History of China's Military

Preface

The recorded military history of China extends from about 2200 BC to the present day. This history can be divided into the military history of China before 1911, when a revolution overthrew the imperial state, and the period of the Republic of China Army and the People’s Liberation Army. Although traditional Chinese Confucian philosophy favored peaceful political solutions and showed contempt for brute military force, the military was influential in most Chinese states.

The Republic of China Army originated from Chinese National Revolutionary Army, which was founded by Sun Yat-sen’s Kuomintang (KMT) in 1924, when the Whampoa Military Academy was established with Soviet military assistance. Whampoa Military Academy, which was presided by Chiang Kai Shek, was tasked with the objective of training a professional Chinese revolutionary army to unify China during the Warlord Era. It participated in the Northern Expedition, the Second Sino-Japanese War (during World War II) and theChinese Civil War before withdrawing with the ROC government to Taiwan in 1949.

After 1949, the ROC Army has participated in combat operations on Kinmen and the Dachen Archipelago against the PLA in the Battle of Kuningtou, and in the First and Second Taiwan Strait Crisis. In addition to these major conflicts, ROCA commandos were regularly sent to raid the Fujian and Guangdong coasts. Until the 1970s, the stated mission of the Army was to retake the mainland from the People’s Republic of China.

The book deeply highlights the Military History of China and its strategies.

—Editor

1

Introduction

The recorded military history of China extends from about 2200 BC to the present day. This history can be divided into the military history of China before 1911, when a revolution overthrew the imperial state, and the period of the Republic of China Army and the People’s Liberation Army. Although traditional Chinese Confucian philosophy favored peaceful political solutions and showed contempt for brute military force, the military was influential in most Chinese states. Chinese pioneered the use of crossbows, advanced metallurgical standardization for arms and armor, early gunpowder weapons, and other advanced weapons, but also adopted nomadic cavalry and Western military technology. In addition, China’s armies also benefited from an advanced logistics system as well as a rich strategic tradition, beginning with Sun Tzu’s The Art of War, that deeply influenced military thought.

People’s Liberation Army

Chinese military history underwent a dramatic transformation in the 20th century, with the People’s Liberation Army beginning in 1927 with the start of the Chinese Civil War, and developing from a peasant guerrilla force into what remains the largest armed force in the world.

Republic of China Army

The Republic of China Army was founded as the National Revolutionary Army, the armed wing of Sun Yat-sen’s Kuomintang (KMT) in 1924. It participated in the Northern Expedition, the Second Sino-Japanese War (during World War II) and the Chinese Civil War before withdrawing with the ROC government to Taiwan in 1949. After 1949, the ROC Army has participated in combat operations on Kinmen and the Dachen Archipelago against the PLA in the Battle of Kuningtou, and in the First and Second Taiwan Strait Crisis. In addition to these major conflicts, ROCA commandos were regularly sent to raid the Fujian and Guangdong coasts. Until the 1970s, the stated mission of the Army was to retake the mainland from the People’s Republic of China. Following the lifting of martial law in 1988 and the democratization of the 1990s, the mission of the ROC Army has been shifted to the defense of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu from a PLA invasion.

With the reduction of the size of the ROC armed forces in recent years, the Army has endured the largest number of cutbacks as ROC military doctrine has begun to emphasize the importance of offshore engagement with the Navy and Air Force. Subsequent to this shift in emphasis, the ROC Navy and Air Force have taken precedence over the ROC Army in defense doctrine and weapons procurement.Recent short-term goals in the Army include acquisition and development of joint command and control systems, advanced attack helicopters and armored vehicles, Multiple Launch Rocket System and field air defense systems. The Army is also in the process of transitioning to an all volunteer force.

