American Sociological Association

Relational Thinking: A Critique of Co-Deterministic Theories of Structure and Agency
Author(s): François Dépelteau

Source: Sociological Theory, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Mar., 2008), pp. 51-73
Published by: American Sociological Association
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RelationalThinking:A Critiqueof Co-Deterministic
Theoriesof StructureandAgency*
FRAN:OIS D'EPELTEAU
LaurentianUniversity
This article presents a relational criticism of the "morphogenetic theory" of

M. Archer. This theoryisfounded and representativeof themost influential mode of
perception of the social universeof the last few decades: co-determinism(structure
e agency). Co-determinisms influencecan be explained by its integrationofmodern
general presuppositions like freedom, individualism,and the quest for a new social
order By identifying five basic principles of relational sociology,we see thatArcher s
co-deterministic theoryoffersa complicated solution to avoid voluntarismand co
determinism,limits thepotential of sociological imagination,cannot adequately see
thefluidityof social processes, produces a certain reificationof social structuresand
agency,and is based on an inconsistentuse of egocentricand relationalperspectives.
These problems can be avoided ifwe use a relational approach (actor . + actorX
structures) based on the studyof complex and empirical trans-actions.
Sociologyhas been stronglyinfluenced by twomodes of perceptionof thesocialuni

verseover the last twoor threedecades: co-determinism and relationism.
The most
influentialis co-determinism. In contemporarysociology,thisrefersto theworks of
well-knownsocial scientistssuch as M. Archer (1982, 1995, 2000a, 2000b, 2003),
R. Bhaskar (1998), P. Berger and T. Luckmann (1967), P. Bourdieu (1977, 1984,
1990a, 1990b),A. Giddens (1979, 1984, 1986, 1990, 1993),C.W Mills [1959]2000,
and N. Mouzelis (1989, 1993, 1995, 2000). In thefirstpart of thisarticle,we will
discuss thatinoneway or another,co-determinism explainssocialphenomenaas the
effects betweenagencyand social structures.
of inter-actions We will also brieflyex
plain thatthe influence
of co-determinismcan be explainedby somemodern "general
presuppositions" partlycomposedby "ideologicalassumptions"(Alexander1982)
such as the paradoxical need for some individual freedom and a stable social order.
withmodernity,variousco-deterministic
Despite theirculturalaffinities theorieshave
generatedmany debates and disagreementsin sociology.Generally speaking,these
problemsreferto questions like:How much respectivepower shouldwe recognizein
social structures and agency? Are we dealing with separated or intertwined "proper
What is thesourceof agencyifconstraining/enabling
ties"? structuresimposethem
selveson social actorsbeforetheyact?Does agencycome fromindividuals? Rational
individuals?Is agencyrelatedto theeffort
of actors?Is itonlyconnectedto collective
action of "corporate" actors? Perhaps it emerges from individual interactions at the
micro-level?Or maybe it is relatedto some criticalformof reflexivity linkedto a
class consciousness,some feelingof deprivation,or internalconversations?
The works of P. Bourdieu, A. Giddens, and M. Archer have played a central role
in thesedebates (Parker2000). It has been said thatgeneralexplanationssuch as
*Addresscorrespondenceto:FrancoisDepelteau,Departmentof Sociology,LaurentianUniversity, Sud

bury,Ontario P3E 2C6. Tel.: 705-675-1151(4228); Fax: 705-675-4873.E-mail: fdepelteau@laurentian.ca.
MA candidateat LaurentianUniversity,forher assistance in editingthisarticle.
Thanks to Sara Fryer,
Sociological Theory 26:1 March 2008

DC 20005
?CAmericanSociologicalAssociation.1430K StreetNW, Washington,

52 SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY
"structuringstructured" (P. Bourdieu 1990b) and the "principle of duality"

(A. Giddens 1984) gave toomuch power to social structures or agency;or thatthey
are too vague, confusing,or unclear (Archer1982, 1995, 2000; Cohen 1989; Craib
1992; EmirbayerandMishe 1998;Healy 1998;Held and Thompson 1989; Jenkins
1982;King 1999, 2000;Mouzelis 1989, 1995, 2000; Parker 2000; Sewell 1992).M.
Archer (1995,2000a, 2003) has proposeda "morphogenetic approach" to resolvethis
typeof problem.Relativelyspeaking,Archer's theoryappears to be, at thispoint,
one of themost sophisticatedco-deterministic attemptsto define the relationships
betweenstructures and agency. We will presentitskeyprinciplesand our hypothesis
is thata "relational"critiqueof thistheorymay help to observesomekeyweaknesses
of co-determinism. This critique will be based on ideas takenfromor inspiredby
thinkersfromdifferenttheoreticalapproaches and ontologies such as J.Alexander
(1988),H. Blumer (1969),R. Collins (2005), J.Dewey and A. Bentley (1949),N.
Elias (1978a, 1978b, 1987, 1991),M. Emirbayer(1997),M. Emirbayerand A. Mishe
(1998), J.Goudsblom (1977),A. King (1999, 2000), B. Latour (2005),M. Mann
(1986, 1993,2005), S.Mennel (1992), and C. Tilly (1998).These names do not repre
sent "clear" relational thinkers. However, they have all tried in one way or another to
move beyondco-deterministic distinctionsbetweenagencyand structure, micro and
macro-levels,and individualsand societyby givingmore weight to social relations
as theengineof productionof social phenomena.By identifying fivebasic princi
ples of relationalsociology,we will see thatArcher's co-deterministictheoryoffers
a complicatedsolution to avoid voluntarismand determinism,limitsthepotential
of sociological imagination,cannot adequately see the fluidityof social processes,
producesa certainreification of social structures
and agency,and is based on an in
consistentuse of egocentricand relationalperspectives.
The main goal of thiscritique
of M. Archer's works is to contribute towhat might become a "relational turn" in so
ciology. In other words, we would like to show that if co-determinism was a logical
answer to the influenceof deterministictheoriessuch as structuralism,
structural
functionalism,and structural-Marxism,it is time to shiftfromco-determinismto
relationalism.
TWO MODES OF PERCEPTION OF THE SOCIAL UNIVERSE
BriefPresentationof Co-Determinism
Generally speaking,co-deterministic theoriesexplain theevolutionof the social uni
verse as the effectof inter-actions
betweensocial structures and agency.The social
world resultsfrom the intertwined powers of initial social structuresand agency
(preexisting structure *+ agency -* reproduced or transformed social structure).
Co-deterministic explanations can be found in classical texts. One famous exam
ple is thewell-quoted statement
made by K. Marx (1963) in the The Eighteenth
Brumaire of Louis Napoleon: "Men make their own history, but they do not make
it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but un
der circumstancesexistingalready,givenand transmitted fromthepast." However,
co-determinism became a common in
mode of perception contemporarysociolog
ical theorywhen key sociologistsrejecteddeterministic
explanationsfromtheories
like structural-functionalism These sociologistssought to
and structural-Marxism.
add some agency by preserving the ontological view of social structures as "social
things" (constraining factors that are external to the actors). This mode of perception
is presented as more complex, balanced, and realistic than voluntarism (agency -*
structure)and determinism(structure >~action).

RELATIONAL THINKING 53
C. W Mills's "sociological imagination"is one good example. In the late 1950s,

