-----~-------- .

-~

THE MEANING OF
i

"
TEN ~u·S,. ..AND" ,,·,M··OOD·S
·~u· f'; , ' -. - ,";.' . ',. •

[THE TEXT OFKA:Ul~I)ABHATTA'S

LAKiiRiiRTHANIRIYAYA
WITH INTRODUCTION, ENGLISH TRANSLATION AND
EXPLANATORY NOTES]

by
j
JAYASHREE A. GUNE
Assistant Editor, Sanskrit Dictionary,

r Deccan College, Pune

.j'
~.
I
I

".','
)

';

I'UNE
!1978
 ! :.

Code No.: M:-183· : : '.

First iEdition: 750 coPies: March 1978

,
I
-f
-. ··c'. I

All Rights Reserved

Professor
S. D .
.Joshi

Printed by M. S. Latkar at SMS LetterPr'iSs,' i29!A-2 Chiplunkar Road

Erandawana, Prine· ·411 004.
Published by Dr. A. M. Ghatage;:· Dir.ector, Deccan College Postgraduatl'
and Research In~titute,
, Pune 411 006.

-_...
 ---------------~ ~~---~~

'." ,

'8

To

Professor . Professor Doctor

S. D. George Vijayendra
Joshi Cardona Pratap

lunkar Road

Postgraduatl'

i
L
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - ------------------------------------
 FOREWORD

Works on Sanskrit grammar deal with the mechanism of

linguistic expression ill. a synchronic manner with passing references
to historical and dialectal variations and also with the nature of the
semantic concepts associated with the linguistic elements, giving rise
to what is generally called the philosophy of grammar. The extreme
brevity of Pal)ini's Siitras makes it hard to know what views'he held
on the semantic problems involved in his analysis. But discussion
011 these are seen in ample ineasurein the Varttikasof K.atyayana, '
the Mahabha~ya of Pata:ftjaliand above all in' the Vakyapadiya of
Bhartrhari. This 'tradition, of' dealing witli both the aspects of
language is continued upto the very end but with varying emphasis
on one or the other aspect, which has 'given rise to 'two types of
grammatical works in Sanskrit. The VaiY'akaral).abhi1~a!.la of
KaUl).9abha~ta primarily devotes itseif to the semantie problems in-
• I,
volved in the meanings of 'grammatical elements and categories. 'As'
a re.qult of it; 'it comes in contact with similar-views of other philo-
sophical systems of· India, resulting irito a lively polemic dialogue
with' them, leading to a further refinement of the coiicepts involved
to an extraordinary degree with the help of the terminology of the
Navyanyaya, ' " ,
Translating and explaining a work of this·type is no easy task.
It demands on the part of the translator not only a deep knowledge
of the subject in hand but an equally good knowledge of other systems '
~ ~;
",
of ihought with which the polemics is carried on. In addition, the
translator 'must. ,possess' ali unusual ability to sort out the various
ideas inextricably mixedilp·in the dis~ussion and a facility to explain
them in, a manner so as to make· it' understandable and digestible to a
modern reader. ,In translating and annotating the chapter on ,the
lakarartha of the Vaiy;akaraDabhii~aQ.a Dr. Jayashree A. Gune has
done this arduous work remarkably well and has thus produced a
book whkhis not onlysystetnatic and informative but also persuas\ve
and above all pleasant to read. This she has been able to do by
separating the problems of general interest in the form of an introduc"
tion from' the details and technicalities which are treated fully in the,
 succeed and the s;
and krtisadhyatv
notes on the various sections of the book in which it has been intelli-
gently divided afresh. The reading
To a modern linguist what appeals most are the basic semantic il ing and pleasant
studies on the 01
problems more than the clever use of a methodology current in earlier Ii
days' and the arguments based on views then current. In'the field material is avail a
:1
of explanation, if
of Sanskrit tenses and moods two such problems stand out clearly,
to compress the
the concept of time or tense and the modality
. of vidh'i ,or
. Iili, the exact
limitations put 0
significance of which is as much relevant to the present_day thought
the reader of sorr
as it was. to the ancient grammarians and philosophers, More than
to be printedha!
the systematic explanation of the grammatical forms in wl)ich they
indulgence of tht
excel, what IS more pertinent to us is their attitude towards language
and the daring they show in dealing. with the exact relation between
the lhlguistic expression and the. reality of experience as they. COIl-
ceived. it. As such, no demarcation is made between linguistic mean-
ing and' semantic level and the writers have boldly accepted the result-
ing problems and have attempted solutions some of which are accept-
able even today. One cannot but come to the same conclusion as
the author, that time is not much different from our ideas of the
occurrence of events, a view which .coD;les close to the attitude of. a
modern philosopher like Bergson. Such an attitude alone is likely
. to explain satisfactorily the' usual gnimmatical categories of tense
based on cOnuTIon sense and daily usage. The analysis of the mean-
ing of lin is remarkable in its subtility and its implications to such
philosophical and pragmatic systems as Nyliya and MimlitpSli. One
only wishes that the attempt to explain them - and the author has
done an excellent job in clarifying them-' should have gone a step
further by classifying and correlating them with the 'motives of
action', which are psychological like i$tasiidhanatva, circumstantial
like krtisiidltyatva or pragmatic like blalavadani$tiinanubandhitva and
their role in action. The difficulty which is felt by all the schools in
this regard is probably due to their insistance on having only ac,ingle
motive of one type or the other. Some new light can be thrown on
it by bringing in consideration of the ·historical development of the'
meanings of the lin forms of'Sanskrit and Greek. Of the. three uses
to which they .are put, optativus, potentiaJls arid prescription, the
a
hist one is of later' origin and has probably developed' from either
ofnie two,which are independent or each other $rid of.equal anti-
quity. Air attempt to derive one from: the other is not likely to
 - - - - _ . _ .. -

succeed and the same holds good for the two notions of i$tasiidhan.atva
and krtisiidhyatva.
las been intelli-
The reading of this monograph, besides being a thought-provok-
ing and pleasant experience, only whets one's desire to expect similar
basic semantic
studies on the other aspects of, Sanskrit semantics for which ample
lIrrent in earlier
material is available. I should like to conclude with two more points
.t. In the field
of explanation, if not of justification. At my request the author had
md out clearly,
to compress the explanations to the maximum extent because of the
or Iili, the exact
limitations put on the number of pages, which may have deprived
:nt-day thought
the reader of some nicer points and the hurry in which the work had
:rs. More than
to be printed has caused some insignificant misprints for which the
; in w!).ich they
indulgence of the reader is solicited .
•wards language
'elation between
:e as they COll-
linguistic mean-
epted the result-
to
hieh are aeeept-
ie conclusion as
·ur ideas of the
le attitude of a
! alone is likely
~gories .of tense
sis of the mean-
ications to such
Mimarpsa. One
I the author has
ave gone a st~p
the 'motives of
I, circumstantial 's
lubandhitva and
tllthe schools in
ing only a single
III be thrown on
relopment of the
)f the. three uses
prescription, the '.'
)pedfrom either
ld of. equal anti-
is not likely to
 This book d
the ten sets of ,
Here I must em)
distinction betw{
which was not dl
Grammarians an
New (navya) G
Ritualists etc. ar
scholar.
Considerable
works are appea
work has been de
successors who a
Nyaya and Mimi
sian and therefon
who have not stu
wiII be of some 1
nin).aya, which di:
Mimaqlsa, and {
opinions of some
suffixes, is very i
I am thankf1
authorities of th
of this work
I wish to e:
the Department
has been very ge
word of an earli{
suggestions.
I am also ~
of Sanskrit, Unb
field and has gil

_.. - ........
 -----~-~---

j
?
PREFACE

This book discusses the meanings of the lakiiras (I-members),

the ten sets of verbal endings representing the tenses and moods.
Here I must emphasize that R1Wihi and his followers make a ~c1ear
distinction between forms - even abstract lakiira - and meanings
which was not done in the West. Semantic theories of the Indian
Grammarians and their development in the later schools of the
New (navya) Grammarians, as well as the Neologicians arid the
Ritualists etc. are therefore of tremendous interest to the modern
scholar.
Considerable work has been done on Ral.lini and many new
works are appearing on Patafijali and Bhartrhari. But not much
work has been done on the theories of meaning propounded by their
successors who as a help in their interaction with the schools of
Nyaya and Mimaqlsa have adopted thenavyanyiiya style of expres-
sion and therefore have remained inaccessible to students of grammar
who have not studied Nyaya. The present monograph, it is hoped,
.will be of some help in tbis direction. Kaun.(l<ibha~~a's Lakar,artha-
nirl.laya, which discusses the semantic theories of the schools of Nyaya,
Mimaqlsa, and of course Vyakaral)a, while also bringing in the
opinions of some Vedanta writers, concerning the tense and mood
suffixes, is very important from this standpoint.
I am thankful to the Director, Prof. A, M. Ghatage and to the
/. authorities of the Deccan College for undertaking the publication
of this work.
I wish to express my gratitude to Prof. George Cardona of
the Department of Linguistics, University of Pennsylvania, who
has been very generous with his help and has gone through every
word of an earlier draft and made many valuable and constructive
'I. suggestions.
I am also grateful to Prof. S. D. Joshi, of the D~partment
of Sanskrit, University of Poona, who first introduced me to this
field and has giv·en me constant help and encouragement.

.- ~- ---.-- ~- .
 I would also like to thank : - "i,
Prof. Ludo Rocher of the Department of Oriental Studies, Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania, who has .alwaysbeen encouraging; f1
Prof. C. G. Kashikar and Pandit Shrinivasasastri whom I con- Page Line
sulted on various maitters concerning Srauta and. Nyaya. res~ctively
with great profit; . . .. 17 8 ST'
My colleague, Shri. D. B. Polkam, who was a great help in
24 31 *.
proof-reading and preparing the· index; 26 n ,ab
Dr.. Vijayendra Pratap, Dr. V. W. Paranjape, Pandit. N. M. 29 5 3lT
Chirputkar and many other coJIeagues and friends who also helped 30 38 "p{c
. me in various ways; 34 12 an
Shri. M. S. Latkar of SMS Letter Press, who has been very 37 37 thi
co-operaitve throughout in spite of the very short time available 38 4 ha-
for printing.
42 28 ree
]AYASHREE GUNE 47 22 imi
47. 26 . prg
47 29 iini
49 4 Ka
50 24 ind
..
56 27 ·m:
~

67 27 lA~
68 10 hOD
74 37 acc!
75 4 <rr~

79 4 .icfcr.
8i 32 W-ir
95 32 abt~
96 20 bet
101 32 lj~

106 1 prec
Studies, U niver- ERRATA
:ing';
ri whom I con- Page Line . For, Read
iya respectively
17 8 sr<;fi'l't'l
I great help in 24 31 **·*jiHibhava * **ji1iinabhava
26 ·11 ,abidhii abhidhii
Pandit N. M. 29 5 srT~IW!<iT~"'l \UJ<i:cr ••• sr~+rl'1<ilfk"Hl~~J<i:cr•••
Iho also helped 30 38 . Fr-o<ct 'PT>{,;;t .'
34 12 . anekathakatva anekarthakatva
has been very 37 37 thin . this
time available 38 4 hat that
42 28 reconniling reconciling
SHREE GUNE 47 22 imitor limitor
47 26 prgtiyogita .. '. pratiyogita ...
47 29 iitlited Umited
49 4 Kau~abhatta KaU!):c;labhatta
50 24 indivisual' individual
56 27 1l1<:'Iltfflll{ m<:'IT~l\l
67 27 TAT llT
68 10 housand thousand
74 37 accusatice accusative
75 4 1fIt<! ~c<rTartt 1fI,~~~ijT~rtt:; ., . .
79 4 ~cF! 'Wr#r . -,,~

8i 32 ~1o'11<'r W1JOl!lQ{
:'.'.

95 32 abtained _obtained
96 20 be specifically be specifically be
101 32 '1W1~~ iij '" '1q;ii:q 1'.(
106 1 preceds preredes

t H' t
 Page Line For Read

109 3 anvayitavaccheka anvayitiivacchedaka

1I2 12 sakyatavaccheka sakyatavacchedaka Foreword
114 10 ~'il<!mlif'<!" l;'I<f<!T'i!rt<9~Cf Preface
116 26 <!l'if.1l1fiRiT <!l'ilrtl1G1fq I
I Table of Contents
127 17 Clll:rtm'ilTrtT?!l!};CfRl'lRfd t1G.'rtf+l'i!Trtl?!l~Gf~RRr
1 Introduction
129 37 belong Ix!longs
[A] lakiirWz
130 32 <ftfaIDi'lrt l;'Ill'IiTii'r <J<!IRlIDi'lrt l;'I.rifiT111
[B] Is 'timE
138 13 Cll;'ill!fcr"F'il'fiClT<! t1~IlRr<r;:'il'liQl<!T [C] Two pr
141 5 sabdakJu:t<;la sabdakha:I).<;la [D] The M
148 19 ~ ~ [E] The Ny
I.
! [F] The Bh
153 29 . ~?llg'iT~rtFJ:. ~~<!~1'l:.
[G] The Pr~
154 34 llT<:~Ur ~,~Ur
[H] The vie'
155. 3 Jyotf~tma ]yotil?toma r 1] Refutati
156 2 inlination. inclination ilft,Gsii .
. 160 . 13 <!T~,\ <!T~TG:
. [J J Some p:
'. , ilftasii,
175 13 mw-r.'lJfT~ll:I1S[ I 111~Ur~lq- [K] Analysis
179 15 m·gl1~m . m'~~fQ nasti G
[L] The aut!
.).... [M] The Lak
Text, Translation ar
." Section 1.'['
II. 11
III II
"
. -L.. :
IV II
"
"
V [e
VI l}
f " VII G
"
Bibliography
Index

I
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 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Foreword
Preface

Table of Contents
Introduction 1--50
[A) lakiirfilJ, '[-members' 1
[B) Is 'time' a denoted meaning of I-members? .. 5
[C] Two problems about vartamiinatvta 12
- [D) The Meaning of lIN 16
[E) The. Nyaya view 21
[F) The Bhana Mimarp.sa view 25
[G) The PrabMkara view 29
[H) The view of KaUQcc;labhatta 32
[I] Refutation of the opponents of the
. i!i(!Gsiidhanatva view . 36
. [J J' _Some problems in -accepting the
i:j(asiidhanatva view 41
[K] Analysis of the sentences kambugriviidimiin
nas'ti and svargakiimo jyoti§iomena yajeta .. 45
[L] The authors 48
1M] -The Lakarnrthanil.1l)aya 49"_
Text, Translation and Notes . 51,-203' . .. .
~

SeCtion. I. lAT. . .. ".,:, .... ' ".$1, ". ,.,. -""

,) II. lIT . . "--. . \«'.:' 67.•. · '. ·5i-
~II IUT aridl1!-T ..... 76.
" . IV lET (lIiir) . . '78' .
~

" V lOT 197

"
VI lAiv, lIN, IUN.and 11!-N 198
" VII General ·201'
"
Bibliography 204-,.214
Index 213-216

•
 INTRODUCTION

[A] lakariil; 'I-members'

[A-I] According to the Grammarians, it is the sentence that
is the basic indivisible lingui~tic unit and that alone has real
existence. Individual words and their meanings are extracted
(apoddhrta) from the sentence and the sentence meaning, and nave
only a relative reality. As opposed. to the sentence meaning, which
is fixed in character (sthitalak'$aiJa), the extracted meaning is not
definite, and thus can change according to the way the sentence is
analysed, Grammatical. analysis can always. be done.in different
ways. Thus the famous example is thefQrm asti which has been
analysed by Pa1).ini into the component parts as + 'Ii, whereas other'
grammarians divided it as follows: a + s + ii. The method used
for thus extracting individual word meanings, and at a further level,
from these, the meanings of the bases and the affixes, is called
\ iiviipodviipa 'insertion and extraction', or anvaya 'concurrent occu-
rrence' and. vyati"eka 'concurrent non-occurrence'. The way this
j, method works has been explained by Patafijali in his Bhli.$ya on
Vt. 9 ad P. 1.2.45. (M.B. vol. 1, p. 219). He takes the example
1)rksal; 'a tree', and Vrk$au 'two trees'. In this pair, we find one
j agreement in meaning, and one contrast: singularity and duality.
~ In the utterence itself also there is agreement in the expression Vrk$a
and contrast in the expressions l; and au. The principle to be fol-
lowed in this case according to Patafijali is that common meaning
is connected with the common part in the utterence, whereas the
) difference' in meaning is connected with the difference in expression.
Thus the meaning 'tree' should be connected with the partvrk$fl,
and the meaning difference singularity and duality is to be connected
with the different expressions l; and au. For grammatical analysis,
the reality of these units has to be assumed, though they have .no
place in actual communication level.
The Mlm~sakas and the Naiyayikas however, do accept the
reality of individual words. The Ritualists, for interpreting the Vedic
sentences, and the Logicians, because precise and exact expression
is important for them, also felt the need for discussing the meaning
of the sentence, and the inflected' words (padas) that form a part

L
 2 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS INTRODUCTION

of it, and the bases and suffixes that fonn the inflected words. Ac- placement has tt
cording to the particular bias of the..oe different schools, their theories Just the introdt
differed, and thus there is a great deal of controversy about the mean- Thus KaUlJ~abl:
ing of all these parts of a sentence. Kaui,JJc;iabhatta's Lakiiriirtha-
'Q;'Iil'l: >!~ 'Q;~
nir,I,laya, translated here, is devoted to a detailed analysis of these
theories of meaning concerning the I-members, i.e., the ten sets of denotative funct
verbal endings representing tenses and modalities. of conveying a
(prrakalp- ) to ,
[A-2]lakiiralJ 'I-members' are the ten Pa:Q.inian symbols:
(k,aipita, assum
IAT, lIT, IUT, llq, lET, lOT, lAN, lIN, IUN, and IJ]N, used in
grammar. These endings do not occur in actual utterances. They I-members are ir
(karman),' and:
belong to Par;tini's metalanguage. The endings actually used are
ti (third person singular present), t (third person sinl1;ttlar imper- Thus it is (
fect) etc. But, for grammatical purposes, these are considered to be to denote a mean
the replacements (iideStis) of the I-members. Thus all the verbal assumed to exist
endings are subsumed under the single symbol I, to which J""al).ini Grammarians. 1
assigns the general meanings kartr 'agent', karnzan 'object', and such as P. IlIA
bhiiva 'action', by P. III.4.69 lalJ karma1ji ca bhiive ciikarmukebhyal} having the deno
[Z- (members are introduced after a verbai root, when) karman taking recour~e
'object', (or kart! 'agent' is to be denoted); and if (the verb is) ments on it" sur
intransitive, (when) bhiiva 'action' (is to be denoted)] . The early L
[A-3] Ten separate members aredistiriguished by the use of ' ingto them, the
markers. The function of I is to group toget.her all' these, different placements like .
'endings. 'The markers T and N distinguish primary endings from mind the Z-meml
secondary endings. ' brevity. Assumi
[A-4] We now consider the particular meanings of these replacements lea<
,suffixes. I-members denote not only kartT, karman and bhiiva, but the 1-IIl"JI1ber COl
,also are used with reference to time and modalities. The function This cannot
of the vowel markers following l's is to disting-uish affixes introduced uttered C3n be s
for particular tenses or modalities. Six I-members an; used when it is the non-ul;ter
actions are re.ferred to particular times: IAT (present); lIT (past The Grammarian
beyond the "ken of the speaker); IAN (past exclusive of today); mount. Their al
IUN (past in general) ; IUT ,(future exclusive of today) ; IJ]T (future grammar. Thus
in general). The other four I-members have no reference to time, ~.<D" s"ht'«f['f'I'i:
They are: liN (optative or potential + precative); lOT (impera- that expresses m
tive); IJ]N (conditional) and lET (subjimctive). (This seems to '
, [A--5] As explained in [A...:2] , the meanings assigned to these R~"'l~ ~~ 'it
l~members are really expressed by the actual endings' ti, t etc. But is uttered', in tl
. does not need to say specifically that these meanings belong
Pi'inini , P. I.1.68 (M.B.'
to the replacements (iidesas) , because of, the assumption that a re- Moreover, if
,S AND MOODS INTRODUCTION

edwords. Ac- placement has the same meaning as that which it replaces (sthiininl.
;, their theories Just the introduction of the I-members as the prototype is enough.
bout the mean- Thus KaUJ).c;!abhatta says- "ill:l'f.Ql~qi fcr<n~o:rf'<f; Q~lfrr~., 'f.i~qa
I'S Lakarartha-
05'fiR: >!~ 05'1ilU: '!iBfUr ~R '<n~" fr4t'-!"a I (V.B.S. p. 23). 'The
lalysis of these
denotative function (sakti) of endings tiP etc., which is the property
the ten sets of
of conveying a meaning (bodlv,akdtlirupii),- is theoretically assumed
(pr[akalp-) to exist in a I-member, itself a theoretical construct
nian symbols:
(kalpita, assumed to be) the one replaced by it (tiP etc.). Then
:l llJ.J.iT, used in
I-members are introduced by this (P. III.4.69), to denote an object
:erances. They
(karman) , and an agent (kart!).'
:ually used are
sing"'l!lar imper- Thus it is clear that, according to KaUl).9abhat't;a, the capacity
to denote a meaning actually resides in the endings tiP etc. It is only
:onsidered to be
assumed to exist in the I-members.. This represents the v.iew of all
l ali the verbal
:> whiCh PaJ).ini
Grammarians. How can one then account for the rules of Pill).ini
n 'object', and such as P .. III.4.69 etc., that introduce the I-members as the ones
likarmakebhyah
having the denotative power? Nage§a answers this difficulty by
when) karman taking recour",e to superimposition of the meaning of the replace-
f (the verb is)
ments on its supposed prototype (see P.L.M., p. 138).
;.:1) 1.'
The early Logicians however, have attacked this theory. Accord-
.jng· to them, the significatory power resides in the prototype I. Re-
:l by the use of
placements like 'tiP etc., can denote meanings only by bringing to
I these different
"y endings from
mind the 1-members that they replace. This serves the purpose of·
brevity. Assuming significative functions as existing in the many
mings of these replacements leads to prolixity, whereas assuming it as existing. in
the l-member concerned, is much simpler.
and bhiiva, but
This cannot be accepted. Only that word which is actually
. Tlfe function
ffixeiftiltroduced uttered can be said to denote a meaning. One cannot assume that
it is the non-u1;tered grammatical prototype that denotes the meaning.
are used when
:ent); lIT (past The Grammarians always have held the spoken language as para-
lsive of today); mount. Their' analysis of it has reality only within the confines of
lY) ; IlJ.T (futur,e grammar. Thus Nagesa quotes the Bha~ya as saying ~[RQ Il;'l
=ference to time. B$<:)s>l>!~'!f'!i: ~RC!: 'It is only the actually uttered word
I; lOT (impera- that expresses meaning, not the non-uttered one' (P.L.M., p. 138).
(This seems· to be based very loosely on the sentence ~~'£!­
lssigned to the&e Ra;jl~ 1Tnfcr' 'it is the meaning that is understood when a word
(s ti, t etc. But is uttered', in the Bha~ya on svarj'l raparj'l sabdasyiMabdasalnjfiii/
meanings belong P. L1.68 (M.B. vol. I, p. 175).
lPtion that a re- Moreover, if I-members alone have the denotative function, and
,,
I
L
 -.-~-------~~- ~- ---~- --- ~

THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS INTRODUCTIOJ'.

4

the replacements can convey meaning only by bringing them to mind, pectively. As
how can a person who is not educated in grammar and· thus has no meaning 'locus'
knowledge of these hypothetical prototypes, still cognise their mean- case suffix.
ing? Even a person educated in grammar might not remember the The Gramr
prototype every time. The Logicians' answer that the cognition of the Ritualists.
meaning from the replacements when the prototype is not remem- sthiininyapi ma,
bered is produced by delusion (bhrama) , and that the replacements suffixes when a
do not have the denotative function by themselves, is not at all 'you'. If, inste:
convincing.. ' In addition, even though brevity can be achievecl in vity, it cannot 1
so far as only l. wiII have the denotative function instead of all the the system of n
replacements, there is procedural simplicity in assuming that the will not operatl
replacements denote meaning immediately upon being heard, rather Moreover, .
than assuming that they first bring the I-member concerned to mind, sentences: '.
and then that I-member: denotes the meaning. (a) ~""
. [A-6] 3!T'>[il 1I iff'S': ~llcn: (V.B. kCirikii 2) base devadatta
The general meaning of the I-members (i.e., of their replace- mental proper
ments) , is discussed in kfirikii 2 of the Dh:Uvarthanil1l).aya. Thus that meaning, s<
according to the Grammarians, while a verbal root denotes an acti- mental case calli
vity (vyiipiina) and its result (phala), a verbal affix den9tes the saka view is ace
locus or substratum of these two. .The agent is the iocus of activity, . 'agent.' Since,
and the object is the locus of the fruit or the result of the action. P. 11.3.18 wiII :
This confor:ms to. the wording of P. II1.4.69, which introduces the the undesirable
I-members to denote the agent and the object. Thus anabhihite/ (b) The s
P. II.3.l, would mean: 'when the agent or the object etc., is not also. If object
denoted'. Therefore, the instrumental case would be used after a then the namim
nominal base, when the agent is not denoted by anything else, (i.e., case by P. 11.3
by another element in the sentence, such as verbal affixes etc.), and ~'!tt CI~: ,.
the accusative case wiII be used when the object is not denoted, To avoid tl
(P. 11.3.18 and P. 11.3,2). When the agent or the object is denoted considered as th
- . ~ by l-members, the nominal base concerned would take the nominative About bhiit
case (P. 11.3.46) . verb is intransiti'
The Logicians, while still accepting Pa1).ini as authoritative, inter- . schools. For a
prete his rule P. II1.4.69, to fit their theories. According to them, see Joshi 1960,
the words karman andkartr in P. II1.4.69 do not mean an object [BJ Is 'time' ~
and an agent. What is really meant is kartitva1f1 'agentness', which [&-1] In
is considered to be the same as krti 'effort', and karmatva1f1 'object-
another meanin~
ness'~ The meaning 'locus' is understood by the use of number,
discussing the n
which qualifies either the agent (locus of activity), or the object .
raised: is this
(locus of the result of activity), in active and passive sentence res-
 AND MOODS INTRODUCTION 5

:hem to mind, pectively. As an alternative, the Mlmfupsakas suggest that the

f. thus has no meaning 'locus' is available from the form ending in the nominative
;e their mean- case suffix.
remember the The Grammarians reject these arguments of the Logicians and
e cognition of the Ritualists. P. 1.4.105 y~madyupapade samiinad.hikara1Je
s not remem- sthiininyapi madhyamalJ has laid down the use of the second person
, replacements suffixes when a I-member is coreferential with the pronoUn yu~mad
is not at all 'you'. If, instead of denoting the agent, the I-member denotes acti-
e achievecl in vity, it cannot be coreferential with the meaning of y~mad. Thus,
ead of all the the system of rules describing the use of the various personal suffixes
ning that the will not operate (V.B. p. 5). ' .
heard, rather Moreover, there will be difficulties in explaining the following
!rned to mind, sentences :
(a) ~'f~'q: q"<ffq 'Devadatta is cooking'. Here the nominal'
base devadatta takes the nominative case, instead of the instru-
their replace- mental proper for the agent, because, ,the verbal suffix ti denotes
iI1l).aya. Thus that meaning, so that, according to the heading P. 11.3.1, the instru-
!notes an acti- mental case cannot be used. But, if the Naiy'ayika and the Mimarp-
x denotes the saka view is accepted, then the affix ti does not denote the meaning
eus of activity, 'agent.' Since agent is not denoted by anything else, P. II.3.1 and
of the action. P. 11.3.18 will' allow the use of the instruinental case. Therefore,
introduces, the tb.e undesirable sentence *d.evad.r.Pttena paCiat'i will result.
us anabhihite/ (b) The same. will happen in the case of the meaning 'object'
!ct etc., is not also. If object is not considered to be denoted by the verbal suffix, '
e used after a then the naminal base ta1J4ula 'rice' will have to take the accusative
hing else, (i.e., case by P. II.3.2, instead of the nominative case, in the sentence
iixes etc;~" and ~a q~: 'the rice is being cooked'.
; not denoted, To avoid these undesirable usages, agent and object must be
)ject is denoted considered as the denoted meanings of I-members.
the nominative About bhiiva 'action' being the meaning of I-members when the
verb is intransitive, there is no difference of opinion among the various
Loritative, inter- schools. For a detailed discussion of what the term bhtiva means,
)rding to them, see Joshi 1960, p. XXXIX.
nean an object [B] Is 'time' a denoted meaning of I-members?
;entness', which
rB~l] In addition to the general meanings discussed above,
~atva1'f1 'object-
another meaning common to six of the I-members, is 'time'. While
lise of number,
discussing the meaning of lAT, the following important question is
, or the object
raised: is this 'time' denoted or co-signified by IA T ? The dis-
v-e sentence res-
 6 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS INTRODUCTION

cussion of'. this question concerns all the six I-members that have (dyotya) or dene
reference to time. According to
The theory of the co-significative function is controversial. The the meaning 'timE
grammarians use it in various degrees in their meaning analysis of however, this me;
particles (nipiittas) , and nominal, verbal and feminine endings. Ac- I-members (as il
cording to this theory, particles and these suffixes do not denote an praises', ek., whe
independent meaning of their own. Where does the additional mean- sary to help brinf
of I-members. T
ing come from then? For example, in the sentence, \l+r.a:r ~1l:'1"U].a:r
noted meaning 0
'Rfuna and Lak$matl).a', the particle ca 'and' brings in the additional meaning of the I
meaning of collocation. This is explained by saying that the meaning can be said to be
collocation also belongs to the words 'Rllima and Laki!mm;Ja', but ing is not create(
these worns are not capable of expressing it unless they are accom- to be the denoted
. panied by the particle ca. The function of the particle .ca is then 'needs the use of
to help the words 'Rama' and 'Lak$mmJa' to express their particular can be said to bE
i
meaning, i.e., collocation.' In other words, collocation is not the de- t, the accompanyin!
noted (vacya) but co-signified (dyotya) meaning of the particle CiIl_ [B-2] Mea
The example involving feminine ending and a particle used as a The meaninB
verbal prefix are as follows: deva can denote a god or a goddess. varthaniI1l).aya 'I
In the latter case, the. feminine suffix i is used as a co-signifier. According to Ka\
Similarly, the root bhu 'become,. be' can also be used transitively in' (v yapiira) , and i
the meaning 'experience'; in this case the particle siik¢t is used as a separate denotati1
co-signifier. Thus a co-signifier can be likened to light, that while Nagffiabhatt
, not creating things, only indicates those things that already are in a are 'not two sepe
room_ A co-signifier just brings to mind the· meaning denoted by single combined
the word· that accompanies it, while not possessing any meaning of combined in such
its own. (Co-signifier~ness has been'defined as ~U+nlrc<rr~f.rWl­ active sentence, a
~m'ii'li<'fB:. in P.L.M., p.1l3). The same theory has been used ordinate' qualifieI
to explain the meaning of the nomin81 endings. Depending on which result is predomi
of the five or six different views about the meaning of the nominal according to the
base was adopted, one or more of the following five meanings would have to be consi
be considered to be belonging to the base, and the rest would be according to the
denoted by the nominal ending. These five meanings are Hili 'generic sentence meaninf
property', vyakti 'individual', li1iga 'gender', sa1JZkhya 'number', and meaning 'time',
kiiraka 'participant in activity'. In the last view, where all five are .also denotes 'tin
considered to belong to the base, the suffix is still not meaningless, its result.
because it co-sIgnifies these meanings. Now the question under £On- [B-3] I{m
sideration is whether to apply .the same prinCiple to the meaning namely, that l-rr.
'time' in a verbal form. Thus it is asked, is this 'time' co-signified 'time', separatel:

- -----
 AND MOODS INTRODUCTION 7

:rs that have (dyOtya) or denoted (viicya) ,by/AT?

i, According to this theory as applied to the I-members in question,
>versial. The Ij the meaning 'time' is not the denoted meaning of these suffixes. Since
19 analysis of however, this meaning is not cognised without the presence of the
~
endings. Ac- Ii I-members (as in forms such as stuti 'praise', sUivaka 'one who
lot denote an \ praises', ek., where I-members are not present), I-members are neces-
litional mean- sary to help bring this meaning out, i.e., it is the co-signified meaning
of I-members. The two alternatives, namely, (a) 'time' is the de-
:Tll~ "'&;"l'r[~
noted meaning of the I-members, and (b) 'time' is the co-signified
;he additional meaning of the I-members, hinge upon the question whether 'time'
,t the meaning can be said to be the meaning of the verbal root. Co-signified mean-
k~mar:J.3', but
ing is not created out of nothing by the suffix in question. It has
:y are accom- to be the denoted meaning of the accompanying word, which however,
:le ,ca is then needs the use of the suffix to bring out this meaning. Thus 'time'
ieir particular can be said to be the co-signified meaning of the I-members, only if
is not the de- the accompanying word, Le., the verbal root, can denote it.
le particle w. '[B-2] Meaning of a verbal root
Ie used as a The meaning of a verbal root has been discussed in theDhat-
or a goddess. varthaniI1l).aya 'Decision regarding the meaning of a verbal root'.
a co·signifier. According to KalJlQl9.abhat.ta, a root denotes two things: an activity
ransitively in , (vyiipiira) , and its result (phi1la); In this case, the'verbal'root has
t is used as a
separate denotative functions (Pithak StIktil}) for both these meanings.
Lt, that while' , Nagesabhat1;a does not accept this. 'According to him, there'
eady are in a are not two separate denotations-activity and its result-but a
g d.enoted by single combined denotation; In this, activity and its result are
y meaning of
combined in such a way, that one is subordinate to the other. In an
'rc<nt>;d~;;:Pr~ - active sentence, activity predominates, whereas, the result is the sub-
lasb'een used ordinate qualifier. On the other hand, in a passive -sentence, the
ling on which result is predominant (P.L.M., p. 85) .' As a result, we can see t:\lat '
the nominal according to the theory of Nage§a, active and passive sentences will
,anings would have to be considered as having different sentence meanings, while
est would be , according to the theory of Kaup'~abha!tta, they will have the same
e jati 'generic sentence meaning. Now, to decide whether l-members cO-,signify the
number', and meaning 'time', it is to be considered 'as to whether a verbal root
:e all' five are also denotes 'time' in addition to its usual meanings activity and
meaningless, its result.
III under £On- [B-3] HaU1)Qabhatta has first stated bOth, the alternatives,
the meaning namely, that I-members denote .'time' and that I~members co-signifY
e' co·signified 'time', separately, trying to establish one and 'to refute the other:
 8 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND \MOODS INTRODUCTION

Thus dyotakdtva 'co-signifier-ness' can either be defined as (a) meaning. In eit

saktylidhiiyakatva 'the property of being that which brings out the verbal root signif
capacity (of the denotative function proper to the signifier), or as ficative function,
(b) tiitparyagrahakatva 'the property of being the conveyer of in- I-member can be
tention (of the speaker) . I t does not deno
According to this theory, (a) the root itself denotes all aspects [B-4] Agai
of an action,including time in general. <fil?:mm;:,f en<Ef~: lAT etc., establish that th,
help to specify which particular aspect of time is in question. Co- signify it. The j
signifier-ness is defined here at the at;tributor of capacity (saktya- to be the denote(
l
dhiiyaka). We can illustrate this by taking the example of the word 4 function will hay
ghata 'jar'. In the sentence <Ii 9lURr, 'he makes a jar', the jar 1 for this one mea
has the qualities of objectness (karmatva) and the property of being I.'., by the suffix alon
produced (utPadyatva). In the sentence E{~ ;;fOll1H'fRr 'he brings i tative function. '
water with a jar', the jar has instrumentality (karal1Jatva) , whereas ment is based 0:
in the sentence <fl' ~~ 'water in the jar', the jar has the quality J I-members to del
. of locus-ness (iidhliratva). The same jar has all these different
1;- lA T to denote
capacities, but different particular suffixes have to be used to bring P. II1.2.123 are
out the particular aspect of capacity already existing in it. The denote specific n
same principle is to be applied to tile verbal root and lAT etc. or (b) There should be
the root has only one, denoted .meaning, i.e., action. But· it also . preted.' AS,we h·
has an indicated meaning, i.e., presentness. The basis of the to mean that 1-ri1.
indicative flmction is the intention of the speaker and lAT is the 'agent' etc. Thel
conveyer of this intention ofthe speaker. (tiitpd1y,agriikaka). Both interpreted to m.
of these views are essentially similar. As a matter of fact, (b) Thus it is the I-I
is just a 'modified version of (a); the difference being that according not a verbal roo1
to Ca), a verbal root signifies time by denotative function, whereas, mean that lAT (
according to (b), the verbal root signifies time by the aid of indi- who maintain th
cative function. . From the way, particular emphasis is given, in P.III.4.69 wouk
connection with the indicative function (lak~a:lJii), to the intention meaning agent (,
of the speaker (tiitp,arya) , rather than to the syntactic connection would also be co·
.(anvaya) , in. (b), it seems to belong to the Neologicians (see note Z signified by the ,
on . [1.5]!). According to both views, either by denotative function these two faults 1
or by indicative function, it is the verbal root that signifies the mean- of I-members.
[B~5]'But
ing 'time'. However, this meaning cannot be cognised without the
presence of one of the six l-members .that have reference to time. meaning of the 1-
Thus the l-member helps the verbal root to signify time by being the meanings wb
(a) that which brings out the ,power of the denotative function al- agent, the object,
ready residing 'in the root; or (b) by being the conveyer of the in- .·the expectancy :
tention of the speaker that the verbal root has time as a secondary reason'why lAT
 . _ - - _--- ....

,S AND ",'I00DS INTRODUCTION 9

lefined as (a) meaning. In either case, since, all a I-member does is to help the
brings out the verbal root signify a meaning for which the root does have.a signi-
ignifier), or as ficative function, and not bringing in a meaning of its own, the
:onveyer of in- I-member can be said to be the co-signifier of the meaning 'time'.
It does not denote this meaning. '
otes all aspects [B--4] Against this, two arguments have been put forward to
[<Of~: lA T etc., establish that the I-members do denote time, and not merely co-
question. Co- I signify it. The first of these arguments is that if 'time' is accepted
)acity (saktyii- J to be the denoted meaning of the verbal root, a separate denotative
pie of the word function will have to be assumed as existing in every verbal root
s ajar', the jar for this one meaning, when it is possible to denote it much simply
operty of being by the suffix alone. In that case, only the suffix need have the deno-
l'fro 'he brings tative function. This serves the cause of brevity. The second argu-
!atva) , whereas ment is based on Pfu;inian rules laying down the use of specific
has the quality I-members to denote specific times. Thus P. IlI.2.123 introduces
these different lAT to denote the present time. Now, both P. III.4.69 and
! used to bring
P. IlI.2.123 are rules that lay down the use of specific suffixes to
ng in it. The denote specific meanings. They are both worded the same way.
lAT etc. or (b) There should be no difference in the way these -two rules are inter-
. I. But it also
preted. As we have already seen. in [A-2] , P. IIl.4.59 is interpreted
basis of the to mean that I-members are introduced to express the meanings kartr·
. md lAT is the 'agent' etc. Therefore, in the same way, P. III.2.123 should also be
rahaka). Both interpreted· to meari that IA T is introduced to express the present.
,r of fact, (b) Thus it is the I-member that should denote the meaning 'time', and
: that according not a verbal root. If in spite of this,P. III.2.123 is interpreted to
Iction; 'whereas, mean that lAT co-signifies the present time, to accommodate those
;he aid' of indi- who maintain that time is only co-signified by the I-members, then
lis is given, in P. IlI.4.69 would also have to be interpreted in the same way. The.
o the intention meaning agent (kartr) etc., then would no longer be denoted. They
ctic connection would also be co-signified, by imagining them somehow to have been
ans (see note 2 signified by the verbal root. This is undesirable. . In order to avoid
tative function these two faults then, time must be accepted as the denoted meaning
lifies the mean- of I-members. . .
ed without the [B~5]! But the second alternative, namely, time isa denoted

erence to time; meaning of the l-memoers cannot be accepted either. IAT etc. denote
time by being the meanings which belong generally to all the I-members (i.e., the·
lve function al- agent, the object, and action if the verbal root is intransitive). Thus
'eyer of the in- the expectancy for a meaning is fulfilled. There is therefore no
as a secondary reason why LAT should apply itself to any additional meaning like

L.
.. --_. .
"---"--~- ..".-----.,.-~.-- -.- .. -.. ,----.--~.-- -_ ..... - --- -_.. - -_.
--------------------------- ----

10 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS INTRODUCTION

-time. And, if, in spite of this, it does so apply itself to this meaning, itself is called time
then since 'time' is a specific meaning of that particular I-member, ~ ~ ,
I'li<{Tra<:<fR~a:R"IiT<5
as opposed to the meanings 'agent" and 'object', which belong to all vol. 3, p. 281) .
the I-members the general meaning will be set aside to make room
for the specific meaning. In sUpport of this, the 't.akrakauIJrJinya- That vyapiira
nyiiya is brought in. (This has been explained in detail in my notes already been diSCl
on [1.7] also see note 2 on [I.17] for comments). Thus, if time is Thus since time h
,
accepted to be the denoted meaning of the I-members that have re- activities (Le. acti
ference to it, then the general meanings agent etc., will not be denoted I meaning of the vel
by them. To avoid this undesirable eventuality, the view saying
that time is denoted by l-members has to be set aside. -
) by the verbal root
signifier of the me
tative function for
[B-6] , After thus first discussing both the alternatives, and Thus prolixity
. showing how _there are difficulties in accepting either of these,
the root and then
.Katll.l9-abhaHa shows how both of these alternatives have support can be accepted.
in the Bha~ya. The same passage (M.B. vol. 2: p. 123) has been But the other
utilised to givesuppon to both the views. This has been made clear ing 'time' can alsc
in the text, and need: not be repeated here.
bhatta takes recour
In order to avoid the fault that all the roots will have to have lAT to denote the
an additional denotative function to denote 'time,' if 'time' is accepted has gone- against .t
as a meaning of the verbal root, it is suggested that 'time' is hothing by Bhattoji DIk~itl
but the series of activities. "IiT<'5I ~ C<f[(rrH!;:(jT~Tfufhn) - kala 'time'. is a root when the 2
generally considered to be the measurer of action fs!;<n<[Ko~G;'fi: "lire: present. Thus lA
.But at the same time, it can also be -said that time is measured by present, but· merel)
action, since division of time cannot be made without the help of some the meaning of the
action. Time cannot be the measurer of action without having divi- grammarian who
sions, and it cannot be divided without being associaied with some Another argument
action. Thus the more basic notion of time is that it has action as a and thus not deno1
ment that describl
determinant. ~N"Ii: 'liT<5: Thus just as a crystal looks red when
i 111.9.2.) . This ca:
it IS in the proximity of a red hibiscus flower, time evep though it is one . I
same. Thus time
j
and undivided, seems to have divisions when associated with action. be prolix to attrit
_ According to grmnmarians, this is still on a popular level and has since an additiona:
D_O reference to actuality. According to them, time and action are root to denote it.
one and the same because time has no reference to anything outside
What of the (
the domain of action. Order in time. is the order of the different
taken to denote thE
moments of action or activities. There is an activity for every stage
such as the agEmt
of time, and thus kala itself may be called vyapara. ( 'liT<5 Q;'l' ~ f'l'''''T<<!T This objection has
o'lT<[T~ '{Rf 'li~'la V.P., II1.9.12). Kaiyata also says that action of that which sets a

••• __ ....oil
 "'-,._. ---

IS AND MOODS INTRODUCTION 11

o this meaning, itself is called time when it measures other actions. (il~qR:mUf[ 1;pl!'l
:ular I-member, m;'!T;:m:'1R~"R'fiT<il' 1(~'ffiR I Pradipa on vt. 5, ad P. III.2.123,
:h belong to all •
vol. 3, p. 281).
to make room
akrakaw:ujinya- That vyaparasantiina is the meaning of the verbal root has
:ail in my notes already been discussed and justified in the DhatvarthanirI).aya II.
rhus, if time is Thus since time is considered to be nothing more than a series of
·s that have re- activities (i.e. action), and action has already been accepted as the
. not be denoted meaning of the verbal root, it naturally follows that time is denoted
he vie", saying by the verbal root. Thus the objection that IAT cannot be the co-
de. signifier of the meaning time, unless the verbal root has the deno-
tative function for it, is removed.
ternatives, and
Thus prolixity is avoided, and the view that time is denoted by
ither of these,
the root and therefore only co-signified by the I-members concerned
s have support
can be accepted.
123) has been
But the other alternative, i.e., that l ..members denote the mean-
been made clear
ing 'time' can also be shown to be justifiable. For this, KaUl!~a­
bhana takes recourse to the wording of P. III.2.123, which introduces
n have to have lAT to denote the meaning present. In doing this, KaUiI).Q.abhatta
ime' is accepted has gone against the traditional interpretation of this rule accepted
time' is nothing . by Bhattoji Dik~ita etc., according·to whidi, IAT is·introduceo. after.
kala 'time' is " a root when the action that is the meaning of that root is in the
i<!TqR~~: 'fire: present. Thus lAT seems' to' be used not to denote ·the meaning
is measured by present, but merely introduced when that meaning already exists in
the help of some the meaning of the root. As far as I know, Kam.t;labhtta is the only
)ut having divi- grammarian who went. against this traditional. interpretation.
·ated with'i some Another argument in favour of taking time as separate from action
has actiori as a and thus not denoted by the verbal root, is the V'akyaparuya state-
I looks red when ment that describes time as being the measurer of action (V.P.,
111.9.2.) . This cannot be true if time and action are one and the
though it is one same. Thus time must be separate from action. Therefore, it will
ted with action. be prolix to attribute this additional meaning to the verbal root,
.r level and has since an additional denotative function will be necessary in every
and action are root to denote it.
mythirig outside
of the different What of the objection mentioned in [B-5]? If tAT etc. are
. for every stage taken to denote these specific meanings, then their general meanings
such as the agent etc. will not be denoted. This is undesirable.
'fil<il' 11:'1 ~ f'l'flT.+n This objection has been answered by saying that there is no relation
says that action of that which sets aside and that which is set aside (biidhyabiidhaka-
 . _ - - - _.. -------- ... - ~~

12 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS INTRODUCTION

b.hiiva) between these two meanings, since both can exist together. p. 280), it has been
Thus 'time' can be the denoted meaning of the I-members. be associated with th
[B-7] , After showing that both. the alternatives that time is action either. An ac
denoted by the I-members and that time is cosignified by them can is about to be brougl
be justified, and can be shown to have support in the Bha~ya, tains and the exister
KaUil).Qabhatta finally states his own view, which combines the fea-
tures from both of these views as stated so far. Thus time is accepted
'to be brought about
i.e., it has to have ex
by him as being one and the same as action. The general notion of Bath of these are 111

I
time is thus denoted by the verbal root, when it denotes action. mountains' or the ex
But the specific aspect of time such as presentness etc., are denoted the counterpositive 0
by the I-member concerned. Thus while accepting that action and possible either. Sin
time are one and the same, KaUIQ.Qabhat;!:a still manages to follow the
strict wording of the rule P. III.2.l23, which introduces IAT to ex-
. press the meaning present. . 'The traditional interpretation· of this
I associated with the s1
because an action is
three divisions. (
.ule does not strictly follow the wording of the rule, though it; is
accepted by all the commentators. The doubt raised in the Bha~ya Uddyota on Vt. 2 a
about the usages (!+[ 31Hr1tJ: etc. is also set to rest if this view is (1 Ira 'q "!il<?fe1+!ll
accepted. there are divisions c
[C] Two problems about vlartamiinatva The Bha~ya explail
[C-l] Katyayana has discussed the meaning of vartamiinatva qualification to the
in five viirttikas on P. nt2.123. Two problems are niised. In the . of the actions of thE
text (see [UOJ etc.), reference is made to the discussion of one of of the kings are co
them, namely, how to account for the use of present suffixes when mountains: The st
an ·action goes on continuously without stopping (nityapravrtta) , i.e., the actions of '
so that it is difficult to characterise it as either past, present, or have kiilavibhiigiilJ
'future. This pmblem actually concerns all the six I-members refer- Now, since the
ring to time. Thus IDityayana says f.wlll"~ 'q 'liTO!n~'lWlltJ: vt. 2 ad (the existence of th
P. III.2.123. lAT is to be used to express presentness which has
been explained as the time characterised by an action which has begun
but not ended. (see [1.2] note 1). In that case, how can we justify
I! of time, it can be ca
Uddyota on Vt. 5 ,
. [C-2J The 01
the use of lAT in sentences such as 'the mountains stand', or 'the in our text) is the
self exists'? The action in question here has no conceivable begin-
breaks in the actiOl
ning or end. The existence of the self is eternal without beginning
studying', l(i{ <!€1
or end. How can we then speak of it as having' existed, existing
now, or about ;to take place? The use of present, . past, and .of famous one is l(
future will be equally hard to explain in this case. It is with this sacrifice' (Le., we ;
background that the Bha~ya raises the question regarding the justi- mitra) . All these
fication.of the use of IAT in these sentences. While they are g(
Kaiyata goes even further. In the Pradipa on Vt. ·2 (vol. 3,
I ended, various br(

L
 'ENSES AND MOODS
. can exist together.
·members.
latives that time is
:nified by them can
Jrt in the Bha~ya,
1 combines the fea-
hus time is accepted
le general notion of
. it denotes action.
ss etc., are denoted
..ng that action and
mages to follow the
r.
;roduces lA to ex-
.because an aGtion is invariably an object of usage in terms of these
erpretation of this
rule, though it is
lised in the Bha~ya
) rest if this view is
19 of iJ'artamiinatva
. are raised. In the'
liscussion of one of
esent suffixes when
g (nftyapravftta) ,
r past, present, or
ix l-mem.bers refer-
~TfiliTlrl'l. Vt. 2 ad
entness which has
m which has be!Wn o
how canwe justify ;
lins stand', or 'the
conceivable begin-
'without beginning
Ig existed, existing
sent, . past, and of
:e. It is with this
'egarding the justi-
I studying', ~l!: '1~11: 'here we are living', and the last but very
on Vt. 2 (vol. 3,
INTRODUCTION B
p. 280), it has been explained that since the eternal action cannot
be associated with the three divisions of time, it cannot really be an
action either. An action is supposed to be siidhya 'an entity which
is about to be brought about', and since the standing of the moun-
tains and the existence of the self are eternal, they are not siidhya
'to be brought about'. Whatever is siidhya has to come into being,
i.e., it has to have existence in future, and after destruction, In past.
Both of these are not possible in the case of the standing of the
mountains' or the existence of the self. Since presentness is merely
the counterpositive of the past and the future, it (presentness) is not
possible either. Since all three' divisions of time cannot thus be
associated with the standing of the mountains, it cannot be an action,
three divisions. . (~lifi~<{~11T<JC<{'1~l.:]qq'1<'l~'1111'11~~<{T: ~fu liTO:-
Uddyota on Vt. 2 ad P. III.2.123, vol. 3, pp. 279-280).
"'RI :q '!il<'l']q111'n: Vt. 5 answers this objection by asserting that
there are divisions of time even in 'these actions that go on eternally.
The B~ya explains the existence of these divisions by adding a
qualification to the eternal action in the form of the limiting factor
of the actions onhe kings belonging to different times. The actions
of the kings are cOllsidered' to be the locus of the standing of the
mountains.. The standing of the mountain:s as limited by its locus,
i.e., the actions of different kings belonging to different times does
have kiilavibJUigii/;L 'division/, in time'. .
Now, since the standing of the mountains as limited by its locus,
(the existence of the kings) can be associated with the three divisions
of time, it can be called an action. (<fQ: '!il~~r.r: 5!C!: f'li~'l'<'lfli",'.l:
Uddyota on Vt. 5 ad P. III.2.123, vol. 3, p. 282).
. [C-2] The other problem raised in the Bha~ya (not mentioned
in our text) is the use of the present tense in cases where there are
. ,
breaks in the action. The examples are:. ~ s!"l111~ 'here we are
famous one is . ~l!: :J;0'!l'l:f,r '!lw:!l+!: 'here we make Pu~yamitra
sacrifice' (i.e., we act as sacrificers at sacrifices initiated by Pu~ya­
mitra). All these actions 'go on for an extended amowt of time.
While they lire going on, that is, when they have begun but not
ended, various breaks occur, a~, for example, taking a meal etc.
 l
I
THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS INTRODUCTION
14
~Ef919'19f.t;'f[ I ~l~<n<
We are not actually studying while taking a meal. But the action
the example given i
of studying has not ended and the sacrifice is not finished. The
I-member lAT cannot be introduced by P. III.2.123 to derive adhi-
mahe etc., since studying does not actually occur when one is eating, -
etc., and III.2.123 introduces lAT with reference to an action actually
taking place (vartamiina).
iI of eating.
[C-3] To aVI
describes a fourfol
following four divi,
(1) pravrUoj
This objection is met in two viirttikas :
(1) t~'1P:"lT <9T<:+l1Ff,!911f<J.: (The present endings [bhavantil I denote an activity
has now abandoned
are) justified, since (an action) has begun and has not ended.
(2) 8TI~ 't[ I1'fClWIT't Fl<:T+r:There is a break even in such clear II of ~~\a '1<:lilifiUr ;:
spots of others now'
and undoubted instances of the use of the present tense as ~:S::'f('r
~9<l:'CI: 'Devadatta is eating'. The action-.of eating here is. not. i sa1'flPraii, but reall
constant, because, while eating, Devadatta also may laugh, talk
a little, drink etc., and while these minor actions are going on, there I
~
activity denoted b3
(2) vrUiivim
the Bha~ya. It wa
is a stop in the action of eating. But these actions are not con- I in [C-2] was stan
sidered to cause a break in the main action, because, they are merely ~ (3) nityapro
necessary accompaniments to the main action. (OiFCI<:l'1'1i<9T'C1I<:IT ~ 1 This explains usag
fq"'~<::'fi<9l'l:. I{Jasi. p. 344). They cannot be called obstacles j
!
where the action i
or interveners in ea:ting. Usages .like ~~ ~9<l:'tf: are accepted as I been discussed in [
being correct instances of the use of the present tense suffix, although
. it .can be shown that even here, the action is not constant, hence, I (4) Siil'nipye

usages like ~f[ 31~(h:r~ etc., also should be accepted. In this case
also, it can be said that the action of taking a meal does not cause a
I past are covered b:
for example,_ 'fl'

break in the action of studying, because of niintariyakatva. Kaiyata

even goes to the length of saying that since it is impossible to go on
I from the town'?
KriyaRaSa p. 2).
studying without a meal, the action of taking a meal can be said to-
be forming a part of the action of studyjng ( W-T91~<r~9T9'19fl1;"lrn
I i
-[C-4] In th
important. Pa:Q.in:
out giving any de!
~:rl'l: Pradipa on Vt . .4 ad P. III.2.123; vol. 3, p. 280). These i explanation is att,
two. views are given by Bhar'Grhari in the Kalasamuddesa. He notes ! time is that by wb
that (a) all actions are always found as if combined with something I is indicated. ~ 1
else ~Ef9 ~ flI;'1l~rr ~:s:;T.tifr<!rw.<r('r v.P. III.9.83) and (b) The actions
which occur during the process of the main action, should be tal,en
to be forming constituent parts of the main action, if they contribute
I
i
P. II.2.5, M.B. vo:
that when associa
called by various t
to the realisation of the latter. Such a constituent action, even if it
is a completely different action, should be taken as a part of the
I of the time into d
ciation of action w
main action, since it occurs right in the middle of it. ((lG:~CR:I<'5~T g or longer duratior
 lNSES AND MOODS
ll. But the action
not finished. The
123 to derive adhi-
when one is eating,
) an action actually
ndings [bhavantiJ
IS not ended.
: even in such clear
tense as "fI'S'-fa
, ~
_eating here is not
may laugh, talk
lre going on, there
tions are not con-
le, they are merely
( ,,1"CI;:l'l"'li<'91'<111JT;:r
called obstacles
are accepted as
se suffix, although
t constant, hence,
)ted'. In this case
I does not cause a
~akrtt'l!(l. Kaiyata
Ipossiple to go on
eal cail be said to
[f":Pf.'Wf'l1'P1'ff,p~fcr
, p. 280). These
lddesa. He notes
d with something
:I (b) The actions
, should be taken
;f they contribute
action, even if it
as a part of the
t. (<I'\"CR:l<"n!l l!
INTRODUCTION 15
'-'!~'fI'f'l"'fffi<IT I '-'!l~l1lttfRr ~ l!~<it;:r 'li;la II V.P. III.9.84). Hete also.
the example given is the combination of activities forming the action
of eating.
[C--3] To avoid the rising of these problems, GUl),aratnasiiri
describes a fourfold present. Thus varaf!amana for him has the-
following four divisions:
(1) pravrUoparata: the present suffix is here employed to
denote an activity in which the agent was previously engaged, but.
has now abandoned, e.g., ,-,!+J:!f<l ;,ft'f'l1<f ., 'liUTcr 'he does not kill now' ,
of '-'!-nTm- G\lHlflUi ., ;;f<;q"Rr 'he does not babble about the vulnerable
spots of others now'. This distinction depends on the use of the adverb
sa,lf'tPrati, but really has nothing to do with the presentness of the'
activity denoted by -the verb:
(2) v?,Uavimta: This is the same -as pravrttasyiiviriima(1 of
_the Bha$ya. It was concerning this usage of IAT, that the discussion
in [C--2] was started.
(3) nityapravrttrt: again this is the same as in the Bha$ya.
This explains usages such as Q,lcrnf<j2'Rr 'the mountains stand',
where the action is going on eternally without stopping. This has
been discussed in [C--I] and text [1.2] etc. -
(4) siimipye vartamanaJ;: immediate future and imm~diate
past are covered by this. This is the same as stated in P. IlL3.131,_
for example, 'lim <'i .,l1UG,:Fmlsre 'when did you come back.
from the town'? answer: 8l<[l11~mfi'r 'here I come' . (see,
KriyaRaSa p. 2).
[C--4] In this whole discussion, the nature of t.ime is very_
important. Pa:J:rini has used the word kiila 'time' Several times with-,
out giving any definition of the word. It is in the Bhli$ya that an_
explanation is attempted for the first time. There it is said that
time is that by which the development and decay of material objects
is indicated. ~., l=l'<1f<!11lq"'iPP>ll'f9'l"&l <"a;'la ci 'iiF;!Ji'i<'l"JS: (Bha$ya on.
P. II.2.5, M.B. vol. 1, p. 409; also see V.P. II1.9.13) . Patafijali says
that -when associated with action, time -appears in different forms
, called by various names such as day and night etc. _Thus the division_
I of the time into day and night indicates some sort of intimate asso-
ciation of action with time. What is meant is that the idea of shor.ter'
or longer duration which is associated with time belongs in reality-
16 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS INTRODUCTION

to actions and it is because of this association with action, that time (a) vidhi' 'injunc1
is regarded as a measurer of development and decay of phenomenal subordinate p
objects. Since these divisions are made only due to the association . :you should !
with action, time should be considered as essentially indivisible, and (b) nimantra-(/a ':
only artificially conceived of as present, past and future.
(c) iimantrarpa 'p
Bhartrhari, the philosopher of language has .recorded several
(d) adhi$[a 'respl
theories about the nature of time, devoting the whole of the ninth
section of the third k~c;la of his Vakyapadlya to this. Time accord.- teach (my) E

ing to him, is a power of the sabdabrahman (V.P. 1.3). (For a ( e) sar(tprasna 'iT
recent discussion of time according to Bhartrhari, see Peri Sarvesvara 'should I stue
Sharma, the Kalasamuddesa ... , pp. 29-39). Kau.."?c;labhatta has put (f) priirthana're
forward the accepted view of the Grammarians that time is one and According to 1'.
the same with a series of activities, i.e., with action. This has been four' of these' mear
discussed already. Since time is' thus identified with action, it is According to NageS
clear that it is denoted by the verbal root, a fact used by others to . pravartalla. This n
support the view that time is co-signified by I-members.
KaUl):c;labhat1;a however, while still accepting that time and
action are one and the same, holds that it is only a general notion of
II stead of saying just
he does in P. III.3.:
time that is thus denoted by the verbal root. In order to denote
;
I (a) in order to ;
specific aspects of time s11ch .as presentness, pastness; etc., the use of ~ (llyiiyavyutp,
. the specific I-member is necessary. Thus in a sense, the meaning of
time is both co-signified and denoted by the I-members, according to
Kain;lQabhatta. The general notion of. time, while being denoted by
I (b) in order to e:
of the. suffix
:po 160, Laghl
the verbal root, can be considered to be co-signified by I-members, p. 33), also I
since in the absence of I-members, as in the forms stuti 'praise' etc. that lIIir shOD
this general notion of time even is not present. The specific aspects \ tcmii, and tha
sake of expar

I
of time such as presentness etc., are however not to be considered as
being denoted by the verbal root, and are thus denoted by the specific Once one has d
I-members like lATetc. question follows: '
[C-5] I cannot here go into details concerning all the lakiiras l, [D-2]· pravaro
due to limitations of space. For a detailed discussion of the problem pravartana 'ills1
which leads to anot
of Parok$atva 'imperceptibility' concerning
Section II.
ID1 The meaning of 1IIir
, lIT see my notes on
,
ii
I. by X of an optative
0'111f[~: );{gc\9if;!ir ~
[D-1] Parr;ini has introduced the. I-member IIIir in P. II1.3. thus the person who
161. (vidhinimantra~matitra1Jiidh~taSa1!lprasnapriirthane$U lin). him: X is a pra
Here six meanings are given as conditions for introducing lIN. (pravartakatva) is
These are as follows : perty of uttering ar

·L
 INSES AND MOODS
h action, that time
cay of phenomenal
, to the association
.Ily indivisible, and
future.
LS .recorded several
whole of the ninth
this. Time accord-
(.P. 1.3). (For a
lee. Peri Sarvesvara
lJ).!jabhat(:a has put
Lat time is one and
)n. This has been
with action, it' is
used by others to
nbers.
19 that time and
a general notion of
in order to denote
~s, etc:, the use of
se, the meaning of
lbers, according to
~ being denoted by
tied by l-members,
l stuti 'praise' etc.
'he spedfic aspects
:0 be considered as
)ted by the specific
,
ing all the lakaras
ion of the problem
I [D-2]pravartanii
see my notes on I
!,
. lIN in P. I1I.3.
'iirthane$U lin) .
r introducing lIN.
l -.-.-_ .. -- - -------,..... _-
INTRODUCTION 17
(a) vidhi 'injunction'. This means inducing or commandil1g a
subordinate person to do something.' Thus.«i 'l<Ti' 'l~: .
:you should go to the town' .
(0) rdmantra1Ja 'invitation'. ~l[ ~lcr '191~ 'please eat here'.
(c) iimantra1}a 'permission'. ~il: amrlcr 'you may sit here'.
(d) adhi$ta 'respectful command'. 3."!l1<l:{]q'li~il..' (please)
teach (my) son'.
(e) sa'J}1tyrasna 'inquiry' or 'delibei:ation'. i'ii '11 ~1'["lll:!1l:{ ;aQ <t~'l
'should I study the Veda or logic' ?
(f) pr/irthana 'request'. '1! m'>!;l "'~l:{ 'may I get a meal' ?
According to KaUI.1(iabhat(:a, it is possible to reduce the first
four of these' meanings to one, namely, pravartana 'instigation'.
According to Nagesa, a fifth meaning can also l;>e included under
pravartanii. This meaning is tyriirthana (LaghuMafi., p. 984). In-
stead of saying just Q'9C!'l1l:!T ~~ then, why does Pii1'Qini say what
he does in P. IlL3.161? Two reasons are offered :
(a) in order to allow a clear grasping of the detailed meaning
.. (nyiiyavyutpiidaniirthal1~) or .
(b) in order to expatiate on the basic meaning (prapanciirtha'J}1)
of the suffix (see the karikii quoted,in [IV.A.2]; V.B.S.,
p. 160, LaghuMafi, p. 983, P.L.M., p.144 etc.). S.K. (voL 3,
p. 33), also has accepted that it is better to say (suvaca'J}1).
that lIN should be introduced to express the meaning pravar-'
tana, and that the seperate mention of the four is just for the
sake. of expansion.
Once one has decided that this is the basic meaning of UN, the
question follows: what precisely is apravariJ,anii ?
. '. '.. .., ...•
.pravartana 'illstigation' .is. a,n W:.tivity on tl;Le,part o(:a"per.sonX, .
. which leads to another person Y'.s doihg soriwihii:lg,nam¢,ly, thy u~e ...
.
by X of an optative form. Thus,"Nage§asays <t'3[Q''KI<n Q',['(~:.J;iiJI
c>.fTtfl{: Q''fcf.!if<ml f0s'lfu:l;[R:cr'U~mwr: (LaghuMafi.. p.958). X is
thus the person who causes Y to do something by commanding (etc.)
him: X is a pravartaka. The property of being a praViartaka
(pmvartakatva) is defined as follows: pravaiiJ,akatva is the pro- .
perty of uttering an optative (etc.), with the provision that one be
 -------_. - - - -

TIlE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS INTRODUCTION

18
doing what he is inst
indePendent. Thus says Nagesa again: . :qem'fi~ "f~'lIQ"4 <lfu . (a) general: :
~l~lirtrr<~ (LaghuMan. p. 958). . . desired.
However, Y does not act imm~iately. Other conditions are (b) particular
necessary. The sequence of events is then as follows: cular desired thing, E
(1) instigation (pravdrtanii) is uttered by the person X, who is (b) is necessar
considered to be an iipta (see below). and effort are involv
(2) further, there is no inhibitory thing present as qualifying the me to something goo<
instigation. not suffice in cases '
(3) from (1) and (2), Y infers that the action he is being askecI are necessary, as in ;
to do is: a means of reaching something he desires, and that [IV.'B.24 etc] , it is ~
it can be performed by him. knowlecIge that the I
(4) it is (3) which then leads Y to do what he has been insti- ..sired. On the other
gated to do. that object of desire
'la;'{+rl1Jf~cft'fcrn 'Cf ern ( ~'S"~,!Q~'l'll ) llRr'fr '<j'fil111'lfFIfuE"'ll ~ that a person becoill<
M'!it ~E"<lI'<l'li'lRTI~q: (an~'ll ~fu<ll~'{«1 'Rl~'lAa ) ClCl: l/'{fu: I iipta, even when spec
cause is not present.
LaghuMafi. p. 959.
(a) an iif1b,a is a person qualified as follows: he is devoid of
confusion, anger, etc., he does not indulge in certain actions
which would lead 'to undesiredresuits, or preclude one's reach- .
I
I-
apta is commanding
cause something goo
object. of desire. is nl
something which cau
ing desired results. (LaghuMa:n. pp. 959-960). I an activity, specific I
(b) as n9ted in (2) above, a prava'rtana is to be. qualified by an through this action 1
absence of any inhibitory factor. . [D-4J All this
On account of the conditions described above by (a) and (b), tions of everyday Ii
a person Y does not perform the act he is commanded to do in the
following instances : ,,<ftRlit~'l ~qir'lil+rT 'I:

(1) If an enemy of Y says, 'eat poison', Y does not do this. Jyoti~toma sacrifice'
1'he enemy is not iipta. Hence, Y infers that his eating will lead of as the statement 0:
to no desired results, nor does he consequently eat. \ of Indian philosoph
(2) even if an ,apba says, 'eat poison, but do not eat in this i! 'not composed by .rr
person's house'-, Ydoesrtot immediately proceed to eat poison.. For, prav.artakagiveiiin.
':h~re there is an inhibitory faCtor : . Y knows that eating poison isa i , Therefore, for t
means to an undesired result, namely, his death. This conclusion
produces an aversion (dvle~a), which is an inhibitory factor (p7ati- I pravartanii isa state:
perty of the words ,
b,andhaka). In effect, the sentence uttered is intended to convey ~~ lTemrrl fu~qR;Qi'l~q
that Y should not eat in this person's house, because it would lead [D-5] We ha\
to undesired result~. I. As regards]
[D..:31 The inference mentioned above (3), that leads to Y (a) lIN denot

- ._-........
 ENSES AND MOODS INTRODUCTION 19.

doing what he is instigated for, can be of two kinds:

(a) general: i.e., one infers that an action leads to something
desired. .. .
ther conditlons are
Hows: (b). particular: Le., that a particular action leads (0 a parti-
cular desired thing, e~g. S'varga 'heaven'. .
~ person X, who is
(b) is necessary for Y to be inclined to act when great expense
and effort are involved. Mere general inference that this will lead
It as qualifying the
me to something good, since an apta has instigated me to do it, will
not suffioe in cases where a great deal of trouble and expenditure
] he is being asked
are necessary, as in a big sacrifice, for example. Thus in our text,
Ie desires, and that
[IV.13.24 etc] , it is stated that lIN does not convey just the vague
knowledge that the prescribed action is the means of something de-
he has been insti-
sired. On the other hand, lIN denotes specific knowledge of what
that object of desire is. In our day to day experience, we do see
J"frl;{'f,Tl:r19for~<rr ~ that a person becomes inclined to activity, when commanded by an
fa ) (fer: ll"'lRr: I apta, even when specific knowledge as to what good this activity will
cause is not present. This happens due to the general faith that this
" he is devoid of dpta is commanding one to do this because he knows that this will
in certain actions cau&e something good for oneself. Thus specific knowledge of the
'eclude one's reach- object of desire is not neoessary. This however, does not apply to
c960) . . something which causes a lot of effort. To be inclined towards such
be qualified by an· an activity, specific knowledge of the object of desire to be achieved
through this action has to be known (also see LaghuMafi, p; (60).
, by (a) and (b), [D-4] All this preceding discussion applies to normal injunc-
mded to do in the tions of everyday life. There are also Vedic injunctions, such as
'ii'fliW-lii<r ~'li1l'[I <riit(f 'one desirous of heaven should perform the
. does'!'not do this. Jyoti~toma sacrifice'. Now, such injunctions cannot be conceived
:s. eating will lead of as the statement of anyone person or iipta. By the iistika systems"
3.t. of Indian philosophy, the Vedas are considered to be lapaurW}eya
do not eat in .this 'not composed by man'. Hence, the definlti~ns oL.pravartanii-and
~ eat poison.. For, pravartaka given in [D-:-2lca!1.1:J()i·ial?plyt.o;th~fVeda. :oJ
eating .poison is a Therefore, for the Veda, a particular situation exists. Here a
This conclusion of
pravartana is a statement the Veda: '. And pravartakiiva is a pro·
:ory factor (prati· perty of the words which occur in the Veda. Thus NageSasays :
.tended to convey 't~ ll"'Ta;rl fo>~"lR:c!~"'l1 lT9a9i<'i 'q OJOG.:[;rgWi (LaghuMan. p. 959).
use it would lead [D-5] We have then, the following:
1. As regards normal usage in the real world situation :
. that leads. to y
(a) lIN denotes instigation or command in general: this is

'. . . ----.. '-----~---.--.-----,... --

"."
20 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS INTRODUCTION

variousiy called vidlzz, pravartana, prermJii. (2) one know

. (b) This is.definedas a pr<ipertywhich leads to someone else's (3) one kno~
doing something. ,q'['t<j~r lOjB:. ,see also text [IV.B.l]. The
command consists in uttering an opta,ttive form, and the speaker is
the locus of the property prqvartakatva. .
I There is desire
cause of desiring th(
absence of misery) ,
(c) When a person Y spoken to hears the command of X, he
performs that activity under the following conditions. He infers ! desiring to perform
knowledge that the
can be performed,
from the injunction that the activity in question is such that it can
be accomplished by him (krtisiidhya) , it will lead to results which he
desires (i~tasadhana), and if there is no inhibitory factor involved I leads to excessivel~
146·48) .
(pratibandhakabhava) , and finally, if the person who utters the
injunction is authoritative and trustworthy (apta).
I [D-7] In ace
are held regarding
II. As regards the Vedic injunctions, of course, since the Vedas. of which leads to :
are ,apauruljeya, no speaker is necessary. The words in the Vedic (1) It is pra:
'injunctions themselves do the instigating. factor. From this i
[D'-6] In sum, according to Nage§abhatta, a vidhi is con- desired; and feasib
nected with the following properties of an action, which one is insti· activity. This is th
gated to perform. ,, [D-2 to D'-6J.
(2) It is a c
(a) iljtasiidhanatva 'the property of being a means to some-
.thing desired. ! y,atva, and .( c)ba,
. (b) krtisadh yatva 'feasibility' I the Naiyayikas, an
(3) It is b.ha
(c) pratibqndhakabhiiv.a 'the absence of an inhibitory factor'.
In addition, instead of (c), one may consider also (d) balavada-
1~iljtananuband.hitva 'the property of not being associated with a
greatly undesired result'. These will be explained later when the
I and has been acce]
(4) It is kiir
(5) and fina'
believe that the or
views of the different schools are being discussed. The discussion S0
means to a desired
far has been general, though it has followed Nage§abhaHa in the
Xnandatirtha and
main. It will make the differences among the various schools easier
In the followil
to understand, since I will have to be brief in discussing them.
[E] The Nyaya .
In addition .to these features,remember that Nage§a says that
[E-IJ This
these' are inferred from: an injunc'tivesiatement. Consider now the
meaning of lIN ac
epistemological "side . of' the . question. One hears an injunction,'
cognises it, then infers certain properties, and then finally acts. Tbus
there is an instigation (pravartana), knowledge of it (jnana) , and
I vidhi is then defir
desire to do, which
an action (pravftti). Further, there is a result (plla!a) involved and 1 precisely, that pro!
to do (p. 142). T
a means (sadhana, upaya) to it, namely, the action one is to perform.
Hence, one has the foHowing sequence in cognition : . 'feasibility' , (b) ~
(1) an instigation is cognised (vidhiji'iiin,a) ,
I something desired'

L
:NSES AND MOODS I INTRODUCTION

(2) one knows the result (phalajfiiina)

21

sto someone else's
Kt [IV.B.I]. The
(nd the speaker is
:ommand of X, he
itions. He infers
s such that it can
o results which he
:y factor involved
n who utters the
).
e, since the Vedas
)rds in the Vedic
a vidhi is con-
i'hich one is insti-
means to some-
(3) one knows a means to this result (upiiyajfilina).
There is desire (icchii) relative to each of (2) and (3). The
cause of desiring the result (phala, viz., in general, happiness and the
absence of misery), is the knowledge of it, Le., (2). The cause of
desiring to perform the action which is a means to this result, is the
knowledge that the action is a means to the end desired, and that it
can be performed. On the other hand, the knowledge that an action
leads to excessively undesired results is an inhibitor (Mukta. on
146-48) . _
[D-7] In accord with the above, the following possible views
are held regarding what is vidhi as the meaning of lIN, a cognition
of which leads to activity.
(1) It is pravlartanii qualified by the absence of an inhibitory
factor. From this then, the properties of being a means to something
desired, and feasibility are inferred. This inference then leads t£)
activity. This is the view of Nage§a, which has been discu&-<ed so far
[D-2 to D-6]. .
(2) It is a combination of (a) i§tasiidJu:matv.a, (b) krtisadh-
yatva; and (c) balavadan4.tiinanubandhitva. This view belongs to

lnhibitory. factor' .. . .
the Naiy;ayikas,' and will be discussed in the next section.
_ (3) It is bhiivanii. This is the view of the Bh2.tlamimarpsakas,
and has been accepted for Veda by Nagesa.
.