HISTORY

The Republic of China Army originated from Chinese National Revolutionary Army, which was founded by Sun Yat-sen’s Kuomintang (KMT) in 1924, when the Whampoa Military Academy was established with Soviet military assistance. Whampoa Military Academy, which was presided by Chiang Kai Shek, was tasked with the objective of training a professional Chinese revolutionary army to unify China during the Warlord Era. It participated in the Northern Expedition, the Second Sino-Japanese War (during World War II) and theChinese Civil War before withdrawing with the ROC government to Taiwan in 1949.

After 1949, the ROC Army has participated in combat operations on Kinmen and the Dachen Archipelago against the PLA in the Battle of Kuningtou, and in the First and Second Taiwan Strait Crisis. In addition to these major conflicts, ROCA commandos were regularly sent to raid the Fujian and Guangdong coasts. Until the 1970s, the stated mission of the Army was to retake the mainland from the People’s Republic of China. Following the lifting of martial law in 1988 and the democratization of the 1990s, the mission of the ROC Army has been shifted to the defense of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu from a PLA invasion.

With the reduction of the size of the ROC armed forces in recent years, the Army has endured the largest number of cutbacks as ROC military doctrine has begun to emphasize the importance of offshore engagement with the Navy and Air Force. Subsequent to this shift in emphasis, the ROC Navy and Air Force have taken precedence over the ROC Army in defense doctrine and weapons procurement.Recent short-term goals in the Army include acquisition and development of joint command and control systems, advanced attack helicopters and armored vehicles, Multiple Launch Rocket System and field air defense systems. The Army is also in the process of transitioning to an all volunteer force.

Equipment

From the 1990s onwards, the Republic of China Army launched several upgrade programmes to replace out-dated equipment with cutting edge state of the art advanced weapons, also increasing its emphasis on forces that could be rapidly deployed and were suited for combat in Taiwan’s heavily urbanized environment. Orders were placed with the United States for M60A3 Patton tanks, M109A6 Paladin howitzers and AH-1W SuperCobra attack helicopters, as well as updating existing equipment. Along with the other ROC military branches, the ROC Army has extensive experience in the construction and utilization of underground tunnels and bases gained during the People’s Republic of China’s bombardments of Kinmen and Matsu during the Cold War and many facilities are rumoured to be located underground in undisclosed locations.

The U.S. Government announced on October 3 2008 that it plans to sell $6.5 billion worth of arms to Taiwan ending the freeze of arms sales to Taiwan. Amongst other things, the plans include $2.532 billion worth of 30 AH-64D Apache Longbow Block III Attack helicopters with night-vision sensors, radar, 173 Stinger Block I air-to-air missiles and 1000 AGM-114L Hellfire missiles. and 182 Javelin missiles will also be available with 20 Javelin command launchers and is estimated to cost $47 million.

On January 29, 2010, US Government announced 5 notifications to US Congress for arms sales to Taiwan. Of the total 6.392 billion US dollars in the 5 announcements, ROC Army will receive 60 UH-60M and other related things for cost of 3.1 Billion.

Helicopters

In July 2007 it was reported that the ROC Army would request the purchase of 30 AH-64E Apache Guardian attack helicopters from the US in the 2008 defence budget. In October 2015 it was announced that 9 AH-64E had been grounded due to oxidation of components in the helicopters' tail rotor gearboxes and comprehensive safety checks were made on all Apaches. The 2008 defense budget also listed a request for 60 UH-60M Black Hawk helicopters as a partial replacement for the UH-1Hs currently in service.

Main battle tanks

It has been reported that the ROC Army is seeking new third generation main battle tanks, as the M60A3s and CM-11s are aging. The possible tanks under consideration were the US M1A2, UK Challenger, German Leopard 2A6, French AMX-56 Leclerc and the IsraeliMerkava. However, it is expected to procure the M1A2 due to closer military ties.

On August 31, 2010, it was announced for next year’s defense budget, ROCA plan for next generation MBT has been put on hold, due to lack of budget. Recently we army was approved to buy 120 M1A1s, with budget allocation set for 2017 and delivery of the first batch expected by 2020. Some critics have been made to this purchases some analyst have expressed that Taiwan’s terrain and some of its bridges and roads are unsuitable for the 60-tonne M1A1.