C. W Mills foundParsons's structural-functionalism to be too deterministic and
conservative. He explained that social life is not made up of "a series of traps"
[1959]2000:3). Social actors are not simply"outsiders"or "permanentstrangers"
in the social world. Of course, theyare shaped by "History" (structuralchanges
they do not control), but social actors can also shape their society through their
"biography."Therefore,themain goal of sociologycannot be to explainhow social
cultures,societies,and other fullyexternaland constrainingsocial things
structures,
determine social action (structure -+ action). The "task" and "promise" of sociology
come fromtheunderstanding of dialectical tensionsbetweenagencyand structural
properties.In otherwords,we should say that the social universe ismade up of
various formsof structuredagency.
Through theirexplanationsof the "objectification" of the socialworld published
in The Social Construction
of Reality (1966), P. Bergerand T. Luckmann also con
tributedto thisco-deterministicturnin the secondpart of the20th century. Here
again, determinism is rejected in favor of a dialectical study of relations between in
dividualsand preexistinginstitutions.
The "objectivityof the institutional
world" is
explained as "a human product" (Berger and Luckmann 1966:50). Seen as an external
socialorder isa "constructed
world and a necessity, objectivity";it is "an ongoinghu
man production"(Bergerand Luckmann 1966:49); and "it does not thereby acquire
an ontologicalstatusapart fromthehuman activitythatproduced it" (Bergerand
Luckmann 1966:57).However,"man (notof course,in isolationbut inhis collectivi
with each other" (Bergerand Luckmann 1966:57).
ties)and his socialworld interact
Indeed,firstsocial practicesacquire some soliditythroughthepassage of time.Sec
ond, theobjectivityof institutions"thickens"and "hardens"as similaractions and
interactionsare repeatedand timegoes by.Finally,producersare in theworld; they
with a producedworld; theyface a preexisting,
interact external,and constraining
social reality. In this logic, P. Berger and T. Luckmann could write that "the product
acts back upon theproducer"(Bergerand Luckmann 1966:57) and it is internalized
by the individuals.Institutions
"controlhumanconductby settingup predefinedpat
ternsof conduct" (Bergerand Luckmann 1966:52); theindividual"posits thatactions
of type X will be performed by actors of type X" (Berger and Luckmann 1966:51
52); they"are there,externalto him, persistentin theirreality,
whetherhe likes it
or not" (Berger and Luckmann 1966:57); and they "have coercive power over him"
(Bergerand Luckmann 1966:57). In brief,inTV, at least twoactorscreatea new form
of interaction (actorA actorB X new structure). As time goes by [T2 - T3], through
itsreproductionthisnot-so-newpatternof interactionis facedby theproducersand
transmitted to newcomers (actor A <> actor BX new structure =X actorC) as something
they do not choose anymore and as a "controlling" factor. Sooner or later, in T4, the
pattern is simply perceived and internalized as an objective reality by all the actors
A, B, and C. Reificationmay appear if theactors forgetthat the institution
exists
only through their actions. In sum, it seems reasonable and logical to say that actors
with social structures
interact sincewe are usually inT4 whenwe act:
(or institutions)
[T'] actorA e actorB =X structureX

[T2- T3] Objectificationof the structure(through"habitualization")
[T4] structureXX actorC * actorA <* actorB
P. Bourdieuwas anothercontemporary who contributedto thedevelop

sociologist
ment of co-determinism.
He denied thathe had developeda deterministic
theoryof

action throughthenotionsof fields,capitals,social classes,and habitus.Moreover, in

thelastphase of his career(BourdieuandWacquant 1992),he presentedhisworks as
a relationaltheorycompatiblewith theworks of E. Cassirer and N. Elias. However,
thereis littledoubt overall thatBourdieu's theoryismore a co-deterministic than
a relationalone (Depelteau forthcoming). For instance,in The Logic of Practice,
Bourdieu rejectedtheartificialoppositionbetween"objectivism"and "subjectivism"
and announced his intentiontomove beyond "the antagonismbetween these two
modes of knowledge" (1990b:25).Once again, determinismand voluntarismwere
rejectedin favorof "thedialecticof objectivestructures and incorporatedstructures"
(1990b:41). P.Bourdieu's co-determinism (witha clear deterministic tendency)refers
to "structuredstructures"thatare also "structuring structures."In briefand as P
Bourdieuwrote:
The conditioningsassociatedwith a particularclass of conditionsof existence

producehabitus,systemsof durable,transposabledispositions,structuredstruc
turespredisposedto functionas structuringstructures(1990b:53).
A. Giddens (1984) also proposed his typeof co-deterministic He rejected

theory.
any formof dualism to explain the relationshipbetweenstructuresand agency.In
some ways, we are gettingcloser to relationismsince the "structuration" of the
society is the resultof "social practicesacross space and time" (Giddens 1984:2).
Like P. Berger and T. Luckmann (1966),A. Giddens wrote that "in and through
theiractivitiesagents reproducetheconditions thatmake theseactivitiespossible"
(Giddens 1984:2).Therefore,a social structure"exists,as time-space presence,only in
in suchpracticesas memory tracesorientingtheconductof knowl
its instantiations
edgeablehuman agents" (Giddens 1984:17).But even as "memorytraces"(and rules
and resources),as "'virtualorder' of transformative relations"(Giddens 1984:17),
social structureshave some structuring properties "the propertieswhichmake it
possible fordiscerniblysimilarsocial practices to existacross varyingspans of time
and space and which lend them 'systemic'form"(Giddens 1984:17).Therefore,and
once again, social structures are separated from agency, which refers to "events of
which an individual is the perpetrator, in the sense that the individual could, at any
(Giddens 1984:9).The
phase in a given sequenceof conduct,have acted differently"
"structuration" of the social world is seen as the effect of some relationships between
social structures and agency, even if social structures and agency do not exist without
each other.
Co-Determinism as a Convenient Mode of Perception inModernity
According toC. W Mills, P. Bergerand T. Luckmann,A. Giddens,M. Archer,and

many others,social actors face a social world fullof structural"properties"they
did not choose and design and actors are not fully determined by these structures.
perceptionof theevolutionof social phenomenamakes a lotof
This co-deterministic
sense formany people inmodernity.We can say thatco-deterministic
social theories
are representative of and compatible with modern culture inmany ways. In a modern
and individualism(Beck et al. 1994;Giddens 1990),
world characterizedby reflexivity
the development of the natural sciences has favored a habitus according to which a
phenomenon(theeffect)isexplainedby theinfluences
of externalfactors(thecauses).
On one hand, it seems that modern reflexivity tends to lead toward determinism.
But thereis a paradox sincemodernityis also based on progressand progresscomes

fromsome freedomand criticalreflexivity. In thisrespect,modern thinking cannot

easily accept determinismas a mode of perceptionof the social universewithout,
at the same time,killing thepossibilityof progressbased on freedomand critical
reflexivity.
What is thepurpose and efficiency of criticalreflexivity
ifour actionsare
fullydetermined?In otherwords,modernityleads to determinism as itsmain mode
of perceptiondue to some fascinationabout ("pure") sciences.However,at thesame
time,fundamental modern hopes, goals, and values such as progressand freedom
are antagonisticto determinism.
Why not, then, adopt voluntarism as the main mode of perception of the social
universe?At least fourreasonsexplain thecommon rejectionof thismode of per
ceptionof thesocial universe.First, froman historicalstandpointsocial sciencesare
theyoungercousinsof natural sciences.Through a processof imitation, a positivist
and deterministic
sociologicalhabitushas been developedand transmitted fromone
generationto another.Using this logic, it has been "abnormal" to be "scientific"
and voluntaristic.
Second, likemany other actors, social scientistsfeel that societies,institutions,
cultures, etc. exist with or without "me." And "we" (as in you or me, and not you
and me) also know that "we" (you or me) cannot change a society or a culture
by "ourselves"(you orme). Thus, co-determinism seems to be themost reasonable
solutionifone wants to combine thequest forprogressand freedom,the legacyof
"pure" sciences,and the senseof separationbetween"me" and the socialworld.
Third,modern scienceis also based on a quest forobjectivity.
The scientific
"sub
ject" is an external observer of an "object." In this sense, dualism seems to be the
only acceptableepistemologicalposture thatscientificpeople can adopt. It ismore
or less requiredto conceivescientific
explanationsas based on thestudyof external
objects from"us" (you orme) ifwe want to avoid subjectivismand relativism.In
thismanner, the transformation of dynamicsocial processes into"social things,"as
explainedby E. Durkheim [1938] 1982, becomes formany a necessaryfoundation
forany scientificthinkingon thesocial universe.
Once again, co-determinism is con
venient since it allows us to see social phenomena as social things and to preserve
some form of agency at the same time.
Fourth,sociologywas not based onlyon a quest forprogressand freedom.Itwas
also founded on a search for new foundations for a stable social order. In this respect,
voluntarismis simplyunacceptable.The "discovery"of softsocial structures
offers
a reasonable solution to deal with this paradoxical quest for freedom (agency) and
order (social structures).
This "need" of structured
agency is stillpresent.One clear
example, among many others, is given by I. J.Cohen in her critique of Giddens's
structuration
theory:
The answeris thatto concentrate

upon thesituatedproductionof social systems
does not immediately make clear theconditionsthatpermitsystemicpatterns
and modes of organizationto be reproduced.Such conditionsare absolutely
vital, for in their absence systems would not and could not be maintained.
Instead,social lifewould consistof an inconstantfluxof events:an unpatterned
and disorganizedchaos inwhich social lifein any recognizableformcould not
occur. Structuralpropertiesin social systemsmay not reproducesystems,but
theyshape,channel,and facilitatesystemreproduction whenever it occurs by
providingagentswith the practical awarenessof the practices,relations,and
spatio-temporal settingstheyrequirein order to participatein the reproductive
process. (Cohen 1989:200-01)