'so (d) balavada-

ssociated with a
i later when the
I (4) It is kiirya according to the Prabhakaras.
(5) . and finally both Ma:t;lt;lanamisra and KaUl).\labhatta firmly
[he di$Cussion Sl) believe that the only meaning of vidhi is the property of' being the
esabhq~\a in the means to a desired end (i§tasadhanatva). This is also the view of
}US schools easier Anandatirtha and Nrsilp.hasrama.
ssing them. In the following sections, these views ,vill be discussed in order.
~age§a says that ~ [El The Ny§.ya view .
[E-l] This is the most straight forward view. Vidizi is the
~6nsider "il0W the. ~
ian injunction, I meaning of lIN according to the sabdasaPra.· (kiirikii 101). This
ially acts. Thus I vi:dhi is then defined as the object of a cognition, which causes a
I desire to do, which in turn instigates one to perform an action. More
it (jiUina), and
~a) involved and
! precisely, that property qualified by which, a cognition causes a desire
,ne is to perform. to do (p. 142). There are three such properties: (a) kiUsiidhyatva
'feasibility', (b) i§t,asiidhaY/iCltva 'the property of being a means to
something desired', and (c). balavadil1ni~lananubandhitva 'the· pro-

•••• _.-'--- "--'-~-'-<,"- '.--. _•• , _ •• ,

----------

INTRODUCTION
22 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS

perty of not entailing a greatly undesired result.' The dharmin of (by swimming) '. Th<
these properties is an object action such as paka, yaga etc., for ex- which in this case, wi
ample, the meaning cognised from the verbal form ending in lIN, being a means to a de,
- such as yajeta 'he should sacrifice', is "1FT: 'lifOOT~'1: W:!!<:!T"l;'f 'i!<'l'lG:-. the sea might fulfill tIl
be a means to a desir
Fr2T~.\;j1 'Cf 'the sacrifice is feasible, a means to something
here be taken as nega
desired (i.e., heaven), and it does not entail a greatly undesired to swim across the 51
result'. Thus injunction has a threefold meaning according to the feasibility as one of tc
Naiyayikas, involving the three properties mentioned above. To
[E-3] 4tasiidlza
cause volitional activity in the person who is being instigated, the The other proper
presence of all these three properties is individually necessary. None
is i~tasiidhanatva 'the
of them may remain absent. Thus ]agacli:sa states that all three of
Mere knowledge of a
these individually (pratyekameva) are to be considered as causes
after he has ascertail
__ for the desir:e to do (sabdaSclPra. p. 142) . unless he knows thal
[E-2] kitisiidhyatv,a
It is because lIN has
The Naiyayikas argue that the agent does not become inclined
as its denotatum, th~
to act unless he knows that the action concerned can be accomplished
If an action is of no 1
by him with effort. He does not proceed to perform such impossible
is not inclined iowan:
tasks as bringing the peak of the golden mountain Meru, or to pro- It is necessary te
duce rain (vr~tikara1Ja), or to create or bring the moon, even thougJ:!
these actions might be able to-produce some-desired resultS for him.
\. account for the follow
It is only when it is-known that the activity in question can be per- 'one' desirous of sat
formed, that the agent becomes inclined towards it. the water'.' Here th
An objection has been raised, that, this property of being will not make sense,
feasible, may have once existed in some particular activity, and to- action in question is :
w'ards which then there would be inclination to act, even though, the satisfaction of his h1:
action is not possible now. Thus creating the moon was possible no desired result. 1
once, when the moon was first created. It has been proven to be desired end, that is t
not impossible to do, and thus feasible. Therefore, there will be of this property that
inclination towards thIS activity, if feasibility is considered to be a A problem has
meaning of lIN, and thus an instigator (see [IV.B.13]). This ob- feasibility and the pr
jection has been met by adding the qualification idiinim 'now' to cognised at the samt
feasibility. The action in question has to be feasible 'n~w' for this (siidlzana) has to be:
property to be the instigator. Since the creating of the moon is not _ means something wt
possible 'now', there will no inclination towards this act. Thus there thus contradictory.
is no fault. . stating that the cogr
Further, another argument used in favour of accepting feasibility natva) and the prop!
as a meaning of lIN, is as follows: There are negative injunc- are not both cogniw
tions such as ~: ~ ;or a'tl:. 'a cripple should not cross the sea diction. What is cc
1.l
 'ENSES AND MOODS
:: The dharmin of
Z, yiiga etc., for ex-
)rm ending in lIN,
~T'.;'1: W:§!ml;J;of <!<"'1q:-
aeans to something
i greatly undesired
Ig according to the
tioned above. To
~ing instigated, the
y necessary; None
es that all three of
nsidered as causes
ot become inclined
:In be accomplished
rm such impossible
n Meru, or to pro-
moon, even though
oed results for him.
lestion can be per-
it.
;>roperty of being
:1' activity, and to-
~, even though, the
noon was possible
Jeen pr6ven to be
'ore, there will be .
~onsidered to be a
B.13] ). This ob-
- idiinim 'now' to
ible 'now' for this
)f the moon is not -
s act. Thus there
;cepting feasibility
, negative injunc-
not cross the sea
INTRODUCTION 23
(by swimming) '. The negative particle here negates the injunction,
which in this case, will not make any sense, if only the property of
being a means to a desired end is accepted as the instigator. Crossing
the sea might fulfill the fondest wish of the cripple, and thus definitely
be a means to a desired end. Therefore, the negative particle must
here be taken as negating feasibility. It is not possible for a cripple
to swim across the sea. It is necessary for this reason,to accept
i
feasibility as one of the three meanings of lIN (sabdasaPra. p. 143).
[E-3] 4tasiidhanatva
The other property necessary for causing an inclination to act-
is i~t,asiidhanatva 'the property of being a means to something desired' .
Mere knowledge of an injunction will not make a person act, even
after he has ascertained the feasibility of the activity in question,
unless he knows that this will achieve something that he desires.
It is because lIN has the property of being a means to a desired end
as its denotatum, that an injunction Can instigate the agent-
to act.
-
I If an action is of no use in producing a desired result, then the agent
is not inclined towards performing it.
It is necessary to accept 4tasiidhanatva as a meaning of lIN, to
account for the following negative injunction. Q:1WJ;Tii'r 'Jf~ 'rclT:S'l« _
'one desirous of satisfaction (from hunger), should not thrash
the water'. Here. the negative particle -negates the injunction. It
will not make sense, if, the injunction meant feasibility only. The
action in question is perfectly feasible. But for a person who desires
satisfaction of his hunger and thirst, this useless activity will bring
no desired result. Thus it is the property of being a means to a
desired end, that is being negated here. It is because of the absence
of this property that there is no inclination to act.
A problem has been raised as to how two properties such as
feasibility and the property of being a means to a desired end, can be
cognised at the same time as existing in the same thing. -A means
(sfidhana) has to be a finished thing (siddhadharma) , whereas sfidhya
meanS something which is to be accomplished yet. These two are
thus contradictory. A solution to this problem has been found by
stating that the cognition of the property of being a means (sfiiiha-
natva) and the property of being possible to accomplish "(sadhyatva) ,
are not both cognised in the same instant. Thus there is no contra-
diction. What is cognised is that this thing which will be a means
24 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS INTRODUCTION

to something desired after being accomplished, is feasible now. (a) the desire fc
ledge of the fruit conci
fu 'li:'4 '1.q~ tfT~T"!T'''!~~<::Fllrq'1~fcrm>.'fi'll'!'l 5:r:rii'r",fcr~\;jT't.MaI)iDa. p. 54) (b) the desire fo
[E-4] b.alavadan4tananubandMtva: this, the knowledge of .
The property of not entailing a greatly undesired result is the sired, is the cause (on
third part comprising :the meaning of the suffix IIfI. The Naiyayikas from this iccha, which:
argue that if the property of being the means to a desired result were the knowledge of feas
the only meaning of lIfI, then there would also be inclination towards something desired. I
eating food mixed with honey and poison. It wiII accomplish satis- general Naiyayika vie'
faction of hunger (trpti) , and the honey gives it a desirable taste. vadan4tananub,andhit
Thus it can be said to be the means to something desired, i.e., trpti. desired result', as one
But this food is also deadly. It will certainly cause death due to the is the inclination to ea
poison mixed in it. That there is no inclination towards the eating . It is certainly feasible
of such food goes to .prove that the property of not entailing a greatly . also a means to soril(
undesired result, is necessary for instigation. Thus there is no voli- insiead of accepting l
tion where the bad effects outweigh the good ones. Since this property inclination to do, Vis'
. is thus necessary for instigation, it must be considered to be the activity, namely, boa
meaning of lIfi. property of being a ca
Acceptance of this property as a meaning of lIfi is also necessary 148). Knowing that
for such negative injunctions as '1'1i<"§r EOOcr 'one should not for which ·the agent
Altert1.atively,· the del
eat kala:Tija' (for the ineaning of
kalai"ija,see note 1 on section
dv,esah) itself (Mukr
[IV.I.l] ) . Now, the eating of kalafi}(l does satisfy hunger, and is.
[FJ' :The Bhatia Mi
thus a means to a desired end .. But it is also a means to hell. Thus
the undesired result i.e., hell, outweighs the desired result of sati.s- [F-1] The Bhl
, 'a person
faction. It is .this property of not entailing a greatly undesired result, <:'ltff\+r :
that is being negated by the negative particle. In this sentence, saCI
There is a little bit of difference of opinion aoout what balavada- goal. The fonn endi
n4tananubandhitvf{l exactly means. .It is normally taken to be the· verbal root yaj 'to sa,
knowledge of the absence of evil (balavadani~tiijanakatvajnana or properties: suffixn(
ani$tasiidhandtvabhiivajnana). But some take it to mean the absence (lhitvl a). The prop
of the knowledge that the aqtivity in question will cause someth.ing common to all the tel
undesired (an4'Jajanakatvajfi..iibhliva). It is thus a negative condi- of these aspects' expr
tion according to them. (Ma:I).iDa. p. 56). defined as follows :
The author of the Mukta. agrees with most of what has been is the activity on .the
said so far about the Nyaya view. ·But he does not accept the third bringing about of wh

I
property baktvadf{lni$tanamtbandhitva as one of the causes of voli- in the case of a simpl,
·tional activity. When a person wishes to gain some fruit, he has is cooking rice', riCE
two types of desire : nasya) . The activit

1
I
L ..

'ENSES AND MOODS
i, is feasible now..
'<rr~Mal).iDa. p. 54)
iesired result is the
iT. The Naiyayikas
, desired result were
inclination towards
;11 accomplish satis-
t a desirable taste.
: desired, i.e., trpti.
se death due to the
towards the eating
.: entailing a greatly
us there is nQ voH-
Since this property
lsidered to be the
'N is also necessary
'one'should not
note 1 .on section
sfy hunge!;", and is
II
eans to hell. Thus
fed result of satis-
ly undesired result, I [F] The Bhati;a Mimarp.sa view '
I
lut what balavada~
.y taken to be the
;anakatvajnana or
) mean the absence
,I cause something
a negative condi-
of what has been
•t accept the third
he causes of voH-
)me fruit, he has
- - ------ --- -- -- --~-- --- ----- -----~
---- --~
-----
INTRODUCTION 2S
(a) the desire for the fruit (phaleccha). For this, the know-
ledge of the fruit concerned is the cause.
(b) the desire for a means to gain this fruit (upayeccha). For
this, the knowledge of the property of being a means to something de-
sired, is the cause (on kiirika 146). The desire to do (cikir§a) results
from this icc.ha, which according to Mukta. on kiirika 147, comes from
the knowledge of feasibility and the property of being a means to
something desired. In this, Visvaniatha's view is the same as the
general Naiyayika view. However, Visvanatha does not accept bala-
vadan4tiinanubandhitva 'the property of not entailing a greatly un-
desired result', as one of the causes of volitional activity. How then
is the inclination to eat food mixed with honey and poison avoided?
It is certainly feasible, and being capable of satisfying hunger, it is
. also a means to something desired. To get out of this difficulty,
. instead of accepting bahavadani$tananubandhitva as a cause of the
inclination to do, Visvanatha has a pratibandhaka 'deterrent' to this
activity, namely, balavaddvi§tasiidhantitiijiiiina 'cognition of the
property of being a cause to something very much undesired' (kiirikii
148). Knowing that the activity in question will result in som~thing
for which the agent has great aversion prevents the desire to do.
Alternatively; the deterrent is'said to be 'great avtrsion' (balavad-
dv,e§alJ) itself (Muk!a. p. 508).
[F-l] The Bhat1;a Mim~sakas analyse the 'sentence ~Q
'a person desirous of heaven should sacrifice', as follows:
In this sentence, sacrifice is prescribed for a man with heaven as a
goal. The form ending in lIN, namely, yajeba, has two parts: the
verbal root yaj 'to sacrifice', and the suffix. This suffix also has two
properties: suffiimess in general, and the property of being lIiV
(lintvla) . The property of being a verbal ending (iikhyiitatva) is
common to all the ten I-members. li1itva is proper only to lIN. Both
of these aspects express bhavanii 'bringing about'. bhiiVlanii has been
defined as follows: <=rf;!gir'l<lr::i'fi<'lT m'lf<lgei:{fq]'~~lq: ['bhavanii]
is the activity on the part of the instigator, which is conducive to the
bringing about of what is being produced' (ArthaSaip.. p. 18). Thus
in the case of a simple sentence such as 3l1~ q'ilfu ~'<!; 'Devadatta
is cooking rice', rice is being produced (bhavitub = 'utpadYamii-
nasya). The activity on the part of Devadatta, which is conducive
 26 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS INTRODUCTION

to the production of rice is bhavana. When a teacher orders his produce a desired resul-
student to bring a cow, the inclination to bring this cow in the mind there is inclination to a
of the student Devadatta is caused by that activity on the part of his Thus Kumarilabhatta :
teacher. This activity on the part of the teacher, conducive to ~~Th"11'lil'fT ~E:lfG?J·G:l
Devadatta's action of bringing the cow, is bhiivana:. f<1',I1R'Il'fi1 liFHI ffi~<~"
[F~2] This bhiivana: is of two kinds: (a) siibdi and (b)
iirthi. It is siibdi bhiivanii that is proper to lIN. :A:rthi bhiivana . (b) is satisfied h.
-is expressed by all the I-members. (a) is a sabc!Javyiipiira, or rather, What is meant by thi!
.sabdasamavetiavyiipiiralJ, 'an activity invariably related with the word tion of lIN cannot rn
(i.e., lIN)', as Kumarilabha1!ta puts it, and is considered to be the explaining this. (1)'
'same asabidhii. (also see Tantrav:a. p. 114; NyayMan. p. 246; P.L.M. f;fibdi bhiivanii. It doe
p. 158; MaJ)iD~. p. 44 f.; M.K. p. 3554 etc. for general discussion). but not known to the:
Mal)iDa. (p. 44) identifies sabdabhiivanii with abhidhii and: pravar- of llN. lIN so to say 1
tanii. It is 'the activity on the part of:the instigator, which is condu- we see a blue pot, and
011 it, that does not me
dve to another person's getting inclined to act. . CI'f ,:p;qq~~'1:1'lio;r
of the eye and the p<
+rT9fl:rgc'ffqT\~q: ~TT~l lil'RT (ArthaSarp. p. 27). This applies in the know it only when ou
worldly situations to the intention of a particular person who insti- of the eye and the pot
gates the agent. In the case of the Vedic injunction, of course, it is a ledge of the blue COI01
.property of the word itself. llN itself is the instigator (prayojaka) does not create the col•
.in this case. It is because. this property .thus .belongs to the Vedic the cognition of llN
word itself, that it is called siibdi bhiiiJimii. §iibdi b.hfivanii. It c
[F-3] This bhiivifJnii has expectancy (iiklink$ii) for three things:
(a) siidhya 'the goal', (b) siidhana 'the means'and (c) itikarwvyata agent.
(2) the other
"the way to go about it'. Out of these three expectancies, (a) is §iibdi bhiivanii is not (
satisfied by the second kind of bhiivanii, namely, iiithi bhiivanii. However the goal of
"Both the bhiivaniis are closely related, since both are denoted by no prior existence. 1'1
,different aspects of the same suffix. This iJithi bhiivanii is defined as (c) is satisfied
follows : ~~;;~I;;Jf.rafs!i'1If.lq'1O<jTrn\: an~'l1T9;:rT (ArthaSam. p. 42) . of the activity concel
aTthi bhiivanii is' the activity regarding an action, caused by In this way, thi
" the desire for a fruit. Since activity is the meaning of suffix in general [i.e., (a), (b), and
(according to the Mimfupsakas, as opposed to the. Grammarians, inclined to act. iiitl
who accept the agent as the denoted meaning of the suffix, [see A-6] ) , and they are satisfi~
. ·mthi bhiivanii is expressed by the iikhyiitatva aspect of lIN. This
(a) the goal:
is the general suffix meaning that lIN has in common with the other
(b) the means
[-members. Thus what it amounts to is that the "verbal effort on the
(c) how to :
'part of the instigator is Siibdi bhiivanii, whereas, the actual effort put
forward by the agent, is the iiithi bhiivanii. The injunction instigates prayaja etc.
Thus the. wholE
;an agent towards a particular activity, stating that this activity will
 TENSES AND MOODS
a teacher orders his
this cow in the mind
ity on the part of his
acher, conducive to
nil.
. (a) Yibdi and (b)
v. rA'rthi bhiivana
~avYiipiira, or rather
elated with the word
I
:onsidered to be the
Man. p. 246; P.L.M.
general discussion) .
fbhidhii and pravar-
tor, which is" condu-
I
q'f. ~~"l"Q"'l'~"'r
. ThIS applies in the
Ir person who insti-
on, of course, it is a
;igator (prayojaka)
I of the eye and the pot is here the main means (kara'IJa) of the know-
olongs to t.b.e Vedic
,a) for three things:
::I (c) itikartavyatii
I does not create the colour, it only brings it to light., In the .same way,
I
cpectancies, (a) is
ly, iiithi bhiivanil.
;h are denoted by
iivar.iiHs defined as
ArthaSam. p. 42).
ldion, caused by
of suffix in general
the, Grammarians,
suffix, [see A-6J) ,
>ect of lIN. This
Ion with the other
erbal effort on the
, (a) the goal: a fruit such as heaven etc.
e actual effort put 1 (c) how to go about it?: by performing rites such as
junction, instigates ,J
~
this activity will
INTRODUCTION 27.
produce a desired result. , If the agent has a desire for such a result,
there is inclination to act. sabdi bhiivanii causes this iirthi bhiivanii.
Thus KUJ:Illirilabhat\a says :
CfSfT~hfW!iI1:ft f<'s6'IfG:~~l"li <r: ~q Q"fcr ,Fil;;'[9iC<fl'lI1:: ~ W:Cl1'l": ~Q,,'i!ms
ii'r<!n~!l"lil <=fl'l;:rl f~f~I~<~~'1~ \ (TantraVilL p. 378) .
(b) is satisfied by the cognition of lIN etc. (ArthaSarp., p. 34) .
What is meant by this? siibdi bhiivana already exists. The cogni-
tion of lIN cannot be said tD create it. There are two ways of
explaining this. (1) The cognition of lIN causes the knowledge of
siibdi bhiivana. It does not create it. siibdi bhfivanii already existing,
but not known to the agent, is made known to him, by the cognition
of lIN. lIN so to say brings siibdi bhiivanil to light (prakiisayati). If
we see a blue po~, and get the knowledge that the pot has blue colour
- on it, that does not mean that this colour is created by the conjunction
of the eye and the pot. The pot already has blue colour. Btu we
know it only when our eye lights on the blue pot. The conjunction
ledge of the blue colour as existing in the pot. But this main means
the cognition of lIN is the main means of the knowledge' of the
Siibdi bhiivanii. It does not create it, it only makes it known to the-
agent.
(2) the other way of course is as follows': it is true that
siibdi bhiivanii is not created by the cognition of lIN. It already exists.
However the goal of that siibdi bhiivanii, i.e., the iirthi bhiivlanii has
no prior existence. And the cognition of lIN helps to bring this about.
(c) is satisfied by the knowledge of lIN accompanied by praise,
of the activity concerned through a-rthaviida (Arthasarp.. p. 34) .
In this way, this siib4i bhiivanii along with these three things,
[i.e., (a), (b), and (c) mentioned above] , instigates the agent to be
inclined to act. iiithi bhiivanii also has the same three expectancies
and they are satisfied by the following :
(b) the means: sacrifice etc.
prayiija etc.
Thus the whole thing can be shown as follows :
.28 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS
INTRODUCTION

yajeta svargak{ima~! [F-4) Some vari

According to Mima
I instead of having a S
pr.ava"rtanii, let this pr,
conducive to bringing th
dh{itu According to Gaga!
pratyaya
holds the following :

yaj
I f<>;s; '>JfiFf: The pro.
_are available through J

yaga
I I
lin/va
r tanii, which is the me~
entity: it is with resp
akhYatatva
Note now, that Nagesa
I
fdbdi bhavana
I to a desired end etc.,
However, he holds tha
'firlhi bh?ivana
~wn >!<R!'1i,ir 'if '>J~R~i!
I I [G) The Prabhakara
rG-ll i~tasjjdhal
pravartana vy7wara
to the prabhakaras.
I It ceases to' exist· the :
supposed to result f:on
I
stidhya sadhana
I
'of the sacrifice, until a
position of the sacri!iI
itikarlavyala as the means of achle'

I
arthi
I
linadijftiina
I
karmaprasastya-
cannot be the means
inclination to perforn
of being a means to a
bh'avana viSi~ta li,i(idi- Well, in that cas(
jfiana direct cause to heave!
generates apurva ar:(
( Through this, connect!
to achieve the desired
sadhya s'adhana itikartavyalii The Prabhi.ikaras
I
svarga yaga
I according to them, for
means either, since
prayajadi 1:f<:+q~1<rt'il'1'9~fq il;1
angajala word dviira is here u
(for definition of vyi
 F TENSES AND MOODS .
INTRODUCTION 29

[F-4] Some variations of the Bhlitta view:

According to MimaKau. (p. 22) , p,arthasarathimisra claims that,. .
instead of having a separate property resident in llN,. which is

, "-
pwvattanii, let this pravarta'!iii be ,considered merely as .. the.power '
conducive to bringing thearthi bhavdnaabout.( grl>li+ilq;:n~~0T1ilf9:cR<t}
, According to Gagabhatta, (BhattaCin. p. 88), the Bhatta school
holds the following: ~!2<:!N;:r,ql~1<rl111~qm <i51+i1<I. qG:l>lf;C!~ ,Fl€!;jT (l'S[
:i0:s: 'OlWcr: The property of being a means to a desired result etc.,

r
I are available through inferenoe. Therefore, they cannot be pravar-
tana, which is the meaning of lIN. pravartana then is a separate
akhyalalva entity: it is with respect to this, that lIN has a denotative function.
Note now, that Nagesa also holds that the property of being a means

arlhi bhav7ina
I to a desired end etc., are to be found by inference (see [D-2J).
However, he holds that pravartana is llN itself. (~,lt >'<,~,;jl f<,.~,p':(l
~'l~qj );(q€\'!lf'i 'if 'Ol~f<T.oi'tq LaghuMaii. p. 959) .
I
vyap7ira
[G) The Prabhlikara view
~G-ll i§(as"tidhanatva cannot be the meaning of lIN according
I to the Prabhakaras. A sacrifice has but a momentary existence.
~' , It ceases to exist the moment it is finished. The heaven which. is
supposed to result from it, does not come into beIng for the performer '
of the sacrifice, until after his death. Since there is no direct juxta-

I
position of the sacrifice and heaven, how can sacrifice be cognised '
as the means of achieving the desired heaven? And, since sacrifice
cannot be the means of getting heaven, lIN cannot then cause an,
' inclination to perform it, by denoting its (nonexistent) property
sastya7,.. of being a means to a desired end. ,
iidi-
, Well, in that case, it can be said that a sacrifice may not be a
/
\
I
direct cause to heaven. But it is still an indirect cause. Sacrifice
generates apurva and this ajniwa then directly causes heaven.
f Through •
this'
connecting
.- '
linkof4p,iirva'eViep,tli.&sqcrificeisa
"'i-:" ':' -.
toachleve the deSIred heaven.: . , ..,,,,' ,"';(<:,';:
''',.~ ,.~_.,
.:... -.: " " ':- ~.'
• - ,;- •.
meahs" ", '
.,-., .: "-"
','it" ': ,'C '~"i'
itikarlavyafii
The Prabhakaras deny this alternative also. It is :ri6t p6ssi):l1i~;'

I
',. . ;. . ' . . -
.~. ~_ . ..., ..!
'I, <

according to them, for lIN, to den9te the property of being'an irirlirect

means either;' since the interconnecting link is not :present.,'
pray7ijadi
q<:.q<:Tm<:{;:r"'~lfit "il:m~q~>lCiT <I\~+r;;JiflHql<I. [IV:C.2] The
a1;gaj7ila
word dvara is here used in the technical sense.' It means vyiipara
(for definition of vyapara, see note 2 on section [IV.C.2]).. The
30 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS INTRODUCTION

link apiirva is vyiipiira, because, it is caused by the sacrifice, and is a:!T9.>T1:{<:r<{T ~+!: ~+O('<<ri;t
the cause of the heaven, which is also caused by the sacrifice. With- Thus the cognitior
out this connecting linl. being present in the sentence meaning (in.
the Prlabhakaras goes
the form <nli'1' s:r~c1&;rlJ ~em 'ffi'/'li'C) 'the property of being an 'one desirous of heave
indirect cause cannot be denoted by lIN. One of the essential factors
in the cognition of the sentence meaning is semantic compatibility, (1 ) ~Tlif.!'ij"1{'
and the Ptiibhii.kara definition of this semantic compatibility is that, its object and with tll
it causes semantic relation (mwlaya). Without the presence of apurva whom this duty is int~
as the interconnecting link, sacrifice and heaven cannot be connected. (2) ~1'?l~ <il<
And since this link is not present in the cognition of the sentence sacrifice as its object, v
meaning, there is no semantic compatibility to denote the property (particular person) fOl
of being an "indirect cause.
(3) ~,"T1iW-ll'
[G-2J The final view of the Prabhakaras is then that it· is
this apurva itself that i~ the meaning of lIN. lIN accordinv: to them, for a person desirous (
denotes kiirya 'the thing to be done', or k!ttyuddesya 'that towards "desirous of heaven.
which activity is directed'. This, according to them, is, the same as . (4) ~'lil1TT >.:[
apiirva. As a matter of fact, the words kiirya and lapurva are con- who is the performer (
sidered to be practically synonymous by them. Thus: apiirva =
(5) al~ l;~r
kiirya = niyoga etc. Thus Ramanujacarya says: ~'f 'I>li'f +!FIF<l<:T-
. Therefore, this (sacrif
<1t"lT.<'fT<;:,{eIT'i'rRll;'fr<+!R 3;<i1Sr RE§fr-n R'1ll'T J{R <[1"1(1 (sastraPraPa.· p. 59).
It must'be stressed here that, the Bhatta apftrva is not the same as Prabhakaras insis
the Prabhakara notion of apiirva. For the Bhattas, sacrifice is the visis,tatii). This has :
'kiirya, and apiirva results from this. For Prabhakaras, however;. oth~~ view. (The ste!
apiirva itself is kilr)lla. Thus 3T'{~q- 'lirif ro:s:rfu:lf<"1'19r'Ol:fl{ (TantraRa. ings of lIN above, are
in the P.L.M. pp. 15'
p. 42),
The Prabhii.karas do not deny that verb ending denotes krti [G-3] This stiIl
'activity' or 'effort'. How then can they say that lIN denotes kiirJi!l; kiirya has to be conne:
or krttyuddeSya and not krti? The answer is that the Pri'ibhakaras of heaven. The worc
do not accept krti as the only meaning of all the I-members. Thus nominative .case. Tht
lIN has the additional meaning kiirya also (see TantraRa. p. 426). svargakama~l kiiryal!!'
But this briiigsup the fault of anekiirthakdtii 'having more than one and the goal of. actiol
••
meaning'. No, say the Prabhakaras. : kiirya is a meaning, which: The. Prabhiikaras
if is not possible to denote without denoting "krti also, since both are connection is ..possible
related to each other. Thus lIN denotes krti as being subordinate . nominative case. Tc
to kiirya. kiirya means that towards which all activity is directed. form svargakiimalJ, to
Activity (krti) is thus a qualifier. Its object is the sacrifice and the ending with the geniti
locus is the person who is desirous of heaven. in connecting svargak
T4'li<'i."l' W~~"1'9ll. .(f5f mIquft~<l~rWl"f<ilSf<n'!il:S:ll:Tr<rt ~q"1<l"1J "1Jit
 TENSES AND MOODS
INTRODUCTION 31
{ the sacrifice, and is
T the sacrifice. With- SlI'>f'-m'1T ~'l"r9>1+r: ~+'I~'1i;1l' [see IV. C.5] .
entence meaning (in Thus the cognition of the sentence meaning. (siibdabodha) for
property of being an the Priabhakaras. goes through the following stages: ~'1it'liTm ~cr
f the essential factors 'one desirous of heaven should sacrifice' ..
nal1tic compatibility, (1) ~T+rf.r:j'r">:p.f, <ll1TfojQ'1'-ii 9>1<ll1. I kiirya with sacrifice as
:ompatibility is that, its object and with the person desirous of heaven as the one for
Ie presence of apurva whom this duty is intended.
:al1l1ot be connected.
~ion of the sentence (2) Wrr'11"'19i '1TlTf<im ~nf':!~l'c!;'r 9iliil1.1 goal of action with
denote the property sacrifice as its object, which is the means of heaven, and which has a
(particular person) for whom it is prescribed.
; is then that it is (3) ~'liT+rml"''1'liT ,<lIlT: ~9it'lil+T9i14; I The sacrifice prescri1:w<!
, according to them for a person desirous of heaven, should be performed by the person
rlesya 'that toward~ desirous of heaven .
.em, is, the same as
(4) ~'lil+T[ '1TlT'licrf It is the person desirous of heaven
nd lapurva are con-
Thus: apurva ,= who is the performer of the sacrifice.
m'l 9>1;.r +Il<lT"([U- (5) ait ~9ir9il+Tlscl'r +Ti'[.m"l~'!: I I am desirous of heaven.
istraPraPa. p'. 59) _ Therefore,
.
this
. . .
(sacrifice)
.' .
is to
.
be accomplished by my effort.
is not the same as Prabhakaras insist on the element of self reference (mada1J1.sa-
tas, .sacrifice is the
hakaras, however
,

, T'lr'"'1~ (TantraRa.
. visi$,tatii). This has not. been given that much importance in any,
lding, denotes krti
(IN d~notes kiir~a
~, the Prabhakaras
I-members. Thus
,mtraRa. p. 426);
ng more than one
, meaning, which.
so, since both are
>eing subordinate
;ivity is directed.
sacrifice and the .
other view. (The. steps in the process of the cognition of the mean-
ings of lIN above, are based of the summary of the Prabhakara view
in the P.L.M. pp. 159-160).
[G-3J This still leaves the problem as to how this meaning
kiirya has to be connected with its locus, namely, the person desirous .
of heaven. The word svargakiimalJ expressing this locus is in the
nominative case. Thus it cannot be connected with the word kiirya,
svargakiimail kiirYI{[1.n makes no sense. The peisoiidesirous of hea,Yen .
and the goal of action cannot'be c6ref~i~ntiat;:~itheach oth~l"; .
The Prabhakar<)s gelaut of. this difficultjby admitting that no "
connection is possible as ,long as the word svargakiim-dlJstays in the
nominative case. To help the cons'truction then, they change the
form svargakiima{z to svargakii.m!fJsya, thus replacing the nominative
ending with ti'1e genitive one. Once this is done, there is no difficulty
in connecting svargakiimasya with the meaning kiir)liam.
 --------~-~-~-~---- --- .--------~----.----.---~

32 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS INTRODUCTION

But how can this be done? The Prabhakaras here take recourse to something desired
to a device called the upadana pramaIJa, with the help o{which, lIN agreed upon is the IT
itself provides this chi!ngeotcase ending in order to help the ton-. is conducive to voliti
struction of the sentence: (For a discussion of the upiidana pramii7pa, siidhanatva. Furthel
see note 2 on [IV.C.6] and the sections following it). result is the cause for
[G-4] Another argument brought forth by the PrabhIikaras in to activity without i
support of apiirva being the instigator, and not the property of being property of being thE
the means to a desired result, is as follows. There are certain obli- the suffix lIN. One c
gatory rites prescribed by the Veda. The performance of these rites involved in this proc
does not bring any specific fruit. However, the nonperformance of (1) the injunc
them brings in demerit. Now, the Prabhakaras argue, these rites
should sacrifice', is 11
cannot be said to be performed in order to gain any desired fruit,
since they do not produce any fruit. If the property of being. a means (2). from this ~
to a desired result were the only instigator, there would be no in- to heaven, which is d~
clination towards these rites. But we do see people perform them. , (3) the Inclina
How is this inclination to perform these fruitless rites to be explained The object of tll
then? However, they point out that if apiiTva is said to be the the contentness of thi
meaning of lIN, there is no such difficulty. Every Vedic rite yields to a desired result.
apiirva. And it is with this lapurva in view, that people perform A slight variati(
these rites.. Even in the case of the optional rites,. which do yield . which, the goal of 3
specific fruits, say the Piabhftlmras; the inclination to a~t is not really (i~lasiidhanlfJ), it· it:
with this fruit in view, though of course, secondarily, the fruit is also [IV.B.7]. Of course,
. achieved. Generally everyone believes that in the case of optional and the desired mean
rites, gaining the object of desire is the main thing. According to the ~l-er<rr1rnBf +!rr<nf;'r!?!~q~
Prabhakaras, however, the inclination there also is due to apiirva
[H-2J Now til
the fruit being a sort of fringe benefit and entirely by the way. In
to know specifically
the case of the obligatory rites of course, there is no other fruit. Thus
scribed act. In day
the .inclination to act is only for the sake of apiirva. Therefore, it
respected and autho
is apiirva, towards which all activities are directed, that is the mean-
Nothing. specific is k:
ing of liN. .. ~ml,~,~~q'1l'!~9 9iT"il1.[IV .C.121· . the persOn concerned.
[HJ The view 6fKaill!\fabhatta- said this, knowing tl
[H--I] KilUl,lQabhatta mostly follows Mal)!<;lrinamisra arid his without knowing wh~
view agrees with those· of AnandauIrtha (Madhv3.oarya) and ever, says Nrsirphasl
Nrsirpha§rarila. According to these scholars, there is only one meaning Veda, since theY de~
of lIN, and that is the property of being the means to a desired result world, and need a 10
(4tasiidhanatvla or hitasiidhanatva). No one performs an action the fruit specifically.
unless there is some beneficial result for him. Therefore, the cause
of performing such aJ;l action is the knowledge that this is arrieans
I to act. Thus in the (
is not the vague pr<

L· ..
TENSES AND MOODS INTRODUCTION 33

'as here take recourse to something desired. pravartana 'instigation', which it has been
le help oiwhich, lIN agreed upon is the meaning of lIN, is a property (dharma), which
del' to heip theton-, is conducive to volitional activity (pravrttyanukUZa). This is i~ta­
le upiidana pramii'ipa, sadhanatva. Further this property of being a means to a desired
'ing it). result is the cause for adion in general. There can be no inclination
, the Prabh§..lmras in . to activity without i~tasiidhanatv.a being known. Hence; it is this
he property of being property of being the means to a desired end that is the meaning of
lere are certain obli· the suffix lIN. One cognises it, and that leads to activity. The stages
:mance of these rites involved in this process are as follows :
~ nonperformance of
(1) the injunction ~9<Tif,Tm '1~cr 'one desirous of'heaven
lS argue, these rites
n any desired fruit, should sacrifice', is heard.
rty of being a means (2) '.from this sentence, one cognise~ that a sacrifice is a means
:re would be no in- to heaven, which is desired by me. It is this cognition that produces.
;ople perform them. . (3) the inclination to act.
rites to be explained The object of the cognition in (2) is sacrifice. The limitor of
a is said to be the the contentness of this knowledge is the property of being the means
:ry Vedic rite yields to a desired result.
:hat people perform A slight variation is proposed by Anandaortha, according to
ltes, ~liich do yield which, ,the goal' of action is nat only a means to the desired' end
1 to act is not really
(i~tasiid.hanla), it itself is a desired means (i~ta1Ji sadhana~ft)
:ily, the fruit IS also· [IV.B.7J. Of course, the desired end in that context is the liberation,
:he case of optiopal and the desired means to it, the desired Godhead (i~tadevata). 'liP\:
;. According to the
lJ1"I<rr~t'!B! 1if['11Rli!~'1crT (AnuVya. v. 46).
) is due to apurva
:ly by the way. In [B-2] , Now the question comes as to whether it is necessary
o other fruit. Thus to know specifically the desired fruit to be achieved from the pre-
~rva. "'~fherefore, it scribed act. In day to day experience, we see that an older man,
d, thai is the mean- respected and authoritative, may command one to do something.
Nothing specific is known as to what good this act is going to do to
the person concerned. But one thinks that this respected person has
:"?,
said this, knowing that this must do something good. Thus, even
~a.ilamisra and his without knowing what that good is, one is still inclined to act. How-
1adhvacarya) and ever, says NrsiIphasrama, in the case of the acts prescribed in the
lS only one meaning Veda, since they deal with fruit that is to be gained in the other
s to a desired result world, and need a lot of effort and expense, it is necessary to know
lerforms an action the fruit specifically. Without such knowledge, there is no inclin!.tion
herefore, the cause to act. Thus in the case of the sentence ~'liT.i'r '1~cr the instigator
, , '

!at this is a means is not the vague property of being a means to something desired,
 ----~----------, . .- ..- -

34 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS INTRODUCTION

but the specific property of being a means to heaven; this is to be different meanings, is (
considered the instigator. (see [IV.B.24J). ,KaUJ}.9abhatta agrees and the fault is avoid,
[IV.G.3]. But this position creates the following problem: this of the use of lIN, the
will mean that in every instance of the injunction, lIN will have a the object of desire. '
different meaning. Thus in 1:'!<1'll1,'-i <£~Q lIN means the proPerty of the property of beiJ
of being a means to heaven. But in other instances of the use of since this cannot be ob
lIN, it would come to mean the property of being a means to getting property that must be '
a son, or all wishes etc., as the case may be. One suffix will have <'<£<'110:. '>:FP':{1'l:. \ [IV.B.t
too many meanings, and as a result, significative association (sa1JZ- [B-3] The Pra
ketagraka) would be impossible. No one will be able to knQw all sadhaliatvla as a mean

I
the different meanings of lIN. - not be an instigator i
It is in order to avoid this fault of aneklithakritva, that it has means to an unspecifi.
been suggested that desire here should be taken as a consecutive meaning of lIN . . It i
character (anugamikli or anugata dharma) of all these different specified desired end
limitors of the property of being the denoted meaning of lIN. (For fault of having too r
a detailed discussion about sakyatlivacchedaka 'the limitor of the answer provided for t
property of being the denoted meaning', see note 1 on [IV.B.25]). The case of lIN is not
The use of this idea of a consecutive character can be illustrated case of tad, the use c
with the case of the pronoun (third person) tad. The same fault there is a l;mitor to 1
of having too many meanings existR· in this case also. In differ-ent , character. . This limi
instances 6f the use of the pronoun 'tad, the !)roperty of being its cognition. If in the
denoted- meaning
, may pervade .such widely different· properties as there is a lit:nitor, at
studentness, mountainness, mouseness, tigerness ",tc. If all these arises. Those who b
pervaded properties are accepted as the denoted meanings 0.£ the of the limitor, be a
pronoun 'tad, it will only result in there being innumerable denoted istasiidhanatva cann
meanings for tad. This is not desirable. To avoid this fault then, .. This objection 1

I,
one must find a property which will be pervasive (vylipaka) enough
to pervade all the innumerable individual meanings which are all out that both in th
vyapyaor pervaded properties. This property; being common to all
the knowledge of tb
the area of denotati
the possible individual meanings, is cailed the consecutive character. I 'knowledge of the ,
In the case of tad, such consecutive character is vakt!buddhivi~ayatva
'the property of being the object of the speaker's intellect~ This pro- saktigraha 'signific;
perty is common to all the different meanings of tad encountered in for that which is Ii
different instances of its use. This results in -there being only one de- speaker's thought,
hated meaning, and thus the fault of anekiirthakatva is avoided. In the to that which is lim'
case of lIN also, it can be shown that there is a consecutive character thing. In the case
present in all the individual meanings of lIN. This common pro- the words such a,
perty is that they are all objects of -desire (~ta). Thus it is that, sp~cify, the object •
the property of being a means to a desired end, common to all these In a way, thi

L

ENSES AND MOODS
~aven; this is to. be
:tUI;Ir;iabhatta agrees
ng problem: this
111, liN will have a
neans the property
mces Df the use of
a means to. getting
'ne suffix will have
I
•
: association (sam-
e able to. know ~ll
Ikdtva, that it has
I as a consecutive
all these different
ning of liN. (For
the limitor of the
1 on [IV.B.25]).
can be illustrated
. The same fault
also. .- In- different
perty of being its
rent properties as
etc. If all these
meanings of the
lUmerable denoted
id this fault then,
(vyiiP7ika) enough
Jgs which are all
ing common to. all
,ecutive character.
trbuddJhivi$ayatva
!tellect' .This pro-
ad encountered in
}eing only one de-
: is avoided. In the
secutive character
'his common pro-
Thus it is that,
nmon to all these
---------------------
INTRODUCTION 35
different meanings, is considered to. be the denoted meaning of liN,
and the fault is avoided. However, in all ~he individual instances
of the use of liN, the cognition o.f meaning must be specific about
the object of desire. Since thus volitional activity needs cognition
of the property Df being a means to. a specific object of desire, and
since this cannot be obtained from anything o.ther than lIN, it is this
property that must be the meaning of lIN. Il:.ei '"f <.<!'lf~"l<T<'ll1;r;:<[05-
+<[<qi<1:. 1lJ'f'lB:,\ [IV.B.26]).
[H-3] The Prabhlikaras object to. this. They say that i$ta-
siidhanatvla as a meaning o.f lIN is hard to justify. It certainly can-
- not be an instigator if it is taken to. be just the property of being a
means to an unspecified desired end. Therefore, it cannot then be the
meaning of lIN. It is true that the property Df being a means to. a
specified desired end does instigate one to act. But this creates the
fault of having too many meanings as explained above. As to. :he
answer provided for this fault of anikiirthakatii, it cannot be accepted.
The case of lIN is not the same as the case of the pronoun tad. In the
case of tad, the use of the idea of a co.nsecutive character works, but
the,e is a limito.r to this property that is being used as a consecutive
. character. This limitor is bodhyabuddhi 'knowledge of. the object of
cognition. If in the same way, it is said that in the case of lIN also,
there is a Ihpitor, and this limitor is desire, then the foHowing fault
- arises. Those who have renounced all desires, will not, in the absence
of the limitor, be able to cognise the meaning of lIN. Therefore,
i~tasiidhanatva cannot be accepted as a meaning of lIN.
This objection has been answered by KauDr;iabhatta by pointing
out that both in the case of tad and in the case of lIN respectively,
the knowledge of the object o.f cognition and of desire does not enter
the area of denotation, i.e., one does not have to have bodhJl1abuddhi
'knowledge of the object of cognition' or ic.cha 'desire' to have the
saktigraha 'significative association'. tad has a denotative functio.n
for that which is limited by the pro.perty of being the object of the
speaker's thought, and lIN has a denotative function with respect
to that which is limited by the property of being the means to a desired
thing. In the case of tad, the context helps. In the case of lIN also,
the words mch as 'heaven' etc., that are uttered along with lIN,.
specify the object of desire. (see [IV.D.ll]).
In away, this represents a slight shift in the view of Kaul).4a-
"- --,--~ -~~,,--
 36 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS INTRODUCTION

bhatta. Previously (in [IV.B.24J), he had insisted that UN itself sedha, see note 2 on
denoted the property of being the means to a specified object of to signify niVl(lrtanii
desire. Now, however, it seems that, in order to get out of the diffi- done)'. To do this,
culty raised by the Prabhakaras, he is suggesting that liN itself the verb form. How
denotes only the property of being a means to a desired result. The normally connected v
desired result is not at this point specified. But it is specified by verb and the negative
means of the words such as 'heaven' etc., that accompany the use as compared to the s'
of liN. ticle because of the ir:
[IJ Refutation of the opponents of the i$tsiidhanatva view. is that the verb mean
[I-I] kjtisiidhyatva cannot be a meaning of liN. of the suffix, i.e., b.hii, .
The 'Naiyayikas accept krtisiidhyatva 'feasibility' as one of the ber which is subordil
instigators and thus as one of the meanings of lIN. The arguments further connected wil
in favour of this have already been stated (see [E-2]). KaUJ.l~a­ pound riij,a[Juru$G 'J
bhatta has leaned on Anandatirtha, his commentator ]ayatirtha; and connected with the
Nrsirphi'israma, for the refutation of this view. ZFi!3;1i""ll'!j'f'l' 'bring
krtisiidhyatva means anything which can be accomplished by connected with the
action. If this is accepted as an instigator, there will be inclination brought. It is conne
for prohibited things such as killing a brI'ihmaI)a etc. For, the killing man is brought. In
of a brahmaI)a is also something which can be accomplished with of a verbal suffix is tJ
action, and is thus feasible. In order to avoid this fault, it is nece~­ is subordinate to th,
sary that krtisiidhyatv.a not- be accepted as the instivator. If only not normally conne(
, i!ftasiidhanatv;a is an instigator, then such fault would not arise, since the suffix. This is '
the killing Of a brahm'aI)a does not produce anything desired. On the such as the paryud
other hand, it produces demerit, which will surely lead to hell Thus in the exampl,
[IV.B.8].
krtisiidhydtvaviidi shows that this objection is irrelevant, since . the meaning of the \
root, I.e., b.hak$a1Ja '.
it also applies to the view that the goal of action is the means to a produced by action';
desired end, and also because it cannot really be called a fault at all,
particle should be co
since the inclination to do prohibited things is well known and thus
brings about the sec
if the instigatot applied in the case of a prohibited action like adultery,
duced by action'. . V:
it is just what is to be expected. Since adultery also has the property
of being a means to a desired end, namely, sensual pleasure, inclina- this would mean "!iii
tion to commit aduLtery is there even if the property of being a means produced by action'.
to a desired result were the only instigator. This objection therefore, The krf;isiidhya
cannot refute krtisiidhYlatva as being the. instigator, since both the same objection is tn
sides are equally at fault [IV.B.I6]. meaning of lIN. B
. Another objection against the krt'isiidhyatva view is that if that thing desired, nam,
is accepted as a meaning of liN, there will be difficulty in connecting Four different·
it with the negative particle in the. ordinary negation (prasajyaprati- difficulty. For a dis
lNSES AND MOODS INTRODUCTION 37
ted that UN itself §edha, see note 2 on [IV.B.17]) Negative sentences are considered
specified object of to signify nivartana 'turning away (from that which is not to be
set out of the diffi- J
done) '. To do this, the negative particle has to be connected with
ng that UN itself I the verb form. How is that done? The negative particle cannot be
esired result. The normally connected with the meaning of the verb, even though the
it is specified by verb and the negative particle are closer and without any intervention
ccompany the use as compared to the suffix which is farther off from the negative par-
ticle because of the intervening verb in between. The reason for this
:atva view.
f lIN.
lity' as one of the .
I is that the verb meaning is subordinately connected with the meaning
of the suffix, i.e., bhavana 'bringing about, causing (to be)'. A mem-
ber which is subordinately connected with something cannot then be
'. The arguments further connected with some other thing. For example, in the com-
E--2] ) . Kaunda- pound rajapurU$a 'king's man', the word 'king' is subordinately
or Jayatirtha; 'a'nd connected 'with the second member 'man'. Thus in the sentence
~l<i'rli'q'+!H'! 'bring the king's man', the verb 'bring' cannot he
accomplished by
connected with the subordinate member' 'king'. . The king is not
viII be inclination
. For, the killing brought. It is connected with the main member 'man', and thus the
ccomplished with man is brought. In the same way, since in a verb form, the meaning
fault; it is neces-· of a verbal suffix is the qualificand and the meaning of the verbal root
3tivator.. If only' is .subordinate to the meaning of the suffix, the negative. particle is
ld not arise, since not normally connected with the subordinate verbal root, but with
: desired. Ori the the suffix. This is the general rule. It does have some exceptions
ely lead to hell such as the paryudasa, which however does not concern us here.
Thus in the example ;:{ '!i<'5:;>;;i -g:;>'"Ilcr 'one should not eat kalanja',
, irrelevant, since the meaning of the verb form is divided.as the meaning of the verbal
3 the means to a root, i.e., bhak§a1Ja 'eating' + the meaning of UN (in this case 'being
led a "fimlt at all , produced by action'). This being the ordinary negation, the negative
known and thus particle should be connected with the meaning of the suffix llN, which
ion like adultery, brings about the sequence na kriyajanJlia1J! or kfi;isadhya1J! 'not pro-
has the property duced by action'. When it is connected with the rest of the sentence,
pleasure, inclina- this would mean '!i<'l~[l::ra:loi ;:{ %:;n""'1l1: 'the eating of kalafija is not
of being a means produced by action'. This makes no sense.
jection therefore, The krtisiidhyatvaviidi answers this objection by saying that the
, since both the same objection is true even if 4tasiidhanatva alone is accepted as the
meaning of llN. Because eating of the kalafij,a does produce some-
w is that if that thing desired, namely satisfaction of hunger (trpti) etc. [IV.I.I].
ty in connecting Four different explanations have been offered to get out of. thin
(prasajyaprati- difficulty. For a discussion of these, see sections [IV.I.4] to [IV.I.8].
 ---.~,.----- -- -~-- -~--- ._--_._._- -~---~----------.--- .. ----- .... -----------------.- .. ~,---

INTRODUCTION
38 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS

perform such a Eacrifi

Thus finally it is established that the fault of not being able to
is explained very well
connect the negative particle with liN in the ordinary negation does
is considered to be the
not exist in the 4tasiidhanatva view.
Nrsirp.hasrama argues hat since krtisiidhyatva can be gotten Here it should bE
from another source, namely, from the relation of the verbal root' aversion (dve~a) as ar
and its suffix, it cannot be the meaning of lIN. This is based on the ing balavadani$trmm~
wellknown maxim anany.alabhya~sabdartha~. Only that meaning greatly undesired,resu:
which cannot be obtained by any other means (i.e., from another hand, (f:ee [IV.B.28]
element in the sentence), is accepted as the meaning of the word in p:orty of entailing a gr
question.. (Vedantatattvaviveka, p. 67). Even if, just the meaning activity. However, h
feasibility is available from liN, that cannot be the instigator by as an instigator. Th
itself. It needs to be qualified by the element of self·refepence consider the absence·
(mada~av'iS4.{atva). This cannot be got from the Veda. Further, result, i.e., balavadim
the meaning feasibility is not even an instigator. The noninclination activity, it is easier at
to acts which are not feasible, can be explained by the aversion a strong undesired re
created by the fact that the efforts wasted on it produce nothing there is no inclinatio
[IV.B.22]. Therefore kitisadhyatva cannot be a meaning of lIN. Ka~9abhatta 1
[I-2] balavadan4tananuhandhitva is not a meaning of lIN. property of being tr
The arguments in favor of accepting balavadanistan,anubandhitva .:onsidered to be th~
'the property of not entailing a greatiy undesired ~~sult', have been ' aversion, even with f1
-discussed 'already in [E--4]. KaUlJ9abha~ta'does not accept this pro- something undesired;
perty as an instigator, and therefore, it cannot be a meaning of lIN known. But when 1
according to him either. 'He points out that'there is no way to Therefore, it is aver
determine how much suffering will be, a deterrent factor in the case of Once this is accepte
different activities and in the case of different individuals faced with is not necessary.
the choice to undertake the same activity. There will be no inclina- As I mentioned
• , does not accept the p
tion to act when the action involv~d needs a great deal of effort. And
sometimes, depending on the person concerned, even a little trouble :as one of the instiga
will be enough to obstruct the inclination to act. Therefore, rather ledge of the propert
than attributing the absence of inclination to act to the absence of an there is strong aver
instigator, (i.e., balavadani$tananubandlzitva), it would be better tively, a strong aver.
to say that, the noninclination to act is caused by the aversion (dve$a) a deterrent to activi
that the person concerned has for that particular undesirable tlling. [1-3] krttyu
That the personal element is very much operative can be seen by the For the discuss:
fact that a sacrifice such as Jyoti~toma, which involves a great deal which all activities: ,
of effort arid expenditure, does not appeal to some people. In these thus the meaning 0
people, therefore, there is no inclination to perform such a sacrifice. According to him,
The trouble involved is for them, an effective deterrent (pratiban- means to heaven the
dhaka). However, somebody else might be very much iriclined to

----~
 rENSES AND MOODS INTRODUCTION 39

of not being able to perform such a sacrifice, in spite of all the trouble involved. This
iinary negation does is explained very well if personal aversion about a particular action
is considered to be the deterrent for the individual concerned.
1tva can be gotten Here it should be pointed out that KaUl)ic;iabhatta has accepted
of the verbal root· aversion (.dve$a) as an independent deterrent in order to avoid accept-
fhis is based on the ing balavadani~tiinanubandhitva 'the property of not entailing a
Only that meaning greatly undesired.result' as an instigator. NrsirphMrama ort the other
' ,
( I.e., "rom another hand, (~ee [IV.B.2S]), with the same objective, considers the pro-
ning of the word in perty of entailing a greatly undesired result itself as a deterrent to all
if, just the meaning activity. However, he does not accept the absence of this property
, the .instigator by as an instigator. This avoids prolixity. For, instead of having to·
'nt of self-reference consider the absence 6f the property of entailing a greatly undesired
the Veda. Further, result, i.e.. balavadlrln4tiinanubandhitva in every case of volitional
The noninclination activity, it is easier and less prolix to assume the propertY of causing
d by the aversion a strong undesired result (balaoodan4tas,(idha1'llatva) in cases where
it produce nothing there is no inclination to act.
a meaning of UIir. Karn:rc;iabhatta however rejects NrsirphMrania's view that the
a meaning of IIIir. property of being the cause of greatly undesired result should be
~i§tiin,antCbandhitva considered to be the deterrent. As long as there is no personal
[ result', haye been .aversion, even with full knowledge that this activity is going to cause
Jot accept this pro~ something undesired; inclination to such acts as' adultery is· well
~ a meaning of UN Imown. But when there is aversion there is no inclination to act.
here is no way to Therefore, it is aversion that should be .accepted as the deterrent.
'actor in the case of Once this is accepted, balavadani§tananubandhitva as an instgator
ividuals faced with is not necessary.
will be no·inclina- A~ I mentioned earlier, even among the NaiYlayikas. Visvanatha
•
:leal of effo'Ft. And does not accept the property of not entailinng a strong undesired result
ven a little"trouble as one of the instigators. He also has proposed to accept the know-
Therefore, rather ledge of the property of being a means to something towards which
, the absence of an there is 3trong ayersion (balavaddv4tasadha1'llatiijnana) or alterna-
; would be better tively, a strong aversion itself (balavad dve~a~ - Mukta. p. 50S), as
e aversion (dvesa) a deterrent to activity instead (see [E--5]).
undesirable thi~g. [1-3] krttyuddesya apiirva is not a meaning of lIIir.
:an be seen by the
'olves a great deal For the discussion·of the Prabhakara view that apiirva, towards
people. In these which all activities are directed (krttyuddesya) is the instigator, and
n such a sacrifice. thus the meaning of lIIir, see JIG]. Kau~J.(;labhatta rejects this view;
[;errent (pratibanr According to him, it is the'-cognition of the property of being the
much inclined to meaI)S to heaven that is the instigator. And that can be justified even
 -----"--------------~--------.

40 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS INTRODUCTION

without apurva. What of the objections mentioned in [G-1] then? able in [IV.D.7J.
KaUl,lqabhatta challenges the basic position of the Pr~bhlikaras The Prabhakan
that it is not possible to denote the property of being a means with- that the knowledge'
out the interconnecting link apurva being present. He does not deny gator. And, accordil
that the sacrifice is impermanent, and thus it is not possible to denote (see [G-2J). Sino
it as a direct means to heaven. But, according to him, this does not that the knowledge'
preclude the possibility of its being cognised as a means in a general be the instigator, ar
way. In this kind of general cognition, it is not nece~"llry that the KaUl,lQabhatta
linking factor be present. 'produced by effort'.
Then KaUI):c;labhatta uses the same device of the upad-iina pra- KaUl)Qabhatta, is al
,ma1}a that the Prabhakaras had used to help their own theory (see Thus for example, 1
[G--3] ). As the Prabhakaras have said [G-1] , the linking factor action of eating (bh
is necessary in order to have semantic compatibility (yog- it is this action of e;
yaw)., It is thus the limitor of compatibility (yogyatavacchedaka).
thus karya. In the
Kaul)<;labhatta suggests that the same device of aupiidanika pramii1}a
root in 'question is
that the Prabhakaras have used to change the case ending from
to be done' is the sa
nominative to genitive, can be used to say that apurva, the connecting
Prabhakaras have
link, i.s also here available on the strength .of lIN's denoting the
The refutation
property of being a means to a desired end. apurva is thus available
as a meaning of IIi
in this way, and therefore, it is not necessary to consider it as ,a
of having too man)
denot,ed meaning.
Other arguments ~
The basic position of the Prll.bhakaras is that a/furva is the
cause directly preceding the desired result. The sacrifice, however, detail in my notes'
does not directly precede heaven. And the agent cognises only the here. Thus a/fUrva
immediately preceding cause, as the thing to be done [IV.C.4J. is made clear for tl
Therefore, since apurva is the immediately preceding cam,e, it is [J] Some problen
cognised as the thing to be done, and being thus karya, as the mean- [J-1J If it~a
ing of lIN. desired result' is a(
This position is met in the following way. It is less prolix to culty in explaining
say that the cognition of the property of being the means to a desired obligatory rites, sil
result is the instigator, rather than (0 accept what the Prabhakaras used by the Pr;abh .
say, namely, that the instigator is the cognition of being the means that lapurva is the
immediately preceding to the desired result. There is no evidence produce apurva (s<
that the part 'immediately preceding' is in any way necessary for view of course do I
instigation. Further, this immediately preceding cause can either be it is with that end
(1) the main means, or ,(2) the subordinate means. In (1) also, according to these
there can be two alternatives: (a) the cognition is in the form that . apurva is accepted
this is the main means, and (b) that this is apurva (svarupata~l the desired result.
'of itself'). All of these alternatives have been shown to be unaccept- something fruitless

L ..-.. ----~ _. _.- •. ~.............I

lNSES AND MOODS
INTRODUCTION
"d in [G--;lJ then?
the Prabhakaras
~ing a means with-
He does not deny
: possible to denote
him, this does not
neans in a general
necessary that the
the upiidiina pm-
. own theory (see
;he linking factor
Ipatibility (yo g_
yatavocchedaka) _
iidanika prama1Ja
:ase ending from
'a, the connecting
'iT's denoting the
is thus available
consider it as a
, of having too many meanings, has already been discussed in. [H-3J.
t apurv,a is the
crifice,
. however
. ,
ognises only the
done [IV.CAL
I:{
ng came, it is , is made clear for the i$tasadhanatva view.
;0, as the mean- 1 [J-l] If it$asadJv.anatva 'the property of being a means to a
is less prolix to
ans to a desired
fIe Prabhakaras
I1
eing the means
is no evidence
, necessary for
e can either be
In (1) also,
I
,II
I the form that
a (svarupatah
o be unaccej)t~
41
able in [IV.D.7].
The Pr;abhakaras have said. that in common experience, we see
that the knowledge 'this is to be done' ~<i: "'l~ll:. acts as an insti-
gator. And, according to them, apiirva is kiirYla 'the thing to be done'
(see [G--2J). Since apurva is kiirya, and since experience shows
that the knowledge 'this is to be done' leads to activity, apurva must
be the instigator, and thus the meaning of lIIV.
KaUl).~abha1;ta refutes this by pointing out that karya means
'produced by effort'. The property of being prodw;ed by effort, says
KaUl).~abhat1;a, is always located in the meaning of the verbal root_
Thus for example, bhok~ 'to eat' is a verbal root. It expresses the
action of eating (bJv.ak:W1Ja), which is produced by effort. Therefore,
it is this action of eating (bhai?$d!./Ja) that is the result of effort, and
thus karyo. In the case of the sentence ~lr'lill1[ 'filer the verbal
root in 'question is ya; 'to sacrifice', and therefore, the karya 'thing
to be done' is the sacrifice as explained above, and not ajYarva, as the
Prabhlikaras have claimed [IV.D.8].
The refutation of the Prlibhakara objection that i$tasiidhanatva
as a meaning of lIIV is hard to justify, since there .will be the fault
Other arguments against the Prabhakaras have been explained in
detail in my notes on section [IV.D.1-12], and need not be repeated
here,. Thus apiirva as the meaning of lIIV is also refuted and the path
[JJ Some problems in accepting the i~tasiidhanatva view.
'
desired result' is accepted as the only meaning of lIIV, there is diffi-
culty in explaining the inclination towards performing the fruitless
obligatory rites, since, no desired fruit is involved. This has been
used by the Pr;abhakaras as an argument in support of their view
that lapurva is the meaning of lIIV, because after all, these rites do
produce apurva (see [G-4]). The opponents of the i~tasadhana'tva
view of course do not admit that .apiirva results from these rites, and
it is with that end in view that these acts are performed. These acts,
according to these people, are completely and utterly fruitless. If
apiirva is accepted as resulting from them, even that will suffice as
the desired result. Even an ignorant man does not feel inclined to do
something fruitless. How then is the performance of these rites to be
 - - - _ . ----_..

42 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS INTRODUCTION

explained? At least three

Kaul,lc;labhatta, in support of his view, brings in several smfti meet this objection
verses (BhagGi. 18.5,6 etc.) , which do attribute some sort of fruit to (a) the verb
these rites. Thus these rites cause purity according to the Gila verses· meaning for this ,
mentioned above. They are the basis of briihmatJa-ness etc., according brought in the sta
to several floating s;lnrti verses [IV.E.5]. This justifies the inclina- not mean 'to kill'
tion towards the performance of these rites. Otl(erwise, i.e., if the (b) The pre
obligatory rites are considered to be fruitless, Veda would end up prescribed. Any I.
being unauthoritative [lV.E.9]. Various smyti and
Strangely enough, in all this discussion, KaUl):c;labhatta argues this positi.on.
in a way that makes it look as if he considers these various smrti (c) It is hi1?1
verses on par with Vedic injunctions. The whole argument that the the sacrifice, the d,
Veda would not be worthy of belief (.asraddheya) , if we do not accept .involved, is slight,
that these verses state the fruit for the obligatory rites, is astounding. fruit.
I t utterly loses its force when we consider that in fact, these are not Since in the (1
Vedic sentences. Orthodox pundits such as Vasudevasastn Abhyan- blem, and I have !
.kar have spoken out against this tendency of considering smrti valved in my not<
statements as arthaviidas etc. to a Vedic prescriptive sentence (see account of all the;
PrabM on i\.padevi, p. 200). . ' [J-3] Anoth
. [J.,2] The second problem to be raised is. also indicative of this islaslidhanatva vie'
same tendency on the part of the later writers to put smrti verses on kite! P. II.3.1. 1
par with Vedic injunctions. Thus it is said that the Vedic injunction expressed [elsewhe
(
"3l1;fltitl=it;t Qa!m.,1:ta- prescribes the sacrificing of an animal for the \ fore, the rule <P~
-deities Agni and Soma. Since there is an injunction for this act of strumental case is
sacrifice, it must be a means to something desired. However, there [when these mean
\ in the sentence] .
is a prohibition;r ~<:lfr'( 'one should not kill'. This is in direct
<{~cr 'the persc
,contradiction to the injunction mentioned above, and creates the
Jyoti 9\oma' (i.e., I
problem of reconniling the two. Now, this prohibition';r ~<:lfr'(
the Jyoti~oma is .
occurs in the Mahabha. santi parva, 269.5. It is not found anywhere \ mental case is uSt'
directly in the Vedic literature itself. Thus it is surprising that a objected that, if i
smrti verse should be brought forward as contradictory to the Vedic \ something desired'
sentences and treated as if it were itself a Vedic sentence. This shows jyot4tomena will :
the later bias against the killing of animals in a sacrifice, and can karm]a 'the main
'always be justified by the device of taking recourse to some lost sruti therefore, instrum
as a base for the smrti statement's authority. This is not at all un- meaning. The we
usual, and as a matter of fact, is quite typical of the later writers of have to take on th
all the schools. used where the mE

NSES AND MOODS
:s in several smfti
me sort of fruit to
: to the 'GIta verses
Jess etc., according .
.stifies the inclina-
erwise, i.e., if the
da would end up
l'l.lQabhatta argues
lese various smr ti
lrgurnent that the
f we do not accept
tes, is astounding.
'act, these are not
;vasastn Abhyan-
considering smrti
;ive sentence (see
) indicative of this
lt smrti verses on
! Vedic injunction
m animal for the
I islasadhanatva view, is as follows. Consider the Paninian rule anabhi·
on for this act of
However, there
This '.1s in direct
and 'creates the
ilibition ;r ~~1FI:.
t found anywhere
surprising that a
tory to the Vedic
mee. This shows
;acrifice, and can
to some lost sruti
is not at all un-
.. Ie later writers of
i
...t.._
.-~-~---- - - -- ---- --- -.~---.
~:-
INTRODUCTION 43
At least three different kinds of answers have been offered to
meet this objection :
,..
(a) .the verb a + /ab.h does not here mean 'to kill'. The Vedic
meaning for this verb is 'to touch' instead. In support of this is
brought in the statement 'I,'IFl1Oli=rCl where it undoubtedly does
not mean 'to kill' in context.
(b) The prohibition applies only to that hir}lSa which is not
i prescribed. Any prescribed hirJzsa does not count as hirrzsa at all.
Various smrti and pura'IJa verses have been brought in to support
this position. .
Ii
(c) I t is hil!ISii. But compared to. the great fruit resulting from
the sacrifice, the demerit and the resultant suffering from the hirrzsa
i involved, is slight, and therefore, is borne in order to gain the greater
fruit.
I
f
I
Since in the text, a whole section [IV.l] is devoted to this pro-
blem, and I have given exhaustive explanation of the arguments in-
t volved in my notes, I shall not repeat myself by giving a detailed
I account of all these arguments here.
[J-3] Another ~ and rather technical - objection against the
kite! P. li.3:i~ This rule, (~vhen lth~ meaning concerned] IS not
expressed [elsewhere]), is understood in all the karaka rules. There-
fore, the rule -9i~'f,~lJP-i1~Q:cTtql I P. II.3.1S, would mean that the in-
strumental case is used to express the agent and the main means
[when these meanings are not already expressed by another element
in the sentence]. The sentence in question is : Gl:ilfcHDi'i<r ,'liT;;;11'l--'r
~ 'the person desirous of heaven should sacrifice with the
Jyoti~toma' (i.e., he should perfonn the lyoti$toma sacrifice). Here'
the 1yoti$1:oma is the kara'IJa 'main means', and therefore, the instru-
mental case is used in accordance with P. II.3.IS. Now, it can be
objected that, if Uitasiidhanatvla 'the property of being a means to
something desired' is accepted as the meaning of UN, then this usage
jyotUitomena will have to be considered as unjustified. The meaning
karmJa 'the main means' is already expressed by the. suffix lIN, and
therefore, instrumental case ending cannot by used to express that
meaning. The word jyot4toma, thus deprived of its case ending, will
have to take on the nominative case ending. For, nominative case is
used where the meaning concerned is already expressed by something
 44 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS INTRODUCTION

else, and only the meaning of the nominal base in question is to be are answered, oppos
denoted. There would thus result the .undesirable sentence *jyot- refuted, and it is est;
i$.{oma1.z svarglakiimo yajetal ing of lIN.
Three different schools have offered four different explanations .
IK] 9i.~9rfG:Hl;;n~ .
to get out of this difficulty. These are as follow:
[K-l] In my
(a) Kaury9abhatta, as a Grammarian, explains this away by
IIV.G.4] to the prob
saying that even if lIN does express the property of being a means,
the acceptance of Val
it does not express its locus, and thus the use of the instrumental
sentences in the intI
case in the form jyoti$(olme11la can be justified by saying that it ex-
In the beginninl
pressed the locus. In support is brought in kiirikii 24 of the V.B.
(b) . Madhav,acarya, the author of the ]aiNyaMa. explains the (S1) 9i.~T91f<t
use of the instrumental, by saying that, the means expressed by lIN object with a shell-Ii
is the yiiga 'sacrifice', the meaning of the verbal root yaj. jyoti$!oma (S,) . eri'r ~TI~a
is a separate nominal base, denoting a specific' sacrifice, -and is thus . (S 3) *o:eri'r ~1f.
not denoted by lIN. KaU1).9abhai;ta rejects this explanation, (see' All of these sen
[IV.F.3] ), because after all, the relation of nondifference exists That which is abser
between jyot4toma and the yiiga denoted by the verbal root. absence. For examp
(c) This view belongs to the Naiyayikas, according to whom, absence in that sent
the verbal affix denotes agentness etc., rather than the meaning agent posse~ed of the pro
accepted by the Grammarians (see [A-6]). Thus anabhihitel speaks of the .absenc"
. P. 11.3.1 would mean 'when ·agentness-. etc. are- not expressed'. what is spoken of as
P. II.3.18 then introduces the instrumental case to express agentness (avacchedaka). .In
and the property of being the main means (kara1Jatva): Even if question is one whie
. liN does denote the property of being a means (siidhanatva) , it does (i.e., counterpositivi
not denote the property of being the main means (kara~zatva), and limitor of counterpo
thus the use of the instrumental case to express this meaning is the property comme
justified. (gha(atva) .
(d) ·The fourth view definitely does not belong to the Gram-
In tS,\ one s
marians. It seems to belong to some authors in the Nyaya school,
since the basis of it, i.e., that P. II.3,1 is interpreted to mean 'when relatum: it is absl
absence. Here agai
number is not expressed', is found in some Nyaya texts (see
Further, again, then
MaryiDa. p. 120;. TattvaCin. vol. IV., part 2, pp. 843-4). In the
present case, the number is expressed. But it is syntactically vacchedaka 'limitor
connected with the agent. The meaning 'agent' also can thus be vacc.hedaka, see not!
considered to have been expressed. The meaning kara1J1a however, . Now, as conce
is not expressed, and thus to express the main means, the use of the -anvayitiivacchedaka
instrumental ending is justified. This view has also been rejected by speaking about a pc
KauryQabhatta (see [IV.F.6]). [K.-,2] Consirl<
Thus all the main arguments against the i$taslidhanatva view particular kind of p
 i TENSES AND MOODS
INTRODUCTION 45-
;e in question is to be
irable sentence *jyot- are answered, opposing views belonging to the other schools are
refuted, and it is established that 4f,asiidhanatva alone is the mean-
different explanations ing of liN.
w: IK] 91+~'nfG:H1mR<l I <:'l'T911111 ;:;l{nm!IB<r <[~cr
~plaius this away by [K-l] In my notes on Ramakr~a Bhattaaarya's solution
rty of being a means [IV.G.4J to the problem of discrepancy [IV.G.l] and, to avoid that,
~ of the instrumental the acceptance of vaijiitya, [IV.G.3] I promised to discuss these two
by saying that it ex- sentences in the introduction (see [IVJG.4]).
iirikii 24 of the V.B. In the beginning, let us take the following three sentences :
, NyaMa. explains the (S1) '!i~>n'1l1~l11mR<l (~~) 'there is on the ground, no
aus expressed by lIN object with a shell-like neck etc.'.
root yaj. jyoti~tom;a
(S,) '9~1 ;:rTI~cr ~~ 'there is no pot on the ground'.
sacrifice, and is thus
tis explanation, (see (S3) <r103'9i\ <rlftcr ~cr~ 'there is no blue pot on the ground'.
nondifference exists All of these sentences denote absence (abhava) of something.
~ verbal root. That which is absent is termed pratiyogin 'counterpositive' of an
according to whom , absence. For example, the pot of (S,) is a counterpositive of the
n the meaning agent absence in that sentence. The pot is thereby also spoken of as
Thus anabhihitel posses.sed of the property pratiyo gita 'counterpositiveness'. (S,)
ire 'not expressed'. speaks of the absence of a thing -'a pot. In such cas,es, ,one delimits
to express agentness what is spoken of as absent, by means of a property which is it limitor
I l~a1Jatva). Even it" (avacchedaka) . In ,the pres~nt instance of (S,) the limitor in ,
;adhanatva) , it does .question is one which delimits the pr~perty of being what is absent
IS (kara~zatva), and (i.e., counterpositiveness). This is a pnatiyogitiivacchedaka 'the
~s this meaning is limitor of counterpositiveness'. Here, the pratiyogitavacchedaka is
the property common to all pots and only pots, namely, potness
elong';'to the Gram- (gkatatva) .
I the Nyaya school, In tS" one speaks of a pot not merely as such, but also as a'
eted to mean 'when relatum: 'it is absent somewhere. It is thus related (anvita) to
Nyaya texts (see absence. Here again, one has a property relatedness (anvayita).
)p. 843-4). In the Further, again, there is a limiting property. This is the anvayitii-
it is syntactically vacchedaka 'limitor of relatedness' (for a discussion of anvayita-
, also can thus be vacchedaka; see note 1 on [IV.C.S]).
,g karaf/la however, Now, as concerns (S,) the pratt yo gitiivacchedaiui and the
!ans, the use of the anvayitavacchedaka are the same: ghatatva 'potness'. For, one is
so been rejected by speaking about a pot pure and simple.
, [K-2] Consider now (S3) In the latter, one is speaking of a
:faslidhanatva view particular kind of pot - a blue one. Further, consider the follow-
 -----------------

46 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS INTRODUCTION

ing. Given that there is a blue pot on the ground; one should not be [K-4] Analysis
\
able to say of this situation: . (SJ (-.::r) erzr ;:rJmr 'there is no Assume that lIN
pot here'. For this is false in the situation. (a) <;'lir~+!HTf<I
Now consider the following paraphrases of (S.) and (Sa) being the limitQr of
(S.) erz<'1T'Ifi;w;r!fR'rltfrraJ'IlT1'lJ'I'I'r.- ~<i>B:. [this is a paraphrase of with heaven', and (b
(S,)] The ground is qualified by an absence which has its counter-
In effect, the al
positiveness limited by potness. this property does TIC
are absent in the san:
(So) ;:fi<i>"iZi9J'Ifi;£9;;r!fRr'-!rfirCiT'liT1iT'I'i'r. 'LQ(i)+!.
[this is a para- 'Further, through
phrase of (Sa)]. The ground _is qualified by an absence which is predicated of the 's
has its counterpositiveness delimited by blue-pot-ness. same locus as heavel
If, now, instead of (S,,) we say that . (S.) is a paraphrase of .Now, to get an
(S,) also, we commit the fault noted above. To avoid this, we [IV.G.1] ), without ~
say that absence has as its counterpositive that which belongs to the again (S,) The pc
class delimited by the avayiUivacchedlaka 'limitor of the class of re- conjunction (sa1J1yog
lated things'.' Thus it is said in our text: a:F'II'lClT'I"~C::9il'lfi;£9;;r!ffu­ on the ground'. H
'subjunct of a relati<
>frfiraT'Il<'1c~,qRI : ( 3l1'lT'I~'1) [IV:G.4].
Similarly, (a) :
[K-3] Consider now (S,) Here the anvayiUivacchedaka is particular relation.· t1
ka1Jlbugriviidi.11Jdttva 'the property of having a shell-like neck etc.'.
But this composite of properties (gurudharma. 'prolix property') , "~<::<f,<'1<'1i'l~;;J!ffW!f
is not really necessary here. For, the only things which have all positiveness delimitec
these properties are indeed pots (ghata) . .For the sake of brevity imitor of counterpc
then, we may reject this prolix property in favor of glwt,atva 'potness' distinct heaven : (s
in one way (gurudharmiinavachhEdakapak~e [IV.G.4]). . reading ).
The meaning UI
(SI) and (S,) are distinguished in terms of their connota- property of being the
tions, by means of different anvayitaVlacchedakas: (S) - km'(lbu- as h ea ven <;'1~+!FlT
grlvltdimattva, (S,) - ghatatva. However, (S,) and (S,) both the relation of the pr'
denote an absence which has as its counterpositive a pot. Hence, im ited by the state <
the pnatiyogiUivacchedaka of both the sentenoes would be the same, lhedaka of absolute:
i.e., ghatatva 'potness'. Simply put, jYOtiStOII'
Therefore, the principle is accepted: whenever possible, the prati- i n the same locus as
yogiUivacchedaka should not be a prolix property (gurudharma). being absent when tl
In (S. ) etc.. th
- Alternatively, one can, on account· of sentences such as (S,) and
'the prop€rty of be
(S.l) insist that, an absence always has as its counterpositive, what Bhattadirya does TIC
is limited by the anvayitiivacchedaka. In short, in these cases, the daka. vaijiitya thus
following is true : anvayitiivacchedaka =' prati yo gitiivacchedaka. lIN according him.
 ENSES AND MOODS
I, one should not be
;:;r~ 'there is no
(S.) and (S,)
; is a paraphrase of
!(;h has its counter-
[this is a para-
an absence which
It-ness.
is.a paraphrase of
To· avoid this, we
·hich belongs to the
: of the class of re-
~Cl'9'O~G;9i19f''19mrRr-
~ayitavacchedaka is
,hell-like neck etc.'.
'prolix property'),
ngs which have ali
the sake of brevity
'f ghatatva 'potness'
V.GAl) .
1S of their connota-
: (S,r' - kalJlbu-
S,) and (S.) both I The meaning understood from (S, ) is then: the absence of the
I
:ive a pot. Hence,
would be the same ,
prati-
r possible, the
rty (gurudharma).
s such as (S.) and I b eillg absent when there is a partioular heaven.
,unterpositive, what
in these cases, the
1 'the property of being a particular heaven'. However, RIil.makr~a
7gitiivacchedaka.
INTRODUCTION 47'
[K-4] Analysis of (S,) ~'1ii9il.il "'ilRnni=l;:; ~Cl
Assume that lIN has a composite meaning consist;ng of :
(al ~qfrt!+lFfTN'll~UJ1+Tl'1J;Jrcrnl<rcr19'O~C::'ll<9l{ 'the property of
being the limitor of counterpositiveness of an absence coreferentiaI
with heaven', and (b) 31+119: 'absence'.
In effect, the absence of (a) is conveyed for jy(Jti~t(Jmatva :
this property does not delimit a class of things (sa{;rifices), which
are absent in the same locus as an absence of svar gao
Further, through the intermediary of jyoti$tomatva, this absence
is predicated of the sacrifice, which is then said to be absent in the
same locus as heaven.
.Now, to get around vyabhicara 'discrepancy' (see note 2 on
[IV.G.1]), without admitting vaijiitya as denoted by lIN, consider
again (8.) The pot is related to the ground through the relation
conjunction (sa1!1yoga) , e.g., (S,) bhutale ghrtta~ 'there is a pot
on the ground'. Hence, for (S.) the ground is the anuyogin
'subjunct of a relation', of absence of a pot through conjunction.
Similarly, (a) and (b) denoted by UN are related through a
particular relation. this is (c) feI;;jl~frt!m'l1f'C{9i~UJ1<!lralm"J;J:Rr~mCl19:-·
'O~G;9i"'''''9R'3;;{J;JRr1'lmCll'li'''l{ 'the property of having the counter-
positiveness delimited by .the state of being the property of being the
imitor of counterpositiveness of absolute absence coreferential ·with a
distinct heaven : (see note 3 on [IV. G. 4] for a discussion of this.
readillg ).
property of being the prgtiyogitavccchedaka of absence in the same locus
as heaven "'lir~+lFnN'f.~UJ1Bi"Cll'119>rI<1<llmal<j"'~'f.<"1'i\s+lI'l: , through
the relation of the property ofhavillg the counterpositiveness of absenee.
lim ited by the state of being the property of being the pratiyogitiivacc-
hedaka of absolute absence in the same locus as a particular heaven.
Simply put, jyotistomaiva does not delimit a class of that which is absent
in the same locus as·heaven; this through the relation of Jyoj~toma not
In· (S, ) etc.. the anvayitlivacched~aka pas to be vijiitiyasvargatva
Bhattaoarya does not wish to accept vaijiitya as a pratiyogitiiva.cche-
daka. vaijiitya thus does not form a- part of the denoted meaning of
lIN according him. If the alternative mentioned in [K--3l, i.e. that
. ,,~." . - ..
~
. . ~ - ,----
 INTRODUCTION
48 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS

A.D. Thus KaUljr;lab:

even a prolix property has to be taken as a limitor of counterpositive-
seventeenth century.
ness ~~\Of+T~'l" ~ra'l"ltmrl'l~(9qaj is .a~cepted, t.hen .~he. absence i? A.D. (see Code 1954).
question must have as a counterposItrve what IS dehlll1ted by thIS [L--3] Kau9:r.lal
anvlayiti'ivacchedaka, namely, vijiitiy,asvargatva. Therefore the alter- all of them dealing wi
native, according to Rarnakr~a Bhattacarya, is to be accepted only shown his mastery 0,
when a negative particle (naii) is actually used. That is not the case the views of other si'is
in the sentence· ;;1flmmi'r., ~9lr'fll+!1 <!~q Thus there is no difficulty. KallJ)Qabhatta, as we
[L] The authors . taries on the Vaiyaka
[L-1] Bhattoji mk~ita, the author of the ki'iriki'is, and.his nephew Vaiyakaral).abhii.lla!l).a:
Kaurrdabhatta
" .. , the author of the Vaiyakaral)abhu$aJ;la, belonged to a bhiisail).a. The bigge
very illustrious family, wellknown for its scholarship in various published twice: fil
fields of sastric learning. Bhattoji Dik~ita's commentary on Pal)ini's then in the Bombay:
AstadhyaYl, with the rules arranged· in different sedions according' edition ralso includes
to' their use in various derivations, supplanted all previous works of unfortunately are. ain
that nature, and is used in traditional schools in India to this day. is no commentary a
His other two works on grammar (the sabdakaustubha and his auto- abridged version has
mmmentary on the Vaiyakaral)asiddhantakaumudii, called the they are. of ·liinited 1
Praudhamanorama) are also very much respected. But it is with and abstruse argumel
his f~urth work on grammar that we are concerned with now. This have been omitted it
work is variously referred to by. the following two names: Vaiya- of the Grammarians·
ka;'amimato~majjana and Vaiyakaraa;tasicldhantakarika. It is the to interprete this te~
latte; name that is more common. The ki'iriki'is of Bhattoji DIkliita .
As stated aboVE
summerise in a very condensed form, the views of the Grammarians
condensed form. E
concerning the problems of philosophical and semanic doctrines. Not semantic concepts iJ
all of these karikas are Bhattoji's own. Out of the total number of
marians'. views agair
seventy-six ki'irikiis, at least twelve can be traced directly to the of the Naiy1lyikas, :
Vakyapadiya of Bhartrhari. As S. D. Joshi has shown, there are
sakas etc.
other kiirikas that can also be traced to various different sources (see [M] The Lakiarar1
Joshi 1960, p. X). The Vaiyakaral)asiddhantakiirika is thus a col- [Moo'!] Thep
Jection of verses taken from various sources. Bhattoji put this collec- Lakarathanir]l}.aya .
tion together, adding some karikas of his own to it. version) . This sec
Katmdabhatta was the son of Bhattoji's brother RaIi.goji, who
theories about the
himself ~~s a w'~ll known Vedanta writ~r. KallIJ.Qabhatta refers to verbai endings repn
two of his works in this text: the Advaitasaroddhara (see [IV.G.18]), . the arguments of tho
and a Vrtti on the Brahmasiitra (see. [IV.J.17]). RaIi.gojibhatta some Ve&.nta writl
enjoyed the patronage of a kelasIi ruler of Ikkeri in the present Mysore views are defended:
state. This king's name was VeIi.katappa, and he ruled from 1560 cular section was t
to 1630 A.D. KaUl)r;labhatta, in his Tarkapnidipa has ref~rred to of the lakaras so fal
. another ke!aQl king, called Virabhadra. He ruled froin 1629 to 1645

:ENSES AND MOODS
Ir of counterpositive_
hen .the absence in
is delimited by this
Therefore the alter-
to be accepted only
That is not the case
ere is no diffkulty.
"kas, and his nephew
i~aJ).a, belonged to a
)larship in various
nentary on !'anini's
; sections acco~ding·
I previous works of
India to this day.
I hhiis3iJ).a. The bigger work, i.e., the VaiyakaraJ).abhu~aI).a has been
tubha and his auto-
l1llUdii, called the
,d. But it is with
~d with now. This
'0 names: Vaiya-
karika. It is the
)f Bhattoji Diksita
f the Grammari~ns
,nic doctrines. Not
he total number of
ed directly to the
; shown, there are
'ferent Sources (see
.rika is thus a col-
toji put this collec-
ther RaIi.goji, who
Qabhatta refers to
~ (see [IV.G.18]),
) . RaIi.gojibh<itia
he present Mys~~e
~ ruled from 1560
·a has referred to
'roin 1629 to 1645
---~.---- ---
INTRODUCTION 49
A.D. Thus Katll!~abhatta's date is fixed in the early part of the·
seventeenth century. P. K. Gode puts him between 1610 and 1660
A.D. (see Gode 1954) ..
[L-3] Kau¢J).abhatta is known to have. written seven works,
all of them dealing with Nyaya and VyakaraJ).a. He also has clearly.
shown his mastery over Mimfu:p.sa and. Vedanta in his discussions of
the views of other sastras in his works. The Vaiyakariu).abhii~ajI).a of
Katll!~abhat1;a, as well as his VaiyakaraJ).abhu~aJ).asara are commen-
taries on the VaiyakaraJ).asiddhantaldirika of his uncle Bhattoji. The
VaiyakaraJ).abhii~a!l)asara is an abridged version of the VaiyakaraJ).a-
published twice: first in the lBenares Sanslq't Series in 1900, and
then in the Bombay Sanskrt and PrakrtSeries in 1915. The second
edition 'alsO includes some 'notes on the text.. However, these notes
unfortunately are almost always silent Qnany·difficult pOint. . There
is no commentary available on the Bhu~al}.a either. "Though .. the
abridged version has been published with a immber of commentaries,
they are of limited use, since iri the abridged version, many major
and abstruse arguments from the rival schools of Nyaya'and M'imaqlsa
have been omitted in order to furnish just a straightforward account
of the Gramrriarians' point of view. All this makes it very diffictiIt
to interprete this text. .
As stated above, the kiiriki'is of Bhattoji Dik~ita are ina very
condensed form. KaUl}.~abhatta discusses these philosophical and
semantic concepts in greater detail, and tries to defend the Gram-
marians' views against the attacks made by the old and new schools
of the Naiyayikas, BMtta and Prabhakara schools of the MilIlil:q1-
sakas etc;
[MJ The Lakararthanil1l).aya
[M--I] The present work is an explanatory translation of the
Lakarathanil1l).aya of the VaiyakaraJ).abhU~3iJ).a (the unabridged
version). This section is devoted to the detailed analysis of the
theories .about the meaning of the I-members, i.e., the ten sets of
verbai endings representing tenses and modalities (see [A--2]). All
the arguments of the rival schools of Nyaya and Mimaqlsa as well as
some Vedanta writers have been brought in, and the Grammarians'
views are defended against them. The reason for choosing tl;tis parti-
cular section was that, little work has been done on the meaning
of the lakliras so far, and I felt that a beginning had to be made; ,
. - --.--- -- .------~''''- .. - .. _"----.
50 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS

I have divided the text of the LakaCarthanim.aya in seven major

sections. These divisions marked with Roman numerals are as
follows:
section I IAT
'II lIT TEX
" III lUT and lll-T
" IV lET
" V lOT
" VI IAN, lIN, !UN and lJ!N
" VII the question as to whether the meanings of these
" I-members are limited to those mentioned in' the [I.1] l<.'i Q<~ c::~
text. q<\l11;'t qD~
'"
fo!>:<ilC::l
,
QP~
These sections are further divided into smaller text passages, marked
with Arabic numerals, to make the sequence of argumeiJtsclear. Thus [The author1
text passages are normally numbered,as for example; [Ul, [VII.2]
by one as follows :
etc .. Thei fourth section dealing with the meaning of lET (i.e., of
lIN, since lET is introduced under the same meaning' conditions as "lAT etc., are to b
Ill'l) is very, large and practically takes up two thirds of the entire pre~ent; [past1 no
text. Hence, this section has been subdivided into eleven subsections, going to happen tc
each dealing with a specific argument. These then are again further reque3t etc." //22/
divided into smaller text passages. The subsectwns here are'marked 1. dasalakiirii1}iin
with a letter of the alphabet. Thus the text passages of the fourth , symbols: . lA
section are marked as for example: [IV.A.I] to finally [IV.J.34]. llY-N. For a c
Each indivisual numbered text-passage is followed by translation 2. pratyeka1!!:
and this translation is then folIowed by exhaustive explanatory notes I-memberS [ka
(indent~d and nUmbered for easy cross-reference) in which these in the first cha
difficult arguments have been made clear and discussed in detail. cular meaning
Therefore, a detailed account of these arguments is not necessary in individually.
the introduction, "and to avoid repitition, it has not been attempted the marker T
here. 3. vidhyiidaU:
KaUJ:lQabhatta's analysis of the meaning of the I-members takes UN (fol;s:if ~
into account all the contemporary thought of its time as well as 'trana 'summa
the earlier work done on the subject in various schools. Thus a so~ething wh
study of it is very important for thorough understanding of the con- sam pr.asna 'ir
tribution of the Neogrammarians, as well as the semantic theories, Se~ P. III.3.1
arguments and counterarguments put. forward by the schools of
As KaUl)
Nyaya, Vyakara;I).a and Mim.ftqwii. It was with this goal in view
that I have attempted to explain the text and the various theories explanations,
and arguments involved. . to elaborate 1:
 :lNSES AND MOODS
laya in seven major 'i,
I numerals are as
meanings of these
mentioned in the
t passages, marked
uneJ;1tsclear. Thus
pIe; [I.ll, [VII.2]
19 of lET (i.e., of
ning conditions as'
hirds of the entire
eleven s\1bsections,
I are again further
15 here are marked
ages of. the fourth
finally [IV.J.34].
v-ed by translation
explanatory notes
) in which these
scussedin detail.
3 not necessary in
,t been attempted
~ l-members talces
; time as well as
schools. Thus a
nding of the con-
;emantic theories,
T the schools of
this goal in view
! various theories
TEXT, TRANSLATION AND NOTES
SECTION ONE
[1.1 J ~<i 5l<lfi; <::OJ<?9il~lUfl1i~ ~fu \-
CIcll1T~ 'i{1~ "11 ':nf9;:<{~ <1f'i~<!fu \
f9~l:{T~T 5ll>.l<l1~ CIT 'lim~ ~l:{l oo:Sl<l:<!: \\ 'I. 'I. 1\ ( ~ )
... - - -
[The. author] describes the meaning of the ten [·members one
by one as follows : -'. . .'
"lAT etc., are to be understood respectively' in the following senses:
present; [past]. not witnessed [by the speaker) ; something that is'
going to happen tomorrow; future lin general] ; injunction etc., and
request etc." //2211 (1)
1. daSatakarii1}iim': I·members llakiirii~] are the ten Pfu:tinian
symbols: IAT, lIT, lUT, lJ!.T, lET, . lOT, lAN, lIN, lUN and
IJ!.N. For a dIscussion of these, see the introduction [A]. - .
2. pratyeka:J!l: 'of each, one by one'. The general meaning of the
I-members [kartr, karman, and b.hiiva] has already been discussed
in the first chapter [Dhatvarthanil1).ayaj of V.B. Now the parti-
cular meanings of each of the ten I-members are to be explained
individually. In this kiirikii, meanings of the six I-members with
the marker T are given.
3. vidhyiidau: lET is introduced to express the same meanings as
UN (f<l;S:>T ~~ P. III.4.7). Other meanings of lIN are niman-
"tra1}a 'summons'; iimantra1}a 'permission, asking someone to do
something which is not obligatory; adhi$tla 'respectful command';
sa1}'lpr,asna 'inquiry' or 'deliberation'; and priirthana 'request'.
See P. III.3.161 and Introduction [D-IJ.
As Ka~9-abhatta will be giving more detailed and precise
explanations while commenting on this kiirikii, it is not necessary
to elaborate here.
-
-_. ,- - .. ~--
-....
 SECTION ONE
52 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS

the meaning of
[ I.2 ] q"i 'I~ll"l;'jS ~ "E~ 'I<\ll"[;'j wf;gfq- <!."i1<J:, I 'I<\ll"H<<i' 'q ~l~~'if]q'I«1ll"Tff­ .that which brin
r.t:q:J1:lOll%CI<~ ~Cllirer.'{~;;r'!llw<ei '11 w{q;5[ffi:&:~ I CI"'I "q'qRr" to the signifier]
If(l:!l~'IM'W-\lTfT?.T'if:>-1,{lTf1''W!ll<rR.s~fu all"TG;l'{ m~>r1rn: I root does not (
1. 'For a discu
lAT is [to be understood] to refer to the present, on the strength of a verbal
of the rule vartamiine lett (P. III.2.123). Presentness is defined as 2. dhiitvartha
either (a) being characterised by an action which has begun but were the ill
not ended; or (b) the property of being a time other than past and whenever tl
future. [The latter is the definition] commonly understood in normal stiivaka 'or
usage. This is present in the activity beginning with putting a pot
does not C'
on the stove and ending in taking it down [when one uses forms like] denoted by
pacati 'he cooks' etc. It is with reference to that [activity] that verbal afib
fAT is used. 3: ~aktilJ: 1-
1. vaitamiinatvaf!l: 'presentness~ is here defined as m~~'<llqR- by Bhartrl
tlmffiSn'ilwPdCl<'fB: 'being characterised by an action which is sabdabrahr.
begun but not ended'.- What is really meant is m~~'ifT':rRtli:!m­ refers to th
f,j;'-l\'fWR:rCl'llTw<'lB: 'being a time which is characterised by an -meaning.
action that is begun but not ended.' The phrase given above cepted by ~
is omitted by KalJll:lQabhatta because it is well known that 4. For lAT to
vartamana is a Mia 'time'; . So commentators say: - !in:~'<lTi:rR-- verbal root
root does I
~!imf,j;'1)r:r"'MCI'!lTw<'fm(l:!'~: I 'f<1ll"F!<ql;" <fiTwnq,~;:c ~qf:J;~:r<lffi:&:''f1<J:, I it is not pc
(sailka. p. 146; Kiisi,. p. 344). - priirabdha 'begun' has been
explained as follows: prarabdha is that ·which is the object of [I.4 ] ;:c 'q " 1
effort conducive to the realization of the result x, while not q1'q<fi<€/11
co·existing with the posterior absence of the activities conducive <fiarfr.t '11
to the same result x. Presentness is priirabdha as weI! as
aparisamiiPJ;a. This second property has been explained as being
Nor [can-
that which resides in a time which does have for its locus [of the meaning
the prior absence of the destruction of the last activity conducive time, prolixity,
to the result x. (Kasi. p. 344) . - lAT alone shOll
Klityiiyana has discussed the meaning of vaitamiinatva in denotative fun(
five vlirttikas on P. III.2.123. For a discussion of these, see statement tha,t
the introduction [C] .. present, then e\
the other hand]
[1.3 1 a:r'.:n<l
<fiTw: fj;- me,,)
<IT '11'0'{) 'IT I ;:C1?T: I Cfl;'{ "IT<q~<'I1l1191<J:, I [in the two ca~
?f)a<fi<ei 'q ~(I:!l"<lT,{'!l«i, ;:c :il-aq; "11m: ;a'f(l:!li1~ ~+liqm I 1. All Indian
Now, is this time [present] cO-Signified or denoted [by ZArl? dure is pr'
The first alternative is not [acceptable], because it [time] _is not replacemen
 lES AND MOODS SECTION ONE 53

the meaning of a root. Co-signifier-ness [is the property ofl being

~ ml:&<iT'1~m(f­
'that which brings out the power [of the denotative func,tion proper
. I CI"I "'1'OfRr"
:r<!ln: I
- Il to the signifier]. This is not present [in the case of IAT] if the
root does not denote [time].
,
on the strength 1. 'For a discussion of the co-significative function and the meaning
~ss is defined as of a verbal root, see introduction. [B-1].
has begun but 2, dhiitvarthatvabhiiviit. But time is not a meaning of a verb. If it
r than past and were the meaning of a root rather than of IAT, it would appear
stood in normal whenever the root is used. But this is not the case; in forms like
1 putting a pot stiivaka 'one who praises', stuti 'praise',. etc., the meaning time
I uses fonns like] does not come to mind .. Since time is thus not the meaning
.[activity] that denoted by the root, it cannot be said to be co-signified by the
verbal affix lAT. .
3, saktil}: The 'word sakti in its 'general mea:ning has been used
3 ml:&1iI1'11~­
action which is
ml:&IiI['fR"HlT(f ,
lcterised by an
se given above
I• by Bhartrhari to denote the power or potentialities of the
sabdabrahman. (V.P., 1.2). In its more particular use, sakti
refers to the denotative function, i.e., power to denote a certain
.meaning. sakti is the only significative function (vrtti) ac-
cepted by all schools.
~ll known that 4. For IAT to co-signify ,the meaning time, it is necessary that the
i' : m\&1iI1'fK- verbalroot"should have the denotative function for it. Since the
''If:'!l'f'l~~''ll<r. I root does not have sakti for the denotation of that meaning,
gun' has been it is not possible for IAT to co-signify it. .
3 the object of [1.4 J ;or 'Of tf ;;:m; U:'l I 'iI<!T '<ll<J:.<!T CI"f ~'ffi,~ <TI1:'llCJ:. I u:<fl~<[
u:or <Oa'
; x, while not or1'Of'li<~lRr«l1~ I l~ 'Of 'l<i+n~ 05f:sfu fqfut<[ fq'ill~sfit <>,~'3([~'q,~
ities conducive
'limfit 'l1"'~ ;or ~'ll<r. I 1;<[1'" ;;ir,<[1l;'! I 8lfq~lS[1<r. I
ia as well as
[ained' as being Nor [can it be said that] it [verbal root] is the denotator
for its locus [of the meaning time]. If many roots were considered to be denoting
vity conducive time, prolixity would result. It is also [more] appropriate that only
TAT alone should denote [time]. Further, if LAT does. not have the
itamiinatva in denotative function for that. [presentness] even after the specific
, of these, see statement that IAT [should be introduced to denote the meaning]:
present, then even the agen,t will not be the denoted meaning. [On
the other hand] ; it will also be co-signified, as there is no difference
~''l1l'f1'll<r. I
[in the two cases] .
l'f'lm I 1. All Indian slj~ras use the principle of brevity; a simple proce-
xl [by tAT]? . dure is preferred to a prolix and complex one. lAT and its
[time] is not replacements are less in number than the total number of roots,
 SECTION ONE
54 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS

1. The alternative
all of which will have to be considered as having separate deno· co-signified but
tative fUn<;tions to denQte the single meaning 'time.' On the
2. The general ffiI
other hand, if IAT is considered to be the denotator, only one
and in the case
denotative fun<;tion will be enough to account for that meaning.
peeled to have
It is therefore more appropriate (ucita) that fAT should be the
tancy (iiklink~a
denotator, and not the roots. Since lAT is .
2. "li(ffiG" 'Il'"'lT ;r <:'-!Ti\ .,. S11<r~1S[1i\ The word laviSe~at'because of additional mea:
nondifference (in the two cases)' refers to an argument which ing time. The
has been explained in the Introduction [Br-4]. IAT must be I
[ 1.5 ] S1q Q;er 'CfTCI1oMp.T;r'~ ooa~IJTT (fT,q,hn~<g 00<:" qT,q~~"li(er~er 'Cf [I.7]
~

(f~Tlq ~~'QT
~

'
?l"Tq'J;,erm(,-!{q- ffi<:crB:. I ,erT;:rl'i~f\fu '
That is why [the following view] is set aside [refuted] : Verbal
root has the indicative function for the meaning presentness, while If there is apl
IAT is but the conveyer of the intention [of the speaker]. .This general meaning by
[property of] being the cQnveyer of the intention [of the speaker] milk and Kaundin'
itself is co-signifier-ness. , agent will not be d
1. laksana: Indicative function, by which the indicated or secon- Both of these alter
dary meaning is cognised. and can also be pr
~. tnllmkaWJ:ufiny
2. Q[<q:1tm~'fi<g"0<: In this' sentence, we find a modified version
. ". Katl1)!~inya. '
of the first view. According to the first view, presentness is the
(Bh~ya on P.
denoted meaning of the verb root, and. IAT is the attributor of
his Uddyota or
capacity to denote a meaning (saktyiidhayaka). So in this view, course has use(
the root has two meanings: action and time. In the second view, exoeptions (a
the root has only one denoted meaning: action. Time however nyaya exempl:
is its indicated meaning. even after the
In the first view, co-signifier-ness is being the attrIbutor of of anav,akasat
capacity to denote a meaning,. whereas in the second view, it to operate on
means being the conveyer of the intention of the speaker. Since, applied in the
in connection with the indicative function, the intention of the rules can appl
speaker (tatParya) has been taken into account rather than the rule permittin
syntactic relation (anv.aya) , this view seems to belong to the
2. 9i§;'!M«fl<fTtRr
Neologicians.
whereas if fA1
[1. 6] . ;r ~1'-!: I OR:: mp.lr,-!W WPHl~;:r RU'!il~'-!1 (f~q<,-!l5I~: I meanmg.
The second [alternative] is no;t [acceptable]. IAT is without 3. ~sf1:rftcr,<n;
expectancy [for any add~tional meaning] due to [its posse..<sion] M.B. vo!' 2, r,
of the general meaning of the I-members. Therefore it [IAT] cannot intepreted in t
be applied there [to denote time]. '

.- .-'-- ..._- .---~

 .....-

-<SES AND MOODS

SECTION ONE 55

1. The alternative in question here is that the meaning time is not

ng separate deno·
co·signified but denoted by lAT.
~ 'time.' On the
nqtator, only one 2. The general meaning of the I·members is the agent, the object
for that meaning. and in the case of intransitive roots, action. Every word is ex-
AT should be the pected to have some meaning. In the case of IAT, this expec-
tancy (iikarlk§ii) is fulfilled by the general meanings given above.
Since IA T is thus without expectancy (niriikii1ik§a) for any
ie§iit 'because of
additional meaning, it will not apply itself to denote the mean-
argument which ing time. Therefore verbal root must be the denotator, and
~] . IAT must be considered to be the co-signifier.
Clnq<lm~'li<c!~c! 'C!
[I.7 1 CI~:nfq >!~~T ;or fel~is[lJT ml'!F'1~'1 <l'fi'!iifiJ:S;'1r<n'11<l; <r!'<l1<f, 'f.~9f;;'1·
<c!Fnq~f'Rl 9;~'l+I. I qa:l~B!T'!i'tsf1:!~CI<'l1~f9:cIre;&:<ql"ll
efuted] : Verbal

I
i Iresentness, while If there is application in spite of this [the possession of the
speaker]. This general meaning by IAT] , then, since by the principle of the butter-
[of the speaker] mille and Kai.Jl)!t;linya, the general is set aside by the particular, the
agent will not be denoted [by lAT]. It cannot be argued like this.
dicated or secon· Both of these alternative views have been mentioned in the Bha~ya,
and can also be proven by reasoning.
modified version 1.. . tallr.akau1J4iny,anyiiyiit: 'By the principle of the buttermilk and
.resentness is the Kai.Jl)!t;linya. This maxim' first appears in the MahabliiCi~ya
.the attributor of (Bh:?ya on. P. 1.1.47, M.B. vol. 1, p. 115). Nagesa refers to it in
So in this view, his Uddyota on the sivasutra hayavarat (vol. I, pp. 96-97) and of
the second view, course has used it in the Paribha~endusekhara while dealIng with
. Time however exoeptions (apavada). (P.S., p. 136). The ·takrakau1J4inya-
nyiiya exemplifies' the kind of exception which can take place
even after the general rule is applied. Thus the usual maxim
;he attiibutor of
of anavlakiisatva (where the exception does not have any scope
&econd view, it
to operate once the general rule has been applied) cannot be I
speaker. Since,
applied in these cases. Since both the general and particular
intention of the
rules can apply t.his rule prevents the application of the general
rather than the
rule permitting only the exception to take place.
o belong. to the
2. 'lil!<IT,",,<C!1<r1<ffi: kart! 'agent' etc. is the general meaning .of IAT
. whereas if lAT is applied to denote time, that will be the specific
fqB!l11~: I meamng ..
IAT is without 3. ~Sf~ff~:CI<'l1<f, iikara here means the Bha~ya. (on P. III.2.l23,
[its possession] M.B. vol. 2, p. 123). The same passage in the Bha~ya has been
.t [IAT] cannot
intepreted in two different ways to get support for both the views.

