afforded due process by being deprived of an
opportunity to oppose the manifestations.[26]
In a Resolution[27] dated December 14, 2014, the IBP Board of
Governors (IBP Board) adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigation Commissioner.
Respondent moved for reconsideration,[28] which was, however,
denied in a Resolution[29] dated May 28, 2016.
On October 10, 2016, respondent filed a petition for
review[30] before the Court purportedly pursuant to the
procedure laid out in Ramientas v. Reyala (Ramientas).[31]
The Issue Before the Court
The core issue in this case is whether or not respondent should
be held administratively liable for the acts complained of.
The Court's Ruling
I.
At the outset, the Court deems it proper to clarify that
respondent's filing of the instant petition for review does not
conform with the standing procedure for the investigation of
administrative complaints against lawyers.
Section 12 (b) and (c) of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, as
amended by Bar Matter No. 1645 dated October 13,
2015,[32] states:
Section 12. Review and Recommendation by
the Board of Governors. -
xxxx
b) After its review, the Board, by the vote of
a majority of its total membership,
shall recommend to the Supreme Court the
dismissal of the complaint or the imposition
of disciplinary action against the respondent.
The Board shall issue a resolution setting
forth its findings and recommendations,
clearly and distinctly stating the facts and the
reasons on which it is based. The resolution
shall be issued within a period not exceeding
thirty (30) days from the next meeting of the
Board following the submission of the
Investigator's report.
c) The Board's resolution, together with the
entire records and all evidence presented
and submitted, shall be transmitted to the
Supreme Court for final action within ten (10)
days from issuance of the resolution.
x x x x (Emphases supplied)
Under the old rule, the IBP Board had the power to "issue a
decision" if the lawyer complained of was either exonerated or
meted a penalty of "less than suspension of disbarment." In this
situation, the case would be deemed terminated unless an
interested party files a petition before the Court.[33] The case
of Ramientas,[34] which was cited as respondent's basis for filing
the present petition for review, was pronounced based on the
old rule.[35]
In contrast, under the amended provisions cited above, the IBP
Board's resolution is merely recommendatory regardless of the
penalty imposed on the lawyer. The amendment stresses the
Court's authority to discipline a lawyer who transgresses his
ethical duties under the CPR. Hence, any final action on a
lawyer's administrative liability shall be done by the Court based
on the entire records of the case, including the IBP Board's
recommendation, without need for the lawyer-respondent to file
any additional pleading.
On this score, respondent's filing of the present petition for
review is unnecessary. Pursuant to the current rule, the IBP
Board's resolution and the case records were forwarded to the
Court. The latter is then bound to fully consider all documents
contained therein, regardless of any further pleading filed by any
party - including respondent's petition for review, which the
Court shall nonetheless consider if only to completely resolve the
merits of this case and determine respondent's actual
administrative liability.
II.
After a judicious review of the case records, the Court agrees
with the IBP that respondent should be held administratively
liable for his violations of the CPR. However, the Court finds it
proper to impose a lower penalty.
Canon 1 of the CPR mandates lawyers to uphold the Constitution
and promote respect for the legal processes.[36] Additionally,
Canon 8 and Rule 10.03, Canon 10 of the CPR require lawyers to
conduct themselves with fairness towards their professional
colleagues, to observe procedural rules, and not to misuse them
to defeat the ends of justice. These provisions read thus:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE
CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAW OF THE LAND
AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND
LEGAL PROCESSES.
 xxxx
CANON 8 - A LAWYER SHALL CONDUCT
HIMSELF WITH COURTESY, FAIRNESS AND
CANDOR TOWARDS HIS PROFESSIONAL
COLLEAGUES, AND SHALL AVOID HARASSING
TACTICS AGAINST OPPOSING COUNSEL
xxxx
CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR,
FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
xxxx
Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules
of procedure and shall not misuse them to
defeat the ends of justice.
Contrary to these edicts, respondent improperly filed the five (5)
motions as "manifestations" to sidestep the requirement of
notice of hearing for motions. In effect, he violated his
professional obligations to respect and observe procedural rules,
not to misuse the rules to cause injustice, and to exhibit fairness
towards his professional colleagues.
The difference between a manifestation and a motion is
essential in determining respondent's administrative liability.