In brief,epistemologicallyand culturallyspeaking, realism,dualism, and co

determinismseem to be thebest options.The main problemhere is thatwhat seems
to be so logical,rational,and reasonableisnot necessarilyrelevantinorder tounder
stand social phenomena.Social theoryshould not correspondto culturaldemands
and some scientific habitus.It should reflecttherealityof thesocial universe.In this
sense,it seems to be useful to oppose relationismto co-determinism.
A RELATIONAL CRITICISM OF THE "MORPHOGENETIC APPROACH"

OF M. ARCHER
GeneralPrinciplesof the"Morphogenetic
Approach"
MargaretArcherproposesone typeof co-deterministic theorybased on fourgeneral
principles:a rejectionof any formof "conflation,"a critiqueagainst the"structura
tion theory"of Giddens, thedevelopmentof "analyticaldualism," and theconcept
of "internalconversation."
Rejectionof "Conflations."Archercriticizes most of thewell-knownpreexistingsocial

theoriesas different formsof "conflation.""Conflationists"are social scientists
who
refuseddualism and theseparationof the social universeinto levels.InM. Archer's
theory,it is all about theseparationof social structures
of thesocietyand theagency
of people. "Conflationists"see only the "properties"and thepowers of the actors
or the structuresinsteadof seeingboth of them in the "stratified natureof social
reality":
Basicallyconflationists natureof social realityby denyingthat

rejectthestratified
independent propertiesand powerspertaintoboth the"parts"of societyand to
the"people"within it.... InUpwards Conflation thepowersof the"people" are
held to orchestratethoseof the"parts"; inDownwards Conflation the "parts"
organisethe "people." (Archer2000a:5)
Methodological individualism,for instance,denies that social systems(or social

structures)referto somethingreal and constraining.This is an example of an
"upward conflation."Archer refutesanymodern conceptionof actors based on
rational choice theory since they do not take into account the causal and preex
istingpropertiesof theenvironment of an action.On the contrary, when explana
tionsare foundedon "downwardsconflation,""the propertiesof the 'people' can
be 'upwardlyreduced' to propertiesof the system, which alone has causal power"
(Archer2000a:5). In this respect,Archer rejectsany poststructuralist variants of
the over socialized conceptionof the actor since it neglects the causal properties
of agency.Postmodernismis seen "as theapogee" of "downwardconflations"since
the "postmodernist denies human subjectsany formof externalmastery over soci
ety'sdevelopmentand form"(Archer2000a:24). It is based on "linguisticterrorism"
"because postmodernismnot only asserts theprimacyof (linguistic)structureover
human agency,it ultimatelyseeks to dissolve thehuman subjectentirely"(Archer
2000a:25).
Rejection of the "Duality" of Structure. There is a third form of conflation called

"central conflation." It refers to one type of co-deterministic theory, which is the
opposite of the dualism defendedby critical realism.The most well-knowncase

of the "centralconflation"approach is the "structurationtheory"of A. Giddens

(1984)where agencyand structurearemutually constitutive(principleof duality).
According toM. Archer, "[in structurationtheory]the two elementscannot be
untied and therefore theirreciprocalinfluences
cannot be teasedout,which is held
to be their
major defectand one which severelylimitstheirutilityinpracticalsocial
research"(2000a:6).M. Archer is opposed to A. Giddens's suggestionthat social
structuresdo not existoutsideof theconstantflowof relationsbetweensocial actors
in theirdaily lives.If structures
cannot be separatedfromactions and theiragential
properties,
Archer is saying,then thereis no possible autonomous reflexivity (and
agency) since an actor can think about something, and try to change it, only if it
is seen as external to him or her.
Moreover, the "duality"of structureand agency (or argumentsabout the ho
mology between thepositional and thedispositional),which conceptualizethemas
inextricably are both hostile to theverydifferentiation
intertwined, of subjectand
object that is indispensableto actorial reflexivity
towardsociety.Consequently,the
potentialof such reflexivityformediating the influenceof structureupon agency is
lost in advance (Archer2003:2).
So, agency has to be conceived of as external to structures if we want to see
thesestructuresas constrainingor enablingfactors:"Constraintsrequiresomething
to constrain,and enablementssomethingto enable" (Archer2003:4):
As mutuallyconstitutive,the twoelementscannotbe untiedand therefore their

reciprocalinfluences
cannotbe teasedout,which isheld to be themajor defect
and one which severelylimitstheirutilityinpracticalsocial research....
Their [A.Giddens and P. Bourdieu] respectiveapproaches to human practices

genericallypreclude fromdisengagingthepropertiesand powersof thepracti
tionerfromthepropertiesand powers of the environmentinwhich practices
are conducted and yet again thispreventsanalysisof theirinterplay.
Instead,
we are confrontedwith amalgamsof "practices"which oscillatewildlybetween
voluntarismand determinism, withoutour being able to specifytheconditions
underwhich agentshave greaterdegreesof freedomor, conversely, work under
a considerablestringencyof constraints.(Archer2000a:6)
We must see the social reality as based on the constant inter-actions between "hu
man beings"and thestructured
"world."It just seemsinevitable
and logicaltoArcher
to study relations between structure and agency since these two concepts have to be
seen as a strata of reality that have their own power or "properties." In this sense, her
co-determinism appears to be an epistemologicalnecessity.
As S. Kemp (2005) ex
plained,R. Bhaskar andM. Archerpresumethatfundamental characteristics
of the
social realmcan be deduced from,or dependon, somephilosophical/epistemological
discussions.
AnalyticalDualism, Time, and CorporateActors.M. Archer defendsa principleshe

calls "analyticaldualism"where time is crucial.By making a distinctionbetween
ontologyand epistemology,she claims that,analyticallyspeaking,social structures
must be externalto actionsbecause theyexistbeforethem.Time helps us to under
standhow preexistingsocial structureslimitor influenceagencyand, subsequently,
how agencycan transform or reproducepreexistingsocial structures.
Once again by
following R. Bhaskar,M. Archer divides a social action and itsconsequences into

threeor foursteps:structural conditioning(T'), socioculturalinter(-)action

(T2 - T3)
and structuralelaborationor structuralreproduction(T4) (see Figure 1).
This "morphogenetic"cycle is based on the followingsequence.First, thereare
some "emergent properties"(Tl). They are "structural"and "cultural"and theycome
fromthepast.Thus,when theyinter-act(T2- T3), actorshave todealwith both con
strainingand enablingstructures. These structures createdifferentlifechances,costs,
opportunities,etc. relatedto preexisting
distributions,roles,institutions,
systems, cul
turalproducts,and so on. Through theirinvoluntary placementsintoa preexisting
social order, actors are not free but are not simply determined by the past and its
social structureand culture.On the basis of theirown vested interests, reflexivity
and other emergentproperties,actors can change theorder of things.This iswhy
"T4" is not always a "structuralreproduction"("morphostasis")but can also be a
"structuralelaboration"("morphogenesis").Therefore,two typesof actors exist in
thesocial universe.The actionsof "primaryactors" reproducethepreexistingstruc
tures.This means "theycan play no part in thestrategic guidanceof societybecause
theyliterallyhave no say" (Archer2000a:268). They are embedded into the daily
reproduction of the social order; "theirinfluenceis thatof uncoordinatedco-action
of thosesimilarlyplaced, ratherthanco-ordinatedinteraction of promotiveinterest
groupswith clearlydefinedgoals" (Archer2000a:268).But action isnot restricted to
reproduction.Actorsmay also realize theirfullpotentialas "corporateactors"when
they are not confined to the "Me"; when, as collective actors, they "become part
of an active 'We', which seeks strategically to transform this structure in order to
make it a betterplace withinwhich to live" (Archer2000a:268-69). In thisdifferent
logicof action, social change or social "elaboration" is shaped by the resources
of actors,theirnegotiations,pressures,and bargainingpower.
The "InternalConversations."The mediation between social structuresand agency

is assured though"internalconversations."
These conversationshappen in between
T1 and T2 - T3 (see the big arrow in the lower part of Figure 1). Briefly, they are
"genuinelyinterior,""genuinelysubjective,"and theyhave "causal efficacy"(Archer
2003:104 - 205). Through our ownmental privacy"we canmodifyourselvesreflex
ively and we can also modify theworld as a consequence of our internal deliberations
about it" (Archer 2003:105). Agents do this by: diagnosing their situations (as they
perceive them in TV), identifyingtheirown interests,and designing"projects they
deem appropriateto attainingtheirends" (Archer2003:9).
M. Archer insistson separatingthese"internalconversations"fromthesociety.It is
a conversationabout the society,not withinthe society.In thisrespect,sheproposes
what one could call a sort of deterministic interpretation of the works of G. H.
Mead (1962). G. H. Mead's theory is explained as proposing an "over-socialisation
of theinternalconversation"(Archer2003:78).More precisely,throughthe"Me" and
the "generalizedother," the "I" lost any kind of real or potentialautonomy since
"thewhole communityenters into the individual'sthinking"(Archer2003:81-82).
Therefore,accordingtoArcher:
Mead is a radical anti-subjectivist. Because to him, there can be no separate self