. . -....... _-,", --- ----- -- ,_. - - ... _....," .- .

 ::' -.'

SECTION ONE
56 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS

The reasoning involved has been explained in the text itself 1. kriya = vyiipi
later 011. Thus it is claimed that bdth the views do have the entity, but a c
sanction of the Bha~ya, and can also be proved by reasoning. activities (v yii.
words kriyii aJ
[1.8 ] Clq,~ I '1cl+n<f'li'To5T "s,"-fft1l": I '1clm<f'f.T"~ \;\F'I·~1'11<J:. CI~"1 .,l basically there
f.t<fT "I"[lfcrl~: 'IT'fi1lT\;\T"1'll1¥r'l '11"'1lJ:, I - v yiipiira refers
To explain [the above statement more meaningfully] : present many such ac1
tense is co·signified by lAT. It should be said that the property of activities 1 + :
being the attributor of capacity [is the co-s;gnifier-ness in IAT], idea that actio
because present tense is the meaning of the verbal root, and because uses the word
it cannot be cognised without lAT. (who does use
. It has to be in
1. According to the first view stated here, presentness is co-signified
Action as a w]·
by LAT. This is the same view already mentioned and refuted
only the indivi
with the objection that co-signifier-ne.."S is the property of being
this. In a pro
_ the attributor of capacity, and that is not possible for lA T unless
sequence in til
the root has the significative function for the meaning time.
ception also t2
[see 1.3]. Now the same view is taken up again and in support,
next activity i
the position is taken that presentness is the meaning of a verbal
perished. HOl
root. Once that is accepted, since this meaning is not cognised
we perceive ar
without lAT, IAT becomes the attributor of capacity, i-.e., it
idea of superin
becomes the co·signifier~
to a circle of fI
2.. The words dyotakatvamiti have to. be understood in this sen-
( SWilC1"1"~q
tence. Thus the whole sentence becomes : 'TI'ft1l"TI;j"j"1'f.<¥r'f eye really pen
( .mcr~~) 'lRlJ:, I circle which d
[ 1.9 ] .;or "I" CI~1:f \;\Ti!'fG<f<% ~G)q: ~/Gftr '1T«m:. I o;qT'1T~<RlT;:rTR!R~­ entity, is perc
temporal orde
'li'T"~<f'l-~<flT+fl<J:. CI~ "I" \;\1iI9l'"'1<9~fq'1Tfu:<I''fI'El I CI·.n~ I ~;or siders them a
o;qT'iR~~crT;:nf~: +fHl<=rl'll<J:. I 3lR!R'ffi~ "I" CI~'ffi''f~fq- different and
'll<;q;:f[t:{'efl 'TR:9Tq~lIl I . single purpose
Nor can it be said that there will be the fault stated above a1l subordina-
[in 1.4] , if it [time] is denoted by the verbal root. For time different :!'> ~

:r1T[~~'f'f'l: ~
from a series of activLties [Le., action] is not accepted, and that
[series of activ~ties] .has been explained as the meaning of averbal . (V.P., III.8A
root. Thus, time is not distinct from a series of activities, as there pravrttiinli 1[t ,

is no proof ·~to accept it as being separate from a series of activities]. to the parts 1
If it is to be theorized as separate, then it will lead to the assumption Bhartrhari la
concept in th

I
[that the verbal root has] a significative function for that [time]
also, and this results in prolixity. the distinctio

L
 NSES AND MOODS
in the text itself
,iews do have the
>ved by reasoning.
l'ni"l'~R1CC CI~'l <'Ii
ingfully] : present
It the propert.y of
fier-ness in lA Tl ,
root, and because
:ness is co-signified
:ioned and refuted
property of being
ible for TAT unless
he meani~g time.
lin and in support,
eaning of a verbal
ng is not cognised
f capacity, i.e:, it
stood in t.his, sen-
~Ff\'1l"Ten'-f-!i~9
o7.fjqH<:R11'lTmR'ffi_
"f I CI'-<l~ I 'limr "f
~ 't[ cr"''3'ffi'9~'lTfq
mIt stated above
For time different
:repted, and that
aning of a verbal
lctivities, as there
Ties of activities] .
10 the assumption
l for that [t.ime]
SECTION ONE 57
1. kriya = vyiipiiras.antii1lia: An action (kriyii) is not a single
entity, but a complex one. It is really a process consisting of
activities (vyapariilJ)'. Though it is true that sometimes the
words kriya and vyiipiira are used as one and the same thing,
basically there is a distinction in the meaning of these two words.
"vyiipiJra refers to a single activity, whereas kriyii is formed by
many such activit.ies taking place one after another. Thus:
activities 1 + 2 !+ 3 + 4 + 5 and so on = action (kriyii). The
idea that action is a process is found even in Y§.ska, though he
uses the word bhiiva. (Nirukta I.1). According to Patafijali
(who does use the word kriyii) , this action cannot be perceived.
It has to be inferred. (Bhli!9ya on P. 1.3.1, M.B. vol. 1, p. 254) .
Action as a whole cannot be perceived because we can perceive'
only the individual parts. Bhartrhari goes in more details about.
this. In a process, individual parts occur one after anot.her in a
sequence in time, and cannot thus be perceived together. Per-
ception also t.akes place in the same sequence. By the time the
next activity is taking place, the previous activity has already
perished. How can we then talk about a single action when aU
,we pera,ive are parts that are not even co-existent? Here the
, idea of superimposition comes in. The nature of action is likened' ,
to a circle of flame formed by moving a burning wand in a circ!f.
(sro1Cl'C[~'ilt.q f>ti'-f!!JfT qR~'!~ V.P., II1.S.S). Eventhough the'
eye really perceives the burning wand at different points of the
circle which do not co·exist, one thinks that the circle, a single
I entity, is perceived. The conglomoration of parts t.hat have a
I
temporal order, is itself called an action when the intellect con-
siders them as unified. These parts are cons;dered to be nOll-
different and unified in a single whole, because they all have a
single purpose: the ultimate result of the act.ion to which they are
all subordinate. Thus Bharlrhari says :
~ITp~€r<:9'!~: ulil[: 'fill"Fll"fT~ I ~'ll1 J;('f.~qcrT~<\: ffii'-tRi, ;;,!Gl~~,!~ II
(V.P., IILS.4.) and Helamja adds t.he part ekaphaloddesena
prav'(ttiinii1'}'t 'begun with the same end in view', as a qualification
to the parts born in a temporal order. (vol. CXVI, p. 21-2).
I Bhartrhari later on goes into further elaboration of the same
concept in the course of which it seems that according to him,
the distinction between an activity (vyiipiira) and an action
L --' .. -~- .. - ",-_.,", "---- ... _------
 .---_.-.••- - _ . - - - - - ---_.-------------

58 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS SECTION ONE

(kriya) is subjective rather than objective, that of a degree rather 1. The passage in (
than that of the basic nature. Thus he points out that it is not (M.B. vo!' 2, p.
only an action such as cooking that can be analysed into con- 2. sii.ryiidina1!t kriy
stituent parts, for example, to put the pot on a stove, to pour amples: 'the Sel
water in it etc. An activity forming a part of this action of is the meaning c
cooking, such as putting the pot on a stove, can also be shown or the standing
to have further parts like picking the pot up, carrying it to the or an end, and (
stove, etc. (V.P., IlLS.9). Thus when one is to be called an sent or future.
action (kriya) and when one is to be called an activity (vya- which the divisi,
para) very much depends on the subjective element, i.e., the and it can be ta!
desire of the speaker. Thus if the speaker views the activity of ment of the Su
putting the pot on a stove as a part of the bigger process of cook- If the meaning
ing, it will be considered to be an activity, whereas if the same (i.e. the meanin
putting the put on a stove is viewed as a whole consisting of need be no cont
different parts, jt will be considered to be an action. Of course the existence of
here Kau:t:lgabhatta does not go into all these details. But it is time with refen
clear that he considers action to be a series of activities which longing to diffe
form constituent parts of it. Thus he has used the word vyapara- from the meani
santana 'a series of activities' to denote action, which is the diction between
meaning of the verbal root. and the eternal
2. kiila= vyapamsantana see introduction [B:"()]. Thus, sinc~
3. gauravat: see note 1 on [1-4]. cases can be ex:
the SlID, the B
[1.10 1 .~ '<IT~ft'fC!'fiTi'O<?h 'fT'Ol.[,"!t " 8l],l'nrer " ~<l.fT<tl c!'i;[<9>T~~"!f<{l.,t
. and if the quest
fii;'-fT"!T R\T<i1<!l'i;[Tl'fl~TZr<rl'1'1'<fr 'fi~ "q~qT~~Rr", "sn,mR<!" ~<l.fl~' by referring to
Olmfq:t["!m ~«r'~~111'l.[l'f~~ B!l~ Q'i;[<'fiT~'f.U~t ~.
"'1'<1:. I will be meanin!
l'fr<::T"!lmR~ re~F'i;[+!T'l.[l'ffit q~T I qT'I'~;ci ~ "l19'1l~qq~: I find an explam
In addition, if time separate [from action]. is [considered to be] i divisions of tim
the denotatum [of ,the root], then since in [the case of the examples]

I
lUI] SH!l,qit!. =or
'the Self exists' etc., the action of the Sun etc., is not set aside, and ~<9=€"'q"''lri<dm.,<o
a justification [of the usage in question ill possible] taking that
[action of the Sun etc., into consideration] ; the Bh~ya bringing up nm fii;'11l'flG:
the doubt as to how :the use of lAT etc. can be justified in [sentences .. In our view, n
like] 'the mountains stand', 'the Self exists' etc., will be meaningless. fied since the actio
The BM~ya giving the final answer that Lthe use of lAT etc. in such does not have a bel
cases] can be justified by :taking into consideration the actions of being that which i1
the kings belonging to differen,t times, will also be the same [mean- answer [of the Bhi
ingless]. There is no justification for running so far [afield],. sideration the begi
 ISES AND MOODS
SECTION ONE 59
of a degree rather
1. The passage in question occurs in the Bhii:~ya on P. IIl.2.123.
out that it is not
(M.B. vol. 2, p. 123). See introduction [C--l].
nalysed into con-
a stove, to pour 2. siiryiidin(hp, kriyiiya niriibiidhat: In the case of the two ex-
of this action of amples : 'the Self exists', 'the mountains stand' the action that
an also be shown is the meaning of ,the verbal root, i.e., the existence of the soul
:arrying it to the or the standing of the mountains does not have any beginning
.s to be called an or an end, arid cannot thus be distinguished as being past, pre-
m activity (vya- sent or future. But the action belonging to the Sun etc., on
element, i.e., the which the divisions in time are based, is going on all the time
liS the activity of and it can be tagged as past, present, or future, since each move-
r process of cook- ment of the Sun does have a perceptible beginning and end.
ereas if the same If the meaning 'time' is considered to be different from action
lole consisting of (i.e. the meaning of the root) and thus separately denoted,there
ction. Of course need be no contradiction. The meaning of the verbal root, i.e.,
letails. But it is the existence of the Self etc., can be said to have divisions in
: activities which time with reference to this action [movemen~l of the Sun be-
he word vyapiira- longing to different times. Since time is something different
on, which is the from the meaning of the verbal root, there would be no contra-
diction· between i:ts divisions based on the action of the Sun,
and the eternal existence of the Self.
Thus, since the question· regarding ·the use of lAT in: these
cases can be. explain~d away by taking reco.urse to the action of
Cl"l'<'llT~'Ii~f~"t the Sun, the Bha~ya raising this question will be meaningless,
'," gnmr~" iti<!l<l:l . and if the question is raised, the Bhii~ya answering this question
"l'~'-liU~t f.!;'{l. by referring to the action of kings belonging to different times
~ 1ol1'l;:n~qq%: I will be meaningless, since there is no need to run so far afield to
find an explanation. It can easily be done by referri.'1g to the
:onsidered to be] divisions of time made by the moving of the Sun.
of the examples]
at set aside, and KIll 3HR<'W :;:rl<+!IolRlT[l~~G<f1rfR<?:r m<':GIol('lllll'lio:. ~HGlollqRBll1H-
)lej taking that ~am"<'l<?:rllj+ll'llGJ~~lj~: I ffl4l:F(I<?:rlN Cl"l'<<iiIT0'll1"r
i<)ya bringing up
ied in [sentences
nm fii;'{lmG;1'11<+!~<':lT[1~~'I1<':<?:rlN ~l!r(qRrmG;l'1 ~qqf~{'l I
. be meaningless. In our view, moreover, the doubt [in the Bha~yal· can be justi-
lAT etc. in such fied since the action conducive to the continued existence of the Self
1 the actions of does not have a beginning, and presentness, which is 'the property of
;he same [mean- being that which is begun but not ended,' is not possible. The final
r [afield]. . answer [of the Bh~yal also has a good justification taking into con-
sideration the beginning etc .. even of the activity conducive to the.
60 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS'· SECTION ONE

continued existence of the Self, when it is qualified by taking the 2. viSi'ftabhedamiidiiy

actions of the kings belonging to different times [into account] . accepted the divis
1. lasma.tpak'fe: 'our view' here means the alternative already qualified, i.e., limih
stated in [I-9J. According to it, time and action (i.e. the periods, it is clear
meaning of the verbal root) are one and the same. action (which is t
the Bha;;ya. If til
2. Since, according to this view, the meaning of the verbal root, from action, quali
which in this case is the existence of the Self, is the same as time, the kings would I
and that does not have a beginning due to the eternal character
ot" the Self; presentness which has been defined as being char- I U 3 J ~ci fu Cfl'f<['f'i{
acterised by an action which has a beginning and an end is not ~CT1ST1:fIT<~~qlJ
posSible. Thus the doubt in the Bha:;;ya about the use of lAT ~<;5Rl"l1:q. ~ql!!B:. I
in this case is justified. .+r1G:I~oj\'f'fRlifia-
3. The final answer of the Bha~ya is also well justified. Though It is alsiysaid in
the existence of the Self does not have a beginning taken by {distingUished} in rel~
itself, it does have a beginning and an end, when it is qualified [or substance]_ itself i
by the actions of the kings belonging to different times. Thus standing of the 'mount,
the Self is eternal, but its existence as limited by a particular something else." It i~
king's term of reign does have a beginning and an end. Thus the distinction here is •
the definition of presentness [that which is begun but not That is why in sabda
ended] would. apply, and the. use of .lAT will be justified. [cases] such as 'the 0
[LI2] u:<l~" fu~Fal1l~ 'li'R:! sf'[ c<[l~ I "~~ ~cll:rfet6<rrlIlFl.Trrt ~l:ut taking into account tl
m-
<[T: f>i;,{llSTrRug::t~N'Il{ITf>t' ~C!l'1lm'D<r "CTOT ~m fu1Fcf{CT1~i:'t~;:r 1. The verse quated
2. The reference to I
fu;;n 'f<fC!Tfu:~.r\<!r~~~'l;ra- f,j;,{l~'f«f 'li1<?W!<[r'IT~:i'r'f'f"a ~~p~: I" (vol. CXVI, p. 8
CT'RI1ti~ni[i:'tG:+!T'Di(" liI6<[B:.1 3. KaUi!):Q.abhaV;a i~
Kaiyata has also explained the Bha;;ya giving the final answer P. III.2.I23. '<:
in the same way. Taking [~he Bhii:$ya passage] 'here the actions
~f<lcrf~1<r.1 ~abd~
belonging to the Icings past, future, and present, are the locus of the
[action of] standing [of the mountains] as a heading [Kaiyata says] 11.14] Cl1:flrn:€r+!1<T'!il<5'r
that the conclusion [from this passage] is that the existence of the <WCT'!i«f Wl~ai't
kings is divided [qualified] by the divisions past etc., and divides ,,'t<'-l <;5'5IG;<[ ~R
[qualifiesJ the standing of the mountains etc. Thus its [the standing Hence, the presel
of the mountains] being an action, and association with the three of the presentness ret·
times is justified. Thus, the Boo;;ya [pas~age is written] taking into concurrent occurrence
consideration the division [of time] only in a qualified [action]. production of the S~
. 1. The reference to Kaiyata is of course to the Pradipa explaining pastness. When that
the Bha9ya on Vt. 5 ad P. III.2.123. (vol. 3, pp. 281-282). co-signified, TAT etc.,
See Introduction [C-I] for an explanation. in all the [appropriatt
 tENSES AND MOODS:
Iified by taking the
; [into account] .
alternative already
nd action (Le. the
e same.
of the verbal root,
is the same as time,
he eternal character
ined as being char-
g and an end is not
lout the use of lAT
,justified. Though
beginning taken by
when it is qualified
! :erent times. Thus
ted by a particular
and an end. Thus
is begun but not
be justified.
rl1r.r~<lrlm<{l;TI <:l:(lT
~ \}m ~ra.tc!lfa:ilit"l
fill ~q'r:r<.!C! ~tlP~: I".
19 the ifinal answer
J 'here':'the actions
Ire the locus of the
ing [Kaiya1a says]
he existence of the
t etc., and divides
1S its [the standing
ion with the three
'ritten] taking into
,lified [action].
Pradipa explaining
. 3, pp. 281-282).
" SECTION ONE 61
2. viSif,tab.hedamadiiyaiva bhii$YaJ!I: Since the Bha~ya has clearly
accepted the divisions of time only when the eternal action is
qualified, i.e., limited by actions of the kings belonging to various
periods, it is clear that the view taking time to be the same as
action (which is the meaning of the root), has the sanction of
the Bha~ya. If time had been considered to have been separate
from action, qualifying the eternal action with the actions of
the kings would not have been necessary.
I L13] ;a<fci ~ '!1'f'1qGJi:t I "r:r<:cIT fli<.!a ~<fl'ml'fl i! <! r.r'li<it<:fa I q<fcrTfa:-
fuffu'ffil11,r:r<:~qlTf l~a" ~fu II foifu1?!i'l<::l~" ~(il;a~1<Fl1<:fT
~<m:l;;ft'1l ~1?!lI.1 SlC! <1:9 "Q;'lil ;;: ~ <{R"T'flTf SlH:n(,('~i'l.n<U foiro1?!i'r,,-
m"l>{ejtqr:rfultfu ~OC;:9iT<i!i'r sr.~'f(jlI.1 .
It is also."said in the Wikyapadiy1l. :·"eyerything·iS qualified
[distingUished} iil relation to. something else. [A. thimg's] nature
[or substance] itself is hot li1!ble to differentiation. . Therefore the
standing of the-mountains etc. is .differentiated by taking into account
something else." It is clear in Helaraja's commentary on this that
the distinction here is due to differentiation between the qualificands.
That is why in sabdakaustubha also it is said, that justification in
[cases] such as 'the one Nlirliy<l!l).a existed', [can be given] only by
taking into aq:ount the distinction of the qualified [entities].
1. The verse quated here is V.P.,III.9;80:
2. The reference to HeJaraja is to his commentary on V.P. III.9.80.
(vol. CXVI, p. 81).
3. KatJil!r;jabhatta is here referring to the sabdakaustubha on
P. III.2.123. Q;'li12l1r.<:fl'~'<!1'1Rcr;;{f;mlqf;;:crl<:fT afjqrN<5 i'r<t 3;<:<~i;1i
~f<M~C( I sabdakau. vol. II pp. 465-6.
11.14] C!~~m"l9il~ o<:f!ql<:Tcl'f'/i" Q;9 I C!f~{lJcrclm<{'912l 'CfF'1<:fO<:ff~'lip·<rt
<mC!9i~ ~wa~9 I ~ C\<#.i'!@c'l1~t'1~ f.rtrffir.al~c9'I.1 C!fu:l<I:.
<mci:t <":Sf,,'1 ~Icr C!"l QSl19~'1'I. I c!<l'fl'l; <;[1c!'liC9~~fu f.r~: q'''l!: I
Hence,. the present time is activity itself. The co"signified-ness
of the presentness residing in it is well justified by [the process of]
concurrent occurrence and non-occurence. Thus, the [previous] non-
production of the same [action] is futureness and completion is
pastness. When that [presentness, futureness, and pastness] is to be
co-signified, lAT etc., [are introduced]. This should be understood
in all the [appropriate] places [Le., also in the discussion of the other
62 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS
SECTION ONE

temporal suffixes]. Thus, co·signifier-ness [of IAT] is the established

the traditional
way '[i.e., view].
by Bhattoji Dil
1. This is the final statement of ;the view that time and action traditional intel
[meaning of the verbal root] are one and the same thing. Thus root, when the
presentness also is the denoted meaning of the verbal root, co- present. As fat
signified by the suffix lAT. The meaning of the verbal root, i.e., who went agai
action is time. The presentness aspect of it is co-signified
2. In sUPIX>rt of 1
by IAT,
is quoted V.P.,
2. anvayavyatirekiibhyii:m: The method of anvaya 'concurrent
occurence or agreement' and vyatireka 'concurrent non-occurence &ii'1T ~~f.lt<n
or contrast' has been explained in the introduction [A-I]. The according to :t"
meaning 'time' is denoted by the root, but to express different Bha~ya. (M.B
a,spects of it, such as presentness, pastness and futureness, the [I.l 6] i'Ii 'i.f I J;i;'11
. , root hast<> be accompanied:by different sUffixes such as IAT, or . 'cr<::rq "'lWi9'~
IUT.' Therefore, by the principle'of anvaya and vyatireka, these m:) <Rilf["~
suffixes should be considered· as being the co-signifiers of these
different aspects of the meaning 'time', which is the denoted
f;i;'l1'l1~ ~fu :
meaning of the verbal root. qT'i.f'Ii<9i'lofI'O<j
Moreover, sine
[1.15] 1<:<i '!T'i.f'liWsf<t <n3;QQfu: I cPur.: I qa111;:f.f,W-I <'l~r''':r 1<:'1 qa111~ the presentness resil
. <'Jre-R'r 'l."f«l1:<:lICJ:, I "fs!i<ni'lG:1'l 'lilmg ~1 wt<!-r lTI~" ~fa­ also will have to Ix
q"F'l~'-l., 'Pl<'J"-I &ii'l1t:fl~~a:fi''f1i1':f\''1'l1~ I .,~ ~QR:'O~<::'Ii<'f of thus theoreticall)
l;9~6t,~qcp..la I , roots, why not say
sentness. [In that
In this way, the denotator-ness [of IATJ is also not unjustified. you have to say tha
Thus: the present time is denoted by lAT, in accordance with the is the re?-son for t
rule "IAT [should be introduced. to express] the present [time] ," 'Since it amounts t
and since time is the measurer of action according to the Vakya- denotator?
padiya, [which says] , "time serves to distinguish action [s], whereas 1. lA T is not nel
number is the distinguisher of all". It cannot be justified that a Even 'when IA
thing can be its own measurer. . or lIT is the 0:
1. This is the final statemen,t of the view that time and action are action is cogn:
not one and same. They are different, time being the measurer out the meani:
of action. Measurer and the thing to be measured cannot be one [1 17J 8iitoi cr"'f q
and the same. Since time is not the same as action, it is not
the denoted meaning of ;the verbal root, and thus needs another ~qlI. I s!~i
denotator, namely, lAT. This is in accordance with P. III.2.123, 'i.f 13"1191 <r~
which in,troduces IAT when the meaning present tense is to be [If it is objecu
expressed. Here, it is clear that Katm)lc;1abhatta does not accept meaning of IATJ,
general will be sei
 INSES AND MOODS
1 is the established
It time and action
same thing. Thus
:he verbal root, co-
;he verbal root, i.e.,
f it is co·signi fied
mvaya 'concurrent
Tent non-occurence
lction [A-I]. The
;0 express different
md futureness, the
res such as IAT, or
nd vyatireka, these
)-signifiers of these
ich is the denoted
:r Ol~~ Il:'l 'l(h:n~
T wtBr 1'rfG:'lil" ~fcr
\ '1'i'f ~'I':rR;;~~'li«i:
. rODts, why not say IA T alone .has the denotative function for pre~
(. .Iso not unjustified.
ccordance with the
i e present [time] ,"
" ing to the Viikya_c,
action [5] , whereas
be justified that a , Even when IAT is not used, and some other suffix such as IVT
;ime and action are
being the mea~urer
lured cannQt be Qne
as action, it is not
thus needs ahother
e with P_ II1.2.123,
~sent tense is to' be
tta does not accept
SECTION ONE 63
the traditiQnal interpretation of the rule P. III:2.123 accepted
by Bhattoji Dik~ita and other cDmmentators. AccDrding to' this
traditional interpretation, IAT is to be introduced after a verbal
rDot, when the actiDn forming the meaning of it resides in the
present. As far as 1knDW KaUll).Qabhatta is the only grammarian
who went against this traditiDnal interpretation.
2. In support of the view that time and action are nDt the same
is qUDted V.P., Il1.9.2. This kiiriki'i is based Dn a:r~9T '1FCI~1ll
fit<ri ~l1p.jo<!"[<l+!l'1n <fil'01: ~~a \
(Bha~ya Dn P. 1.3.1),
according to'· Nage§a in his Uddyota on that passage in the
Bha~ya. (M.B. vol. 1, p. 258). .
[1.1 6J (if, 'i'f \ f.ii<!1<!1 m: .
p.j'nN mfta<:Clffilk 'l€r+!F'I<'l~'1 ?ili!l"l \ am 'i'f
·~~R "Ilsr-u<P{ '11;;~l{ I am 'i'f ~'1t "Il~ cr;{ ~f*Ff,,,q'1ll1:q~'f.~'1
OlZT. 9C'i+!T<{~~l'rcrR~;;<l([l"ll:. \ .... ~"!'1T<J:. \ aTN "i'f '1~+1H<'lffiful!""
f;i;'!l'!l~ ~fcr '0~+!~<!1m:~~Ill~fu Own '11'Oir CI~l 'i'f GJ'!«!ll%Zl
'll'i'f'li<'li'lti\~Cl11{ \
MDreDver, since action can be cognised even withDut IAT, only
the presentness residing in it is to' be co-signified [by IAT] . Then that
also will have to be said to be denQted by the verbal rODt. Instead
Df thus theoretically cDnceiving denDtative functions for many verbal
sentness. [In that way, there will be] simplicity of procedure. Also,
YDU have to say that the utterence [of the root]· accDmpanied by IAT
is the relIson for the cognition of action qualified· by presentness:
-Since it amoun:cs to the same thing, why nDt say that IAT is the
denDtator?
1. fA T is Dot necessary for the cDgnition Df. the meaning action.
or lIT is the one that accO'mpanies the verbal rDDt, the meaning
action is cognised. Therefore, lAT is necessary only to bring
out the meaning presentness.
[I 17] a:r~ CI~ 'llClf '11'0<11 <{ <?-l1<J:. \ m,ii1ur <:fl+11~<?-T 'l1"11~fu ~<J:. \
ir'll{ \ a:r~"[<l~ <:f.l=fcI~ <rT~<!<rT"I'li+!l'll>trm<J:. I CI~'Rll'l \ " •
'i'f W+!'II ~~1'P-l <?-T1\'f." ~fcr ,
[If it is objected that] in that case, [if presentness is the denoted
meaning of IATJ, the agent will not be denO'ted[by 1AT] as the
general will be set aside by the particular, that is nDt so. The
-~.-- .-.... -- ~--~- -. -
 - - - - - - -- - - - -------~---- ------

64 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS SECTION ONE

relation of that which is set aside and that which sets it aside does A-'"' "r...
I '!> ~rn:T>J\
not exist here, since both the meanings are possible. Thus it is said,
fu:&:lrcrI~'l
'it is possible that both should apply'.
1. See Introduction [B~5J. [If you obje
2. vi§e:j.ena samanyasya biidhiit: This is the same objection [by IATJ, then .
brought in iri [1-7]; This basis of this objection there was the sense; [that is] :
"takrakaUr(.l4inyanya)1a (see [1-7]; note 1). But the whole by accepting the
argument bringing in takrakau,1J4inyanyiiya is false and does not time is seperate
apply here, The arguments involved are clear in the Uddyota perty of being ,
on Vt. 7 ad P. III.1.22, where the two rules concerned are . not ended, and t
P. III.1.21, and P. III.1.23. (vo!. 3, p. 78-9) . of the absence of
[118J f'i; '"f I 0:<[ ~ <'>: ~lJjtrcr f<!~9'1lT,ftj'l <!-Tlq: I ~<9FQ~Sjq- foi~'lT?!>:t- be presentness?
It should be und
<rf"ilI~: I Q~I '"fFl'~'f'!trRrO:QI;:ri foiqtffi <rel<reff1fu "'fp:TT~'1fu
presentness etc. c
~il1T"'fq'[ffl:
.. .
I . ' ",
..
""c" ,- .
' .' does not have a .
Also: in ~hat case [if agent etc. is not denoted] , the rule that being characteris€
1- [members should be introduced after averhal root] when object action] does haVE
[agent, and in the case of intrasitive roots, action] is to be expressed,
1. bhl4yamaZag.
will be without scope, as in other places also it will be set aside by mentioned in
the meanings such as injunction etc. Thus the general rule also
takes .place by the maxim ·,that the relative strength and' weakness' (1.20] q~: 'liT<
of tllOse rules threatened by uselessness is reversed. <ffill!,,<'1TfG;
1. P. IIIA.69 is a general rule. If every time a specific meaning '"f " SlT,lll
is.taught the general rule is set aside, it will have no scope left. " g;'O~<!T+9
In this case, it is ,to be superceded by P. III,2.128.. In other
~~al
places, it will be then superceded by o.ther rules giving specific
meanings such as P. IIL2.115, III.3.13, 15, 162, 173 and· In reality, til
III.4.7, etc. Thus P. III.4.69 will be useless. This cannot be etc., of the form (
allowed. Any rule which is threatened by this sort of uselessness belonging to it, is
automatically becomes stronger according to the popular maxim, presentness is ind
since every rule must have its own sphere where it can apply. exists', 'the moun
To provide scope for P. III.4.69, as weI! as the specific rules, 'that which come
it is necessary that EAT should denote both the general meaning NarayaI;ta alone 1
of the I-members as well as its own specific meaning, i.e., prE- 1. This is the f
sentness. denotator or I
considered tl
II.19] apnfcrR'fC!'lilOOBr 'IT"'l,'q ~!F!J&:<i m1;<ll1<9~'t\ BTTfijij ~;;[ 1
Ka1.l,l).9abhatt:
£ITCfli«r'la:rl1TG:T<l qc::~"ilFITq: 1 ~~g 'lil<'-<?'1Ifcrf~cRErSjq- q~l1F1«T of the root.
QS[ m~;;;"ilT'1RlJ.m=rIsi;'llq'<9Mcr«rll. 1 Q~H111m1«TT<il f'li<ll<rr: J:TI .... "il- verbal root,
<'flm'fl;;[ ~fl:l1ifQlfcr 'Il~ 9c111T<!«rmrcr ~T~<r: 1 W:!T'l1 Sl~"il<'it sjq- denoted mear

...-------- ~ -,~
 ------------

,SES AND MOODS SECTION ONE

sets it aside does f'l;fo:'<!fu:~lTI'1]: !lRo"i''!lo:. cr~q'('5faJcr''!Bl" ~>!91~fcr .mm~C91~fi'rfu

. Thus it is said,
f~i;:crlOJ'1 ~a <'l<flI. I
[Hyou object that] if time separate from [action] is denoted
same objection [by lAT], then the Bhli~ya passage already quoted will not make
;ion there was the sense; [that is] not [acceptable]. It [Bha:~ya statement] is made
But the whole by accepting the a~ternative of co-signifier-ness. Actually, even if
false and does not time is seperate [from action], presentness is [still] the pro-
r in the Uddyota perty of being characterised by an action which is begun but
es concerned are not ended, and that is not possible in 'the Self exists' etc., because
of the absence of a beginning of -[that] action. Thus, how can there
<?[;:Q~slit f<t<-'m:r~­ be presentness? This is the meaning of the doubt [in the Bm~ya].
It should be understood that the meaning of the final answer is :
n<reflifu ;:'11'11""EiRr -preSentness etc. are [justified] since even though the action [hereJ.
'/

does not have a beginning, it is possible to -[have the property of]

~d], the rule that being characterised by that [Le. that which is begun] becau.e [the
oot] when object action] does have a beginning when it is qualified by something.
lS to be expressed,
1. bhii~yamaZag.naka1Jz syat : This refers to the objection already
11 be set aside by mentioned in (I.1D).
general rule also
~th and weakness [L20] - '1'Gcr: <01<7.1 ~lfuR'fcr: V-f; g fs!;i{'1 I Cli!:Ci !ll~.'<11'IR~+lH1<'11~q
'1cf+ll~'~l\<;:'li <7.:S'~ ~fu q"+ll~: I cr;lilfJ;~lil~<'i Cjl~l'I'I I, ~<,q
specific meaning '<! "811<l1n~ ", "'1~Cllf~'g]~cr" ~<'11<nijlit -'Icf+ll;r,ei !' Cll1 smHo:.",
ave no scope left. " g;;%9~P:'Ifqf~ '1<:;l~o:. ", "q:9il ll: ~ ;rH::T'1UT 3TI~<r." ~~ ~cr<'1+11it
:.2.128. ' In other
~r~al
i les giving specific
l ), 162, 173 and·
In reality, time is not separate but is action itself. Presentness
etc., of the form of the property of having begun but not ended etc.,
~. This cannot be "'_
sort of uselessness belonging to it, is the meaning of lAT. This is the final view. Thus
e popular maxim, presentness is indeed denoted. In this way,- presentness in 'the Self
lere it can apply. exists', 'the mountains stand' and pastness in 'there was darkness',
the specific rules, 'that which comes into being [abhu] was covered by void', 'the
~ general meaning
NaraYaJ:la alone was there', etc.; also is justified.
neaning,i.e., pre- 1. This is the final view of the author as to whether IAT is the
denotator or co-signifier of presentness, and whether time is to be
considered the sarrie or different from action. According to
~'!\ ~lfu:fu ii(~ I
Kau~H;labhatta, time is the same as action which is the meaning
rft9:cr~slit Cjchn~<'i of the root. General notion of time is thus denoted by the
~l f'li'1I'1T: ~m:;;;"i­ verbal root, but its particular aspect, i.e., presentness is the
It'!1'11 snm:o"i~ slit denoted meaning of lAT. Thus KaUilfc;!abhatta is adhering to a
 1,'

66 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS

literal interpretation of P. 111.2.12'3, which goes against the

traditional' explanation accepted by other commentators, but
which does not follow the original phrasing of the rule. See
Introduction [B~71.
'2. The Use of present tense in the sentences about which the Bha$ya [ILl] ~:g~hn~ I (
had raised a doubt are also shown to be justified if this view is rn:~'i1: I it
,accepted. In addition to the previously quoted 'the Self exists' ~<lR!C!;'j '!.~
and 'the mountains stand', three other sentences have been quoted
in, which the use of past tense needs justifying. The sentence [The author '
tarna iisU is taken from R.V. X.129.3a. The word varna in this the words], 'beyo:
sentence means according to the commentators avidya 'ignor· the rule parok~e 11
ance'. It is this avidya that causes the perception of the uni- today, and exclusi'
verse even though it does not really exist. This avidya is eternal and future. [Qui
and thus cannot be limited to anyone Hme. tuccheniibhva· today, which is n
pihita1!l yadiisit is taken from R.V. X.129.3c. KaU'l).~abhatta not used to expn
justifies the distribution of the tenses here py superimposition today, or even pa~
of the ideas of past, present and future on the existence of the 1.
highest reality with the aid of the contextual actions of kings
belonging to different times.

Past
x

Any definiti,
, Kau:ndabhai
.. . '
about the 1:
cannot be u
ditions givel
usage. Thu
today, whle.· 1
dition, I.e., 1
apply to fu'
be exclusive

.~-.--- .-~--
 ------._--.---'-

>ES AND MOODS

:oes against the

llIllentators, but
f the rule. See SECTION TWO

'hich the Bha$ya [Il.1] ~:s'.h:n~ I ({"{raj ~fu I q{'raj ~fsm ~,;{l<r. I 'f.l<'ml19<::;;qc!~1~~~i:!~~
XI if this view is
I 'the Self exists'
fB:f<l'il: I ffi:f9-4t slit "%!~fei.~q: I cr,;{H;;Qcr;') '!.~ q{raj w;t,gm '119: I
lave been quoted ~.n;;QC!;') '!.~s~;;Qa;') ~fei.'1fu '!.~sr.l:fq{rij '" ~ l~llT: I
;. The sentence [The author of the karikiis] stated the meaning of lAT [with
)fd tama in this the words], 'beyond the ken [of the speaker]', in accordance with
s avidya 'ignor- the rule parok$e lit [Po III.2.115]. Time is twofold: pertaining to
}tion of the uni- today, and exclusive of ;today. [This] twofold [time] is [both] past
avidya is eternal and future. [Out of these], lIT expresses the past exclusive of
. tucchenabhva- today, which is not witnessed 1by the speaker]. Therefore, lIT is
KaU't}Qabhat(:a not used to express the past happening today, future exclusive of
sUperimposition today, or even past which is witnessed [by the speaker].
existence of the 1.
actions of kings
Time

I
today exclusive of today
\ l
Past
x
future
x I
past
I
future
I x

witnessed not witnessed

x .,;
Any definition has to avoid the fault of overapplication. Here
KaUiIJ<;labhatta has shown tha,t because of the conditions given
about the usage of lIT ,to express a particular meaning, lIT
cannot be used in any other possible cases. Each of the con-
ditions given is necessary. An absence of it will lead to wrong
usage. Thus lIT is to be used only to express past, exclusive of
today, which is not witnessed 'by the speaker. If the first con-
dition, Le., that it should express past, is taken out, it will also'
apply to future exclusive of today. If the second that it could
be exclusive of today is taken out, then it would also apply to
 SECTION TWO
68 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS
ma1J4.anany.iiYl
past pertaining today. If the third condition, Le., that it should The term vi~a
concern something not witnessed by the speaker is taken out. from vi~aya.
then it would apply to past witnessed by the speaker also. Thu8 stracts. vi~ay,
all the three meaning conditions are necessary to give the precise cognition. It
usage of liT. cognition whic
2. adyatana: day accompanied by (a) 112 of the night that is
past + 1/2 of the night yet to come. (b) 113 of the night [II.3] ~:1 qUa:!ci! c
that is past + 1/3 of the night yet to come. or (c) from sunrise "];l;'lr <fri:o
to sunrise. f;F~oJfilIT'C
3. parok$a: (a) one hundred years ago, (b) one housand years But impercep'
ago, (c) two or three days ago, (d) even hidden bya wall etc. action is unperceiv,
is acceptable. (BhJ§!~ya on P. lII.2.115, M.B. vol. 2, p. 120). is very much not ~
Not being witnessed by the speaker is the common factor among ·temporal order. ]
all these different alternatives. If [this is your 0 b
[II,2 J 'lUa:!cFl Wi)'f1'lRrffia:!lc'f.u+rlc~cnnlfeiISp.jCllBlf0~l~lfc!,:pn'll1: I 1. The objection
ImperceptiJ?ility [not being witnessed by the speaker] is the is that the tel
property of not being the object of the knowledge with content such eluded in the
as '1 perceive', that resides in the speaker. and lIT shou
1. KaUll)9abha1ta's phr.asing of this (Le., ... m~lc'f.D.nc~cm:'OJ- But all actio]
i~,,!<[CllOJlf0~F1Tf9"l<[c'll1: is awkward,because actually, the phrase carinot . serve
siik$iitkaromi 'I perceive', does not refer to the fOlm of the (rdivyiipti) iE
. content (vi~ayaliikiir.a), but to the form of the knowledge (vi~ayi­ 2. kriyii niimeym
tiikiira). Therefore, the commentary sailkari on the V.B.S. re- the word an·
oncurs. Kau:r:
places it with ~l~lC'f.D+!lc~l~OJOJ.'nr'i<lt<[+rT~fciISp.jClroT~ <[~~T<i clT-
purviiparibhut
~OJ~r~fci,,!<[c'll'ilq'lc'l+L I Sailka. p. 151) : the absence of the property
poral order'.
of being the object of the knowledge endowed by the contentnens
whole. Ever)
de;:cribed by the phrase 'I perceive'. The commentary Parik93
the action of
of the V.B.S. interpretes the phrase 'I perceive' as referring to
the .fire, putti
the anuvy.avasiiya 'consciousness of knowledge', i.e., knowledge
Because these
of knowledge. (Pari. p. 123). Thus the phrase comes to mean
co-exist and t
m~W!iW=rl''-lcr~f:1o<f'!tlF!f.'r~fqClfci,,!'1cllml~~HTI<l''ll!cq+L as a whole.
'the property of not being the object of the kriowledge that has that time, th>
its contentness defined (or conditioned) by the consciousness the following
. of knowledge such as '1 perceive' ..
.'. 2. vi~ayatii: According to the Neologicians, the property of having [1I,4] Cl<::,!¥,OJP-f;
an object (savi$ay,Gtv'a) belongs only to knowledge, and that ];l;!!F!lfci~~l
property thought of as belonging to anything other than cogni- [The objectic
. tion, i.e.,' desire etc:, is merely like borrowed finery (yiicita-
 SECTION TWO 69
SES AND MOODS

rna1Jq.ananyiiya). Thus every cognition has an object (vi~aya).

e., that it should
The term vi$tayatii is a 'relational abstract' (Ingalls) derived
~er is taken out.
from vi~aya. Navyanyaya is very fond of such relational ab-
~aker also. Thu~
stracts. vi~ayatii or contentness has for its locus the object of
) give the precise
cognition. It is always said to be described (niriipit,a) by the
cognition which is the vi~ayi.
;he night that is
1/3 of the night [II.3] <T~ q-«aJ~ <C!Cl:fl<rc'i'f.+I.. B~~'-lT Olfri f;i;'-fI'-lI: q~aJ<C!rq: I Cl~'fCi +:r1 1ii'\ I
(c) from sunrise "iiii'-li <Tl~'-l!i<'-l.alqRE:!'!l ~f'R1'i..m'l'-lql <T ilFf'-ll fq o:s1'iclT
R~~[i:ri'!+(' 1<:fQ ~?! I
Ie housand years
But imperceptibility [cannot serve as an] excluder, since all
en by a wall etc.
action is unperceived. Thus it is sa1d in the BhaWa that this action
vol. 2, p. 120).
is very much not seen, [Le., not perceived], and has its parts in a
Ion factor among,
temporal order.' It is not possible to be pointed out as a whole.
If [this is your objection], it is not [acceptable]. _
olfc!q'-l'C1+I. I ' 1. Theobjection in the :Boo.~ya on P. III.2.115 (M.B. vol. 2, p. 120)
speakerJ is the is that the term parok~a 'unperceived' has been supposedly in-
lith content such cluded in the rule so that all perceived action can be excluded,
and lIT should apply only when the action is not perceived.
, :rr~IC'f.~l'!1<i'\Cll~­ ,But all action is imperceptible, and so this term (Parok~a)
ually, the phrase cannot serve- as 'an excluder.' The fault of overapplication
the form of the (ativyiipti) is still there.
10wledge (v4ayi- 2. kriyii niirneyamatyantiiparidHlii: In the Bha~ya passage itself;
>ll the V.B.S. re- the word anwn'l<lna~arnyii 'cognised only through inference'
'-lClroTr.s '-l~T<i ClT- oncurs. Katn:J.~abhatta has here substituted in its place the word
:e of the property purviiparibhiitiivayavii 'the parts of which take place in a tem-
T the'~ontentnens poral order'. This just explains why action is not perceived as a
mentary Parlksa whole. Every action is a conglomoration of activities. Thus,
e' as referring to the action of cooking consists of several parts such as lighting ,
" i.e., knowledge the fire, putting the pot on it, etc., all occuring in a sequence.
ie comes to mean Because these parts take place in a temporal order, they cannot
co-exist and thus cannot be pointed out or perceived as action
:'1ll:. as a whole. Only one part at a time can be perceived, and at
Dwledge that has
that time, the preceding part has already ceased to exist and
he consciousness
the following part has not yet come into being.
roperty of having [11.4] ClG'!'ioo>Jf'i:Cl!iClT c'-ll<m:Tfei!'!I<TT BN<T1<TT qTi\8:'!~i'\l[ mf~ClC91<l:.1 a<T
~Iedge, and that ~'-fI<Tlfei!;!m>~<Tlil"lq<'-lajsfq ~<:~ +:r'l<l.\q I '-l"-fl" Ol<i qqrq" 1<:~ I
)ther than cogni- [The objection stated in [II.'9] is not acceptable], because, the
1 finery (yiicita-
 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS SECTION TWO
70

irnperceptibility of the means [to produce action], that have the the action
power conducive to it [actionJ; and which are engaged in activity, engaged in ;
is intended. Because of this, liT is applied even when the means there is no
[to produce ac(ion] are perceived, if they are not engaged in activity.. cooked'. E~
For example, as in aya1'(t p,apaca 'this man cooked' etc. does perceiv
perceive the
1. The word siidhana has been used for the kiirakas by Pataiijali,
ing. If he
and following him, by Bhartrhari, and all the later grammarians.
cooking, the:
Siidhana is the means to achieve action. According to the
Mahabha~ya, a substance has many attributes (gul,Za) , and [II. 5] q:01 ~~0'iT'1
. each of these attributes can work separately to achieve some 'fi1'!1Tfl:]; fl:r<
action in one way or another. Thus the same substance through f-ii<7.[~+t '
. its various attributes can be different kiirakas. Thus it is the Thus lIT is
attribute which really is the means and not the substance. ceived by oneself
(Bhia~ya on P. II.3.1, vol. 1, p. 442). Bhartrhari does not differ then is inferred :
from Patafijali, though he uses the word power (sakti) instead babbled a lot bE
of attribute (gulJa). According to Bhartrhari, sadhana is the 1. Since it has
power to achieve an action either in the same locus or in another, the action 01
(V.P., IIL7.I), which means that the locus of action is either that action
the agent or the object. HelJaraja explains that in the Bha~ya that UT car
also, the word attribute is rea.Jly used to mean power, since power . one does. on
can be an attribute in ·so much as it also depends· on its locus . impereeptibi
a.lJ!d qualifies it. (p. 230). Here, KaUil)cc;labhatt;a says that the difficulty in
sadhanas are possessed of the power conducive to the action. 2. The sentenc
This means that he is going against Bhartrhari in differentiating first person
between siidhanas and the power (sakti) to bring the action see PLM. p
about. In the V.B.S., on the other hand, the phrase kriyanukiila 3. Not all sehe
only' [of the means] that are conducive to action' has been used, the imperc<
without bringing in the word Mkti 'power' at all (V.B.S. p. 153) . people, the
2. aya1'(t papaca: The alternative under consideration is that the the rule IJai
term irnperceptibility does not mean imperceptibility of action, cause of thE
but the imperceptibility of the means of action (siidhana) in· in the first :
stead. Now, if we accept this meaning, the difficulty may arise rule can be'
that the usage aya1'(t papaca 'this man cooked' would not prove. ful, llT is u
to be correct, when the agent is perceived by the narrator after view as bel<
the activity. of cooking has been completed.. The means of '"'~
eo! '-1.:::l 'Ipn
'~ .
action is not unperceived here. . To meet this difficulty, the
~l+!fq #>,
qualification vyaparav4tiinii1J'l '[the means of action that] are
(VyutpaVal
engaged in activity', has to be inserted. Because of this added
(P.L.M. p.
qualification, lIT is applied even when the means of achieving
 SES AND MOODS SECTION TWO 71

I, that have the the action are perceived, as long as they are not actually
·aged in activity, engaged in ac,tivity when the narrator perceives them.. Thus
when the means there is no difficulty about the usage aya1[l papiica 'this man
~aged in activity. cooked'. Even though the narrator while using this phrase
\' etc. does perceive the agent of the action of cooking, he does not
ias by Patanjali,
perceive the agent while actually engaged in the action of cook·
ter grammarians. ing. If he does perceive the agent engaged in theaetion of
•ccording to the cooking, then the usage aya'f{l papiica is not desirable .
:es (gu~a), and [II. 5] ~oi l;~o:q1<:f1~l;'fTr'f 'fdl1FICl1<r-m:qt c'fT~~1~1 l;,!:ql1!!fcre;:'<ll~sfq cm:
to achieve some 'f,1'!UJr:l:fl:ral <'['!,ll'! Rl~ I l:[?:!1 '\,<!:§: '>Ill" ;J;1:l;CI1G:. Cll;ll' 11'<11
.lbstance through I"
1'll<?1i[~
"r-.. I"
~lq 'l~l"q
I .
Thus it. is the Thus lIT is applied when even one's own activity is not per-
t the substance. ceived by oneself due to one's being absorbed in something etc., and
Ii does not differ then is inferred from its result. For example, people say, 'mad me
. (sakti) instead babbled a lot before him.'
, siidhana is the 1. Since it has been established that liT is to be used only when
:us or in another, the action or according to the other view, the means of achieving
, action is either that action is not perceived by the narrator, it becomes clear
It in the Bha~ya that lIT cannot be used in the first person. Of course whatever
)wer, since power . one does oneself must be perceived and thus the condition of
~nds on its locus imperceptibility is not fulfilled. . KaUil)!~abhatta answered thIS
, ta says that the difficulty in this passage. .
·e to the action. 2. The sentence quoted here as an instance of the use of iIT in
in differentiating first person is taken from SisuVa. 11.39. For other examples
:,ring the action see PLM. p. 155.
rase kriyiinukUla 3. Not all scholars agreed thus explaining away the difficulty about
n' has been used, the imperceptibility in ~he first person. . According t.o these
(V.B.S. p. 153) . people, the usage in the first person can be justified by taking
ation is that the the rule 1}aluttamo viii P. VII.1.91 as a jfiiipaka. Thus if be·
ibility of action, cause of the abovementioned difficulty, there is no use of lIT
n (siidhana) in· in the first person, then P.VII.1.91 will be useless. No Pfu;linian
acuity may arise rule can be without a purpose. Thus to malce this rule meaning-
would not prove ful, lIT is used in the first person. Vyutpattivada mentions this
Ie narrator after view as belonging to the Upayakara and his followers. Thus:
The means of ~R'2 '!'fi!B=r;;{li~li,'!l:r'! q'U'lIc'!l{ I 3lq ~'l Rle: 3"'<Ili!!~q1~.<'['t;:nq,:T:­
is difficulty, the
action that] are
arcrT'1f+!{q m: ~!3~ UIl3~T '11 ~C'fT~~fq'f,C'llj<:f1l:["Ii1U'f<i ~~cr I
(VyutpaVaLaVi. p.141). NageSa does not agree with this view.
Ise of this added
(P.L.M. p. 155).
lUS of achieving

,~~ .." .., ..... __ ..•..•.....

72 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS SECTION TWO

[I1.6J "o<na~ Mi<,:IT[T9~!!'<'l;r" ~Ri <'m'fClB9 I ~'fQ<.:1<<n <['If['f,ilRf{ 1. This is the staten
qQe:r<9Tq'l1G:~ sr.'l<l':RI'1<~TCllCl<'i'iNsc!<':11" mfiJrerr.,trT~'lrul\m·~f.iof <[- question whether
of the means of
~H~<::'i'f"T<l1'f.ll;;q for~CllU'fl<n<[Tl1tr~~;r ree:TS'lT'TlCC I
use of lIT·
[The usage] "I Udayana, composed the KiraI,iivali" however In the rule j
must [be considered] wrong. Even if imperceptibHity can be some- . understood from "
how or other justified in the abovementioned way, in the action of connected with t
expanding of the work which is accomplished with utmost contem- 'when the root is
plation and which is composed with well-arranged words giving the indicative functio
[final] decision of the meaning of the siistra, there cannot be pastness desired meaning .
.and exclusiveness of today. For this reason lIT does not apply here. meanings are to
1. The use of lIT in the first person in the sentence vyatene action, and (2) t
kira1Jliv,alimudaYlana/:t, which occurs in the beginning of Kiral).a- these two, the. fin
vali (p. 2), is obviously wrong. Even if imperceptibHity can whereas the secOl
somehow or other be justified, stilI according to Kau:Q.<;!abhaHa, son, the author 1
the usage is wrong. He means to say that at the beginning of the action wh
of the text yet ,to be composed; while the author is engaged in . 2. In the V.B.S. it
expanding it, the condition tha,t the action should be in the past,
of action is inten
exclusive of today is not fulfilled.
tators however,
The saiJkari on V.B.S. however says that the usage v),litene scholars, whereas
here can be justified by the superimposition of tlie pastness, im- i.e., that imperce
perceptibility, and exclusiveness of today, the basis of superim- to sailkan (p. 15
position being. that the result is achjeved of communicating how be taken as the
easy and quick the writing of this work was for Udayana. Ac- action, is the viI
cording to sankan, the Mafijii$1i supports this view. (saftka. grammarians thiJ
p. 155). we see that Kau;
[II.?] ~ <'!'!~'l~ I f.ii'l1<n 1l:9 qlD~q rem-<'l'-TI <"1":r'ITf{1 '!nn ~K<'!­ Nagesa states th€
fef.r.lH'l I'{I<'!>\' <"e:run'lT ~91'O'!«i <.1+'!-I'{: trTI'{i'[<?a~IT[T<[T ~9T'O'!ml'{<r«i {IL8] <r 'i'f <.1'lf %'11
<.1+'11'{ ~Ri .n<':'fli. I e:r<'lICC I aTCl 1<:'
But the following should be taken into consideration. Because 'J:<T! I'{F~Ri "~"
of [the principle ofl brevity, the [final] view is [as follows] : lIT
is applied when the action is imperceptible. For, when the heading But that is no]
'after a root' [is made to mean] 'the meaning of a root' by indicative [This objection is n
function, the relation [between the denoted and the indicated mean- activities] is not per
ings] is that between the denotator and the denoted. But when is perceived. That j
[the same rule is said to mean] 'the means of action' by indicative cannot be pointed Ot
function, the relation is that of the denotator and the means of the the action of runnin!
denoted [meaning, i.e., action]. Thus ,there is proli){ity. all, in the sentence '!
 SAND MOODS SECTION TWO

kn <[~'liijRrtJ:. 1. This is the statement of the final view of Kau.1):Qabhatta on the

<[~R;;rr·~f.ioT <[- question whether it is the imperceptibility of the action or that
~I of the means of action that is concerned in determining the'
.vall" however use of lIT .
, can be some- In the rule parok$.e litl P. III.2.U5, the word dhiito~ is
the action of understood from that heading (P. III.1.91). This word is then
tmost con tem- connected with the word parok$e, and the meaning becomes
rds giving the 'when the root is not pEirceived'. In both the alternatives, the·
lOt be pastness indicative function has to be appealed to in offier to get the
lot apply here. desired meaning. Thus from the word 'root', two indicated
tence vyiitene
ing of Kirana-
:eptibility can
I
I
Ij
meanings are to be had: (1) the meaning of the rbot i.e.
action, and (2) the means of the meaning of the root. Between:
these two, the first alternative is clearly more directly connected,
whereas the second alternative leads to prolixity. For this rea'
(aU'l).9abhatta,
the beginning ! son, the author accep~s the view that it is the imperceptibility
of the action which determines the use of lIT.
is engaged in
be in the past, 2. In the V.B.S. it is the view that imperceptibility of the means
of action is intended is stated last. According to the commen-
usage ,vyiitene tators however, this is just stating the view of some other
~ pastness, im-.
scholars, whereas fhe author's own view is the one stated before,
iis of superim- i.e., that imperceptlbility of the' action' is' intended: Aocording
unicatihg ·how to sailkan (p. 153), the view that the word 'unperceived' should
Jdayana. Ac- be taken as the qualification of the meaning of the root, i.e.,
iew. (sanka. action, is the view of the old grammarians, whereas the Neo-·
grammarians think that it qualifies the means of action. Thus
we see that KauIYQabhatta has sided with the old grammarians ..
:qaT '41c1lR',=![- Nagesa states the view of the Neogrammarians. (P.L.M., p. 143) ..
rT ~ororl~m'<l.,<'i
[1I.8] .;or 'Cf 1J'lf f,j;=![l qU~,=![o<rT~ em:. I i3!!"l~ G'U"litsfq ~,'-l'li+iqU­
a,:r''!1tJ:. I alC! 11;or fc[u;ltwrr ;or f.ia::~'r[ 'OJ9'ltR(m1Sltsfc[ I grcr 11;'1 " q«<['
;ion. Because
1I~ '<IT'!fu'' '<:,'f'[ '<IT,!.,f,j;=![l<rT 11;'1 q«lt<=!f?[ 'li~Coi 1J~fu~?!'! I
follows] :. lIT
n the heading I But that is non-excluding, s;nce all action' is imperceptible.
. by indicative i [This objection is not acceptable). Even though the group [of
dicated mean- I activities] is riot perceived [as a whole], each [activity by itself]
:1. But when I( is perceived. That is why, in the Bhas;ya also [it is said] that it
,
by indicative cannot be pointed out as a whole. That is why, the objectness of
means of the i the action of running in the [imperative form] 'see' is accepted by'
'Y. all, in the sentence 'See the deer is. running'.

.1
. .Ji8J4-._.
74 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS SECTION TWO

1. After stating his final view, KaUiJf9.abhatta wants to refute any is here the obje
objections that may arise against it. Therefore the same ob- This lends sup:
jection already mentioned [II.3] is restated. As an answer to can serve as an
this criticism, KaUl)it;labhatta says that even though action as
a whole cannot be perceived, each part of it is perceptible. [II. 9] ;r 'Of :q,~~'
Every action is made of many small parts that take place in a +!T~'fij J;t'U'
temporal order, and thus do not co-exist. That is why the Nor should om
whole group of activities cannot be perceived together, because [which is by defini'
it does not exist. But each of these activities that form a part· impediment to [aci
of the main action can be perceived, one at a time. That is why, ceptibility spoken (
in the Bha~ya also when the imperceptibility of action is stated, action. It appears
it is said, that it cannot be pointed out as a whole. The parts 1. Nage.sa rejects
can be perceived. Thus there is no difficulty in considering the q~ij,di sq'iq~iJ
imperc('!ptibility of action as an excluding condition for the
use of lIT.
KaUl!t;labhatta has here stopped the process of having parts
at a level he wants to, in order to support his argument.
Bhartrhari goes further. According to him, these -parts also
have further parts. Thus the action of cooking is comprised of
putting the po,t on the fire, pouring water in it, taking it down
etc. Whereas the action of pouring wa;ter, which is a part of the
action of cooking, also has parts such as picking up the jar with
water, stre,tching the hand towards the· pot on· the stove etc.
According to Bhartrhari, a partless thing cannot be called action.
. (V.P., III.S.lO).
2. The sentence pasya mrgo dhiivati 'See the deer is running',
is often quoted. Nagesa has used this example in his refutation
of the view of the Naiyayikas, that in the cognition of the sen-
tence·meaning, it is the meaning of the word in nominative case
that is the main quaIificand. If that view is accepted, in this sen-
tence, the word mrgla will have to take the accusative case instead
of the nominative, which is undesirable. (P.LM., pp. 110-111).
According to the grammarians, the difficulty does not arise,
because in their view, it is not the deer, but its action of
running that is the object of the action of seeing. Since dhiivati
is not a nominal base, and case affixes can apply only after nomi-
nal bases, the question of applying the accusatice case termina-
tion does not arise. Kaut:lt;labhatta has here used this usage to
prove that action can be perceived. $ince the action of running

.--.-~
 -----,------------- - - -

~SES AND MOODS

SECTION TWO 75
lilts to refute any
are the same ob- is here the object of the action of seeing, it must be perceptible.
As an answer to This lends support to his view that imperceptibility of action
though actIon as can serve as anexc1uding condition for the use of lIT.
it is perceptible. [II. 9) rr:q 5l,i:\<ii rr ljfi'f[;'lr.rrcr 'n~'I. I Cll'lmJQ 'ill<'l~<'llafct I 'Rre:r<'!ll]q
lt take place in a +rl~'f<i fit'lFTi <J'W~CI >;:rcr 5lfcn:mftrcr R'f£ I
That is why the Nor should one object as follows: each part is not an action
together, because [which is by definition a dhiitvartl~aJ. For even then, there is no
that form a part impediment to [action being the] root-meaning. And the imper-
me. That is why, ceptibility spoken of -in the Bha~ya is proper with respect to an
If action is stated, action. It appears that this is the thrust [of the present view].
Nhole. The parts 1. NageSa rejects this in his Uddyota on P. III.2.115.
in considering the
:ondition for the 'l~arS'l'19~)sr.'151<'1a:r<'ll'l2j~'R'r >Tl<fi I (vol. 3, P. 272 )

of having parts
3S
rt his argument.
these -parts also
19 is comprised of
't, taking it down
~h is a part of the
19Up the jar with
I.
on the stove etc.
t be called action.

deer is running',
! in hIS refutation
nition."of the sen-
1 nominative case
epted, in this sen-
ative case instead
M., pp. 110-111).
, does not arise,
lutits action of
g. Since dhiivati
T only after nomi-

;ice case tennina-

sed this usage to
action of running
 SECTION THREE

current day.
after a verb wi
. SECTION THREE to express acti
The rule in qu
[ IlL I J S36,hlT\[ I 'ifl" lilf<i"'1>l" ~Rr I gr<l;;rC!~ +nler;'n<<[~: I gr<l;;rC!~ S3~fq the sense of th
pure and simp:
<L"!l<J:. I <[2:!T " 'ifl" lif<lcrl ~<'1T<tl I
taining to this
[Now the author proceeds to] state the meaning of IU,!, [with
action for ithe
the words] 'something that is going to happen tomorrow'. Future
action for the ~
exclusive of today is meant, on the strength of the rule anadydtJane
says that fu.tu
lut (P. III.3.15). For example, 'it wiII happen tomorrow' etc.
2. tattvaJrt refers
1. In the rule anadyatane lut/ P. IIL3.15, the word bhavi$yati 'to
express the meaning future', is understood from P. III.3.3, . of which the I
whereas the heading dhiito /:t 'after a root' comes in from used in the te:
P. I1L1.91. The meaning .of the word anadyatana 'exclusive l3+1'1'f''f~ I ). i
of today' has been explained already. (see [ILl] note 2). The though there
meaning of the word bhavilffydt 'future' wiII be explained by the commentary F
author himself in the next passage.
'i+!:q: ~M'li<::1Jf
2. The word sva/:t 'tomorrow' in the kiirikii is rather limiting. If
it is taken literally, IU,!, can be applied only when something in this contex1
. is going to happen· the very next day, and something happening since d/:tVlt1!ISa
with future.· ,
day after tomorrow wiII be excluded. That is why Kall,I).Q.abhatta
has paraphrased sva/:t. with allladydtane 'exclusive of today'. . itself to def
According to the commentators, the wordsva/:t in the kiirikii (see [VI.4]).
should be taken as an upalakW1}a for any future exclusive of action which CI
today. present. Non-:
to here as its :
[III 2] (Qftt!+rT\[ I liler"'lC!1fq ! lifql;<[reT+rT"<f ~<<[~: I ~ iillil ~m <LOl1<J:. I <[!If[ ledge 'there is
""liT lifer"G'1Rr ~''11;;t, I CR~ 'i:f'f<hrF!qmlil'fqRr;'l''r~~lF1l"<'1Rrl1'i'f~ I action is the (
[Now the author] states the meaning of llf.'!', [with the words Thus the defin
'to express] future'. Future in general is meant, on the strength of action, of whi,
the rule ITt se$e ca [Po III.3.13) , as in the example 'the pot wiII corne to the present
into existence' etc. That means having the property of corning is that time w
into existence in a time which is the counterpositive of the prior
absence [existing] in the present.
1. ITt se$e cal P. I1L3.13. dhiirto/:t comes in from that heading in
P. I1L1.91, whereas bhavi!jyaiti is taken from P. I1L3.3. The
'rule anadya~ane lull P. I1I.3.15 introduces the suffix IU,!, in the
sense of future action not taking place in the course. of the
 SECTION THREE
The rule in question (P. 111.3.13) introduces the suffix If!.T in
19 of lUT [with
101TOW'. Future
rule anadydtane
norrow' etc.
2. tattvGJ.n refers to bhavi~yattvam 'futureness'" for the definition
rd bhavi~yati 'to
'rom P. III.3.3,
'comes in from
~atana 'exclusiye
IJ note 2). The
explained by the
'2!W1: ClG.N"f.~I1f'lil<qful1ml''I'l.1 (Pra. p. 150) is meaningless
;her limiting. If
when ,,something
, ~thing happening
ly KaUl).Q.abhatta
usive of, today' .
I~ in the kiirikii
ture exclusive of
l'-t ~fcr~'l?llO: I >l~
m~~r:il~qRrl1'<'I'l.1
[with the words
n the strength of
the pot will come
perty of coming
tive of the prior
1 that heading in
P. 111.3.3. The
suffix lUT in the
le course of the
77
current day. The suffixes tum UN and !,!vuL are introduced
after a verb when there is another verb in construction with it,
to express action for the sake of future action. (P. I11.3.1O).
the sense of ;the remaining cases of the future action, Le., future
pure and simple. Thus If!.T can be used to express future per-
taining to this day, as well as to other day, and when there is
action for ithe sake of future action as well as when there is 'no
action for the sake of future action. That is why KaUlfgabhatta
says that future in general is meant.
of which the phrase 'Ic!l1HlTl<Tlil'llT1v-hTlrul1<i't,qRrl1'<'I'l. has been
used in the text. Another reading ('Ic\111"llT1<r1il'1lTR,~~,qfu"f.­
'Nl',g't'l'l. I ), is suggested in Darp. p. 150. It is clearer,
though there is not, much difference in meaning. The
commentary Prabha which says 'lc!111.i'r "IT "<i<.1: ClOT{a"lllit >l
in this context. This definition would fit better for past:J.ess,
since dhv,an1sa 'posterior absence' connects with past and not
with future.' As a matter of fact, it ii; used later on' in V.B.
itself ,to define pastness. , W;rm"l'-imrfc!"llflt,ct +!..CI<'!'l.
(see [VI.4J). The definition simply means as. follows: the
action which comes into existence in futUre does not exist in the
present. Non-production of action at the present time is referred
to here as its prior absence (priigab,~iiva). Now, in the know-
ledge 'there is a prior absence of action at the present time',
action is the counterpositive (pratiyogin) of its prior absence.
Thus the definition means that future is that time iu which an
action, of which the prior absential counterpositive is limited
to the present, comes into existence. In other words, future
is that time when prior absence of an action comes to an. end.
 SECTION FOUR

But neither of
The Siddhiinta
SECToJON FOUR 2. See introducti(
[IV·BI1CR ~cT;:CT
[IV·A.l] ~its~m~ I f<r~'11GJf<rm I foos>'r~~ <1,~m:: I 3!T~~T RWSlITfT- ml1T;:l'I ~g<<{T
l!;:~lTfl\;\rg:TG({T 'l~;.Fcr I f<rN~fli ~{ITfll. I +l''111tR~g:~ lFI<I~mrn Instigation is ;
<[T'Iil: I Rl1;:~tJf R<!rl"FHITfll. I 3!wt<['t; '-'ll;&:l1r;;r;:cT<tl <Df~'n1t: ~'Ia-­ means [to achieve]
;:rm!a <[T'Iil: I 3!lW;!!Jf 'lill1T"fFl:J;'!fT I. 3!\;{rg:: ~''-iiR~'-iiT O<flrn{: : perty of being the r
[Now the author] states the meaninK of lET, [with lhe words] being the cause of
'injunction etc.', on the strength of the rule li'liart.he let [Po III.4.7]. [the cognition that
By 'etc.', summons, permission, respectful command etc., are to be should be the deno
taken. The word vidhi means injunction, i.e., inducing [or com- 1. pravartanii ha:
manding] a subordinate person such as' a' servant etc. . The vi'Ord activity. In 1
nimantra1Ja means assigning a duty, i.e., direding a person like a 5f'[fu:;f;:C'-ii~HfilS('
grandson etc., on the occasion of the necessary Sriiddha ceremonial of the conteni
meal. The word iimantr,aIJa means permission to do as one likes. activity.' The
The word adhi$ta means a respectful command. thing desired i
. 1. liiwrthe let! P. IIL4.7 provides for the use of lET in the Veda contentness of
to express the same meanings as lIN. The meanings of lIN are means of the d
given in P. III.3.161.Seelntroduction [D-l]. of the suffix 11
[IV·A·21 ~'Ia;:n<li ~fu 1f R~'li~: I "fl.!uif 'l~~rn«l;l ~~l'~ll. I ~n::Ts: I knowledge of
"3!~Q ~'1€r;:n~ql1:1'~ "f2~~fq I cr~ f<'>~ f<r\;\'R!c<:n i'lili",'1.'{ fcI'Ia;l'lT II knows' that th
. ;:'11'1C~,q'''C::;:Cl~ 'IT ~~T'~l!'11f<t 'IT I f<r'<'11G:r;:rTl1rnG:l;l 'OfglTffm~:
he desires. In
is the propert)
l£,Clll. II " ~Icr I 3!Q ~Qil: fu:&:Fcr~~l;'~!ll1r.~'q.ll. I Thus in the se
The conclusion is that lIN expresses instigation. The separate should sacrifice
mention of the four (meanings] is [just] for the sake of the expan- means of the (
sion . [of the basic meaning]. Thus it is said, "[question]: In all does not denoi
the four, the [common aspect of] instigation is closely connected. It denotes the
[Therefore] lIN should be prescribed in that [general sense] alone. i$!asiidhanartt
Why then is the difference [in the four meanings] intended? trates the fop
[answer]: The mention of the four [meanings]vidhi etc., was question. Th(
made in the first place to make the details clear, or to expatiate and the propel
[the basic meaning]." That is why this is stated in tile Siddhiinta- in i$tasiidhanl
kaumudi also.. desired end'. ~
1. The two verses quoted here sound like Vakyapadiya verses, and
and in LaghuMafi. (p. 983), one of them (asti pr,avaitaniiru- [IV·B·2l crm"f<frf4
partt . .. ) has been quoted with the introduction uktartt ca hari1Jii. ~ <:9lTI~ 51
'll'1C!T ~ ~~
 SECTION FOUR ,9,

But neither of these verses can be found in the Vakyapadiya.

The Siddhantakaumudi reference is to S.K. vol. 3, p. 33.
2. See introduction [DC:l].
[IV·Bl] Cf'1l!ef€r;:u ~'[~~"'T 'ij~ ~t!T'il'l<'llI.\ ~!roT'ij'laTm'l<:<:[ >!'[fu~
a:n~;!T Rl1;:'11Jff- <fll1T;:i.t ~i!''lT'I'ijRUR Q~'1 '11~c<IlRr«!1<l:' \
~R'!5![~<:[ ~'1<'i.,fl'rru
;.,
1«1
. ~;,.
~lIil:'1h,:
,
Il'lCf-
Instigation is a property conducive to activity, i.e., being the
means [to achieve] the desired thing. Since cognition of the pro-
'lil<':~'liT Ol:fl'll<':: :
[with the words]
,Ie! [Po III.4.7].
I perty of being the means of the desired thing has been determined as
being the cause of activity in general, it is appropriate that that
[the cognition-that this is the means to achieve something desired],
ld etc., are to be should be the denoted [meaning of lIN] .
Iducing [or com- 1. pravar!;anii has here been defined as the property conducive to·
Getc. The ",-ord activity. In the V.B.S. this property- has been specified a~
~ a person like a l!'[ffi;;{'l'li;j)'H~'1QT'l'<~'Ii'~+I.\ 'property of being the limiter
iiddha ceremonial of the contentness -of the cognition which produces" volitional
) do as one likes. activity.' The cognition that this is the means to achieve some-
thing desired is the one ~hat produces volitional activity. The
lET in the Veda contentness of this knowledge is in the property of being the
:anings "of ilN are means of the desired thing. Therefore that must be the meaning
r . of the suffix liN. What Katu:Jlgabhatta is saying is -that mere
w:I:;;'n~+I. \ ~l~: \ . knowledge of injunction would not make a man act unless he -
. knows that the ac;tion. -in question will achieve something that
1<:[: i'f;ilt::~ foI'laJ<n \I
he desires. liN instigates activity because its denoted meaning
aQTt::lo1 'i:@1Jff111~; is the property of being the means of achieving the desired end.
\ Thus in the sentence svargakiimo yaje.ta 'he who desires heaven
.on. 'Fhe separate should sacrifice', lIN suffix tells the agent that sacrifice is the
sake OHhe expan- means of the desired heaven. Here it should be noted that UN
question]: In all does not denote the cognition that produces volitional activity.
closely connected. It denotes the content of such cognition. The phrase yiiga
neral sense] alone. i$!asiidhanal?Z 'sacrifice is the means of the desired end' illus-
mings] intended? trates the form of the content (vi$aya) of the cognition in
s]vidhi etc., was question. The contentness (vi$ay,atii) resides in the content,
ir, or to expatiate and the property of being the limitor (avacchedakdtva) resides
I in the Siddhanta- in i$tasiidhanatva 'the proper:i;y of being the means of -the
desired end'. Thus i!?!asMhanatva is the denoted meaning of liN.
ipadiya verses, and [IV· B· 2] C!~'Cf ~fl'r;ft>{ I§+I.\ "liJf€;I~ l!<ITmK ~aJrJf<'ll<t." ~R'!I liJf€;It!~
(asti pravaitaniiru-
~ <:<m'l~ w{\'<'f.K 'li<'iR l!l:{~",m'il'la'R'la:t1!f,cnfu:~: \ <f,,fi'tarcrT-
)n uktam .
. ca harina.
'll'lCfT ~ feiNRR'! "'fiCfi ~lffi'~'l''ll<t.'' ~''lf'ij'li<':ut m+l«tt O<!l~l:jjCf+I. !