Infantry vehicles

CM-32 Yunpao, an 8x8 armoured personnel carrier locally manufactured, will replace ageing M113s and V-150 armoured vehicles. It is a modular vehicle platform capable of accepting various configurations for specific combat requirements.

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

General Staff Department

The General Staff Department carries out staff and operational functions for the PLA and had major responsibility for implementing military modernization plans. Headed by chief of general staff, the department served as the headquarters for the ground forces and contained directorates for the three other armed services: Air Force, Navy, and Strategic Missile Force. The General Staff Department included functionally organized subdepartments for artillery, armoured units, engineering, operations, training, intelligence, mobilization, surveying, communications, quartermaster services, and politics.

Navy Headquarters controlled the North Sea Fleet, East Sea Fleet, and South Sea Fleet. Air Force Headquarters generally exercised control through the commanders of the seven military regions. Nuclear forces were directly subordinate to the General Staff Department. Conventional main, regional, and militia units were controlled administratively by the military region commanders, but the General Staff Department in Beijing could assume direct operational control of any main-force unit at will. Thus, broadly speaking, the General Staff Department exercises operational control of the main forces, and the military region commanders controlled the regional forces and, indirectly, the militia. The post of principal intelligence official in the top leadership of the Chinese military has been taken up by a number of people of several generations, from Li Kenong in the 1950s to Xiong Guangkai in the late 1990s; and their public capacity has always been assistant to the deputy chief of staff or assistant to the chief of staff.

Ever since the CPC officially established the system of major military regions for its army in the 1950s, the intelligence agencies inside the Army have, after going through several major evolutions, developed into the present three major military intelligence setups.

•  The central level is composed of the Second and Third Departments under the PLA General Staff Headquarters and the Liaison Department under the PLA General Political Department.

•  At the major military regions intelligence activities consist of the Second Bureau established at the same level as the Operation Department under the headquarters, and the Liaison Department established under the Political Department.

•  The third system includes a number of communications stations directly established in the garrison areas of all the major military regions by the Third Department of the PLA General Staff Headquarters.

The Second Bureau under the headquarters and the Liaison Department under the Political Department of major military regions are only subjected to the professional leadership of their counterpart units under the Central Military Commission and are still considered the direct subordinate units of the major military region organizationally. Those entities whose names include the word institute, all research institutes under the charge of the Second and the Third Departments of the PLA General Staff Headquarters, including other research organs inside the Army, are at least of the establishment size of the full regimental level. Among the deputy commanders or deputy chiefs of staff of a major military region in China, there is always one who is assigned to take charge of intelligence work, and the intelligence agencies under his charge are directly affiliated to the headquarters and the political department of the military region.

The Conference on Strengthening Intelligence Work held from 3 September 1996 – 18 September 1996 at the Xishan Command Centre of the Ministry of State Security and the General Staff Department.

Chi Haotian delivered a report entitled Strengthen Intelligence Work in a New International Environment To Serve the Cause of Socialist Construction. The report emphasized the need to strengthen the following four aspects of intelligence work:

•  Efforts must be made to strengthen understanding of the special nature and role of intelligence work, as well as understanding of the close relationship between strengthening intelligence work on the one hand, and of the Four Modernizations of the motherland, the reunification of the motherland, and opposition to hegemony and power politics on the other.

•  The United States and the West have all along been engaged in infiltration, intervention, sabotage, and intelligence gathering against China on the political, economic, military, and ideological fronts. The response must strengthen the struggle against their infiltration, intervention, sabotage, and intelligence gathering.

•  Consolidating intelligence departments and training a new generation of intelligence personnel who are politically reliable, honest and upright in their ways, and capable of mastering professional skills, the art of struggle, and advanced technologies.