apart from others, and because the development of mind depends upon a so
cial environment, Mead is diametrically opposed to the Cartesian and Jamesian
notion thatindividualthoughtbegins from"subjectivecontents",ones ofwhich
we alone are directly aware with introspective certainty and without external
mediation. (Archer2003:84)

aoutcme
1 2
3 production 4
Sourcea Roy Btashakar Reclaning Heay Versa,, Landan, 1989, pk 94
Figrr l I The plac of condiritoitg in Bhasars trnsformatzona

nmodel of s:cal action.
strnctural
conditoning
sacto-cultura interaction
structura elaboration (morphoenesis)

s rutural reproduction ) T4
(morphostasi
Sourca Marparet S Arier, Raist Socia Trheory,Cambrid Univesity Press 1.995, p. 157
Figure 1.
Dualism between agency and structureis logicallycoupled with some dualism

between themind (subjectivity) This logic,
and the empiricalreality(objectivity).
constantly based on a clear "sense of separation," leads M. Archer to the following
general formula of the "courses of action":
Courses of action are produced throughthe reflexive deliberationsof agents

who subjectivelydeterminetheirpracticalprojects in relationto theirobjective
circumstances.(Archer2003:141)
General Principles of Relationism in Sociology
or "relationalsociology"are used to iden

The labels"relationism,""relationalism,"
tify theories that perceive social structures, if any, as effects of trans-actions between
various social actors (actor * actor ?X social structure, if any). The social universe is
seen as the effect of trans-actions between various and interdependent social actors.
M. Emirbayer (1997) was probably the first to use this label in an explicit way in his
"Manifesto for a Relational Sociology." As he wrote, "relational analysis" studies "dy
namic, unfolding relations" (Emirbayer 1997:281). Generally speaking, themain chal
lenge posed by relational theories is to explain social phenomena without any total or
partial causal relation from social structures to action. As a developing mode of per
ception, relational sociology is still a challenge in itself. It is also challenging an old,
persistent habitus in social science: to see social actions as the effects of social things.

|CIOETY
Source: Elias (1978a:14)
Figure 2.
as
relationalsociologyrejectsvoluntarismand determinism
Like co-determinism,
realistic and acceptable modes of perception. No specific social actor can transform
any social structure according to his/her freewill, but no social actor is determined
by any social structure. In fact, relational sociology ismore "radical" since it denies
the possibilityof any empiricalrelationshipbetween structuresand social actors.
Relational theory studies social structures, if any, but it sees them as more or less
stable effects of trans-actions between interdependent actors. In fact, social structures,
if any, refer to similar and continuous trans-actions, which can be seen from TX to
Ty in specific spaces. Starting from these general ideas, we can identifymore precisely
fivebasic and closelyconnectedprinciplesof relationalsociology.
Principle of Trans-Action. Specific social actions can be understood only as parts

of a chain of trans-actions. In other words, any individual action is always one
actions: the actionA is the
piece of a moving puzzle composed by interdependent
action A only because it is interconnected to the actionB, and vice versa. In this
logic,people are "bonded togetherin dynamicconstellations"(Goudsblom 1977:7).
They make up webs of interdependence of many kinds, like family, social classes,
studytrans
etc. (Elias 1978a:15).Therefore,relationists
states,nations,organizations,
actions rather than self-action or interaction. "Self-action" is related to the notion
of agency in voluntaristic and co-deterministic explanations and to the concept of
social structurein deterministic explanations.In both cases,
and co-deterministic
agency and structures "are viewed as acting under their own powers" (Dewey and
Bentley 1949:108), as if their respective "powers" would be "owned" by the actors
or the structures, or as if their "properties" would be simply intrinsic to the actors
or the structures. In relational thinking, power is the effect of social relations; and
"properties" do not exist outside or prior to social relations. N. Elias's habitus in
the process of civilization (1978b) is a good example of a relational analysis showing
how and why "individual" or "natural" "properties" are habits, which are created
through a long chain of complex trans-actions between various social actors (kings,
nobles,merchants,etc.).These habits are also produced,diffused,appropriated,etc.
through trans-actions between educators and students, parents and children, priests
and believers, writers and readers, and so on. They are not social things that are
A processof socialization
by totallyor partiallydeterminedindividuals.
internalized
results from empirical and complex trans-actions. Habits are more or less stable
depending on trans-actions between involved actors like parents and children, priests

Individuat
e T+ Symbolfora more
or lessunstable
balanceof power
-*, o
OOpen(unattached)
valencies
Source: Elias (1978a:15).
Figure 3.
and believers, and elites and ordinary people. Parents, priests, elites, and so on are
also "socialized" throughthesetrans-actionssince theactors are all interdependent.
The notion of "inter-action"refersto pure,perfectco-deterministic theory.
Here,
"thing is balanced against thing in causal interconnection" (Dewey and Bentley
1949:108). Structuresand agency,for instance,possess intrinsicor a priori prop
force,and so on); theymanifestthemselves
ertiesor powers (ideologies,interests, by
limiting the power of agency (if it is a structure), or by changing the structure (if it
is agency).The formof thesocialworld resultsfromtheirinter-actions.
The notion of "trans-action" is different since it denies that social actors and their
actions can be understoodas preexisting"things"outside social relations.Social
actors and actions are what they are, at some specific time and space, only through
Besides basic and important
empiricalchains of trans-actions. biologicalproperties,
their properties are not intrinsic to their "nature" or just individual. They constantly
change in more or less significant ways through their trans-actions. In this sense,
their properties are social not because they are determined by society, but because
"Individual"propertiescome fromindividualsand
theyoccur throughtrans-actions.
they are developed by them, but only by trans-acting with actors and other parts of
theirenvironment.
actorsare affected
Moreover,we shouldneversay that(interdependent) by initially
structured trans-actions since trans-actions do not exist outside, beside, or prior to
actors who act. Real, empirical structures are real, empirical trans-actions. The fact
that some trans-actions can be memorized and more or less reproduced in similar
ways does not transform real social structures into something other than empirical
trans-actions.
In this way, the principle of trans-action can be seen as the radicalization of the
principleof dualityproposedbyA. Giddens (1984).Relational theorydoes not only
affirm that structures do not exist without agency, and vice versa. It also rejects
the use of any ontological or analytical distinction between structure (more or less
continuous and similar trans-actions) and agency (social action). It is simply illogical
to pretend that trans-actions can exist outside, without, or prior to social actions.
We will see later that an analytical distinction between structure and agency implies
an egocentric perspective of the social universe, which severely limits the potential of
sociologicalimagination.
As far as causal factors are concerned, the concepts of social structure and
agency are neglected in favor of empirical studies of interdependent actors and their

trans-actions. For example, the structure of one language is seen as more or less
continuous similarities in terms of grammatical rules, sounds, words, etc. These con
might seemquite stablefromtheegocentricperspectiveof human
tinuoussimilarities
beings who are condemned to live only several decades in this world. But we can
guess that none of them will be eternal since they are the empirical effects of trans
users (speakers,listeners,
actions between interdependent writers,readers,teachers,
students, specialists, and so on). There is no influence of grammar on any speaker,
but there are conscious or unconscious, hard or soft, noisy or quiet, social relations
betweenvarious users where actorA accepts or not, understandsor not, etc. the
speechof actorB;where actorAuses "old" or "new" words; social relationswhere
actorBignores,accepts,or refusesa newword;where some authoritiestryto preserve
or change some rules,etc.Attempts to explain the relativestabilityof one language
and constraining/enabling
thanksto internalized which totallyor partially
structures,
determinespeeches,come fromsome confusionbetween a structure as a "thing"and
some specificknowledge,understanding, memory,etc. of a language."Individual"
knowledge,understanding, memories,etc.may look similaras if theywould impose
themselves on many individuals in time and space. In fact, they are moving effects of
complexchainsof trans-action. In sum,people are drivenby their"personal"but in
terdependent knowledge,understanding,
(or "trans-acting") memory,etc.when they
talk or write.Habitus are "inter-subjective" and can be studiedas "objects" from
the (egocentric)perspectiveof a researcher.But theyhave no agency since theydo
not existwithout,prior to,or after trans-actions.Habitus are not bridgesbetween
objectifiedstructuresand subjectivepractices.They aremore or lessshared,imposed,
contested,remembered, appropriated,etc. "trans-acting"legaciesof long chains of
trans-action.
Principleof the "Primacyof Process." The socialuniverseshould be depicted "in