.. _.. ,'-.-.0.
so THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS SECTION FOUR

~n addition, there is the aphorism of J aimini that fruit asso-

1. The verse quo
dated with [acts prescribed in Vedic] injunction resides in the viveka .. '. (Vidl
[person] who carries it out, since it [the Vedic injunction] is char- brings forwar{
acterised by that [agent]. This has been explained in BhamatI· not the proper
.in the section, ' [the individual self] is the agent, since the [Vedic]
injunctions are meaningful', as follows: the fruit heaven etc., i0<t'I~<=1{: ~'!€r<i
connected with [Vedic] injunction resides in the person who carries answer, karik.
it [the action prescribed by the injuction] out, i.e., in the agent, property of t
since injunction means the property of being the means of achieving <fTC~'!€r<jl):q f;n;
what the agent expects. that KaUlJ.lQab:
1. ~1~'fi0- >!'119'ClR q~a:r<1['91<J: q<l'!l<J:
<'14 wt~ ,:t{1<J: I M.S. IIL7.8.18 2. any,al;: by tl
states the first of the two views which are later to be rejected siidhyata) am
in M.S. III.7.8.20. (balavadani'itii
. 2. The aphorism karta sastrart'havattvat/ B.S. II.3.33 describes' be discussed Ie
the individl,lal self as being the agent. Otherwise . (iI the [IV.B.4] ;:J::! ~!!<ll\;f
individual sel£ is not the agent), Vedic injunctions such.as yajeta Now [if it is c1:
'he should sacrifice', juhuy,at 'he should give oblations' etc., be denoted [by lI!v:
would be meaningless. While commenting on this section, desired. end, [it] als.
Bhamati brings in M.S. nL7.8.18 and explains it, (Bham. 1. The view of thE
p. 61'3) without mentioning that it is a. view. which is later rejected. Acco:
to be rejected. fold meaning a:
3. The impor:tant thing here is the part (kartrapek~itopayata hi being the mean
vidhilJ) which supports KaUI,lQabhatta's view that injunction feasi bili ty', all(
means the property of being the means of achieving what the not entailing a
agent desires. The compound krartrapek'iitopaydtii is to be to cause volitio
divided kartrape~ita :.+ upayata, arid not as kar'tarapek'iita + ,saktiprakasika,
upayatii which does not yield the desired meaning.
q~qlru:q ~IC!
4. I have accepted the reading adhikaraIJe of the Bombay edition
142) . For det,
instead of adhikara(zctrtt of the Benaresedition'. The explanation
in question is not that of the section kartii sastraithavattviit, KaUJ.lc;iabhatta :
but that of M.S. III.7.8.18 which has been brought in in the peities Which b
suffix 1Ifl.
course of the discussion of that section.
[IV.B.5] a:r;ft'fci ~~~
[IV. B.3] 3m 1l;'I +rcr:S<j~~<i<fq'I. "i<:ri ~!!!I<=gqp:r~'!l<J: f;n'11<,!rl:{: >!'1~'li: I
"j\;f;:rqT J;t<j
~,[~~IT "Iif:q ~,!c;-f.q ~cl<jl'I. II " '?;Rr I
,
That is why it has been stated by MaI,lc;ianamiSra that there is f,j;'11 'lil~ ~
nothing other than the property of being the means to a desired end "wnit'! fi'if.
that instigates men to [perform] actions. This property, [since it is] In this [matter]
the cause of volitional activity, is called instigation. chapter of the Anuv
NSES AND MOODS SECTION FOUR 81

li that fruit asso- 1. The verse quoted here is taken from Mlll}Ic;lanami:sra's Vidhi-
.on resides in the viveka .. ' (VidhiVi. kiirikii 27; MK, p. 3612): The purvapa~in
ljunction] is char- brings forward the objection that lIN denotes instigation,and
lained in Bhamatl not the property of heing the means to a d'esired end "@
, since the [Vedic]
~IR.l:f: Q'<Rr'llql1l=l:fa [ ;or :O;'l: ~1S[1~'lTl:fm ] M.K. p. 3612). In
fruit heaven etc.,
answer, kiirikii 27 says that instigation is the same as the
person who carries
property of being the means of achieving the desired end.
i.e., in the agent,
means of achieving ~n(Q'q~'lI)T.f f;nl:[11lTT+!'tfu,il'ITl:fijq MK, p. 3612). This is the view
that KaUJJ;lr;iabhatta has followed.
2. any,a/J: by the word 'other', the property of feasibility (krti-
'I: I M.S. III,7.8.18
siidhyatii) and the property of not entailing a stronger evil
.ater to be rejected (balavadani~tiinanubandhitva) are meant. Both of these will
be discussed later.
3. II.3:33 describes'
Otherwise (if the [IV.B.4] ":1 '(IHn'i!'l<q~'i.tq ~Rr<fl~l:f<~l:flfq Q"!#r'llCll:f1 'O]9'l:f<Ei ~Rfu ~<l:. I
tion!> such.as yajeta Now [if it is claimed that] the properly of being feasible can also
ive oblations' etc., be denoted [by lIN] ,since, like the property of being the means 10 a
5 all this section, desired end, [it] also [acts as an] instigator; [that is not acceptable] .
[plains it, (Bham. 1. The view of the Nai)layikas has been brought in here, later to be
'iew which is later rejected. ·According to the Naiyayikas, inj1IDction has a three-
fold meaning and it consists of i~;<asiidhanatva 'the property of
trapek~itopaYia:tii hi being the means to a desired end, krtisiidhymtva .'the property of .
ew that injunction feasibility', and balavadani${iinanubandhitva 'the property of
achieving what the not entailing a stronger evil'. All three of these are necessary
itopaydta is to be to cause volitional activity. Thus Jagadisa says in his sabda-
;8 kaTtarape~ita + saktiprakasika," foil~~g ••. 5[qij'f.f'<[9itlSff"t ",Q"llI~9im;or~ ~iF'i <r
meanIng. C1~ .C11~ '<[ ~fu<fI~l:f<qm!!:lOl'i!;:r<Ei <{<>q<::I~!!:T"@<{I~'i!<'i 'if Q'<'t'fiii q (p..
the Bombay edition 142) .• For details of this view see -Introduction' [E-2]. Here
n. The explanation KaUiI).~abhana is stating the first of these two additional pro~
:i siistrarthavattviit, perties 'Y'hich have, been· pr¢posed tb Qe the.rnea.ning of th¢.
1 brought in in the . suffix 1II'i. . .."._. . ': " , ."
[IV.B.5] :o:r~c'! Q'~+!T'i'-fI>:[WF1'IT~S¥tI~~ I " 9i1>faT 'l '<[ 9iiR,~fc::2-
lOl'i!'lClt foi'lT I. 9iii{;or
.
~
'1Ta
~ , ];f;'1lo f.lm~" ~ll<<iCl: . II ~ +!RG<!-
];f;<!l '9i1~ ~~l:fCl1liJ ~Rr mjq- I 'fili{ ~l~q ,<['f-f,~+!liJ<P:{ 'filirfll'rlra I
amiSra that there is
ans to a desired end lOll=l:fI~'! Rfi?r~~" Qfc::g <f1'i!;1 C1~T II" ~Rr I
Iroperty, [since it is] In this [matter] it has been said in the first section of the first
tion. chapter of the Anuvyakhyana, "the property of being the goal of
 ..---------------

82 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS SECTION FOUR

action is none othE!r than the property of being the means to a desired significatory ,
[end]. That whiGh~hould be. doneis hot invariably connected with guageor the
[covered 'by] action "(ingepenill, sinc~lhe prdhibited[action] will involving the
alSo be':ihe'kme [Le.'action,' and so akllrya]. Neither is future action by a
action then the goal of action; because that wiII apply to 'God will These two elc
create' also; nor can it be said that that which is' impossible not to of the three, ;
do [i.e., that which is possible to do, i.e., feasible], is the goal of i.e., older thai
action, for [the same reason of its] similarity with that which ig the command
prohibited. Thus it [i.e., the goal of action] is the desired means." 'bring a cow',
1. The verses quoted are taken from the Anuvyakhyana of Ananda- cow', aSvam :
tIrtha on B.S. 1.1.1 (Anuvya. 43cd, 44, and 45). Of course the so performed,
desired end in that context is the liberation and the means to these sentenc{
it the desired Godhead (4tade1 1ata). Thus verse 46 says "kiirya1JZ 'insertion anc
siidhantami!ftasya bhagavan4tadevatii" Since Kaul!c;Iabhatta is sentence aCCOl
going to quote the commentary on these verses, it is not neces- the meaningi
sary to explain them here. Then when tl
by the action
[IV .B.6] fq~ij ~ '1:rF'f~'ijT<n+J:. I 'llp~''lfqfu!2'-i't'ij'f.~~9 'IT'f''f'1<!'1lJT;JT<r.
meaning as a
HO<l9~<':T<r. 'llT"fIRa t!:'l c::!,q~*f re~~{I;:rTlfih'ij'f.'91<r. 'lii< ~<n;fr. the sentences
~t ~ ~CfT'lQ ~""T~~T f;:r<':T'f.IT ClTij'l AI'lI~"ffQ I 'lili{ClT ~fu I action of brin!
This-has_ also been explained in the Nyayasudha. "A sentence and each time
always ends up _signifying [a meaning] qualified by the property of the indivi~ual
being something to be- done. Also from the usage of elders, [it can 3. kiiryiinvlle ev,
be seen that] one learns a meaning-relation only with respect meanings -of w
to what is associated with that which is to be done. From junctive sente:
this [it is clear that] anything which expresses the accomplished after the sP-llte
thing, cannot be the signifier. How, then, do the [texts called] in accordance
Vedanta convey a pure Brahman? It is to refute this doubt that tence with tlie
[the authQrof the Anuvyakhyana] establishes what it [karya 'what stands'its mea
is to bect9Jle'] is, '[with the words]' 'kiiryatii9a'.'" -' cow is an anirr
1; This passage is, based on NY~yaSu. p. 68;' lam translClting ,would be .rn~a
the word kiirya as 'something to be done' or as 'goal of 'action', general cqnGlq~
thing to be cior
'.jn accordance with the definition~ in the PtakaPaii which'SaYs;
and anything' t
~" '<T'$Qlr:lJQ~;;'-1a I (p. 452). , Later on, I have thought any meaning.
it best to leave it untranslated. 4. Now the dout
2. vrddhavyavahiira ': The usage of the elders is always considered not convey an]
to be one of the main (and sometimes the only one) factor in cate pure Bra:
the complicated process of. smi-zketagraha 'the cognitiol,l of the does not chanj

SES AND MOODS
leans to a desired
yconnected with
:ed[action] will
~either is future
.ply to 'God will
mpossible not to
J, is the goal of
;h that which is
, desired means."
lyana of Ananda-
). Of course the
nd the means to
46 says" karya1JZ
Kau'J!Qabhatta is
" it is not neces-
. ,
irr'l '1T'f<T'1"!'!<fTrrTi'(
.:::..
~ meaning as a whole is understood, ithe child sees that in both
.'il'll<'11i'( 'll>l 'len-a;
qfu I 9il~aT ~fu I
ha. "A sentence
, the property of
of elders, [it can
lly with respect
be done. From
:he accomplished
le [texts called]
~ this doubt that
G it [karya 'what
I am tra!Islating
l 'goal of 'ad ion' ,
ParL which sa);S;
, I have thought
llways considered
iy one) factor in
cognition of the
"'-----'----. - - -
SECTION FOUR 83.
significatory. association', which is imperative in learning a lan-
guageor the mean{ng of .apew\vord. :it i\l always describ€d as
involviJ;ig the observation· of it'c0l1v~rsation ,and the resulting
. action by .a biila'ac'nild' ," in, whith' two elders .are invoived.
These two elders are referred to as the i;,fJtortrUlvrddka, the eldest
of the three, and the madhyamavrd~ha, who is the middle one,
i.e., older than the child, but younger than the person who gives
the command. When a child hears ,the commands giimanaya
'bring a cow', asvamlinya 'bring a horse', gii1!l badhiina 'tie the
cow', asvarrz naya 'take the horse away'; and sees the actions
so performed, it learns the meaning of the individual words in
these sentences. In this procedure, the method of iivapodviipa
'insertio,n and extraction' is used. When ,the child hears the
sentence accomganied by the action of bringing a cow, at first,
the mea!ling is understood as belonging to the entire sentence.
Then when the second sentence 'bring the horse' accompanied
by the action of bringing a different animal is heard, and its
the sentences the word .anaya 'bring' is common, and so is the
. action,of bringil).g; bu;t the words 'cow' and 'horse' are different,
and each time a different animal is brought. It is this way, 'that
the individual word-meanings are isolated.
3. karyiinvz!e eva vyutpaUe!J: According to the Prabhiikaras,
meanings of words are properly comprehended only through In-
junctive sentences which involve some act to be done. Thus
after the sentence 'bring a cow' is uttered, and a cow is brought·
in accordance with tha,t command, the child connects the sen-
tence with tne visible action resulting from it, and thus under~
stands'its meaning. On the other hand, some· fact such as 'a
cow is an animal', which does'not.involve something-to·.bedo.ne,
,wo.uldbe !11~aningless tothe.~hild. ,FrplIl, this, -they draw the
general cqJ;J.(~\qsion th~t Ru,ly t~Q~~,seti~~\'!c~s, wh!Ghjnwlvesome- " .<
thing to be done, i.e.,mainlyinjuctiYe~ntences; are meaningful,
and anything tha.t expresses an acco~~lish~d fadcani'tot convey
any m e a n i n g . , . " .
4. Now the doubt arises'l;hat if'thus an accomplished fact does.
not convey any meaning, how is it that the Vedanta texts advo-
cate pure Brahman ( The Brahman always' has existed and
does not change. It does not involve any action to be done:
 SECTION FOUR
84 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS
[IV. R.IO] <a~:t[ql
To be meaningful, it has to be qualified by the property of being
lI"f<i~l:{i
the goal of action.· This creates 11 difficulty for the Vedantins,
because ,they hold that anything which is kiirya could not have [The state]
existed before, and later, ~t necessarily gets destroyed, andBrah- follows]: The
man exists eternally. How can it be called kiirya then? It is means that beca
in answer to this doubt that the Anuvyiakhyana verses define absence of the I'
what karyatii 'the property of being the goal of action' is, in does have futui.
such a way that it does not contradict the eternal pure existence that future acti
of he Brahman. claimed that] it
create'] is karya
[IV.B.7] 1{!!<:IT'i{;rCfIf4<'l"l 1{!!<<l 'q f<i~fcr ~lS[:
I ~'l~~ Cftllm'i{Hle( I kiiryatii] is the
[In the verse], along with the property of being the means 1. This is the
to the desired [end], [the words] 'also except the property of being gives the ree
the desired' are to be understood, since that is what is said in the karya. If f
conclusion. of creating i
1. The commentator ]ayatlrtha is here referring to AnuVya. 43. a kiirya. Bl
The verse itself just says 4tasiidha1'liatal!t vinii. But in the con- 2. linviicyatiin&
. clusion, the adjective, 4ta 'desired' is also applied to the means since it is d
(AnuVya. 45). That is why it is being suggested that 4tatvarjz caita:t kiirya;
ca vinii should also .be understood in AnuVya. 43). . . However, th
[IV.B.8] '!iliirRfct I o'-1lr.>t "f;11~ I f<rli?!~~<l,,~;r"lllt: ~l"fi'i{~;r mr<91~- before linva(
'f"ff '
of creating .
Cfe( '!il'll",<l'.:r: I
kiirydtii has
[The statement beginning with] 'kiiryam' [is explained as fol- sra~yalJi dOl
lows]: Invariably associated [with i.e.] produced [by]. [If
that invariably associated with action is considered to be kiirya] , [IV.B.II] "'[i<l:fH
killing a brahmin etc., which is prohibited, will also be the same '!iFl-m ,'1
[i.e., kiirya] , as that also is produced by action. Hence, this [that ~,91q
which is invariably associated with or in other words is produced by The krtya [1
action] isnbt the thing to be done ..

I
[by the rule] krt
1. This. is the explanation of '!ili[;r W~'1io<lir.>t f.tfiiR;:l.O'l Ul'Itolcr: I doubt that kiirya
(AnuVya. 44). Thearg1,lIrient here is quite dear. must be done, the
. .. ~.. . . words] kiirya1'JZ
[IV.B.9] . ~ 11111 '[.a;r 91 ~a ff.rg'f,l>Wrfcr 0'f~'TG; lIfoi~:t[~:t[l 'f.lil cepted] , adultery
fit:t[If.tl'l"lifoi~<rc<l91 m~'~CfP<r\R~ I ;r lI"~~:t[~fcr I etc.] being impos:
karya is future action or futurity in action. [This view is based has been expres:sel
on] the following usage: [bne says] , "this has not been done by me, 1. The word kl.
nor is it being done, but has to be done." [Madhva] refutes this lfyaT to the
. [view by 'saying] 'na bhavi~yat'.

.-.-.--~
 SECTION FOUR 85
IS AND MOODS
[IV.JUOj <a&:l:f<I1f<I 1 ~~$"T ~w 1 l:f<I: <all;<Ic!l<l:f''l ~~"'1:1~0f;fil:fll:fT
'Operty 'Of being 'l'lFot"<R~ sfri 'll1<{<'11+!1'I l«l:fiI: 1 '" ~<I<'ll1<{l'r'l1 fol~'Il'Ol:f<IF~ifj'llR1<J: I
the' Vedantins,
[The statement beginning with] 'sra~yatt' [is explained as
couldnqt have
,yed, and Brah- fDllDWS]: The wDrd hi is used with reference tD a cause. This
means that because in the [example, 'God] will create', there is an
Ia then? It is
absence of the prDperty 'Of being the goal 'Of actiDn, even though it
a verses define
,f actiDn' is, in does have futurity 'Of the actiDn cDnducive to creati'On; [the view
I pure existence
that future actiDn is kiirYIG has to be rejected]. [N Dr can it be
claimed that] it [the action of creating in the example 'God will
create'] is kiirya, since [the property 'Of being the goal 'Of action, i.e.,
! lili"lFI1<J: I karyatii] is the accepted meaning of 'lIN.
~ing the means 1. This is the explanatiDn of the part sraksyatHa iti hyapi which
operty 'Of being gives the reason for rejecting the view that futurity in action is
t is said in the karya. ' If future action 'is accepted' as kiirya, even the action
'Of creating in the example 'God will create' will have to be called
'0 AnuVya. 43. a karya. But creating the world is nota duty fDr,God.
But in the CDn- 2. linvacyalangikarat: As it is this reading creates difficulties,
d to the means since it is difficult to connect with the preceding sentence na
d that 4tatva11! caitat kiirya;meva, f'Or which it is supposed to provide a reas'On.
43) : '~Dwever, this could be ,done by ~upplying the w'Ord kiiryatiiyiil}

n;;{<ij~", ~11<'11~-
before linviicyatiingikiirat. It w'Ouldthen mean that the acti'On
'Of creating residing in God cannot be called ,kiirya, because
kiirydta has been accepted as the meaning of lIN. The form
Kplained as fol- sra~yati does n'Ot end in lIN. ' The definition is aUvyiipta.
:ed [by]. [If
I tD be karya] , [IV.B.II] "'[.<l:fTW " l«l:fl~'f'llTit '[.«TT +!'IP<I 1 <I'"'C!1~~<rWrfcr <I~'1
lO be'the same '!il<{ifl<'l1~~'fl:f f.i<.t"lRr 1 'lil<lfl:rfu I' G<:;:nlJl1l1"'l~~'f~~1'fl:f<'ll<J:
ence,this [that 'Ii1<l<'llQRi'ir<>m: 1 ~wn~~ 1
, is produced by The krty,a [suffixes] are introduced in the meaning 'Of necessity
[by the rule] krtyiiSca [Po IlL3.I71] . [NDW first bringing up the]
Im~ ~l1<'1<I: I doubt that kiirya is that which it is impossible not tD dD [i.e., which
~ar.
must be done, the author 'Of the Anuvy;akhyana] rejects it, with [the
wDrds] kiiryarrt [etc.]. [Then he] says that [if this view is ac-
cr, +!~"<!~l:fl 'Ii1~ cepted] , adultery etc. will also be a kiirya, because 'Of its [adultery'
al etc.] being impossible nDt to do [if 'One is in afit 'Of passiDn]. [This
lis view is based has been expressed with the wDrds] siimyiideva.'
~en d'One by me, 1. The word karya has been fDrmed by adding the krtya suffix
vaL refutes this 1!yaT tD the verbal rDDt kr. (rhalor~ydtl P. III.1.124). The
86 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS SECTION FOUR

ruh~ krtyiisca/ P. III.3.171 prescribes krtya suffixes when neces- is past, you also
sity . ~r obligation is to be expressed. (The word iivasy;aka Iconcerning the 0
'necessary' or 'obligatory' has come from the preceding ,iivaoyakii- 1. I am taking
dha.nw17;lyayor1Jini};J P. III.3.170). Thus the word kiirya should . property of I
mean something which must be done, i.e., scmething which it is against whicll
impossible not to do. TIle argument here is the same as in were quoted
[IV. B.8] . being the me,
[IV.B.12J Clf'"Ri I Cl~1l1~<:q~: I ~!i Cl<m'cl<'r 'Ill'h'lfi:l~li[ I ~f+l<<n~ I Cl>lT gator. Now
another obie~
~!2'<'1~l:t!2'<:!l"FI''1~'1 'IT ~u'1<ll'Cjl <J: 'Ill4,,!fgf~12maqlO:'f.<'t s Pl
to a desired ,
;n~1l1<i1 1'Jf'€rRRi +[T'I ~Rr I saril y be an i;
tad means 'hence'. [Madhva] says that the property or being activity is ne
the goal of action is the desired means [to the desired end], [with being fulfillec
the words] 'i~la1fl' etc. Thus, since the properties of being the de- bility is the
sired one or the means of the desired. [end] cannot be denied [as 2. vVhat is this
existing1 in the Brahman, there is no difficulty for us even though of the referenl
[the Brahman] is said to be qualified by kiiryatva. and not possi
1. This is the end of the Nyayasudha passage explaining the Anu- by adding th
vyakhYiana verses. This passage explains the last line, in which passage [IV']
the conclusion of ~he whole argument is stated. The original might be the
objection aro'se from the Prabhlikara \:iew that only those sen-· Cardoria sug!
tenoes in which kiirya 'something to be done' is expressed, are bringing of t
meaningful. This created a difficulty for the -Vedantins (see idiil'tirp 'now'
note 4 on [IV.B.6]) who advocate the pure Brahman. To of the moon
avoid this difficulty, Madhva proceeded to define the meaning would r,efer 1
of the word kiirya in such a way, tha,t even though Brahman mw.u!ala is' r
is admitted to be kiirya it wiII not contradict its basic nature mentaries, th
of pure and eternal existence. Being desired or the means of 3. The orb of tl
the desired liberation does nO,t in any way compromise the something de:
character of the Brahman, and thus the word. kiirya can be sired end is c
applied to it without any difficulty. an inclinatiOl
[IV. B.13J <[3; ~lEm'Cj~,'!~'1 '<f;:ll:+iU:S(?[~"31'CjRIJ[''il<J:: Cl'! 'l'[fu: <:'-!l~Ri ~;;r I of the moon.
faulty. Ther
8lfflcr'f.T'i qiP?rcrT'11<:<'fo:':~"<rl'1l! ~'!1<J: Cl'll]q 5!<a'('lTq~: I
4. i~tasiidhanatt
Now if [you claim that] since the property of being the means can be true e'
to a desired [end] is common with the orb of the moon, there will be is taking reee
inclination to activity about tha,t [if the view that i~tasiidhanatva is to both sides
the instigator is accepted], ;that is not so. Since the property of moon was po:
being the goal of action as accepted by you exists.in something thai and thus it d
SES AND MOODS
fixes when neces-
word iivasYiaka
,ceding iiv,asyakii-
"Ord kiirya should
:thing which it is
the same as in
~ I ~f~<l:fl!G: I Q'-11
foIfu2!!TaQT<{'Ii<'t s fq
lroperty of being
;ired end], [with
of being the de-
ot be denied [as
. us eVen though
i.
'laining the Anu-
1st line, in which
d.· The original
; only those sen-
is expressed, are
,Vedantins (see
,Brahma11. To
fine the meaning
though Brahman
its basic nature
or the means of
compromise tbc
'd kiirya can be
!~Rr: ~'!T!G:fcr ~;;r I of the moon. But this is not possible, and thus this view is
~lq~: I
being the means
lon, there will be
'~tasiidhanatva is
the property of
1 something that
I to both sides cannot be held against either. Creating of the
SECTION FOUR 87
is past, you also will have this fau!,t of the inclination to activity
Iconoerning the orb of the moon]. .
1. I am taking this passage as connected to the view that the
property of being feasible is also to be taken as an instigator,
against which the AnuVya. verses and the commentary on them
were quoted in support of the view th<'\t only the property of
being the means to a desired end is to be considered as an insti-
gator. Now the krtisiidhyataviid'i is making a comeback with
another objec~ion, i.e., that .since the property of being the means
to a desired end exists in the orb of the moon, there will neces-
sarily be an inclination to an activity concerning it, and such an
activity is not possible. Thus the condition of feasibility not
being fulfilled, there wm be no such fault if the view that feasi-
bility is the instigator· is accepted.
2. vV11at is this a~tivity concerning the orb of the moon? Because
of the reference to its being sorriething which is past (atitakiirya) ,
and not possible now (since later on the fault has been removed
by adding the adjective idiini1'(t 'now' ~o feasibility ill the next
passage [IV.B.14]), it seems to me that the activity concerned
might be the creating of the moon (candrama1J.l/alanirmii~za).
Cardona suggests that it is also possible to think of it as the
bringing of the moon (candra;ma:IJl/aliinaYlana). In this case
idiiniiJ!z 'now' must be taken to refer to daytime when bringing·
of the moon is not possible, whereas atita 'past' in this case
would refer to the night. Since the reference to the oandm-
ma:~u!ala is'rather cryptic in the text, and there are no com-
mentaries, there is rio clue to :the exact intention of the author.
3. The orb of the moon gives pleasure, and is thus the means of
something desired. If the property of being the means to a de-
sired end is accepted as the only instigator, this would lead to
an inclination to activity (pravrttij.: i.e.; creating or bringing
faulty. Therefore it cannot be accepted.
4. i${asiidhtmatvaviidi answers this objection by showing that .it
can be true even if feasibility is accepted as an instigator: This
is taking recourse to the maxjm ·thata fault which is common
moon was possible once (i.e., when the moon was first created) ,
and thus it did have the property of feasibility. Since that is
88 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS SECTION FOUR

the instigator according to the krtisiidhyatiiviidi, the fault exists is not removed.
even when this view is accepted, as it has not so far been specified moon [pleasure]
that to be an instigator, the property of being feasible cannot property now-ne<
be past. being the means.
inclination to do
[TV.B.l4] ~ '!iT~cn~!l;j <r~fu ~<r. I ~<::Fl1fuq'-1N<lC!l~!l;j <ritf<r '-1liT<ll{ I
For us [krtisiidh;
<rli+rr~2'-1N<lCC!1"'l'!iTir''1li'1 R%r'fgli~;H<'Il<r. '11"'1<'1 liFl1111'11'<'q ;r . adjective of actio
crq; fo\>:'1tr ~fu I Cl <r. g"~B: I 1. The fault is
[If it is claimed that only] the knowledge of the [existence] of desire. N
of the property of being the goal of action 'now' is like that [i.e., object of desi
instigqtor], [we can] equally [say] that the knowledge of the pro- injunction st
perty of being the means to a desired end 'now' is 'that way [the sacrifice' inst
instigator]. Therefore, since it is impossible to explain the property fonn a sacrifi
of being the goal of action as other than the property of being the But this hea'
means to a desired end, and since there is no evidence to [support the sacrifice ~
that anything else] is the de,noted meaning [of lIN] ; that [anything exist 'now', i
other than the property of being the means to a desired end] is not if now-ness c
the meaning of injunction. [All this argument in favour of ~tasjjdha­ additional dil
natva as the only instigator] is inane. There will bE
1. The fault mentioned in [IV.B.13] is removed here. avoided at al
2. The i$tasiidhanatvaviidi tries 'to imitate the s~metactics. The 2. In the caSe 0
reason for this being an empty argument will be explained in , being feasiblE
the' next passage. Now-ness is i:
Since creatin£
lIV.B,l5] ~liu:g<lTr;j ~~<nq~T 'liRrm>:'1<rT;ul<lli'1 ~'1€r9i<'ll<r.1 ., ~<::1;:r1f~12- feasible now,
'-1N<l<r1;u1;f ~'1€rO!P <r~ <r?f ;:rr~fu 9l"'1l{ I ~a:Rf<R<'Im"~l'1H<r­ does not ariSE
rn:"f'lli'1 <iT fo\~"f11jl{ I an;q ";:~liu:S<l'fjiil ~"m'1T ~O:T<ll '-1~~91<r. fruit of heave]
. tD"fIR'lffl: I 3!<r 1l:'1 ., \1T"li't '-11"l<l~ 'IT I 3!"'i\ '1FT1<D ~'lffi~ now, -the acti<
li'1l<r. li9fJli1i<n;ffCf<l<9Tlil'l1<r. I 3!lili1'!i :9;<l: 'liCflfolGJ<lffi<l,et
feasible now.
fqffi~fu ;r ~"f: I [IV.B,16] fiI; '<f 'P1
fq'o'1;'<2t ;
[The argument in favour of ~tlasiidhanatva in IV.B.14 is inane]
as the knowledge of feasibility is the instigator. [Otherwise] there '-1~2t;r cil
will be the fault of the inclination to an activity concerning the orb ~\1'f('tl;~
of the moon. Nor can it be said that [only] the knowledge of the , Moreover, the
lJ.
property of being the means to a desired end 'now' is the instigator the goa! of action
and -that does not exist in that [the activity concerning the orb of is [in the context·
the moon]. The property now-ness can be adjective either (1) of I either (1) the ins
the desire, or (2) of its object. In :the . first alternative,
.
the
I
fault [alternative], that
 ES AND MOODS SECTION FOUR 8St

the fault exists is not removed The desire relative to the fruit of the orb of the
ar been specified moon [pleasure] now is evident for all. For the same reason [the
feasible cannot property now-ness cannot qualify] the means or the property of
being the means. In the last alternative [no. 2], there will be no
inclination to do sacrifices etc., since' heaven does not exist now_
~ C!~fC! <:!l1Fl+J:. 1
For us [krtisiidhyatiivlidina~] however the property now-ness is the
~~ l1HTl1l91~ ;or
adjective of actiori .. Hence there is no fault.
1. The fault is not removed by taking 'now-ness' as the adjective
the [existence] of desire. Nor can now-ness be taken as the adjective of the
, like that [Le., object of desire in order to ge;G out of this difficulty. The Vedic
odge of the pro- injunction svargakiimo y,aj.eta 'one desirous of heaven should
I ,that waY [the sacrifice' instigates the person with a desire for heaven to per-
iin the property form a sacrifice. In this case, the object of desire is the heaven.
rty of being the
nce to [support
; that [anything
ired end] is not
our of 4tasiidha-
I But this heaven is produced by the merit which results after
the sacrifice and as far as the sacrificer is concerned, does not
exist 'now', i.e., when he becomes inclined to sacrifice. Thus
if now-ness of the object of desire is insisted upon, it creates
additional difficu~ty, instead of removing the one in question.
There will be no inclination to sacrifice, a fault that must be
.ere. ,
avoided at all costs.
2: .
~
ne tactics. The In ·the.case. of those who·acceP[t. the view that the property· of·
be explained in being feasible is also an instigator, this fault does not arise.
Now-ness is in this case taken to be an adjective of the action.
SInce creating or bringing of the moon is not an action that. is
'9I<J:.1OJ ~o.l;:jlfli1'!­ feasible now, the fault tha.t there will be inclination towards it
ofi<lOj<'lfir<i91'1T<:<l- 1 does not arise. In the case of the sacrifice that produces the
~'8'11'w1~<91<J:. I fruit of heaven, even thongh the heaven may not be in existence
:;:<~
r:
<l'Tm<i:1 ~'lRR
~<lT~QOj<<i
I now, the action leading to it, i.e., performing the sacrifice, is
feasible nj)w. Thus there will be no difficulty in that case either ..
[IV.B.16] l"fi 'C[ 'Iil'l«i OJ f,\;'1I"';:'1<'i~'ifli'fG 1i~q@'~;t 'fiT'1c!l<U: Q'eRr'fi<El
V.B.14 is inane] fq<'1~<~ 'If 1 3ff?!' ~~<:!f'C{rr«i R<!l Q'~'1'1'rrml: Q<:'I1]q 'i\<::R<[+j.jf~T
)therwise] there <:!~~rr <H,'I' i1~'1''1f« 1 Rr.sr~ >l'l~: 13'~fu~<l'l1 Q'eRr'li<:'1 (RffG-
lcerning the orb Q'13'9'~\'tIi[II[<l'l1 C!G.;Ctli[lI[f<:!~~ ~ 1
:nowledge of the Moreover, the refutation by Madhva that the property of being
is the instigator the goal of action is not [just] being something produced by action, .
:ning the orb of is [in the context of] the property of being the goal of action being
iTe either (1) of either (1) the instigator, or (2) the meaning of lIN. In the first
lative, the fault [alternative], that [the view that the instigator is i$(asiidhanatva]
'90 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS SECTION FOUR

"is equal [in fault with the view that the instigator is anything pnr' $edha.· The
duced by action], [for ,the following reasons] : There is no inclina- between these
tion to activity without the property of being the means to a desired ~ I J;fRriStor: '1"
end, and that [the property of being the means to a desired end] known as par:
also exists in [prohibited actions such as] adultery etc.. Since the with the firs
inclination to do prohibited things is well established, overapplication [whereas] th:
of the instigator in that [direction] cannot be a fault. Therefore, which the neg
the objection [brought against the view that the goal of action is ber [of the VI
anything produced by action] is irrelevant. 4. The kriyajan)
1. Here the opponent to the i~t,asiidhanatva view is referring back to same fault, i.E
the objection stated in AnuVya. 44. See [IV.B.8]. with lIIv in t
[IV.B.I7] S"F<lt RiSrliltfllilRu'1 Rq"i!l;:1l<\"r ;r ~~1l <rl~ 'fi~1l:.1 Cli£[ for his oppon,
of being the m
'1!€'1llllJf<;:lo1:[1 Cl'lTfiT '1"+!Hl+ro1:[oi" ~''1WCf'!;~''IGt;,fu ~'l'i I
in the view of
In the last [alternative, i.e., if kiiryiitii (in this case, being any- on [in IV.I] c
thing that is produced by action) is taken to be the meaning of IDy] , it is not,necess
the only' objection that results is that in ordinary negation, there
[IV.B.I8] ~fi3v~11l
y;'ilIbeno connection [of UN] ,vith'the negative. But this [objec-
ClQf.''1(';·':
tion] is equally [true] for you also, as will be explained later.
111erefore, enough of [bringing up these] faults which are c()nfusing. Nrsirph,asr~l1na
. [only] to a disciple. This is the [general} direction [thrust, of the . lIN is only the pro'
argument] . meaning componer
1. ,If 'being produced by adion' . (kriyiijanydtva) is taken to be not [an additional
- emmot be the word
the meaning of lIlv, there will be difficulty in connecting it with
the negative particle in the ordinary negation. By ordinary
I eire. It can be (
ending with verbal

I
negation, here prasajyaprati:!edha is meant, as prasajyaprati-
sedha is generally considered to be the normal type of negation, 1. The passage ql
the other kind being the eXception. see Introduction [I-I]. putting forwar,
2. prasajyaP7l!lti~edha: In P8!t).iniarr tradition, Patai'ijali was the natva and krtis
~ in this passage
first who has shown the distincion between the two kinds of
negation, namely, prasajyaprat4edha and paryudiisa. (M.B. passage.
vol. 1, p. 101 etc.). The I\tIimarp.sakas in their diEcussion of the [IV.B.I9J ~:ST~f~m
tli~edhavidh'i 'negative injunction' go in great detail about the '1"J[m-5<f!j!:'
function and characteristics of these two kinds of negation.
Like lAT etc.,
Out of thes~ two prasajyapr:dti~edha is considered to be the
by virtue of the ge
nOrn1al or ordinary negation, and only when it cannot be applied,
[kfti] further has aJ
is the second kind of negation, namely, paryudiisa is accepted.
which is the denot
That is why, in our text, the word ni~.edhasiidhiira~~ye 'in the
ending; i.e., the vert
case of the ordinary negation' is .used to refer to prasajyaprati-
 SES AND MOODS SECTION FOUR 91
1
is anything pro··
ere is no inclina-
$edha. - The following oftquoted verse states the difference
between these two kinds of negation: 'l~«ro:" fg~>l\ 'l?f q~~
l
eans to a desired '" be
;P{ I J:ffuq"l: ~ ~<IT 'l?[j,<:!{<[~<[ <[Of II 'That [negationJ should
, ~

1 ) a desired endJ known as paryudJiSia in which the negative particle [is connectedJ
etc.. Since the with the first member [in the verb form, i.e., the verb];
:, overapplication [whereas] that [negation] should be known as pratUjedha in
ault. Therefore, which the negative particle [is connected] with the second mem-
goal of act;on is ber [of the verb form, i.e., the suffix] '.
4. The kriyajanyatvavadi answers this objection by saying that the
referring back to same fault, i.e., that the negative particle cannot be connected

'lll~ .+r.
r.B.8J .-

r;jfu ~'fi I
I C!~
with lIllin the ordinary negation, can also shown to be true
for his opponent's view, i.e., the meaning of lIN is the property
of being the means to a desired end. As to how this filult exists'
in the view of i${asadhanatva is not discussed here. Since later
case, being any- on [in IV.I] considerable space will be devoted to this problem,
meaning of lIN] , it is not necessary to go into elaborations at this point. -
- negation, there [IV.B.IS] ;a~'>T'11~g ~'S"~~g ~e!lJl,<!<[,Fj~Fj I <[ 11 'lifulJl~'l,FJioJrsf<t I
But this [objee-
C!~:qI''l«''<[,1t;jI~o~Tir'FjI<r. T 3l1~'-T1e!FG'<!I11lITl=!"!I<r. e!RB~: I
explained later.
teh are confusing Nrsi:qlhasrama however [holds -the following] : the meaning of
n [thrust, of the llzv"is only the property of ,being a means to what is beneficial. The
meaning component [a1]OlSa]..,..., the property of being feasible - is
is taken to be not [an additional meaning]. That- [the property of being feasible]
c~rmot be the word-meaning since it can be obtained from something _
)llllecting it with
n. By ordinary else. It can be established on the strength of the verbal- root
_s prasajyaprati- ending with verbal suffix.
:-ype Of negation, 1. The passage quoted here is found in VeTaVi. p. 67. After first
juction [I-IJ. putting forward the alternative that lIN denotes both i$tastidha-
atafijaJi was the natva and krtistidhydtva, Nrsi:qlhasrama comes to the view stated
he ,two kinds of in this passage, the argument involved will be clear in the next
yudasa. (M.B. passage.
discussion of the [IV.B.19J ~:S1~~ ~,FjlJlI1F'-T1'liitIJ[IRCI «:srf"om:. ~ciT ~fij:e!: I ~l 'Of ~f9q'll
detail about the lIHfi'rot{lll;cP'llerr;{ f,j"p.n'f.~C!l~ 5[~Rrfoiq'l~'l~lJl~'l<'i «"'Ie! ~9 I
Ids of negation.
Like lAT etc., UN -is possessed of the capacity to denote krti,
1- dered to be the
by virtue of the general feature of their being verb endings. That
mnot be applied,
[kfti] further has an object. lit makes its object that action [bhava]
liisa is accepted.
which is the denoted meaning of the item uttered with [the lIN
ihara~~ye 'in the
ending; i.e., the verbal root]. In this way, one obtains the property
:0 prasajyaprati-
92 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS,
SECTION FOUR
of being that which can be achieved [feasible] [as belonging tol
the objec;t of inclination to act [without attributing this meaning Here by the cc
to lIN]. object, it is cogn
1. The argument here is tha,t it is not necessary to say that lIN thing that' can 1
denotes feasibility. Tha,t meaning is available otherwise. Only [IV,l'.20] r[
'" . lJ1'"
'ifC[
that meaning which is not denoted by anything else can be said to
'iJT~;;~>li: <3
be the meaning of the word 'in question rananyalabhyal;
sabdiirthal;. 'Gfal''l~9T'5f
In support of this it has been explained as to how the mean- q~T 'if Rrof,t~
ing feasibility can be obtained without ascribing it to UN. The Nor should [om
verbal ending in a form such as yajeta has two properties : desire to do cannot t
(1) liiltva: the property of being lIN, and (2) iikhyiilcttvlJ: nised as qualifiers, bl
the property of being a verbal ending which is common to all elsewhere that the
the ten I-members, This property has been referred to as tiiltva relationship when tl
here. as in pacati 'he cook
The purpose of the whole discw:sion is to determine the conducive to sacrifie<
meaning obtained from the liiltva aspect of the suffix. Here it cando Thus also des:
has been put forward that the liiltv,a aspect gives the meaning ment] is unjustifiablo
i$tasiidhanatva. It has been admitted ~hat it is necessary to -denotative function
know that the objec:t of activity is feasible. But the knowledge 1. ' These are some
of feasibility can be obtained with the help of the tiiltV!a aspect vious passage, a
of the verbal ending, which is common to all the :ten lakiiras. 'bility can be 0
This common meaning is action" and its object is provided endings. The fi:
'by the meaning of the verb which is uttered along with the two kinds: (a
suffix. Thus: meaning such a~
yajeta In a qualificativc
I (b) sa1Jlsargatiii
I I denoted by lingt
verb lintva + iikhyatatva( =tintva) the connection OJ
I
#!asiidhanatva 'I Hence it can be
bility cannot be (
krti (action) . 'Thedefloi;ed me
the object of action (in'rtote 1, rV.E
that 'the meaniI:
I
yZiga (sacrifice) feasibility will
nc
I______________~------ been explained el
as a result of a cc
-have the same ql
jari that the caus,
,NSES AND MOODS.
SECTION FOUR 93
[as belonging to]
ting this meaning Here by the connection of the two meanings action and its
object, it is cognised that the object of action (sacrifice) is some- .
y to say that lIN . thing that can be atcomplished by action, i.e.; it is feasible. .
e otherwise. Only [IV. I ,.20J 0{ ~<i l31"'!f«llta:. <:ilJ~Q'11 '11'11"0{ . ~'Ill1:Q;ua f'if'lil€Jl:'j;'lqfu; I
: else can be said to
;al~'"~'1T: <3l'll'1q'fiR'Il~ ~gt!l'l~I'l~'1 S!;:zr5{T'l'l1(Fn~1 1'1; 9"
In IClnanyalabhya(~
'l9"a1<'1~'I15{lfq '-TFll:'j;'fi051 ~Fcrf{<'-Fq'1'1T'ilr' +r~;;r g '1111fqitt~'1'f.: I
, to how the mean- Q~l 9" Rl'lllql:!'l'lRi{'I fqN~,<na:: ~<ill(l'f<'l+rl~o{l:!'l'l<a~Fcr 'Il'"'1ll:, I
ng it to UN. The Nor should [one object ,by] saying the following: In this way,
wo properties : desire to do cannot be justified, since feasibility etc. are not now cog-
(2) akhyal,r.ttva: nised as qualifiers, but as relational [vi~ayata]. It has been explained
is common to all elsewhere that the cognition and the desire have the cause-effect
,ferred to as tiittva relationship when they both have the same qualifier. In addition,
as in pacati 'he cooks', here also, the cognition will be that of ac:ion
to determine the conducive to sacrifice, and not that in which sacrifice is the qualifi-
he suffix. Here it cando Thus also desire to do cannot be justified. [The whole argu-
gives the meaning ment] is unjustifiable also because the vidhikrt etc., do not have the
it is necessary to denotative function for action.
But the knowledge L ,These are some objections to 'the, view put forward in the pre- _
f the tifltv,a aspect vious passage, according to which, the meaning element feasi-
II the :ten lakaras. -_ bility can be obtained ~rom the tifltva aspect of the verbal
)bject is provided endings. The first objection is as follows : _ vi~ayata can be of
d along with the two kinds: (a) prakaratakhyavi~ayata: which is a denoted
meaning such as ghatatva 'potness', is of the word ghata 'pot'.
In a qualificative cognition, this occupies the place of a qualifier.
(b) sa'/flsargatakhylCl vi~ayata : which on the other hand, is not
denoted by linguistic elements directly, hut can he obtained by
!Iva (=tii1tva) the connection or the joining together of these linguistic dements.
Hence it can be called relatiohalvi~ayatg.The meaningieasi- ),
I hility cannot be cognised ftom ycijetl1- 'li_eshouldsacritice'dir~tly. -
, 'The' denoted meanings -ate';§acrj.fice,+"acHon :iishown' above.
c,
(action)
(iririote 1, IV.B:T9)'. It is-~fhroughjoining' these two together
. that the meanIng feasibliity is obtained. Thus the meaning
feasibility will not be a qualifier of :the cognition. Now it has
been explained elsewhere that in order for desire to be generated
as a result of a cognition, both the desire and the cognition must
have the same qualifier. Thus it has been said in the Nyayaman-
jari that the cause of the inclination to act is the desire which has
 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MUOnS SECTION FOUR

feasibility as a qu¥lifier, and the cause .of that (desire) is ihe interpretatioI
cogni~ion. with fe;J.sibility <is, a q~alifieI: .. , ,[Nya.yMafi. p. 248]. . general aspec'
Alsollee Ranl. p. 506 .. What ,w~.actllaliY find in, the example NaiyG.yil$a in
yajeia, is tha:t the qualifiers are not the saine forthe desii-e and rule lalJ, krm
the cognition which· is to be its cause, siricethe mea~ing' feasibility been accepte(
is not obtained as a qualifier of the 'cognition, but only as rela- denote the m
tional viiiayatii. In this case the relation of cause and effect the other han
cannot exist between this cognition and the desire. Therefore and thus obt
desire cannot be justified. . etc. It is ve
2. The second objection is that in order to get the meaning feasi- base in a gr:
bility, the cognition must have sacrifice as the qualificand. The as brought in
form of the cognition should thus be yiiga~ matkrtisiidhya~1 'the Incidentally, i
. sacrifice is feasible for me' .. But this is not possible. Just as tattvaviveka :
· in pacati 'he cooks', the form of the cognition is piikiinukulii buted to him
krti~, in yajeta it will be yiigiinukUlii krti~ 'action or effort view that the
conducive to the sacrifice, in which sacrifice is a subordinate bility, since f
qualifier. Thus the meaning feasibility cannot be obtained, and . verbal root en
desire cannot be justified. The rest of tl
3. The third and the last objection challenges .the very base of the tions and ans'
view that the meaning feasibility can be obtained through the srama by ou
general aspec;tof the verbai ending, .which is taken to mean nrsi1JZ/z.iismma
kiti. Suffixes such as :the ones. called v'iclhikrt do not have the is no trace of
denotative func;tion for the meaning krti. The word krti is here are available .
taken to mean effort (prayaf:1~a), in accordance with the Naiyia- [IV.B.21) IF,%'1 '1"
yika view. (kTti according to the Grammarians means kriyii- fo!u~'<l*
siimiinya 'action in general'). kit suffixes generally mean the
~fuffi~'f<
agent according to karMri krt/ P. IIL4.67. According to the
):f~'1'<~
Naiyayika interpretation,. this can be. made to mean effort, since
agehtness (kartTtva). is the· same ,a~· effort (krti). But the fo!~Q"{
1;IiiJhikrts. ilre art exception tothisgeI!eral. rule, and :me:j.n bhava . .• . 'IT'f<f<'11""
<)l;ld f?atman; (P,!IIIk70}.';.. Thlls;;they do not. del1ot~ikrti in [The aboverhl
.. either the Grammarian Qf,tlw;;Naiy;ayika point9f.vJ~w. Thus, afterwards to have
··since the meaning 'effort~js'·J1bt·obtained -in the first place, the abtained. by .the in
· question. of ,what its object is aJjld ·the connection between the [sacrifice] ispottl
· two which.is supposed to yieldthe.meaning feasibility does not of being flO?-sible fa
arise; Therefore the. whole argument about obtaining the mean- intention· is as foIl
ing feasibility from somewhere else and thus not attribute it Veda, it by itself i
to lIN cannot be justified. able to do sometb
4. This whole argument takes the non-grammarian view about the qualified by the "p:
 -----------------------~--------------------

'1SES AND MUODS SECTION FOUR 95,

at (desire) is the _interpretation of pa1).iniarpules.for, granted. - The only way the'_

yayMaii. p. 248J. _general aspect of. the verqall"ndingscan Jlenot,e krti is .wboh the
ld_ in)he. exa.mple . N aiyi).Yilsa interpretqtign.(see PLIyI. p."106)_ ,?f the Fai,linia,.n
for the desire -and rule lalJ karma1Ji ca bhiiva ciikamakebhya(ll P .. · III.4.69, has
neaning feasibility been aocepted.According to tl),e· grammarians, -these suffixes·
, but only as rela- denote the meanings agent, object and bhiiva. Naiyaylkas on,
f cause and effect the other hand, interprete the rule by addiIlg tva to these words,
desire. Therefore and thus obtain the meanings kartrtva (Le., kiti) , karmatva
etc. It is very strange to frod this Naiyayika view used as a
-lIe meaning feasi- base in a grammar text, even though it has been attributed'
qualificand. The as brought in as a purvapak~a by the Vedantin Nrsil!lhlisrama.
1t!qtisiidhyalJ 'the Incidentally, in both of Nrslll1hasrama's books, Le. the Vedanta-
possible. Just as_ tattvaviveka and the Advaitadlpika, this whole discussion attri-
on is piikanukulii buted to him cannot be found. Only a bare statemen)t of his.
'action or effort view that the meaning of lIN is hitasadhandtva and not feasi-
is a subordinate bility, since feasibility can be obtained on the sltrength of the·
; be obtained, and 'verbal root ending in a suffix is to be found in the VeTaVi. p. 67.
, The rest of the discussion which elaborates on this with objec-
e very base of the tions and answers to them has also been atltributed to Nrslipha-
~ined -'through" the , srama by our author very clearly' with the .words beginning
is taken to mean nrsiJrihiisMmiistu and ending iti priihulJ [IV.B.21J '. But there'
t do not have the is no trace of all )this in the texts written by Nrsliphasrama that
! word krti is here - are available to 'us, as has already been pointed out.
:e with the Naiyia- [IV.B.21] +!<l%'1lf~I~'[~<Tr~.+1'1lo:. 1 <lll;1 <1FT! ll<'[.fuBI'<."1:[: ll<'[.fuBl'<<i<or-
ians means kriyii- mtN'llll<!N'll{1T[<'!I~«!~lll<ll<J:. Cla;>!~ s:fu ms: 'I 'a'TIll"lll~"!: I'
merally mean the '[.fu6l'<."1:[<'1+n~ ~<::omasfq- <! (Ir+n?i >:r'l€T'f.~ 1 S'!~9'(I~I]rr
According to the
>:r~lf<a: 1 ff.11 li~ili~~I, CI~'i:[ 05'jf.l;'f.>[1'fl'Jt<llftt ul1'1C1lf(l <l
nleati' effort, since
(krti). But the fq~a'3{ '5Jf<fa,"'1Oll'''!<fIlr( L .lJ<t~l'l[<ij+1I'-tIJj"" 'l~<l<!r'Cjilil111-
, and :meGln bhiiva '". ~9'''!<orl..:i~lfu; 1 ,. " :': 'i.;'/'l~, .,'. , " ",".
:lot. dl<note,·krti in ,', [The abovementioned-.objeetio;;ls
" .'
are",not
'. " .' ';'"-..
valid]_,
"
~;~., .,"
~
It' is ,pO$sible'
-, • ,"'1-':. " ' ..
It 9fy.i~w. Thus, afterwards to have a cogniti(}J;l. ~ike tMtJbi:,tlie;m,i.~d,Atsel,f;,or itxan be" ,
;he first place, the abtained,bythe inference that the sacl:jfice is,reasibl~~ot me;. sin2e jt '
i ction between the [sacrifice] i~~notthelocus,of a property contradict6ryto thepropeity ,
easibility does not . of being f~flsible for me. This isvvhat [Nrsii!lbliSrama] haS said; His
ltaining the mean- intention is as folloWs': even if just feasibility' 'is 'known from"the'
l not attribute it veda, it by itself is not the instigator. Otherwise even a person not
able to do something will be inclined to do it. Thus [feasibility]
an view about the qualified by the part 'me' [is the instigator] ; and that it is possible,
 SECTION FOUR
~6 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MC)ODS
non-inclination towe
[to get] by common sense also.. Thus lIN does not have the deno-
by the aversion [to
tative function with respect :to it, since it can be obtained otherwise, anything desired;al
and since it is impossible for the Veda to denote [feasibility] includ- . Hence it [feasibilit:
ing the part 'me'. . .
[can itbe said ~hat]
1. in this passage, the objections mentioned in the previous passage
with the desire to do
. are answered. Even if the cognition connecting action and its
can be cognised by
object is as a relational vi~ayatii and not as a qualifier, and eve?
1. Here KaUl.l~abl
if the cognition resulting from yajeta would not have the sa;;n-
alone is !the im
fice as the qualificand originally; the mind can make the connec-
it cannot be th
tion and later a cognition in which sacrifice is the qualificand is
agreed upon ~h
possible. But this does not remove objection no. 3,which points
the instigator. '
out that the vidhikrt suffixes do not have the denota:tive func-
is that even the
tion for krti. Thu~ an alternative answer to the problem has
perty of being 1
been pro~sed in the form of ,the' inference that the sacrifice is
the instigatorm
feasible for me because it is not a locus of any property contra-
made to obtain
dictory of its being feasible for me. Here for the first time,
by resorting to
personal' elemenjl; has been introduced along with feasibility.
in [IV.B.21]. 4
Thus the sacrifice should not only be feasible, which it can be
passage, the in:
called even if only one person was capable of'performing it; but
is it then that
it should be specifically. be feasible for me, the person who is
something not I
supposed to have the desire ~o Perform it: If :his. were not s.o,
non-inclina.tion
even a person nqt able to perform it would be mclmed to do. It.
. is from. aversiO! .
It will be like a cripple deciding to swim across the EnglIsh
definitely does I
Channel, because after all it has been proved to be feasible by
labour. The r
other people. The addition of personal eleme~t is a~o~~er
bhiiva) betweel
argument in favour of not attributing the meanmg feasIbIlIty
established by,
to lIN. After all the Veda cannot cause the cognition of the
comitance', wh
element 'me'. It is intended for all, and not just for one person.
tasmin sati tal
Thus we have to look elsewhere for the means to obtain this
occurs, Y also (
meaning. KaUlJ"abhatta thinks that it 'is possible. ~o obtain
'absent. Thus 1
it even by common sense. ". Sirice it cah thus be obtamed else-
. an averSion tCi
where, lIN cannot'be said'to have -a denotative function ,for it;-
is an' absence I
2 ... As has already' blien pOinted out, this whole argument cannot
be found in the works of Nrsirp.hasrama available to us. . . [IV. B.23] ~ ~1'!m"F
{IV.B.22] ~: ~Rrm<<rcl1m~ ;or' ~'1ci<i; ~''RIri~ ~~'f~'1~(!(! ~ml~;or q;iifu ;:'f1~;or' ~

'pnwl'f"!;or'f.foj;or ~l('{. I ;orlcRCI"£§;p:j'l:, I ;or "f R'I>'l'-ll~D~;or CI~;p:j'l:,1 ~11W-!i'-'1i'r ~

~'liCl~"'1lTlil~'lftql"'i~'Il('{. I <'!l'JO:Wf"~
Nor [should on
Actually, the cognition of feasibility is not the instigator. The
 --c-'-----.-.-~ .. - . . ---~.--

SECTION FOUR 97
ENSES AND M()ODS
non-inclination towards tha,t whim is not feasible, [can be explained]
not have the deno- by the aversion [toit] , which is caused because it does not [cauS"e,l
obtained otherwise, anythingdesired,and ~hus cteates[all that] tr-oub\e for . nothing.
[feasibility] includ- Hence it [feasibility) isno;t the denoted meaning:. [oflliV}. Nor,
[can it be saId ~hat] it is the denoted mea:riing [oflIN]- inacc~r~~nce
;he previous passage with the desire to do [tha;t which is feasible]. Since that, [feasIbIlIty]
:ting action and its can be cognised by common [sense],. the desire to do is possible..
l qualifier, and even 1. Here KaUl)9abhatta has given his own view that 4tasiidhanatva
not have the sa~ri­ alone is tthe instigator. Since feasibility is not the instigator,
III make the connec- it cannot be the denoted meaning of lIN. It has already been
is the qualificapd is agreed upon ~hat the meaning of lIN is the property.of be!ng
no. 3, which points the instigator. The difference between this and the prevIous vIew
he denota:tive func- is that even though both contain that lIN denotes only the pro-
:0 the problem has perty of being the means to a desired end, in the previous view,
~hat the sacrifice is the instigatorness of feasibility was not questioned. Efforl was
ny property contra- made to obtain that meaning without taking recourse to lIN, i.e.,
for the first, time, by resorting to the relational vi~ayata or the inference explained
19 with feasibility. in [IV.B.21J. On 'the other hand, in the view set forth in this
Ie, which it can be passag,e, the instigatorriess of feasibility is not accepted. How
[performing it; but is it then that we find no inclination ~o activity in the case of
the Person who is , something not feasible? The answer suggested here is that the,
If this were not so, non-inclina;tion to activity in the case of something not feasible
)e inclined to do it.
is from aversion created by ·the fact th.at the unfeasible. activity
across the English definitely does not achieve anYithing desired, and thus is a useless
d to be feasible by labour. The relationship of cause and effect (karyakiirmJa-,
:lement is another bhiiva) between aversion and noninclination to activity can be
meaning feasibility established by anvaya and vyartir.eka 'positive and negative con-
le cognition of the comitance', which is generally stated in the following form:
just f(Ji one person. tasmin sati tadbhavati,'tasminnasati tadabhii1)a~. When X
:ans to obtain this occurs Y also occurs. When there is an absence of X, Y is also
possible to obtain 'absent: Thus there is.noninclinatlon to activity \¥hen there is ,
.s be obtained else- an: aversiont6 that activity. ' 'YheI! tlietds. P? ~v~rsi?n, there
;ive fundiun-:ior it.~ is an' absence of ''rt(;n~inc]jriatiori.,i'" " '" .' ,., ';" "
~El31~rral;jr.=i~~· ~,,~~f<jrr<:!lln: IsifrrE~n"<f.l~<ml1~ ~ 'Ii-g,
e 'argument cannot
lable to us. [IV.B.23)·'ij
. q;ijfu;:l:fl~ "l~~I!~~ "i;:"ll;:;f ~"lfuRfu <n'"'l+lI~l~<i'P 81RP-
['t'f1W[~ aa ~1+Tl~
~l~~il ~qp:n"~I'1111~;f<t: ~~reml:fl' 81~D£1rr,a~'1 Wla'fi-
'Il1q]!!D£1rr CI"v'P1+{ I
<€[j~<'Iln: I
Nor [should one objectJ by saying the following:. The property
le instigator. The

.. ---.-- ....
;,- .
 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS
SECTION FOUR
of. being the means tp a .desired ,end will also, not be the. instigator.
,1;"0.).', thet:..e is,n0.jnclination to ac,tiv~ty .iJ.1.the, case of something whh;)1 lls being specific [r.
,;!}.i;t)1ges"a~,.ungesi~ij.pleJ;.t;sult .or somt;thing, ,whi{;h IS;D,eutral; becau,qe thoug\;l in' common
.. ofave\siQn pprn pU~lpf. it$ inv9lVil!g useltisslabour, as· is exemp!lfie.d ~~gardil(lg ,~4e jruit,
i~",necessary.,", ,
:lin ,the expressionJ.'difficult work'. It)s necessary [to· consider1 it
,[4tasiidhanatllt~] as an instigator, ~aking into account theunive,r- IV.B.2S] Cf'f' ~,,~
, sally established non-inclination towards [activity] which may not a'<'1l'L, I
cause something desired and does involve effort, even when there
In that, in or
is an absence of aversion.
desire is the consec
1. In this passage, the opponent has tried to use the same argu- iug-ness; as in the c
ment (taking recourse to aversion) that Kal1J.lQabhatta has used 1. §ak)l1afavaccheG
to refute the instigatorness of feasibility, in order to object to
.denoted meani
the instigatorness of iIitasiidhandtva also. Kal1J.lQabhatta answers
pravrtti1VimittG
this by pointing out )that aversion cannot be the .cause of non-,
word to denot
inclination in all the cases.
denoted meanil
• rv.B.24] l€ii ~!Hrr·iF[«Ir.r~£9Tf~IS{'Hrr'<1<{'Ei Ci'f Wf'!<Ei ~'I<iifG:'Jl'<1<I<9lfG:'l1 ~ the denoted m
~1Jf ~H~'l !:['l€!'li«lliJ: I <{ fc'l~<{ I ~"~'tll;:n'lq1JlJniJ: I Cl~'!{1: property. All
~'l~qCf 12:9 ~g'91iJ: I <f"-fiit <.?T'li 'f<'llG; :J<i!:[ij€T"l'!!l Wl~~~ fj;~fG:i!
of being a den
of their indiviC
~m9T 11T !:[or€T'l~fu m«ll !:[9€!Cf 12:9 CI'!!llq 'lWl'<lC<f<fl<fRllJl t 1j snBfi+r'li
of a word. Th
:q foIfu'Gt[ Cf'i'tlR fq'll <{ !:['[~Rfci f1fu t 1l9 RM'l1 <fT"l'l1<frnlCf fe!f¥iTt~ both thedenoi€
<l~ ;Uffil~l I 3lCf 1l:9 il'li q;<.?lJ"~H~~'Cl'[~r.1jcn~;u~~ Cllfu~'lT­ of the property
s<;a;,! ~I on the other h"
Moreover, the property of being the means of the desired end accepted as th€
is (the same as) being the means to the object o'f desire. It is the property 0
the denoted meaning through being )the means of achieving heaven Thus the word
etc., since it is only in that form that the cognition [of the property individual pot,
of being the means to a desired -end] is. the' instigator. [It is not denoted meanin
an instigator ,in )the form of being the means] of just something 'one desirous oj
"desired, since the .cognition of desire is: not ,necessary.. It is an "the denoted mel
.' instiga~or \)Yo: its ver~J1.at11fe.' . .Even •tho~g~ ~r.i comrpQ~ ex,\lerience, the means of, ac
[a man] does become mclmed. to.. act at it~e ,cpmmand,qfone res- 2. in this case, tl
. p€{;ted, knowing that [this perwri] is instigating me knowing some- different meanin
-thil!g which is good [for me] ; in the case of [activity] concerning befOte[in Iv.Ii
the' other world, which is to be accomplished at much expense and . is necessary. T
trouble, there is no inclination to activity without the specific cogni- . being the mean~
tion of it [the object of desire]. So lIN must signify it specifically. heaven, will ari&
Therefore, the denotative function of that [lIN] should be accepted (sa'lJ'lketagraha)
be able to know
,NSES AND MODDS
t be the instigator.
3f something which
iS~I1,eutral; .becau,qe
lr, as is exen).pllfi~d
ry [to consider1 it
Iccount theuniver-
;y] which may not
:, even when there
lse the same argu-
(lec;Iabhatta has used
order to object to
lI,}c;Iabhatta answers
! the cause of non-',
:'l<iT~~"R"T1R<lT ~;:r
:T>JFn<lq~1J[lQ. I Ql;>:[l:
'l1 >r'l~>.T~ f.j;fu~ir
"'l<!T'lT~~'i~ 3l1ID"l'I'P
n 'll,,;:f1<Ifl:Ifufq~'~q
r.~clll':~~i'; cnfu"l'll-
of the desired end
~t of desire. It is
)f achieving heaven
)ll [of;the property
;igatoi~ [It is not
of just something
!cessary.', It is an
:omrpQn eXperience,
nmand," qfone res-
'me knowing some-
:tivity] concerning
much expense and
; the specific cogni-
(nify it specifically.
should be accepted
SECTION FOUR 99.
as being specific [regarding the object of desire]. Th.at is why, even',
though in' common experience" there i~ ~olition even if there is doubt
i!lgar~i¥g ,~he)ruit,:in.a<case'like·this; its [of the fr,uitJ, specifi~satiolf
:i~ ,fleceSsar~v "',,: ' "
IV.B.25J Cf?[ ~'"£9T ;jRl~,qqKo:Hl'l' cl'<:J<::Tfqq ~'f<IClTq~"'f.RFI:J;l1lH'tfu
CI~'!B:. I
In that, in order to avoid having many meanings [for lIN],
desire is the consecutive character for ~he limitors of denoted mean-
ing-ness; as in the case of tad etc. This is the reality [of the matterJ.
1. sakYlatavacchedaka: 'the limitor of the property of being a
denoted meaning.' The N.K. (p. 580) identifies this with
pravrttinimitta, a property on which the usage of a particular
'word to denote a particular meaning is based. saky,a is the
denoted meaning 'of a word. saky.atii is the property of being
the denoted meaning. sakydtiivacchedaka is a limitor of this
property. All schools agree !that this limitor of the property
of being a denoted meaning is a generic property, irrespective
of their individual views as to what constitutes the denotatum
of a word. Thus the Logicians accept the generic property as
bOth the denoted 'meaning or rather part of it; and as the limitor
of the property of JJeing the deno,ted meaning. Kam:t9abhana
on the other hand, staltes that eVen if generic property is not
accepted as the denoted meaning, it still can be the limitor of
the property of being !the denoted meaning. (V.B. p. 119).
Thus the word g,ha{a might have as its denoted meaning an
individual pot, but the limitor of the property of being the
denoted meaning,i.s potness. In thesentence svargakiimo yajeta
!one desirous of heaven should sacrifice' , the property of being
th~ denoted meaning of lIN w9uld thus be the property of being,
, the means of achievinglleaVe:I\" " ' , '"" ;, ' ',' :'" ,
2. In this case, the problem would aril1~' 'thaFliN would haVe. '
different m~anings in every instance, slriceashasbeen explained '.
befcire[inIV.B.24j, speCific knowledge of the object of desire "
is necessary. Thus, different meanings such as the property of
, being the means of achieving a sori, or wealth, or any particular
heaven, will arise as the case may be, and significative association
(sa1J'lketagraha) would as a result, be impossible, as no one will
be able to know all the different meanings of lIN.
'f.
 ------------ - - - - - - - - -

THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS SECTION FOUR

100

3. It ii! in order to avoid this fauljt that it has been suggested that meaning [ofllN]
desire should be taken as' the consecutive character of all the also1 is obtainabl
-different -limitors- of the property' of being the denoted meaning together with [at
of lIN. The case of the third person pronoun tad has been'cited etc. [It cannot t
as an illustration of the use of the idea of the consecutive ing element] 'hea
character. _'desirous of', it st
4. In the case of the pronoun tad, the same fault of having too it should also be
many meanings exists. It might pervade such properties as tiger- etc., there is even
ness, heaven-ness, student-ness as the occasion may be. If all these svmgakama 'one
pervaded properties (vyapyadhar:ma) are accepted as the limitors 1. The argumer
of denoted meaningness, it will result in tad having innumerable the property
denoted meanings, -which is undesirable. Thus it is that a of desire, ane
search is made for a consecutive character (anugam,aka dharma) , than llN, it
which will be common to all these different possible meanings of 2. Even though
tad. This property has to be a pervasive one (vyapaka dharma). ti:tined with 1
which will pervade all the limitors of individual meanings that ment 'properl
are the vyapyadharmas. In the case of tad, such consecutive of lIN. - AIs(
character is the property of being the object of the speaker's tences is the
intellect (vaktrbuddhivi$ayatva) , which is common to all the Thus in the i
individual' inst;mces such as tiger-ness or student-ness etc. Thus there is an ;
there is only one denoted meaning, i.e., that which has the pro- should sacrifi
perty of being the object of. the speaker's intellect, and the fault 6,7, and it I
of having too many meanings is avoided. In the same way, it is not din
in all the differel1;t individual meanings of lIN, such as the pro- the property
perty of being the means of achieving a son, heaven etc., the which there'
consecutive character is that all of those are objects of desire meaning is J
(i$ta). Thus it is that the pervasive property of being the since there i,
means of achieving a desired end, will be considered the meaning
of lIN, in order to avoid the fault of having many meanings. In [1Y.B. ')7] 81~ +r~
spite of this, -in every individual instance of the use of lIN, the 't!T~ Wi,'
_cognition of me,aning must be -specific regarding the' object of ~ "f§C!<:
desire. See Introdudion'[1I':'2j., \ _ ' -' 81'1'TC!"f<'3'
[IV.B:26] Q;<T 'r.f ~'fnlfu:(11~;r''fl'!~'11<'3~11''flG:: 'OJ'F!~~ I ;r ~"'Hjq~ir'!iTmfu:­ );[m;r;:er'!i
'I'<::(1Hf+To111ml~p~C! ~«I'l1<'l~<!<'fll: I 'fiTllT"CI'I'<::1G:: <:'f<ii~I<?-@<!fit ~Rrmm~
mocr.:r''filTer'!iT+TT'IlG:: I for~~~ - <:'fir'liT+nfu:(1Hf'ic'11&:HBlJr.<!+lT'Il- Now [if you
~m <'-1<!'l, I eating of food in
Thus, since the property of being the means of a,rttaining heaven of not entailing ~
ek, cannot be obtained from something else, it must be the denoted meaning due to

-,--~
 ,.
ii
SES AND MOODS SECTION FOUR lor
,n suggested that meaning [of lIN] . Nor [can it be objected that] this [meaning
racter of all the also] is obtainable from elsewhere, namely, from the items uttered
:lenotedmeaning together with [an opta;tive form], such as 'one desirous of heaven'
zd has beeri' ci ted etc. [It cannot thus be obtained] because, even though the [mean-
the consecutive ing element] 'heaven etc., is present from the word ending in kama
'desirous of', it still cannot denote the 'property of being a means'.
It of having too it should also be noted that in the case of the Visvajit [sacrifice]
roperties as tiger- etc., ther·e is even an absence of the co·utterence with [words such as]
ay be. If all these wargakiima 'one desirous of heaven' etc.
ed as the limitors 1. The argwnent is that volitional activity needs the cognition of
.ing innumerable the property of being the means of achieving a specific object
us it is that a of desire, and since this cannot be obtained from anything other
ramaka dharma), than lIN, it m1,lst be the mellning of lIN.
lible meanings of 2. Even though the meaning element svarg,a 'heaven' may be ob-
yiipaka dharma). tained with the help of the word'svargakama, the meaning ele-
al meanings that . ment 'property of being a'means' is not available without the help
such consecutive of lIN. Also it should be noted that not in all injunctive sen-
of the speaker's tences is there a co-utterence of a word such as svargakiima .
.nmon to all the Thus in the injunctive sentence prescribing the sacrifice Visvajit,
It-ness ·etc. Thus there is an absence of. any such word. viSvajitii ya;eta 'one
~ichhas the pro- should sacrifice with Visvajit' has been discussed in M.S., IV.3.5,
ect, and the fault 6,7, and it has been decided, that the fruit here even though
1 the same way, it is not directly stated, is heaven. Thus lIN here does denote
such as the pro- the property of being the means of achieving heaven, without
heaven etc., the which there will be no inclination to perform this sacrifice. This
objects of desire meaning is not available from anything else in this sentence,
rty o'f being the since there is an absence of any word like svarg,akiima etc.
.ered the meaning
my meanings. In [IV. B. 17j SF! lf~fqql..l+'l'Rfl;q+rl"l'11~1 - l<'l~qT~1J!l<[ <R?'fa:f<!21~~"!f<'il<'f~
.e use of lIN, the ~l'1<:"ll<'l'<<i'l'lf'1'1iCf"ll ~"l<'l <?n~iG ~;q I r.j~l"lRlBl'<~ l<'l~<r.llq~: I
ing the'object of ~ "!SCf<:,!:~<:"lTfit "Il"ll1H<'llG: I 3'{<'iT:f:r:'2l<:"llfti §;.crf~~~qlG: I
. ' :; 3'{~w'f~<W-! ~~<'fl"" I cr~l'i'R!fu:q"l9il <[«'llil:. j;:q: ~Cf;:'~1J!
~<;"l'!fti ~iT'liTl'!TiG:­ l<RJif"'il"li ~Rr <r Cf<~~ ~q:Cfl1.. I 3'{cr Q;'fT"Cf~T~'f.lJ1i'r <[«'l~ql;q

~<i:. <:q~l~q~~crTorfti ~RJml1Tc8 l<'R\~ 3'{""l<:g crztRJ <~<nr. I

If'l1O"ll~n~ir."l+nql- Now [if you say that] in order to avoid inclination towards the
eating of food in which honey and poison are mixed, the property
of not entailing a greatly undesired result should also be the denoted
a:ttaining heaven
meaning due to its being a means of causing inclination; [that is]
,8t be the denoted
102 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS SECTION FOUR

not [so]. For [that way] there will not be any volition in the case Aversion need I
of anything to be accomplished with much effort, due to the genera- he does not acc
tion of a lot of suffering in that. Even a little suffering [is considered 2. janakavighatlak
to be] intense for some reason. The quantity.of intensity [of suffer- vighataka is to
ing] is hard to determine. Therefore it is not right to assume that which destroyer
[balavadan4!iinanubandhitva, is ~he denoted meaning of UN]. Strong means that whi
aversion about a particular [activity] is independently a deterent. (pratibandhakl
That is why someone who has great aversion to the effort involved NiKa, p. 200-::
does not feel inclined [to perform] Jyoti,~toma etc., whereas someone the absence wl
else does [feel inclined to perform it]. This should be kept in mind. fire to burn, tl
1. Here again as before [in IV.B.4] , the Naiyayika view has been Thus the coun
brought in, later to be rejected. According to the Naiyayikas, 1nmji is the prai
injunction has threefold meaning consisting of i~tas,(jdhanatva; in order for em.
krtisiidhydtva, which has already been rejected; and lastly bala- the fire, it is no
vadani~tiinanubandhitva 'the property of not entailing a great i.e., the fire. 1
evil', which has been brought into discussion now. cause Um~akii~
·2. See Introduction [Ei--4] and [1-2] for a detailed discussion. hand, the jewel
",. • (> ,..." ('...,...... (> ,... of the result (t
[IV. B.28] ~':I~llT: :J;~~ <!<o<!~Hi!!H~J;<fFi{<9 r<!""1~: 9<O<!G,Hi!!~T\;f.'!'<!:ijT;:r;'1 and not becaw
~m'f~ '<{"Iiipn crO:+{l'f<:'4'fTQa:mT<J:. 1 ~ g. crtt!T'<{~'<![l:rfq:ijFl<:'1Tr.'1QI;,1T 1 3. In this w~y, th
. 31~:r'1o'1RR'fiT+!ft ;;;-;i9ilfoil;Jz'li<:;:[TJq :ijl~~'1' ~fu~~'Cj9i,Ello:'l 31i <fin sideration tlte c
'fiT1:lJfl+n<!I~q 'fiT<fI:1;O:'-t. cr<:'1 ~fu<!~,<{9i,qp;l'lm~Ts: 1 ing great evil at
it is easier to a
NrsirpbJasram~ however has said tha;t the property of not entailing
deterent in the
a great evil is not a meaning of lIN. fThe reason for this is the follow- 4. The view attril
ing] : since the knowledge of the property of being a means to a great in his works a
evil is a deterent, only its absence is expected [for the inclination to
activity]. Nor [shQuld it be claimed] :that the knowledge of the [IV.B.29] CI~~''1B:,1
, ,~

absence of it [the property of en,rtaiiing great evil] , is expected' [as ~'r<!: ~<!T~:a:,i

an instigator] .. By the process of positive and negative concomitance, ~T~q~ql

even that cognition which does not destroy the cause can be a 5J'f'1B:, 1
deterent. Otherwise, [if it does destroy the cause] , it will not be a That is doubtf
deterent, [since in that case], the result will not arise only due to in such instances a
the absence of the c a u s e . ' \. [this will] result in
1. KaUl)!9abhatt;a considers aversion' as an independent deterent, aversion. Since tha
and thus avoids having to consider the property of not entailing desired end is the [
a great evil as an instigator. NrsiJp.hli:Srama on the other hand, reasons] : when th
achieves the same result by saying :that the property of entailing This non-inc1inatiol
great evil should itself be considered as a deterent to all activity .. which has been acc<
 ES AND MOODS
ition in the case
e to the genera-
19 [is considered
nsity [of suffer-
to assume that
: of Ulir] • Strong
ltly a deterent.
, effort involved
Ihereas someone
I means that which does not destroy the cause itself. a deterent
Je kept in mind.
:t view has been
the Naiyayikas,
i~!asiidhanatva;
and lastly bala-
ntailing a great
I.
d discussion.
iG:f.rn<Ii'if.1«1'1fT<R"f
111'!~1<j~r:>wan I
""HEllO: I 81;:'l~
I ing great evil as an additional cause in every instance of activity,
, of not entailing
lis is the follow-
neans to a great
le inclination to
IOwledgeil of the
is expected' [as
, 'e concomitance,
:ause can be a
it will not be a
ise only due to
ndent deterent,
of not entailing
the other hand,
~rty of entailing
t to all activity..
SECTION FOUR 103
Aversion need not be brought in at all. In spite of this however,
he does not accept the absence of this deterent as an instigator.
2. janakiivighatlaka: janaka 'generator', here means the cause.
vighataka is to be understood as vighatayanti vighatakalJ. 'that
which destroyes or dissolves'. Thus the word ;,anakiivighataka
(pratibandhaka) has been defined as kiirmJibhfttabhiivapratiyogi
NiKa. p. 200-201). Thus a deterent is the counterpositive of
the absence which is the cause of the result in question. For
fire to burn, the absence of acandrakiirita mani is necessary.
Thus the counterpositive of this absence, i.e., the candrakiin~a
ma1Ji is the pratibandlwka 'deterent' of the burning by fire. ,Now
in order ·forcandrakiinta mm.1i to deter the burning property of
the fire, it is hot necessary for it to destroy the cause of burning,
i.e., the fire. Thus even something which does not 'destroy the
cause (janakiivighataka) can be a deterent. If on the other
hand, the jewel had destroyed the cause (fire), then the absence
of the result (burning) would be due to the absence of a cause,
and not because of a deterent.
3. In this way, there is less prolixity. Inste?d of taking into con-
sideration the' cognition of an absence of the property of entail-
it is easier to associate the property of entailing great evil as a
deterent in the places where there is no volition.
4. The view attributed here to Nrsil11haSrama cannot be found in
in his works available to us.
[IV. B.29] Q~;:''l1I.1 "f<'5'1c.:R2;;r;:['!imRt '1fT~sfit CP! ~111'1c.:OJP1t 'l1:c.:R'T+!;n«1
~;f<r: tr~m~''1TO: I Q~~ trm ~ ~'lful!fijiJ;:"'IO: 5[fuiJ;:"l'!i~'11 ..~q-··
'ii:fT~'1m~qq~; ~1;w:r t[fui[;:"''!i~ +!FHl1l9l~fcTQl;!1n~«I"CRWr,!
I
\u'f'l+I,
That is doubtful. It is well established that there is volition
in such instances as adultery, even when there is knowledge tha~
[this will] result in. great evil, provided that there is an absence of
aversion. Since that is so, only the property of being a means, to a
desired end is the [one] denoted meaning [of lIN, for the following
reasons] : when there is aversion, there is a deterent to volition.
This non-inclination can be explained only as due to the aversion
whkh has been accepted as the deterent. There is' no reason why
104 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS SECTION FOUR
/
the knowledge [of the property of entailing great evil] should be cause-ness (parl
the deterent. link is not pre!
1., KaUJ:.1Qabhatta here rejects Nrsi:rphi'i..srama's view that the pro- ., ~

[IV. C.3l <{ 'q'fl'fl'l'

perty of entailing a great evil should be considered as the dete- l3T11Fl:[~IFI'
rent to the inclination to activity. See Introduction [1-2]. Nor should it b
[IV. C. 1] <I~ 5fT1'!l'flU: I ~lIm"l"'fot [q<<lll: <lIn a3JiJr'f.Cl<lT'llla (lB1' <rl'lf>.rgli- generally should be (
~FP{<'lI<J: I particular aspect ha
As to what :the Prabhlikaras [say] that the property of being ricted to be somethil
the means to a desired end is not lthe meaning of injunction. It is 1. Even though th
not possible to, denote that [i$iasiidhanatva] , since the momentariness be present, why
of the sacrifice is known. of heaven in a
1. Here starts the discussion of the view belonging to the Prabha- this also. To t
kara school of Mi!llfup.sa. See' Introduction [G-l]. must be brougr.
gha(ena jalamiil
[IV.C.2] tfP'RT~T'l<!<'l12'·nftt ll:1{1:rr~~Clr '11"l!'rl1+i~l'f'f<'fI<J: <D>'1C!l:(!R<:'f
clear that a pot
~nll:'ll~ ~l1<EfI<l:. I SF'l<lw:f\"l'f,~t(EftEf,'l\Ef 'q 'l1><I(lI<'!l<J: !
compatibility tc
It is not possible [for lIN] to denote the property of being the a pot with a hi
indirect cause either, wiJthout the presence of the link. Knowledge chidvetarlMJa gh£
of semantic compatibility is a cause of a verbal cognition, and this a hole'. The co
semantic compatibility is only.that which causes the connection. than the kind :
1. The Prabhakaras have above shown :that no direct con~ection principle will h:
.between the sacrifice and heaven is possible. [see IV.C.I]. seen that the ~
Then how about lIN denoting an indirect connection? S:acrifice compatibility ir
generates apurva(which for various schools means either merit sacrifice cannot
or duty, see no:te I, IV.C.5), and this merit then directly causes hole cannot be
the heaven. Thus the sacrifice is a cause of heaven indirectly restrict the sacr
through the connecting link 'merit'. The Prabhakaras deny heaven, or heav
this alternative also. According to them, it is not possible for fice, just as thE
1II'1 to denote the indirect cause-ness, without an interconnecting without a hole.
link being present. .
[IV. CAl 1'5 'q I <wr:
2. dvara 'door', thus 'an intermediery'. The word dviira has been
'lim') 9i€fo'~ q:
used in the sense of the technical term vyiipara which has been
defined as tajjanyatve sati tajjanyajanako vyaparalJ. by the Logi- Moreover, the ~
cians. Thus vyapiim with respect to Y, is that which is caused It has been decided
by X, and is the cause of Y, which is the result of X. In this , stands as the thing
case also, this definition can apply. The link in the present from the thing desir
case is apurva 'merit'. This apurva is caused by the sacrifice, desired end.
and is :the cause of the heaven, .which results from the sacrifice. 1. Here the very
3. The Pr§.bhakaras do not accept that lIN 'denotes the 'indirect sacrifice is chal
 1I

,SES AND MOODS SECTION FOUR 105

; evil] should be cause-ness (pam1]1parasadhanatva) of the sacrifice, because the-

link is not present. See Introduction [G-I] for explanation ..
iew that the pro- [IV. C.3l rr ~'1lj"rq ~!<{;:r<~ ~l+rl~'fli\qlJf "iT~'f(jlmfcr 91"'ill:. I ll;'fif<!~r~
lered as the dete- w:rl~1.j~Fi~ ([R(I'l:'Ff.R~ fol'i<1<'91'l:. I
iuction [I -2] .
Nor should it be claimed that the property of being the cause,
l'lll~ (I~ --nl:@rg+r- generally should be cognised. [This is not possible] , since when one
particular aspect has been rejected, the general knowledge is rest··
;>roperty of being rieted to be something with another qualifier.
injunction. It is 1. Even though the link between the sacrificer and heaven cannot
he momentariness be present, why not the cognition that the sacrifice is the means
of heaven in a general way? The Prabhakaras do not accept
19 to the Prabha- this also.. To understand the argument here, another example
[G-l]. must be brought in. Thus when /the meaning of the ·sentence· .
ghafena jalamanaya 'bring water with the pot' is cognised, it is
"<'1I'l:. <fl''icn~r~'f
clear that a pot with a hole iniit would not have the necessary
''f(lI<'ll'l:. I compatibility to bring water. When this one kind of pot (Le.,
>erty of being the a pot with a hole) is thus rejected, the sentence has to mean
linle Knowledge tihidr.etare1J.a ghiatena jalamanaya 'bring water with a pot without-
)gnition, and this a hole' . The cognition here is restricted to the kind of pot other
he connection. than the kind already rejected as not .compatible. The same
direct connection prin.ciple will have to apply in this case also. We have already
~. [see IV.C.I]. seen that the sacrifice and heaven do not have the' necessary
,ection? Sacrifice compatibility in the absence of the connecting link. Thus the'
leans either merit sacrifice cannot be the means of heaven even as a pot with a
.en directly causes hole cannot be the instrument of bringing water. This would
heaven indirectly restrict the sacrifice as being the means of something other than
'riibhiikaras deny heaven, or heaven as resulting from something other than sacri-
s not possible for fice, just as the bringing of walter has been restricted to a pot
~n interconnecting without a hole. This is not desirable.
[IV. CAl 1'# 'if I <wr: 'fl€rC'f(l1.jl <rT1FT+<lq I "liT+>nG?1'l:. Cf.l+<l1e<l9~(f~<ffer;:ri't9
:d dvMa has been
"a which has been "liTli't Cf.ctc'-i(l1.jI~(f')<'H<lF1.j?f 'to?"'(f<'91'l:.1
Jaralp by the Logi· Moreover, the sacrifice is not cognised as the thing to be done.
It which is caused It has been decided elsewhere that the person who desires, under-
ult of X. In this , stands as the thing to be done, only that which though different
i lk in the present from the thing desired, is the means which immediately precedes the
i by the sacrifice, desired end.
from the sacrifice. 1. Here the very applying of the word kiiry.a or kartavya to the
notes the indirect· sacrifice is challenged as sacrifice is not the means that imme-

, "'"-. ~------. --"-'-'---~--" -.--.~ ..