•  Strengthening the work of organizing intelligence in two international industrial, commercial, and financial ports — Hong Kong and Macau.

Although the four aspects emphasized by Chi Haotian appeared to be defensive measures, they were in fact both defensive and offensive in nature.

Second Department

The Second Department of the PLA General Staff Headquarters is responsible for collecting military intelligence. Activities include military attachés at Chinese embassies abroad, clandestine special agents sent to foreign countries to collect military information, and the analysis of information publicly published in foreign countries.

The Second Department oversees military human intelligence (HUMINT) collection, widely exploits open source (OSINT) materials, fuses HUMINT, signals intelligence (SIGINT), and imagery intelligence data, and disseminates finished intelligence products to the CMC and other consumers. Preliminary fusion is carried out by the Second Department’s Analysis Bureau which mans the National Watch Centre, the focal point for national-level indications and warning. In-depth analysis is carried out by regional bureaus. Although traditionally the Second Department of the General Staff Department was responsible for military intelligence, it is beginning to increasingly focus onscientific and technological intelligence in the military field, following the example of Russian agencies in stepping up the work of collecting scientific and technological information.

The research institute under the Second Department of the General Staff Headquarters is publicly known as the Institute for International Strategic Studies; its internal classified publication Foreign Military Trends is published every 10 days and transmitted to units at the division level.

The PLA Institute of International Relations at Nanjing comes under the Second Department of the General Staff Department and is responsible for training military attachés, assistant military attaches and associate military attaches as well as secret agents to be posted abroad.

It also supplies officers to the military intelligence sections of various military regions and group armies. The Institute was formed from the PLA 793 Foreign Language Institute, which moved from Zhangjiakou after the Cultural Revolution and split into two institutions at Luoyang and Nanjing.

The Institute of International Relations was known in the 1950s as the School for Foreign Language Cadres of the Central Military Commission, with the current name being used since 1964. The training of intelligence personnel is one of several activities at the Institute. While all graduates of the Moscow Institute of International Relations were employed by the KGB, only some graduates of the Beijing Institute of International Relations are employed by the Ministry of State Security. The former Institute of International Relations, since been renamed the Foreign Affairs College, is under the administration of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and is not involved in secret intelligence work. The former Central Military Commission foreign language school had foreign faculty members who were either Communist Party sympathizers or were members of foreign communist parties. But the present Institute of International Relations does not hire foreign teachers, to avoid the danger that its students might be recognized when sent abroad as clandestine agents.

Those engaged in professional work in military academies under the Second Department of the PLA General Staff Headquarters usually have a chance to go abroad, either for advanced studies or as military officers working in the military attaché’s office of Chinese embassies in foreign countries. People working in the military attaché’s office of embassies are usually engaged in collecting military information under the cover of military diplomacy. As long as they refrain from directly subversive activities, they are considered as well-behaved military diplomats.

Some bureaus under the Second Department which are responsible for espionage in different regions, of which the First Bureau is responsible for collecting information in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau.

Agents are dispatched by the Second Department to companies and other local corporations to gain cover.

The Autumn Orchid intelligence group assigned to Hong Kong and Macau in the mid-1980s mostly operated in the mass media, political, industrial, commercial, and religious circles, as well as in universities and colleges. The Autumn Orchid intelligence group was mainly responsible for the following three tasks:

•  Finding out and keeping abreast of the political leanings of officials of the Hong Kong and Macau governments, as well as their views on major issues, through social contact with them and through information provided by them.

•  Keeping abreast of the developments of foreign governments' political organs in Hong Kong, as well as of foreign financial, industrial, and commercial organizations.

•  Finding out and having a good grasp of the local media’s sources of information on political, military, economic, and other developments on the mainland, and deliberately releasing false political or military information to the media to test the outside response.