dynamic,continuous,and processual terms"(Emirbayer1997:281).We should not
"fall into the trapof process-reduction"(Mennel 1992:256).This process-reduction
happenswhen social processesare transformed into "things,"and when individuals
are separated from the society as if they would be outside, beside, or prior to social
relations.Social phenomenaare fluidandmoving likemovies insteadof being fixed
like pictures. However, and once again, it does not mean that there is no continuity
in thesocial universe.The social universeis fullofmore or lesscontinuousand sim
ilar trans-actions(or social structures)thatwe callmarket,wedding,war, genocide,
racism,exploitation,domination,love,and so on. Their discoveryand explanationis
one of themost important tasks in sociology. But these structures should be studied
as chains of trans-action. In terms of structures, relationists are not looking for the
or figurations
"girdersof thebuilding,"but for"webs of interdependence ofmany
kinds,"that "people make up," and that are "characterized by power balances of
many sorts, such as families, schools, towns, social strata, or states" (Elias 1978a:15).
In thissense,we cannot treatsocieties"as staticgivens" (Goudsblom 1977:7). Figu
rations,or social processes,"are continuallyin flux,undergoingchangesof different
orders somequick and ephemeral,othersslowerbut perhapsmore lasting"(Gouds
blom 1977:6). We always come back to the same general ideas: sociologists should
study interdependent actors and their relations instead of social things and isolated,
individuals.
pre/post-"trans-acting"
Principleof Dereification.Anothermajor task and challengeof relationalsociol

concept,expression,and formof thinking.From
ogy is to get rid of any reifying

a relationalpoint of view, states,social classes, socialmovements,politicalparties,

pressuregroups,nations,firms, cultures,societies,gender,patriarchy,
capitalism,etc.
do not act, think,enable,nor constrainsince theyare neitherpeople nor social
things.They are evolutionarysocial processesmade up by interdependent actors
through their trans-actions (actor *- actor =X nation, social class, social movement,
capitalism,etc.). In the same logic,and once again, thenotion of agencycannot
be seen as an individual "property." It is true that individuals are all different and
theydevelop some knowledge,memory,etc. about "past patternof thoughtand
action" (EmirbayerandMishe 1998:971); theycan also "make practical and nor
mative judgmentsamong alternativepossible trajectories
of action, in responseto
theemergingdemands,dilemmas,and ambiguitiesof presentlyevolvingsituations"
(EmirbayerandMishe 1998:971); and it is also truethattheirknowledge, memory,
expectations, hopes, desires, etc. do not appear and evolve in a social vacuum as var
ious deterministic
and co-deterministictheorieshave repeated.Besides very specific
which are part of thebiological environment
factors, of the "ego" (as defined in
Parsons 1937), other "properties" exist only throughempirical trans-actions.
B. Latour (2005) would probablyagreewith us ifwe say that individuals"trans
act" with other "trans-actors"(individuals,weapons,mountains, and so on); and
thatsociologicallyspeaking,individualsand other "trans-actors"take theirproper
tiesthroughtrans-actions.An individualis a soldierfullof hate,a knifeis a weapon,
and a mountain is a defensive wall or an obstacle, etc. when there is a war. In
anothertrans-action,
thesame individualis a "lovingmachine," themountain a ro
mantic view,and theknifemight become a gift.Even ourmost "personal" thoughts
and habits are linked to trans-actions in one way or another. When we think, alone
inour bedroom,we do itby usingwords, ideas,etc.,which havebeen learned,appro
priated,memorized,forgotten,
adapted,modified,etc. throughspecifictrans-actions.
No action is detached from more or less long chains of trans-actions. There is no
pure "individual"action (or agency)outside,beside,or prior to social relations;and
thereis no "social" outside,beside,or prior to real, specifictrans-actions.
PrincipleofRelationalPerspective.Elias explainedhow "natural" it is forindividuals

to see thesocial universefroman egocentricperspective(see Figure 2):
This egocentricviewof thesocialworld and itssocial "things"fitsverywellwith

voluntarism, determinism,and co-determinism. It "shows the individualperson,
theparticularego, surroundedby social structures," which "are understood to
be objects over and above the individualego." (Elias 1978a:14)
One important goal of relationalsociologyis to replacetheegocentricperspective

for a relationalperspective,which helps us to see what is occurringby studying
trans-actions.
We will see that in the case of M. Archer's "morphogenetic approach," the main
differencebetweenco-determinism and relationalsociology is that the lattertakes
a relationalperspectivefromthebeginningto theend,whereas the formerswitches
froman egocentricone to a relationalone during the demonstration. The same
comment could be made about P. Berger and T. Luckmann's social construction of
realityandmany otherco-deterministic
theories.
Principleof Emergency.The quest forsocial laws is rejectedby relationalsociology

because theevolutionof trans-actionsis undeterminedand unpredictable.Ifmore

or less stable social structures are simply effects of trans-actions, there is no social
law to discover in the social universe. If someone is looking for causal mechanisms
(another persistent habitus in social science), then someone has to write like C. Tilly
that "causal mechanisms" "do not consist of individual mental events, states of con
sciousness, or self-sustaining actions of social systems. They operate in the domains
of collective experience and social interaction" (1998:24). Continuities that we call
processes,etc. are only similarand contin
socialmechanisms,patterns,figurations,
gent trans-actions that happen from Tx to Ty in the spacez. In this sense, everything
is possible in thesocialworld, includingthe totalannihilationof thesocial universe
through aggressive trans-actions based on the large-scale use of nuclear weapons.
The development of a relational sociology is an urgent task because we have the
capacity to destroy ourselves in so many ways through our trans-actions (principle
of emergency). Relational sociology is foundedon the idea that theunderstanding
betweendetached individualsand social thingsdid
or of inter-actions
of self-actions
not and cannot help us to control our trans-actions. We can only hope that a better
understanding of our trans-actions will help us to improve our production of the
social universe.
A Relational Critique of M. Archer's Co-Deterministic Theory
There isno reason tobelievethatco-deterministic disagreewith theprinciple

thinkers
of emergency. M. Archer's theory, for instance, is a critical one that favors emancipa
tion by telling people they are dealing with structures they can transform as "corpo
rate actors." In this sense, this critical theory is an improvement compared to critical
theorieslikestructural-Marxism.
but deterministic understands
M. Archer correctly
that a critical theory cannot explain that people are simply or foremost "bearers" of
structures without destroying its own critical goal and efficiency.At least, social ac
tors have some agency. However, M. Archer also proposes a co-deterministic critical
theory based on realism and dualism because social actors cannot be seen as free
producers. When actors act to reproduce or change some structures, they are always
which impose themselvesupon them.Therefore,themain
embedded in structures,
concern of sociologists is "how structure shape(d) interaction, and in interaction,
in turn re-shape(d) structure" (Archer 2000b:464). We must see an analytical cycle,
which goes from structural conditioning to some form of possible agency where the
actors can change the initial structures (see Figure 1). Analytically speaking at least,
there is no doubt that we are dealing with a clear co-deterministic theory that is very
different from relationism. But what is the best mode of perception?
One Weird and Costly Solution to Avoid Voluntarism. M. Archer is saying that we
must study inter-actions between structures and agency. Relationism opposes the
study of trans-actions and relationists agree with A. King (1999:200) "that the con
cept of structure, as an ontologically prior or autonomous realm, independent at
some point from individual knowledge or activity, emerges as a metaphysical notion,
and is only arrived at through the reification of (interpretative) relations between in
dividuals." So-called "structural conditions are only other people" (King 1999:211).
In her reply to A. King's criticism (1999), M. Archer relied on a Durkheimian
logic. She explained that social structures are (relational) "emergent properties."
Once they are created, they have "the generative capacity to modify the powers
of its constituents in fundamental ways and to exercise causal influences sui generis"
(2000b:466). Therefore,we need a "realist analysis of how structuralemergent

propertiesimpingeupon agents,by genericallyshaping the situationswhich they

confront"(Archer2000b:467). She used theexampleof literacyrates to supporther
point:
My discussionof literacyrateshas to be takenas preciselythat: the influence