1106 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS SECTION FOUR

diately preceds heaVen. 1. It has been asserte(

. ,(IV. C.S] . aOllT 'tf ll:H:l1i(~ 'filn{IOl{'1fo:a~~l:!T"1;q+!'i~ilq ~'P:f 'fil~"l~qur I 'filf{<ei the goal of action (I
itself. The locus (
'tf 'l'~~~<ei a~ f'l~,lS[1J]l'i..a'fauwrf.lq'lI'fiI~;qt ~q"a<[T 'IFf
nominative case. 1
3iT~a'lT Flfr'!il+!: l:!l<['<'la I !!~~:~llil'll~~l'fil~.n~~lfq heaven cannot be
~~<r 'l'<~,\~>:'l<'1;;il~lq: I 3i'11~i:t ~~S5f1+!TU'l~<[1 Sl"'lljl'l1ql<I:. I between the two a1
Thus only the connecting link, i.e. the duty, which is the means nominative. There
:immediately preceding the desired end, is the denoted meaning in is changed to svarg.
-the form of the thing to be done. The thing to be done is that 2. The problem here j
towards which the activity is directed. As regards the expectancy given by the Prabh
about the object and locus of the activity which is the qualifier construction can be
lhere the sacrifice and the person desirous of heaven respectively denoting its regula]
are connected with it as the object and the locus. Just as the absence function itself is ut
·etc., of happiness and suffering [is known] from common [day to the denoted meani
·day experience] , duty is also known ftom the Veda as the goal of upadanapramii1}a, v
.action-. And no doubt regarding the absolute authority of the Veda
-is possible [due to the fact that the Veda is] not written by a human iiT'1I<tll~'fi: ~'1'1R1;
:agency. ~l<i'I, I G<l:!l['l'CI~~~
1. Here the final view of the Prabhakaras is stated that it is the upadiinapramii1pa t:
apurva itself which should be considered to be the meaning, of meaning elemt:nt~
lIN. As a ma:tter of fact'the words kiirya and cipurva are con- meaning.
sidered practically synonymous by them. For the Prabhakaras
, apur1JJa= niyoga -= kiirya: This is clear from the following [IV, C.7] G~'fCl'I, '1<!\q~
"

statement by lliimiinujacarya: ~ilq 'IiFl mrn;m:T<Tt'i:f~<'I1"'i_ G1<'l'! G<:<! G~ ~

~;rl<+rf.r ~"r,f R~~fI<rT R'1I'l !<:m 'I1'1a I ~q <:'I5f'fi~~a~,q~l~' This has been said i
-<:qf'l~'ffl<n '&1lR. mo:'fi ~m 'l~~ ~,qerir ~«n~f+Jofl <:ena·,ltur ell raja: as the form svar
ll:l~~1S[([:ql f.if;r~&l<rl f.if.!'1I'W-ll ~m; ..wf\:;r'fi ~la 'i:f I (sastraPraPa. of [though seperated by b
person for whom the a
TantraRa. p. 59). N.K. (p.288) also says : <!lm~'f.mUl~<r+!'i~
tative ' function]; the '
'fi1~~1r ITll1l'fi\1: I
have the main significa
[IV.C.6] ~>:'-i<ei 'i:f 1;[+!l~cr~l'rq Cf'~l 'tf 'fill! crR~<:~i[9il+!<:<! IPl+!Fa~I~<!'
for the meaning which
Unrql~'1l"I<j}f+!lot;:r crfu:l~'.lJ~q i~'l'\~<!l <:qii'fil+!<:i:tm U~1;[: 9iliffi I
1. The Prabhakaras 1
[This] property of being the goal ,[of action] is a different
view that it is the
property [from the effort itself]. Thus further [what is denoted by
the change of svar!
the word] svargakiimalJ 'desirous of heaven', which ends in nomi-
ing its own denote
native 'cannot be connected [directly] with that karya. Therefore
only the primary n
by the expansion of the denotative function of lIN itself with the aid be considered as d~
'of the ttpadana pra,min:ia, the connection is made so that one under- theory of the cogn
stands svargakamas)ila [karya'?Z] 'of him who desires heaven'.•
:NSES AND MOODS
f'i 'lil~«l~qur I 'lilit,<i
. ~
;l~llT l~qllCI'11 '1FT
+ll'll~"'l'lil~cnq§BllN
[~1'11 31"'1'11=;:!'1](1:' I
vhich is the means
noted meaning in
o be done is that
'ds the expectancy
:h is the qualifier
eaven respectively
Just as the absence
common [day to
~a as the goal of
10rityof the Veda
ritten by a human
~ted that it is the
Je the. meaning of
.d apitrva are con-
r the Prabhakaras
rom the following
n"CRlrn'G~''lT'''i_
~W-f.~Uf'1fu-a~ ~;;jl<i
l~~l <'ITa ·.~ur 'II
(sastraPraPa. of
'1FTl~~Rrel~<[+r'i~
ll'lBl 11'1l!l;:C!BlF'l'1-
i<ltfu Woi(r'<{: q;l~~ I
)n] is a different
,hat is denoted by
.ch ends in nomi-
kiirya. Therefore
itself with the aid
,Q that one under-
ires heaven'_
SECTION FOUR 107
1. It has been asserted that the meaning of lIN is duty which is
the goal of action (kiirya). This kiirya is different from activity
itself. The locus of activity is svargakiima a word ending in
nominative case. The goal of action and the person desirous of
heaven cannot be coreferential. No connection is possible
between the two as long as the word svargakiimal} remains in
nominative. Therefore to help the construction svargakiima(l
is changed to svargakiimasya with a genitive ending.
2. The problem here is as to how this can be done. The answer
given by the PrabbJakaras is ~hat this change of case to help the
construction can be denoted by lIN a,t the same time when it is
denoting its regular meaning, Le., kiirya. Thus the denotative
function itself is utilised ;to effect changes that will help justify
the denoted meaning. This is what is meant by the word
upiidiinapramii~za, which can be explained as follows:
Blj'11GJR'li: ~'1qRl~1~6il:'!i.aT <!T'<I: I 8ls{ ~''1Rl: I <l'lT~l;{ 31~qqRl­
m~~ I a,6i!~0J0~~ ;;jAaT "IT'<I: aTIql'Of~'li ~fu I (N.K., p. 196).
uplidiinapramiilpa thus is the assumption of all such syntactic
meaning elements as will be compatible
.- . - with . the . denoted
meaning.
[IV.C.7] CI~'fa~ ~~'li'l~"u'>l1~ I "!!~'11~+rf+l"'C{G: 'UOG;Bl '1R+lYJ:. 31~
CIT<'1i:l a<1:£ CIS{ ~~'i 'lRl: '1~r <'I Q'lil+l<1:£ q;~FCI~A<l\"'1~<l[" ~fu I
This has been said in the commentary on Nayaviveka by Varada-
raja: as the form svargakiimasya 'of the person desirous of heaven'
[though seperated by being] on a different level,· [still] denotes the
person for whom the activity in question is meant, [by the deno-
tative function]; the word· signifying the primary meaning does
have the main significatory function [Le., the denotative function],
for the meaning which is intended [by the word] .
1. The PrabbJakaras here bring in Varadaraja in support of their
view that it is the denotative function of lIN itself that effects
the change of svargakiimal} into svargakiimasya, without affect-
ing its own denoted meaning. Thus Varadamja says that not
,only the primary meaning, but also the intended meaning is to
be considered as denoted. To understand this, the Prabhakara
. theory of the cognition of sentence-meaning must be taken in-
108 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND ]\fI)ODS: SECTION FOUR

to consideration. This theory is called the anvitabhidhanavada .. assumed i.ri order I

According to the PIiabbakaras, individual words exist only as bringing water; tl
parts of a sentence, and not independently. Thus the meaning called the limitor (
of individual words can be cognised only in their proper context, Since apurva is
in a sentence. [PrakaPaii. p. 377J. Thus in the process of the (yiiga -7 apurva .:
cognition of the sentence-meaning, first the related meaning is. . ,of heaven, the onl;
cognised, and then in that context, the individual meaning of js by being the me
the words in the sentence. Where does this related· meaning ·of gaining apurv.
come from? The Ptabbakaras hold that the words in addition the sacrifice to be
to their individual meanings, also denote their relation with the
other words in the sentence 'by their denotative function. tiit- 2. In general, in thi
parya is the intention of the speaker which relates the different been explained be'
words in a sentence together. .
{IV, C. 9] ;:r;:;r.u'f<f+!fq
[IV. C. 8] ci2li 'i:f lOqfr'f.l+!~'l mr 'IT'lf<Iq'lit Fr'lf<r ~fu <If''1: I 31''fT~.r~ lO'fOJ'f'lT"q<f'
<r[<rfeIq'l'!i<ro'liq~q <rFT~q'l''fB:. I 'l"T'flO'l if[~fufersr!~ ~lr~r:" ~;
g'lq~[~'l~ 'i1FqP1if[~G:'li+!~ff.~1Jj~ Cft'fl~,ci 'i:f I Cf~ 'i:f " <f.T'r:+<lf
W'1c!T I Cf'!T~;:r ;j[<;l"+n~"1 fffitCf~<'lB:.1 'l"lVffll'f<0G:'li'1':r- 'f'f G:[q: 1
~>.Tfu~ '!?~'<r[GJq*'lTmTor'l,~'CfIr.r[G:Tf.r'liQ'+!T1JjWT"~9 r
Nor can it be clair.
Thus, the person desirous of heaven has the cognition that thue is jf, in this way, even ~
duty for me which has the sacrifice as its object. The duty [apurva] word], can be broug:
has as its object ~he sacrifice by virtue of being the goal of effort we accept that what
[krtyuddeSya], which has the sacrifice as its object.. The sacrificial .of the word '[with otl
act is the object of an activity and has as its locus a man. The [the word in questior.
properties which delimit the relation of the sacrifice to these are: .colony on the Gailga'
the property of being a means for carrying out a duty [apurva- itpfidiina pmnWIJato
kara1}atvaj, and the property of being the agent of the duty. That here convey a relatic
itself is compatibility. Similarly, the property of not having a hole, indicative function w1
in the sentence 'bring water in a jar', [delimits the jar's being related in 'protect the curds f
to the act of bringing water]. The limitor of compatibility is brought where is the fault. U:
in by taking that meaning for granted in [the sentence] 'bring water' . bility is aiso denotea
etc., and in the .present case, [in the sentence sv;argakiimo yajetaj,
by the denotative function itself on the strength of the aupiidiinika 1. The Priibhakara
pran!iiIJa. . 'ing of the word,
such things as In:
1. anvayitiivacchedaka is the same as compatibility. It is the The opponent hI
justifier of syntactic relation. It is the factor that determines the denotative f
that X is compatible with Y if certain conditions are assumed. meaning, there v
Since 'the property of the jar being without a hole. has to be' notative functioI

.---~
 :ENSES AND MUODS:
znvitiibhidhiinaviida.,
words exist only as,
Thus the meaning
their proper context.
n the process of the
, related meaning is,
iividual meaning of
lis related meaning
Ie words in addition
:ir relation with the
;ative function. tiit-
relates the different
~Ic! <IT1ol: I 3i'fl'i.'h<r
1'fl;1f Qf~fulW1fot
<r,'li~'~ :q I <r~ :q
8:. I '11nml~<f'lilq­
'fi~11ll'l\Ul~9 r
gnition that ihEre is
The duty [apurva]
'~ the goal of effort
ect. The sacrificial
locus a man. The
rifke to these are ;
it a duty
•.J.. .
[apurva-
of the duty. That
f not having a hole,
e jar's being related
patibility is brought
tence] 'bring water' ,
v,argakii"",o yajeta] ,
, of the aupiidiinika
ubility. It is the
tor that determines
itions are assumed.
t a hole has to be
SECTION FOUR 10~
assumed iIi order for the jar to be compatible with the action of
bringing water; the property of being without a hole, is 'to be
called the limitor of the syntactic relalion, ie.,anvayitiJvaccheka.
Since apurva is the link, between the .sacrifice and heaven
(yaga ---'> apurva' -"7 svarga), and ,apurva is the only direct means 1 1
,
,of heaven, the only way the sacrifice can be the object of activity
js by being the means of gaining apurva. Thus being the means
{)f gaining apurva is the limitor of the syntactic relation for
the sacrifice to be the object of activity.
2. In general, in this passage, the same theory which has already
been explained before [IV.C.6], is stated again.
£IV. c. 9] ;J;:ero'f'1lif'i <I~9 '>J'f''llq'~I<'l~ ,iq'Q~ «f:.,11ll1"'~<::; <:'llfu:f<r ~'J I
<:9'>J'f'11.q'1;;j[1ol'f.<:~9 ,;;j[q'1l<::'li~'lio!l>'\;;j[lol'li<'ll~q'llll<1:. I " '1m'll
1ol11Sl:" ~''1l<tt <:9~f'f:ql<q;:!'i'N'li,qFn~;i'tql<::Fllf+!11Tfl<!9'lil'>Jl<1:. I
'. 'lilt,~"-!l <::M' ~~"-!<Il+I.," ~<'11;;q~"9]>fuf:..11ll1 g <!l<:<ifclR'r
'f9 <::N: 1
Nor can it be claimed that ,there will be no indicative function left,
'if, in'this way, even that which is' not the denoted [meaning of the'
word], can be brought in by the same denQi;ative function. For,
we accept that what conveys the relation of the denoted meaning
of the word [with others] signifies all meanings necessary to justify
[the word in question]. In [sentences such as] 'there is a cowherd
:colony on the Ganga'; on the other hand, there is no scope for the
itpadana pmmii1Ja to operate,since [tqe items ganga, gho~a] cannot
here coiwey a relation between their denotations. And since the
indicative function where the denoted meaning is not suppressed, as
in 'protect the curds from the crows', does not exist lip ouropin,ion] ,
where'is the fault [in our .-theory that, the limiton:bf the <:pmpati-;"
bility is also denote~ hytlieden{)tativefunctionl','[ ,',' , ' : .. ,.
"
1. The Prabhakarath€~orY'i~ that in addition 10 the aenote,c:lmean~
ing of the word, it also signifies by the denotative function all'
such things as may be necessary to justify the syntactic relation.'
The opponent here brings in the objection that if in this way,
the denotative function' can denote what is not the primary
meaning, there, will be no, separate indicative function left. De-
notative function will be doing the work of the indicative func-
llO THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOGDS SECTION FOUR

. ti~J;l. 'rhus in tbe sen~nQe, gaiig{iYfllJt.gho$a!J,. the word glmiga ." they do not acce
wIll be .able to·signify the b~mkoftlje river without the aid of there is no.diffic
,- . ",the secondary iii.~ko;hjl'e!lJnction~,'" i . "':: ,.: '. '. ;,
[IV;(:.10] 'u;<i :~'1:'~
I 2:' The Pmbh~karas r~j~ctmi~ hbjectibn by' pointini()ut the differ- • ~<'1~ ,'31cr:
ence between' the' instances where' the indicative function will " ~~qlF~,fq<iq
have jurisdiction, and where the denotative function itself will ~<'1'~: I
have an expanded power to denote something in addition to the
primary denoted meaning. The expanded power of the deno- Thus [the follo\1
tative function is accepted only in such cases where the addi- goal of action as his
tional meaning is necessary to justify the syntactic relation of the person who desir
the denoted primary meaning. The primary meaning is never of action as his own.
rejected. It is on the other hand, justified with the aid of the be instigated with re,
additional me.aning. On the other hand, in the examples of the the volition of the I
indicative function such as the sentence gmigayit1!Z gho~a!J, it is is explained and the
not possible to justify the syntactic relation of the primary stood from this [an
meaning. A cowherd colony cannot be on the water of the river. being the means to ,
Thus the primary meaning 'the stream or the current of the 1. This is just a su
river Ganga' is utterly rejected, and the meaning 'the bank of ing of IIJil is dt
the river GangIi' is brought in by the indicative function. The to a desired end
meaning brought in ,here by the in~icative function does not [IV· C. 11] foi; :q r
justify the syntactic relation of the primary meaning of the .
cr;;mrrBHl
word ganga with the meaning of the word glw$,a. .On the, ot),ier
hand, it brings in a connected but entirely different meaning. 3l~'1iT'~cr,(
Since thus it carr be shown that the jurisdictions of the indiCative Moreover, [if il
function and the expanded denotative function are entirely diffe- lIN, lIN] would ha'
rent, and that both have in their separate spheres, it cannot be i.e., it would denote
claimed that the expanded denotative function will take over of achieving the objE
the functions of lakWIJit and thus destroy it. being the means of ,
3. Even though. this answer takes -care. of the instances of. the acceptable, since the
.indicative function where,the primary meaning !is entirely aban- object,of some unspe
doned, what about the other kind 6fdhdicative function; in which ing.of vidhi is upiqu
the primary meaning is not rejected, but additional meaning is produces' activity.. )
brought in by the indicative fundion? This kind of 'indicative being the' means of
function is called the ajahatsvitrthalak~.a1Jit. The stock example would undesiredly, 1
cited here is 'protect the curds from tli,e crows'. Here the primary 1. This in. essence
meaning of the word 'crow' is not rejected, but in addition to it, [IV.B.24], and
other animals or birds are also understood as things from which and [H-2] , ex(
the curds should be protected. The Prabhlikaras an~wer that , against the viev

-- --.---.-~
:lNSES AND MOCDS SECTION FOUR Ill·

~lJ,the'Yordgmiga • they do not accept this kind of indicative' function at .all. Thus.
.F:it4out the aid of there is n()difficulty, ,_ ':" " ; . , ."
[IV.<:.1'O] 'll:'i ;!;:[''-ff'~>l ~~9ij<i'~~ '§;~<:fa" <:1: ~'j\T'I: iit~itr~9ili[ 1;'f'l:1"1<~"I:
[lting out the differ- '. : §;~"1a":8!Q:' 'llT+'i!'1;'l.mm f.r:l\i;"1: 1 . ~ ~ ~<!TNC!+!~~ff0"1
:ative function will . '. ~I;{Q<iRr~qq'lC! ~fu' . <;'l~.qRR:~f~qq',!.m ~ . ;'J'fflI'il.,«ii
function itself will ~~"1.~: .1
[ in addition to the
~ower of the deno-
Thus [the folJowing results] : the person who understands the,
€s where the addi- goal of action as his own, is the person ;to be instigated, and further'
rntactic relation of the person who desires a result is the one who understands the goal
r meaning is never of action as his own. Therefore, the person desirous of heaven' is to·
.vith the aid of the be instigated with regard to the activity depending on desire. . Thus
;he examples of- the the volition of the person towards the duty known from the ·Veda.
[iiyaf!! gho$alJ, it is.
is explained and the coming into existence of the heaven is under-
)ll of the primary
stood from this [and not from liN]. Therefore, the property of
~ water of the river.
being the means to a desired end is not the meaning of UN.
the current of the I. This is just a summation of the Prabhiikara view that the mean-
aning 'the bank of ing of liN is duty, and not the property of being the means.
tive function. The to a desired end.
. . .
. function· does not [IV· C. 11] foi; "'. t~'<ml9"1"1<:f['o1"1<'it"l ~l'il"l<'it;r ~ Bl<fCl: 1 "IFa: I'
~ meaning of the
Cl;;m"l<;1:[T>!'RT'll<'1Tf( 1 >{'fa'!i;uFl~I;{'J:r'f ~~Io.'P~<'fl<i: 1 '11-<1:[: I'
W$,a. On the other
different meaning.
8!~9iT>.lClTq~: i . .
•ns of the indiCative Moreover, [if i$;aslidhanatva were accepted as the meaning of
,n are entirely diffe- lIN, liN] would have a denotative function [with respect to this, .
•heres;' it cannot be i.e.,.it would denote this] either as the property of being the means'
;ion will take over of achieving the object of desire [unspecified] or as the property of
being the means of a;ttaining heaven .. The first [alternative] is not
le instances of, the . acceptable, .since the cognition' for that (the property of' being the
l/tcis entirely aban- object of some unspecitied desire], is·not anjnstigatQr; fodhe mean-
~ function; in whic4 ing .ofvi4hi. is u1?-iquely that whieh is ;~m::objec:tof<a,cognitiQh .which
:iitional meaning is produces activity. Nor is the last .[~lternative;,i.e;,the pro'pertyof
; kiildof':indicative being the means of heaven] acceptable, since [in thatca:seJ, lIN
The stock example would undesirecily, have multiple meanings.
, Here the primary' 1. This in essence is a repetitiori of what has been -said before
it in addition to it, [IV.B.24], and has been explained in the Introduction [D-3l-
things from which and [H-2] , except that here this argument has been turnea
ikaras answer that against the view that 4tasiidhandtva is the meaning of UN.'

••• -0 _ . _ ' _ . _ _ _ _ .......--.~-------- • • - .

 -~-- ------- -- ----~----------~---- ~--- -- -------- ----------~--------- ---

112 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS

(
SECTION FOUR

;[ IV. c. 12] a~T(UM~'m ~<P:[aT9~'liT<1T+G<rfi'I'liT«ftra ~'" la'l ;;it'<'<[-

1. I have translat
~~~'l~%1<:'li<9T<J:. I Q'<Fc1sfq ,il'<'>:t;;~T q:;~c<[~qlli'l *,<iTfu;:n- out the contrast
--f+rom~~!J[t;;il"lT;:ntRl:
. .' . . -
I ';'lllflt: mll!);qfulC!~"~'fc<[>!il:1~ra
. ' , - I the word svargG
[If you claim that] as in the case of tad et!;.,desire'is the con- expedient. WI
:secutive character for the limitors of the property of being the denoted devoid of all n
meaning, that is not so. In the case [of tad], the limitor is the 2. One of the maje
intention [of the speaker] that is to be cognised. If in the present and the others
case also the limitor is taken to be the desire to be cognised, then rG-4].
ihere will be no cognition [of the meaning of lIN] for the renunciasts [IV.D.l] _81~ f.i:r;
who are devoid of desire. Also, there will be no significatory asso'-
'liH!J[l~Cll
dation since heaven etc., are not previously present.
.,<'ljJ[<11~
1. For detailed explanations of sakyatiivaccheka, and the conse- Here the follo"\\
cutive charaCter as illustrated in the use oJ the pronoun tad, not proper to consi<
see my notes on [IV.B.25]. there is no authorita
2. See Introduction [H~3]. of being a means to
be justified even wit
;[IV.C.13] ali'Ff Rc<[;rIi'rRr'li';>.Tiil "~lg:q~Ti) ';<11<11<1:."
~ra ~f.i:rfoi~CI"fiT<o~fcr;r~
is] known definitely
lili ~Fll3'~"'nfoil3['l'!il R'lill ~fu <!1"l1"1 'li<'llq~l f"lf"l'l1'f~ 'li<"l1-
cognised as the me:
W"I!Jf1"l a'l 'li<'lFIT9: I ~~'li'li<lU~~'lc~" <itNCI+l~~l;i~~'l ~ is nothing to- prevem
- Q'~;~ I a~'l 'if ~~ <;'lCl:" ~1i13[1~<il"l"1~ I CI ...1 'if 'li1l>:t 1. -Here Kaui.Wabt
'li<"l1'llm1:1!);1S[!Wf.t I R'>:tSl;'l't~Bll~BI ~~'l1<J:. Q''[Rr: I _ by challenging
a<;+l1C'Jic~~'1+r~i'l'l ~f+rfu ms:
i not possible to
Moreover, in the case of necessary and conditional rites, [such heaven. EVen
:as enjoined by the injunction] "one should bathe when there is an of the sacrifice,
.eclipse" [or "one should worship sandhyii daily"], what is conveyed of heaven, that
as a means in a
by the injunction is "I, who lead a pure life, and perform duties at
:appointed times, have a duty to bathe and worshipsandhyii." There- (IV· D. 2] 'Q;llflitlq;;n
fore, no fruit is -looked for here. Nor is there any fruit, "sirice the '-'l<;>mil:~<'l
"sentence laYing down this rite does ndt'mention any. [People] are acti- afo:Cl1:'lJ["l
vated Wy such injurictlons] by' virttie of ~ori~idering [asg'oal] "only Nor can one ar
the duty, which is conveyed as"the bbject 61 an aet :[enjoined by. a] perty] must necessal
Vedic [injunction]. The Veda also refers to this [duty] alorie, as cannot be qualified J
ihe aim of man. " Thus in "the activities which are optional, the water with the pot',
getting of the fruit is [only] incidental. In the case of the obligatory holes, the [cognitio_
-rites also, the inclination to act is due to the presence of apurva. qualifier] 'with [a I
Thus apiJrva, which is the goal of action, is the denoted meaning the present case als(
[of lIN]. [This is what the Prabhakaras] say. cannot p,e a means

:NSES AND MOODS
IcI ~;;r la'l[ <!1~l1-
il1~'I'll't ~<rr­
:Cliilrr~q:il1>r~I~IcII.
.;desire'is the con-
f being the denoted
the limitor is the
If in the present
be cognised, then
for the renunciasts
significatory asso-
~nt.
.)(1,and the conse-
. the pronoun tad,
~Rrf<i~CI'IiT.,.nfqrr ~
i'illq~l f<lfl;{<II'f't 'f.i'ill-
<ftNCI<l~!;i~it'l ~
~rrI'f. I . CI'Ill 'G <ill't .
<!~<!1'f. ll'!RI: I
itional rites, [such
e when there is an
, what;is conveyed
I perform duties at
,sandhya." There-
my fruit, 'since the
'. [People] are acti-
:ing [as·. goal] only
lct[enjoinedby. a]
s .[duty] . alone, as
. are optional, the
se of the obligatory
tresence of apurva.
e denoted meaning
-----c,-------~------------ --------
SECTION FOUR 113
1. I have translated the word kamya as 'optional', only to bring
out the contrast with an obligatory rite. I have also translated
the word svarga as 'heaven' throughout only because it is more
expedient. What is actually meant is· a state of happiness
devoid of all miseries.
2. One of the major differences of opinion between the Prabhakaras
and the others is set forth in this passage. See Introduction
rG-4].
[IV. D. 1] . 3l~~ Rf<<l1li. I 3l~~~l1 <II"'1i'l<l~Clli. I ll<lI1lTll1I<!1'f. I !l'[RI-
9iI<:1lTl'iCl~irl3l'<lrrClI~FI~ ~rr fcirrI~q<ffl: I ~filr'f.<'IR~'1I'BTI;{­
rr<'l:(!lrrT<!+~ slit BlI;{<li'lI3F!l<l(<!I\:t <!ll;{'liTl1l<!1'f. I
Here the following should be taken into consideration: It is
not proper to consider apurva the denoted meaning [of lIN]. For
there is no authoritative justification. The cognition of the property
of being a means to heaven, which [cognition] is the instigator, can
be justified even without that [rapurva]. It is true that [a sacrifice
is] known definitely to be momentary; so that it cannot itself be
cognised as the means [of attaining heaven]. Nevertheless, there
is nothing to prevent its being cognised as a means in general.· _.
1. Here Kaw:'li~abhat\a starts refuting the view of the Priabhakaras
by challenging their basic assertion that without apii,rva, it is
not possible to -denote the -sacrifice- as the means of achieving
heaven. Even if it is true that because of the impermanance
of the sacrifice, it is not possible to show it as the direct means
of heaven, that does not preclude the possibility of its cognition
as a means in a general way.
[IV· D. 2] ll;.Iif<i~Iif<!T\:t B"I<lFl1m<i a~CI<:ll'f.HClIRl1C1li.1 l1~ f~i:t ~rr .
'ili'ilm~~<l1'l[ I~<:iil;'jlcl ~'f. I rr I !!~a sfq Bl~<B"l'<lrr<'l;qT\:t
CI~CI<:ml;{rriilrr <!II;{<!+l1'1I'f. 1 ClI"[~<ft\:t '<f ~~Ier<:9iTrrq~1lTl'f. I
Nor can one argue as follows: a cognition of a general [pro-
perty] must necessarily be qualified by something other than X if it
cannot be qualified by X itself. For example, in the sentence, 'bring _
water with the pot', when it has been excluded that the pot can have
hoies, the [cognition of the sentence meaning is restricted by the
qualifier] 'with [a pot] other than the one which has a hole'. [In
the present case also, once it has been established that the sacrifice
cannot be a means to heaven, in the cognition, it will have to be
 SECTION FOUR
114 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS

direct means. (Th

something other than a means, i.e., it will not be a means of any
apurva is denoted [I
kindJ. For, in the present case also, once the property of being the
dation in the absen
direct means is known to be impossible, there still is the possibility
cannot be got even
of cognising [a sacrifice] as a different kind of means. In such a
cognition, the linking factor is not necessary. 1. The Prabhakan
1. Here the second argument of the Prabhakaras is rejected. This fice being an in
argument was stated in [IV.C.3]. answer, KaUl)lQ:
2. See Introduction [1-3]. fault present ir
[IV· D· 3] Q;~T~;:r~l'iF[~ '"f 'i'rnrnl'f~<::<i> 'RlQUv.<i> ~'t[lo;l'fJ.ll. 1 ~~T:q considered to bE
'" ,........ ,.... - ~ '"" .... grasp the relati
~rrnl';FF'f;:r'f"''f <'fl~~l'fT<::1I'i'f,ll+rlIJjT<::~;en'!1~~"Gl <J "Gll:l'<'1ll. 1
where else, and
3T;:<:f~n ~~;lTfq 'i'r'<:f~l'f~<::'iiJ;<:f 'iT'<'li'flq~~«1<J'f~;~fq 1
place. salikan~
For being such a means [indirect means] , the. linking factor is , N'
'liT'lllTsl~:S:lG:'1: 1
the limitor of compatibility. That [in the present case], is the ~ ,
apurva, and that is not denoted meaning, since it can be brought <:!l'ill""i{>f\l:IlT'i'f'll<'f1
in by the aupiidiinika pram{t1;a that you [Prabhakaras] yourselves are grasped fin
have shown. Otherwise; there· will be the undesirable consequence without first 1m
that the limitor of compatibility will be the denoted meaning every- the s' gnificatory
where. the views have
1. r-iow KaUl)l(iabhatta us!'s the same devise that the Prabhakaras . as objections ag
had used (see notes on [IV.C.6]) against them (see Introduc- V.B.S. says:
tion [1-3]. . . Slr;,9f5;qR~m. 'I;
2. If apurva is considered to be the denoted meaning here, then 'f. ir ;:rf.i:q;:r~ ~<'-1
at every place, it will be necessary to include the limitor of com-
patibility in the denoted meaning, and this is not desirable. [IV. D.5] 'liTir<'f~qllT
Thus the property of being without a hole, is not considered f;:rqf~ '1<;"
to be the denoted meaning of the word 'pot', even though that
property is necessary as a limitor of compatibility in a sentence
R'fk ~'!l1
such as 'bring water with a pot'. [see IV.C.S]. Alternatively, y
other, establish you
[IV- D. 4] f'i;:q 1 ~~l"I<J"I<i1"i{T "Il<:flll;:r: qFqnm"i{;:r,~qijTTfq ~f~I~'1'1i
saying): it is im!
Q;'fl<ID ~~~aG:2l+r'i~ 'fl~ll. 1 ;:r :ql'i'lf5;qR~c'iT QF'!<;rnT"i{;:ri'f+!fit optative form as a
~1"i{ll. I· 'fl'<<:f"lqa:rsfit !lF15;qR~cil ;:r'f<'l"~"~O<::l<::":1qf~.:r(1T­ argmnentat'on, my I
'3l 1iiffil:. 1 denotes the propert)
Moreover, let the cognition of the property of being a means . became it is impossi"
got from the Veda, be in the form of an indirect means. Why form as a means of
should apurvla have to be considered as the denoted meaning in order 1. tvaduktarityii:
to understand this? Nor can it be claimed that, in the absence of taking advantal
apurva, it is hard to understand [how the sacrifice can be] an in-

NSES AND MOODS
e a means of any
perty of being the
I is the possibility
neans. In such a
, is rejected. This
Cl'tlT'nwi+I. I Cl'TI:q
ifqRl:l#'1 <f Cl&:l"''1+I. I
~ ''1~FJ~~ fu I
Ie linking factor is
:sent case], is the
it can be brought
§.karasj yourselves
,irable consequence
;ed meaning every-
It the' Prabhiikaras
tern (see Introduc-
neaning here, then
the limitor of com-
, is not desirable.
is not considered
, evert though that
)ility ill a sentence
~~,~qijTTfq- Cl~'fi
l:laT QFQU<:fl'<1<f<FJl'!N
n:!~"~o<;"l<::~qrm?-f-
of being a means
, reet means. Why
d meaning in order
, in the absence of
lice can be] an in-
SECTION FOUR
direet means. (The same applies) if one adopts the view that:
aparva is denoted ,[by lIN], since there can be nQ significatory asso-
ciation in the absence of its previous appearance, and it [apurva}'
cannot be got even from a Vedic utterance, [as a direct m~ntionJ.
1. The Pnabhiikaras object that it is hard to understand the sacri-
fice being an indirect means without the link, i.e., aparva. In
answer, KaUl)lt;iabhatta points out that there is just as big a
fault present in the Prabhakara view also. Even if aparva is
considered to be the denoted meaning of lIN, how is one first to>
grasp the relation of aparVia and lIN? It does not occur any-
where else, and so the significatory association does not take-
place. salikanatha brings up the same point 'f.~ m~FCln~q
iw'{j:!lsi~:sf<{'1: I __ . >:j'il );P:!llJll;Cll,:J>:jll1i+I., Cl"Sf <:f+'FiillO:IJl+!~'f'1+I. I
,,[l:'1P911O:IJ]'i~'fi'91'<T~'! I (PraKaPafi. p~ 417). Unless both the relata
are grasped first, the relation cannot be grasped. Therefore>
without first knowing apurva independently, how can one grasp
the s;gnificatory association of apurva and lIN? Thus, since both
the views have faults of similar magnitude, they cannot be used
. as objections against each other. Thus the commentator of the
. V.B.-S. says: . .
3!'lFJf:J;qRl:lrJ! qp'Rre1'<1;:r,FJ+!N '9iir ~~ ql'<1~~fu IT3':rqR~~$~~1
'!lir o:rfifClllil: ~,'1~;or W'1>fr<ra:r+!+I. I (Darp., p. 161).
[IV. D.5] 'lil>l-,~~qllf fu~'1<::o:ri'R.>!O:l;l:[l:l·I:J;qq'111 'II l:[l:ll'f.~Rl<r. Cl~qf<?~?-fl
frr'lf~ q<:>q,l<:fl'<1<f,'!!<f a~Gl~l:l~: ''I~'fCl<:1<'11qR~?lT 'if m:flJiT
frr'lfo:: ~'H ~Rr ~'1'1+I. I
Alternatively, you [the Prabhakarasj might, in some way or
other, establish your position that apurva is conveyed by lIN ,by
saying): it is impossible otherwise to grasp the meaning of an
optative form as a thing to be done [kiiryaj. But, by the san1e:
argtunentat;on, my position is also easily established: The optative,
denotes the property of being a mediate means, [and this is conveyed'
became it is impossible otherwise to grasp the meaning of an optative:
form as a means of what is desired] . .
1. tvaduktarityii: in the same way as you have stated, i.e., I'!y
- taking advantage of the anupppatti. See Mru:tiDa. p. 69.
 ~ ~.~-.~.~--------~--~--~- ~----- -----~-~------- ~~-~ .. ~-~.

116 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS SECTION FOUR

[IV· D· 6] o:~ 9iI P:f!<::;:qn:. 9irl''!lTo:q'lf..''Q'i~''I~er 9icTo<:lq<n~a't\11fit ;or :!'faB:.1

mind] before [one h
upon hearing an inl
9iTl''I"TI01r[aT~FIl!-l WI'l"ermrercT'f.<erTn:. I ;or «!O«Of~a<ert~~,;:i a>.:fT
3tood as kiirya. (a
m~Of'<J:. 1 llHT11TOfT'<I I stood that an apurv,
Similarly, it is also not proper [to say that] only that which is stand that a sacrific
other than the desired object, but is a means directly preceding it is principal means] .
understood as the thing to be done [by the agent]. Just the know- main object. (b) h
ledge of being the means to the desired object is the instigator, since be understood direct]
it is more simple that way. Nor can it be claimed that the cognition being a denotatum 0
of the part 'that which immediately pr'ecedes it' is also like that [i.e., thing to be done, the
simple], because it is prolix. There is no support [for such ~state- 1. The last altem~
, ment either] . the result may .
1. The Prabhakaras had said that only the means which directly accepted, then .
precedes the desired object and is not the same as the desired . denoted meanin!
object, can be the goal of action. [IV.C.4]. This was their be the main me~
justification for saying that even though the sacrifice is a means . as the thing to I
to heaven, it is not the direct means, and thus cannot be under-
[IV. D. 8] ;or,fit ~~
stood as the goal of action. Only apurva which is a means
directly preceding to heaven in the link of causation [i.e., sacri- <;FRlo'pr,er;
fice ---'> ~ apurva ---'> heaven], thus can be a goal of action, and ,,'l1TCfr[Tfit
therefore, the meaning of lIN. Kam:t9abhat1;a here objects t6 Nor can it be cl:
this on the basis, .that there is more prolixity involved in this. cause it is a matter·
It· is more simple to 'say thart just the knowledge of the ido be done' is the
property of being a means to a desired end, is sufficient as an (kiirya) is (by conee:
instigator,instead of adding the additional qualifier: 'only that the property of being
means which directly precedes the desired object'. meaning of a verbal I
[IV·D.7J 'f.TP:nO<:fCJfoa~~m<R ~ R:wFHmlO1;j' nTlTJa<m'{;:rl!f'!a't Ofl I
ri> "'f be brought about] tI:
cannot even conceive
8!lit:;-f[ a't't;or ~TT;j' ~er~qa 0:'1 </1 I <r1"l": I 3l'l<Wnfit >lT~­
. of an effort is not a rr
q~>.:[a~;or a't't;or ~HTljl''1erl''l 'f.T>la«Ter'fl!Hlq~: I ;or rn:a't«: I stood from -worldly (
8!'t~Bl" 'f.T>fa«TOf'fllH;:a{llTtr «]l1,« 9i1>lCl'1Ter'fll!' ;or ~:qq 1. It is said that i
. R~«~ m~n<ljN;or<"T1:rTerTn:. I ;oF,:q: I <fT<H>!Cf "Te.1T<9iI~a<fTer'f1'[­ that the knowle
"l'l1"T<::~~erT'O<:f<OfO:T<r1tj~: I Apurva is the th:
Further, the. means to a desired end and which immediately kara view in wl
precedes that end is either (a) the principal means to that [desired all synonymous.
object] or (b) a subsidiary means to that [object]. And if (a), 2. KaUl)l9abhatta a
also: the entity in question is understood (a,) to be the princi- pointing out that
pal means or (a,) as itself. (a,) is unacceptable: the apurva Being produced .
(supposedly conveyed by an optative ending) , is not present, [to the of the verbal rooi
 NSES AND MOODS
:rn~cftil!f't ., ~CllI. I
I r-..... <, •
O<f<frfl:Clm~'in<r CI'-11
Jnly that which is
:tly preceding it is
!. Just the know-
ile instigator, since
that the cognition
also like that [i.e.,
rt [for such state-
ans which directly
me as the desired
. This was their
;aciifice is a means
s cannot be under-
which is a means
usation [i.e., sacri-
oal of action, and
ta here 0 b jects to
y involved in this.
knowledge" of the
is sufficient as an
.lalifier : 'only that
,bject':
iT1T[(I<w<!<rm'RI'l 'l"T I
I 8l'L<fBnf't 5[T~­
;jTq~: I <r fu<ft'i: I
!CI'l"T'l"llllT ;or. l;'1TC(
" which immediately
ns to that [desired
ect]. And if (a),
to be the princi-
table: the apilrva
not present [to the
SECTION FOUR 117
mind] before [one hears such a form], so that it cannot be cognised
upon hearing an injunction, as a means and thus cannot be under-
,tood as kiirya. (a,) is also unacceptable: after one has under-
stood that an apiirva is to be brought about, one would not under- .
stand that a sacrifice is to be performed. For, [the ap,;;,rva is the
principal means] . [The sacrifice is] not the direct means for the
I
main object. (b) is unacceptable: now the sacrifice Mane could
be understood directly as the thing to be performed, so that apurva
being a denotatum of lIN would be done away with. [For, it is the
thing to be done, that is the meaning of lIN] .
1. The last alternative (b) is that the means directly preceding
the result may be a subordinate means. If this alternative Is
I accepted, then there is no reason to consider apilrva as the
denoted meariing "of lIN. " Since in this case, the sacrifice would
be the main means, it is possible to "directly cognise the sacrifice
as the thing to be done.
[IV. D. 8] ;orrf't mfRfCl -:ur<f<?1 <.?T't; 5[9a'li(ero:~;:n,<!~'l" fq,.,,.~ s:fu ~'fCllI. I
~lcr;;f"'i(9ww.r CI<?1 <!T(9'JRg~ ~9a'f.(91C( I ;or "'l'l<t~'-[ (1'-11(9-
<Fl'fT9<flf't I (ll~~ <.?T'Ii(l tJ:9 W"l91C( ~(,-[liJ'fCI~9 I
" Nor can it be claimed that [a~rva] is the meaning of lIN be- "
cause it is a matter of common experience that the knowledge 'this
• is to be done' is the instigator, " For, what is to be brought" about
(kiirya) is (by concensus), the result of an effort (krtijanya). [And
the property of being the result of a conscious effort is] proper to the
meaning of a verbal root. It is this [property of being something to
be brought about] that serves to instigate one to activity. And one
cannot even conceive apilrva to be that. [Further, being the result
of an effort is not a meaning to be assigned to lIN] ; for, that is under- ".
stood from -worldly experience. This has already been said.
1. It is said that in the common day to day experience, we see
that the knowledge 'this is to be done', acts as the instigator.
Apilrva is the thing to be done. This is according to the PrabM-
kara view in which the words" ktirya, niyoga, and apilrva are
all synonymous. See TantraRa. p. 59.
2. Kati:Wabhatta" answers this argument of the Prabhakaras by
pointing out that ktirya means that which is produced by effort.
Being produced by effort is a property located in the meaning
of the verbal root. For example, the root yaj denotes a sacrificial
 SECTION FOUR
118 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS

and in the Int:

act (yiiga). Performing this act is preceded by effort, so that that an anugan
the action is the result of an effort. Thus, the root meaning is tion. This will
possessed of the property of being the result of an effort. This represents the (
is the property of being klirya. Thus the thing to be done is the pravrttiriimitta.
sacrifice. Apurva cannot be connected with the meaning of the tion, according
verbal root in any way. pak$a, where, tl
3. KaUJ::l~abha1;ta also points out that even though it has been not enter. In t
accepted that the property of being produced by activity is an
instigator, it does not have to be the meaning of lIN. As has [IV. D. ! 1] ;:r 'ifl"! Cl
already been pointed out (and explained in [IV.B.22J'), this '-TClI9~C:'
~ "-
knowledge can be obtained from common experience. q,<l~lql1;'

[IV. D· 9] 1l;'1m~'3I\'Fl"l1;'1 R~'fg!r~I'f'1<'1I\'( ;or Cl'OWf'1m<'lr.~'fCl+J:. 1 '1R'<§;;r;;it~

<:P:1i'I1\'( 1
Similarly, it is also improper to argue [as follows] : the property
of being the means to a desired en9 can not be the denoted meaning Further, desire
of lIN, because it cannot be explained .. denotatum [of lIN]
1. Here, reference is made to the arguments of the Prabhakaras, .
part of the denotat
which have already been explained in [IV.C.ll]. association is possit
to be cognised, or (
{IV· D.IO] ClG:la:~';<'!Rf;r~~'!IR<'1'1~.~'1I\'( 1 Cl~Ir.:1 ~f.l;;f;jq'1<'1"€;q!]i'r- denotation] , as folIc
...... f'.;T ~ ...... ,..." ~ r-. • r-,
. q'11;?-1C1"l,;<,!qZ"l1l~}J11('l~ ~i:&:i'l'l'l"Cll~o<::'f.'1rCl '.lJ'fCl CTG;l1~G:- which has the.limit(
mill'! ClC:Ill:: '.lJffir>i~: 1 ~fu:fqq'l""I!!qft~Gl9!l,<[W!i111Sr ;or g [lIN] has the dena
Cl~0 '.lJ~Cl:·1 1l;'!l1''fllrr f<'o;S;I~~'O£§lf~q'l"Cll'l'O~1;'!ir"lI~'1-
the property of heir
particuJar meaning
clJl\;{;:rc~91'if'f, ~~ Cl"! \lJFfCl>i;a: 1 .
context etc., there .
For, it is possible [here to have a single property common to all limitor of being th.
denotata] just as tad etc., [pronouns] denote things delimited by [in the case of IIJi
the properties potness etc. Thus one grasps the word-meaning rela- possible, on the str
tion of tad etc., as follows: The words tad etc. denote things having
limitor of the property of being the objeCt of thought; things which, 1. This is in ans
while possessed of the properties potness, clothness, etc., are brought that the knowl
up. as objects of thought ... And the property of being an object of the case of tad
thought is merely a consecutive character, which accompanies each of the limitors i
instance of an object's being brought up. It is not made part of the are devoid of d
denotatum .. Similarly, here also,. the significatory association is has been explai
grasped as follows: lIN denotes the property of being the means 2. In answer, Kat
of the locus of heavenness etc., which is the limitor of the property of cognition or "
(If being the object of desire. How can the pi
L The concept of the consecutive character and its use to explain bhat\a goes on
the meaning of ·tad has already been explained in [IV.B.25] of the speaker'
 · -- --_. ----------

SECTION FOUR 119

'ISES AND MOODS

and in the Introduction [B-2]. The only new thing here is

by effort, so that that an ,anugamaka dharma does not enter the area of denota-
.e root meaning is tion. This will be specifically stated in the next passage. This
)f an effort. This represents the difference between the notions of anugamaka and
~ to be done is the pravrttinimitta. Pravrttinimitta does enter the area of denota·
le meaning of the tion, according to all theories of meaning except in kevalavyakti-
pak~a, where, the pravrttinimitta, being a generic property, does
)ugh it has been not enter. In that case, it also can be called anugamaka.
by activity is an
g of lIN. As has [IV. D. ! 1) ;or "fT'!" <r?:IcD 'II "I1~'13~~'<m '11 );from1 I ~;or foi;orlJct 3f;&J~­
[IV.B.22j'), this :qCfI'l~"W{m ~"~I~q:q<lT'l~({'f,'lm ~"if(ifirr1r ~f'f<fJ;f~Bnl'lla: I
,rience. q"I~lqR'~Icr'f,l~sfq <r({lC::l );f'f,<:UJlf~~l'\ 'l'fQ3~firq:qCflq,,~G:'f.\­
R(:qr.g'fCf+J:. I 'lR~'>f.!I'4q<Blimo:ql~Cf~'l'lfRq"Ii~+;orl ~qir~T'4;:rfl:r(~<i '11'4-
BHl.'l1,\ I
iVS] : the property
Further, desire is not here part of that which is set up as the
~ denoted meaning
denotatum [of lIN] ; nor is the cognition of what is' thought of made
part of the denotatum of tad etc. The grasp of the significatory
the Pdibhakaras,
association is possible even without it [the knowledge of the object
11].
to be cognised, or desire, as the case may be, entering the area of
~I 3~f<i<s!:q<q~qoil­ denotation) , as follows: [tad] has the denota,tive function for that
''1m '.lJ'fa· <rGJ~q,,-:­ which has the limitor .of the property of being the object of thought.
ICflq~<1+iq;+ilSr ;or IT [lIN] has the denotative function for that which has the limitor of
ICflq,<~<:qir<'!If~q-
the property of being the object of desire. Even at" the time when~
particular meaning presents itself, in the case of tad, by the help of
context etc., there is a cognition of tha;t which is limited by the
rty common to all limitor of being the object of the thought of the speaker. Just so,
ings delimited by [in the case of lU.'] , the cognition 'means of attaining heaven' is
lord-meaning rela- possible, on the strength of the co-uttered word 'heaven'.
Jote things having
1. This is in answer to the Prabhakara objection in [IV.C.12]
ght; things which,
;, etc., are brought that the knowledge of the object to be cognised, is a limitor in
>eing an object of the case of tad. If, similarly, the desire is considered to be one
accompanies each of the limitors of the denoted meaning, then the renunciasts who.
; made part of the are devoid of desires, will not cognise the meaning of lIN. This
has been explained already. .
Iry association. is
f being the means 2. In answer, KaUI)i9abhatta says that the knOWledge oft-he object
)r of the property of cognition or desire, does not enter the area of-denotation at all.
How can the pot then be cognised from the word tad ,? Kauwa-
bhatta goes on to explain that. We know what is the object
its use to explain
of the speaker's thoughts from the context. The actual togni-
ned in {IV.B.25]
120 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS SECTION FOUR

tion is here expressed as buddhivi$ayaWvacchedakiivacchinna. [in this case, i$tasiidh

This applies to the pot in the following way: The property of true. If [these rites]
being the object of the speaker's thought, resides in the pot. The inclination towards tl
limiting factor to this property is thus potness. (buddhivi$ciyatii only trouble. [We a:
gha/e, tadavacchedaka1'[lghatatva1'[l). The limitor of buddhivi$a- in the case of any inl
yaW thus resides in the pot which is the same as saying that the an [activity] is the IT
pot is limited by the limitor of buddhivi!}ayatii. (buddhivi$ayatii- one.
vacchedakaviin ghafialJ = tadavacchedakiivacclzinllalJ ghat aM. 1. This refers to the
stated in [IV.C.l
-3. In the case of tad, the context provides help. In the case of lIN
also, the object of desire is specified by means of the word IV. E. 2] ~ 'q1':f~E(l~~;
'heaven', which is uttered along with it. This in a way, repre- [ C9rqq~: I i
sents a shift in the view of our author, because previously, he ., 'q q<::tf~lO
had insisted, that lIN itself denoted the property of being the ~~'1C9~<r :q~
'"
means of a specified object of desire, in. order for it to be an Nor can it be ob.
instigator. See [IV.B.24] and Introduction [D-3] and [H-3]. with apiirva in view..
[IV· D.12] ~3; ~:~'2::nfct ~'>!~"'m~IS['{'9<TH191q: qrnT'if~'9.liq ~Ff>t being the means to a
BfTfGfcr ~ "<! I ~ltffi~l!i<rl'll1lj<91q: I crlOmfullJT~crlm~<r
that very thing [aPl~r
the] result as being t:
:q'R!'!i~~1~,{'!i'91q: cr~9 foi~'1't!T ;n~+J:. I oo!N.'f,l;:ri cr<:::i~mq: I goal] , \ which is an ot
Nor can it be a.'l objection that, in that_case, since suffering is qbject of v:olition. An
also the object of desire of God, even the means 6f that [suffering], can that [the object
will be the denoted meaning [of lIN]. This is a desirable result for since there is no evidel
us,. as will be explained later. Therefore, since the cognition o·f the goal, will be quite m
property of being a means to something desired, is necessary as an concerned.
instigator, that alone is the meaning of injunction, and not a/ntrva. 1. Here the Prabhak
For, in common everyday situations, that [apiirva] is not the goal. [see IV.C.I3].
1. In this passage, one basic difference between the Prabhakaras, 2. But actually, Kal
and their opponents, becomes evident. The others try to account goal at-all. It dOE
for the meaning of lIN, in both the common and the Vedic usa·ge, of being the goal (
whereas, the Prabhakaras always assign priority to Vedic utter- Only that can be
ances in their analysis. activity in questio
an intermediate IiI
[IV. E. I] '{'§; f.r~~ 1J;:<'-Tl9"'f.il<D foi<<r'~<[l'iflq~ir crft<<r..r s:fcr I cr;;[ I cr1!Tl
It just helps expl~
m~. q'3[ :q'[~<r.r]q'~f:f.r~'f.""91q: ~:~'!i'f.OO<'11~ I :q'[fum~ performed now.
S:1!m\;f~qlm~BT ~g<EI1"1 I .
[ IV .E.3] ~ 'q ~<::<TtRl
As to [the previously stated objection) that it [i$tasiidhanatva] <'1m~'1f
is not the meaning of lIN because, in that case, in the instances of Nor [can one c1ai
fruitless rites, such as performing sandlzyii- etc., the meaning of lIN will still be impelled t

----- -- "-.- - ,-,~


'1SES AND MOODS
;hedakiivacchinna.
The property of
~s in the pot. Tl;J.e
, (buddhivi§dyaUi
tor of buddhivi§a-
as saying that the
, (buddhivi§ayatfi-
'chinnalJ ghata~z).
In the case of lIN
~ans of the word
3 in a way, repre-
LIse previously, he
lerty of being the
!r for it to be an
:0-3] and [H-3].
:rm1'il.,«mN ~'fir
J<:l1l]G;~ ,,1 'o{.,<l1$1 <:'l'
Ml'li1<ri GG~3Jr<1:_ I
, since suffering is
, f that [suffering],
lesirable result for
,e cognition of the
is necessary as an
I, and not ajn'trva.
1] is not the goal.
the ·Prabhakaras,
'lers try to account
td the Vedic usage,
tty to Vedic utter-
,~'l'>l ~fcr I <1;;[ I <I~T
W-<'l1"l I J:!'lR!l::r1~
t [i§tasadhanatva]
:n the instances of
le meaning of lIN
--------------------------
SECTION FOUR 121
[in this case, i$tasiidhanatva] , will have to be rejected: that is not
true. If [these rites] were like that, [fruitless] , there would be no,
inclination towards them, due to their being fruitless. and causing
only trouble. [We also reject this objection on general grounds] :
in the case of any inclination to activity, it is the knowledge that
an [activity] is the means to a desired end, that serves to instigate
one.
1. This refers to the Priibhakara argument which has already been
stated in [IV.C.13].
IV. E. 2] ., '<fT'{ oi1~}I., J:I'lRl: I <IT'i<l1Vt <li::"I;n:nO:1~!'!m'il.,''l<!-f PF'l'>l-
~,
[ ,Ejt'i~: I 'l<:g;<I: J:!'lRIW!'l"1~'l~ "al'"mf,jq'l"~'l 'V0 '3'~'lr$
., '<f <lO:~''l' <T '<fF'l'i::'l <I«f.~'l~ I, +THFfl'll<l, I 'iO:1~f-aH;<i't­
t'i'l'<'l<:<r J:!'l"fl 'i!!'ilillTl"l I
Nor can it be objected that the inclination to activity here, is
with apftrva in view. In that case, we can justify the property of -
being the means to a desired end, as the meaning of lIN, by taking
that very thing [apftrva], as the desired end. Actually, [we define
the] result as being the object [of effort] as follows: [that is the
\
goal], which is an object of desire, and is brought about by the
object of volition. And apttrvq does not have that [property]. Nor
dm that [the object of effort] be assumed to be something else,
since there.is no evidence [to do so]. Further, any other thing as a
goal, will be quite useless as far as the inclination to activity is
concerned.
1. Here the Priibhiikara argument has been turned against them.
[see IV.C.13] .
2. But actually, Kau:J:]\Iabhatta-states that aprtrva cannot be the
goal at all. It does not fit in with the definition of the property
of being the goal of activity, that is accepted by KaUl).<;\abhatta.
Only that can be a goal, whicli, while being produced by the'
activity in question, also is the object of desire. Apttrva is only
an intermediate link, and cannot be the object of desire in itself.
It just helps explain how heaven is produced from the sacrifice
performed now.
[IV.E.3] ., . '<f "IG.'.;/1N((<'lT<l, f;r"'li~sf?r J:!'lRl: ~o:,,~~~fq ;;ft~ f.r;'W--.
,'l~ I.,O:liJT'1i 'i1m:T~<:Q{J:!~: I
Nor [can one claim that] even if som"thing has no fruit, one'
will still be impelled to activity, merely by virtue of what a Vedic-
 U2 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS
SECTION FOUR

·statement conveys. When there is cognition of fruitlessness, even a

.country hick will not feel inclined towards activity, though being " lJr'<"iI:rT
·told by a thousand Vedas. 13 ;:r1Q<!ll:. "
1. See Kumarilabhatta (slokavarttika, p. 653). wi);;r<!+!:!ft;<:[., Moreover, if ritt
+!'i.Uslit 5!'Jcfi!t I Even a dullard does not feel impelled to sidered to be fruitless
ingless : 'these are th
activity without a reason.
ffi3lJ.l.a-ness [of a mar
[ IV.E.4] ., "'f '3T'fO<'of'fiffiffi:r<1~r f?!M~ir <:[ ~'i<:[i!t I <mO<:fMfu +!<!: no resped for these,
are praised, always p'
13+!f'C[1<:[ 13 131R'J'fi:" ~ +T'l'Jf<"'f<!f9ul;l: I "<f~C:l<!Cl'r:'liii.,
away, they go to the
<'ll~ 'fi1<{~9 Cl<J:: I <:fit C:l;t crq:'fiir t:[T9'1Tf.r +I:.,l/'iIljTll:. II ~dT;:'ilit
1. Thege are fioatir
g 'f.+!lluT· <:TW <<f'f<'lf 'fo<.OTR "'f I 'Ii<lo<fT.,lfa ~ t:[pt f.rr1rci
brahma.J:J.a-ness ir
+I:Cl~"fI'll:. II" ~<'lgT<ctl "I'l'l~'J t:[T9~<'lI'fi!t: I cr~ "'fl:!f%;gl slit next, to the sari<.
![«r'Jl"fWO:l~: 9i<.O~Fcr 'fo<'> <<f'f<'JTlit m.'i+!llJf~"i t:[f'!"<'i +T'ICllfu port of his view
'11'1: I 3TCl ~'l f.r<1f'iflfcrgllll<D ~'1l]h.[4lf::)}gl~ slit f.r<1f!['lll1·
[IV. E. 6] ~[W!l<"l*q
fuf'"f1'Fcr fu~FCl: I " lJ~1''f: ~
Nor [can it. be claimed that] thi!, contradicts the following lITlJl1''fT '"
·statement of the Lord : 'tha;t sacrifice, performed by those who expect 'fo<'lT'ii~T f.r\
no fruit, as prescribed by the Vedic injunction, keeping only the
If [it is claime(
. following in mind: I should sacrifice [as a dutyJ, isendciwed·with
the [quality] S1attva.' In the eighteenth [chapter], the Lord himself sandhyii] are just use
sentences will also [u
11as spoken of Pllrity [as·a result oUhese obligatory .rites] • in [the
praise]: 'Darsa al1(
following verses]: 'Activity such as sacrifice, charity and penance,
for all desires', 'the J
·should not be given up. It should definitely be performed. Activity
[the fulfilment of] al
such as a sacrifice, charity and penance are purifying for the wise.
the expectancy regar,
Even these actions should be performed without any attachment,
tences: 'One desirO!
and without expecting any fruit. This 0 Partha, is my best and
and Piim.l.amasa [sacr
:finalopinion.' In this way, the taking away of demerit, even though
flee with the Jyotisto
not looked for, is the fruit. Therefore, purity results even for him
who is acting without any expectation of reward. This is the essence [IV. E. 7J ., '<f' 13~~
[or thrust. of the argument]. That is why. the final conclusion in " <Ii'>!] S9<i~
the case of the routine J yot~toma is that the usage 'routipe is justified, Nor can it be clai
even when the performance is for the sake of attaining heaven. form sarvebhya.(z, [th
1. The Bhagavadgita verses quoted are 17.11, 18.5, and 6. fruit. The dative fa
·2. For nityasomejya, see HiralJ).yasS. p. 278. arthaviid2, as in the ca
[IV. E. 5] Fii "'f I W<<:[T'J"'''Tl.tiil1S'fO<'l~ " ~Cl~'~<:[T"f'i >n<m "fT&lu<i 1. The sentence urjt
<f<::Nrnall:. I <f~ .,T~<1fT(::nCl"f ., lJ ;n&llJf <f'O"ii!t" ~«r~
the Sabarabha$ya
slightly different
NSES AND MOODS
'uitlessness, even a
Tity, though being
wt1q~+l:J:fu:~l".f <!
t feel impelled to
a 1 <mcl".f~~fu +l<!:
"l".f:U<::T~CI'1:'f.il <!
+I:~l,iSrijnB:. II 11: ClTrl".ffq
n~Tfci ~ ([p.r frrfuci
1 <I~ "if1:J:fu:ID sfq
i'Jjl,l".f ([T'!<!«i +1'!ClTfu
+I:i-g1~ sfq Rc'1;('11<1'
:licts the following
)y those who expect
, keeping only the
1, is endowed with
] , the Lord himself
tory rites] ; in [the.
,arity and penance,
erformed. Activity
ifying for the wise.
Lt any attachment,
la, is-;;;'my best and
;merit, ~ven though
esults even for him
This is the essence
final conclusion in
'routine is justified,
taining heaven.
18.5, and 6.
:~'1Top:i m'Ri '1Tlllu>:[
IlllUf ~'Ol".fa" ~~
SECTION FOUR 123
" 13r<'11~q113a V; Q 13ClCl oJTUCI'IClT: 1 fcI~Clql'nm l".fTPCI '1lll<"R;
<:f;rf<l~+r.." s.:i'1l;.l".f "if ~'f~'fhf''<I: 1
Moreover, if rites such as worshipping sandhya etc., are con-
sidered to be fruitless, then the following statements would be mean-
ingless : 'these are the three sandhyas prescribed, on which the brah-
mllil)a-ness [of a man] is founded [Le., is dependent]. He who has
no respect for these, is not called a brahmal)a.' 'Those whose vows
are praised, always perform sandhya. Having their demerits washed
away, they go to the ancient brahmaloka.' '
1. These are floating smrti verses' which attribute such fruits as
bnihma.na-ness in this life and an entry in the brah.malok;a in the
next, to the sandhya rite. KaUl)lQabhatta quotes them in sup-
port of his view that sandhya does have a fruit.
[IV. E. 6J ~['!'Iic't=n'1l".fm ~fu~<J:. Clil "<:f~""1': <f,l~."fl <::~,!aTli1ffi '"
" "~"'1: <f,T~~:'1r ~furu<l: " '~iV;CI'1r,fq <I'lI[('!1qN: I," o:B'1aT-
'"
<l1131"'fT <:'!ir'f.T<ll <:f~<I", " ;;>:ftmru~<! <:Efl'T'li1<il ~<I" ~c'1<1:
'm>['fi~1f.!vq<l'11':i'1'11rrl<J:. 1
If [it is claimed that these statements about tlJe fruits of
sandhyii] are' Just useful' for praising lthese rites] , then, the following
sentences will also [undesirably] have to be considered as that [just
praise]: 'Darsa and Purilamasa [sacrifices should be performed]
for all desires', 'the J yoti$1;oma [sacrifice should be performed] for
[the fulfilment of] all desires.' For, they now have no other use:
the expectancy regarding the fruit, has been satisfied by the sen·
tences: 'One desirous of heaven should sacrifice with the Darsa
and Pilr1I).am3.sa [sacrifices].' 'One desirous of heaven should sacri-
fice with the Jyoti~\oma.'
[IV. E. 7J <! "if' ~"'1: 's.:fc\ "if1F'1f: <:f~'!T<J:. q:;03<:ftl(['Ii<'!f?rfu 'IT""!'!. I
" <:!i:j'fls'!,,~~ " ~<<:f~~~'!l;;:<'!li1'S{c"1<! ::qg~'1'1~: 1
Nor can it be claimed that, because of the presence of the dative
form sarvebhya.~z, [these sentences' can be justified as] stating the
fruit. The dative form has been explained by merely being an
arthavad~, as in the case of the sentence 'for the obtainment of urjas'.
1. The sentence urjo'varuddhy,ai has been quoted in that form in
the sabarabhli~ya on M.S. 1.2.2.19 (p. 114), but is found in a
slightly different form, in which there is no dative, in the
 - -~~--~~-~-~-~-- ~-~------

THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS SECTION FOUR

124

Taittirlya Sarp.hita, II.1.1.6. This sentence has been discussed fled] , on the strengt
in four sutras (M.S.I.2.2. 19-22). The question is as to whether 1. The uselessness
this sentence should be considered as a p.halavid.hi or as an also been discUi
arthaviida. P.haiavidhi is an independent prescriptive sentence flV. E. 9J Wl <;q
from the Veda, which lays down the fruit for the rites prescribed. rn"-I+~q7
arthaviic],a has no prescriptive power. It JUSt serves either to
1;~'" ;;
praise somethIng prescribed, or to censure something which is
prohibited. Since the dative means 'for that~, it has been put <l,<!,q;.,T;;f
forward, that this sentence has been used to give the fruit for ,!G:~~'-TaT
which the sacrificial stake should be made of udu1JZbara wood. ~'l1~'Ta "
Kam;u;labhatta denies this by saying that the dative form in the '(n"l,qfu~
sentence urjo'varuddhyai can be explained by its just being an
[And if you sa]
arthaviid,a. Thus the dative form sarvBbhyalJ also should be ex-
plained-likewise, and not taken to mean that, on the strengh of tative qua showing
attainment of heave:
it, the sentence concerning the Dal1sa and PUIiI).amasa sacrifice
is also phalavidhi. praiseworthiness [of
for the generating of
2. In this, KaU1)l9abhatta is going against the thesis of the MImarp.- ness has anywhere
sakas (Prabhakara), who finally decide that though urjo'varud- worthiness [except t
dhyai is not a phalavid.hi, neither is it an arthaviida. It has an instigator. If e\
finally been decided to be taken as an independently prescriptive . -is ;;till to be consid
sentence prescribing the me of ur}u1JZb'ara wood for the sacrificial [the ~ruit, which in
stake. Others however, are of the opinion that this sentence is like the statement of
just a praise of a stake ma:de of udutJibara wood. (Timtra-
Therefore, these ser
. varttika, as quoted in the M.K., p. 1336). . [I.e., they say, that
[IV. E. 8] f<j; 'Cf I ~Tq9i~;orlq>{l~sfi't ;;gfci~q '[iWr ~",~if ~qf<:'{ I ~'C(;rlii' even though someth
prescriptive sentenCE
1;gRrK[a ~ I ;or I a<;<{1 81fi't c",~,qT<'l: I ~"qIl'[f'<ml''f.<'lm
in questionJ are to
~<'l: I ;or I 81~lG:lmj:fTu<i "ll'1a<.C!G::1qtj~: I 'l§~1~ .11Rfu especial inclination,
qFP!Tmlll~ "ll'1a1;a1D'f"'l~fu I different way, or by
Further, even if [these verses in question] are considered useful soon.
as praise, [their] uselessness is .unavoidable, since praise itself is 1. Strangely enou~
useless here. Nor can it be claimed that this praise is just in order way, which ma~
to stimulate [people about these rites], because, even that is not verses as Vedic
needed. [If you say tl)at] it serves the purpose of making people not accept this,
inclined towards· activity, that is not so. It cannot be justified in it" force, when
the case of a person who knows that arthaviida has nopresctiptive verses. The ten
power, just as [the inclination of a person] who knows that the arthaviida to a
sentence 'this cow gives a lot of milk', is not true, [cannot, be justi- orthodox pundit
 NSES AND MOODS SECTION FOUR 125

laS been discussed fled] , on the strength of that sentence.

III is as to whether
1. The uselessness of the praise for the purpose of instigation has
zlavidhi or as an also been discussed in the TantraWi. (p. 117).
oscriptive sentence [lV. E. 9J 8l?l" ~llf?l>l'lic!l<rF!~IFlTu'-lsfq m'OJ~c<!'lI'C!'f,''1e:H1 Ull~'li,'1-
he rites prescribed. fBC'll~tmas~ ~FlTU'll<!m ~'>! I G'<li'f.«'"I<!'li''11~R'fCl~1'OJ­
It serves either to
W1~<r ~t'l'li<iq;n<J:. I 'C!1=IfraUIl'OJ1:,'1;u1<t<:'1 ~'1c\<f,''1l+!l'l1'<'Of
lmething which is
;~, it has been put
Cl'<!i'fi<"l1'"l<!'li,'11]q- Clil'C!<!e:l,r ~1'CJ<:''11=11'l« a31Tf1'1l ~ 'f. M'IFF1-
give the fruit for 'fG:~;i~<rc!l "l ~G:<:'1 1:'1l<J:. I "1:111<1:'Iltr u:~qT ~11=l1u'IB:. I tr,ci """'11-
. f udu1J1bara wood. ~t!l"IC!" ~''11<{T T<!NCl sJ!l'ln~s]q- G<:'Il'1F,,<:~qU] 'l1'C!<!e:Hl
dative form in the 'OJl.it'Qm'(llQ<re:H] el1 ~'[Rr[q~I'SI1l':r1=lirCfl<:: ~m ''l'lB:.1
r its just being an
[And if you say that] even if these statements are not authori-
also should be ex-
tative qua showing that the rites iJ1 question are intended for the
. on the strengh of attainment of heaven, they can still be meaningful as signifying the
. iira).amasa sacrifice
praiseworthiness [of these rites]: That is not ac.:eptable. Except
for the generating of the specific fruit, no other kind of praiseworthi-
~sis of the Mimarp-
lless has anywhere been assumed. And any other kind of praise-
though urjo'varud- worthiness [except the one which generates the specified fruit] is not
!rthaviida. It has an instigator. If even that which does not produce the said fruit, .
dently prescriptive i.s still to be considered a:s praiseworthy, by way of signifying it
d for the sacrificial [the fruit, which in reality is not going to be generated] , then, just
lat this sentence is like the statement of a bad poet, the Veda also would not be believed.
I wood. (Tantra- Therefore, these sentences are meaningful in their own meaning
[Le., they say, that sandhyii does produce brahmaloka etc.]. Thus
even though something desired [as a fruit] is understood from the
~if ~h:+r. I ~u"l;nif
prescriptive sentence 'one should worship sandhyii', [the statements
:J.<;oi~'lf~<'tmf+rfcI in question] are to be considered as an arthavlida, for the sake of
I : I 'l"i:G:'~ 'lllRRt
~~ especial inclination, through their signifying [the same thing] in a
different -way, or by implying that (these fruits] will be produced
e considered useful soon.·
1ce praise itself is 1. Strangely enough, in this passage, KaUl~~labhatta argues in a
lise is just in order way, which makes it look as if he considers these floating Smrti
" even that is not verses as Vedic oentences. The whole argument that, if we do
! of making people
not accept this, Veda would not be worthy of belief, really loses
mot be justified in it", force, .when we consider the fact that these are not Vedic
has no prescriptive verses. The tendency of considering the Smrti sentences as an
ho knows that the arthaviicf.a to a Vedic sentence, is not approved of lly some
e, [cannot be justi- orthodox pundits. (see PrabM on Apadevi, p. 200).
126 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS
SECTION FOUR

[IV. E. 10] 8"l(f q;oI "wkr'F(fllF[Rr: ~1{1'(fqT'!.(f1q~~ni'(" ll:fcr ~~~'FC'1N'fil.:rrr­

optional rites, sh
'l~qa:l~ ~<i'1l'~~1{ 111C>l~:q111<:f~fq- ~~C<!Ii'(" ll:~'Fci m;:.e:r'tfTi'/: I the optional ritE
O'>fi'f<:fH:l 'tf " 'fiTP{ <:fqT 'f."'l:q1qfG:~ (fql Rc<:f+rqlfcr ~?jT;~:" ll:m I entirity, there h
Il;<i ~2ffi'iFF'IB9 fot>::q~ ~fq +r~ <rrt 0,1'1: I to perform then
For this reason, KuIlliirilabhatta, commenting on the sutTa, about the routin
'sarvaSaktau pravrttil; syiit tathtibhutopadesiit' [Let one be inclined in support of K
to perform an act, when one has the capacity to perform it in its do have fruit, aJ
entirity], which represents the priliminary view in the Sarvasakti applies here witl
section, has said: 'since the goal to be achieved is common in both 2. Kau:ryc;labhatta r-
[the routine and optional rites]'. This has been explained as follows: VI.3.1.1. occurs,
Just as the optional rites are prescribed in order to gain some fruit, in M.K. the sect
so are the routine ones. ThiS is the meaning of the aphorism. Thus VI.3.2.S.
this is no fault. from the point of view that the property of being [IV. F. 1] al;w.:~l'iFR
the means to a desired end, is the meaning of injlmction. <r ~'ni'( I 9
1. ~OJ'Fcll ~(q; ~1<I: (f'.n~1~~1i'( M.S. VI.3.1.1, begins the discus- >TIS'lN<;~
sion about the question as to whether, only he who can perfonn ~9'~-%fl<!11r
every detail and minor rite, should be the one inclined to perform (fc:<rfl1'ill<rl
the routine rites, or whether a person, who cannot perform the Now [it can be I
minor rites, but can perform the main ones, should also of injunction, there cc
feel inclined to perform them. The opponent's view [later to iyoti~tomena svargaki
be rejected], is that only when there is ability to perform the . sacrifice by means c
routine rites, with all their parts and minor rites, will there be denoting an instrume
inclination to act in the matter. The reason given in support expressed [by somethi
of this statement is tathiibhutopade§at. This phrase has bet'n later in the verse [no.
explained in six different ways in the Tupt[ka by Kurnarila- the object is intended,
bhatia, of which the sixth and last way is the one.' with ings of the ~everal en
which we are concerned here. Kau~c;labhatta has not given when the locus and :
an exact quotation, which is 8"l~ ~<;'i!T·Witl1'i"f ~+1RC'(li'( there is no difficulty
(TupT. on M.S. VI.3.1.1, p. 1417). Ka11l,lQabhatta give5 the case ending in the ser
sentence as follows: ~~:q- (11T~:q-) ;::r<l'R (:atjq-) g~<:f<'lTi'( property of being th(
where the words I have put in paranthesis are taken really from property] is not expr.
the commentary Tantraratna by Hirthasarathirnisra, and 1. This is another te
tulyatvltt is substituted for vidyamiinatvat. Later on, another []-.. 3]- (a) .
sentence from this same commentary has been quoted. tathii- [IV. F. 2] <!~ +rl'il'll
bhiitopadesiit thus is taken to mean that since the routine rites sP=!~~sfq­
are also said to be the same as the optional ones in so far as
~crl'IT ;jT:l,q.
having a fruit is concerned, the same rules which apply to the
As to what Mad!
NSES AND MOODS
SECTION FOUR
, ~Rr ~'OJ'f",Rl'fi1::!Jf­
" ~"''fci l'fZ~'<flif:
, ~ ... 1 the optional rites can be fruitful only when performed in their
'1+lqlRi 'l"l1~:" ~Ri 1
ing on the siUm,
:.et one be inclined
, perform it in its
in the Sarvasakti
s common in both
plained as follows:
:0 gain some fntit,
e aphorism. Thus
property of being
lmction.
begins the discus-
, who can perfonn
nclined to perform
annot perform the
)nes, :-should <:Ilso
It'S view [later to_
.ty to perform the
rites, will there be
1 given in support
) phrase has beE'n
ilia by Kumarila· 'the object is intended, relation, or potentiality alone, [are the mean·,
is the one with
;ta hils not given
'11l'f'f"f W;r+lF«'I1CC
labhatta give& the
pi{ (:atflt) g~'1t91CC
! taken really from
sarathimisra, and
Later on, another
,n quoted. tathii-
:e the routine rites
ones in so far as
Ihich apply to the
127'
optional rites, should apply to the routine rites also.' Thus; since:
entirity, there is inclination to act only when there is ability
to perform them with every detail. The same should be true:
about the routine rites also. This passage has been brought in,.
in support of KaUl)!gabhatta's view that the routine rites also
do have frtiit, and thus i$:asiidhanatva as the meaning of lIN
applies here without difficulty.
2. KaUl).Qabhatta refers to the section where this aphorism M.S.
VI.3.1.1. occurs, by the name sarv.a§,aktyadhikara~za. However,
in M.K. the section referred to by that name, starts with M.S.
VI.3.2.8.
[IV. F. 1J 8T~Brer~<:r~'1 M~'1>l~ ",""IRrmi'l;r 1;Q"!'f.l+l1 'l~G"~iln<::1 iictl<rf
;r 1;'11<1:.1 <f,1::Ujl;rf+l"!1~ It'! Grn:"!l;rl~fG ~<I.. 1 s;-,n'<'l~ 1 "a<1~­
<rlserN<i~'1: Bl'ir;:,,!: 'OJf'i:G~'! 'IT" ~fu 9~'1'llUj1::I<<rl 8T:~'11;'
'OJ'f~,m;rm'Cjl~ iicfi'11<;"'1 ~Ri R'-1~S"3nfrt Bl\Hc'!lf+l~l~Sfit
G<::;rf+l"!Fn<;[l~qfuqRrG I
Now [it can be claimed that] if 4.!asiidhanatva is the meaning:
of injunction, there cannot be any instrumehtal .form in the sentE'nce
jyoti$tomena svarg.akiimo yajeta 'the person desirous 'of heaven should,
sacrifice by ,means of Jyoti~toma'. That [the instrumental case'
denoting an instrument], is introduced only when the means is not
expressed [by something else]. On this, we say that, as will be stated,
later in the verse [no. 24] , 'locus, point of seperation, that for which
ings of the ~everal endings]'; ipstrumental case etc., are to be used'
when the locus and potentiality are not expressed. In, that case,
there is no difficulty about justifying [the use of the instrumental
case ending in the sentence jyoti§tomena E1tc.] , because, even if, the'
property of being the means is expressed, that [the loclls of that
property] is not expressed.
1. This is another technical objection. For details, see Introduction'
[J-3]- (a) .
[IV. F, 2] <!~ +!l"!'!l:c[]<!f: 1 ~l~;rFar~!['[.fiFl~>l+!T"{i(~Jj!B1,,!;r,'t-
sf+l~~ sflt '11'l~q-~q"'1lfuJ?tm~l!lRiqla:<f,1 >l'la1;'1T~fl:r"!l~;r
iial'1T ;rT:1q;:~fu ~m"!1;rms;: 1 Go;( 1
As to what Madhavacarya has given as an explanation, [which
 SECTION FOUR
128 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS
use of the instru
. is as follows] The use of the instrumental is not unjustified. For, that there is the
even though, llN expresses the property of being the means to a yagla 'the sacrifil
desired end, located in the meaning of its own [verbal] base yaj, specific sacrifice
which is immediately connected· with it; it does. not express the of yaj, liN aut,
[same property in the] specific sacrifice, which is the meaning of Jyoti~toma. Sin(
the nomUlal base 'jyoti~toma'. That is not acceptable. . and the use of tb
1. Here Kaul}!;labhatta brings in another explanation of the use has to be rejectec
of the instrumental in this sentence, given by Mli.dhavaciirya, 2. In support, Kau
the author of JaiminiyanyayamaIa. See Introduction [J-3]-(b). sentence dev,adat
According to Miidha.vacatya, llN is closer to the verbal rooi yaj, agent is expresse
which is its own base, in the form yajeta. This it is natural use the instrume.
for liN to express the means located in the meaning of the verbal the word devadia
root, i.e., yaga 'sacrifice in general', as the means, is denoted by same principle t
liN. But Jyoti~toma is a specific sacrifice, denoted by a sepe- jy.ot4!omena SVG
rate nominal base. lIN, denoting i~tasiidh(mdtva located in a highly undesirah
sacrifice in general, contained in the meaning of yaj, does not verbal suffix here
express it as located in a specific sacrifice Jyotit~oma. Thus, that, the specific,
the instrumental use jyoti$tomena is justified, since the specific instrumental cas€
means is not expressed elsewhere. Katu:l4abhatta does not accept ag,ent. , The senh
this explanation. able result. To,
[IV. F. 3] \rl:iTla'2T~'1;;'1~<j'r~il~~Tfl:!'i!FI~TqHUfT<J:: I 3F'1;.rr "~qG:'Cf: G'"fm" noted by a verb
this sentence), c,
~«i~f't "Tmr ,(a"RtI;s:[ 9iif1:!'i!Ti:tSfG'fortq~qUfT~'i!H[<J:: <perf{
®l>:nqirf{m I [IV. F. 4] 3l"" :!
'Ii~ iEfI?;f;:rfl:!;
[Madhavacarya's view is not correct], because [one can] not
avoid [considering. that] the meanings [of the items] yaj and 'RUf<EfI<im l
jYl!t4toma are [contextually] the same. Otherwise [if this identity Others, who acce:
of reference were not accepted], instead of [the sentence] ll:qG:'q: suffix, describe the rn
G'"fm 'Devadatta is cooking' ,- [which contains the nominative follows: when agen1
etc., should be used] .
devadattalJ] ,- [one would desire *devadatt.ena. paeati, with the of being a means is e}
instrumental devadattena]. For, although the ending [tiJ denotes
property of being the:
an agent in a general way, the specific agent is not denoted [by this
is no difficulty [abou1
ending] , so that the instrumental would, undesirably, be introduced,
This is made clear in
to express the agent [specifically].
1. According to the'
1. In this passage Katu:l\labhatta rejects Madhav,acarya's view that
does express agen
even if liN expresses the property of being the means, it is only
the sacrifice in general, as the meaning of the verbal root yaj. accepted by the ~
the Naiyayikas.
Thus, in order to express the specific sacrifice Jyoti~t0ma, the
 SECTION FOUR 129
,NSES AND MOODS
use of the instrumental is justified. Katu;l!9abhatta points out
,t unjustified. For, that there is the relation of non-difference or identity, between
19 the means to a yii~a 'the sacrifice in general' (the meaning of yaj), and the
[verbal] base yaj, specific sacrifice Jyoti~toma. Thus, by expressing the meaning
~s not express the of yaj, lIN automatically also expresses the specific sacrifice
is the meaning of Jyoti~toma. Since, thus, the fault remains the same in this way,
ltable. and the use of the instrumental is not justified, this explanation
anation of the use has to be rejected.
by Madhavacarya, 2. In support, Kau~9abhatta brings in another example. In the
duction [J-3]- (b) . sentence dev.adatta~ paeati 'Devadatta is cooking', the meaning
the verbal root yaj, agent is expressed by the verbal suffix. It is not necessary to
This it is natural use the instrumental case to express that meaning. Therefore,
;aning of the verbal the word devadJatJta takes the nominative ending. Now, if the
eans, is denoted by Eame principle that Madhavacarya has used· for the sentence
denoted by a sepe- jyoti~!omena svargakiimo yaj,eta, is applied to this· sentence,
:na'tv,a located in a highly undesirable result will follow. Thus, even though the
19 of yaj, does not verbal suffix here expresses the agent in general, it could be said
Jyotit~oma. Thus, that, the specific agent Devadattta is not expressed. The use of the
:1, since the specific instrumental case thus would be necessary to denote the specific
atta does not accept ag,ent. The sentence *devadattena paeati would be the undesir-
able result. To avoid this, one has to accept, 'that what is-de-_
ll·;q~ "~'l~: Q"R£" noted by a verb ending, and another item (i.e. devadatta, in
q~itun;n~"!FHa:. '!l<lR
this sentence), can be- identical.
[IV. F. 4J &.'-1 ~ '!l~<91R'!lm~':r1cr91">i "''tW~''CITS<[m-~cr ~~B!lN
lUse [one can] not 'Ii~'91?!<[m-r.:a ~;qif 9tfi'-l"<i'tS?f llN<[<9m?flm-"!1~SN cr~q­
le items] yaj and 'Ii~rrr<9l<[m'if[<[f';l G)q: I ~~+!'l<lT'liF() fq'l,U't sr.;'1cra:. ~l!!m-«ils: I
jse [il this identity Others, who accept that agency etc., are denoted by the verbal
senterice] ~'lG:'<!: suffix, describe the meaning of the rule anabhihite [Po IL3.1], as
ins the nominative follows: when agentness etc., it not expressed, [the third ending
etc., should be used]. Thus they say that, even though the property
a . paeati, with the
of being a means is expressed, a particular property of that, i.e., the
;nding [til denotes
property of being the main means, is not expressed. Therefore, there
,ot denoted [by, this
is no difficulty [about justifying the use of the instrumental case1..
ably, be introduced,
This is made clear in the VivaraJ).a at the end of the first VarQ.aka.
, lVlacarya's view that '1. According to the view described in this passage, the verbal suffix
he means, it is only does express agentness etc., rather than the meaning agent, as
he verbal root yaj'. accepted by the grammarians. This view apparently belong to
ace Jyoti~toma, the the Naiyayikas. See Introduction [A--61 [J-3]-(c)., In sup-
130 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS
SECTION FOUR
port reference is made to the Vivara:t:\aprameyasarpgraha. How-
ever the view of the author of the VivaraiI).a is not quite correctly pac ani sthalya
represented here. See ViPraSarp. p. 135. argument woule
form. I hav,
[IV. F. 5] 'f~ 8l;orf1:r~iJ ~«!<i'1r<!l'i:r~lj~'lT1p ,{«!·f: 'Ii?['e:~l~'!Tql'n'O'n'l1a:.1 paoan~ sthalya:
iJ~l 'ifT?[ ~: 'll<li:i'll;:'1'!T'UaJ+rl;ll~sf.t <! 'f."{lJTTr+rI;lHfi'lfu I suffix denoting
[There is another claim] : In [the rule anabhihite] [Po 11.3.1] ,
(IV. F. 7J ;or 'if ~,
the word anabhihite means 'when the number has not been expres~ed', .,
because, the verbal suffix does not denote agent etc. In the present QH'1'r q'
case, since the number is syntactically connected only with the agent, l1F!l<;f <f
that [agent] is expressed, but not the main means. R:Wc'liG:,
1. This view definitely does not belong to the grammarians, since >!ffj~~:1+J
they do accept the agent as the meaning of the verbal affix. Nor can the fo
The grammarians also use the word akhyiita· to denote the form expres..o.ed, since cog;
ending in a verbal ending, as opposed to The l\1Imarp.sakas; who is not intended. T
use it to mean the verbal suffix. According to them (Mimarp.- principle: In order
sakas) , iikhyiita is the element common to all the ten I-members. suffixes], [it is to be
iJ?fT~'fRl G:OJ05'lil~lJTl;ll~lJllI. (ArtlmSarp.. p. 16). This particular where the cognition
view however, seems closer to Nyaya, and is also given in Nyaya with the agent as c
texts such as Ma!l).iDa. and TattvaCin. (see Mal).iDa. p'. 120, would end up being 1
TattvaCin. vol. IV, pt. 2, p. 844). See Introdudlon [J-3]-(d). tion [of sentence me1
[belonging· to (he vc
(IV. F. 6] iJ~;;~lI. I "'f<[<!Tsrn;orl", "'1,,-!;:J! l.mO''fll'(' ~«ni<::~.<::i~~RlJll,{
[known] from expe
<Ji<:lJlqce~'11?;[;::wn'1T1:r1;jR s.fif <'111jil~S?[1fi:T ~~'!T<!illl;ll~sfq
specific desire, its de:
'f."{lJllOJf1:rl;ll'1T<I: Q:W'fr'IT ~'1qrG:''1Ia:. I acter. That also thl
That is inane [false]. [One should say pacano'gnil; 'fire with 1. The intended COl
which one cooks' , pacani sthiili 'pot with which one cooks']' the action of coe
[Under the theory now proposed, one would, instead achieveJ. the agent is cons
*pacano'gninii, *pacan'i sthiilya.1JZ [with instrumental and locative and the norriinal
. endings, because a krt suffix does not denote number]. To avoid the instrumental I
this, [one has to] accept that [anabhihite provides for the introduc- way, in the senter
tion of endings] when either an instrument or its number has not the lIN suffix d(
been otherwise expressed. Once this has been accepted, here also [in the qualifica.nd c
<i1rcnn~;or <:'l'l'lil+!T 'f~q ] the instrumental ending is hard to justify. active sentence.
above, the agent
1. kara1]iidhikar(ClJ{lyosca P. III.3.117 introduces the suffix LyuT been expressed, a
to express the main means and the locus. Thus a krt suffix such of the difficulty
as LyuT denotes the kara1Ja, but not its number. the form jyoti:;tor.
2. Both the Benan;a and the Bombay editions have the reading schools have diffe
ENSES AND MOODS
yasarpgraha. How-
s not quite correctly
~"!I~'l<f'nClTo(l""I''ll<l:.1
: ;:r <f.':llTTf+r"lFl~rCl I
'bhihite] [Po II.3.1] ,
not been expreseed',
etc. In the present
only with the agent,
:ans.
grammarians, since
of the verbal affix.
1 to denote the form
e Mimarp.sakas, who
~ to them (Mimarp.-
II the ten I-members.
». This particular
also given in Ny§ya
ee Mai).iDa. p. 120,
eduction [J-3]- (d) .
,. r-. ""
llt. ~"·n:<cr.GJ~'n'llTI'1
;"!1fir <i~<n~ f1'l "ll ~ Sfit
acano~gnil} 'fire wilh
whicl~:-:
one cooks']'
::I, instead achieve],
mental and locative
lUmber]. To avoid
des for the introduc-
its number has not
cepted, here also [in
is hard to justify.
:es the suffix LyuT
'hus a krt suffix such
ruber.
1S have the reading
SECTION FOUR 131
paeani' sthalya which obviously cannot be correct. The whole
argument would not make sense, based as it 13 on this impo~sible
form. I have substituted the grammatically explainable
pa()an~ sthiilya1?l. Thus it would provide an instance of the
suffix denoting locus (adhikara1}!a).
[IV. F. 7] ;'[' "" 'li<l3Nr,u1{rif "I"! 9i(~J~~'1{9i1 '-II"l1 1{"! 'TT 'li~19~""I9i"lI~
<UNit Cl"! 'liCllf1'l~Cl ~<"I"~'1<r+lT~fq- 'Ii,lJ)fij~"'1'1i'-iTi;[ Cl1<'1':fl··
+rT'lT'>! 'll,IJ)Tf1'l"lFlfl:rm 'IT''''Il1., I <i'T"l~1:[ C1~~<q'i1:[:J;"TR<~<r1-
R1:[C!(O( I<l:. ClT<<rtr~'n "'i§T19~ i;[~lW1 rn:i!<'lr.IP."(o( Ii '1 01:[9< ~ fl:rffi
!fRri:,:J;wn"'9"r:rr'1Cl(91~ei <:1m ..-r1\'iTlI!TIiTU1{!fl3'Wr~ fu:"Z I
Nor can the following be claimed: The main means is not
expressed, since cognition with the main means as the qualificand
is not intended. - This is based on the strength of the following
principle: In order to bring the krt suffixes on par [with the tiN
suffixes], [it is to be accepted that] , it is the agent that is expressed,
where the cognition has the agent as a qualificand, or if cognition
with the agent as a qualificand is the one intended. The sastra
would .endup being unaUlhoritative [if this is acc~pted]. The cogni-
tion [of sentence meaning] is different according to different theories
[belonging to the various schools]. It is -also wellknown and also
[known] from experience that the intention itself being only a
specific desire, its desiredness or undesiredness is not fixed in char-
acter. That also thus is uncertain.
1. The intended cognition in caitraJ! pakta 'Caitra is the agent of
the action of cooking', has the agent as its qualificand. Thus,
the agent is considered to have been expressed by the krt suffix,
and the nominal base caitra takes the nominative, il~sread of
the instrumental case' proper to expressing the agent. In the same
way, in the s~ntence jyoti§tomena svargakiimo yajeta even though
the lIN suffix does express the meaning karaIJa 'main means',
the qualificand of the cognition is the agent, since this is an
active sentence. Therefore, according to the principle stated
above, the agent should be the one that is considered to have
been expressed, and not the main means. This would take care
of the difficulty regarding the use of the instrumental case in
the form jyoti$tomena. Kaul).Qabhatta rejects this, since different
schools have different theories about the cognition of the sen-
. . . .,--.--.. .-., --.,.
~~.-,. >~- ~-~ • ~.-.,-~
 SECTION FOUR
132 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS

tence meaning, accepting this principle would create chaos, and and the difficu
the siistra would end up being unauthoritative. [IV. C. 3] 81'5fi'01:[ij
[IV. G. I] ap.{ 1Ilt(;r<ir G'i'lfuitii "IT'i.l'i1<i rr:q att!l+[,1fu I 'n;;jq~lC::Jq ~'Il11- ~Tff I
,q~oi! 8:i'<rT~1<J: I CRI<tTTt(;r
Now, the property of being a means is to be signified as being On this we sa
being the means to
located in the Jyoti~\oma. But that is not possible. There is dis-
perties. There cam
crepancy, because heaven is produced from Vajapeya also.
exist here. This e[,
1. vyabhiciira: the fault of discrepancy, in the relation of cause the denoted meanir
and eff·ect. (Kiiryakiira1Jabhavabhanga!J N.K., p. 824) . This dis- been accepted that
crepany is of two kinds: (a) anvayavyabhiciir,a: nonproduction denotative function
of the effect, even when the cause exists. (b) vyatirekavyabhi- means to particular
cala : production of the effect, even when the stated (;aUSe is not 1. See [IV.B.24].
present.. It is this second kind of discrepancy, with which we 2. Inthis way, the
:are concerned here. Thus, the opponent points out, that the has been accep,
;effect heaven can be produced even without the performance of previous objecti
the sacrifice J yoti~toma, which is the stated cause of heaven in is also put asid
·this sentence. Heaven can be produced also from the Vajapeya [IV. G.4] 'f.l§;>I'I'ITf<
'or the Agnihotra, etc.
1:[rfi'ral~
[ tV: G. 2J rr =.r fol~TC!I~Cl 'tn'i.lrr,~ 'IT'i.l;rl<!l{ ·1 ~1~W'lll~ 'Il<iqrrl1:[,'IT~fu ~('(, I +rT'lmCPTIf
Nor can it be claimed that it is the property of Delng the means M~1JjT+rT
. -to a distinct [heaven], that is to be signified, since this [distinct] gr;:'IrqaT'f
.class is assumed later [than the cognition of the meaning of Ilk].
t!;~Rr rr Q
1. The opponent to the i$!asiidhanatva view, says that this dis- According to tl
crepancy that has been pointed out in [IV. G.l] , cannot be is not a limitor [of ~
removed by saying that the heaven which is produced by the terpositiveness limit
]yoti$toma, is distinct from the heaven produced by the Vaja- cognition which aris
peya. What' is at issue is vaijiitya (itself a gener~l prope:ty ject] possessed of a
here). Hence one gets vdijiityavacchinna svmga; that IS there IS a
[from a sentence sue
-distinct svarga. But there are not several properties, one for each understood : an abse
·heaven. This view apparently belongs to the Mim§..qlsakas, who positiveness of abse:
'consider that there is only one generic property distinct-heaven- component meaning~
-ness residing in all the individual heavens achieved from the terpositiveness of ab
'performances of a particular sacrifice, and th~ ?bject of t~e ·are coimected] by
'sacrifice is to achieve a particular heaven lmuted by thIS limited by the stat
-generic property. The opponents put forward the objection positiveness of absoll
·that this whole concept has been thought of only after the mean- Further, the princi]
. 'jng of the prescriptive sentence with liN has been cognised,

NSES AND MOODS
. create chaos, and
ve.
'a I 'Il"lQ<rr<::Jcr <:'!:rT\-
~ signified as being
:ble. There is dis-
lpeya also.
e relation of cause
., p. 824) . This dis-
ir,a: nonproduction
) vyaUrekavyabhi-
stated <::ause is not
.cy, with which we
)ints out, that the
the performance of
cause of heaven in
from the Vajapeya
~ <!i"Cf«l<r<'!TfG:fu ~<r. I
. of ~ing the means
ince this [distinct]
e meaning of Il]'i].
says that this dis-
V. G.I], cannot be
is prpduced by the
duced'by the Vaja-
a· general property
rga; that is there is a
perties, one for each
~ Mimfup.sakas, who
~rty distinct-heaven-
achieved from the
:I the object of the
~n limited by this
ward the objection
only after the mean-
has been cognised,
SECTION F9UR 133
and the difficulty of discrepancy understood .
[IV. C. 3] 8l;;{t'O!f('t I f?!;;mrl<r([<lIT'CR«i ~N~T ;sf, q('t I '1 '" (1?[ G~T~­
~Tft I (1"1" ~;;rr<'l R~l;([~ 1iJf9:(1l;'11"!iH:r~CfR~+l: I q:q",WI'I
(f"l,m\:f"l<~ fe!N1iJf9:QR:fcr ~HToit"'T~fcr I·
On this we say the following: lIN denotes the property of
being the means to [the objects of desire] with distinct generic pro-
perties. There cannot be even a suspicion that the discrepancy may
"
exist here. This element of distinct generic properties appears [in
the denoted meaning] because, the denotative function for lIN has
been accepted that way. That is why we have sa;d before that the
denotative function of lIN is [to denote] the property of being a
means to particular ends.
1. See [IV.B.24].
I
2. In this way, the fault of discrepancy disappears and since vaijiitya
has been accepted as a par·t of the denoted meaning of lIN the
previous objection that the distinctness was imagined afterwards
is also put aside.
[IV. G.4 1 9i~1119TfG:m;;rRq.'!{<[:i:T ~<;'if+!f'1q-;;%,,'f.''!Cf~ 'if<::<'!T,!p.~;;r~ra--
<rlm(1T<rT q:9 '3lo/'if<'!~lfit fe!mcr1'.fl,.mlIln"lTf'if-f.'.:1lfT{<[rc!T-
trT'!m~flicrT'!~'f.'9<'!T'!P.w-;rl!Rrn flim'f. <91;P:<r'~ l;'I.m+!T'1T-
f\:f'f.<.:Uflm,!qfcrWTcrler~"if,<91'11 S"l1for:l!W'I(f ~fcr. "Il:J.QQfu: I
8l''!P-icrT~<::'f.1er~~;;rl!fcr>nflicrT'f.<er~<'ifu~ . ;:r~+!f+lil:fl~H:,0:r5
q:~fcr '1(f~U\:f ~fcr ~+!1<::f,,* <':l+!'J5~Uf"l1"l~l:;nl:{f: I
According to the view that [an unnecessarily] prolix property
I is not a limitor [of a relation], [it is thus accepted that] only COUll-
terpositiveness limited by potness [is] the relation posited for the
cognition which arises from sentences such as] 'there is not [an ob-
ject] possessed of a shell-like neck [on the ground]' etc. Similarly,.
[from a sentence such as svargakiimo jyoti~tomena yajeta] , there is,
understood: an absence of the property of being a limitor of cQunter-·
positiveness of absence in the same locus as svarga; [further, the
component meanings, viz., the property of. being the limitor of coun-
terpositiveness of absence in the same locus as sv,arga, and absence.
are connected] by the relation of having the counterpositiveness-
limited by the state of being the property which limits counter-
positiveness of absolute absence in the same locus as a distinct svargu.
Further, the principle that [absence] has its counterpositiveness
134 THE MEANIl\:G OF TENSES AND MOODS
SECTION FOUR
delimited by the property which delimits the class of things
as related, holds only in such places where [an absence] is also occurs in that wh:
directly denoted by the item nan used with other items. Hence, so that this property :
there is no conflict [between this principle and the view presented purpose].
here]. This is the solution offered by RiamaJq-wa Bhattactirya. 1. Now starts the '
1. For detailed discussion, see Introduction [K]. 2. Heaven is not pro
2. If, in the view given above, UN denotes absence, then thi3 absence
should have as counterpositive an entity, which belongs to the [IV. G 6J fll"IT ~'l<T' ~
class of things delimited by the property which delimits related- c'ff11"'fR:UT~
ness (anvayitiivacch,edaka). In other words, the thing absent 51 'liT <: 'fiTo"ITl:r'
here should be delimited by the property of being a particular 'l,~~;r R<i
svarga. But this is not Ramak)'wa's view. Hence, the restric-
;i{N'fi~ I
tion that this principle applies only where nan is used.
3. Both the Benaras and Bombay editions accept the If'.a'ding . Instead ,[of the rn
sentence signifies only
Fl'"flcft~'lirWlFfN'Ii<:UfT"-FCIl'1T'I9.R'r'fTmCfl'l'O~G:'f,T<i~'il~R'r<j\mCnq;'<i­
ness and of the pro~
'l1'+'l"iir~. The Bombay edition also mentions another can the cognition of (
reading as given by MSS. T. and D. TJJis reading is fei;;nCfT'! ••• of discrepancy which 1
0!111'l~>{rmCll'l'O~G;'li''lI'l~~'il .•. <:j'+i{"iir;:r. However both of these nondiscrepant knowle(
readings are not proper in the context. The absence or abh"!iva crepancy if [a sacrifice
heavenl through the (
in question is that of ;I, property .. This property (~q<T~+!T;:rTRI'f,<:Ufl-'
to any heaven] , let tht
m'lqf~:qTmql'l'O~?:'Ii''l) is the counterpositive or pratiyogi~ of that by] occurring. immed
abseIice. CO,unter-positiveness or 'pratiyogifa re~ides in this through this de1imitat
property. TilUS thi, abh?<va is the nirfip.1k:t of...avacchedakatv- one's accepting that [.
ani~!hapratiyogitj and the limitor of that coullterpositiveness or
property-possessor, whi
prati),ogitdvacchedaka has to be <:9h<fllHlfl;j'HUfl'1Tq>TRi'i!mCfi'l~'5
1. This samiinfidhika
"Il<'l-<q. I have amended the reading accordingly to fei'J!lcfi"!-
p.177.
<:'lir<f<lR1N'li\UfI"'1;:al111'l>[m>{rflTqI9'O~<::'li''l''ll9f.<~lim:qTflTCIl'li'9<:fMpiir~1 2. This view (svar gat
[IV. G. 5J '!~ ~'lip.p111 1<,'!Ifu:;:rr <! <:9*'l19"~~;:r ;;"1Tfa2'Tl1<fl~'l~ -.n~,!('r I belongs to the I
0!'l"~'f,''!i'.5J'ill;j;:rl<f1l1~'li~+'191~ I <:'Ff,ql.;,,! Cf<::"''''!'[R!<EfI<::m- clearly in the Vy
liWfCfcgl<J:. I
In order to avoid d
carefully. Accordil
Now as to [another view, which maintains the following] :
to heaven consists
[A sentence such as jyotilftomena] svargakiimaij. etc., does not con-
limitor of the pro]
vey that [heaven] as delimited by the property heavenness, is what
relation to the pre
is attainable through the Jyoti~toma .. For, this is incapable of
Thus it is that X t
conveying the meaning component consisting of the delimitor
of the property whi
[heavenness] , and this is also impossible: the property heavenness
preoede [in effect,
 ._---_._----------_.
lES AND MOODS
class of things
an absence] is
. items. Hence,
~ view presented
3hattacarya.
;hen this absence
1 belongs to the
delimi ts related-
;he thing absent
,ing a parti cular
ence, the restric-
is used ..
ept the widing
~;;r~Rr:il Fral""'1-
:ntions another
in g is fei;;na1<r •••
er both of these
bsence or abh'iva
:l;9ir<:!m.nM~1T[1-
i ratiyogin of that
. re~ides in this
... avacchedakatv-
:rpositiveness or
il'[l'l~R!<rl f<Rri'l~~
19lyto fei;;rra1<r-
l'i'rmC!l'li<'l<:!l'i[r£t.,1
ml1<:!l~;q<'t 'i[l''''~ I
C!~"Fo/lRl''l1G;re-
the following] :
:., doeB not ·C011-
venness, is what
is incapable of
the delimitor
~rty. heavenness
SECTION FOUR 135
also occurs in that which is not produced by means of the Jyoti$toma,
so that this property has an overly broad extension [for the present
purpose].
1. Now starts the view of the Neologicians.
2. Heaven is not produced exclusively by Jyoti~toma. 'See [IV.G.1].
[IV. G 6J f'iirg l;'lir'~["JB'I;;{r<r<'l<:!Tm"lR<'li1:mrlll'3{ ~<lj'T ;;f\'<:<ra I., 'C{f?{
o:qfl'f"'lrnn<i ~re'i[r'l'li+1:, I <:!llT;orWI'[<':* ~o:qf+!'C{H;al;'r <:!llH-
51'1il<':'lilo:qf+!"'ll~m.,feiuR< I <I't!l 'C{ l;'l<i<'ll'l~~" o:qf<'fin<':'n~J'<TG;­
'I;;~?:;or R:qa'I;h:RI'~ llTl1Ifo: I <lG;T~~ '1lmar ~l!<I1"~ 'q. rr
<[1'1'0+1:, I
Instead [of the meaning refuted in the last passage] , the Vedic
sentence signifies only the co-occurrence in the same locus of heaven-
ness and of the property of being produced byhSvamedl1a. Nor
can the cognition of discrepancy refute this. Only that cognition
of discrepancy which has the same qualifier can be contradictory to
nondiscrepant knowledge. Thus, since one sees that there is dis-
crepancy if [a sacrifice such as Jyoti~toma is considered the cause of
heaven]. ~hrqugh the delimitation of heavenness [Le.. with respect
to any heaven] , let the [Jyoti~tomas' etc.]. property [of being cause
by] occurring immediately hefore [its effect)., not be accepted
through this delimitation. . [Nevertheless], there is nothing to bar
one's accepting that l.Jyoti~toma etc.] is a cause with respect to a
property·possessor, which is the locus of that [property heavenness] .
1. This silmardidhikarmJya view is also quoted in VyutpaVaLaVi.
p.177.
2. This view (svargatvavacchedena niyatapurvavrtfitvagraha) also
belongs to the Naiyayikas. It has. been presented more
dearly in the Vyutpattiviada. [see VyutpaVaLaVi. p. 165].
In order to avoid discrepancy, it is necessary to choose the Iimitor
carefully. According to this view, the property of being a means
to heaven consists of having the property (PI) that i~ the
limitor of the property (p,) of being invariably preceding in
relation to the property (P3) which has heaven for its locus.
Thus it is that X that is the cause of heaven, which is possessed
of the property which limits the class of all X which immediately.
precede [in effect, a cause] .
 ~~~~~~~~~- ._---