A manifestation is usually made merely for the information of
the court, unless otherwise indicated. In a manifestation, the
manifesting party makes a statement to inform the court, rather
than to contest or argue.[37] In contrast, a motion is an
application for relief from the court other than by a
pleading[38] and must be accompanied by a notice of hearing
and proof of service to the other party, unless the motion is not
prejudicial to the rights of the adverse party.[39] Settled is the
rule that a motion without notice of hearing is pro forma or a
mere scrap of paper; thus, the court has no reason to consider it
and the clerk has no right to receive it. The reason for the rule is
simple: to afford an opportunity for the other party to agree or
object to the motion before the court resolves it. This is in
keeping with the principle of due process.[40]
In the present case, respondent filed five (5) manifestations
before the COC praying for affirmative reliefs. The Court agrees
with the IBP that these "manifestations" were in fact motions,
since reliefs were prayed for from the court - particularly, the
issuance of the writ of execution pending appeal. By labelling
them as manifestations, respondent craftily sidestepped the
requirement of a notice of hearing and deprived the other party
of an opportunity to oppose his arguments. Moreover, the fact
that he submitted these manifestations directly to COC, instead
of properly filing them before the RTC, highlights his failure to
exhibit fairness towards the other party by keeping the latter
completely unaware of his manifestations. Undoubtedly,
respondent violated his professional obligations under the CPR.
He attempts to justify his acts by arguing that he merely
represented his client with competence and diligence. However,
respondent should be reminded that a lawyer is ethically bound
not only to serve his client but also the court, his colleagues, and
society. His obligation to represent his client is not without limits,
but must be "within the bounds of the law" pursuant to Canon
19 of the CPR. Accordingly, he is ethically bound to employ only
fair and honest means to attain their clients' objectives.
Respondent further argues that his filing of the manifestations
with the COC is justified considering that the RTC had already
lost jurisdiction over the case and the COC had the ministerial
duty to issue the writ of execution. His argument fails to
persuade. The Court has ruled that a COC has a ministerial duty
to issue a writ of execution when the judge directs its
issuance.[41] In this case, however, the RTC Judge had issued the
second Order (dated February 25, 2014) explicitly directing the
COC "NOT TO ISSUE a Writ of Execution." Therefore, the COC in
this case did not have a ministerial duty to issue the writ of
execution. If respondent honestly believed that his client was
entitled to the writ, then he should not have clandestinely
submitted ex parte manifestations directly to the COC to coerce
the latter to grant his intended relief. Instead, respondent should
have filed the proper motions before the court, which alone has
the inherent power to grant his prayer pursuant to Section 5 (c),
(d), and (g), Rule 135 of the Rules of Court.[42]
The Court has the plenary power to discipline erring lawyers. In
the exercise of its sound judicial discretion, it may to impose a
less severe punishment if such penalty would achieve the desired
end of reforming the errant lawyer.[43] In light of the foregoing
discussion, the Court deems that a penalty of suspension from
the practice of law for three (3) months is sufficient and
commensurate with respondent's infractions.[44]
As a final note, the Court stresses that a lawyer's primary duty is
to assist the courts in the administration of justice. Any conduct
that tends to delay, impede, or obstruct the administration of
justice contravenes this obligation.[45] Indeed, a lawyer must
champion his client's cause with competence and diligence, but
he cannot invoke this as an excuse for his failure to exhibit
courtesy and fairness to his fellow lawyers and to respect legal
processes designed to afford due process to all stakeholders.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Rolando V. Zubiri (respondent) is
found GUILTY of violating Canon 1, Canon 8, and Rule 10.03,
Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly,
he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months
effective from the finality of this Decision, and is STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be
dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar
Confidant, to be attached to respondent's personal record as a
member of the Bar. Furthermore, let copies of the same be
served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of
the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all
courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
ROBERT BERNARDIO v. ATTY. VICTOR REY SANTOS
A.C. NO. 10583, 18 February 2015, SECOND DIVISION (Leonon,
J.)
ATTY. JOSE MANGASER CARINGAL v. ATTY. VICTOR REY SANTOS
A.C. NO. 10584, 18 February 2015, SECOND DIVISION (Leonon,
J.)
DOCTRINE OF THE CASE
A lawyer owes candor, fairness, and good faith to the court
(Canon 10). A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to
the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court
to be misled by any artifice (Rule 10.01). A lawyer shall observe
candor, fairness, and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions
with his clients (Canon 15). A lawyer shall not represent
conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned
given after a full disclosure of the facts (Canon 15.03).
FACTS
In the first administrative case, complainant Roberto C.
Bernardino (Bernardino) filed a complaint against Atty. Victor
Rey Santos (Atty. Santos) before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) praying for the latter’s investigation and
subjection to disciplinary action. It was alleged by Bernardino
that Atty. Santos falsified the death certificate of his Aunt
Rufina—making it appear that Rufina died in 1992 when it fact
she died in 1990. Atty. Santos apparently used such falsified
document to support the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed
by the husband of Rufina (Mariano). Years later, Atty. Santos, on
behalf the daughter of Rufina and Mariano (Marilu), filed a
Complaint for sum of money with prayer for a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and TRO against Bernardino, alleging that
Marilu is an heir of Mariano, which allegedly contradicts the
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication that Atty. Santos drafted. Thus, Atty.