which an initialdistribution exertsupon proportionsof thepopulation
of literacy
who have the skills to change it, and the different amount of time which this
distributionalfeatureentailsbeforeilliteracyis eliminated.(Archer2000b:466)
and voluntarism:"In short,
This approachavoids self-action more thandesireplus
knowledgeisneeded to explainchange,itsmagnitudeand speed" (Archer2000b:466).
Fair enough,but thereis nothinghere to justifythenecessityof dualism and its
analyticalseparationbetweenactorsand social structures.
Relationismalso recognizes
that no specific and detached actor can change one structure only on the basis
on his/her desire and knowledge. The main point is that we do not need dualism
(and some form of reification) to explain that actors face real people and other
environmental featurestheydid not choose and design.The notion of trans-action
impliesthat theproductionof theworld is not based on freewill and self-action.
The principleof trans-actionis foundedon the idea thattheproductionof thesocial
world happens throughsocial relationsand in a physicalenvironment.In thissense,
as far as relations between actors are concerned, it "is not hard to grasp the idea
thatwhat we attemptto conceptualizeas social forcesare in fact forcesexertedby
people overone anotherand over themselves"(Elias 1978b:17).A. King was rightto
note that"social conditionsare thusindependent of any individual,as an individual,
but theyare not more than all the individualsconsideredtogetherin theirsocial
relations"(1999:213).We will see laterthatM. Archer reifies"structuralconditions"
when she adopts an egocentricperspective(inT1 and T4 inFigure 1).
The keypoint is thatthereisno need forany co-deterministic approach to under
stand that it ismore difficultto improveliteracyrates in poor countriesthan in a
statewithmany resourceslike theUnited States orGreat Britain.Comparativeand
empiricalstudiesof trans-actions would easily show this typeof difference.More
over,relationismcould also explainhow changingtrans-actions could significantly
improve the rate of literacy in a poor country; and how certain trans-actions can
damage literacyin anothercountryevenwhen "structuralconditions"offerplenty
of resources.In fact,it shows thattrans-actions
may transform useless fea
initially
tures into resources that actors can use to achieve their goals. On the contrary, some
trans-actionsalso transformprevioususefulresourcesintouseless ones.M. Archer's
co-determinism cannot provide this sort of explanation.As preexistingconditions
of action inT1, structures
are definedas having"ontologicalproperties"thataffect
agency before the actors "trans-act" in T2 - T3. It is only after this initial determi
nation thatsome agencybecomes active:
(A) Properties of structures -> Actors X, Y...; (B) Agency of actors X, Y... .
or transformed)
(reproduced propertiesof structures
It seems thatsocial structures
are substantializedsince theyexistbefore-and then
somehowwithout-trans-actions. M. Archer is conscious of thisproblemand she
wants to avoid it.But shealsowants topreservesome formof autonomousproperties
to the structure.She achieves thisparadoxical goal by linkingthe "conditional"
propertiesof the initialstructuresto the inter-actions
of theactors:
There are no constraintsand enablements
per se, thatis as entities.
These are the
potentialcausal powersof structuralemergentproperties,such as distributions,

roles,organisations,or institutions,
and of culturalemergentproperties,such as
propositions,theoriesor doctrines.Yet, to constrainand to enable are transitive
verbs;theyhave to impedeor to facilitatesomething. As with all potentialcausal
powers, theycan remainunexercisedbecause it is a wholly contingent matter
whethertheyare activated.In otherwords, constraintsand enablementsdo not
possess an intrinsiccapacity forconstrainingor enabling in abstraction.For
anything to exert the power of a constraint or an enablement, it has to stand
in a relationship
such that itobstructsor aids theachievementof some specific
agentialenterprise.(Archer2003:5)
Archer agrees thatthe"properties"ofmountains,forexample,depend on relations

betweensocial actors. In relationalwords, itmeans thatsociologicallyspeaking,the
"properties"ofmountains are deeply shaped by some contextualizedtrans-actions
between social actors so deeply shaped that,as sociologists,we can relyon this
formula:
{Trans-actions (sociologically relevant) properties of "things"}
War figuration Mountains as a defensive wall

Market figuration -- Mountains as a tourist attraction
Chess game -> Mountains have no relevant/efficient
"property"
Thus action and its environmentare interconnected.
They "trans-act."But one
problemwith Archer's co-deterministicframeworkis that the recognitionof the
connectionbetween the "conditioningproperties"and the relationscontradictsthe
time sequence that she adopts at the core of her theoretical framework (as seen in
Figure 1). In effect,the co-deterministictheoryofM. Archer should be logically
impossibleto combinewith the idea that the sociologicallyrelevant"properties"of
some parts of theenvironment depend on some trans-actionssince theseproperties
come firstin her theoreticalframework. Any added subtletyor distinctionbetween
the realityand some "analyticalnecessity,"which triesto avoid the initialsubstan
tializationas representedin Figure 1, transforms
a clear theoreticalcore into some
vague and contradictoryexplanationsbased on principlessuch as the "potential
causal powers of structuralemergentproperties"(Archer2003:5). How shouldwe
understand time if T1 is in fact "activated" by T2 - T3? The concept of "potential
causal power" might help us to make sense of this weird time sequence where the
"potential cause" is the effect of its eventual effect.But do we really need to deal with
these types of logical problems only to remember that there is a reality out there;
and that none of us, as specific and abstractly detached actors from an egocentric
choose therealityinwhichwe act?
perspective,
of theSociological Imagination.Like C. W Mills andmany others,
Reformulation M.
Archer explains that we have some agency, but we do not choose the world in which
we use it.Asfaras sociologicalimaginationisconcerned,theeffect
of co-determinism
is limited. We do not want to deny some important discoveries that have been made
by deterministicand co-deterministictheories,butwith themour sociological imag
ination is always restrainedby the effectsof initial"structuralconditions" (class
position, deprivation of "capital," and so on). In this sense, deterministic and co
deterministic theories are usually depressing and fairlywell-known stories to tell to
excluded,oppressed,and exploitedpeople.
On the contrary, by adopting relationism, sociologists put themselves in a situa
tionwhere theirexpertiseon social relationsmight be more usefuland refreshing.

Sociologists can explain, forexample, thatwithmore divisionof labor, the same

people in the same poor environment can increasetheirproductivityin significant
ways nomatterwhat are theinitialstructural conditions.But toprovidethistypeof
explanation, we shouldavoid anyegocentricperspective where individuals(as "egos")
have to face some social thingsthatexistedbeforethem.
In otherwords, sociologyhas a brightfutureifitsucceedsin renewingthereflexiv
ityof social actors. It canmake a marginal contributionto contemporaryreflexivity
if it adopts a mode of perceptionthat fitswell with thisphase of modernity,its
scientific
model, and its individualism.However, thebest gift thatsociologistscan
offerto otheractors is a differentmode of perceptionand thinking. Relational so
ciologycan help us tomove beyond an individualistic worldviewand the sense of
separationthatso many individualssupportwhen theysee themselvesin the social
world. Deterministictheoriescan clearlycontributeto develop or maintain some
formof alienation,ifwe definealienationas "the estrangement of individualsfrom
one another,or froma specificsituationor process" (Scott andMarshall 2005:12).
Co-determinismhas represented an improvement since it usually triesto add one
formor anotherof agency.Butit is stillbased on thissenseof separation, whichmay
lead to alienation.In co-determinism,individualsinter-actwith social structuresthey
did notwant and produced insteadof trans-acting. Generally speaking,relationism
explains that "I" do not control the evolution of any social process, but "I" am part
of someprocessand itsevolutionwith "You," "They,"and so on,which are the so
cial universe. It explains that if "I" and "You" adopt a relational perspective, a new
"We" may realize that we are the producers of the social world for the better or the
worse.At thispoint, (relational)sociological imaginationhas an enormouspoten
tialwe can onlyvaguelyenvision.In thisrespect,theprincipleof emergencyshould
push us to have comparativeand deeper discussionsabout the respective
merits of
co-determinism and relationism.
Reificationand Agency.M. Archer recognizessome formof agency.In this sense,

her co-deterministic theoryimprovesdeterministic explanations.However, this co
deterministicvision of action reifiesagencyas individualproperties.In effect,
when
agency is attached to detached actors, when agency is explained as an intrinsic in
dividualpropertyand comes fromtheadoptionof an egocentricperspective,
agency
This is clearlywhatM. Archer is doingwhen shewrites:
is reified.
is a personal interior
In otherwords, it [subjectivity] with a first-person
property,
subjectiveontology,and with powers thatcan be causallyefficaciousin relation
to himself and to his society. ... These [the properties of the social world] are
prior to his conceivingof a course of action, relatively
temporally autonomous
from how he takes them to be, but can causally influence the achievement of his
themor advancingthem.(Archer2003:14)
plans by frustrating
In reality,
notions such as agency,will, and freedomare empiricaleffects
of social
processes.And thereis no "no-social-land,"no space in the social universe,where
theactor ceases to be embedded in trans-actions.As A. Giddens (1984:9)wrote:
Action is a continuousprocess, a flow,inwhich reflexive

monitoringwhich
the individual maintains is fundamental to the control of the body that actors
ordinarilysustainthroughouttheirday-to-daylives.