The Autumn Orchid intelligence group was awarded a Citation for Merit, Second Class, in December 1994. It was further awarded another Citation for Merit, Second Class, in 1997. Its current status is not publicly known. During the 2008 Chinese New Year celebration CCTV held for Chinese diplomatic establishments, the head of the Second Department of the PLA General Staff Headquarters was revealed for the first time to the public: the current head was Major General Yang Hui (hgVf), the former deputy head of the Third Department of the PLA General Staff Headquarters (he was a senior colonel when he held that position).

Third Department

The Third Department of the General Staff Headquarters is responsible for monitoring the telecommunications of foreign armies and producing finished intelligence based on the military information collected.

The communications stations established by the Third Department of the PLA General Staff Headquarters are not subject to the jurisdictionof the provincial military district and the major military region of where they are based. The communications stations are entirely the agencies of the Third Department of the PLA General Staff Headquarters which have no affiliations to the provincial military district and the military region of where they are based. The personnel composition, budgets, and establishment of these communications stations are entirely under the jurisdiction of the Third Department of the General PLA General Staff Headquarters, and are not related at all with local troops.

China maintains the most extensive SIGINT network of all the countries in the Asia-Pacific region. As of the late 1990s, SIGINT systems included several dozen ground stations, half a dozen ships, truck-mounted systems, and airborne systems. Third Department headquarters is in the vicinity of the GSD First Department (Operations Department), AMS, and NDU complex in the hills northwest of the Summer Palace. As of the late 1990s, the Third Department was allegedly manned by approximately 20,000 personnel, with most of their linguists trained at the Luoyang Institute of Foreign Languages.

Ever since the 1950s, the Second and Third Departments of the PLA General Staff Headquarters have established a number of institutions of secondary and higher learning for bringing up special talents. The PLA Foreign Language Institute at Luoyang comes under the Third Department of the General Staff Department and is responsible for training foreign language officers for the monitoring of foreign military intelligence. The Institute was formed from the PLA 793 Foreign Language Institute, which moved from Zhangjiakou after the Cultural Revolution and split into two institutions at Luoyang and Nanjing.

Though the distribution order they received upon graduation indicated the PLA General Staff Headquarters, many of the graduates of these schools found themselves being sent to all parts of the country, including remote and uninhabited backward mountain areas. The reason is that the monitoring and control stations under the Third Department of the PLA General Staff Headquarters are scattered in every corner of the country.

The communications stations located in the Shenzhen base of the PLA Hong Kong Garrison started their work long ago. In normal times, these two communications stations report directly to the Central Military Commission and the PLA General Staff Headquarters. Units responsible for coordination are the communications stations established in the garrison provinces of the military regions by the Third Department of the PLA General Staff Headquarters.

By taking direct command of military communications stations based in all parts of the country, the CPC Central Military Commission and the PLA General Staff Headquarters can not only ensure a successful interception of enemy radio communications, but can also make sure that none of the wire or wireless communications and contacts among major military regions can escape the detection of these communications stations, thus effectively attaining the goal of imposing a direct supervision and control over all major military regions, all provincial military districts, and all group armies.

Monitoring Stations

China’s main SIGINT effort is in the Third Department of the General Staff Department of the Central Military Commission, with additional capabilities, primarily domestic, in the Ministry of State Security (MSS). SIGINT stations, therefore, are scattered through the country, for domestic as well as international interception. Prof. Desmond Ball, of the Australian National University, described the largest stations as the main Technical Department SIGINT net control station on the northwest outskirts of Beijing, and the large complex near Lake Kinghathu in the extreme northeast corner of China.

As opposed to other major powers, China focuses its SIGINT activities on its region rather than the world. Ball wrote, in the eighties, that China had several dozen SIGINT stations aimed at Russia, Japan, Taiwan, Southeast Asia and India, as well as internally.

Of the stations apparently targeting Russia, there are sites at Jilemutu and Jixi in the northeast, and at Erlian and Hami near theMongolian border. Two Russian-facing sites in Xinjiang, at Qitai and Korla may be operated jointly with resources from the US CIA’s Office of SIGINT Operations, probably focused on missile and space activity.