136 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS SECTION FOUR

2. tadiiSraye dharmit;ti is in the translation above, a niTupaka sap- ~~9ilr

tami. Thus the result is: sVlargalviisrayanirupitii hetutii ~l:f[fueft
jyotilftomel q~fu I

[IV. G. 7] sr~ err O<[t1'r<il~~~;iI S'f i1 ~fa<rr"l'li: I"f; l! ;q['l{c!I~wrt:[~'1~iJ'~ Nevertheless [t:
property of being a
€tS'fT~'fi'" 11;'! I c!N'>J;;rlfcrer~~<r. C!q;o;qRI~'f.f.'lW1-!1{ ;:n~,'l<! I
perty which delimit
Alternatively, the doubt about discrepancy does not prevent [In the case of a par
this [knowledge that heaven tesults from the performance of the smoke by fire], fro
Jyoti~toma etc.]. On the contrary, this [doubt] is actually condu- actually have a dire(
cive to this [knowledge], since it is limited only to doubt about the [of smoke and fire] .
fitness [of heaven qua heaven being that which is caused by aparti- of a fire or that J yo
cular sacrifice]. Further, there is no definite knowledge that heaven of results [a fire, he1
is not capable of being preceded by a particular sacrifice as a result reason, in some case
of the doubt about such a generic property [heavenness delimiting vasion of an effect b]
the class of that which isproduced by Jyoti~toma etc.]' makes causation knc
1. This is fairly clear. As to how the fault of discrepancy arises, of grass, rubbing sti<
this has already been explained before. Here, the opponent says caused by each of tl:
that the doubt about whether the fault of discrepancy may not have grasped the lirr
be found here,- if we say that heaver) is produced by Jyoti$toma grasp, on the streng
(since heaven is also produced by other 'sacrifices), is not really etC.]. This' gnispir
, a deterent at all. The doubt here is only as 'follows: Since heaven occurs and is seen iJ
is produced by more than one cause, it will be discrepant to the above reasoning]
delimit the heaven being produced by Jyotl$toma by heaven. a cognition of petv
ness. This kind of doubt should be no deterent to volition how- ,knowledge of the lirr
ever since, even with the doubt, it is taken for granted that Jyoti- the absence of result
I?toma does produce heaven. Though other sacrifices may produce of the Jyoti$toma e
it also, there is no definite knowledge that Jyoti$toma does not [IV. G. 9J sr;{~ Rrr<
. produce it. And only such a definite knowledge can be a deterent 'il111lI.1c:!
to volition. By doubting about the discrepancy,. as a matter
of fact; you are accepting the fad that Jyoti$toma does produce This is to be c(
heaven, since otherwise the discrepancy will not arise. Thus perty of being pro(
the doubt regarding the discrepancy is a help rather than a limits it [the proper
deterent. without grasping the
it, when there is th€
[IV. G. 8] C!~fq 'lil<iQl'l'<~"9il>f~ 9i~ 9iH:lJfClT >!1l[irffi ~<r. I i1 I ~1l!HT­ of discrepancy.
f~u<[mi1f:'fln~sfi.t '>J~lq; o<[Tfi:cfl:rll:qc'li"'~i1 C!~ ~f.!;lU<r. I 1.' From here on,
srci 11;'1 C!~>nll:'liW(~ ~,<[~~~~s]q ~Rw::.~q<[i:'r I C!~ Q:lJfl<:filr- view stated in
l!fTr<;~ I SiC! ll;'I ol{Tqc!I'I~9iT'i~sfq 'Ii<""!<'ll", cl:f[l<n:r;il statement is tha'
 ENSES AND MOODS
i'e, a nirupaka sap-
ryanirupiiil hetuUi
;q[''!crl~~l:{'l<:r~<2t
:'f.f.'r~~ <n~~ I
T does not prevent
performance of the
I is actually condu-
to doubt about the
s caused by a parti-
)wledge that heaven
sacrifice as a result
,avenness delimiting
:t etc.] ,
f discrepancy arises,
~, the opponent says
.iscrepl:lncy may not
.11ced by Jyoti 9toma'
'ifices), is not really
)llows: Since heaven
ill be discrepant to
>ti~toma by heaven.
ent to'volition how-
~ granted that Jyoti-
crifices may produce
Jyoti~toma does not
.ge can be a deterent
pancy, as a matter
i~toma does produce
ill not arise. Thus
help rather than a
~<r. I ~ I <:TI+!l~l­
i:\
;.,~~ crm ~1'1i1<::1<r. I
~~~~ I cr~l Q:<Jfl<::fur-
s]q 'fm"lm<l:, c<nfu>r~
SECTION FOUR 137
l'{+!lon'li1r;qF1:f~~Tq~~~ ~T"I ~~;g:: "~"£9~ I ~l<::<l:o:RT­
~o'-:nfu'Ofi<:rT+!mffi'~ cr~o1:fRl~'t<Jf 9iI<1:c;qfcI~~,fr<ll<r. I cr~T~~q­
qfflRRl I
Nevertheless [the following objection is raised]: how can the
property of being a cause be grasped if one does not grasp the pro-
perty which delimits what is caused? This objection is not valid.
[In the case of a pararthiinumana] , one grasps the pervasion [of e.g.,
smoke by fire], from a verbal statement, although one may not
actually have a direct knowledge of the co-occurrence in a given locus
[of smoke and fire]. Similarly, one accepts [that grass is the cause
of a fire or that Jyoti~toma is the cause of heaven] on the strength
of results [a fire, heaven as. conveyed by Vedic statement]. For this
reason, in some cases of direct perception also, one accepts 'the [per-
vasion of an effect by a cause] , given that the element [result] which
makes causation known is available. Thus, for example, in the case
of grass, rubbing sticks, or a fire jewel [where fire is considered to be
caused by each of these]. Hence it is that, although one might not
have grasped the limitor of the property of being pervaded, one does
grasp, on the strength of the result, a pervasion [of smoke by fire
etc.']. This grasping of pervasion with respect to smoke which
occurs and is seen in different ways, is established and correct [by
the above reasoning]. For, given the necessary elements to'produce
a cognition of pervasion, namely, co-occurrence· etc., even if the
Iknowledge of the limitor of the property of being pervaded] is absent,
the absence of result is not observed. Hence, the [above knowledge
of the Jyoti~toma etc., as the cause of heaven] is not unjustified.
[IV. G. 91 Sf€!<:: Rrr<1:f+l1 ;;fr'!«f ~ ~'1"'i9?0i'C[l'i'Roi 9i"+!'l"'~~ foRT
>riQ.1l'!. I c;qf1:ri:fH~lT~~qfer<::TM~: <:T'<3; crG.>r~re.l'1'Il"'l I
This is to be considered concerning this argument: The pro-
perty of being produced is being possessed of the property that
limits it [the property of being produced]. How can it be grasped
without grasping the limiting property and it is impossible to grasp
it, when there is the deterent present in the form of the cognition
of discrepancy. .
1.' From here on, KaUl).~abhatta starts to refute the opponent's
view stated in [IV.G.8]. The whole point of the opponent's
statement is that it is possible to grasp the relation of cauSe and
 SECTION FOUR
,138 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS
Here ,if the limito
being caused, without having to grasp the limitor of the pro- to be fireness, then
perty of being caused or produced. Thus even without grasping , grasp of causatior
heavenness as the kliryattiVlacchedaka (= janyatavacchedaka course to the conI
'limitor of the property oJ being produced), it is still possible resulting from gra!
to grasp the causation between lyoti~toma and heaven. Now from the ritual ruJ:
KaUl,lJQabhana points out that janyatva (= kiiryatva 'the pro- of discrepancy is ,
perty of being caused or produced) cannot possibly be grasped This does not help
without also grasping its limitor, because janyatva is the same in the concept of v
as janyatavachhedakadharmavattvam 'having the property that
limits the property of being produced'. And grasping this limitor [IV. G. I2J ;;'1'rfcrrfti'li:tc<Pl
is not possible in the present case due to the discrepancy al- ~'1fr<'IT'I"~;
ready explained. tflllT<rll'l'l><:u'
~C!IlG:l;rt fe!0!
'[IV. G. 10J ';or "i ~l;;~ ;or tf ;;)1;[: Igl'n'<!G1R~'l~q~ G~'ll5[RP;F'l'f.Gl'l
81':!fii:a1:r"nf9CR'lTQ'.1 ;or "i Gfua:rlf <r1~,li'l U~'l~ ;or. ~<fl~'fa~fcr
In the sentence jyc
as follows: heaven [:(:
'IT'"'ll'{ I 5[~ir ;;<i'rfcrnfl'f fqrrl1:'l~~"J{T<~'lir>..T'Iot G~~'1Tl1T'I~'lT­
anyone other than the
tf i l1'lTQ'. I G'I 1I(t ~;;rl<'1~'1TqTGaf sfcr '{<1l1:!q~~,qTQ'. I can that be grasped, S1
Nor [can it be claimed] that this fauLt is not valid in the case of heaven] delimited by h
·the Vedic statement. It is impossible to say that the doubt regarding to cognize also that the
.fitness. is not deterent. Nor should one say that there is no definite perty jyoti~tomavaiian)
:knowledge, just a doubt, imd a doubt is not a deterent. It is im- Otherwise, usages such
possible not to have definite knowledge [that· lyoti9toma is not the be possible.
-cause of heaven qua heaven] , after first hearing [a Vedic statement] 1. Here svarga is the J
about heaven caused by Agnihotra, even without lyoti 9toma. For, other than the pe
in. your view [the concept of] the property of being a distinct vrttitva) . Thus t]
[heaven}' does not come in first even superficially. resides in svar ga an
Now the ,adhikara
[IV- G. II] 1<lJP,:'T<r1<!rq ~~<>ilq~~ciT fq;jflGl'11.'1'lo'lfu~'lil~:'li 'IT (j\~: I
of being a locus' is
'1fi'1(t "i 'rfITfT.a<:+!qr''ll~ ~'-l'1+r, I jyot4tomavadanyij·
Even in the case of the grass etc., the grasp of that [causation] one other than the j
·takes place, when the property of being a distinct [fire] is taken into the limitor in a limi
consideration, or by the positive and negative concomitance of the dena) or (b) by tI
"distinct [Le. grass and the distinc:t fire resulting from it]. It should yen.a). It is in th
-also be borne in mind that another fault is also going 1;0 be stated. reasoning arises. 11
1. In this passage, Kauwabhana also shows that the example of heavenness, all and
the, fire resulting from different causes such as grass, rubbing heaven is not the I.
wood, etc., does not really help the opponent. Fire is produced anyone other than t
by grass, as well as by the fire jewel, or the ritual rubbing, wood. also from the perfOl

)ES AND MOODS
ltor of the pro-
;vithout grasping
~ya~avacr:hedaka
is still possible
:I heaven. Now
'ryatva 'the pio-
sibly be grasped
rtva is the same
1e property that
tping this limitor
discrepancy al-
(j <'n);ri~<r'~'f. Cll<!'
q 'l·AA"n~CI~ra
q~~1.lTl1Fl<<n­
[Q<'Il<I: I
.id in the case of
doubt regarding
!re is no definite
~rent. It is lm-
(:oIDa .is not the
Tedic statement]
Y'oti~toma. For,
>eing 'a distinct
;hat [causation]
reJ is taken into
omitance of the
1 it]. It should
ng to be stated.
the example of
l graSS, rubbing
Pire is produced
tl rubbing wood.
SECTION FOUR 139
Hereif the limitor of the property of being produced is taken
to be fireness, then the same doubt of discrepancy arises and the
grasp of causation detered. To avoid this, one must have re-
course to the concept of vlaijatya 'distinctness', Thus the fire
resulting from grass, is of a different type from the fire resulting
from the ritual rubbing wood, and so on. In this way, the fault
of discrepancy is avoided, and the causation is clearly grasped.
This does not help the opponent's view, since he does not bring
in the concept of vaijatya.
[IV. G. 12J '>'1.''rfcn!Ii:l~'<R '>4'rmmll'fG:«!'l'lRr: <'Ill ~,ilq <rl~'l'ij I 'I '" cre:1N
<qir<'llq~~;or "flNClfur1r "Il~llq<FClc"l~ I 31M'f.<::1J[<ilq~~<<!,
mm'lrf"l"ll1:oi.'\'ll""l.q<!'<f\'e[l3'+'1'i1<I: I :a:r'''l'·n''' llW1<!'T 'I Il~: "
a ~<1.lT~1<rT foIo>'!l!<J'W1<I: I
In the sentence jyoti§.tomena etc., the verbal import can only be
as follows: heaven [produced by ]yoti~tomaJ does not reside in
anyone other than the performer of ]yoti~oma.· Objection: How
can that be grasped, since even that is contradicted if [the result is
I
n. heaven] delimited by heavenness·? Answer: Because, it is possible
H
I
.
to cognize also that the delimitor of locus-ness is related [to the pro-
perty jjoti§tom4vadanyavrttitvaj by co-occurence in the same locus,
I Otherwise, usages, such as 'there is no fish in the Ganga' will not
be. possible.
1. Here svarga is the locus of the property of not residing in anyone
other than the performer of ]yoti9toma (jyoti§tomavadanya-
vrttitva). Thus the property of being a locus (adhikaralJala)
resides in svarga and this property is then delimited by svargatva.
Now the ,adlzikaralJatavacchedaka 'the limitor of the property
of being a locus' is thus svargatva. This svargatva is related to
jyoti'itomavadanyavrttitva 'the property of not residing in any-
one other than the performer of ]yoti~toma;either (a) by being
the limitor in a limiting relation (adhikara1Jatiivacchedakiivacclze-
dena) or (b) by the relation of co-occurence (samanadhikara~l­
yena). It is in the former case that the problem of discrepant
reasoning 'arises. If heaven the locus is taken to be delimited by
heavenness, all and any individual heavens are understood and
heaven is not the locus of only the property of not. residing in
anyone other than the performer of ]yoti~toma. Svax,ga can result
also from the performance of Vajapeya. Thus heaven being pro- .
140 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS
SECTION FO:uR

ven to be the locus of jyoti$(omavadanya (i.e. vajapeyavad)-

of the Neologicians.
vrttitva also, the problem of discrepant reasoning arises if jyou.·
$(omavad,anyiivrtflitva is said to be the vyapaka of svargatva. In
1. This view is fo'
order to get around this fault, it has been suggested that there as follows: Cl~
should not be a limiting relation here with the limitor of the Ql;'l :q •••"l<'li[s
property of being a locus. Merely the co-occurence of heavenness ~'!<:I1<i'I'i!'l1Rfci <["\I
with jyoti$tom[lVadanyavrttitva is' sufficient for the syntactic 2. p. 257).
relation. In order to prove that such co·occurence is sufficient
for the grasp of the syntactic relation, the following example is 2. If the property
given. The sentence 'there is no fish in the GaiJ.ga', will be false, of lIN, there wi
if it is taken to apply to the whole river, and it would apply to As has been spe
the whole river, if there is a limiting relationship between not be the property
having fish, and the Gailganess, which is the limitor of the pro- prior to somethi.
perty of being a iocus. The statement can be Perfectly true, prior absence of
however, if taken to mean that, in a part of the river, there is no the expiatory Tit
fish. This .can be done by saying that Gailg,aness and the pro- prior absence .
perty of not having fish co-occur. absence? Thw
2.. I am translating the word svarga as 'heaven' only for expediency. there will be no \
What is actually meant is a state of bliss devoid of misery. pt. 2, pp. 256-2,
[IV. G· 13J q:<i:q. "n~i'I'i!<'!i=l'l f<l<:'1><:, <:11<'1,<1 :q 'l~l'I~ <:I<'lme:rut 'l('3'i~ 3. I have amende
. 'l~'lRr~ :ql'3'i'!f+r'~~~lIJ 3T<1 11:'1 'ib:l:~rr:!<qF:1f~l m'lP-ll'<f1C:-l accepted by bo
Jf'[l%: ~~~ I '31""1«1 ~:Ff'lf+rfu i!~ :q Qon'f<iiT<,,~~I'l<'iwr­ otherwise it mal
'3Nrr,'!'illrr1'3l ,,'ll'Q'i{ ~'[r'<f;:f ~'l1G:. I ."I :q '31"rrf'll'ill<r1~'[I;;r;{
4. 1 have accepted
~'ll~fq 'l1"'ll{ I '3+1Fre~~~?':[Q'lT Clmm~fu l1 ~'11f':!'f.<lc'n: I
rather than <11'
Thus, the meaning of injunction is the property of being a result closer to the W(
which is desired. And Y is the result of X if the following holds: See note 1.
if X exists, in the next instance, Y exists; and if X is not present,
Y also does not occur. That is why the inclination to perform exc [IV. G. 14J 31~B'l~
piatory rites is explained, since they are [performed] so that pain
should not be produced. If the view that. the property of being a 'Ilfu'C;; W
means is the denoted meaning [of lIN, is accepted], there will be for<'1 olen I
no inclination [towards these rites], since the knowledge of the pro- .
pertyof being a means, in the form of existing prior to it [the non- , Here the followi
producing of pain], is not possible. Nor can it be objected that case of smoke, once c
[in this view] , there will be no inclination because of the absence of cerning the donkey, '
knowledge of the property of being a means. For, that is obtained cular smoke not resi
due to its being cognised by the same cognition.. This is [tpe opinion] donkey, the absenc.
established. Thus, ~

'ENSES AND MOODS
(i.e. viijapeyavad)-
ming arises if jyoti··
1M of svargatva. In
iuggested that there
l the limitor of the
lrence of heavenness
t for the syntactic
:curence is sufficient
'ollowing example is
;aitga', will be false,
d it would apply to
onship between not
~ lirnitor of the pro-
n be perfectly true,
I As has been specified above, the property of being means has to
the river, there is no
gjaness and the pro-
only for expediency.
s devoid of misery.
. R~ <:I,l{iWreJut' l{'<:1"~
:!<ql<nf~crn m<[~,"l~
, . Q<m'f'llrel;mFl<9~q'-
~ .
'0[ <:Il'i!~<91't!l~l,);I'[lW'
~fu Q~l{lf<rif.<iCliT: I
rty of, being a result
he foNowing holds :
if X is not present,
ltion to perform ex-
,rmed] so that pain
property of being a
pted], there will be
10wledge of the pro- .
prior to it [the non-
it be objected that
[se of the absence of
?or, that is obtained
rhis is [the opinion]
-~------,~---~-,. --------- -------~--
SECTION FOljR 141
of the Neologicians.
1. This view is found in a commentary of the Tattvacintamal)i,
as follows: (ll;1l1<J:. <:I11l1;:l{(I: <:'1<:11<'12 );[,'I'Ii l;'1<:11~'1<;'l<rl~9i '11 i'i"<'1>l:
(IFf '0[ •••l;jl''1'lS;:1jl{: I <:~ <:Il1m&fT&;ci ;;''lllcrffi111R I ...31mffil1"1llT:
l;'1<:11"<'tl!!'11F!lcr <hl;j: I (TattvaCinRa. (sabdaklu.lc;la) vol. 4, pt
2. p. 257).
2. If the property of being a means is accepted to be the meaning
of 1IN, there will be no inclination towards the expiatory rites.
be the property of existing prior [to the result]. Now, existing
prior to something means exis.ing in a time (hat is limited by the
prior'absence of that something. Now the result intended with
the expiatory rites is the prior absence of suffering. How can a
prior absence be said to be existing before another. prior
absence? Thus the causation cannot be grasped. And thus
there will be no volition. [see Aloka on Tattvacintamani, vol. IV,
pt. 2, pp. 256-257] .
. 3.· -1 have amended the reading .;or 'if <:Il'iFI''1=ilFI1<J:.. which is
accepted by both the editions to ~ 'if <:ITIO!;or''I1=ilFl1<J:. because
otherwise it makes no sense.
4. I have accepted the reading <:!l~'Il!!''1ll.
of the Bombay edition
rather than 'Jl~'Il!!'ll''1ll. of the Benares edition because it is
closer to the wording of the original view in the Nyaya texts.
See note 1.
[IV. G. 14] 3l~11'1~l{ll. \ ~ 'Hf'lic<rPi"l,l-\i[~ll{T U6l1'lG:;:1fI'[Rr:
'll~q; ~11 ~lcr 't!T~sfq );['[~'1l'{T'I~<! <:fo\fu~,~~a<;"1l);['1c'i'!i<91;;r
fq~ll~c!1 I
. Here the following should be taken into consideration: In the
case of smoke, once one grasps that there is discrepant reasoning con-
cerning the donkey, even if there is a cognition that there is a parti-
cular smoke not residing in anything other than :that which has a
. donkey, the absence of inclination [towards a donkey] is well
. established. Thus, since this [meaning accepted in the view of the
 SECTION FOUR
142 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS

a'<1c,g
N aiYlilyikas that the sentence jyoti$Iomena etc., denotes this meaning :
a heaven (is caused by Jyotil?toma) which does not reside in anyone 1315;~
olher than the performer of Jyoti~tomaJ cannot be the instigator, it is Objection:
not the meaning of lIN. Asvamedha not ,
[IV.G.15] l~ ~<i" 13,"1~sfi'r ~:;jT<"1"l."q;t ;r ~G:. !l~H!Q ~'I !l'lcN.~T;rre;g;T Q?[
This objection is :
. should even you r
l1Hl11T'I1G:. I ~toma come into·
In addition, in this case, even later on, the concept of the pro- that an individual
perty of being a distinct [heaven] need not be conceived of. There Objection: In t
is no basis for it [for the concept of vaijiitya] , since instigating know- the use of the lim
ledge is already first established.
1. The concept of vaijatya will not be needed. Vaijiitya is to be 1. The view ta1
thought of only in order to justify the inclination to act, by an individual
removing the discrepancy created by the heaven being produced by another ir
Kau~l,iabhatt;
by causes other than the Jyoti$toma. But in this view, the inc
clination to act is already explained, by the knowledge that the limitor of
Jyo%toma produces the desired result heaven. Thus vaijatya is
not necessary in order to justify that. [IV.G .18] a,!Hc'li
~![i'!'l
[IV. G.1] ;r 'q' 'l:.~ 'l~cl'r.RllTcnfii'll~if aC'f.<i"R"I. I 'jl1T~ ~~lfit ,'I<TBr 131!:j' a>i
a,'!'
<!T1l;;r;:<[,~ '11'elij;P:lT'I1G:. I 'f.HllTal''1~q 815;~ie<;<'IiG:. I <liN
aG;J:t~ a~q<ftl1: I 31~1l'fl'llG:. I 'f.l'UiaT'I''f.li.alltf 131'1~~~ro Therefore on"
o1.{Trn&:[TWh~'f;l I ' . .
a goal [kiiryat~]'
But ;that is hard .
Nor can [it be said thatvaijiitya] has to be conceived of in order Alternatively, let I
to justify the causation already grasped, since there is no difficulty extended limitor c,
about the heaven being produced by the sacrifice even without a father in the Adv,
generic property. It [generic property] is not necessary to the 1. karyatva = kG
property of being a cause. Nor is it useful for grasping it [kara~Jatii], explained in r:
because of [its, i.e., of vaijatya] absence here ratihe time of grasping words, i.e., jan,
the causation]. The pervasive relation that like the property of this limitor he
being a cause, the property of being a result is also delimi.ted, is wide. It limit
without purpose. medha etc. C
1. The property of being a cause (Kara'IJatii) is always delimited. Ra.J'lgojibhatta,
Thus ya y,a kam'IJata sa sa avacchinna.· But to say, that like a. limi tor can h
that, the property of being a result should also be grasped as limitor. His j
being limited, does not serve any purpOse.
[IV.G.19] ;r.gicr131
[lV.G.17] ~<i" "fer ~fuID111"~'el;;r'''1: ,'1<1: I'J; ;r ,'l'I~ ~~ I 'lif<itf(fS1tr j'(c'l'C'lm
~c\ \'iilf~l!lr111'CH1"",,>i'lfuIDm~1<{,a'llltf i~ ., '1:[.G:. I 1;'Il'fl'l1G:.

rENSES AND MOODS
;notes thiS meaning :
not reside in anyone
Ie the instigator, it is
concept of the pro-
:onceived of. There
Ice instigating know-
. Vaijiitya is to be
clination to act, by
lven being produced
in this view, the in-
the knowledge that
n. Thus vaijatya is
l1. I '>Ir!{i f<r.nilt <:E!ilBf
<:'l' a:;:1~1C1i<9Hl:' I ::J1N
. f'l«f.l£.cllf'1. ~lE!R:g~fu.
;onceived of in order
here is no difficulty
ice even without a
,t necessary to the
.sping it [kiiral.1atii] ,
,the time of grasping
ke the property of
is also delimlted, is
is always delimited.
lt to say, that like
also be grasped as
'il~ ~'J I 'lif<iq~ slit
f?fi <r <:<[,<\. I <:'Il'!l'll<\.·
.~--------~--------
SECTION FOUR 14J
Cf"l«:E!<TC<fffir ~Rr CI'<lG;o<['f~~iF'I1C;; ~fu ~<\.I Clf~ WF1Cf 11:'1
~1:rfu<[Cft l~ 'J!1<<[l'l'~'f,<[T I
Objection: In [that case, why should the heaven produced by
Asvamedha not come into existence from Jyoti~toma? Answer:
This objection is not valid. Even if vaijiitya has been assumed, why-
should even you not have the heaven produced by a parti.cular Jyoti-
~toma come into existence from another Jyoti~toma? or It is natural
that an individual [Jyoti~toma] is the cause of an individual heaven.
Objection: In that case, follow that in the first place. What is:
the use of the limiting generic property?
1. The view taken here, is that every individual sacrifice creates_
an individual heaven, which is distinct from -the heaven caused
by another individual sacrifice. This view has been rejected by
Kaut:lt;iabhatta, who accepts the generic property svargatvaas'
the limitor of the property of being a goal see [IV.G.18].
[IV.G .I8J Cf<:l'lT<'f.1~<lTq"W<::'Ii'e1+l9~9~q 'li14<'I1+r<l'l'i 'IT"<['1:. I Cf'<!19"~'lin:r~
~~ii;;r I gr<:g 'IT <:9fr<9l11f"~<::'Ii'1:. I <[~T 'i'fTf~~'fG<:'!l'1'~'liCoi­
~l~ Cf~I'fCfl11;liR<q'i'f(~<:~G<:nD;g:I~ I .
Therefore only the following is to be said : the property of being.
a goal [kiiryatii] is having the property that limit':> it [karyatiiJ.
But ,that is hard to grasp if the limiting property is not grasped.
Alternatively, . let heavenness be the limitor. As to how an over-
extended limitor can be correc;t, this has been shown by my revered:
father in the Advaitasaroddhara.
1. kiiryoatva = kiiryatiivacchedakad.harmavattvalJz: This has been
explained in [IV.G.9]; where the same thing was stated in other
words, i.e., janyatva= janyatiivacchedakadharmavattvalJZ. But
this limitor heavenness, which must thus be brought in, is too
wide. It limits the goal of Jyoti~toma as well as that of Asva-·
medha etc. On this, Kau:i:Ji;labhatta answers that his father,
Railgojibhatta, has shown in the treatise Advaita:aroddhara, how
a limitor can have an overly wide domain, and still be a proper
limitor. His father's argument is given in the next passage.
[IV.G.19J <r.ij[C1t1ID;g:T~ l(O'!<'I'J!TRr<i'!U:S~ 'f;phn?[~+!il1I'r'f.T<:1T[([I'I'~'Ii,'J<r
~o'l<9imi::i:rlliJ~'f'! \1~;;r CfG;'I'~~ I <r ~ ~1T[""'I;q- WiRfl'll"l!
 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --------------

144 Th"E MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS SECTION FOUR

need something
crepancy. Ran
an additional jf
Now this is what is said in theAdvaitasaroddhara in the section - cited above, he 1
-where the property substanceness is rejected: After first proposing substances as th
[as a priliminary view] tha(t sUbstanceness can be established as the to be taken as a
limitor of the property of being a material cause in respect to all the ina concept itt
effects, [this view has been rejected in favour of the view that] Being stanceness. ACI
[satta] alone is the limitor. Nor can it be objected that, in that case, in all substance~
-colour etc., could be [allowed to be] produced in a quality etc., be the karaIJatt
[instead of in a substance]. For a particular colour a particular sub- the discrepancy.
stance is necessary as the material cause. Thus it is due to the 3. The objection a
absence of its special ingredients itself, ;that there is the absence of property of beir
the production of the result [i.e., the production of colour in a resides not only
quality]. - would lead to di
cause of the col,
1. dravy,atva: 'substanceness'. The accepted rule is that '-H 'IT the kiirm:zatavac
'fiRlTfcrr UT 13r'l~;J>!r Thus the property of being a cause always has in quality (guIJ
to have a Iimitor. Thus to take the usually cited example threads which limits the
are the material cause- [or more correctly, the cause related _by -cause. There WI
the inseperable relation of samavay;a] of "the cloth. The property be considered p:
of being a cause would];>e here limited by the_property threadness. herence. It is
But in the case of the result pot, the material cause is the earth _accept substance
or clay, and the property of being cause would then be limited of the property ,
by the property c1ayness. Now there is another maxim which
4. Rangojibhatta d
says that 'f,~+!l~ ~Ic! s::c<i 13li<iTT'l"fiT,lTfB: 'substance is the
satta alone is su
inseperably related cause for all results.' When we think of the -cause. For him
karaIJata in this connection, there would be discrepancy if either stanceness. The
threadness or c1ayness were taken as the Iimitor. The conse- for every partk
,cutive proper-ty for both of them is substanceness, which is a necessary as the
broader concept. Taking this as the limitar of the property of condition is not:
being a cause, will avoid the discrepancy. This is the general or colour in it is
argument given in favour of the acceptance of substanceness as a Iimitor that is
a jati 'generic property'.
[IV.G.20] ~'1C!TB: I;
2. KaulJ't;Jabhatta's father Railgojibhatta does not accept substance-
131c! ~<1<'!T
ness as a generic property. How then can the discrepancy be
<ltTlt'l<q'<ir
avoided? Threadness or clayness are narrow concepts, and we ~

~Ic! ~ I
I ~-------'--.-----

NSES AND MOODS SECTION FOUR 145

need something broader such as substanceness, to avoid the dis-

crepancy. Rangojibhatta does not think it necessary to posit
an additional jati substanceness. In the case of the examples
oora in the section cited aPove,. he ",ould take into consideration only the individual
fter first proposing substances as the material cause. When the broader concept has
. established as the to be taken as a limitor of the property of being a cause, he brings'
n respect to all the ina concept that is even more wide than the supposed sub-
.e view that] Being stanceness. According' to him, satta, the 'Being' which resides
d that, in that case, in all substances, qualities, and actions, should be considered to
in a qu;;tlity etc., be the kiiral}atvavacchedaka here, and that would take care of
lr a particular sub- the discrepancy.
IS it is due to the 3. The objection against this, argument is that the limitor of the
e is the absence of property of being a cause \V'ould then, be' too wide, since ,satta
on of colour in a resides not only in substances, but also in' qualities etc. This
would lead to difficulties. Thus cloth is -the inseperably related
cause of the colour residing in it.' According to Railgojibhatta,
rule is that "iT "iT the kar~atavacchedaka would be satta. But satta also resides
: a cause always has in quality (gul}a). Since, thus quality also has the limitor
ted example threads which limits the property of being a cause, it would also be a
le cause related by cause. There would 1h.en be the difficulty that colour could also ,
cloth. The property be considered' produced as in a' quality, by the relati~n of in-
property thr,eadness. herence. It is to avoid this difficulty that it is necessary to
11 cause is the earth accept sUbstanceness as a generic property and thus the limitor
uld then be limited of the property of being a cause.
other'~maxim which
4. Railgojibhatta does not accept this objection to his theory that
'subStance is the satta alone is sufficient as the limitor of the property of being a
hen W'e think of the cause. For him there is no need for the generic property sub-
discrepancy if either stanceness. The difficulty noted' is removed by pointing out that
imitor. The conse'· for every particUlar form or colour, a particular substance is
nceness, which is a necessary as the inseperably connected cause .. Since this special
: of the property of condition is not fulfilled by a quality, the non-occurance of form
This is the general or colour in it is perfectly justified. ,Thus the objection against
of substanceness as a limitor that is too wide, has been removed.
[IV.G.20J ~;:;"icrTl{ 1 «I'lT IT '!iliicrlq~?§<:91l=TRllf\,!'RT~'RTl{ 1 CI~q:2'Rm. 1 CltlT
lot accept substance- \,!R1 <:qiT«lTqf';~;;rBl'n::M;n;:;;:;<i'lRnTI+R,;q'f.HUJTmql<::~<'f"<lTq~RRll
I the discrepancy be
)w concepts, and we
~R1~1
-
Cltllr.'l<'f"" 'if 'W~ U\'!"!q" 011fl:r:qHl<::fii~;n~~911~UJ,q~<r'W
, .
 146 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS SECTION FOUR

Let' that be proper. You, on the other hand, have stated a being individ
. limitor of being an effect, which [limitor] has an overly wide domain. of the other,
This is however, not proper. FOf, if this were [accepted as] so, it [IV. G.22 J "l '<f Q'
would, undesiredly, result in the following: [the result i.e. heaven]·
delimited by heavenness would not be· produced from the Agnihotra ~ "CGi'
because its cause, the J yoti~toma, is absent. If, in spite of the absence m~lurt
of the cause, the result so delimited does come about, then the fault "m~11Jj
of discrepancy arises. Consequently, just as a donkey [who carries fu~lrQj
the clay to. make a pot is not the cause] in the case of a pot etc. so
Nor [can it b
also wouid the Agnihotra etc. now n~ be the cause of heaven. This
the property of bei
is ·undesirable. and by [thus] bei
1. For a discussion· of anyathiisiddha and .ananyat,hiisiddha, see thus [accepted, 1
pp. 194-96 of the notes on T.S. mantras used to a
offering cakes [pl
[IV.G.2 'J 3l'i'r'O,,~" .r1f~iB>.{~<r",""~~<r" ~Rr ,,~~dj<lHni:~,"l lerfua'lT
in them, the acts
ffIl~"er;qT: '1<: ~er{o"fcR 't>s fer J;[~<j; 'ti<;! "I"l'f, ,'II <J:. qH'Rfer,~
mantras are: 'I
'f,rii<Cf'<flerQ{Oll~Her"ll"'lfq a~"g I worthy of your s.
Concerning this we say the .following: The injunctions [0 Puroqiisa) , Y01
.ft~~<r 'one should sacrifice [with] rice', and "~~<r firmly and happily
'one should sacrifice .[with] barley' provide that the rice and barley contain the phrase
are to be offered at !the Darsapaul'l,lamasa;'even if one or the other is the ritual act only,
absent, each one produces the [same] result and thel'e is no discre- is· the final, accept€
pancy even though the result is produced in each other's absence. contradicted under·
The same [principle] should apply here. two faults: (a) [5
identical capacity,
• 1. Mvamedlia and Jyoti;~toma are two seperate causes of heaven. the offering of barl
In the previous passage, the question has been raised about the not now come abol
possibility of discrepancy and in that case, the possibility that, (b) [If, on the ot)·
as in the case of· the donkey and the pot, Agnihotra then would bringing about thi!
not be called a cause. In answer to this, KaUl).9abhatta brings
in another example. The two sentences vrikibkiryajeba and 1. In this passage
yavairyajeta both lay down the use of different grains for use and rice is diff,
as oblations in the Darsapiirl).amasa sacrifice, fOf. the same fruit. and rice can b<
(cf. ApasS. VI.31.13). Even though they are contradictory to and have the s:
each other, it is accepted ithat .they are both individually able to perty of being
produce the fruit, and thus ~here is no discrepancy in the result the same singl·
being produced with one of them as the cause in the absence of each other.
the another. The same principle should be followed in the pre- 2. This objection
sent case also. Thus both the Jyoti~\oma and the .Agruhotra etc., (ApaSS. :
 - - . - -.. ,~~-
- - - - - - - - .-.--- "---.-

'.NSES AND MOODS SECTION FOUR 141

nd, have stated a being individually capable to producing heaven in the absence
of the other, there is no discrepancy.
verly wide domain.
accepted as] so, it [IV. G .22] ;or 'C[ Q~'f,~fiRr+!~;orl."a"91R<l1 'C[T1'["il~lr<fl I Q,9+!fq "~T;:i
result i.e. heaven]
rom the Agnihotra
a u~ '1in~ '2,W[ "11,'11 li1~~ 'f,;;'!'llm I CIl~r<:!l<::l~ij '1fu[ijB"
mt)urt l'l"l li1+!<lBl+!F! I" ~Rr ~~l~<:!,,;:r<:!l""'1'f,lm.+!~'1T:
,pite of the absence
lout, then the fault ";:Hl[1urT l'l"l " ~fQ +!~f0~1G; li!l~ll'1m Q,91~'ot ;or 'l'll1'lTil ~fcr
mkey [who carries fu~lrQ~;'llq%: I Q~91~'lf~"I'f,l'lf:J:,'!fuO'lJ1::r'CfRl;:'!Q<:l~: I
lse of a pot etc. so Nor [can it be claimed that] there, both [rice and barley] have
it of heaven. This the property of being a cause due to having the same single capacity,
and by [thus]' being alternates [of each other] . [If this claim is]
myat;,hiisiddha, see thus [accepted, the" following fault] also [results]. There are
mantras used to accompany the preparation of the vessel in which
offering cakes [PUro¢asa] are set, and the Setting of. the cakes
~~IJj+nU\~~,;or f9~a>!T in them, the acts themselves being stated in the mantras. These
:"';pf,'91~ OR ,m:f<:,~ mantras are: 'I make a comfortable seat for you. I make it
1V0rthy of your si1ting in it by this pouring of ghee. Sit in it
[0 Puro<J,ii§a] , you, who are the essence of the rice, seat yourself
The injunctions
firmly and happily in this place free of death'. Since these mantras
,', and' '1~~~iJ
contain the phrase 'you who are the es~ence of rice', they accompany
;he rice arid barley the ritual act only when the cake is made of rice, not of barley. This
one or the other is is· the final, accepted conclusion. .This established conclusion is now
there is no discre- contradiCted under the present claim. For, this results in either of
~h other's absence.
two faults: (a)' [Since both offerings now are supposed to have an
identical capacity, they should both produce the same aparva. But
! causes of heaven. the offering of barley, not accompanied by the mantras noted,] will
!n raised about the not now come about qua act which is to result in this one ajnirva;
he pO%ibility that, (b) [If, on the other hand, this offering is considered to apply as
nihotra then would bringing about this apurva] , then there is discrepancy.
1UJ.l9abhatta brings
1. In this passage, first it has been suggested that the case of barley
'rihibhiryajeta and
and rice is different from the case of the two sacrifices. Barley
rent grains for use
and rice can both be used alternatively in the DarnapUD)arnaSa
for the same fruit.
and have the same capacity. Thus they can each have. the pro-
re contradictory to
perty of being a caus,e. The sacrifices in question do not have
ndividually able to
the same single capacity, and therefore, are not alternates of
pancy in the result
each other.
e in the absence of
ollowed in the pre- 2. This objection is then rejected. The ritual formulae syona1JZte
and the Agnihotra etc., (ApaSS. II.IO.6 and II.ILl) are to be used only when
148 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS SECTION FOUR

rice is used in the purotfJiSa, since the words 'essence of rice' rice] , the property
occur in the formulae. Thus, these verses are not used with apurva with a sin
a barley puroqiiSa. Now, if both barley and the rice are to have so that grass, rit!
the same capacity, the same formulae should be used for both property of being;
. of them. This would go against the accepted ruling explained 1. The problem
above. applies to the
3. If both rice and barley have the same power, and this formulae karmJa. (M.
are not used with the barley puro,qiiSa, then the resulting apurva ~ .
[IV.B.24] ;or 'qiFT<
will not be produced. If it is produced even without the formulae
being used, then there will be discrepancy. One fault or the '11'Olj"L. I
other is inevitable. Thus it cannot be said that rice and barley 4T'!'1la ~
have the property of being a cause because of having the dame. ~'<{~li\ ij
capacity, unless the established conclusion regarding the use of fuf@la
the mantras noted, is rejected.
Nor can it be (
[IV. G.2 1 J 3l'L~ Ei"fl<'1'fi<;q~ f9'f.<;ql'!r?{C'I,!~~qql~ 'q lft~~l1l!J)t <R-<mlm- [considered] the cc
~F'IW: I >f~'ij+!f!1lt 13+l'!l<lh(l<rt 'q+rBi''!'! I ~~<TT~13T'ij;r<,!­ pancy, then that [d
<"'tIIJf1'1T: ffim~mG:T'I 'ql'!<:Hn\QHu<{T~ I S!91~U~~~ >!~qG:l<;­ grass etc. also. Bec
its being a cause thl
;:,HW<T!11 o;fhi'rq~~~a:{l'!13T13~>f~ 'q >!1~T<;iit 111f~l3T>:'1T~f9~!Sfl­
barley etc. by Vedi.
q~'.R'1T <r~ );i'r~'l[1;;qmfff~qf{T I <T~1J'1~lC!1'1T~ Il;Cf &g<TT I 1l;'1 an absence of the ri
<"r% g!J)l\"filTl'!!J)["lr '!~T'!N i{lj!o'l"L. 1 of being a cause is
If, [to avoid the faults noted, thus]· justifying the Mantras, . and negative corico:
which provide an option, one assumes that there are distinct apurvas there is fire; if ther
[produced by the rice and barley offerings, then the following results] : and vJ"titiuka] are
the properties which apply to the rice, do not apply to the barley, of fact, there is St
just as the wip'ng etc., which apply to the graha [vessel], do not which are neces~al
apply to the camasa [vessel]. For, [once one has distinguished the of there being the I
two cases by] taking into consideration the apurva of the soma 1. The argument
offering, the present [case, where the injunctions do not merely have has here been
their primary significations, but have the] secondary signification things too. TI
[of conveying that an offering is] a means [for bringing about] an is not really n
apurva is exactly parallel to [the case of] the camasa [ves~el]. Thus, the don
Given, then that intermediate apurva [produced by the wiped graha pot is not a c
vessels] is understood immediately from [the mention of] the word which are abso
graha so that camasa is not included, it is difficult to avoid [con- to indicate tha·
cluding that] sprinkling etc. do not apply to barley. For, from [the tion to the abc
menti(')ll of] the word vrihi alone, one understands a particular ap17rva the generic pI
produced through the rice [alone]. Therefore, with the [barley and anyathiisiddha,
,,
I--··~···--------
ES AND MOODS
essence of rice'
not used with
rice are to have
~ used for both
uling explained
ld this formulae
:esulting apurva
mt the formulae
'ne ,fault or the
rice and barley
laving the "arne
'ding the use of
~'<'imrrrt <r~t'lmfu-
~'[.c!T~'I.1T\o1'l''1-
Rn~~<'1 J:[~q<::1~­
"1fu.m~'11~fq~!!IT­
'l'!.~ Tl:'I ~l!<ll I 1l;9
, of being a cause is justified] by perception accompanied by positive
19 the Mantras,
distinct apurvas
llowing results) :
y to the barley,
[vessel]'; do not
:iistingU'i.'Shed the
v,a of the soma
not merely have
ary signification
nging about] an
:amasa [ves.<el].
the wiped graha
.on of] the word
t to avoid [con-
For, from [the
)articular aparva
the [barley and
SECTION FOUR 149
rice] , the property of being a cause reside~ [ir, them] with respect to
apurva with a single generic property. In common experience, it is
so that grass, ritual rubbing sticks, and the fire jewel have [the
property of being a cause] with respect to [a single type of] fire.
1. The problem as to whether the wiping etc., of graha vessel also
applies to the camasa vessel has been discussed in the camasiidhi-
kara'(la. (M.S., IIL1.8.16-17).
[IV.B.24] <[ ~ei ~l'l.1l1li'-11fq ep.:~1!ajql%: o<l'l+Rnu~r''11i'l Q.rrrl~fq GG;Tqfuftfu
'11'O1:{'l:, I C!"{ ~g;al'1t +iT'lll1191il. I "'11~: ~{'Il ,!rrrl~~<:jil1Hm:r­
'+!l'l'lRr ~lli q:rrrm~ '1~'I.1~~ C!"m~s:];<'lf~~''';:'1''G'lfu~'f.'I.1~'[.c!l­
>'''Ia:l1il. Gfl'l.1~: I ~T'I.1i't g; ;:f\+r1+l:,1 i'ii ''1'1l\'''f.<;r.''''O:sT~8:T~;:'1~n­
ful?i;:~Rr 'l ilgl'l'l.1+m'l'llft I
Nor can it be objected th3lt in this case, even the donkey would be
[considered] the cause of a pot, and if it is put aside because of discre-
pancy, then that [discrepancy and thus not being a-cause) would befall
grass etc. also. Because there is no [authoritative] reason to suppose
its being a cause there. The property of being a cause is justified for the
barley etc. by Vedic injunction, and in the case of grass, when there is
an absence of the ritual rubbing wood and the fire jewel,' [the' property ,
and negative concomitance of the following kind: when there is grass,
there is fire; if there is no grass, there is no fire. These two [anvaya
and vydtheka] are not seen in the case of the donkey. As a matter
of fact, there is superfluity [in the donkey) due to the stick etc.,
which are necessary [for making the pot]. There is no question
of there being the property of being a cause [in the donkey].
1. The arguments here are fairly clear. The word anyathiisiddhi
has here been translated as suPerfluity. But it can mean other
things too. The word has been used to indicate a cause which
is not really necessary, and thus should not be called a cause.
Thus, the donkey which 'is not· neoessary to the making of the
pot is not a cause. The pot is made with causes like a stick
which are absolutely necessary. But the word has also been used
to indicate that which accompanies the necessary cause in addi-
tion to the abovementioned meaning of the unnecessary. Thus
. the generic property da'(lif.atva 'stickness' also is considered
anyathiisiddha, and slickness ~annot.be classified as unnecessary ,
 150 , THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOCDS SECTION FOUR,

to the production of the pot. 2. Will this then

[IV.G.25] c[~Tfq '-liT1:uf R<!l 9il'1f6HT'Il<J:. "1~111~ 9i~ <[~P1: 9il~mfu
rice or barley
there has beer
~'6"'B:. I 'il~f1:t18:"'f ~Ri ~<;r.[1'l~~l'I'16+"f'"ij~'1 "l~- one performar
9il~c!l'l~'f.6+'iF"ij,~;:n"lql<J:. I ~Fl 6l<[.~;orrn'11~~ '1~,3;<q~: I produced from
q:'1!!'fCll'!'Sl~'WJ3;U"ijl<J:. CI~'1 ~g<'ll;;r o1:ff<RrJ,: I 6~~ 'i:[ final apurvaf
'fi0T'I'llmi ;or2fin1r l!'lll'TFCI~ '1'11<::I<iT!!'1lGJ;'j· ;:rl:1qq?l~ I q:<i why the alten
Q:'Tf1~,fq Q.1J[,ql'lR£9;;r~'11<j6t'l.~;:r q~lqP;£9;;f Q'fci Cll'G;T,+l\;or that sacrificer.
~1J[<~;or ~ga'1:flR ~2o'1~ I [IV.G.26] aTmiT"fl
Objection: Since the result is not possible without the cause, ~"'-li+l'
how can the result be achieved by [the use of] barley in the absence ~ffl{;<[~
of rice? Answer: This is true. But there is no fault because only c[lq~qlr.
that relation of the time which is limited by .the inten~ion 'I will
CIlq~'1lr.
sacrifioe with rice' is the relation which limits the property of being
CIlq~qlr.
the goal of activity concerning rice. Barley cannot produce tlie ,nerit
of sacrifice through that relation. Thus there is no discrepancy, In the case 0
since the property of being a cause will be there in ,accordance with heavenness by the
the ritual formula spoken: Since the merit resulting from the deter- duced by Agnihotr;
mination is destroyed when the resulting apurva is produced, using the same generic pro
barley in another sacrifice is, not unjustified. Similarly, [in the case , said [thus] in the
'of fruit produced b)' dIfferent causes, one should vi~w this as follow- with Agnihbtra, at
ing in order to avoid discrepancy]: Grass is itself a cause relative Agn~~loma; he wh(
to [a fire] delimited by fireness through the relation of conjunc~:ion as much as he [Cal
, . which relation is itself limited by the property grassness. the amaviasya [sac
1. KaUlJ!r;labhatta defends his position by saying that the fault of Atir1itra.' The wi,
discrepancy does not arise inspite of the fact being concedt.'(] 1. TaiSa. 1.6.9.1"
that the result is thus produced with one of the two causes in the [IV. G.27] aTCi Q;;
absence of the other. He accomplishes this by bringing in a c[Sll3;fi'ra
relation by which this result is produced by barley iri the absence That is why tl
of rice and vice versa. Thus the relation limiting the kiiryata- The property of ha
vacchedaka in the case where rice is used is of the time when the the property of be:
intention has been made that the sacrifice will be made with rice. the smoke [as inv
The result though finally the same with the use of barley, is not mountain]. There
then produced with this same relation which is limited by the of inference..
intention previously made that the sacrifice is to be performed'
[IV. R.l] ~IT Ril'l<
with rice. This difference of relation by whieh the result comes
·p:rrq~r aT<
into being, does away with the fault of discrepancy, since in the
absence of rice, the result produced by the barley is not produced ~q I<\"q~~'l
with the same limiting relation to the goal of action. ~Ri Cl~t

." ,u',
 ,SES AND MOGDS SECTION FOUR 151

2. Will this then limit the performer of the sacrifice to the use of
• ~ (I ...... r.:: rice or barley exclusively in all instances of the sacrifice, once
Of. ~ <{Ct +'l: 'fil'lF:h C!
there has been the intention to use rice or barley in it during
i ~l'llj."f;:'il~'1 >{1~­
one performance? No, says Kaurygabhatta. Since, the apurva
[Wn~B1 '1~-::!(q%:1 produced from that rite with the intention is destroyed once the
n-:: I lj~~~ 'Cf final apurva from the sacrifice is produced, there is no reason
Do'j· '11:!qq;;j~ I t:!;<i why the alternate grain cannot be used in another instance of
~£§;;;[ >1m cllG:Tc.ll<f that sacrificer.
[IV.0.26] armiT"fIil:: ""iT g arm~"f,"Hn~~folfugljlFW:[lj.'1;:~~,,'!lT,,!+!'1-
vithout the cause, ~G:9i+!C!: U1il'1"J"1Ql'1 t:!;'1 "~<rlsf>liT"f1ra:..i'l i'!l-: t:!;llfcr I ~<[a 'Cf
ley in the absence €ri%(i'1~<ll1 "'1 t:!;<i fol"[Hm~ ~iTfcr '11'IG:~lqJ1:<fTI~
fault becau&e only c!"I~(W;TIlcT 'l t:!;<i l~"[l'l:. QllJf+!1W '1'iTa '11q~;t,.TIqJ«l\fu
, intention 'I will
property of being Cf1'l~qJr..m~ 'l t:!;<i f<i"[l'l:. 3T+!1'11BTT '1~a '1l'lGfQ\1~\qJ"<ilfcr
produce the merit '(fl'l~qJr.;TIfcr I" 1i:Rr ~f"C!"i'r folm~rg ,
I . no discrepancy, In the case of the heaven from Agnihotra etc. the limitor is
1 accordance with heavenness by the relation of inherence qualified by the. apurva pro-
Ig from the deter- duced by Agnihotra etc. Therefore', it is unavoidable that heaven \vith
s produced, using the same generic property [is produced] by Agnihotra etc. It has been
.arly, .'[in the c.ase . said [thus] in the Taittirlya sruti, "He who knowing. this, sacrifices
lew this as follow- w'ith Agnihotra, attains as much as he attains by performing the
If a cause relative Agni~toma; he who knowing this, sacrifices with Paurl).arnasi, gains
.on of conjunc':ion as much' as he [can] gain by Uktha; he who knowing this, performs
,sness. . the arna~asya [sacrifice], achieves as much as he [can] gain by
that the fault of Atiratra.' The wise should take note of this.
X being concedt.'<l 1. TaiSa. 1.6.9.1-2.
two causes in the [IV.0.27 J arC! t:!;'1 "l+!q-:l+!~ff~'fil:qc!lq~G:<t "l+!~,qlra:Of.i'rq <f g
by bringing in a C!"fl:!fi'rcll ~'ilT''1'1i.~cf.lC'1fi'r~'R!I;ffi fflr"£§a ,
'ley iri the absence That is why the following statement of the scholars is justified:
ting the karyata- The property of having. smoke as a mark etC., alone is the limitor of
the time when the the property Of being the goal [in the case of] the consideration of
Je made with rice. the smoke [as invariably related with fire, and as residing on the
e of barley, is not mountain]. There is no [reason] to bring in vaijiitya in the process
is limited by the of inference..
; to be performed
[IV. H.l) '1<;g. folP::{w~'1l'-Tf~~H'!il~ ~1"'I<:'11'f.T~ '"'1llc!ilm\:m"f'-fll w<:n-
1 the result comes
,ancy, since in the .'1M~l ar~qfol,<!o'1'1T'fIB"ffT~Il<fTmil~1Jf 13lft~~1 ~+!+!Rn?l'lN'fi:r.r
~y is not produced ~Q"'l"1!lr.('<l1 '"'11R1itm",i'r'ilrn:fo!\il1<!l+!'1:!m<i<"~IJf+!>!T+!lU'1mQiSR[
action. 1i:lcT c!ffiq<{fi'rfc! l'f111TW-f.TPl:fi'r: qfhfooC!: Q;:!<]: I Sl>Tl"lfa I

-,.- .... " .. -"------_. __

-------'-~'.~-.-.-.-- -.--.-----.-.~-. ." ~--------
152 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS SECTION FOUR

As to the following way [of thinking] cherished by the MImti.ql- Actually, since
sakas etc. If,at the time one considers the meaning got from is able does not pe
lIN, vaijiitya is not accepted, then the fruit from Jyori~toma and [sacrifice] in order t
Agnihotra, will be the same. In that case, since the Agnihotra, which additional fruit of w
. can be performed with less expenditure of money and less trouble, .. in the GYtii, worldly
can produce the desired end, there will be no inclination to perform saying: 'People will
Jyot~$toma and Asvamedha due to the aver;;;ion created by their being respectable person il
richer only in extra 'trouble. Thus there will be no performances of duty and reputation
these rites; on account of this, [the Vedic statements enjoining these of Yudhi$thira etc. 11
rites] will be unauthoritative. [To avoid this] that [vaijatya] has to [men] born of [the
be accepted. Concerning this view, we say as follows: the kingdom [altho
[IV. H. 2] ~<'IT<l;:rcrr'iTFl<:'T Wl<l<f,~'T ;;;>ilfai\+n<8C!fq <'I'<C/1<;f IF[~'l:fitfR!: I instiga.tor to activati
wish to be qualified. b
_~Tsfq rr <'Iof~>.tfcr 'T~l{'l ;:r a<:~'1 31:rgl;:r<'l.~i9: I 31?<!'iT a'lTfq
Thus the fault !:j1;ate.
,""Tfcrmi'! S''l;:a+rI<'51;!T'lar'~~'i<fl <:)'llq~: 1 1. The verses quol
Inclination is not unjustified since the knowledge of the property
of being the means to the desired end, \vhich [knowledge] is the [IV. H.4] 31a 1l;c!T~f;
.instigator, exists also with respect to the Jyoti$toma etc. Aversion 'T1<'ItiT>:>.t >r
. also [is not felt] by all. Thus only he who does not feel that [aver- rr ~I;{: I
sion] wi)! perform [these sacrifices]. Otherwise, even for yOU, [who Hence it is that
accep:t vaijatya] , there will be a fault; since a very lazy person will rites] accomplished v
not be inclined to perform this Jyot~toma. of worldly eminence,
L The Bombay edition has the following additional sentences after selves' authorised to r
this : 'I~gcr: 'Ii~ ~;;(li<ll+rl~Sfq <1<::.... I=Il<::fq ~~:Iqq~;:rf~l+rluir ;, 'Cf the extreme passion :
R~+rlut'\;;(;~'l ;U-I;f 'Ii<?'lar~~~'l<fm1fcr ~c!T~":n>il s'i>.tac'T~<'T<:'l1f1:fI'n;:r'liI<? [such] great expense
thus even when there
1l;C!If1:r'CfFllG:. 'Ii'ii'!afu:fcr 'l1'O<1+!. 1 'ifl'1Bf ilJ~,;;f;:'l~;:r a;:+fl?[;;f''''l'ifl~I~Rl~: I
<I;:+rl"l~ mUT;;(;'T«i 'Cfl"llr.<:[llJal'{ 1 ~<::;;"'T'ifH 1l;'l ;i:)"l'lmiill <'T+rl;:r]G:. I . 1. 31Cf t<:'lf)3Q'fiTrrt
<b~'T 'Cfl~+nUT<'l1G:.
I' I have followed the. Benares edition in
dropping these sentences as they appear to be corrupt and as the [IV.H. 5] 'I~a~[ "
sequence of argument is clear without them. q'1uT1l1'.'1"1T: ;
flV: H. 3] ~1!a: ilJ'!Cl<:'lH:!~l~S'lilij~qWdlWl'i'Tif <51fii;'li>mnfl<"'lTl<l'li- :l[!TT'l,'T f;'j"
'li<?lil '11 +ri[Cf1 Q~Rlrr'i:!'lq;;rl I . 31a 1l;C! <furl'll+!. " 310filrn 'Cflfq "F'i~rr Q?:l;f
<r..CfIR 'Ii'iFit'TFcr ~ Sc'l<nl'{ I <'I.+rl~Cl<:'T 'Cf1'lillcrm:UTI<::fuf0'l~ I
Actually, since [ii
aa: ~'l"''if -'li1Ri 'Cf " ~<'T"l "fl~'Ii~fcrgrfu:'li :q'lc\'Ii~<lr'lCll'{ I 31<1 be performed for [att
tJ:'l WIi<?~I~feJ~ ?:l;Nrn,1;.::1<lt ~''f.<'-'Ii<:IG<fl~ .jl"l;;r.{llffUTT- 1).amasa would be. per:
~~~ ~Rl: <'I~~£9~ I a<:+rlarfcr)gl:Iqjf<l9OJI:;;rr<l+rHr«f.Z"~'I it will be difficult to a
:q'[<!l :q>i\~'l;fcr_.n'fCl;,::l"l: 1 Putre~ti are useless.
 ------,-,-----
,NSES AND MOODS
oed by the Mima,tp.-
meaning got from
j 'ill Jyoti~oma and
le Agnihotra, which
y and less trouble, -
lination to perform
!ated by their being
no performances of
!!Its enjoining these
It [vaijatya] has to
,llows :
",Of)?! :Q'l''l~qt!Rr: I
n:rEf: I or"'!"T C!OfTN
!CIge of the property
-[knowledge] is the
oma etc. Aversion
not feel that [aver-
even for you, [who
!ry lazy person wm
mal sentences after
,~qq~~fml1Tu'-T <[ 'if
'~c!;;<l'~~<l'~;nfl:[\;rT~'fil<'l'
(lr~n%>r"'!m~T!ffu~: I
<Dq'l,,;r(~ "II <'l'1'[T<rTFJ:. I
Benares edition in
: corru pt and as the
f ~lf<f;'li;mnn~CfTf"l'fi­
"GFlTB:. "or9itffl '<fJN
'<fJ911Rfm:UJ1C\W.0'l~ I
t !fEf<l91~;i't'lc!B:. 1 orC!
'li'{l"<l'l~ ,j\,,"fm\!lUJT-
lfcrq"81;;;ll'F1Fi't<'f. ~ "WI
SECTION FOUR
Actually, since a bad reputation is created when someone who,
is able does not perform [a sacrifice], inclination towards a big_
[sacrifice] in order to avoid that [bad name] , or in order to get the,
additional fruit of worldly respect, is not unjustified. That is why
in the Glta, worldly eminence etc., is mentioned as an instigator by
saying: 'People will tell of your imperishable ill-fame, _and for a,
respectable person ill-fame is worse than death. Therefore, your
duty and reputation .. .'. This explains the inclination on the part
of Yudhi$thira etc. who knew all the sastras, towards the slaying of
[men] born of [the same] lineage, Brahmal).as etc. for the sake of
the' kingdom [although that] yields -little fruit. Therefore, - the-
instigator to activation is the intense desire which arises from the
wish to be qualified- by eminence etc., and this [intense desire] alone. _
Thus the 'fault Itated above, does not [arise].
1. The verses quoted are, taken from BhagGL 2. 33-34.
[IV. H.4 1 orC! ll;EfT!glrr'liT<rf 'fiHf<m\'<~ "f['lC!THN oS'If-:r.'li>rRr'llif '1:§:foi'Qii'l''lT-
<l'RHn~~ ;['[RI&>:'l'aSN I >rfci'l1<D ,mt<91(;'l:[lFJ:. 'lSfil'QO'J"lT<l'l"l<D--
<[ itq: 1 orc!~c!'F:R SN <[ R'[R!: I
Hence it is that one sees modern men inclined to [performing,
, rites] accomplishect with great expense and effort, this' for the sake"
of worldly eminence, though they know [!that they are] not [them-
selves' authorised to perform sacrifices] with 'the ancillaries. Due' to-
the extreme passion for eminence etc., [they have] no avers;on to-
[such] great expense and effort involved. They are not turned away
thus even when there is knowledge [of the trouble involved].
1. orC! ll;Ef[!g~'!lFli 'liHftllWi'i "fFlc!T+r~N'lilRUJ1HN I
[LaghuMafi. p. 334.]
." ~ . ~ ~ (" ~ ~ .::-." (I~
[ IV. H . 5 1 ~c!~g;
(I
",p:!!: 'liT+i"'ll ~ql'lT~R:ll - ~<:q-C!: "~'f''''~ ~--
ti'I!JfIlTW'lT: mr.~~C!'1TN ~:;'ql!!"nG:1<[lHFF~'f'-T ~~lW 1 -a:oiqibTHlt!-
;[<:rT'1('l lrr<'l'C!'lT orl'l"<'l"H<l' ~'fl~'iiTH.p.jEfT~"61~ ~<ITil~<'lfuf;l;:-­
"-'1'[4<[ ~~f9:c!<"T"l~.Tl<r. ~~2'll1~1 ;r'[~'1{!~l1Ofl<r.1
Actually, since [it has been said that] Darsapaurl).amasa should:
be performed for [attaining] all desires, it follows that Darsapaur--
l).amasa would be performed for all
the fruits. Thus even for you
it will be difficult to avoid [concluding] that [sacrifices] such as the'
Putr~ti are useless. The Darnapaul1).amasa rites are obligatory,.
 ·J 54 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS SECTION FOUR

hence must be performed [under penalty of incurring sin] '. One can, fices yielding] all de
[now] , perform these in the desire of attaining a son. Once this has the fruit of only all
been done, . [the Damapaul'l).amasa] inCidentally meet [the require- i$\fna for the fruit c
ment of being performed] obligatorily. Therefore, by virtue of one's not be even possibh
wishing to perform as few rites as possible one is not possibly in- Jyott~toma. Nor wil
·clined to perform [also] the Putre~ti etc. This [view] is not a
1. For the performance of Darsapaurl).amasa to fulfil all wishes, up a [ritual] fire, al
ct. ApasS. III.l4.9_ Also See JaiNy,aVi. IV.3.U (p. 246-47). Putre$ti etc. is pos~
uselessness [of Putn
{IV. K 6] ;:r;:~C!<l:'.fii'l ~Srf!~Tfu:'Ii~ ~~ ;a-,'f,~: </'.<'<'1a I ;:r 'i'.i\'~lj!Brlfq the fruit itself is not
G1.:'1 "~~.'1: 'f,m~[ "'ITfciitll":" ~fu Cfl'Fflil.". cTBnfq ~"'r?i:if Nor [can one claim
f!!'iil~ CT~T~'1 ~+11'11il.". ~;:r{ll"T<'1T 8iH'~'fli ~~f~!i'Ifci '11'O<!B:. I after Darsapaul'l).ami
~ ~foI>:~ >['f,<,"'1 ll">:'1fo1'il<f.<'lT'.fwn CT"! >[~~qq~;·1 form a sacrifice witt
[Objection by the vaijiityaviidin]: But it is for this very reason other sacrifices [wid:
that [we] assume that the son which is the fruit [attained by per- after Darsapau.l'l).am
forming] the Putre~ti is superior [to that which results from others] . 1. Both the editiOI
Nor [should you, in turn, object as follows]:. Although [such] a should be '~[11<
[son] be superior, it is still difficult to avoid [concluding that the
Putre~ti is] useless. For, from the statement sarv.ebhyah· kiimebhyo· 2. Soma sacrifices l
. jyoti§fo'mal} [orie knows] that. this [Jyoti~toma]. also.is enjoined for masa is first pe
the purpose of [obtaining] a son. Hence, [a son] can [be obtained] ct KatyasS. VI
through it also. Therefore, [one will not] be inclined [to perform a
[IV.R· 7a1 o/'1<,~iii'FI
sacrifice] anew [for the same purpose]. [Answer] : One assumes that
WQ>Tr'G'{Rr
three kinds of fruits exist, a.l1d that [the Jyo:ti~toma] is for the fruit , ~

,of the medium quality. Thus inclination [towards the Putre$ti] ~'m:m'
'can be justified. Then let it be so
1. Jyoti~toma is a Soma sacrifice and so presumably gives a higher own· .counterobjectio
fruit (i.e., a better son in this case) than Jthe usual Darsapaur- answered. [If you sc
l).amasa. Putr~ti gives the best possible kind of son. For the have started perforn
sarvakiimatva of Jyot~toma, see JaiNyaVi. IV:3.U (p. 247). the inclination towar,
'[IV.H.7] m I Wr'lllllCfT'fli ~qio!m~r: 'f,1+'1~~~ll1"'~ ,,>lIfcil2Tl1B! 1. The Mimfup.saka
'Cf 'liTRRITl1'1TlT'Ii<? Q;'1 ",f.r;itir foI'il~ .~fCJ ;:r ~Srlj!~lfu:'Ii<?~ "'IT1cmT- lessness of the Sl
m~]1:r~+1i'ITsfil ;:r CfT 'f,"'~~'<.<!'li<,q;:llrftfu ~ I 'f,CTl'ilH1.:'1 TllT- the third explam
fu:m~q1.:'1 ~q(uf+m:rTCq]lTfil ~~~l~T<l~nl1!j;:rFl'ii'f'1qR:i[!~ have nothing aga
harm to their pt
'Ii<?~'O!TC'I'f,<,q<lT<n 12:Cf <ii,1!j1ljT~nICflil.".1 ;:r 'Cf "<::~qio'i+!T~l~T:lr~
provide an answ
~T~;:r '1~CT"s,fcJ CfFf'1i~ll~ <::~i'G'tGICfR:-~;:m<:>'1 G>.:rm +!T;:rl'TRcr I [IV.H.5] that tl
'Or [one might claim that] the Vedic sentence about [these sacd- accepting vaijiit>
 iNSES AND MOODS
ingsinl '. One can,
on. Once this has
neet [the require·
, by 'virtue of one's
is not possibly in-
) fulfil all wi shes,
.3.11 (p. 246-47).
' 1a I ;j 'qlc'f.l!~lfq
f'l"l<r. C!B11N :g '3{liU if
'f"r ~'!n::mRr '!1~+I. I
Tfq~; I form a sacrifice with soma after performing the Darsapaul1).amasa',
or this very reason
[attained by per-
suits from others] .
\1 though [such] a
)ncluding that the
'ebhyah' kiimebhyo·
tlso is enjoined for
can [be obtained]
.ned [to perform a
One assumes .that
la] is for the fruit
Irds the Putmiti]
Ibly giV'es a higher
~ usual Darsapaur-
:l of son. For the
IV:3.11 (p. 247).
l'Il'3{%> ,",j)-R!2t11~
fl!.,>{Tre;'fmB1 'ii>{lfu2'r-
{I w.cn"Cf1;j~'1 ~r­
FlU++i~;n<l ,q'f'l"qfto:i~
i '''<r~'iq'i1l]111UP'<!1:l!l<l
q provide an answer to the objection Kau;ryt;iabhatta had raised
RH a~T~ 111"fl1Tm I
about [these sacri-
SECTION FOUR 155 .
fiees yielding] all desires lays down the use of Darsapaun:J.amasa for
the fruit of only all the op,tional 4tis [without soma], and of Jyot-
i~trna for the fruit of all the optional soma sacrifices; hence it will
not be even possible to gain the fruit of Putre~ti etc. by means of
Jyoti~toma. Nor will the concept of three kinds of fruit be necessary.
This [vi,ew] is not acceptable. In the case of a person who has set
up a [ritual] fire, and is desirous of a son etc., the performance of
Putre$ti etc. is possible even before Darsapaul1).amasa. Sinoe the
uselessness [of Putre$ti] is thus avoided, the concept of v.aijatya in
the fruit itself is not IJOssible, because [it would result in] prolixity.
Nor [can one claim that] , as soma sacrifices are [to be performed]
after Darsapaurl}amasa, because of the statement 'one should per-
other sacrifices [without soma] are also like that [to be performed
after Darsapau,rl}amasa]. There is no authority for this [view].
1. . Both the editions read '~~'l" <::iii~~ aT'!,!:' which obviously
should be 'ml1B1 <::"j'f'mCll'!<J:' to make sense.
2. Soma sacrifices are to be performed only after the Darsapaul1).a-
miisa is first performed. A specific order has to be followed,
d. Katyi1isS. VIII. 1. 1. ' . . . .
[IV.H· 7aJ ;j<'!~c"'lii,!;j;j; f-!i~'C[<::f.re 'It r{ a~'l ~3r~jiUl;j~'f'15iR!'f;:;;:'l .
ooo'<lT'<i{R! ~<r. CI~lfq ul1Ho"Cf<::Mliir111Uj;jT 'fil+'qfR~ffi~l<fr
~h: ~ <1<::111: I
Then let it be so. It is in no way undesirable for us. But your
own counterobjection about the uselessness of Putr~ti etc., is
answered. [If you say this] , we say that, nevertheless, for those who
have started performing the; Dan§apaurl}amasa, the elimination of
the inclination towards the optional sacrifices is unavoidable.
1. The Mimarpsakas, after their two explanations to avoid the use-
lessness of. the special sacrifices have been rejected in favour of
the third explanation supplied by KaUJ.1t;iabhatta, say that they
have nothing against this third explanation. It does not do any
harm to their position. On the other hand, all it does is to
\
[IV.H.5] that the special sacrifices will be usc1esseven after.
accepting vaijatya.
\
\
1
 156 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS SECTION FOUR

2. In answer to this, KaUl).Qabhatta points out that even though 1. KaUll,lQabhatta is a

his explanation does justify the inlinalion to perform these special is no difference bet
sacrifices before the performance of Darsapaul1}.amasa, their use- sacrifice such as
lessness for anybody who has started performing DarsapauIl,la- performing a spec
masa is still unavoidable. opinion, the conce
[IV. H. 8] '1~g([~g ~"lR"ll~<li !!JfoT9i([Hn""~lo'1'1\;fl;'j., ~lir <:l'~ '"f
sakas cannot be St
time it takes to Pt
R'f';tq:j<':<l1l'r9i~'11mq;m.fol., 9ill'1~'11<'11'if[<l~., 9il('>~([1!!JT <lTN
fruit.
([G:l1t ~1+T'11i1 G:~ttloTl1l~I"l<.:al~al8jRr "~li'l., '1!,('ll1lUJlspn:n,,"lla
.,~ 'l~ <l~~" ~<'!Tf<t~f~mllllum.:rnmi't ~~lRTa~ I
[IV. H. 10] "<.1~~T"'<ll;o
'1a;'!mllT<9"T1
Actually, however, one who has not set up a fire, having per-
ceived the momentariness of possessions and thoughts, wishes to bring orfit '"f I "
about [a] soma [sacrifice] and its fruit, without delay, need not wait ~([ "~Rr R,
for a [certain] time to set up the optional [sacrifice] fire; nor need f.'!(l:{W~Ii't<[ ~
he wait to perform the soma offering until after he has performed aG:111'l'liTll.,r;
the Darnapaul1l).amasa first. For, with respect to the Agni$toma, <.1'If~<'1R~
the established view is that one need not do this. This view is held
One should also ob:
· on the authority of the following Vedic utterance: "Let one who is
a sacrificial fire will be
to offer a SO:l1va offering, set up a fire; he should inquire neither about
j
elude that such a per:
the season, nor· about the constellation [which is in conjunction with.
intervention of it fire'ri
· the moon] . " .
need not be preceded b
· 1. For the text quoted,. cf. AsvasS. 11.1.14. (p. 140). that the Agnihotra, D~
[IV.H 9] a~ '"f 1l1<f<fl'<:'!G:oJtf[l]hfl~l: ~q'll''l1Z'O~l'1G~([l'l,9il('>R''+<rmr- gatorily; hence must p
, ~tllTll1rf.'!9iH (["'1nNi'l~ UrllT!!t61<[,,!~qq~n"'~'f:qqml<':1~ ,,~­ 'Let him who is desirou:
fruit of the obligatory
QloTllT<fTttrli't >;'l<JQ;"'i.ll1'li<''f<i 9iol ~~1ta: I 'limTf<tR"~<[ <:9"Q-
perform the Agnihotra
R"lo'!'1r'!Rl1f<t01''!<:'!1r.'!'~<:'!I<9i~1'l0Tit'''~T'!T 'If:§;R'Qc<{'11'1T- Darsapaul1}.amasa sacri
~rf<tm: <.1 QrG:<['!-T "1'P ~1'1~; <.1'1f:J:ll'lfu~"!1<J:. I
l contiguity. The desire
The Darsapaul1}.am~.sa takes a month to perform. For a rich prompts one to perforr
man intensely desiring heaven, who cannot tolerate that long await, simpler concept than I
the performance of a soma sacrifice for the same heaven, is justified. the positing of the abs
Thereby the uselessness [of bigger sacrifices] is avoided. How then obligatory rite, the OCC1
could one justify positing that )the heaven relative to the soma sacrifice fleer] , the aversion to t
is greater than the one for \the Darsapaurl,lam~sa? For, it is weliknown this [aversion]. [Sec(
in the general experience that something is achieved with much effort of the principle 'Let thE
and expenditure, when there is an intense desire of getting it quickly, stated] be heaven, sinCE
even though the same thing can be achieved with little expenditure which all deSire] .'
and trouble, but with a delay in time etc. . 1. <:'1 ii'liT111 ~>;hloT"I