Pure conceptualinventions and distinctions(structure/agency,

micro/meso/macro,
etc.) should not be seen as real things.
As J.Alexander said about thedistinction
betweenmicro- andmacrophenomena,theyare simplyshapedby theobserver:
The termsmicro and macro are completelyrelativistic. What ismacro at one

levelwill be micro at another.... Equally significant,
thereare levelsof analysis
"larger" than thatof individualinteraction forexample, the levelof institu
tionalexchange-which themselves can be viewedas micro processesrelativeto
structures and processesof still largerscope. (Alexander1988:303-04)
Structures,levels,and other similarconceptsdo not referto thingsthatexistout

side of individualtrans-actions.There is nothingbut various trans-actions.
Actors
always and constantlythinkand act within the socialworld. Any "agentialprop
erty"existsonly throughtrans-actions because theyare developed not by isolated
individuals,but by social actorswho existonly throughtrans-actions.There is no
space or time for pure Hegelian spirits or Cartesian minds in the social universe. Our
reflexivityisnot a detachedone; it is the real,empirical,and concretereflexivity
of
a social actor,of someonewho livesonly in theworld, onlythroughtheworld even
when someone thinksor talks to himselfor herself.
Of course,people have the capacity to have "internalconversations"and think
about their world, theirgoals, and theirfutureactions.These "conversations"
matter
a lot. But actors do not think or talk to themselves in a social/physical vacuum
frozen in time.It is not because a sociologistcan focus his or her attentionon
some individualsand their"internalconversations"thattheycan be detached from
theirtrans-actions.As N. Elias (1978b) showed by insistingon the emergenceof
habitus,very "personal" actions like tastes,perceptions,reactions,evaluations,and
so on are closely connected to the evolutionof long chains of trans-actions. The
evolutionof thesechainsproducesmoving habitus thatare part of themind and the
flesh of the individuals. In this sense, if individuals exist as biological entities, social
actorsneverexistoutsideof the social processes inwhich theytrans-act. Actors are
alwaysconnected to theevolutionof some empiricalsocial processes.They do not
existoutside,before,or afterthem.There isno agencyfloatingacross the sky.Even
when theytalk to themselves about theirprojects,jobs, couples,etc., actors are not
Hegelian spiritsthattransform a preexisting
world. Projects,goals,wishes, identities,
emotions,mobilization of resources,evaluations,etc. evolve throughthe constant
social and physicalexistenceof theactors.
M. Archerwould probablyrejectthistypeof relationalexplanationby sayingthat
it leads to an oversocialization
of theactor.Itwould be anotherformof "conflation."
As we explainedbefore,she insistsinher criticismagainstG. H. Mead (Archer2003)
that the mind cannot be constantly infiltrated by the "Me" and the "Generalized
Other." The "I" has to be independent in the "internal conversations" ifwe want
to preserveagency.Again, the realitydoes not depend on epistemologicalneeds or
discussions.If we accept the idea that the mind of the actor is constantly in touch
with other actors in one way or another, then there is no possible pure "I." Are we
going back to some form of determinism by saying this?The answer is "yes" only if,a
priori,we oppose theindividualto thesocietyaccordingto an egocentricand dualistic
perspective of the social universe. In this logic of action, where the structure precedes
and initially determines the actor, it seems that we need an independent agency, a
substantializedagency,to explainhow specificand analytically
detached"agents"can
change some initialstructuralconditions.But the answer is "no" ifwe simplytry

to understand how trans-actions (actor e-* actor) evolve in a physical environment.

Then,we do not need thenotionof agency.
We need to studyeffectsof trans-actions.
We need complexand empiricalstudiesof trans-actionsto see and understandthe
fluiddynamicsof interdependentpeople who create theirsocial universe through
theirconstanttransactions.
The Fluidityof Social Processes.There is no need to finda way to protectpure

individual"properties"isolated in a temporarystop in action (situatedin between
TI and T2 T3), where theworld is suspendedbeforedetached actorsmake new
moves and are immersedin theworld again. There is no need for any artificial
(or "analytical")broken sequenceof inter-actions betweenunits, levels,entities,or
"substances"such as structures
and agency.Any "structure"referssimplyto specific
transactionsthatsharesome similaritiesand thataremore or lessreproducedthrough
time and space. In this sense, social structures are fixed only in our imagination or
on paper. In reality,"structures"
are always inmotion. In thisrespect,
we are dealing
with fluidsocial processesmore thanfixedsocial structures.
Many of theseprocesses
may seem to be stableand simplyreproducedbecause some transactionsaremore
may createan illusion the illusion
or lesscontinuousand similar.These similarities
of a unity, as if a society or a family would have a fixed structure like a building. In
fact, a society, a family, or a culture is always a "continuity of changes":
inmany processesof change theunityisnot due to any substancewhich remains

unchangedthroughouttheprocess,but to thecontinuity withwhich one change
emerges from another in an unbroken sequence. Take the example of a specific
society,theNetherlands in the fifteenth
and twentieth
centuries-what links
them to each other is not so much any core which remains unchanged but the
continuityof changeswith which the twentieth
centurysocietyemergedfrom
that of the fifteenth century, reinforced by the fact that it is a remembered
(N. Elias, quoted byMennel 1989:256)
continuity.
Of course, there is a real, objective past, and actors "trans-act" in an environment

theydo not choose.But sociologicallyspeaking,one real,objectiverealityat TX is
composed and made up by continuingtransactions, not by preexistingstructures.
And once again, the preexisting reality of a trans-action is not so important socio
logically speaking. Let's use one last example. M. Archer ismore or less saying that
a military conquest that happened 200 years ago is not chosen by any present actors
in a societytoday,and that thisconquest createdsome structuresthatconstrainor
enable some actions after they were created. This is a truism that is relevant only
if some voluntaristicthinkers pretendthat individualschoose theirsocial universe.
(Whereare thesethinkersin social science?)However,sociologicallyspeaking,as far
as social processes are concerned,the importantpoint is thatno social structure,
which seems to come simply or directly "from the past," has any autonomy and
powerof itsown-even "conditional"ones. ImaginethatDutch and Protestantac
torsaconquered some Catholic and French actorsb200 years ago in one society.
Today, thisconquesthas no empiricaleffecton thesesocial processes if theactors
a and b use English as a common language, and if exploitation and domination
but fullof class identi
happen in a freemarket,which is blind to ethnicdifferences
ties, and if the objective, real past is not remembered, appropriated, or used in one
way or another in ongoing transactions. It is possible to think that the evolution
of certainsocial processesbased on specificideologies,emotions,mobilizationsof

resource,strategies,etc. has transformed thisconquest into an historicalfactwith

no significantsocial effect.It exists as "facts" inmuseums or books but not in
transactionsin any significant way.On theotherhand, if the actorsahave wished
and succeeded to preservesocial processesbased on ethnic/racist dominationand
exploitationto the detrimentof the actorsb, then the conquest can be used as a
constrainingor an enabling resourceby some of the actorsa and/or the actorsb
in theirattemptsto preserveor transformthisfiguration. Through theirtransac
tions, thispast as it is used, appropriated,etc. matters a lot but not the past
in itself.
In sum, sociologydoes not needmore epistemologicaldiscussionsabout the links
betweensocial structureand agency. We need concepts thatcan help us to see the
evolutionof social processes in a complexsocial universe.
We need researchon what
are themain interconnected dimensionsof empiricaltransactions. And we also have
to developmethodological tools to deal with thehigh complexityof theseempirical
chains of transactions. There is a lot of work to do; a lot of empirical and conceptual
work. Many relationists have already started thiswork inwhat seems to be, or could
become,a new post co-deterministic era in social science.In thisnew era, complex
betweenrealpeople are finallybecoming,or could finallybecome,
social transactions
themain focusof researchin sociology if,and only if,co-determinism becomes one
phase in theevolutionof sociology.
"Analytical"
Dualism and itsContradictions.In conclusion,principlesof trans-action,
of primacyof process,and of relationalperspectiveexplicitlyimplythatsocial pro
cesses are not produced by any specific actors but by transactions. So, why do we
need co-determinismconsideringthehigh costs associatedwith it?More precisely,
why shouldwe take the riskof reifyingsocial structures
by separatingthemfrom
theirinterdependent
producers?Why shouldwe restrictthepotentialof sociological
imaginationto some "structured
agency"and theegocentricperspectivesof "I" and
"You"? Should we not talk about "We" as interdependent producers of more or less
stable social processes?Why shouldwe adopt this strangeepistemologicalposture
that obliges us to transform processes in motion into fixed pictures and miss the
of social processes?These questionsbringus back to the ad hoc argument
fluidity
that M. Archer's dualism is just an analytical tool. M. Archer is worth quoting at
lengthhere:
It is analyticalbecause it sees greatutilityindifferentiating