Santos represented clients with conflicting interests.
Another complaint was filed against Atty. Santos by Atty.
Jose Mangaser Caringal (Atty. Caringal). Similar to the earlier
complaint, the latter alleged that the former represented clients
with conflicting interests. The same alleged that in representing
Marilu, Atty. Santos would necessarily go against the claims of
Mariano. Because of this, Atty. Santos was allegedly violating the
so-called “Dead Man’s Statute” because he would be utilizing
information or matters of fact occurring before the death of his
deceased client. Similarly, he would be unscrupulously utilizing
information acquired during his professional relation with his
said client that would constitute a breach of trust or of privileged
communication. It was also alleged that he engaged in
forum-shopping; that he violated Canon 10 and Rule 10.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (Code) because he drafted an
affidavit which states that Mariano is the sole heir of Rufina
when he knew this to be false. Moreover, Atty. Santos allegedly
converted funds belonging to the heirs of Mariano for his own
benefit. The funds involved were rental income from Mariano’s
properties that were supposed to be distributed to the heirs.
Instead, Atty. Santos received the rental income.
ISSUE:
1. Did Atty. Santos violate the above-cited canons
and rules from the Code?
2. Does the IBP have the authority to impose
sanctions on lawyers?
RULING:
1. YES. He violated Canon 10, Rule 10.01, Canon 15, and Rule
15.03.
The Commission, by virtue of the doctrine res ipsa loquitor,
finds that the respondent’s act of failing to thwart his client
Mariano from filing the Affidavit of Adjudication despite his
knowledge of the existence of Marilu as a possible heir to the
estate of Rufina, the respondent failed to uphold his obligation
as a member of the bar to be the stewards of justice and
protectors of what is just, legal and proper. Thus in failing to do
his duty and acting dishonestly, not only was he in contravention
of the Lawyer’s Oath but was also in violation of Canon 10, Rule
10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. As officers of
the court, lawyers have the duty to uphold the rule of law. In
doing so, lawyers are expected to be honest in all their dealings.
Unfortunately, respondent was far from being honest. With full
knowledge that Rufina had another heir, he acceded to
Mariano’s request to prepare the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication.
Applying the test to determine whether conflict of interest
exists, respondent would necessarily refute Mariano’s claim that
he is Rufina’s sole heir when he agreed to represent Marilu.
Worse, he knew that Mariano was not the only heir. As stated in
the Report of the Commission on Bar Discipline:
Worse, the respondent himself on the witness stand disputes in society. This was restated in Sec. 27 of Rule
during his April 14, 2009 testimony in the Civil Case for 138—Attorneys and Admission to the Bar.
Sum of Money with Prayer of Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order docketed The Resolutions of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines are,
as Civil Case No. 09-269 filed with the RTC of Makati at best, recommendatory, and its findings and recommendations
City admitted as follows: “I called the attention of Mr. should not be equated with Decisions and Resolutions rendered
Mariano Turla. I . . . asked him what about Lulu she is by this court.
entitled to a share of properties and he told me, ‘Ako
na ang bahala kay Lulu, hindi ko pababayaan yan.’ So
he asked me to proceed with the Affidavit of
Adjudication wherein he claimed the whole properties
for himself.”
This very admission proves that the respondent was
privy to Marilu’s standing as a legal and rightful heir to Rufina
Turla’s estate.
However, Rule 15.03 provides for an exception,
specifically, “by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts.” Respondent had the duty to inform
Mariano and Marilu that there is a conflict of interest and to
obtain their written consent. Mariano died on February 5, 2009,
while respondent represented Marilu in March 2009. It is
understandable why respondent was unable to obtain Mariano’s
consent. Still, respondent did not present evidence showing that
he disclosed to Marilu that he previously represented Mariano
and assisted him in executing the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication.
Thus, the allegation of conflict of interest against respondent
was sufficiently proven.
2. NO. The authority to discipline members of the Bar is vested
in the Supreme Court under the 1987 Constitution.
Art. 8, Sec. 5 of the 1987 Constitution states that the
Supreme Court has the power to promulgate rules concerning
the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the
practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged.
The authority to discipline lawyers stems from the Court’s
constitutional mandate to regulate admission to the practice of
law, which includes as well authority to regulate the practice
itself of law. Quite apart from this constitutional mandate, the
disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court over members of the
Bar is an inherent power incidental to the proper administration
of justice and essential to an orderly discharge of judicial
functions. The disciplinary authority of the Court over members
of the Bar is but corollary to the Court’s exclusive power of
admission to the Bar. A lawyer is not merely a professional but
also an officer of the court and as such, he is called upon to share
in the task and responsibility of dispensing justice and resolving