.-
rENSES AND MOODS
ut that even though
perform these special
luO}.amasa, their use-
rming DarSapauO}.a-
l\;jl~" ~lir Ci<'M5
'1«1 ., 'lil<om\1 ll:fT .,lft
i'l., <{!\<{+nUJ1Sm+llG,",,1C1
m?! fu~lRlQB:, I
) a fire, having per-
ghts, wishes to bring
delay, need not wait
rifice] fire; nor need
!r he has performed
to the Agni:;;toma,
t. This view is held
!: "Let one who is
nquire neither about
in conjunction with
;p. 140).
tI9a<:([I'1i'lil«~"'+"1+Il3-
.... t'......
'Q,H'~'f'Ffl'il:Rl<t G,"'.lJ~
'lil<Ol~fl,,~ "9~-
<IT ;'!~fl'QC<f'll<{l-
,,,.
,<91<1:, I -~
erform. For a rich
lte that long await,
: heaven, is justified.
avoide<1. How then
to the soma sacrifiCe
For, it is_ weliknown
'ed with much effort
)f getting it quickly,
th little expenditure
SECTION FOUR 157
1. Kau~Qabhat1;a is again trying to support his own view that there
is no difference between the fruit gained by performing a routine
sacrifice such as DarsapauO}.amasa, and the fruit gained by
performing a special soma. sacrifice like J yoti~toma. In his
opinion, the concept of vaijatya, put forward by the M"unfup..
sakas cannot be supported. The only difference, he says, is the
'<{
time it takes to perform these sacrifices in order to achieve the
fruit.
[IV. H. 10] "<:I~l>l"IG,"'~l'1: <:It?!., '-T!{'-T+llurr ~9<i.l9" ~Rr 311'i'tfll~'-T'Ii+l'lc'-T9'Cfl~.,
'-T/!{'-T+I1UJ<'1"lm"i~!~1"5jH;Q>{+ljq: Q<Ul't m?! 'n~1<'-TIq l(2C'IB:, I
3lIq '<{ I "<{I'l,"'>l1~l1r.rir-l ~itRr"," <{!9,"~~ ;':-;UIflQf+llfll+'-Ti
~([" ~R! fl~([Ri'lll'lrlj~~'I 'f.(>,fI11.:f4; flF.:r'Cfl.,ltt9fr'lil+1'11'f'imTr
f<r<'-Tll'lrit;:[ Qi'1'1f'-T!l1['I: 'f.~ 'Ii,,'-,!: 5!wn'lrr:r~~fcr([q;~'ffl<rr:rR!­
Q<::11[9"!il+l~Hi 'Ii"q.,I+lQ/!{'f "'Ii['O~['-T11l;9 <ol"f~;:r "<:I ~<T:- ~'-T1<1:,
fI'lf;q<'-Tflfuf«'Il<l:," ~fq ;'-Tl<{l"'l 'Ii~'FilRri'-Tl<l:, I
One should also obEerve that the statement "Anyone who sets up
a sacrificial fire will be offering a soma sacrifice" allows one to con-
clude that such a person will make such an offering without the
intervention of a fire rite, so that _such a person's soma offering also
n-eed not be p~eceded -by the Agnihotra. Further, [one cannot claim
that .the Agnihotra, Darsapaurl).arnasa etc., must be performed obli-
gatorily; hence must precede the soma offering, for,] the statement
(I 'Let him who is desirous of heaven [perform etc.] , serves to provide the
fruit of the obligatory rites enjoined by the statements 'One [is to]
perform the Agnihotra as long as one lives, let one perform the
DarsapauO}.amasa sacrifice as long as one lives.' This by contextual
contiguity. The desire for heaven is correctly assumed [as that which
prompts one to perform such rites] on two counts: [first], it is a
simpler concept than [the avoidance of demerit, which involves] :
the positing of the absence of demerit as the fruit because it is an
obligatory rite, the occurrence of demerit, [in the mind of the sacri- .
ficer] , the aversion to this, and the desire for its absence, brought by
this [aversion]. [Secondly, this is correctly assumed] on account
of the principle 'Let the [fruit of a sacrifice whose fruit is not directly
stated] be heaven, since this is the fruit common to all [persons, i.e.,
which all desire] .'
1. Hii"!i1m G,".hi~lHm ApasS. IIIA.14.8·· m+!{T <{l"\;~~ <{~-
158 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS SECTION FOUR

III.4.14.10: This supplies the s,annidhana mentioned aoove. 'There should be no '
2. The principle that heaven should be assumed to be the fruit ror different vows also, tll
all sacrifices for whom a specific fruit is not mentioned directly, also for everybody. 1
is stated in M.S., IV.3.7.1S. be no inclination of 1
DarSapautll).antasa, ar
[IV. H. 11] <!l;g;q~g; ~~["lFll~.sfcr 'i1:fl;<l'jl~q<'!l"1:fri'!'l ;;~fu!!1irrF<ril~,{T' the Agnihotra. The
f'f~iSftq'nil J:[~mt!+ln[~'f.<:1:fl1:1:fmljlu>.:i 9i21lj;:1:f>.JT ,,~,,<i't <::~­ . is justified in order to
QloTljlt!"t" ~'1:fcr: t!~'fiil9: ~'ioTljlt!l:[T: mHl'lA ~Fl~'Plll:.' with the injunction y
Actually, even in the absence of vaijiitya, the difference in the elaboration.
fruits of Jyoti~toma and Agnihotra, can be justified by the greatneES 1. Instead of differ!.
and smallness [of the same fruit]. Since the inclination [to perform either on a qual
these sacrifices] is thus possible, not one of [the injunctions enjoin- suggests that the:
ing] them is unauthoritative. Otherwise, how could there be no use- for the bigger or
lessness given the eventuality of Dal1Sapaul1J.amasa for all .fruits on . of the performer
the strength of the statement "Darsapaul1J.amasa should be performed form the costly :
for all [the desires] ?" . expenditure is no
1. The argument already mentioned in [IV.H.6] has been brought ing of the Agnil:
forward again here. Tl><.1s even though Jyot~toma and Agni· [IV.H.3].
hotra give the same fruit, there is a difference in quantity. Before [IV.H. 13] a:rfq '<f '
it was said that the difference was: qualitative ... , <rRl!!~TT-cr;:
[I V' H. 12] <!l;g;q>;:g; 'fi<OTf'Cff1:f1 R6f."''f~lifi't ~ ~'fcf. m~p:lT'l[C;; ifl<:'lT'"f t 1% g; Cl'<l
T'ih g; t!fll~'fmT~lljf<t ~UJt~'fCllm=ai'lit<l o1:f'l~~R-,n' s:r~' . ~'li'l"C!TR'"
Q;'l "t!Q:~m%;~ W ~q~fu;~Jq '<f I <::?IT<::'f~ '{: ~'f,irT ~ f9f-cr<rT c
g;<i~'fmT: . ~c!l: "~Fct l1i~FrT<:cf t!W~~" "f9~6'i ~ 'I>1<?:l<J:." ~fu ~ f.lif
~,~ Q'<IG:i'lQWH')I':fi~)q'l1'f"\1:"f:
, .~!!I;:"!'flq'M 1'!1:ffc;:r t!~l<n'lt I Further, let then
<r ~~ 13\111N'liTRUJT G;Bq]oTI1Tt!,{T'Q<::M9ilRUJTlim~Sr '<fTJ:[~~1:fl­
it does aide inclinatio
precisely the way YOt
qf~: I 1:fll'joiftl'lf9f-cr'fml'i:l ~~~q'f~R<1:f~ qS3f95~ !
that [a given sacrifice
Actually, the concept of quantitative difference in the fruit is is not [a Slh'ficient] il
also not justified. There is no proof [of such a difference] , and pro- ledge that a sacrifice i:
lixity [results from such an assumption]. On the other hand, it is cient instigator]. On
fitting to differentiate among rites with the same fruit according to sacrifice] is the mean1
capacity. Thus the following Mahabharata verse is justified: 'A man to particular activitie\
with the capability of a thousand, [should give] a hundred, and he Cl1ssed earlier, unaCCI
with the capability of a hundred [should give] ten. [These] and grasped that heaven i\
the man who according to [his] capability, gives JUSt water, are all tion of co-occurrence:
[entitled] to an equal fruit.' On the strength of sentences such as· perty of being the re
also has grasped that
ENSES AND MOODS
~ mentioned aDove.
d to be the fruit for
mentioned directly,
;;>f1fuR1ini1rr~?f9i<?'1) •
tr'F'1trT "<f<ll'>n- <::;J-
:rfRl'ljq <il<i~'f'1lI.1
he difference in the
.ed by the greatne~s
ination [to perform
injunctions enjoin-
llld there be no use-
[sa for all fruits on
;hould be performed
i] has been brought
)ti!?toma and Agni-
in quantity. Before
ltive.
. m<nliT'llc; ifh:'!1"l I.
<i 'o'1'[~~Ri(jT I 8lci
G:?!T<::r:r~ '1: ~q:''1T <f<l
I "~mn6ir ~ '!>1"ij<!:,'
n<ft<t ll'1f<n 13ifqTIlf<t I
ftul111m~'!\ "lTWF'1T-
q~~~<i I
~ce in the fruit is
ifference] , and pro-
le other hand, it is
. fruit according to
is justified: 'A man
a hundred, and he
ten. [These] and
; just water, are all
f sentences such as·
SECTION FOUR l51}
'There should be no deception regarding money', in the sections on
different vows also, this same arrangement is desirable in other cases
also for everybody. Nor can it [be said] that in this case, there will
be no inclination of those entitled to perform soma sacrifice for the
Darsapaul1l,lamasa, and of· those who are able to perform that, for
the Agnihotra. The inclination [for the smaller routine sacrifices]
, is justified in order to gain the fruit of [performing] them, in accord
with the injunction yavajfiva 'as long as one lives'. Enough of this
elaboration.
1. Instead of differentiating in the fruits of sacrifices in question,
either on a qualitative or a quantitatIve basis,' KaUJ;lt;labha\:\a
suggests that they all do give the same fruit. But the inclination
for the bigger or the smaller rite is dependent on the capability
of the performer of the sacrifice. Thus those who can, per- w'ill .
form the costly soma sacrifices whereas others, for whom such
expenditure is not possible, will gain the same fruit by perform-
ing of the Agnihotra etc. This is similar to the argument in
[IV.H.3].
[IV.H. 13] arJq "i'f 8l1:i'! ~,<w:!~~ ~:jflc<t C!~[q ,~'f(jtl~C!,<f,~ct
<T~!i!<rN<i<'l1:i'l'l <rT!11"'1C!:' ~~llm\;]<i''1~T<illfq <[ >!'1(['f.lI. I
1''1; i'! c!'<Ii9i<?13N<i(jT'ilT<iB~fu I <l21'T "i'f ~ijll,~<r1l1H1N'ii~ui{<iT­
,\'m\;{j~:jf''1Wf~sf'r 8l'>:'1B'~ore.;:1.n'[Rr''!>r~srq "l ~ >!'[RrRR!
foif~<iT c!TI':OJ'ill<i'5r.:Fmr.'1~ >!~'f.'iI'i<ifqq<Wr'l fo!'<:'1~i91q:
~fu <i f'f.i5="lil;<lq: I
Further, let there be [for the sake of argument] vaijatya, since
it does aide inclination [to perform the sacrifice]. Nevertheless, L'1
precisely the way you [have argued] , it results that the knowledge
that [a given sacrifice] is a means [for attaining] heaven in general,
is not [a sllliicient] instigator [to performance], just as the [know-
ledge that a sacrifice is] a means to something desired [is not a suffi-
cient instigator]. On the contrary, only the knowledge that [a given
sacrifice] is the means ;to a particular result [desired is an in~tigator
to particular activities] .. Thus also [is the Naiyayika position,' dis·
cltssed earlier, .unacceptable, as follows]: Even if someone has
grasped that heaven is produced by an Asvamedha, this by the rela-
tion of co-occurrence in the same locus [of heavenness and the pro-
perty of being the result of an Asvamedha]; and even' if someone
also has grasped !that [heaven] does not occur in anyone other than
 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS SECTION FOUR·

-the performer of Asvamedha, still [one sees that this person] is Hot sentence mean
[thereby necessarily] inclined [to perform this rite]. Therefore, [une indeed the mea
·concludes that] the production of such a knowledge by means of the that prompts (
·[verb affix denoting] vidhi is fruitless. For, the meaning of vidhi· 2. According to 1
[should be] only an object of that cognition which is an instigator . properly be oni
[to action]. Therefore, this [view given by the Naiyayikas] amounts is rejected'
-to nothing.
1. I have accepted the reading q'q<'fiOHll"'!<rffi:i.!TrrI1Ef of the Bombay [lV.H.l) 1 aT;:>:(~J
,~

edition instead of the q''fiOlm·"'!<rQl~I<r'l:. of the Benares edition g 'fig)'

in this passage.. f<imrf;
2. The Naiyayika views mentioned here have already been ex- ,PH 'q

plained in my notes on [IV,G,6] and [IV.G.12]. . Otherwise, it v

[IY.H.14J '1~" <r ~I~1fu:N;;r;:<t :i.!1~ ~fE[('i<ii flf; S ClOl'-'I'j'i'1+!'lW I SiCi IJ;Ef a speaker is the de:
in the way stated 1
~NOl;:'!m<r;;r;:lT~;f :qEf~9i'l:." '{fu . R;:clT+!fi1r~I<~'fClftrfCr
.by lIN etc., is the
CI~~l1, I 'lili'1<rl'11 ~<rl <!T"'!<ii, mf;ffiqql~9if<i"l'1'E[f<r1~<r [on the part of ane
~If;ff<:q9<'i9imf<iq'1 ll;Ef f<ifeT'iI'f~: <:f,<[ClcCTI<J:. I to what the agent
As for the [view] stated by .lGaiJ.geSa] the author of the [this assumption w
£Tattva-] cintamal}i [as follows]: That which incites one to action obtains as timitor (
is not" a knowledge produced directly-by injunction.. It is, ratl{er, general property \
.another [knowledge] brought about by this [earlier knowledge]. being a means to ;
Hence, [the formulation is] : A knowledge produced by a knowledge denoted]. -
which itself arises from injunction is the instigator to action. That 1. f<if\;{~'fl1<:f1:r:ql'i:
[proposal of GailgeSa] is· empty. [When there is a question of . of Udayanacal
setting up entities to account for facts, one operates with] the restric- the property 0
tion that, unless there is some circumstance to the contrary, a con- directly expres
struct [is to be such that] its object directly produces [the results in noted by lIN.
-question]. Thereby the only proper meaning [to assign to the affix
denoting] .injunction is the object of tha;t cognition which direcltly [IV. H.16 J ~l~"!l
propels one to action. IJ;E[ ~

1. ~~;:'1:i.!Trr;;rr>:i ~r;f :qCT<'i9il1, I This view of GailgeSa has been .Clle;'iI\;{

quoted from Ta1J!;vaCin. (sabdakh3l}qa) vol. IV. pt. 268. Ac-. . If, on the othe
cording to GaiJ.geSa, the cognition C, directly rising from lIN object of the know
is not the instigator. It is the cognition C. which is produced denoted meaning
by this cognition C, that is the instigator. This has been ex- prQperty of .achievii
plained by Mathuranatha, the commentator on Gailge§a, as the inclination to a
follows: lIN produces the cognition that sacrifice is the means liN. There is ther
to achieve the desirable end heaven. From this cognition of the cess [which the Na
mSES AND MODDS
this person] is lIOt
e] . Therefore, l,me
ge by means of the
~ meaning of vidhi
.ch is an instigator
'liyayikas] amounts
'IEf of the Bombay
b.e Benares edition
already been ex-
G.12] .
Q;q.'i;;1:{l1 'f{~ I 8lCl 12;Ef
.ClTl1fiJr~Cllt~'fClftrf(r
Til:qqTG:'f.fol4'1iEff<r:l~'I
CI
the author of the
ncites one to' action
tion.· It is, rather,
:arlier knowledge].
ced bi a knowledge·
)r to action. That
! is a question of
:s with] the restric-
Ie contrary, ':a:icon-
Clces [the resurts in
, assign to the affix
ion which direcltly
GailgeSa has been
. IV. pt. 268. Ac-
;ly rising from lIN
which is produced
This has been ex-
r on Gailge§a, as
:rifice is the means .
his cognition of the
SECTION FOUR· 161
sentence meaning, the mental knowledge arises that sacrifice is
indeed the means to achieve heaven. It is this mental conviction
that prompts one to action.
2.-According to l(au:J)lQabhatta, however, the meaning of lIN can
. properly be only the direct instigator. Thus the view of Gailgesa
. is rejected. .
[IV.H.I.:> 1 . 8l;:"!"'! " f~f'C!~'fg<:f'1>t:l1:{: ~'[~<{Io:j fQ!G-l~f1:r: L 8lfl1~1:{TS~B1:{l
g 'Ii~R:l'!ll'~gl<{ClT \I" ~<~O:1:{<{T'if[,n'fCl~IC1:{l 9'f"1f1:rlTl~ 12;9 '"
fejNoJfu;: Rr~~<1:. I ~;;~T<Ef;;rI~: OJ'f1:{Cll'!;;~O:'Ii<Ef<'>li:r<{ <illEl91<1:. I
CI?Tl '" l1C1f~!I'!~l 'C{<{<EfOJ'fC1:{1 I
Otherwise, it would' be possible to [posit that] the intention o(
a speaker is the denoted meaning of [the affix denoting] . injunction,
in the way stated by Udayanacarya : . "vidhi, the meaning denoted
by lIN etc., is the intention of a speaker with respect to activation
[on the part of another]. That [the action in question] is a means
to what the agent wishes is, on the other hand, inferable." For
[this assumption would have the advantage of] brevity: One now
obtains as limitor of the property of being the denoted meaning, the
general property' wish-ness. Thus the meaning -'the property of
being a means to a desired. end' is eliminated [qwameaning to be
denoted] . . ,-
I. feifer:!i'fg<:f~lTl<{: etc. has been quoted from the Kusum~.iijali
of Udayanacarya. [Kusuma. p. 567J. The actual instigator,
the property of being the means to a desired end, is not here
directly expressed. by lIN; it is inferred from the meaning de-
noted by lIN.
[IV· H.16 J ~11..11<Wlc'i'!i'iJHf'lq~'l :;:Ff<{<'l~<"!l>!~ '" fei;;rlcftl1~"irl:!I'C!l1<Ef
12;9 OJI'fCl<iRClI I 8l~+EftC1:{1 feiM;;r;:l1'iJl'll1tEf IT'[RI~+l1~l'l
. ClT~'C!Hl'li;;g;'r +!lrrr~lEfI<l; ;fj<:Efl~<1:{1~ ~~fl'r~~<nJ:" -
.'. If, on the other hand, one insists that only that which is the
object of the knowledge whiCh is directly the insigaior, can be the
denoted meaning rof lIN], then the only proper meaning is the
property ofachievinga.distinct svarga. In the way ad.opted by me,
the inclination to activity is [causedJ by- the cognition produced by
liN. .There is there'fore, no'support -for conceiving that kind of pro-
cess [which the Naiyayikas accept]. For,[this view] has no autho·
162 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS
SECTION FOUR

ritative support and involves prolixity. This should be taken into

It is true that,
consideration by the intelligent [who therefore should accept my
this as·· follows: (
view].
the property of be
[IV.I.I] .a:t~q+rfq ";:l'fi(;lt:<;flI," ~fcr frjilr"ll!!c[t[fu: 'fi~1'f1JlJfl~~t'<!Tta:~qq- [all is in order] .
'OF!'fi~;:r CJG:1'fTOJBf "fTfirn<qlC£. i· ll;a;:r ~~m"l;:r,qT1'fl'llqq~ such results, one's
T"ClUR!ffll<!;:r,;;i 'fi<;r.'-iCl ~fcr qn~ClT 'f,<;C[cr0li1<:T'i!ffi!: I Once desire turns:
Hence, there isiJ.o I
.Now; even if this is so, the prohibition' [One should] not [eat] [such prohibitive i:
kalafij.a' cannot be justified. For, the eating of kalafija does produce the absence of [an
something desired such as satisfaction [of hunger], the absence of it
1. This has been 1
. [of something desired] is refuted. By the same token, the following
statement of the author of the Kalpataru is rejected: In order tc [IV. I. 3 1 cr~ a:tli
d,
justify the absence of the property of being the means to a desired crT<'fill<i'
end stated in the Vedic sentence, the property of being the mt;ans FH'f'-i~<!
of something extremely undesired is assumed. . tllB1U'-i1
1. kalafija: The whole sentence is fAa kalafijam bhak~ayet. na
la§ttna1?l na grfijana.1!l, of which, however, only the first part is ;:r <D"f
usually the subject of discussion. About the meaning of the However, that I
word kalafija, there is controversy. The following oftquoted parimalal himself,
floating verse describes it to mean the meat from those animals \vho :does believe i1
or birds ·that have .been killed with a poisoned arrow: there is certainty ,
ferq~+'l'fCl'!Tut;:r ~ <f\ ',Plqfa:tuIT 1C!'Il+r"lli 'fi<'l:;:~ ~<!1C£. ::J;'!'1'lf. 'Cfl~T'-iaf 'Cf~rr. I fruit at the time de
It has also been translated as red garlic, which in view of the tion [supposed to1
fact that garlic (la§una) has been seperately mentioned in the means to a desired
same sentence, does not seem likely. It has also been translated proper that the Ve
as fermented food. both authoritative
sons in question.
2. The relevant passage similar to the one quoted here can be
tional meaning: t
found in. the VeKaTa. on B.S. 1.1.4 [po 146-147). Katu;l\fabhatta
which is] greatly 1
rejects the view of the Kalpatarukara that in order to justify the
negative [particle]
ahsence of the property ·of being the means of something desired,
one should assume that the eating of ka/afija causes greater [as not entailing a
the qualifier. Th
evil. This is not true. Even if the eating of ka/afija does cause
described before.
greater evil, that· does not refute the presence of the desired
satisfaction which can be had by eating it. 1 . ~~ISfIJfT1'fT'!lq<;]':
rally taken inl
[ IV. 1. 2 1 '-i:;:J" q~+r~. ~<;ClnR2m"l"1~ 'fi~rfcI cr'tlfcr~;:"ijTij ~j'!;rg'li­
(a) ~~ISfIJfT1'f
'f.<'lTffici"aC! I Qfu%~ 'Cf Q~~;i .,T~fcr ~~T<!;:r<cn1'fT'IBl" by itself,
."., ~i'<j~' 1«l\CJG:~Rn;rt., 'fifa:{~);r ilftr l1'C[~lI. I : as qualifil
SES AND MOODS
lid be taken into
lould accept my
1a:rQn~~tc<!T~~<m-
12m"1"'c'lT+n,ilqq~
n..fifq: I
~
houldJ not [eat]
iijadoes produce
the absence of it
:en, the following
d: In order tc
~ans to a desired
beIng the means
'n bhak§ayet. na
, the first part is
meaning of the
lowing qftquoted
Jm those --animals
JOisoned arrow:
''IT 'Gl'1tT"1ui 'Cf~<J:: I
h in view of the
nentioned in the
:J been translated
ted here""can be
. Kaul:lI;labhatta
der to justify the
)mething desired,
a causes greater
zlaiija does cause
~ of the desired
lfRr<:!""11it <:!i<rrn-'f.-
~
ff ~<:!l"l"'c'lTo:rT~
qmB:.1
SECTION FOUR 163
It is true that, in the Parimala,[Appayya Dil,,~itaJ expands on
this as·· follows: Once one has conceived of [an action having].
the property of being the means to an extremely undesirable end,
[all is in order]. Upon one's considering that [an action leads to
such restilts, one's desire] for the evident. fruit i~ then ,suppressed.
Once de.sire turns away, the [result] is not [apy . longer] desired.
Hence, there is no fault in considering that the meaning [of lIN] in
[such prohibitive injunctions as] 'one should not kill' is [indeed]
the absence of [an action's] being the means to a desired end.
1. This has been taken from the KaTaPa. p. 148.
[IV. I. 3 1 Cl:sf 3ilRCl'f.'lil!!'l>~"1 <:FTF"1~"1 ~cl{fq lilfiT"'~'f.~:@l'l~l{+o:rl'll'l<rB
Cllc'l>l~'f.9W;;;~T ;orl~cftfu ci J:!Rr ~~T"l"'C'llo:rl'l"lT"1'li~ f;jq"l-
'IFf"1~<!TJ:!Fnu:qTqfu: I ~'If<r. J:!Rr i!+1TQj'~Cl~l{ 'G ~a:~l{ s:"q~", '
J:!1+11Ul{lJ:!1.lTU~ '" ~<RI ~fu l;'Il{l'i'l f;j~l.;l{ "l<?'la:f;l21"'~"1C'1+1f't
~,~: I Cl~ 'G fiT~i';rQj'l+rT'IT'l?!T f.jj~mFn'lT;or"n J:!RI':rfficr l(Rr
;or <::Tq ~c~'fct crClllg<RH1C<!T q<:Rcri'l'l I
However, that has been rejected by [the author of the Kalpataru-
parimala] himself, as follows: In the case of a desirous person,
who does believe in the' Veda, but is blinded by lust, even, though
there is certainty about future suffering in, hell, the desire for the
fruit at the time does not go·away. Thus for him,a negative injun·
Hon [supposed to] signify the absence of the property of being the
means to a desired end, would not be authoritative. And it is not
proper that the Veda, which is accepted as authoritative for ali, be
both authoritative and not authoritative, according' to different per·
sons in question. Hence, [says Appayya], lIN has an addi-
tional meaning: the property of not being followed by a [result
which is] greatly undesired. Thus [in a negative injunction], the
negative [particle] nafi conveys the absence [of an action] qualified
[as not entailing a greatly undesired result], due to the absence of
the qualifier. This [view of Appayya] is refuted in the way
described before. .
1 .. f;i~qUjT111'llq'>[: fiT~mt+rT'f: Three ki~lCis 'of visilitiibhli1,)as are gene·
rally taken into consideration.
(a) fiT~qQj'lo:rl~'Rl: fiTfu21o:rT'I: the qualificand is present
by itself, but the qualifier is absent. Thus the qualificand
as qualified by the qualifier can be said to be absent. For
•• 0" .~, . . . . . . . . . . . . _ _ . . . . . . _ _ --.~,.,..."....... _ _ _ "~~. __ :.....
 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MUODS SECTION FOUR
164

example, if one asks, is fancily dressed up John there? a contrary, so that

and John is there, but he is not fancily dressed, there is a [that the act in qu
Ithe words] asura,
. fciiUq-lJfTllT'IW,i'fCf: lei Ri211lTO!: I
namely, a demon, ;
(b) 'fci1Ut'l"1111'l!:!~Cf: fciRiTl'!lllT'I: the qualifier is present by itself, dom]. Nor [in th
.. but· the qualificand is not present. Thus if the saine ques· a compound [must
tion· ,vas: asked again, and there was a fancily dressed· per· asu'l"a, avidyii. Fo
son present, but he is not John, then it is fcii:l'11l111'l!:!~'fCl: statement [vibhii$ii
fciRiTl2TllT'I: I a compound] optio
(c) :;r11'l"T111'l!:!~'fCl: fciroHll1l'1:
both the qualifier and the qualifi· the paryudiisa niin,
cand .are absent. Thus if the same question were asked, 1. niinuyiije$u: ~
and there were neither John nor any other fancily dressed . 'Ii~f<r <Tl~'l"l~9:
person present, then there. would be :;rl1l1l111'l!:!lf'fCf: f.lfuHl111'l:
~ command yaja
In the present case, since the qualificand, i.e., the property 01 first says the '
being the· means to a desired end is· present even in a prohibited mantras are 1"1
action, but there is the absence of the property of not entailing TaiSa. I.6.11.
a stronger evil, which is the qualifier, the meaning of the nega'ive the Bhia~ya on
particle is said to be the fciiUqIlJ1111'1!:!~Cl: fcifu12T111'1: I that the senter
2. Kal1l].9abhatta points out that this view that the property of not y,a jiimahe are t
entailing a stronger evil ·is also a meaning if lIN, has already this is a case of .
been refuted. (see [IV.B.29]). that instead of
been a.compoU!
[IV. I 4) Cl<:.IWli~qfu:rcr ~ I 3l?f <!;;:~ I 'l"HT1<::If;niJlJl'er~''1ij+iff.er-· rejected on the
,5i0Wl<TCf<:'l" '!<'5Ef<::f.rgl~iff.er,'I<:1.f ooI:JIJf'll '11"!:.~q<:'l" '11;:,'l] 'IT according to w
!:!lJ'fCl<:q'l li'{qer l(f<r I m:~e.=rIJf'l"l~<:lf9"ll~;;:?flr.1.ff.T~1!~'1 'IT 2. This discussion
~Cf 'l:<'l";:1l I <T ~'1+!~U 8lf9~<'l"~'1 <:nnlJjt[fu: I ~lffi<T though in a nt
exact opposite (
Cl<:'l" ~'-!i~'1'1i''1T<I:. I 8lq l!;'1 "<Tl~~9:" 'l:fcT q-ft;;:l~ <T <r 'l:f<r
that there shot
~'fCllI. I asura and avid:
If [one now asks] how, therefore, this [negative injunction is
explained, I point out that), with respect to this, [those who have [IV. I. 5] Cf'<!,m"1<Ti
expressed opinions] say [as follows]: In regard to sacrifices [and <:<ft'-!i1U<:"f.
other] such [acceptable acts] , one understands that [the acts], by Others [hold th
virtue of being connected with the property of being the means to that lIN denotes the
desired ends, are [also] not associated with greatly undesirable re- vidual ends, then on
sults. [This property of not entailing ·greatly undesirable results], svarga [do not then
either reiterated by the indicative function, or mistakenly understood, denoted by lIN, but]
is what is negated. [This is the opinion of some]. [According to) . [Similarly, in negat
others, [the negative particle nan conveys], by indicative function,
 SES AND MOODS SECTION FOUR 165

up John there? a contrary, so that, [from a negative injunction], one understands

ressed, there is a [that the act in question] 'is the means to an undesired end, just as
[thewords] asura, avidya [signify the contrary of a god and wisdom,
namely, a demon, and ignorance, not the absence of a god, or wis·
;>tesent by itself, dom]. Nor [in this second position] does it undesiredly result that
f the same ques- a compound [must be formed], as in the case of [the compounds]
cily dressed per- aSUTa, avidyii. For, [the compound] is optional by virtue of the
; foii\l'i'fTl:rT'i'-m'fo: statement [vibhii~ii], that [nan and a syntactically related item form
a compound] optionally. Hence is it that, as [I] stated earlier, in
. and the qualifi- the paryudiisa niinuyiije~u it fa compound] does not [occur] .
:ion were asked, 1. ,iiinuyiije~u: The complete sentence is ,as follows'f;;JRI3; 'l~1+!~
r fancily dressed 'liDm ill?1'fl~9: In all instances where the adhvaryu gives the
'is!~'fo: fqiiiltw:n'f: ' command yaja, other than in the case of the anuyij;jas" the hotT
the property oj first says the words ye y,ajamahe, and then the proper yiijyii
1 in a prohibited mantras are recited. This process has been described in the
of not entailing TaiSa. I.6.11. This particular sentence has been discussed in
g of the negative the Blla~ya on M.S. X.8.1.4. After a refutation of the view
I'n'f: I that the sentence gives an option as to whether the words ye
: property· of Hot y,ajiimahe are to be recited or not, it has been established that
IN, has already , ,this is a case of paryudiisa'exception': Now an' objection is raised
that instead of the 'two words na anuyiije~u, there should have
been a compound such as ananuyilje~u. This objection has been
ior~mCl"l<'i6+'fFCI­ rejected on the strength of the Pal,linian rule vibhli.$,iil P. I I.1. 11 ,
~~o~ ''iI"F<':r! 'II according to which the formation of a compound is optional.
01"'-If.l~~g<'iH'f 'II 2. This discussion is used here to support the statement that, even
rfu: I foil'!Nlffi"l though in a negative injunction, the meaning denoted is the
exact opposite of the normal meaning of lIN, it is not necessary
q~il:I~ ';:f'-," ll:m
that there should be a compound as ,there is in the case of
asura and avidyii. "
ve injunction is
:those who have [IV. I. 5) (l"lttlTCI"l<;i fei"<1~ ~ q~ <<mf~q<i:' (l"l<'fio;(lT<.~'mm
! ) sacrifices ,[and «IT'fiI,wf.mm'il"l<i[ ~:g:~t ;{3{, ol<~>ll\'!'Ii ll:<'F'l I
,

; [the acts], by Others [hold the following opinion]. If the view [is accepted]
19 the means to that lIN denotes the property of being a means to particular indi-
, undesirable reo vidual ends, then one accepts also that [co,occurdng] itemssuchas
~sirable results], svarga [do not themselves convey the result in question, thus, bdng
~nly understood, denoted by lIN, but] serve to convey the intention [of the utterance] .
[According to] , [Similarly, in nega:tive injunctions], lIN [itself] has .as a, meaning
'cative function,
166 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS
SECTION FOUR

the property of being a means to an undesired end, and the negative one object [to thi:
partic1~ [nafi] serves to convey the intention [of the injunction].
ings are construe:
1. CRI<~<:INi'{,'f is the last view adopted in the text before the afiixes are atta
this. (see [IV.H.13]). of lLN should be
How, then, can tt
(IV. r. 6] {f'Q«:fflH,oi f<t'<"p~ ~Ri q~ "i'{ ,"",":;n:r:''{<'!'S[ ~''1'IT'1q(1~1<:<:Ir'CIi'{,~
a,means to a desh
f<t~'1'~: I <:IjI~i'{~ '"fl';f . ~'<:I"if R'1l'm: 5[<'1'fT'1111T'f<;~~liT2t ing of the base [j
f.'r<P.I~: 5[,'1'11'1 '{'1.f"'!"!0'1Rl~'li'l"'!B:, I ~''1'fT'1r sfit "i'{ iSnm:; as follows] . [Til.
~'1T~,"fJ~ f<tNil<::lrn:~e:f'Trr >n~'l1': I ~et '"' for~'1·~f.li!t'CI U;'! i'{SfT [the meaning of ,
f,p'1a I u;oi ,",1':rf'Q~~'I!T<D <:1m Q'<'!'f1'1: re-,;"!Ri I ~ffl1?l base] through til.
'li1Rlqqqf~R''1q~ I' lIN and nan are
absence of eating
StilI others [maintain the following]. Under the position that natively, [this int,
the meaning ofvidhi is the property' of being a means to particular noted] : a differen
ends, its meaning in [the sentence] na kalafijam. ,. is. the property 1. The semantic
of being a means of avoiding demerit. And being a means here con-
as follows:
sists [in being related to demerit] by concurrent occurrence and non-
occurrence as follows: if X occurs, there is necessarily the abstnce 2. The meaning
of demerit; if X is absent, there is necessarily the presence of demerit. desired end '
Moreover, the demerit itself is to be considered distinct [in different --? eating (th<

cases] i in accord with the'seperate injunctions [accorded for this and that the mean
cases such as] 'One should not slay a briihmalJa'. Thus, [in the root is satisfie.
present view], n,an serves merely to deny thenieaning of vidhi as a link in th
[denoted by lIN]. [That is, n,a kaiafija1!1 bhak$ayet denotes: "the
eating of kalanja is not a means of avoiding demerit"]. Thus, by (IV. I. 8] ~oi '"' "8'1
implication, it is established that the eating of kalanj,a leads to de- l1'~ot ~n
merit. Therefore, there is no [grammatical or logical] difiiculty. ~"f 'liO!~

Thus ,it is tha

(IV. I. 7J 'liO!:;:;;rl1~'I!r+rl'!: ~'''!'!T'1q~l<:<:IT'CIi'{fiJ~'! '1r'<'1a Ii'{,", ~<'!'1Ti'{t
~'1.f~'Ta<'1fl~o<r'#!: 'li~mr~":rifsl1w '{2<:1Ni'{,'!r;:'f'1' '{Ri
ron:sfu;t ~TRr 'He
~~

not take up the $(

'1T'O'1iJ:,1 8'1+rl'fiT<:'lil1';:'1"!+'TiG:T<ilm: I ;:r]~*,
.....
f1':r?lo'1,qRr-
-..!;
that both takinguI
'li<;qi'{T[! I ends. And because
, , Some also [maintain the following] . [The negative injunction there is no fault. I
na kalai'ija1!l bhak$ayet] conveys precisely that the absence of ,he the injunction na k,
eating of ka/anja [Le., not eating kal{l1ija] , is a means to avoiding absence of eating ~
demerit. [That is, now ~he meaning of nan is related to the meaning 1. 8tRTU'S[ Ag:
of .the, root, bhak$, so that one understands an' absence of eating, sa,/!!sthtis of J y
Which is then related'to the meaning of the affix lIN]. Nor should VII.4.10. In'
ms AND MOODS
and the negative
the injunction].
the text before
''1'lT'{q~ ~l ~"r£!<1'~
5!«rqr,{ll'fT'I~CI<l: l'fT~
~,{l slit "<I >rim::
[~'{'-lf.!q£! 11;'1 <I"lT
re<,{Rr I 'CI~1;;r
;he position that
ans to particular
is the property
means here con-
Llrrence and non-
lrily the abs<:nce
,sence of demerit.
inct [in different
rded for this and
Thus, [in the
leaning of vidhi
et denotes: "the
rit"]. Thus, by
Inj,a leads to de-
:al] diffictllty.
:<i~ I <I 'Cf rr<'!<!FIT
'l!!ffi£!;:r,'1r~'1,{ - ~Rr
.,..". ~ ~
<: <i <" J1:r?!o'{,Q['<f-
" ....:;
gative injunction
e absence of ;he
eans to avoiding
d to the meaning
)sence of eating,
N]. Nor should
SECTION FOUR \67
one object [to this] as follows. There is a principle that affix mean-
ings are construed [first] with the meanings of the bases [to which
the affixes are attached]. [Therefore, in the present case, the meaning
of lIN should be related first to the meaning of the root bhizk§].
How, then, can the [meaning of UN, namely] the property of being
a means to a desired end be related to absence, which is not a mean-
ing of the base [to which lIN is attached]? [This objection is met
as follows]. [The interpretation given] is justified by accepting that
[the meaning of lIN is] indeed connected [with the meaning of its
base] through the intermediary of absence. [i.e. the meaning~ of
lIN and nafi are not themselves related merely as such; it is the
absence of eating which is related to the meaning of lIN]. Alter-
natively, [this interpretation is justified by abandoning the principle
noted] : a different principle is set up in cases where nan isused.
1. The semantic rule involved in this argument is normally stated
as follows: rr,'l',{l<lT );['!i<'!'lff.'1C1~l~I;f"li''1ll:. I
2. The meaning of lIN, i.e., the property of being the means to a
desired end -. absence (the meaning of the negative particle)
~ eating (the meaning of the verbal root). Thus the condition
'that the meaning of a suffix must be connected with' that of the,
root is satisfied by acceping the meaning of ,the negative particle
as a lirik in the relation.
[IV. I. 8J 11;ci 'Cf "srf<rust "I):s~<i 'li!..llflRl", "<!TRrU~ rn'SfoJrj 'lir....lJfTfu" ~<'!'frfit ,
>r~ut >!l;:llfl'l'fT't 'iill!ffi"l<l<ci <!\"~ I ~~u,{l'" <I <D"I: I' 8i'CI
11;'1 'W-&l'f!':TIlfTl'fl'lf<i"l<fi; <fiTi{mfu ~~" ~,1:[i?r "tiRm. I
Thus it is that in [the sentences] sr~l?r ..n'S~ ~~lJfTfu, <lTRm-sr
rn'S~<i 'nl'llflRr 'He. takes the ~o4aSin at the Atiratra', 'He does
~~ ,
not take up the ~o4asin at the Atinatra', the meaning conveyed is
that both taking up [the cup] and not taking it are means to desired
ends. And because [there are] distinct results [associated with them] ,
there is no fault. Hence is it [also] tha:t the Prabhakaras [interprete
the injunction na kalaiija1J! etc. to convey] 11 duty whose object is the
absence of eating kaiafija.
1. 8iRr~T~ Agni~toi:na, Ukthya, $o9asi, and Atiratra arethe four
sa1J!s'thiis of Jyoti$f;oma, as laid down in the TaittiriyaS8.l11hita,
VII.4.10. In the same context, .
both the
.
injunctiveandprohi-
". ~
 168 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS SECTION FOUR

bitive sentences mentioned above occur. The question as to .how prescribed b)

these sentences are to be interpreted is discussed in sabarabha~ya the three kine
on M.S.; X.8.3.6 (p. 2063-64) .. There it has been decided that, two are refe:
in spite of having to accept the optionalness of the action, there All the prirr.
can be :no. question of accepting· the negative in the sentence TaiSa. 1.3.7.
: rnRi~m . t;j'):sfuri l1il'lIflRi as a paryudiisa. It must be accepted
. t!,."' 2. The prohibiti
as a negative injunction. Therefore, since, the taking of the 269.5. This i
$oqasin is prescribed by one sentence and prohibited by another, literature itse
and paryudiisa has been ruled out, there is an option. Both 1he should be °bro
action of taking a $oqasin and the absence of such an action are and treated a
means to a desired end. Since the fruits gained by the taking later bias aga
and by its absence are different, there is no difficulty. of taking res(
2. Now what is this slifference· in fruit? It . is nowhere stated. smrti sentenc-
KhaQ.Qadeva in his Bhattadlpika tries to find a way out by 3. For the ut:>ar
saying that, since there is no incompleteness [deficiency) even if .
the $oq,asin is iiot used, it must mean that there is greater fruit [IV. J. 2] Cf<gi.'!<s
if it is used. (sn:rl[lTr sftT rl[rrc1T+rrc/lG; '1;rit 'fio;'i+!T BhattaDi. p. 797) . l\e~,!(

[IV. J. I] 81~<i 1J<;q111ISirnl<f!1l("Tti5nr~ qlqrqffi: I " rr f~~r<r." ~Rt f.li!l'erl<r. I Actually, ho,~
. ~ 'Cf a<1J~'fil~lla.l<r.1 a~i~ "zr.:ftt;j')+!I'H(~c<1rr~rrl lillO!lii[rr- . $omiYalll] pasumi
cause this particui
~~~9;~cml'1~1 "rr~'Il<r." ~<'1i'trr 'CfTf.!~~gci\~1 I rr 'Cfrrr<inlRi'er: the object here oj
l!~~"-Rll'l'RI1?{m'STi't q~'I>'t'1~;~'<.1i[+!r[1~'1 'Cf 1J+!1~~~~;:1l<r. I . the animal offered
Now, this being oso [it follows that] the sacrificing of an animal 1. The argumer
to Agni and· Soma results in sin .. For, [the injunction] na hi1!lsyat enjoins a saer
'one should not kill' prohibits [such sacrificing]. Nor is there any with theproh
[authority for] restricting [the prohibition, so that it be inapplicable] tion, it will b
in the present case. [The situation is] thus: [From the injunction] The whole thi
agni$omiYiaill. .. one understands that the sacrificing [of an animal] [IV. J. 3J. 81<9;'
is a means to a desired end. And [the injunction] na hi'1zsyiit states
[that such killing] is the means to an undesired end. Nor is there S:<'1M'f.
any confliflct between the two [in which case, the particular Vedic ~'<llrrlq
. injunction to sacrifice would cancel tbe general negative injunction] . Or, let the wo
. [For a single act can be a means to both] , since it is observed that section visaye pr&
both the properties [of being a means to desired and undesirable that on the strengt
ends] occur together in )the eating of food mixed with honey and Agnihotra, it will f
PoiSon, ,and in approaching someone else's beautiful wife. ceiling this] , the f
:1.·: -The- sacrifice of an animaf for the deities Agni and Soma, is touching. only; ,
 ----~------------~---~--""-~-"-~""

>ES AND MOODS SECTION FOUR 16~

lestion as to how prescribed by the sentence 3nnql~1~ q~~T<?i'tQ This is cne of

in Sabarabhii~ya the three kinds of animals involved in the Jyoti~toma. The other
!en decided that, two are referred to as savan'iYia pa§U and anubandhya poasu.
the action, there All the primary rites involving these pasus are described in
in the senterice TaiSa. 1.3.7.
nust be accepted 2. The prohibition "I Rl2-Tl<J:." occurs in the MahaBha.. (santi.)
le taki ng of the 269.5. This sentence is not found anywhere directly in the Vedic
)ited by another, literature itself. Thus it is rather surprising that a smrti sentence
ption. Both lhe should be"brought forward as contradictory to the Veda sentence
leh an action 8re and treated as if it wer,e itself a Vedic sentence. This shows the
:d by the taking later bias against the killing of animals in sacrifices. The device
fficulty. "of taking resort to some lost sruti as a base of authority for a
nowhere stated. " " smrti sentence is not unusual.
I a way out by 3. For the utsarga-apaviidq question involved cf. SaTaKau. p. 42ff.
~fidencyJ even if
'e is greater fruit [IV. J. 2] 'f~galig:" q~111<?i\Q" ~<'1'fli;l+11fu'1flT<'l~Ofl'T( I S1ml'H>;;'l ali'1T'f
lattaDL p. 797) . "eif~allJ"F<11~12~'l~ iit'l''ll<J:.1

'll«' ~ra Rq'Cfl<1: \ Actually, however, the verbiilabh used in the [injunction, agni-
$omiya.J?lJ pa§urnfilabheta, has the meaning of sacrificing.This be-
~'~F'1n'il:<1T llllm<r"l-
cause this particular act, which has not been enjoined otherwise, is
al I "I '<fl,=rlltl'iffN: the object here of an injunction, and connectep with a thing [i.e.,
R~F:::~"ll<1: I the animal offered], and a d~ity [Agni, Soma]. ."
ing of an animal 1. The argument is that the injunction. 3UftF.h+l1'-i q~+r["i;li'ta
tion] na hilJlsyat enjoins a sacrificial act, a particular act. There is then conflict
! ~or is :here any with the prohibition. And due to its nature as a special injunc-
be inappli'Cable] tion, it wiII be an exception to the. general prohibition to kill.
!1 the injunction] The whole thing is discussed in SarBo. p. 42ff.
~ [of an animal] [IV. J. 3]. gj~g; en S1f0+11"l~'f ~q~~l'f+( I "fq~'-l 5[l~~"lm, "
1a hinzsyiit states " '

ld. Nor is there ~<'1M"1i,<it " 'fffl~T<?i'tQ " ~F'1~~UTqloaefFf'1Tl,,"f~l-

particular Vedic ~'i!l"l\q~f{f\1 ~q~ ~q~~l"S( a<l:~~ ~fu re;awaa<'lTF( I
3.tive injunction] . Or, let the word iilaJlzbhana here [mean] touching only. In the
is observed that section visaye priiy,adarsaniit [M.S., 11.3.6.16]; the opponent ,"ays
and undesirable that on the strength <if. the sentence vatsamiilabheta in the section 011
with honey and Agnihotra, it wiII follow that the"k:iIIing of a calf is prescribed. [Can-
I wife. celling this] , the final decision is that the word [ala1J1bhanaj means
;ni and Soma, is touching. only; ,
170 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS SECTION FOUR

l. This problem has been discussed in M.S. II.3.6.16. The injUllc' where [it occurs it
tive sentence under discussion is <f<lJ+!reit<! This is taken principle [set fortI:
from MaiSa. 1.5.9. . Now does this mean that a calf should Tantravar1Mka] .
actually be killed or does it mean that the calf should only be following. [The w(
touched ritually? In this case. of doubt, the decision is made the bahi$pav.amiina
that the calf should only be ritually touched. The grounds for bahi$pavamiin a'l!1 i:
1

this final' decision are that alabh is often seen to be used in by the nine verses c
contexts where the meaning 'kill' is not possible. Thus in contexts trivrt denotes] 'bei
such as in the sentence 'f'ff 3lT<'I<=<!I'fT;:fr mlH<fT'f'lRr the verb as] trivrd rajju~l '
a!abh is used in the context of milking a cow. usage denotes 'a pc
on the basis of [VI
2. I have amended the' reading vi$.ay,e [accepted by both the
cated to Aditi', '[
editions), which is obviously wrong, to visaye, which is the
lthese meanings]
correct reading in the M.S. vi$ay.e in this context makes no sense. . ~tatements in ques1
[IV. J. 4] 3lC! 1l.'1 ." '1,\ i'[!Il[l'JaTI ~~C!: 13,f'1!~C!tlr '1liJI\1<'1'Fi <f ~lJr" ~Rr with which they at
'llrreffi lJ'W~~~ I mentary statement,
understood. For t:
That is why the following verse in the Bhagavata is justified:
For example : trivi
"since [it is] the smelling of the wine that is prescribed. and similarly,
[Moreover], in ['
the iilabhana of an animal, not its killing."
[both the normal
1. . This sentence is omitted in the Benares edition. 1. am here· word are to be U!1l
accepting th'e reacting' of the Bombay edition of the text. mentary sentences
'2. The half verse quoted here is taken from the Bhagavata Purii.lf3, particular ways] , "
X1.5.l3. what particular we
3. The only way in which iilaMana cannot be killing is if it is [Kumarila answen
accepted to mean only touching, and not actually sacrificing. stood, [in a state!
[ IV. J. 5] C!~r 'q ~'l'<!~~ifi,Il[;:'lT~<f lJ~~ ~'l1iJN'!i«f ffl-7.fRr I C!~ ~ Vedic] ,since,' c;:onte
a meaning of a .we
"~,[G;'-f~t'1'fm.,B:" ~,~'f''fr ttiM1'lr.,'T'!i~'1 ~ S:j;Slil;:<!''11''l~'fr>f: J
in other cases also
<'IIi!; "~'[";;~:"~fuwil'rn:. 'i{~tP.f, 'q~~~'1 05111; 1;'lT05T, ~il: ll: that meaning whic!
" 3lrR,'1~: "l[~'f''fr "3lRfu+!Itf,'t;:r ') l[~'f<!C'fRtt;;:;:frs>t l[Rr stood. This will 1
RoT~ sfit '1~ 'fl~I .,Tffii ~ ".~'Rmg:::fmh+!: ", " €Tit 'q~ this view of Kuma!
Rolq<J:" l[;!lT~' . <l~rfm:<l;l=f<i" mmli, I 'fl;f'l~"f'l<'lfq- (q'!i;;:q<f on the basis of rna
'1"r ~'i(r"''!i<'liB05r'f.~G:'1r,MR''lT~ (q~i':r'f.'1T<p:fa'lT 'i(05'1,'1T' means 'touch', it is
,[FP:ro~ C!:<l;'fc! 1l.'1T>.if '!frm: I 3l"l"f1fq ~f<:::'f.<'IT~Gj6~ 1l.'fr~i stood elsewhere aI:
m;:;:'l:f l[fcr "liJi'l 'fft7.f<l l[~'f<l+r. I .1<:'f+!"f1fq' ~T'lc::oi<fT<J: 1;Qm>.f- 1. trivrccarvadhi!
''fR!)hri<;:'l~Tfit lJ 1<:'1 >!Tll:'l:f l[fu fu'qfcr I stated in the •
[The verb iilabh] also correctly ha~ the meaning 'touch'every- '11m"f~ 'i(~<R
 SES AND MOODS
16. The injul1C-
This is taken
it a calf should
f should only be
decision is made
The grounds for
:1 to be Ilsed ill
Thus in contexts
ncFfRr (he verb
~ by both the
'e, which is the
; makes no sense.
1;;;+1;:i ;:r ~<l1" ~Fci
lata is justifted:
:d, and similarly.
..on, I am here . woi-d are to be understood]' optionally. . For [although the .comple-
f the text.
,agavata Purar.la,
idlling is if it is
Illy sacrificing.
fu~'1fcr I qi;, ~
""
S3}!i1rcr<'n~1t~r'~: I
~'I; ~~roft, "lit IT
'RI''1T<O-~S'~ ~Fci
[gIl'[: ", ".nil' 'q~
~~q'l<'1fq Jq'!il;q;:r
fi'jT'f'1C1<n «<;;'f'i'qT'
'li<'1TtG:fu:&: ~Ttif
'1G:rJ;:rTil:, ~qOJN' -
19 'touch' every-
SECTION FOUR 171
where [it occurs in a Vedic injunction, and this is possible] by the
principle [set forth by Kurnarila] in the trivre-earu section [of .the
Tantravar~ika]. In that [section, Kumarilabhattaj has said the
following. [The word trivrt] denotes only the [nine verses comprising
the bahi~pavmniina stotra]. 'For, in the Veda, [the statement] trivrd
bahi~pavamiin,a1J'! is made, and this is followed [in the ritual order]
by the nine verses comprising the stotra. In normal usage,' [the word
trivrt denotes] 'being threefold', since [it also occurs in such usages
as] trivrd rajju(! 'a triple strand rope'. The word oaru in normal
usage denotes 'a pot'. In the Veda, however, it denotes rice. Thus
on the basis of [Vedic statements such as] "the earu which is dedi-
cated to Aditi', '[let one offer] rice to Aditi'. [Now], although
[these meanings] are determined [in' the above cases, where the
statements in question have complements i.e. other Vedic statements
with which they are understood] , in cases. where there is no comple-
mentary statement, both [the normal and Vedis meanings] are to be
understood. . For there is no distinction [required by context here] .
For example: triverdagni~!udagni$tomalJ, sauryal!! Caru1?7 nirvapet.
[Moreover], in [Vedic statements] which have complements also
[both the normal. meaning and the particular Vedic meaning of a
mentary sentences may require given seritences to be interpreted in
particular ways] , Vedic and normal usage are the same in respect to
what particular words denote [by themselves]. To this objection
[Kumarila answers as follows] : Only that meaning is to be under-
stood, [in a statement with a complement, which is particularly
Vedic], since, contextual complementation supercedes [in determining
a meaning of a .word] because it becomes one sentence. [Further]
in other cases also, since the utterances in question are Vedic, only
that meaning which is established in Vedic utterances is to be under-
stood. This will be stated in the tenth [book]. [In accord with
this view of Kumarila] , in the present case also, since it is concluded
on the basis of majority usage [in Vedic injunctions] that [iilabh]
means 'touch', it is established thaUhis meaning alone is to be under;
.stood elsewhere also:' .
1. trivreearvadhikar{f}}Janyaya: The import of this nyiiya has been
stated in the BM.ttaDI. on X.l.10 as follows: ol'r'l»lfu:&:lQa.'!'11
qT'f~q1?1 <r;;;'1~'1+I, Thus the meaning provided by putting to-
172 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS SECTION FOUR

gether the understood portion of the sentence is stronger than consider· inter:
the meaning wellknown among people. (a), in which
for carrying 0
·2. The complete name of the section is trivrccarvasvavaliidhikar:a1Ja,
accepted view
since along with the two instances ·trivrt and earu mentioned
Vedic meariing
here, a third one asvaviila is also discussed in the commentary
Agni$tut is. ch;
on the relevant st7tra. (M.S., I.3.4.9). See Tantra Va. p. 221.
t'rivrt way .. S,
3. Tii1!~lyaBra. 20.1.1 states l~'l;;;:~r,'1q+!r;,B:.. The term bahi~pa­ 6. TaiSa. 2.3.2.3.
vamiina1Jl denotes the nine verses [rks] contained in three trip- 'let (the adhv(
lets of verses [t[.ca] , the three giiyatra siiman-s together forming him [the sacri
a stotra. These verses complete a stotra called bahi~pavamana, splendour of BI
because this stotra is chanted outside [bahis] of the sadas near the
.affix [lal~ ~
cat1Jaia [the pit which stands to the northeast of the mahiivedil
during the first soma-pressing rpriita~. sa/Jana]. See Taryc;lyaBra. cated to.,:' (
should be a tn '
6.7.9: <rW>'1q+!l~ laqfrq sayarya ad. loc.: '-! 81~q~trff@1: <!~6'1q- means 'rice', aj
lire
1iFn;f laG,::WfilB1<J: '"11<ql~ laqf.q I Also see ]aiNyaVi. 1.4.3. X.l.l0.34-44 aJ
TaJ)c;lyaBl1a. 20.1.1 [see above] states that the bahi~pavamana sidered here.
is to be trivrt. That is, the stotra of nine verses is to be chanted 7. dasame: The
in such a way tha(t the group of verses is a stoma called trivrt. tenth section oc
The tr.ivit stoma contains nine verses chanted as follows: in each M.S., 'X.l.l0.3'
of these ~ounds [Paryaya] ,three of the'rks are cha~ted after the
"l\Rq;;fla9il+!: Hen
sound hi1Jl [hilJlkara] has been made. Depending on the precise
order of the individual verses, the triv?'t has modifications. These in favour of th
are stated in TaI!c;lyaBra. 2.1.1, 2.2.( 2.3.l. 8. All this discussi<
rather than the
4. iidityascarulJ: Kumarila. [TantraVii. p. 222] quotes: Since in one pi
gnfG:«r: lIl<!ufi<!: '1'1Rr '"1": 'the initial caru is dedicated to AdIti, 'to kill', but has
in milk: and then 81fG:rcrm~;r (bne should worship) Aditi ale frequent, ijlt
[with an offering of] rice'. I cannot trace the~e exact statements Vedic instance.·
to a Brahmarya or Srautasiitra.. However, compare . ~;f'1Of9ili!ls­ . contradiction wi
fG:<lt tf'1Rr '"1": trl'1Off'1: ApaSS. X.21.4. [IV. J 5] 1l:'i '"1~fe
5. 13!'lq; ( 81mgq; ) 81m!!!+!: This statement is made in Tar.tc;lyaBra. Thus, since tlie
17.6.1. The Agni$tut is a one day soma sacrifice, which is a the same thing, ho"
modification of the Agni$toma. The question arises here whether [the. injunction] ? .
trivrt is to be interpreted as denoting (a) threefold or (b) a stoma l. "It has been sho
which consists of nine verses. Further, there is not here, as in 'one should not
the cases noted in note 3, a contextu.al compliment to show that 1omiya111 pasu1n'
·trivTt has its _particular Vedic meaning. Hence; . cine: might to this prohibiti<
 ms AND MOODS SECTION FOUR 173

is stronger than
~aviizadhika1'a1J.a,
caru mentioned
the commentary
antraVi'i. p. 221.
.e term bahilipa- 6. TaiSa. 2.3.2.3. states 'll ~\llerT.!~'lil+r:. ~ <IHI1 ~ <iFf ""<> f;WI~
led in three trip·
together forming
bahi§pavamiina,
he sadas near the
)f the mahiivedi]
See Ti'it;lc;lyaBrii.
'I~lffl~T: ;qfo: 6 q-'I-
iNyaVi. 1.4.3.
bahi§pavamiina
; is to be chanted 7. dasame: The discussion alluded to here as occuring in the
ma called trivrt.
; follows: 11l ea,ch
consider interpreting this term as denoting also the meaning
. (a), in which case, the statement provides that all the means
for carrying out the sacrifice are tripled.' However, the finally
accepted view is that trivrt has here, as elsewhere, its particular
Vedic meariing, so that TIiI):9yaBra.· 17.6.1 prescribes that the
Agnt~tut is characterised, by the chanting. of each 'Stotra in the
t'1'ivrt way .. See M.S., X.6.7.22-'23and the Bhi'i'!ya thereon .
'let (the adhvaryu) offer a cam 'dedicated to siirya [Sun] for
him [the sacrificer] who. is desirous of attaining the brilliant ..
splendour of Brahman.' Now, the item saurYia contains a taddhita
affix [~T~l:f it'l<IT P. IV.2.24], so that the item means'dedi-
cated to ... ' . (literally, 'whose .god· is .. .'). - Hence, the Daru
should be a type of oblation. The final decision is .that cam here
means 'rice', and not a pot as in common usage. See M.S.,
X.1.10.34-44 and the Bha9ya thereon. Details carinot be con-
sidered here.
tenth section occurs in the Bha~ya on the section beginning with
M.S., Xl.lO.34. The sentence discussed is <llif ~ R~i.)<r
. ~

:hanted after the

~\ll'lT.!~'IlTl1: Here also, the common meaning 'a pot' is rejected
19 on .the precise
in favour of the Vedic meaning 'rice'. -
lifications. These
8. All this discussion is in support of taking iilabh to mean 'touching'
rather than the usual meaning 'to sacrifice', and thus 'to kill'.
luotes : Since in one place it has been shown thatiilabh cannot mean
,dicated to Aditi, 'to kill', but has to be taken to mean 'to touch', and such usages
I worship) 'Aditi are frequent, iilabh should be taken to mean 'to touch' in every
exact statements Vedic instance. This effectively gets rid of the difficulty of
>are . R;fq-u['liT~S- . contradiction with the prohibitive sentence 'one should not kill'.
[IV. J 5]' 1<.'i ",,~Nf.!T;r1;f'l'I: lJ+!T;:n~9i<"~'Il+rT~ 'Ii ;qT~l:f'-l11;f'li+rl'1: I
.e in Ti'it;lc;lyaBra. Thus, since the inju~ction and the prohibition do not refer to
'ifice,which is a . the same thing, how can one '[the prohibition] set aside the other
ises here whether [the. injunction] ? . . .
I d or (b) a stoma 1. It has been shown previously that the prohibition na hil!~syiit
s not here, as in 'one should not kill', prohibits killing. But the injurictios agni-
ent to show that $oniiyal11 pasuiniilabheta, which has .been claimed to go contrary
. ~nce, . cine' might to this prohibitioti, is not abOut killing at all. It just prescribes
 .. -~--~~----~---.~-~-----------"~.-" .. ----~. . . .

174 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MuOnS SECTION FOUR

that part of the sacrificial animal should be touched ritually. considered to

Thus, the injunction and the prohibition do not have anything actual harm t(
in common,and therefore cami.ot contradict each other. of the prescrir:
[IV. J. 6J ~BTt'l'W'1FTf'"ll~q",.'IT 'I . ~ . 'Cf ·qf.fifi'1J~<[r ~>.f.rt'l~;:<{cT: 3. This objection
~1~9 '11'lf~: IP.il'11'q~ <.11<[ ""<{C!. {fa 'l1'"'1~ 1 I[1'Cf1<iq~­ killihg does n
,'i1;'!ilUJrr '«l1<{q~ijJl.:T <[F11fJtqf~91~1'1r'l'>.f1Cllf<l.'1G:;:c!l.:~Bl<i~nr'11'f. accompanying'
8T.<{:qml~1'1c'lfu~'<[.rr91q.~'-'f 1
animal, and in
The [actual] harming [of the animal], on the other hand, is perty of belo~~
inferred from the rites ancillary [to the offering, that is, from the being offered, t
longing' to the
, preparation of the animal offering by cutting out its parts]. Nor
should [the following objection} be stated. In .this case, one does that it occurs :
not get a harming within the [sacrifice]. For the offering is effected [IV. J. 7J f~mHI[9'
with parts got elsewhere. [The situation is now] a~; in' the offering
'-fTlT~~'<[
of the tail [of an animal slain elsewhere] during the pdtnisa}!zyaja
rite. [This objection i!\ refuted as follows]: The preparation per- . 1;:r,['\1it 'Cf'
formed on the animal earlier can be (considered to be) performed Objection: [}
within the actual rite, jus,t as the husking etc. [of rice to make the sentences that lay d<
purocJasa] is considered part of this rite [although it takes place befere formed]. Otherwis(
the actual rite]. This so that, through the iBtermediary of the [parts , killing wi th a weapc
of the] sacrificial animal [the preparation on the orie killed earlier] is that the [prescri])(
be properly part of the sacrificial act. For, otherwise; [the animal complete limbs and
offering] would not be [properly considered] dedicated to Agni sound, and thus car
and Soma. ' [also].
1. The above translation assumes that priicinapasusaljlskarii:l}iiJ!1 1. Previously it ha
refers to the preparations - actually killing etc. - of the animal; scribing iila1!'lbh(
thus in yajffiyapasudviirii, pasu refers, by lak~a1Jii, to the parts killing is to be <>
of the animal (lqdaya vapa etc.) actually offered. There is room ing rites. Here 1
for interpretive disagreement. , have been prescI
2. patnisal1lyiija are rites of offering oblations io the wives of gods. in which the aniI
For this rite, the use of a jf}.ghani, the tail of an animal, is considered as in
prescribed by the injunction ~>.f;:<{l qc<[l: U'11;;rlfRr (satBra. killing with a w;
IILS.5.60 etc.). Now the problem arises as to where this tail way the animal
of an animal is to come from .. ' If there is no sacrificial animal acceptable for a :
involved in the rite itself, a tai! of an a:nimal kiIIed elsewhere, way to kiII a sacr:
either in ahoth~r sacrifice or ,ev~n. atai! bought especially for the injuhctions to kil
occasion from a butcher shop, may be. used. [See JaiNyaVi. 2. Kaundabhatta re
IlL3.16· (p. 149) ]. Since thus actual harm to life is not done thes~ 'sente~~es' i
in the body of the sacrifice, 'and yet the patni:>atfZyiija tites are animill is killed, j
ms AND MUODS SECTION FOUR 175

touched ritually. considered to be complete, it can be said that one cannot infer
)t have anything actual harm to life occuring within a sacrifice on the strength
:h, other. . . ; of the prescriptions in the accompanying rites, -
Ht ;;]T"l<lt"<l<\:;:'la; 3. This objection has been rejected by noting that, even if the actual
killing does not happen within the course of a sacrifice, the
<ll,",!l{ , m~'t<iq~­
accompanying rites can be performed by proxy on the sacrificial
'l~a\~"§"Fli:r~+l'na:. animal, and in order for the oblation to have the necessary pro-,
pertyof belonging to the deities Agni and Soma, to whom it is
eother hand, is being offered, the actual killing also has to be considered as be-
;hat is, from the longing to the sacrifice and thus cannot" be escaped by saying
its parts]. Nor that it occurs somewhere else.
is case, one does
ffering is effected [IV: J. 7] f~~Hj<rWf,T<;feI"fl'l'f.'ll'f'llrn:~l.1<i "'~'l{~ I 3'FPH OJ&T~l ~<r~sfq­
~s in'the offering 'lFTfu:&:'<:fl'fRrRfa ~;;r I 8l~rfUsaa'Cf(FW"'T+lGU~<r l1T~'H1JfTfu:<\:rq,
he patnisalf/yaja T;:r~'Cfl:t "'f l'i!OJl3'<rJ:f'llH<:'1n't WlllT"a~<r 1~~'1<rqf;,'f'9TT~fa a'i'll{ -
preparation per-
Objection: [A prescription of], killing is obtained from the
o be) performed
sentences that lay down the way in which the killing [should be per-
rice to make the
formed], Otherwise, 'sacrifice will be considered complete even by
takes place before
killing with a weapon, [This objectionJ is not [valid], 1:he truth
iary 'of the lparts-
is that the [prescribed] way -of killing fuifills a purpose in preser~il)g
,ne killed earlier]
complete limbs and by avoiding the fault of the animal making' a
I'ise, [the animal
sound, and 'thus cannot be expected [further] to be an injunction
~dicated to Agni [also]. - '
)asusajJZskariit,a!!t L Previously it has been stated that the injunctive sentence pre-
-of the animal; scribing alaJJ'lbhana does not actually prescribe killing. Actual
;anii, to the~parfs killing is to be obtained only by inference from the accompany-
. .,'41,
~d. There IS room ing rites, Here the opponent says that the killing can be said to
have been prescribed by the sentences that lay down the way
;he wives of gods, in which the animal should be killed, If these sentences are not
of an animal, is considered as injunctions for killing, says -the opponent, even
t'll';a (satBra, killing with a weapon [which is in direct contradiction of the
way the animal is said to be killed for sacrifice], will also be
to where this tail
acceptable for a. sacrifice. Thus these sentences prescribing the
sa~rificial animal
way to kill a sacrificial animal must be~ccepted as authoritative
1 killed elsewhere,
injunctions to kill an animal. .
especially for the
[See JaiNyaVi. 2. Kaul):gabhatta rejects this by pointing out that the purpose of
:0 life is not done these sentences that lay down· the way in which a sacrificial
i sa1flyaja rites are animal is killed, is to obtain whole limbs without any cuts on
176 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND !\1\JODS SECTION FOUR

them, and also to avoid the fault which will occur if the animal 2. Any injunction acc(
. makes a sound while being killed. Thus an additional purpose there is provision IX
of prescribing killing cannot be imposed on these sentences. An to be leading to sor
additional purpose not actually stated in a prescriptive sentence, so accompanied, th
can be thus assigned only to th?se seritences that have 119 appa- commentary Sarabc
rent purpose.
Sfu'lkhyakarika :
[TV. J. 8J .,.'i'[ f;'FG:I>TCjra:!:!I'lf.a:{~lqit;Jlmrijf1'lo<:[lWll~Tliif~~<I'Cj""'Tf<{21"!:!­ ~~<lW[Ril'iq'l '<ll<,!>i
<rl~li!''lo'llOCT<lr q~Cj""'I~'o<l~" <fir ~<Jli!I;;r i<{i;['C[Wlf"<rRRr <Jfu;
"1<'11 _I ;J.G:T>l'11fq<J~ ~r<lCT~<;>:fI!:!T+!lU'1<=1t'<l1 <f\f.R-Ffi~q"l I [IV. J. 9] "!ftt,, s:r~;jlJ
qi{q~<:[I~<<I'i{., <f~ f<!u~ 'i'[ ., ~~Tl11+!lU<lfuT% 1j~\'<i'f,P:rlql<l:. 1 ql'R!+l1ql<l:. ~
<II 1); Q<:[Ff~
Nor is it right to' go about it in the following way: Since any-
thing which is laid down in an injunction not accompanied by dero- 9i~liR"~fq l:!
gatory statements or the teaching of an expiatory rite, is invariably +!qf<'~ ilJ~~
associated with the property of not entailing evil [anything un- !:!'11;;j'f,B:, I 'f<!i-
...... ,. -'::"'r-!',-...;
desired] ; and since there is contradiction with the resulting meaning ~~Il~qrl['
of the injunction, the prohibition [against killing] should not operate. ~~fW'o'r '<il~
[This is not accepted for the following reason]: When there is
[direct] contradiction between a Vedic statement and the meaning of - . Nor is Madhva's [c(
[another Vedic statement], the question of restricting [the scope] [one objects that sacrifi,
arises out of fear tha;t, otherwise, one of them would be unauthorita- is] not [so], since [sucb
live. But when the contradiCtion' is .with the resultrng meaning lMadhva comments as f
[inferred from an injunction], there is no [fear of the calamity of harm to life]., because of
nonauthoritativeness] for the Veda [itself]. Thus there is no reason causes,demerit. That i~
to restrict the scope [of the prohibition] . k;illing of the sacrificial ,
the Veda wiil cause greir
1. As has already been explained, according to Kau~J.(;labhatta, from .killing prescril:>ed i
there is no direct injunction in the Veda which prescribes the 'not pure', he [the auth
killing of the sacrificial animal.· This is obtained only by infer- even killing prescribed b
ence, since there are Vedic statements that provide for the rites will cause detnefit.' Tht
to be performed on that animal. But this conclusion is only ingj. But the property
inferred from the Veda, and not stated directly there. Thus, [by its very nature] the
since there is no contradiction between an actual injunction anq prohibited [that can m::
the prohibition to kill, the..contradictionbeing only between the property of being prohibi
prohibition and what is merelyipferred, from other injunctions, it is prescribed by -V-edic
there is no fear of nonauthoritativeness descending on the Veda. cated to Vayu [the-'W~
Thus there is no reason \vhy the scope of the prohibition should stated by the w~rdl 'Ved:
. be restricted in order io accommodate the killing in sacrifice. out that this inference vi.

:NSESAND l\1l)ODS
lccur H the animal
additional purpose
lese sentences. An
'escriptive sentence,
;hat have n9 appa·
h~f~'4<1<CR?'-!TR!l1Of~-
· t<iisterW[I'<!RRr J;lm;
;'4t<<lT Blf.[~'li.r.r;qT I
m% ~\'«'liTl'lT'Il<J:, 1
way: Since any·
ompanied by dero·
o rile, is invariably
vii [anything un·
· resulting meaning
should not operate.
When there is
md the meaning of
'icting [the scope]
. , tId be unauthorita· . is] not .[so] , since [such an act is prescribed] by the Veda'; correct ..
, resulting meaning
of the calamity of
; there is no 'reason
" killing of the sacrificial animal]. 'killing which is not ,prescribed by
to Ka~QaJJhatta,
hich prescribes the
ined only by infer·
trovide for the rites
conclusion is only
ectly there. Thus,
·lual injunction and
, ,
g only between the
1 other injunctions,
nding on the Veda.
prohibition should
!ling in sacrifice.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- ---- .... _- .... _-.--... _- ..... -_. _ .._.•. _ . _ - , - - -
SECTION FOUR 177
2. Any injunction accompanied by a derogatory statement, or when
there is provision made for an expiation, is generally considered
to be leading to something undesired. When however, it is not
so accompanied, that is not the case. Thus it is' said in the
commentary Sarabodhini on the Siailkhyatattvakaumudi on the
Sfui.khyaklirika : f.!;:C;:T5!T<I~q~+!o<ll&;CTf9N'fT'f,!,![~l{>!~<'i;q1j"T
~flq<l5i"lRT\oiq'i\ 'C!T<or'llJT1lF;:RiTs;q •.m~'i'li<or+!. I SarBo. p,49
[IV. J. 9] ;ql]q" 8!~~fi:rRr ~;;r ~.<n<J:," ~1cr<i.'f'j<!T " ~~~m<J:,
q)qB'l'l'll<J:, ~;~ ~'1Rr ~ I ~f~<l<'11<J:, I 1&'fll ''1~~'f.'j
<11 l! Q<lr.r~l SloT 1'fc/<J:, I ~'fQ:ql ~13:ql l! ~~FI'.T:
. 'li~~"~fu l'fl "";'1 ]%'131,'.['1 ~~'1i'f~<f1<!T 8!f<t qlq~l!<Fjl<J:, ~;@
t
l'f'!R'orTti ~~ I ~mRr I Of ~ 1~I<1T;ql~l!'~' ~1<<i
wl\;;f'1i'+!. I f'i; l! f.im<or+!. I <l~T'f OfIR<l1 :~r<~<l" 'fT<lc<i"'ii!<l+r."
~i'Illf<l:",i$~r4~<l<'fTf<l:<<lTll: I ~~fu,1 <31r.rlN~0f ~<l1~111;q~
l.:lJ11rfo!Dlir '«Ill: I 1&'Mtfu I <l'f'<lil9il~1 '« 1'!1<'1'j lJl''l'j I
. 'Nor is Madh:va's [commentary] on aSuddh,arniti cenna s.abdat 'if·
[one objects that sacrificial kHiing is] impure, [we answer that this
[Madhva comments as follows] : Let there be suffering [caused by
harm to life]., because of its [very nature] of being harm to life that
causes,demerit. That is not ,so, since the Veda prescribes [it, i.e.,
the Veda will cause great calamity, but there is never any bad result
from .killing prescribed in the Veda.' [commentary] : by the words
'not pure', he [the author of the sittra], brings up the doubt that
even killing prescribed by the Veda is after all killing, and as such
will' cause demerit.' Thus $uffering will r'esult [ftoin sacrificial kill·
ingj. But the property . of being harm: to .life [M1J1satvalh] is not
[by its very nature] the cauSe 6faemedC It is the property of being
prohibited [that can make it the cause of (iemerit] ,.and t4at . [the '
property of being prohibited]' does not exist here. ·Oii.the'other hand,
it is prescribed by Vedic injunctIons such as.'awhite[animal] dedi·
cated to Vayu [the 'Wind, .should 'be.sacrificed],., [This has been
stated by the w9rd] 'Veda' [in the satra].He then l'lroeeeds to point,
out that this' inference which is faulty due to having a [hetu] with a
178 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS SECTION FOUR

limiting condition, also goes against the smrti, [by quoting the versel [Madhva's argum
'killing' etc. . ' standing the basis of
1. Here Kaw;rc;labhatta brings in the Madhva commentary on not [claim that hhrzsii
B.S., III.1.25 [III.1.27, according to the numbering in the edition but because it is prohi
with the Madhva commentary]. Madhva answers to the oppo· thatthe property of b-
nent who brings in the doubt that sacrificial killing might lead ofl, injunction. And
to suffering due to its being hi1rzsii after all, and thus a cause of merely assumed [as
demerit. According to the Madhva way, the opponent is here authoritative] stateme
indulging in an inference with a fallacious cause. Thus it seems teachers such as Kam;
that according to him, the opponent's inference may be stated 1. The smrti quote!
as follows: ~1Jr 'il'1&1Flil ~l~ This, he goes on to say, is authoritative. F(
fallacious, since the hetu (hi1'flsii) is faulty due to the existence as authoritative, ,
, of a IilllJting condition., This cause with a limiting condition [IV;]. 11] ~ '<C' '-loft!
has been defined generally as follows: m"<rc<nr.:![C11~~9i<:~cIT &g: ;;r;:l{'Il'il'lRi
T.S. (notes)' p. 307, which in short nieans that this hetu is true w:<rr 'IT ~~
only conditionally. Thus, in the present" case,'even though harm
to life in general does cauSe demerit, and thus suffering, that is [Given this. ther
not true in every instance of killing. Thus killing prescribed by snqtisl such as conu
the Veda is not a cause of demerit and the resulting suffering. have to be discarded
In.support is quoted a smrti verse taken from the Variihci Pural).a; demerit ca,used by dri
which says that sacrificial killing prescribed by the Veda doe.~ also'- Thus it has hi
not create any bad result. pural)ai, 'Just as [it
mud, or the result 0:
2. The text in both editions reads s-utriyiihi1'flsiirnpaltviit and later possible to wipe away
b.hii$yasthiihi1'flsiitvena. However sutriyii and bhii$yasthii are sacrifices.'
adjectives of miidhvi which occurs at the end of the passage and
1. The verse quotec
EO must be separated. Also ahimsiirupatviJ;t; or ahimsiitvena
would make no sense in the context. Thus I have taken the
text to be sutriyii + himsiirnpatviit and bhii$yasthii +
himsii-
[IV. J. 12J aloft'"'18 '
~~'1 110:1'
rupatvena.
<:CIT SH «i
3. The Bombay edition also unnecessarily has na at the end instead
~~~CTT f
of .ca. Actually na at the beginning of the passage is connected
here. Thus niipi. .. miidhtfi siidhvi. " GfGtITIIf>!!
,I <[mil' IT;
[IV. J. 10] ~~r~l{F1'1.iit'i!T'?ri!;:I'!"'<orm:: I ",fu ~ITfuuTI ~m~ lT1ITm'il- d~+lro~liI q
a:<!f.cr 'I l'iii g Rf~ 1 ' ~q~ll'!"'«i ~NR«!~~'1Tfit aT~9
~ ~l{Te/m: 1 ~fc!<:r.:!f<i;:crifi+l6r~~fct<!;<;tf9i+!~'1ifi~<fcfetfc! <r ,,'IW{l~iri ~

!!m1lfCl~'IlRR:cftfc! "ilW I On this [wel c

 lNSES AND MOODS
quoting the verse]
a commentary 011
ering in the edition
Iswers to the oppo-
killing might lead
.nd thus a cause of
e opponent is here
1se. Thus it seems
nce may be stated
goes 011 to say, is
ue to the existence
limiting condition
. nt<lcnCl~~"'Ii~~CfI ~g:
at this hetu is true
even though harm
IS suffering, that is
illing prescribed by
resulting suffering.
. the Vadiha Pural).a,
by the Veda does
'rupaltviit and later
nd bhii$yasthii are
of the passage and
'it or ahimsiitvena
; I have takeiFthe
'i$yastkii+ himsii-
1 at the end instead
assage is connected
.1ft 1&'mfo!;r tflq+f[tfT-
fqNR«r~ 'i!~Cfq (Iti
'Ii~.CI'lir.;qWjfcr or
SECTION FOUR 179
[Madhva's argument is not acceptable] , due to [his] misunder-
standing the basis of the opponents' objection. The opponents do
not [claim that hilrtsii produces] demerit [just] because it is hil!ISii,
but because it is prohibited. It is the same even for you who accept
that the property of being the means to a desired end is [the meaning
of] injunction. And one should consider that the smrti quoted is
merely' assumed [as authoritative] by Madhva, who assumes [as
authoritative] statements in endless array on the authority of endless
teachers such as Kamatha ·etc., so that this smrti is not authoritative.
1. The smrti quoted by Madhva has been rejected here as non-
authoritative. For a list of those cited by Madlwa and assumed
as authoritative, see MaTaMuMa. p. 3, note 4.
[IV. J. III Il;'i "". Etul1q~~iFf+l;rIfu:~~fii<ilr:fl'rr~: I q:oi '1HIQi'\sfr.i W1!f~­
;;f;:l{q'[q'[qfutClf~q I Cf'iT ;'1:1'fa IT'i+l~'f.;:i':r I "'-l'iT qi;;r ![\bTUl:
~'IT CIT !!U'[.CfB: I '!.Cfl['1:'-IT Cf~~'1ii ;r '-l~<Ifg+l~fCf" ~fu ~<J:. I
[Given this. then, one might say that] all rites [prescribed in
smrtis] such as commiting ritual suicide. at Prayaga and sati will
have to be discarded [as not being authoritative] ; and, in this way,
demerit caused by' drinking wine will be unavoidable in the Viijapeya
also. Thus it has been said in the first book [of the Bhlgavata-
puraI.J.a], 'Just as [it is not possible to cleanse] muddy water with
mud, or the result of [drinking] wine with [more] wine; it is not
of
possible to wipe away [even] the killing one animal with [several]
sacrifices.'
1. The verse quoted here is BhagP. 1.8. 52.
[IV. J. 12] ¢l?{\~a ";P;~",{T;:q~~T'f.. 1&'m;jqt 'C("1im: I ~'<ll'rllf ""
~~'! +ll[T'Ii<iIlf'IT ~+lT"~fu 'liiliG:'!1q'[~!~~'.:fClTfum<J:.1 "e.~'<l+'l­
~ffi'sfi'l ~ "l~ ~m 'fR('!j;;f"m- <!m"'RI~~'i~[qitmi( I" 'IT
~~CfT 1&'~1 m "i 1®fcr ~fcr ~'<l~+E~Cf'fT~ I
<il<4a"
. "<qmllf'ie.tr f<r~Cf: W:T'-I1l;Cf~ WK!<.'!l1-l ;r 1&'61" i\.fu ml1<lCfT<J:. I
"'-Imif tf~'!: ~121: ~w:r'! ~'-l+wrT I 1RI1 S~'-I ~~ lJ'i~
~~ CI~$CI'<l:" ~fu" '-IT ~f<r~cn ~m f.T'-lcnR+r.J:, 'C(tffi I
¢l~,! Cfi fq;qT~~rn:+ll F.: J~,qm " ~fu t:p.q.m.'-Im?:{+1'1-
.'iT'f'IT~irt 'C( tfTtfTmqf~~ <Dq: I
On this [we] can say that, on the strength of the following'
180 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS SECT~ON FOUR

statements, the absence of demerit is established, so that there is no and "Slaughter is n,

fault:.on the strength of the following passage' fro~ the subs~ory of furthermost words, i.
karka(i in the [Yoga} vasi~tha : (a) 'You wiII carry. away other demerit: .
propie \vho a:ie worthyqtbeingkilI~, .' There is no hann. to .these . 1. .Just saying that
according to dhqrma. Killing when it is in accordance with dharma must mean tJ.lat
however is. equal' to great mercy'; on the strength.· of the' advice of elsewhere, which
B~bha in the Brahmottara khal.lc;la: (b) 'even while following the killing prescribed
duty of a k§atriya, avoid purposeless harm to life'; from the [follow- was born, does n
ing] statement quoted by srldharasvarni: (c) 'killing prescribed by
the Veda is not counted;as killing at all'.; from the. [followirig] slate- [IV.; J. 14) ~ ~'<l)lm<
mel1t in the Bhagavata: (d) 'the prescribed consuming [by only] . mi<il ~l~Rf
smelling [it] of wine and the [prescribed] sacrificing of the animal ~"'-il
is not killing'; and also from the following verses from the fifth sedion As .to [the opinil
of Manu.: (e) 'the ·creator ·himself created the animals for the sake follows]: There isa .
of sacrifice. Sacrifice is for everyone's prosperity. Therefore the [by authoritative stat
killiiIg iri sacrifice is not killing'; and (f) 'the killing prescribed by which is conveyed b)
.the Veda' in this \vorld should be known as not killing. For from these statements now]
the Veda the dharma was born'. statements] do not Sf:
L The quotatibns here are taken from the following places·: answer as follows] :
(a) YogVa. III.82:46. view], there is no.way
(b) SkandP. III.n.25.· and puiposeless 'hami
. (c) not traced. Moreover [it is not 'Pl
(d) BhagP. XI.5.13.· .as saying that ritualI)
(e) Manu. V.39.. nary killing], since it
(f) Manu. V.44. meaning of naii]· h
2. All these statements go to establiSh that killing of sacrificial property which delirr
animals prescribed 'by the Veda is not to be counted as harm construed [with nan]
to life, and thus cannot be the cause of demerit and the resulting ofharming qua harmi
suffering; . which is somehow dif
3. It is rather strange,' though typical, that the smrti statement [such a sentence] wil
quoted by Madhva shouid be· rejected as non-authoritative, 1. I have accepted tl
.. while other sinrCi statements saying more or less the same thing
-edition instead ,C
Should beacc~pted as authoritative enough to support the
author's view. edition.
2. .Tne opponent su
[IV}·13] .. arS[ f~lJI ., f~J.1 S!w.+11~ ., ~m I "if~S"if\Ol'Z3'l~mlif~'l\Ol­
na hil}'lsii is const
• ~~<IT ql'rn<!'fil~'f.~l'RfW~: I that ritual killing
[The reC:>01 for this, the conclusion stated in the last passage is] K'aul.l4abhaWi re
that the .sentences "Killing isnot killing", "Sacrifice is not killing", The particle·
~., .