the two in order to
examinetheirinterplay, something which isor particularimportanceto practical
analystsof society.
... there is never a moment

at which both structure and agency are not jointly in
play. As far as the basic scheme is concerned, its phases of "Structural Condi
tioning" -> "Social Interaction" -* "Structural Elaboration" are ones inwhich
"all three lines are in fact continuous, the analytical element consists only in
breakingup the flowsinto intervalsdeterminedby theproblem inhand: given
any problem and accompanying periodization, the projection of the three lines
forwards and backwards would connect up with the anterior and posterior mor
phogeneticcycles"...Whatmakes analyticaldifferentiation
possible are the two
simplepropositions:thatstructure
necessarilypost-datestheseactions... ,which
of course is precisely what practising sociologists want to examine in various
fields. There is no philosophical dualism because (a) structures are only held

to emergefromthe activitiesof people, and because (b) structures only exert

any effectwhen mediated throughthe activitiesof people. Structuresare ever
and neverreifiedentitiesexisting
relationalemergents without social interaction:
theconversewould be tenetsof dualism. (Archer2000b:465)
Even ifwe proceed to some hermeneuticreadingofM. Archer'sworks,her "an

alyticaldualism" is difficultto buy. It seemsconfusedand fullof contradictions.If
social structures"are ever relationalemergents,"thenwhy shouldwe studysome
thingelse thanempiricaltransactions? What is theutilityof a theoreticalframework
based on the studyof interactions betweenagencyand structures? Once again, if
structures are transactions (in T1), how can they influence... transactions (in T2 _
T3)?M. Archerpretendsthatthereisno problemsincestructures are not causes and
effectsat thesame time.But theproblem is thather utilizationof timemakes sense
only because she constantlyswitchesfroman egocentricto a relationalperspective.
When T1 is related to T2 - T3, structures are seen as social things. It makes sense
only because she uses an egocentricperspective,
which showshow structuresshape
specificactors.During T2 - T3, structuresare definedas social relationsby using
And fromT2 T3 to T4, structures
a relationalperspective. are seen as effectsof
social relationsaccording to a relational In
perspective. thiscycle,T4 becomes the
nextT' and itannounces thereturnof the initialegocentricperspective.This flexible
and relativistic approach might be useful to reply to some critiques, but it is unac
ceptablein itself-especiallyfora realistsocial scientist!If social sciencehas tomake
sensemore thancreatingconfusion,thenatureof thingsshouldnot depend on the
perspectiveadopted by thesocial scientist,especiallyif thisperspectiveis constantly
changing.
The good news is thatwhen we put the theoryofM. Archer into itshistorical
a significant
and dialogical context,it represents contributionto sociology.It shows
the limits of co-determinism and the need for a shift toward relationism. Maybe the
most important pointwe shouldkeep inmind is thatM. Archerpartiallyadopts the
principleof dereificationlikeany relationalsociologist:in reality,social structures
can only be empirical transactions. This is why her dualism is only an "analytical"
one. In the same vein, her attempt to avoid reification obliges her to partially move
toward the principles of trans-action, of the primacy of process, and of relational
perspective. At the end of the day, there is no social thing when M. Archer talks
about the social world as it is in reality. It is all about transactions. Therefore, the
conclusion should be that we have to fullymove beyond the study of inter-actions
betweenstructure
and agency.
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Relational Thinking: A Critique of Co-Deterministic Theories of Structure and Agency

Author(s): François Dépelteau

This content downloaded from 84.240.10.251 on Thu, 1 May 2014 03:30:32 AM

This article presents a relational criticism of the "morphogenetic theory" of

Sociologyhas been stronglyinfluenced by twomodes of perceptionof thesocialuni

*Addresscorrespondenceto:FrancoisDepelteau,Departmentof Sociology,LaurentianUniversity, Sud

Sociological Theory 26:1 March 2008

This content downloaded from 84.240.10.251 on Thu, 1 May 2014 03:30:32 AM

"structuringstructured" (P. Bourdieu 1990b) and the "principle of duality"

TWO MODES OF PERCEPTION OF THE SOCIAL UNIVERSE

This content downloaded from 84.240.10.251 on Thu, 1 May 2014 03:30:32 AM

C. W Mills's "sociological imagination"is one good example. In the late 1950s,

[T'] actorA e actorB =X structureX

P. Bourdieuwas anothercontemporary who contributedto thedevelop

This content downloaded from 84.240.10.251 on Thu, 1 May 2014 03:30:32 AM

action throughthenotionsof fields,capitals,social classes,and habitus.Moreover, in

The conditioningsassociatedwith a particularclass of conditionsof existence

A. Giddens (1984) also proposed his typeof co-deterministic He rejected

Co-Determinism as a Convenient Mode of Perception inModernity

According toC. W Mills, P. Bergerand T. Luckmann,A. Giddens,M. Archer,and

This content downloaded from 84.240.10.251 on Thu, 1 May 2014 03:30:32 AM

fromsome freedomand criticalreflexivity. In thisrespect,modern thinking cannot

The answeris thatto concentrate

This content downloaded from 84.240.10.251 on Thu, 1 May 2014 03:30:32 AM

In brief,epistemologicallyand culturallyspeaking, realism,dualism, and co

A RELATIONAL CRITICISM OF THE "MORPHOGENETIC APPROACH"

Rejectionof "Conflations."Archercriticizes most of thewell-knownpreexistingsocial

Basicallyconflationists natureof social realityby denyingthat

Methodological individualism,for instance,denies that social systems(or social

Rejection of the "Duality" of Structure. There is a third form of conflation called

This content downloaded from 84.240.10.251 on Thu, 1 May 2014 03:30:32 AM

of the "centralconflation"approach is the "structurationtheory"of A. Giddens

As mutuallyconstitutive,the twoelementscannotbe untiedand therefore their

Their [A.Giddens and P. Bourdieu] respectiveapproaches to human practices

AnalyticalDualism, Time, and CorporateActors.M. Archer defendsa principleshe

This content downloaded from 84.240.10.251 on Thu, 1 May 2014 03:30:32 AM

threeor foursteps:structural conditioning(T'), socioculturalinter(-)action

The "InternalConversations."The mediation between social structuresand agency

Mead is a radical anti-subjectivist. Because to him, there can be no separate self

This content downloaded from 84.240.10.251 on Thu, 1 May 2014 03:30:32 AM

Sourcea Roy Btashakar Reclaning Heay Versa,, Landan, 1989, pk 94

Figrr l I The plac of condiritoitg in Bhasars trnsformatzona

structura elaboration (morphoenesis)

Dualism between agency and structureis logicallycoupled with some dualism

Courses of action are produced throughthe reflexive deliberationsof agents

General Principles of Relationism in Sociology

or "relationalsociology"are used to iden

This content downloaded from 84.240.10.251 on Thu, 1 May 2014 03:30:32 AM

Source: Elias (1978a:14)

Principle of Trans-Action. Specific social actions can be understood only as parts

This content downloaded from 84.240.10.251 on Thu, 1 May 2014 03:30:32 AM

Source: Elias (1978a:15).

This content downloaded from 84.240.10.251 on Thu, 1 May 2014 03:30:32 AM

Principleof the "Primacyof Process." The socialuniverseshould be depicted "in

Principleof Dereification.Anothermajor task and challengeof relationalsociol

This content downloaded from 84.240.10.251 on Thu, 1 May 2014 03:30:32 AM

a relationalpoint of view, states,social classes, socialmovements,politicalparties,

PrincipleofRelationalPerspective.Elias explainedhow "natural" it is forindividuals

This egocentricviewof thesocialworld and itssocial "things"fitsverywellwith

One important goal of relationalsociologyis to replacetheegocentricperspective

Principleof Emergency.The quest forsocial laws is rejectedby relationalsociology

This content downloaded from 84.240.10.251 on Thu, 1 May 2014 03:30:32 AM

A Relational Critique of M. Archer's Co-Deterministic Theory