Other stations aimed at South and Southeast Asia are on a net controlled by Chengdu, Sichuan. There is a large facility at Dayi, and, according to Ball, numerous small posts along the Indian border. Other significant facilities are located near Shenyang, near Jinan and in Nanjing and Shanghai. Additional stations are in the Fujian and Guangdong military districts opposite Taiwan.

On Hainan Island, near Vietnam, there is a naval SIGINT facility that monitors the South China sea, and a ground station targeting US and Russian satellites. China also has ship and aircraft platforms in this area, under the South Sea Fleet headquarters at Zhanjiangimmediately north of the island. Targeting here seems to have an ELINT as well as COMINT flavor. There are also truck- mounted mobile ground systems, as well as ship, aircraft, and limited satellite capability. There are at least 10 intelligence- gathering auxiliary vessels.

As of the late nineties, the Chinese did not appear to be trying to monitor the United States Pacific Command to the same extent as does Russia. In future, this had depended, in part, on the status of Taiwan.

Fourth Department

The Fourth Department (ECM and Radar) of the General Staff Headquarters Department has the electronic intelligence (ELINT) portfolio within the PLA’s SIGINT apparatus. This department is responsible for electronic countermeasures, requiring them to collect and maintain data bases on electronic signals. 25 ELINT receivers are the responsibility of the Southwest Institute of Electronic Equipment (SWIEE).

Among the wide range of SWIEE ELINT products is a new KZ900 airborne ELINT pod. The GSD 54th Research Institute supports the ECM Department in development of digital ELINT signal processors to analyze parameters of radar pulses.

Liaison Department

The PLA General Political Department (GPD) maintains the CPC structure that exists at every level of the PLA. It is responsible for overseeing the political education, indoctrination and discipline that is a prerequisite for advancement within the PLA.

The GPD controls the internal prison system of the PLA. The International Liaison Department of the General Political Department is publicly known as the China Association for International Friendly Contacts.

The department prepares political and economic information for the reference of the Political Bureau. The department conducts ideological and political work on foreign armies, explaining China’s policies, and disintegrate enemy armies by dampening their morale.

It is also tasked with instigating rebellions and disloyalty within the Taiwan military and other foreign militaries.

The Liaison Office has dispatched agents to infiltrate Chinese- funded companies and private institutions in Hong Kong. Their mission iscounter-espionage, monitoring their own agents, and preventing and detecting foreign intelligence services buying off Chinese personnel.

Special Forces

China’s counterterrorist unit is drawn from the police force rather than the military. The name changes frequently, but as of this writing, it is known as the Immediate Action Unit (IAU). The Chinese Army fields large number of special operations groups and would appear to have a vast pool of manpower to choose from. However, it is believed that any significant terrorist activity within Chinese borders would draw the attention of the IAU.

China has reportedly developed a force capable of carrying out long-range air-borne operations, long-range reconnaissance, and amphibious operations.

Formed in China’s Guangzhou military region and known by the nickname Sword of Southern China, the force supposedly receives army, air force and naval training, including flight training, and is equipped with hundreds of high-tech devices, including global-positioning satellite systems. All of the force’s officers have completed military staff colleges, and 60 percent are said to have university degrees.

Soldiers are reported to be cross-trained in various specialties, and training is supposed to encompass a range of operational environments. It is far from clear whether this unit is considered operational by the Chinese. It is also not clear how such a force would be employed. Among the missions mentioned were responding to contingencies in various regions and cooperating with other services in attacks on islands. According to the limited reporting, the organization appears to be in a phase of testing and development and may constitute an experimental unit. While no size for the force has been revealed, there have been Chinese media claims that "over 4,000 soldiers of the force are all-weather and versatile fighters and parachutists who can fly airplanes and drive auto