'JSES AND MOODS
o tha t there is no
n the subSt;OlY of
carry_ away other
no harm to ..these
anCe with dharma
_ of the advice of
-hile following the
from the [follow-
.ing prescribed by
[following] state-
uming [by only]
ing of the animal
m the fifth section
mals for the- sake
1. Therefore the
ing prescribed by
jlling. .For from
7Ving places -:.
ing of sacrificial
counted as hafm
and the resultil-i!:
sm'fli statement
lon-authoritative,
is the same thing
.to support the
e last passage is]
e is not killing",
.,
Witt
---------.-~-----
SECTION FOU:R . 1&1
and "Slaughter is not slaughter", cannot make sense, unless the
furthermost words, i.e., himsa and vadha mean that which causes
demerit: _ ' . ' -" . ' . - ' . .....-.
- 1. J ~st saying that kiiling is not kl1!irigdoes not make s~nse. It
must mean that killing in. this case is nqi; the. same as killing
elsewhere, which is the cau~e of demedt. Th~s the sacrificial
killing prescribed by the Vedas, from which after all the dharma
was born, does not entail demerit. and the resulting suffering.
[IV.' J. 14] ~ ~"1J~T<rt <{~?liill:'<!~~~ m'<!'limfui a;;r I c«.j~<rl­
m~l:&:l~rmRt:i 3{""f<f<'llq~'Iil~~;;r!ffcr'lWrar'li<q~ ~<qfu­
~1'<l.1 3{",,~'!n:q~l<{l+!i'i Cl~~q~:· I
As to [the opinion that the above argument is .not proper, as
follows]: There isa difference between-harming .which is enjoined
[by authoritative statement] and just any harming. [And it is this
which is conveyed by statements such as hi'IJZsii na hi'IJZSii,' so that
these statements now] make sense [thus interpreted]. Hence [these
statements] do not serve to prove [the view above]. [To this we
answer as follows]: That is not -[acceptable]. For, [under this
viewL there is no way of eliminating -the equality _of [ritual harming]
and PUfpos€less harming [since they are' now both merely hil!'lsii].
Moreover [it is not -proper to Claim that na hi'IJZsa is to be interpreted
as -saying that -ritually enjoined killing is merely different from ordi-
nary killing], since it is an established principle that [absence, the
meanil1g of naii] has its counterpositiveness' delimited by the
property which delimits the class of things [denoted by]' the item
construed [with nan]. [That is, na hi~nsii must denote an absense
of harming qua harming]. Otherwise [if na hi'IJZsii denoted 'a killing
which is somehow different from others] one could; improperly, use
[such a sentence] with reference to killing·which is not ritual.
1. I have accepted the reading &""m<!'!f~l<{l+!i'i of the Bombay
-edition instead ,of the .3{""~1 <{m'1~I:qI+!fit of -the Benares
edition.
2. Tlie opponent suggests that tlie negative particle nan in hi1!ISii
na hi'IJZSii is construed with hi1J'lsii, so that the statement conveys
that ritual killing [vaidhaht1!isii] is distinct from ordinary killing.
Kaul).QabhaWi refuses this as follows:
The particle nan denotes absence (abhiiva). .That which is
 ---.----

182 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS SECTION FOUR

absent is called the abhiiViapratiyogin. This must be delimited that it must be c

by a property. Sitnilarly, the thing absent, denoted by' hilJlsii, since the prohib
is related with absence, just as the items nan and hil'fZsft are obvious that hi1
syntactically related. There is also a property which delimits fore, if the stater
the property of being related, the anvayitavacchedaka.. Now, sa~rificial ki!lin~
there is an accepted principle which applies in interpreting but also does p
sentences with the negative particle nan. Absence has its ·praH- that meaning is
yogitft delimited by the property which is !anv,ayitiivacchedaka. [IV. J. 16] ;or ~QI~1f:1'
For example, if one says nilagha{o na 'there is not a blue pot', gF'l~i u<
the anv!ayitftvacc,hedaka is the property blue-pate ness; and
Nor can it be Ci
the pratiyogitii is delimited by this property. Otherwise, false
repeating [the same
statements are possible; The sentence na ghaJo'tra 'there is not
bition]. It is not I
a pot here', denotes the absence of a pot. Hence the property
purpose [of {heir 0'
delimiting the pratiyogiUi of the absence' here is potness. Now,
[in the M.S.] woul,
if this same property delimited what was absent when one said
. nilaghd{Ona, the following would result: one could say na 1., An anuviida c is
~vailable from .
ghatalJ, even if there were indeed a blue pot present.
claiming that it j
In the present case, the anv,ayin in na hitllSii ishil!!sli.
,quoted .above ir
Hence, as in <[ <{'!:: (where the anv,ayitiivacch-edaka ispotness) that the sacrifici
the, anvayitiivacchedaka must be a. general property, not a pro- claimed in the i:
perty such as particular~harming-ness. Arid it is this property mat sacrificial
which has to delimit the abhavapra.t!iyogitii. (See Introduction create demerit; 1
[K...:2] ), Put simply, na hi1f1Sii must convey the absence of halm- been said that 1
ing qua harming. 'To make sense of a statement such as hifflsa na the injunction I
hilpsii, one says that the second item hil'fZsiidenotes harming all killing. It i,
which does not produce s i n . ' . that this difficU:
[IV. J. 15] <[ 'if ~:&::'fTq;;fR'IlT ~ 'R'>~:
I u'-iT (:l@I2!IR2r1'('l';;rf;'r't;~ as repititions of
prohibition. TJ
q<f<reT~ ~v:rf~; I fliMR'tI'l'lT'FfI'l'l\T uID''iJli'( I siu~­
2. Kal1J}.Qabhatta:
;;f<['li1<Ef[1'(<li ;;iI-'lu '{<~Hi:l+J:. I calling somethir
Nor [can it be saJd that] all it means is that [hitl/sii] does not not possible to
cause unmitigated d~merit. If it is taken that way, [these statements] If another purp<
will be futile as the resulting meaning will be that [hinlSii] produces meaning to be ;
hath desired and undesired results .. This is [already]. understood possible. Thus,
from the injunctive and prohibitive sentences. For the same reason, showing that s
the view that it is the absence of the. property of being the cattse of cannot be callI,
something desired that is to be:signified is also toberej'ected. gathered 'from j
1. Sirice sac'rificialhinzsii is prescribed by an injUnction"it follows 3. The tatprakhyi
;;NSES AND MOODS SECTION FOUR 183

that it must be a means to something desired. At the same time,

must be delimited
since the prohibition na hitflSyiit does prohibit hi'lJ'lsii, it is also
denoted by' /ziJ!Zsii,
obvious that hi'lJ'lsii must cause something undesirable: There~
wi/, and hi'lJ'lsii are
fore~ if the statements quoted before are interpreted to mean that
,rty which delimits
sacrificial killing does not just create demerit pure and simple,
~acchedaka, Now,
but also does produce some merit, they will be u.seless, since
.es in interpreting
that meaning' is already available in the way explained above.
sence has its 'praa-·
'wayitiivaccitedaka. [IV. J. 16) ., ~~1~!f:!"1"'liTri:r" ~r",,,rcr '!l'"'P'l:. I ~rcr m~'fi~ ~~~~1<I:. I
is not a blue pot', 3F'!~i ~,~~~uT\,"%"sre~<I:. I
olue'pot'ness; and Nor can it 'be Claimed that these [statements] may be taken as
'. Otherwise, false repeating [the same thing signified by the injunction and the probi-
I!o'tra 'there is not bition]. It is not possible to do so when they can have ariother
lence the property purpos'e [of their own]. Otherwise the section called tatprakhya
~ is potness. Now,
[in the M.S.] would be meaningless.
;ent when one said
'1. An,anuviida isa statement which just repeats wmething already
one could say na
available from other sources. In this case, the opponent is
present,
claiITling that it is not necessary to interprete the smrti statements
I hi1?zsii ishi1!zsii.
quoted .above.in such a way that we would get the conclusion
'hedaka is potness) that the sacrificial killing does not cause demerit. As has been
:opcrty, not a pm· Claimed in the last passage, they can be interpreted just to mean·
it is this property fuatsacrificial killing, unlike ordinary killing, does not only
(See Introduction create demerit, but alsO can cause merit. But against this it has
ie absence of halm- . been said that this information is already available to us from
It such
. as himsii
'
na the injunction prescribing it and the prohibition that prohibits
i denotes harming all killing. It is in answer to this that the opponent now says
that this difficulty can be solved by accepting these statements
as repititions of the information got from the injunction and the
~lrIf.rID~9.n.f~~
prohibition. Thus they can come under the heading anuviida.
~"ll<t. I oi~ ~i!- 2. KaUQ.Qabhatta rejects this by pointing out that the device of
calling something an anuviida can be resorted to only when it is
[hi1?zsii] does not not possible to find any purpose of its own for the statement.
[these statements] If another purpose can be shown as being served then that is the
[hi1?lSii] produces meaning to be accepted, and calling it an anuviida. is no longer
ready] understood possible. Thus, since these statements can serve the purpose of
.r the same reason, showiI)g that. sacrificial· killing does not cause demerit, they
being the cattse of cannot be called mere repitions .of the information already
,be .rejected. gathered from the injunctiQn and the prohibition.
;.unction, it follows 3. The tatprakhyiidhikar.atza section is on ~<~<i' :ql~l~B:.
184 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS SECTION FOUR

'(M.s., 1.4.4.4.). The sentence discussed in this section is 2. The aphorism' h~

arfl1it;t ~fu' Now the problem arises as to whether the [IV.J.9].
word agnihotnri here should be taken t6give the name of the 3. Kaul,l~abhatta hen
sacrifice concerned. Otherwise it should be considered a gUlJa- father Railgojibha1
, v:idhi, in which case, gIving the name of the deity to whom the able to me.
sacrifiCe is 'to be offered. The opponent's view is' that this' sen-
tence gives the name of the deity. The Bmil 'deCision however [IV. J, 18 J u:<i "~(::T;g:+i1
,,,
is that it cannot be taken as the name, of theqeity, because.there c!T<'l'i1'-l" '"f
is another sentence which does furnish the name of the deity to l!\]l:{~I<l:lqi<r
whom, this particular sacrifioe is to he offered. This sent~nce is
.,_.' • • . _, . ," ,' . . _," ,_ I, . -. "
Thus in statement:
, '"arm~fcr~i:!lrc!1:m: <:'11~ Since, there" is tliis other sentence etc., it is the property ,
which has already given the, name of the deity; the wor'dagm- as the criterion for deci(
, hotr;a is to be taken, as the ,name of the sacrifice concerned, and with ,adharma. Thus
not of the deity. " : ,', , , ' , - , ',,- statements, there is ll(
4. Now .this whole reasoning would be meaningless' if ,,the oppo-- sacrifice when it is pn
nent's view iii this 'present case is tei be adopted by calling the 1. The part of the '
smrti staternerHs, mere repitions. In that case,agniliotra' does The verse only me
not have to he taken as the name of the sacrifice, but, Can be about taking win.
taken asa repititionof the infonnationabout the deity, which of the 'general im
'is already obtained fr()m the sentence agnirjyotilj etc. , ,, ' understand the m
[ly. J. 17] c!<:+!I~Fff.r'll q:« t(1':IT1'[I'I: ' ![fcr1~nfcr ., a.C! .~'1 <:'-liI~ -~.n'WT­ by the Veda is per
~I:qj "~HL ~'!If.l'CTI"!c!:" "«'if<l'Cfi~if' ~'1 'llt(;;r;:p.fl~rrnr I ,Veda including th
arC! q:'11=!1l'lC!1 0l11Bif ~BrCllI.I"3T~mRr~ $tI:I« ~fcrl 3TCI wise be a cause 01
q:'1 'CTtr<'1l'C!ii<'1<!t: <iI.hi[l:ir''1m:<t~Hl>fI' :,,-rnJj<t<i1<Fc!~ m'CTir 2. I have accepted th
,...,; ~.' ,..... -, .~" '~ . "; . !' . ' '
~C! ~?T"-l" ~<>f<:+!I,t('l5[{Uf'[<l1 0<l~'l'IC!B:. I q;;;q;:II<;[•••![ffi'RJ: 0
, "Therefore the, absence ~f demerit a;~~rs be as conveyed by 'to- sense than 'C!1l,~ 'CT.
denotation. alone. That is 'why, while ,counting ,the tendemeriis in edition. '
the Skandapurana, it is only the, unprescribed kilLing that' IS -men- [IV; 1.19] ar~g
~

q,W(
tioned as causing demerit, in the' foliowing sentehce: "and Idlling
which is not prescribed"., That is \Vhy bhagavan Vy~sa has com- fq'C!l~;i c!~'1,
,;' ('

posed theaph9l'ism asuddhamiti oenna, sabdiJ,f;. ; That is why my . 'l'Sf"W1N <rI

revered father 'has explained [this ap)loris'flll, iIi' his, Vitti as follows : a:Tfufu~n1fC!
The only way. of finding out what ill dharma arid what is qrJhar'/nja is
Or let it [causing
a ,Vedic injun~tion, a,?-d the ?resc~ibed IdlFrig i1'.n:eriti~ne~ ~s r%h,arma , taking wine. The ISh:
[Ill the Veda]. Therefore, It [tile. presenbed kIllmgj IS l)ot adharma.
taking through [smelli
This is the meaning 'of the aphorism. , . ': ',.' " ' 1 ', •._~,1. ",". ' ".. , , ' ,
, '. ' , ".... '. . ',"! .. ' • .~, -,. ..,
cOrisideratibn'the fact t
1. The part of the verse quoted here as coinirig from the SkaridP.
" is also fouridin Manu. XII.7.
,
"
• ,
" ,'c:,',
.~. r '.\ \. ," ., _f ~. .., • ~.
tiohof a verysmalleXp
 ENSES AND MOODS
in this section is
, as to whether the
ve the name of the
considered a gu~a­
deity to whom the
iew is' that this sen-
al 'deCision however
qeity, because ,there
lame of the deity to
I
d. This sentence
\ .' .
is
this other sentence
~ity; the ~Ol'dagni­
ifice concerned, and
ngless 'if ,the oppo-
lpted by, calling the
ase, 'agnifiotra' lloes
acrifice, butcilll be
.ut the, deity, which
~otilJ etc. ","
~9 ~.it, <::o:r'1l'ilTUf-
iiI'! tflq'~<f-I1~T'fC[T I
~ ~l«' ~fct I aTe!
'l;jir~iRT",T;;i'lTl;jir
,. .. .
-be as conv~yed. by
the tendemefits in
kllUng that i~ inen-
;ehce: "and killing
in Vy~sa has com-
. ',That is why my
isvrtti as follows :
Wh~t is adharma is
.ehtionedas dharma
i ~gj i~ !).Otf r:ulh~rma.
SECTION FOUR 185
2. The aphorism has already been explained in my •notes on
[IV,J.91, ,'
3. KaUl)'Qabhatl;a here mentions a, vrtti on the,Brahrnasutra by his'
father'Railgojibhatta. This vrtti however has not been availc
able to me.
[IV. J. 18] o;oi "il<::I~~1 &: f;or~l'iT" ~''11~ il<:;fel&:a,'!?!'! "lll~SI;j+lfu'i<'5~
(I~ ~,.... ,...., ~ ,
(mq'1l'~ 'C( ogR:'~I'fa ~rcT 'll+!1;:'la: O;'la <:;:q 'li'R!;or'!i "q;orlO;{
l;ll.:ll-l~l<:;l'li'r !.T"foF'CT: I
Thus in statements such as "dharma was born from the Veda"
etc., it is the property of being prescribed by the Veda that is given
as ,he criterion for deciding the import as to what is dharma or mi'xed
, with ,adharma. Thus taking this as the general meaning of these
statements, there is no impending demerit in taking wine [in the
sacrifice when if is prescribed].
L The part of the verse quoted here is from Manusrorti V.44,
The verse only mentions hi'l!lsii, and' does not mention anything
about taking wine in sacrifices. That is why, consideration
of the 'general import' of the verse is to be .taken in order to
, understand, the meaning that not only just killing prescribed
by the Veda is permissible, but also that anything prescribed by'
Veda including the taking of wine in. the sacrifice cannot like-
, wise be a cause' of demerit.
2. I have accepted the readings "lir~s"!+fI~'1<o;'t and u:a<::>-f'Ii'l'C(<{-
'f,'ii'1;:rwr. _.~CI: of the Bombay edition as they make better
sense than .m'ill;jl-TI~~ an d U:'CT<::ii'fi'l'C(<{'fi"q'll"l' of the Benares
edition. ', , ,
[IV. J.l9] aT~g ~Cl1:'lmHI~i;o.W;~glqfu~oi:;I" CloT\q:a+ill1'l'CTI~<mcirir~~ ,
., . foNI~~'CT~<ti;ij'i""~:rcf ~mi'<[ ';~'11lr~;ori1q' :;i-li-=ilfu. -"." .
. '[F.f<il'<:lll'i!
"
~:'
_.
~;:i'11 . ~'qcfiRtcll~
,.-.:J "_.
'~m1fG:<lrfct~"qQ'l>:rfu~l;jl~<{
. .,_. """
~fu~~ l!<ftl~h:flo<!~ I "
Or let it ,[causing demerit] be a desired result in the case of
taidng wine .• The Bh~gavata verse quoted', aireai:ly prescribes this '
taking through [smelling with] nose and the wise should take into'
consideration' the fact that on the strength of the following prescrip-
tioh of a verY smailexplatoIy rite; there is no difficulty': " [the routine
 , - - - - -, -~ -- - ------- -_._- - - - - - - -

186 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS SECTION FOUR

rite of] sondhya performed outside purifies [the demerits caused by [involved in any saCI
the following prohibited things); a lie, runeln)f wine, experiencing the act] . It is with '
sex during the day, and [partaking of] the food of an untouChable;' . svalpo,lJ 'very little.'
1. The verse quoted here is taken from BrParnS[Jl. 6.146. such acts is known]
[IV. J. 20] q,'~ ;r'iH~9 'I~~1jI~f+r<lf<rl~19N Wlf91lf: I Cl~l '<1 +:rl19CII
is not killing". For
as in anudarii kanya
ol[ll:i'1 'fRl§f~ q~~~l>:f9'9'1!1~''f RlJfl~B: I 9'9<i '<1 one, by way of doubl
"~H~o/i'l: ~H~'IR~n~: ~!!t<l9li~: ~'<f<o~ '1IQ'fjQl<:fI<5B: I be stated, on the basi
'fj~lu:. I ~w ~9 'f&<'f~fuI" l[t<llR I no sin [is involved] i
Others, however, [maintain that] there is indeed some .demerit [to have] the meani
in killing animals even in a sacrifice. Thus bhagaviin Vyasa has de- impossible to restricl
cided by quoting the statement of Pancasikhacarya in the Patafijala possible [in such w;
Bhli~ya. This statement is as follows: "Let there be very slight 1. For a discussior
mixture [of demerit], which however can easily be got rid of, and is honey, see [IVJ
thus to be forgiven. It is not capable of removing the merit [of the Z. For a discussion
sacrifice]. Why not? Because there is a lot more merit," etc. a sacrifice, see [
1. The quotation taken is from the YogBhli. on the Y.S. II.I3 3. The part of the'
(CaIcujtta ed., p. 75; Bombay ed., p. 73). This statement is [IV, J. 22) 81Cl 1:;91:
going to be discussed in the next passage, so that no elaboration S[~ !fliTG:
is necessary here, also ct. SaTaKau.p,. 39.
2. The reading .;:n'l,};lS[J;!1<"l{ of the Benares edition is obviously
r.: lif[<'li<'l
~iim
I '1',
'<
wrong.
[IV· J.21) 81~>~:
~ . ~ ~

I ~o/iq': <J'f.~: 'lEJ11l:l3'I;;r<'f: llt<l91'f: ~1",'f<9<:f: I 'i:J:

,It is for this vel
[by which he means
+!~ql3'+'l'fCl1;;Jm~ l[91'l'!!'!Riol ~1~R'r ~;;J I ~Cl'(!!~~­ expiatory rite. [Anc
~~'fT ~:<3~'f WTI~W1I;;r'li<9Tf<tt<lfl:Iii\"flil: I ~~ - 'ifcr I is not performed, nev
-.::" ' . ".

~q<'i '<1 "CR:!lT?l:tr ~\3!1 S9'i!:" l[fcr ~u:. "~W,'li;l[l"l[fu

vamarsa!h.. 'worthy of ,

that persons desirous

Cj~ S~'l'T2T'fj<91u:. I '1, '<1" 81~:" , l[fcr'f~11l9T'~~T«1'f1~liRt9:.
whicq ne~essaJj,ly: cc;
~ffi~ '1" 3l'<d91<r . it~CjT"'fCl1iiIfu-': 'lJt-:f'f1J:1 trTi:n«:[Cl:' kp.§al.qsya eki[l)€~J J:
3F[fflf;jq'i!~ m'fT· iiCl'1 'l3'~~i uir'<11~i+:r~io:. I . [Pcmca§ikh;;t} •. ans,~et
The meaning of this [statemen't] is'~s follows :(ft is to be] 11' <t Sal,'aKau. I?'
construed: 'Let there be a very small mixture -"a demerit resulting [rv.J :23]" '1'<1 ~~
from the killing of: an animal.' Objectiol).:, 48 [there is no inclina-
tion] to eating food mixed wtth honey ~nd poison, so there would "
f.j; +11~mil
.
, '~

l;~rCfClO'l
[now] be no inclination to [performing] it [an act which results
in sin]. Answer: The suffering [which results from] that [act] ~is <rT<r~, 'C[
permeated by a larger happiness, so that, like the exertion etc. Nor should one
 ES AND MOODS
SECTION FOUR 187
]erits caused by
le, experiencing
[involved in any sacrifice] , it. does not cause [one to turn away from
the act]. It is with tjlis in mind thllt [thetea,cherPaiica§ikhasaysj
n untouchable".
svalpa1.i'very little.' And the slightness [of the sin I:esultipg from
t •. 6.146.
such acts is known] from the teaching, "Hence, killing at a sacrifice
([~T "'1 'l1'1'I([T is not killing". For [l&.ere] the [particle] nan has the meaning 'slight',
Jj]~B: I O(;:r;:i ;:r as in anudma kanya 'a girl with no (i.e. a small) belly'. Nor should
one, by way of doubting [this view1loint, say the following] : Let it
be stated, on the basis of the same reason [- the same teaching] , that
no sin [is involved] in that [sacrificial killing]; [this] by taking nan
d some demerit [to have] the meaning 'absence' as in agha~(/IZz 'no pot' .. For it is
z Vyasa has de- impossible to restrict a general prohibition [against killing] if it is
n the Rataftjala possible [in such way to maintain its effectiveness].
be very slight 1. For a discussion of the, ellting of food mixed with poison and
)t rid of, and is honey, see [IV.B.27].
te merit [of the 2. For a discussion on how exertion is not a deterent to performing
erit," etc. a sacrifice, see [IV.B.27], Introduction [1-2].
the Y.S. ILl3 3. The part of the verse quoted is from Manu. '5.39.
lis statement is [IV· J. 22] 80m U;<'!l~ 1 ~qR~~: 1 ~q1'1m m;qf~W! q 'iT'!';q: 1
; no elaboration
3!~ ~llr<::([: mm;:r'<i "IRR(i ([.:nft mlmWl: ~l!l1i: 1 ~~

on is obviously f~ ~~,'f,i!s 9iTir'111T~T<:([.:*l'i<fTfG:§i{~:<?fl'f. 1 3!([ 'Il;'lr~ ~~­

<:i:tfu 1 ~"'£9tff I 9i<:+!I~fu I ~'<R;qfu I ~.05 @,<rTfG: I, ,
,It is for this very reason that [Paficasikhi'l] says suparihara~z
i ;<[1re:,;q;:O(;q: I '13
[by which he means] 'capable of being overcome' through a slight
i'[ 1 <IS([~~~T3- expiatory rite. [And] even if, through oversight, the expiatory rite
:rr~ 1 ~ej~ ~ 1 is not performed, nevertheless, [says Pafica§ikha, the sin is] sapratya-
~~T 31i;:m' ',<i~t\· vamarsd!h 'worthy of .being countenanced'. For it is indeed the case'
f· -,'

fTo(T'~'n"r;ql<:Hjlto( -
,
that p~r~ns desirous of a: gre~t :result tplerate a small unpleasantness
~. . ' . •f which necessarily; cccom~anies it,l:Ience[dqes Paiica§i~] ,say
!fB: 1 ~1iw<m: '
kJda{qsy,q ~etc,.:'I~t!) ~i,20J;~' ': [To;';therq1}estion;;Jfo~)y~a;t;[r~?on?', > .,.

W;W~ikhal:an$w,et§.t,~U§a:la:1JZ,N~ ~tc. .. ' . ',i;',;I:'',;; ,(t, . . . . ....

[It
is to be] I;. cf.. sa-:ra..Kau.p, 4} .• ':,;',:.::" . '~ , . ,,:;:,J": '•.. ,;
:merit resulting .
'e is no inc! ina- [IV. J. 23f "I"f iW~"''11q'jq~ifi <i~~iT<:irT(<t~ ~~' ~ffi'!!<tl ~q
so there would fl'; llT~fufci 'O(ro<1+I.. 'I ~;;d'i'<T""~I<J:. I ~~."qT'i'm;q~<:'1
t which results <:~foRro!p.[l'1re<'fr'i;qQ'Ir 0"{f'('1Q1Q<mftt ~.mO(l:J; HFfl'<l 1
1] that [act] is ;ql'f<:'1 "'1 <lgfcRrc'1'1T'lT<'fm'<"Rl'1T, ([~~l;o(<fu:r <IS<Of9i;;Q"lT<J:. I
e exertion etc. Nor should one [object by] saying [the following]: This is
._----- ----~~--~-~------

188 . THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS SECTION FOUR

acceptable if indeed the heaven is greater than the sin which results [IV· J. 2513i<:£PTT ~
from killing [in a sacrifice]. .But. what is the authority for this? f;r~f,
[This objection IS not to be made], since the answer has already been Alternately, let
given [namely, that the statement ~asmiid yajiie vadho'vadhaf;, pro- pectively from the Sl
vides this]. Moreover, from the fact that the expiatory rite for the Nevertheless, the inc
sin resulting from the killing of an animal [at a sacrifice] is accom- [that person's] desi
plished with an extremely small expenditure of money and effort, just as [a person] h
one infers that the sin to be eliminated by it is also very slight. And, .cause he sees a desi
since the ~acrifice itself is accomplished with great expenditure of desirable results] .
money and effort, one assumes that the heaven which results from
]. Previously it w:
it is [also] great.
sacrifice must bi
flV.J.24 1 3FT \l:'iT:a-i:t"f~Cf,"'fi<'ll'l'-m",,1't s<ft;:itTit~~'Il?J1 n'fIJf1iffl:qT~~lfu:':"!1 the demerit prot
:t;:~\'fIU ~fcrT-:lIJf1R~q'll'ii\cn I <rol;:Cf<TCff~"lfu:'Jfi'l:(Glq'f;B~ . Now it is said 1
.... r-. ,...... ,..... (I :--. ... ment that, the
CI",,! "!~'fi<'lT;:a~W<f<;qql'Qre~''fHl:: I a:rCf \l:'f 'HfI~~l:ql'1'RT'lo:;q
still no difficult
qf6Cfl{ I ,,'fifSr.'1q,"~l1 <i'fl'!?!1'll'it "!<flfcr I particular result
[In accord with Paficasikha, then the sacrificial killing of animals . is desired, there
does result in sin and suffering]. Hence is justified the stream of by the killing a
suffering described in the Veda and the Pufifu).as as befalling Indra actions are brol
etc. anhe hands of Raval!a;' Mahisasura etc., even wheri· they were though· he know
enjoying the fruits of a hundred Asvamedha sacrifices. The coming because of his d .
into being. of the fruit of sin produced by' killing etc. in the sacrificf'!, deed (d.' f;rfil
right in the middle of the enjoyment of the fruit of the sacrifice is there will be su
established by [this]. justification, that is why it is said in the re- instigated to pe:
maining part of Paficasikhacarya's Statement that even in heaven, can be obtained
[he1 will be experiencing a little misfortune.
1. . Becoming Indra, i.e., the king of gods is a fruit to be won by [IV· J. 26] 3i<f \l:'f
performing it hundred Asvamedha sacrifices. There are; in the 1'lllf'f~
PUl'8.'I).as,· examples of many kings such. as Nahu~a etc. who got \l:'1 c"!q
thi~ high position on. thestrehgthof their.pe'rfotminga hundred·
3TIB+1'l'l
ASvamedha sacrifices. But' eveIi.,enjoYing" the fruit ofc;these
fq~: I
sacrifices by becoming Indra, did not utterly free thes~ p:Oople
from all troubles.' There were several times when they were ;r~: .~
I
troubled, defeated and even captured by demons such as Ravat.la It is for this re
and Mahi~sura. According to PaficaSikhaaatya, this trouble [act involving actm
taking place in the midst of the fruit of the sacrifices is to be in the eleventh [bot
explained by the little demerit that they incurred by killir!g on their desires] do
animals Jp. these sacrifices. the drinking of liqw
 .NSES AND MOODS
~ sin which results
uthority for this ?
!r has already been
vadho'vadhal;, pro-
liatory rite for the
acrifice] is accom-
money and effort,
very slight. . And, .
~at expenditure of
vhich results from
f' '"" r-
[Cf1 \[tl1l'<;;;"'1ql'r'f,"'~
. q~fu@:q1~:q;:r~q
I killing of animals
tied the stream of
as befalling Indra
n wheri they were
ices. The coming
:c. in the sacrifice,
of the sacrifice is
is said in the re-
~ even in heaven,
'uit to be wori*by·
There are; in the
b.u~a etc. who.got
otminga hundred'
lii fruit of'; these.
free thes~ p~bpl;
when. they were
IS such as RiivaQ.a
itya, this trouble
, sacrifices i5 to be
curred by killing
SECTION FOUR 189
[IV· J. 25] Sl1:[. <n ~@(!;:'8"111;[ii'l(n I cr~:nf[ cr1ctt~10r0ICI:. ~'lf'Wll:J;qq;;rT
f<\~fu9CI:.l
Alternately, let the happiness and suffering [which result res-
pectively from the sacrifices and the killing involved in it] be equal.
Nevertheless, the inclination [to perform] is justified on account of .
[that person's] desire for such [fruit which results from'the act] ,
just as [a person] is inclined [to perform] a prohibited [action, be:
.cause he sees a desirable result arising from it in addition to un-
desirable results] .
]. Previously it was stated that the happiness resulting from' the
sacrifice must be so great that the small suffering resulting from
the demerit produced by sacrificial killing cannot be a deterent.
Now it IS said that, even if it is supposed for the sake of argu-
ment that, the happiness and the suffering are equal, there is
still no difficulty in justifying the inclination to act. If that
particular result which could be got from that particular sacrifice
. is desired, there will be inclination in spite of the suffering caused
by the killing of animals involved in that sacrifice. Prohibited
actions are brought in as an example. lust as a person, even
. though he knows that adultery leads to hell, is still .inclined to it
because of his desire for the kind of happiness derived from thiil
deed (cf. f<\f';r~ ~'l~: ~RI~<!T [IV.B.16] ) knowing that
there will be suffering caused by sacrificial killing, will still be
instigated to perform a saqifice by his desire for heaven which
can be obtained with the aid of a sacrifice.
[IV· J. 26] 3TcI q:9 fq~<i[Gf:Wr ~Bl1~'oi ~R~: I grcr 1I:91'fClH'Iil,,§)
'1F19~ "<!<r l'!11Jfl1m ~"CI: ~n<n,Cl<n ~1'{T<'!+r.i;:r ~tIT I .
q:oie<!<n<!: ~WIT ;:r ,~ ~ fq~;:r f.!~: .~<!~B." 1[fc! I
3lIml'lo:rH9 ~T~cr~1<'11 <!Fr 1;q<J;:j 91 ~ ;:r g ~fu 1;9~ ;:r
fq~: I i'i;rg ~'1 fq~~~i'l'l ~: I S1Q q:11* 1;9"llmfr fu!%:
<1 ~: I ~:~;;p.f.'<nfc:fu 1119: I SlCl q:~G:;;n;:rm f<\ro:1 I
It is for this reason that the discerning do not accept that thi~
[act involving actual harm] is of the highest kind. Hence it is said
in the eleventh [book] of the Bhiigavata: '[The foolish men bent
on their desires] do not know that their own duty is pure, since [not
the drinking of liquor, but] the smelling of liquor is enjoined; [that]
 190 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS SECTION FOUR

so also, the iilm.nbhana of an animal [enjoined by scripture] is not belongs to him] , 11;
harming; [and that] similarly, cohabitation [is enjoined] for progeny, formed as instigatel
not for [mere] pleasure. [The meaning at the base of this.is as
1. If hilllSa is thu
follows] . [These fools] do not know that what is enjoined is
will cause a fal
iila71~bhana,' that is, as shown before, either' a sacrificial giving or
is given that tI
mere touching of an animal, not its harming, [and they do not
the sacrifice, an
recognise this as] their dharma.. On the contrary, they believe that
be considered (
actual harm is enjoined. Hence they do not recognise that their
dharma is a pure one, because [they think it is halming, hence] a 2. The section cal
cause of suffering. Thereby, this [verse] is a censure of the ignorant. [IV. J. 29] l:Ri %,,:
1'1
>..:;J

[IV. J. 27J "~,q~@!q)Sl.1"(!: l;qo'eT[: ~f'B.nR"I: I q~ ~mf.q m'>loerr: f;'j121~

~''1 <m"j;'q ~ '" qI<t.". ~"'~S" jq . UW'<~~ I ~qll~:i f~(r I lol~: 'U
3lU'CIT Bmlll,!~qT: I 3jQ 0:'1 %:Wf{T~ "qTli~q'Rl~ff~T:" ~<l Ql;<iT"'f' "
'i1\"'fm, I lol'>lo"lT: I af.!"1 li;:f)~..n +rR!r,:q"f@ lol'iffi!T ~"lA s:m "~'".ll". I
'
WRl"<'!f
As to [the follo
Later on also [the following statement] is justified; those igno· viidas convey the p
.rant of this, evil [improperly] obstinate, thinking [what they are require these [in ore
doing is] right confidently betray the animals, are eaten by them after worthiness] consist~
· death." Thus [they] do not know [tha,t v,That they are doing] is great.iy undesired re,
· impure. [The.word] as,anta/:l [means] engrossed only in enjoying' worthiness]. There
[the sense objects]: That is why, [Camasai in answer to the king] I ot.her way, it is not j
. ,will say' in. the summation of this, that [these people art!] turned also this" [praisew(
•away from· Viasudeva.· visrabdhiiZz, it should be noted means con· simultaneous applic~
·fident ~hat their desire will be fulfilled by this: in effect, a person is
.1. The verse quoted is BhagP. XI.5.14. It immediately follows able]. It has alreal
yad ghrii'IJabhak~o etc. (XI.5.13). of not entailing sO!
2. viisudevapariinmukha(/. occurs in. BhagP. XI.5.1S. by lIN] because [it
act which produces g
[Iv. J. 28J mei UT~FTT;j~13"r;:i ~'lT~fq I <l~ q'f(jc>\", 1:nQ"l :'!<;q: J:!,<;~g I for through [the he:
'1FT~, U1W~ 'fiT mI-cr I (j~T 'q 'Ii~N'f.<:.Jr +rzJ<i'fq+i, I will produce bad r€
i''-lf ;rFf 'fil:!+!~'l~~: 'Ii<"$lBR ~a:i~<i:. I "I ;PQ1~'! ~!);U~ '1>"'1- quite well denote t
'q1fu:qRrf~:' I ~fu I without any accoml
act]. Thus the folle
As to [the objection that, in this case] , the sacrifice wili not be
[IV. J. 30] q~;:''1li
complete, there is this to be said; Let demerit plague the man.
~~q,'19i
Where is the contradiction to the sacrifice's being complete? Thus
in the kartradhikara1Ja [section1, [Kumarilal bhatta has said,
"whoever, in the midst of a sacrifice, "eats ·kalanja etc., the [demerit
 ..... _ . - ---------------------

1
.j
!

,NSES AND MOODS

SECTION FOUR 191
'( scripture] is not belongs to him] , there is no lack in the sacrifice. It has been per-
lined] for progeny, fonned as instigated."
base of this is as
1. If hilJZsa is thus. said to cause demerit even in the sacrifice, this
lat is enjoined is
will cause a fault in the sacrifice. To this objection, the answer
acrificial giving or
is given that the fault lies with the man, Le., the performer of
[and they do not
the sacrifice, and not with the sacrifice. The sacrifice thus should
" they believe that
be considered complete and fulfilLed.
:cognise that their
halming, hence] a 2. The section calledkantmdhikara1}G is on M.S. III.4.4.12-13.
lre of the ignorant. [IV. J. 29] ~ foi~'lqfa:la'fTlIT~<'l"'!ICl'll<<lll>\qTa:l;ri "e[~~+J:. I a"'T.f '1<"'1,,-
q~ ~~f.<I f<I~o"lT: f;'[I2H~frCliqi'i'f I 3F'l"~RH'l1'11<J:: I SIC! 1l;'!T;:<:j~.'l"'fT?Il'f
;a I i't<lll~:i f'f~: I fcli':r: lITf'i:aol CfT ferfClf<rl1Cl'l"I: <31~tlffi"r I C!?! I <r<,,~Uf
r~~'!'Rl'~!l:~lT:" ~Ci cr;'l"T;:<:j?TT~m(F~Hr: I lIT1;;r~<'I1~<lT~>l1lIT<:''W{
r~ ~<'l"'~ ~fu ~~:q+r, I WRI<'Ir"~ lJi~'l"qm"~T:1>:!TPl;:r: I
As to [the following claim]. It is established for all that artha-
;tified : those igno- midas convey the praiseworthiness of sacrificial injunctions, which
tg [what they are require these [in order to instigate one to action]. And. that [praise-
:aten by them after worthiness] consists in [the sacrificial act] not being followed by
;hey are doing] is greatiy undesired results, since nothing else can. [constitute this praise-
I only in enjoying worthiness]. Therefore; since [that praiseworthines] is got in some.
lswer to the kingJ_t. other way, it is not [assumed] that [iIN which denotes] vidhi denotes
)eople are] turned also this' [praiseworthiness). Nor, [consequently], is there any
noted means con· simultaneous application of an injunction and a prohibition [so that,
in effect, a person is not subject to sin]. That [view is] riot [accept-
amediately fcHows able) '. It has already been noted [see IV.B.27] that [the property
of not entailing something greatly undesired need not be denoted
5.1S. by liN] because [its effect namely, the instigation of a person to an
act which produces good results, not bad ones] , is' otherwise accounted
q1q;:r ~<;q: >!<<;~g I for through [the hearer's] great aversion [to perfonn an act which
IN'f,~ot 'l1Z,;!~C!+J:. I wil! produce bad results for him]. Moreover [the affix lIN] can
Sf,<l\>;Cl'f ~!1u;q 'l?TT- quite well denote that [an action) quickly produces results, this
without any accompanying praiseworthiness [as a qualifier of the
act}. Thus the followers of Sailkhya and Yoga.
icrifice will not be
: plague the man. [IV. J. 30] cr~;:i<!l'{ I ~'lT.f;'j"'l'1 FNClT~~'R!i"HJ:: I ;:r 'if aa: ~
complete? Thus ~'f<iq<'l'f.<;q;:i ~+J:. I ~~<!r: ~0(5¥tfu "CfT1l;:r FNIEf-
bhatta has said, 'fi"''''lqI4~<! ~ll<mt ll:'li ,,~'f,<'iT'lll1<f1<J:: I "~'if~t~­
etc., the [demerit <IT 'cli'fl<J:: I
192 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS SECTION FOUR

This [whole argument about the sin which befalls a person denotation of an injun
who performs a sacrifice] is dubious. For, it has been noted that, along with the propert
from the statements [vadho'vadhaJ). etc., one lmows that] the prohi- absolutely unavoidable.
bition [against killing] does not apply [with respect to sacrifices]. denoted [by IIIV] : the r
Nor is it [really] proper to assume from those [state!l1ents] that feasibility, and the actl
[sin does indeed result from such acts, but that] sin is smalL [Once along with the propert
one accepts that] , by virtue of the prohibition [such as na hiiJ1syat] , unavoidable]. Thus, il
sacrificial killing does [result in] sin, [so that such killing is like any of generating an undesi
other] , it is impossible to restrict [the prohibition] in respect to that properties n1entioned al
[sin which is] the same [for any killing]. This by the principle junction, the property
that, once a. woman has gone out unveiled, it is useless for her to undesired goal [is signi
wear a· veil later. For, [now] the restriction [on the prohibition does not operate in the
serves only to mitigate the sin which results from killing, not to. the sacrifice of an anim
eliminate it, so that the restriction is itself] partly [subject to] In the case of the sye
being invalid. being means to a desir
1, The statements quoted previously say, according to KaUl)Qa- rehited to [the act, not
bhatta, that the prohibition does not operate in the case of the without causing stifferi
sacrificial killing prescribed by the Veda. Now the opponents meaning of the injunct
say that these same statements can be construed to mean that 1. syena is a sacrifi(
the demerit incurred by sacrificial killing is relatively smaller is to achieve the
than the killing not prescribed by· .the Veda.. KaUJ:.l9.abhatta . sacrifice does ach
rejects this by taking recourse to one of the principles drawn· former is hell. ~
from day· to day life.. A woman, once ;;he has gone out in a causing undue sui
public place without adequately covering herself, need not trouble
covering ·herself the next time she goes out.. Thus what is the 2. I have accepted t:
use of restricting ~he scope of the prohibition only in so far as rather than grrr'!'1
the quantity of the demerit incurred from the sanctioned and
unsanctioned killing is concerned? One might as well go all the 3. I have accepted t
way and say that the prohibition does not operate in the case of the Bombay (
of the sacrificial killing. of the Benares ec
[IV. J. 3 J] <{~'F!lj<!t'fq"('H ~1!!1<'fffi<Wau'Fj;~:\.9lT~'li:;:'-.91~<'l+Ifq- [IV. J. 32] gr~,fqr;
Mr<rOJ<f.l If'4OJ'l'a: ~!fflT"i:['i<<i ~futll~'l<'If+Iit<'f'<ih,n~<i ;;Jrl;f«l a&:
m''lm<'l"l!i: I (1'4T· 'if f.riSt"i:[P-li!> ~f.r!i!;;J'i9i<'l~ I <'!lq~: I
MN<.IT 'if ClT~Tf.rm;;J'i9i~1rfu feRTm;;[ MfW~ f.riSt"i:[: I['f<RrS:fu '>\111 ij:{r.'l'i
;:r ,,1j'rful!!1tc ~.,.o:r;'r '1T'f;;J;:r'f;lHfu I o;:>t.,,,t1i!> 'il!i!ffi"i:['1<Ef~fcr­ ~!i!~'Iia~
~l~'l«i<lT{'lTrorn.., M·q$n"i:[ ~a- Ef?:Rr I 1l;<TBf ~'I~
Some, taking recourse to this same explanation, include.in the CTG:l<Ua<l<P
 ,NSES AND MOODS
1befalls a person
ISbeen
. noted that,
liS that] the prohi-
;pect to sacrifices].
[statePlents] that
in is· small. [Once
,ch as na hit}'lsyiit] ,
1 killing is like any
in respect to that
s by the principle
useless for her to
)n the prohibition
Dm killing, not to
Irtly [subject to]
'rding to Kaunda-
in the case of' the
Jow the opponents
rued to mean that
relatively smaller
a. Kalmdabhatta
! principie~ dra~n
las gone· out in ·a
If, need not trouble
Thus what is the
I only in so far as
le sanctioned and
t as well go alf'~he
perate in the case
.nM'I;~JP31;;r.:r'-li<'!+!fct
~<r,qf+rn\,q'<ir,l:f]f<t;r<i
~frr1?!'5Irf'-li<'!~a t
iWa f.ii!l'<i: Wlacr ~Rr
Il;tl~ ~lR!ll;jrf<'!t,Rt-
)n, include in the
..~.
SECTION FOUR J93
denotation of an injunction, llie production of the desired results
along with the property of not generating more suffering than is
absolutely unavoidable. Thus they say that the following three are
denoted [by lIN] : the property of being the means to a desired thing,
feasibility, and the actual generation of the desired object etc. [Le.,
along with the property of not generating more ·suffering than is
unavoidable]. Thus, in the case of a prohibition, it is the property
of generating an undesired thing like that [accompanied by the two
properties mentioned above], that is signified, and in the case of in-
junction, the property of not being the producer of that kind of
undesired goal [is signified]. Because of this conflict, a prohibition
does not operate in the case of a positively enjoined act. That is why
the sacrifice of an animal in the Jyoti~oma is not a cause of demerit.
I
In the case of the syena [sacrifice, however] , . only the property. of .
being means to a desired end and the property of being feasible are
rel1tted to [the act, not the property of producing the desired object
without causing suffering].1'hus· there is no contradiction of the
meaning of the injunction.
1. syena is a sacrifice to be performed in one day. The object
. ·is to achieve the death of orie's enemy. Even though syena
sacrifice dOes achieve this desired· fiuit, its resuit for the per~
former is hell. Thus it does not fulfill the condition of not
causing undue suffering.
2. I have accepted the reading 5[~qq~<rT of the Bombay edition
rather than 8f<{;q;;n:,!qq~'IT of the Benares edition.
3. I have accepted the reading <{F:(!{t<r'-li~:~lm~:@l'5l<l'-li<q~
of the Bombay· edition. The reading <{F(!{t<r9i~:'.~{lM;v.<,!~ .
of the Benares edition is meaningless in the context.
i
[IV. J. 32] 8f~, RF<'-<'ll rfl"(R'i;v.,C/l.O'I ~cf"'<'Il<J:. 9ioi (!;;v'f'-!~I ~~<{9i.
'5I"'l<'1 (!"[l;;<r~fQ ~;;rl .n;:r~~'11~f!9i";;(;:<r~l.O,-! <IF<lD<r9i-
II . ,qiq~: I ~Q'Ilr.<r<€r (!~Rt ~;;r I ~ 9ilfW-ti<i~f;:<l'lf<;le;'i­
I;
~+!llt,r.'-!<lF'Q<l'-l"9i<'!T'l~r;l~>-1'!l1;j 11:« I '1~ ~~, (!;D'f(!<::N: I
~~'{'l«f<l~ (!~Rr ~ I 11:<11;'1 ~'l~q~'R!'~<{ f<I~'I't<'!I<lt'll<J:. ,
11:CIB1" 5!C/<l9i~ :q'-!~fil,<!c<r'll'llf!f!l~~ F'fjr,,'il~'5I<{~ !:I'l'il:f]qffi: I
d<::l;\f(!<I<[OlC/~f<Iq'l~: <m'5l<l9i <'!fl1lTI<q'<i1<'-!<:'!l>-1 ~. ~;;r ,
..
<-.
..-.----~-, ..
 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS SECTION FOUR
194
able]. (d) [When'
(f[UJo:rr~'li~'Cf,~ql'.r~qflq:q~:<arjr.:f.f,''1B{ "f.<'i'§r~ sfrt we mean [that the ;0
tf'i'l1'( fEi·,:q~fi';qlil<n~inq~: I B'IiOl~qflq'1'f;~:~n"l~<i "'f ;:r not produce a hards]
'<'1Tmmi:l sqlrq for<,,'<l<nlil: ,,'11'( I ~"I1~1'1~?~n"lit'll«i ~I~i'i'li'i'i_ at the time [it is pel
~ftr ~;;r I '<'1fr1m[+niq:l3<;'11fit ~<l~~"I1<l1'1,~;:r f<1"".~­ eating of kalanja al1
"fTIiITq~: I <Tl;'IlT"I<T'Il«i eI'i'lmm - ~~ I " '<'!ReI[ ;:r '®!'t(f '"
some man or other SI
the object of intense
"~ui'l <T ~?[<r~l;it'!T'l:."~<"IR~"-1"'Ilo:rr,,?[mRqIilTTfqfum&:­
junction [lIa kaZafijaJ
'1~~lfl'(l "<T 'Il0l'§rl=(' ~'1.f[~~ ;:r\'lil"l~'Ii''1jl'[I'I'I'r liI'lic'l- over, even the Jyoti~
tf.l'[~ sfq (fl'[~~ ~~ph;i¥t~ (f~l'[j<rftf.l'[~<T '~rNQT~'liQltN: I a hardship, which is
Concerning this view, -the following is to be considered. It is meaning of the injU!
refuted. (e) [When
difficult to explain what constitutes being unavoidable. How, then,
hardship] the essenti
can this [be consideredJa 'denoted [meaning of lIf,r]? [The idIow-
_ ing suggestions are -made to explain precisely what constitutes being a -distinct kind of ha
ship produced by [s;
unavoidable; (a) [That hardship] is said to be unavoidable which
way or other, distinc
results from- [the same action as] produces what is desired. [if one
futation of the mean
wishes to kill a btiihmr11t}a, his death is a desired result. It follows,
unavoidable] which (
then that] the hell which results from killing a briihmmJa is, [though
[Consider] prohibitio
not desirably] an unavoidable [hardship] . [Hence] this is unaccept-
not eat if one has fev,
able. (b) [That hardship is unavoidable] which oCCUl:S only where
·
has an eye dlsease-. "
or :when a desired result occUrs (lit. which is pervaded by the desired
result). This is [also unacceptable]. If [that hardship is unavoid- unjustified. In a pn
able which occurs only] at the time [that the desired results are got] ; sure, possible [to say
then it follows that then even those exertions necessary to perform a of not producing hel
sacrifice are not to be considered unavoidable. Hence the meaning immediately discernil
of an injunction [namely instigating one to perform such sacrificial tions, as are stated in
acts] is contradicted. [And if that hardship is unavoidable which purpose, so that it is I
occurs only] on the place [where the -desired resul ts are achieved], {of- the property of
the same fault [applies, for, the place of the ultimate desired result is view] ; the meaning {
heaven] . (c) [That hardship is unavoidable] which precedes the 1. for (f), d. sabc
desired results, this [too] is unacceptable. [The knowledge which Cf~g;<;ag;
directly prompts one to activity is the knowledge that the act is a fIV. J. 33[
means to a desired result]. The present [actions which lead to un- s:fcr Wi.!",
'lvoidable hardships are not so, hence] serve no purpose in one's ;;{r"qrr.rrq
volition. Hence, this is not properly a meaning of an injunction. 9ii;r.'.{(f "Z'
And [if one assumes that] this does prompt one to action, it will <m:l'1Tt+l1
follow that a person will be prompted to perform an act which can be l!v~qq~
'lccomplished only with a great expenditure of money and effort but
Actually, even i
which yields only a minute desired result. - -[And this is not accept-
 'ENSES AND MOODS SECTION FOUR 195

11 'ii<O~l1a:r1t SJq
able]. (d) [When we speak of] the production of desired resUlt,
we mean [that the act' produces what is desired and. that] it does
F1'f;~:@I;;{~<<i '<f <r
not produce a hardship which is the object of an intense aversion
i"!~:@T;;j<r'fl,<i (T~"'fllii
at the time [it is performed]. This too is unacceptable. For, the
<i;F-rnlW'l',2t;:r fe1~1P~- eating of kalafija also possesses the property of not producing in
" ;;<!Rei'r <r ':!~'T<f '" some man or other such [a temporally specified] hardship which is
',"Ilmf¥;tlifr:r<q R1ct I~_ the object of intense aversion, so that the meaning of a negative in-
'1il;;j., 'jii''11111 '1ifl C['f,i''1- jnnction [na kaMfijattl bhak~ayet] wou1d be [here] refuted, More-
over, even the Jyoti~toma sacrifice. is not such as does not produce
:r~ "~rN<ll~'f.(Tl~: I
a hardship, which is the object of any aversion at all, so that the
! considered. It is meaning of the injunction [jyoti§fomena yajeta] would [here] he
dable. How, then, refuted. (e) [When we spea.1( of an act which produces unavoidable
fN] ? [The Ivllow- hardship] the essential meaning is [that the act] does not produce
It constitutes' being a distinct kind of hardship. This too is unCl-cceptable. The hard- .
unavoidable ",hich ship produced by ,[sacrifices] such as the Jyoti;;toma are, in some
is desired. [if one way or other, distinct ,ones, so that [this view] results in the reo
result. It follows, futation of the meaning of an injunction, (f) [That hardship is
ihmmJa is, [though unavoidable] which does not lead to helL This too is unacceptable.
e] this is unaccept- [Consider] prohibition [stated in] medical texts, such as "One should
occurs only where not eat if one has fever", "One should not approach a woman, if one
.lded by the desired has an eye disease." In the present view, these ·prohibitions are
llxlship is unavoid- unjustified, In a prohibition such -as na kalanja1l1 etc., it is, to be
ed results ar~' "O'ot] , sure, possible [to say] that nan conveys the absence of the property
,sary to perform a of not producing hell [i.e., it does lead to hell] . [For there is no
rence the meaning immediately discernible purpose herel. (However], such [prohibi-
! rm such sacrificial tions, as are stated in medical texts] do have immediately discernible
f., mavoidable which purpose, so that it is not possible [here for nan to convey] the absence
,; Iits are achieved] ,;~k [of'the property of not leading to hell]. Hence, [in the present
tle desired result is view] , the meaning of (these prohibitions] will be refuted,
'hichprecedes the 1. for (f), cf, sabdasaPra, p, 147.
knowledge which
that the act is a nV. J. 33( Cf~g;>;(Tg; ~i.t;r (T·"T >:i'r\f.lS'Jq "IFf ;r cr~l ~tSf: <! Q;'I ll'laa;rp:r
which lead to un- ~fct f<!~wn~f'i:<f'll~q<i f.p;1:f,i7.+( I ;:r ~<i ;;;'-llfctffillF:ft <mi~{1I­
purpose in one's ;;j;:'lQl'n'l''lT fu!!l;:rltlll~'l'lq'~mT1D<:Ilfl'l' ~it,q'<il<1fT~T o:rf'i:<I:
of ·an injunction. 'Il~r."I(T ~fct 'IT'Oll+( I mIlfT~~(p1i[Tr.mmlif~sfcr m[<T+l<fetoftlliro-
to action, it will ~l'll<+lrs,~ <l'1<'IR'l'~ ";l:Ii"li;o~;;~mm~ tll::<lTmtJ
act which can be
ley and effort but ll~~qq~~~lifTqq(rii(T''1m: I
;his is not accept- Actually, even if the Vedic [utterances] signify that, only he
196 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS

who does not have such an aversion is inclined to act, .not any other.
Thus it is fruitless to imagine that kind of denotative function for
injunction. [Objection]: Since there is the difficulty that there will
be the demerit caused by killing animals in Jy~toma etc., the leaders
of wciety would not be inclined to perform it. It is in order to
[V. I] 05Ts~hlli'[ I ITT
avoid this difficulty that we assuine a denotative function for the
generation of the desired goal etc. [without causing any suffering "05T~ 'q" ~i
that is not absolutely unavoidable]. [Answer]: This should not [Now the author
be said. It has been described many times that even the inclination [with the words], 'rec
of the great is justified in actions such as satz, committing ritual suicide wish are included, or
in the confluence of the three rivers, and in the Sarvasvara sacrifice, as4i liiz!otau 'lIN and
of which giving the oblation of oneself is one of the parts~ Although wish [is to be denoted.
[these] cause such a tremendously undesired thing as death, [there after a verbal root whe
is inclination] because of- the intense desire for the fruit. are to be denoted] .;
1. tatha bodhane'pi. If ;:r..a~:>.:f.!;~:~:;nN'f,~?~IHi;:r'f,'9~ [IV.J,3] 1. The PalJ.iriian rule
is denoted by a Vedic injunction.
2. This is the same argument as was PUt forward in [IV.B.29j.
3. .On Sarvasvarayajiia, see M.S., X.2.23.
[IV. J. 34] 1~ :if</lifq';:r f.1'~I;j~mp:r: I ~it.n~ffiq~~;m"JI'Fl<9-
. ~mlJl'':'1i'llll-srorT'i!il;nftt .f<iNWl~~fl':!'~: I ~'i!~t ~l(~'f,­
~'1T'i!~g f.Iit"l~'1 ".;{~'I1J!'[~'Il"llomN'f, ~?11~ ~11:r~
f~l1Iol{~ I
What is more, even in this way, one cannot obtain the relaxation
of the prohibition. As in the case of the syena sacrifice, it is possible
to justify the operating of the injunction by means of [the assump·
tion that here the optative ending] denotes merely the property of
being the means to a desired end, and feasibility; This in accord with
the prohibition .. The contradiction of a part of the [negative] in·
junction in the case of the prescribed killing is not much compared
to the contradiction by which the prohibition would not take effect
at all. These things should be taken into consideration by the
learned.
1. This is the final refutation of the view put forward in [IV.J,31].

~-- .. ~
 ENSES AND MOODS

act, ,not any other.

)tative function for
:ulty that there will
Ima etc., the leaders
It is in order to
Te function for the
Ising any suffering
: This should not
,ven the inclination
litting ritual suicide
;arvasvara sacrifice,
le parts. Although
n.g as death, [there
, the fruit".
[IV.J,3]
SECTIQNFIVE
(V. 1 1 oli~~+n([ I Q"pf;')fu I s:nfG:<!l fij"'1T'alf.iT1Sf1 'llll"~ "3ilf~1fr" ~<'lril"
"olic; 'i:{" ~ffi ~?{l"'1t ~qf[1=!1('( I
[Now the author of the klirikiis] states the meaning of lOr,
[with the words], 'request' etc. By the word 'etc: injunction and
wish are included, on the strength of the two [Pal).inian] rules.
iiS4i li1i!o!au 'lIN and lOr [are introduced after a verbal root when]
wish [is to be denoted]', and lot ca 'lOT [is] also [to be introduced
aft'er a verbal root when the meanings vidhi etc. given in P. III.3.161
are to be denoted]:
1. The Pfu;liriian rules concerned are P. III.3.173 and P. III.3.162.

lrd in [IV.B.29].

ffi~ "efl3f'r~;pz1iIT~;rCcf- '"

~~~<!t ~~<!~if.­
lR!if. ~«rlfG: ~~-

btain the relaxation

crifice, it is possible
ns of [the assump·
,ly the property of
This in accord with
the [negative] in· . ~
,'," .::"
lot much compared _. ..".-- . .
"
'~;.:"
"',' .
,uld not take effect " ,

lsideration by the

rward in [IV.J.31].'
 _._._._._._ ..- .._ - - - - - - - - - ------ .... _-_.

SECTION SIX

r-, . (I

[VI. 3] . l",;S;oq;:nil: I ~

~~:$tt< t:.'-~
SECTION SIX
[Now the atith6r]
'in the sense of instig,
]VI. 1] <!:§1~'f.i':1lf fucn+!~+nil: I - rule vidhinimantrana
il:'l:fT 'I..a Q-<':fJTl<::l =q W1+n~ <!'S'1<::<!: I taught by [the rul~J·,
",'1i f;fi<!TRrq'Ql =q 'I..~ .nfqf.l W;~ l;'lCI: \I 'I ~ II ('I) 1. vidhinimantraniim
P. III.3.161 a~d I
[Now the author] states the meaning of [the I-members] marked
2. Since a whole lor
with N, in the order-IAN etc. :
heading lET, to d
iAN etc., have been taught respectively in the following senses: to elaborate here. .
[when an action is referred toJ past [starting with] yesterday; [when].
an instigation etc., [is to be denoted]; [when an action is referred to] [VI. 4] ~'-T!jlil: I ~
past in general. Il).N [is introduced] in the case where [two actions "31~" ~~T
are related as cause and effect, butJ an action does not [actually] R'ilf'iffm'ff fq"
come about; both when [the actions are referred to] past and [to the]
[Now the author]
future. II 23 / / (2) .
'in the sense of past in ,
1. la1iiidaya~z: IAN, IFN, and IUN are meant. Thus IAN denotes
the past that happened yesteday. lIN means instigation, and occurs under the head
'became, happened'. R
-IUJiJ expresses past in general. -
being the counterpositi'
[VI. 2] ll.'l:fT 'llCl m- I 3Fr?jc!~ 'llCl ;«<!~: I "3T;rocr~ ~"~ ~o:. I And this is in no way
so that, even when a I
The meaning of past yesterday is: the past not inclusive of pot came into being'.
today, [Le., the day previous to the one in which the user of the form
is situated]. This on the strength of the rule anadywtane Ian. 1. The property of 1
absence existing nc
1. anadyatane Zan. P. III.2.111.
which is the locus '
2. ~. .:.
"lCll1VI~<R=rqfcr<!T!l'r~
Time by anac.ti6n whit
.
, .I
.' ~ ab~end~ existiI1gin
I ~ts~o:.' c(jJilbe
Today Exclusive of today
which is the (ocus (
I I It is the action of!
,---.---'----! I
future ,
past
x I
past
I
future
[VI. 51 ~>:f!jlil: I
~
v x ~~: L <!'
Thus the definition avoids the fault of overapplication;
w;f%i'! '1l"l:
 SECTION SIX 19!}

[V 1. 3] '. f€:le~ /lTl[ I iRUfIG:lf,jfuIRlf'fl~lP'I&tfa ~1<J:. I anfG:<lT "snfuN

re~iiil "~fa ferr1<r 8lT~n~'l1 'll['l.l'a I . .
. [Now the auth~i'] states the meaning of lIN, [with the words]'
'in the sense of instigation etC:, on the strength of the [Pa1,linian]
rule vidhinimantra:::za . .. etc. By the word 'etc.', the meaning 'wish'
taught by [the rule]' aS4z [inlotau is also included.
~~ II (~) 1. vidhinimantra~ziimantraniidhi§~aSa1!lpras.napriitham§u liM
P. III.3.161 and P. III.3.173.
members] marked 2. Since a whole long section has already been spent, under the
heading lET, to discuss the meaning of lIIV, it is not necessary
following senses : to elaborate here.
yesterday; [when].
tion is referred' to]
[VI. 4] ~'~!1Tl[ I ~l~ "fa I "~.' "i<iN'lil"t "~" ~ ~'fl<I:. I 'l'll
/{here [two actions ""l~" ~i1lT~ I 8l'f fer'-f!H~'~1Tfu<i'rm,<t 'li,q<'1+!. I Q~ jij;'lTl1T.
oes not [actually] R"1f~mfa f<Rr!1Titsfi't ~ ""IZTS1i<I:." ~fu IT'lT'IT: I
past and [to the] [Now the author] states the meaning of IUd'\[, [with the words]
'in the sense of past in general', on the strength of the rule lwi, which
Thus IAN denotes occurs under the heading bhute. For example, [the form] abhut
1S instigation, and
. 'became, happened'. Here. [by] pastneBs' [is meant] the property of
being the counterpositive of consequent absence at the present time.
.lit ~"~ ~'I1<J:. I And. this is in no way incOJ;npatible. with the action .lin question],
so that, even when a pot actually exists, one says [correctly] 'the
;tnot inclusive' of pot came into being'.
he user of the form' 1. The property of being the counterpositive of the consequent
ldytAtane Zan. absence existing now, has to belong. to action, and not to that
which is the locus of that action. Thus what is really meant is'
q€r111~~.re1Tfci';i'rm~<mfflImir ~''f+!.1 Pastness is characterised'
by an action which is the countetpOsitive of the' conseq)rent .'
. ab2ence existing in the present. '){i$' due <to.·t~is thaI Uie usage ....
_:.cl ~TS'li,<I:. can he calIedcorrect,eyen.when··the·pot in; Cjllest ion,
live of today which is the locus of'the action of becoining'kstill in
existence. .
I It is the action of becoming which is past.... ' .
I
-I [VI. 5 1 W;:&"{l1'Tl[ I <f,1:llf4"'n~~T I ."La +nf<j~lfu I ~ll:~ll:l1<p:rT'ITre:~~<? .
future ~~: I <r~ "i all:~iF1?J1t ~'1T 8lRt~1 'l+'llilr!T'lT
x
I?:f#ff +nCf: I
lpplication.
200 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS

. [Now the author] states the meaning of llJ!=l, [with the words]
'when there is' etc. [The words] 'in the past and also in the future'
are to be understood qS 'in the instances where there is the relation-
ship of cause and effect etc: Thus, the import is that in the instances
where there is the relationship of cause and effect and it is under-
stood that the action does not take place, llJN is to be [introduced]. [VII. I] <!;:~oi ~>.Ti'i~
1. The Pal).inian rules in question are as follow: ~~f;rrn'if ~ CI€tfu ~'${ I '
f,j;'1T1~1 P. IlL3.I3S, and ~Q;~Q;+!(llffl~, P. IlL3.I56. Now, why so mll,
meanings are also see!
[can it be claimed] : tl
ings. We can reverse
cative function] ,as wi
[acceptable].
1. A new topic starts
It has been point
we can see that tl
.etc., only in the
For example, P.T
6f past not witnes
in this text, this ,
such example is
as a)1 exception .•
is asked, why thE
. presentness etc., '
2. ' A tentative anSWl
the meanings gi'
suffixes, whereas
by the use of inc
'. "<'-.
as just the rever·
[VII. 2 I ~~ oo~f
<l Q; OJ"fu;qR
;',-
." fu211'f I Ii<'-
[The objection's'
that all '[words denot
their correctness in. c
not ,limit the .denota
Thus [for :whatever!1
 TENSES AND MOODS

(J~, [with the words]

.nd also in the future'
: there is the relation- SECTION SEVEN
s that in the instances
ffect and it is under-
[VII. 1] ;r"~oi 9i~l'rG'~"!l ~ l~m-: I . grilT"aUlTfl"fq <.\~;rl<r. l05aJlTfl
is to be [introduced].
.ow: f<o~'Rrn~
,
" P.
.....
IIL3.156.
I ~ ~" I . ~qn<>;(l~: I q~>;("I"Ri<iir<ll;>;(1S11:11111'l1~fij ~ 1
Now, why so much insistence on these meanings only? Other'
meanings are also seen [to have been hlid down in grammar]. Nor
[can it be claimed]· that there is indicative function for these mean-
ings. We can reverse this argument. There will also be no [indi-
cative function] .as will be expiained later. [This argument IS]. not
. [acceptable].

I
1. . A new topic starts here concerning the meanings of all the lakaras .
. It has been pointed out that if we. look at the rules in grammar,
we can see that they do not limit themselves to introducing lAT
etc., only in the meanings specified so far, [Rresentness etc.].
For example, P.III.2.llS /at sme prescribes IAT in the meaning'
6f past not witnessed by the speaker.. AcCording to the discussion
.in this text, this ,vill be exclusively the. domain of lIT. Another
such example is sme lot P. 111.3.165, which. intr~duces 101'
as an exception to) the domain of lff.T etc. 'Thus the question
is asked, why then so much' insistence on the specific meanings _
. presentness etc., so far discussed in this text? .
2.. A tentative answer has been offered. Perhaps it can be said that
the meanings given so far are the denoted meanings of these
suffixes, whereas the meanings ether than these can be obtained
use
.. by the of indicative function. This is immediately rejected,
as just the reverse could also be claimed.
[VII. 2] <:f~ <:f'lM ~<1:[~~'fl1trl<r. I . <l'<!<::ii!l <:f1~<91~>;(llfIi o1:[l~un:r. I
;r 11 OJfuiqR'O~'!irnfij 'l'!;<fc\ I <lill 'Cfl'41"<l't lj'~?!OJllj'~ m~<'l­
m!!l'r'l I ~ ~~>R:U;r;:rl"1+!. I
[The objection ·stated above. is not acceptable] because we accept
that all [words denoteJallthe inem;lings.Grammar on,lyJells about
their correctness in certain meanings...As will· be said later,. it does
not limit the. denotative function . [alreadyexisti,ng in the wot;dsl .
Thus [for :whatever rother .meaning] a grammatical statelllent"exists,
202 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS SECTION SEVEN

it is desirable that that other meaning be correct. [The meanings cated meaning will
given in] the text here are just to point out the general direction. particular meaning
1. The maxim same sarviirtkaviicakiilJ 'All words denote all the
[VII. 4 ] t;~v;rt Sfi<lR!<JHi
meanings', occurs in Vacaspatimisra's commentary on the Yoga-
sutra. (y.s. 1.27, p. 33). It has also been quoted by NageSa 111+rh:r'liT~fl:l~;
while rejecting the existence. or necessity of the indicative func- The determinant 0
tion; . (P.L.M., p. 62): discussed) is the order
2. The view that grammar just points out the correctness of a word sakas refer to lET alon
in a particular meaning,' but does not create a word to denote a 1. If the I-members I
specific meaning, is also found in the first iihnika ofthe BhiiWa. Fan.ini gives them
There it is said that people go to a potmaker, and ask him to follows: UT . (F
make a pot for them to use, but nobody ever goes to a gram- (P. III.3.l3), IU'!
marian and asks him to make a word to be used in language. justified on the ba~

I
(M.B. vol. I, p. 7). Words and the meanings in which they the I-members witl:
are used are known from the usage of the people .. All that order has been dete
grammar does is to present the correct usage. I (lIT), U (IUT),
accepted order. Tl
[ VII. 3 1 ..,~ 1fiIf~f 1«<r"'~!!'l'lT?! '9 ",~1'iTq I Jtfu~lTf..,~'!t <I~'1l<J: I
'the fifth l-membeI
qi: ''1¥TTtfij~m ~f'I'f.+[111t<Flil~fl:r<;'RIT <I"3[ <I"Sf "'e:rIlTT '" there is no confus
"'1!3<q<Jllll~Rr <I"Sf <I"3[ l;~7.1~.+f: I </1?;<Jij '9lM'li ~<!~f<Tuj~
.. ~«r"'lm[lnf;fq~fu I . . II ~>.
If [the maXim] 'An [words denote] all the meanings' is not Here ends the con
accepted, then there will have to be [recourse to] the indicative. in the Vaiyakara1).abh\i
function. The decision [as to which one is the denoted and which one
is the indicated meaning] will be based on whether the meaning is
wellknown or not so we1lknown. However, the indicative function
used by the Naiyayikas and the Mima:rpsakas does not lend correct-
ness [to a meaning] as it goes against the grammatical rules. We
will make this clear in every·place where that [use of the indicative
function by the Naiyayikas and the MimaI!1sakas] occurs. More
[about this] will be said in the section on the meanings of the sUP
endings. So enough ·of too much elaboration here.
1. In the absence of the maxim that all words denote all the mean-
ings, resourse has to be taken to the indicative function. The
-
,_..............................
previous objection that this argument can be reversed, and what
you say are the denoted meanings can be called to be the indi- The text. at the I
cated meanings, and vice versa, is here answered by saying that taking into considerat
the decision as to which is the denoted and which is the indi- as well as the variant:

,j
 ~ENSES AND MOODS
ct. [The meanings
general direction.
ords denote all the
mtary on the Yoga-
I quoted by NageSa
I
the indicative func-
xrectness of a word
a word to denote a
nika of the Bha;;ya.
:er, and ask him to
rer goes to a gram-
e used in language.
lingS in which they
~ people. All that
e.
! :'li>rf~~<IT qr~<I:. I
1 q"{ q;r 05fSuTT OJ
i'!~ '"l1N'li ~<[~RuTi't
.e meanings' is not
i. toJ the indicative
loted and which one
:her the meaning is
indicative function'"
i. es not lend correct· ..;~,
.I!llatica! rules. We .
:se of the indicative
:asl occurs. More
eanings of the sUP
~re.
ienote all the mean·
live function. The
reversed, and what
lied to be the indi-
!red by saying that
which is the indi-
SECTION SEVEN 203
cated meaning will depend on the relative wellknownness of that
particular meaning.
[VII. 4] t;(\G{T Sfi+!R'l'+!"'Ii~:1<[;:'il'fi+! t;'1.1 sm u:'I "q-s:qti) 05'1iH::" ~~OJ .
l'l1+!T~~1W~ t;'1 Q<{'1fu;<:[~ I(fcr I
The determinant of the order [in whichJthese [l'members are
discussed] is the order of their markers. That is why the Mirriliirp.'
sakas refer to lET alone with the words 'the fifth I-member'.
1. If the I-members had been taken in the same order in which
Pan,ini gives them, the order would have been something as
follows: aT (P. III.2.115) , [AT (P. 111.2.123), llJT.
(P. III.3.13), IUT (P. I1I.3.15) etc. The order used here is
justified on. the basis .of the order of the markers. Thus first all
the I-members with the marker T are given. Among them, the
order has been determined by the vowel marker. Thus A (lATJ,
. I (lIT), U (IUT), lJ (llJT), E (lET) etc. This is the generally
accepted order. That is why the Mimfup.sakas also use the words
'the fifth I-member', and it is always taken to mean lET, and
there is no confusion.
. II '1(fcr~"t~<:[T'f,~U['LG(1it 059iH'~uT<r: II
Here ends the conclusion about the meanings of the .l-members
in the Vaiyakar:otI}abh'i1~a.
. .
The text. at the Lakararthanil1).aya printed· here is' constituted
taking into consideration both the Benares and Bombay editions
as well as the variant readings given therein.
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 fENSES AND MOGDS . 207

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Sanskrit Series 11, 12, and 15, Varanasi, no date.
TaitthiyasarPhita - ed. NaraharisastriTalekar [vols. 1·41, and
. Kashinathasastri Agashe [vols. 4.8], Anandasrama Sanskrit
Series 42, Poonaj 1959. [TaiSa.]
Tai1).\lyamahabrahmaJl).a - ed. Chinnasvarnisastri, 2 vols., Kashi
Sanskrit Series 105, Varanasi, 1935·36. [Ta1)QyaBra.]
Taritrarahasya - by R,ilmanujacarya, 2nd ed. Ramasvami Sastri,
. Gaekwad'sOriental Series 24, Baroda, 1956: [TantraRa.j
Tantraratna -. by parthasarthimiSra. [TantraRat.]
Tantravarttika .. by Kumarilabhatta, see MimaqJ.sasiltra.
[TantraVii:]
Tarkasamgraha - by Annambhatta, with two commentaries, ed.
Y. V. Athalye, with critical and explanatory notes, introduc·
tion and translation by M .. R. Bodas, Bombay· Sanskrit and
Prakrit Series 55, 2nd edition, Poona, 1963. [T.S.]
Tattvacintiimani .- by GaiJgeSa Bhattacarya, with Rahasya by
Mathuranatha, and Aloka by Jayadevamisra, ed. Kamakhya·
nath Tarkavagisa,Bibliotheca Indica, New Sedes nos. 900,
908, 91·, 918, 921, 927, 135, 943, 955, 960, 975, and 977,
Sabdakha1f9a, vol. IV, part 2, Calcutta, 1901. [TattvaCin.]
Tattvacintamal,lirahasya - by Mathuratiilrtha, see Tattvacintamal)i.
[TattvaCinRa.]
Tuptika - by Kumarilabhatta, see M.S .. [Tupti] or [TupT]
Uddyota - by Nagesabhatta on Pradipa, see Pradipa ..
- ----.---_ .. '~'~---'---.--.------'--- .. -' - .... - .-- .. _-..--
 210 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOOD~

Vaiyakaral)abhil~a,i).a - by Katlji,Jic;!abhatta, withPadarthadipikia, cd. Yogasutra - by Pataiijal

Pandit Ramakrishna Sastri, Benares Sanskrit Series 51, 53, harananda Ayany~
and 54, Varanasi, 1900. [YogBha.]
Vaiyakarall}abhU~aIl}a - by KaUi!]J,c;!abhatta, with V:B.s., and Kasikai Yogavasi~tha - ed. W ~
see Kasilcti. [V.B.] Nirnayasagar Pres
Vaiyakar<lil;labhii~al)asara - by Kaul)lc;!abhatta, for various editions Yuktisnehaprapiira:l).l -'
see: Darpal)a, Kashima, ParIlc~a, Prabha, Sarala and sankari. dipik§., seeS8.stra(
[sara or V.B.S.]
Vaiyakara1).asiddhantakaumudi - by Bhattoji Dik~ita; with two
commentaries, see Balamanorama. [S.K.]
Vaiyakaral)asiddhantalaghuma:fiju~ - by Nagesabhatta, with two SECONDARY SOURCES:
commentaries, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series 44" Varanasi.
,1925. [LaghuMaii.] Abhyankar. K. V. - A I
Oriental Series 13·
VakyapadiYil- - by Bhartrhari, edd. K. V. Abhyankar and V. P.
Limaye, University of Poona Sanskrit and Prakrit Series 2, Alston, W. P. - Philoso
Poona, 1965. [V.P.] , Series, Priceton-l:
Edition, 1965.
Varttikapatha - by Katyayana, see M.B. [Vt.]
Vedantakalpataru - by Anandasarasvati on B.S., see Bhamati. Cardona, George - Ne!
[VeKaTa.] 1967.
Vedantatatfviveka - by Nrsimhasrama:, 'ed. Ramasastri Telang, Anvaya and Vy2
reprint from Pandit, Varanasi, 1912. [VeTaVi.] Bulletin, vol. '31 c
Vidhiviveka - by Ma,l)\IanamiSra, MImii.:rpsakosa pp. 3597-3631, see Gode, P. K. - The CI
Mirnarpsakosa. [VidhiVI.J nephew of BhaW
VivaraJ.laprameyasarpgraha - by Bharauitirtha, ed. Suryanarayana Adyar LibraryBl
Sastri and Saileswar Sen, AUS. 25, 1941. [ViPraSam.] Ingalls, D. H. H. - Ma
, Vyakaral).amahabha~ya - by Pataiijali, ed. F. Kielhorn, 2nd revised . Harvard Oriental
edition, 3 vols., Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series 18-20, Iyer , K. A. Su~ramania
Bombay, 1892-1909. [:Bha~yaor M.B.] in the Light of 0'
-Vyutpattivada - by Gadadhara Bhattacarya, with Jay§., ed. Umesa Poona, 1969.
Misra, 3rd edn., Allahabad, 1953. [VyutpaWi.]
Vyutpattivada-Lakararthavicii.ra - by Gadadhara Bhattacarya, ed. Joshi, S. D. - Kaw.i9.~l
Ph.D. dissertatlO
V. Subrahmanya Sastri, with the commentary Vivarana, sphota-nirl).aya ,
Annamalai University Sanskrit Series 10. Annamalainagar, notes, and introc
1948. '[Vyutpa VaLaVi.]
Matilal Bimal Krishr
Yogasiltra - by Pataftjali, ed. Vasudevasastri Abhyankar, Bombay Harvard Orienb
Sanskrit and Prakrit Series 46, Bombay, 1917. [Y.S.J "
 )F TENSES AND MOOD:;
,ith PadarthadipiM, ed.
Sanskrit Series 51, 53,
ith V.B.S., and Kasika ,
la, for various editions
la, Sarala and Sankari.
oji Dik~ita; with two
:.]
age.sabhatta, with two
Series 44,· Varanasi,
'\bhyankar and V. P.
and Prakrit Series 2,
't.]
1 B.S., see BMmatI.
I' Ramasastri Teiang,
.
eTaVi.].· .
~"" 'sa pp. 3597-3631 see
, '
ci; I, ed. Suryanarayana
,
; l. [ViPraSam.]
~: {ielhorn, 2nd revised~,.
, . ?rakrit Series 18-20,
'ith laya, ed. Umesa
tpaVa.]
Ira Bhattacarya, ed.
lmentary Vivarana,
O. AnnamaJainagar.
.bhyankar, Bombay
917. [Y.S.l . Harvard Oriental Series 46, 1968.
211
Yogaslitra - by Pataiijali, with Bha~ya by Vy'asa, ed. Swami Had-
harananda Ayanya; University of Calcutta, Calcutta, 1963.
[YogBha.]
Yogavasi~tha - ed. Wasudeva Laxmanasastri Pansikar, 2 vols.,
Nirnayasagar Press, Bombay, 1918. [YogVa.] .
Yuktisnehaprapiir~Q.i _. by lliimakr~Q.a Bhattacarya, on Sastra-
dipika, see sastradipika. [YSP.]
SECONDARY SOURCES:
Abhyankar. K. V. - A Dictionary of Sanskrit Grammar, Gaekwad's
Oriental Series 134, Baroda, 1961.
Alston, W. P. -. Philosophy of Language, Foundation of Philosophy
Series, Pdceton-Hall Inc., Engelwood Cliffs, N.]., Second
Edition, 1965.
Cardona, George - Negation in P,8Jl).ini's Rules, Language, vol. 43,
. 1967:
Anvaya and Vyatireka in Indian Grammar, Adyar Library
Bulletin,. vol. '31 c2, Madras, 1967.
Gode, P. K. - The Chronology. of the works of KOI).r;labhatta (a
nephew of Bhattoji Dlk~ita). Between A.D. 1910 and 1660,
Adyar Library Bulletin, vol. 18, Madras, 1954.
Ingalls, D. H. H. - Materials for the Study of Navya-Nyaya Logic,
Harvard Oriental Series 40, 1951.
Iyer, K. A. Subramania - Bharq-hari, A study of the Vakyapadiya
in the Light of of the Ancient Commentaries, Deccan College,
Poona, 1969.
Joshi, S. D. - KaUI).~abhaHa on the Meaning of Sanskrit Verb-roots,
PhD. dissertation,. Harvard University, 1960.
sphota-nirl).aya of Kau!)Jr;iabhatta, edited with Translation,
notes, and introduction, University ·of Poona, 1967.
Matilal, Bimal Krishna - Navya-Nyaya Doctrine of Negation,
 ---------------~------

212 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS

Epistemology, Logic, and Grammar in Indian Philosophical

I~
Analysis, Mouton, The HagUe, 1971. - -
Raja, Kunjunni -- Indian Theories of- Meaning, The Adyar Library SELECTIVE
Series 91, Madras, 1963. -
Rao, Veluri Stibba - The Philosophy of a Sentence and its Parts, abhava 45, 47, 134, 1661
Munshiram Manoharlal, New Delhi, 1969. 186, 194 - -_- --- --~
Renou, Louis - La Theorie des Temps du Verbs d'apres les Gram- abhidha 26, 27' • -----_------ -- - --1
lnairiens Sanskrits, Journal Asiatique, C.C.x.V.III,' fase. 3, adeSa 2 - j
--I
1960. aclhliratva 8 1

adhikat(1).a 120, 131. - -_'

Sarma, Peri Sarvesvara - The KalasamuddeSa of Bhartrhari's adhikaranata/tva 130, 13~
Vakyapadiya with HeIaraja's Commentary, translated from adhikara;;Qatiivacchedaka 1
the Sanskrit for the first time, Motilal Benarsidas, Delhi, adhlsta 17, 51, -78
1972. adyat"ana 67, 68 -
ajahatsviirtha(ajahatsvii.1
Varma, S. - Analysis of Meaning in Indian Semantics, Journal of lak~a1).a) 1,09, 110
the Dept. of Letters, University of Calcutta, vol. 13, 1926. iikii.ilksii 26, 55 __ __
akhyaia 91,)30 - - _- _- - _-.
akhyatatva 25,: 2~, 28, 9,
alambhana 168, 169, In
- 189 , 192 -- -
amantra;I).a 17; 51-,78
anadyatana67, 7.6, ~98
ananY<tthiisiddha 146
anavakasatva 55 - -
anekarti-iakatii/tva 30, ::
111 - ---
anistasadhanatva 24, 16~
anugamaka dharma _100,
anugamika '34, 99" 112 _
anupapatti _115
anuvii.da 183
anuvyavasaya 68
anuyogin 47 - •
anvaya 1,8, 30, 54, 62, ~
109, .138; 149, 166
anvayita- 46 -
anvayiti§.vacthedaka' 45-:
109, 131, 134, 181,
anvitabhidhanavada 108
_anyathasiddha 146/1'49--
anyathasiddhi 149, 191
, TENSES AND MOODS

.Indian Philosophical

Ig, The Adyar Library SELECTIVE INDEX OF SANSKRIT WORDS

,ntence and its Parts, aparisamapta 52, 59, 64, 65

abhava 45, 47, 134, 166, 181,
69. apauru~eya 19, 20, 106 ..
186, 194
,rbs d'apres les Gram- abhidha 26, 27 '. apavada 55 .
C.C.X.V.III, fasc. 3, MeSa 2' apoddhrta 1
adhiaratva 8 apta18-20
adhikaral)a 120, 131 apiirva 29, 30, 32, 39-42, 104,
leSa of Bhartrhari's adhikaral)ata/tva 130, 139 . 106, 108, 109, 112-8, 120,
:ary, translated from adhikaranatavacchedaka 139 121, 147-51 .
11 Benarsidas, Delhi, adhi~ta. i7, 51,.78" . arthavada.27, 42, 123-5, 191
adyatana 67, 68 arthi: bhlivana 26-9
)emantics,' Journal of ajahatsvartha(ajahatsvartha iiSis 197, 19.9'
icutta, vol. 13; 1926. lakijal)a) Hi9, 110 aritakarya 86, 87
akailk~ 26, 55 ativyapti 69
akhyata ~1, 130 . atyantabhava 47, 133, 134
akhyatatva '25,: 26, 28,92 aupadanikapramfu:).a 40, 108,.
alambhana 168, 169, 175, 180,' .114
IS9, 192 ' ' avacchedak~45, 1()s,1l8, 136,
amantral}a 17, 5L78 . 11'37,' 139, 143 ..
anadYatana67, 76, 198 avacchedakatva 48,' 79, :112,
ananyathasiddha 146 .. ···134;·143 .
anavakasatva 55. avapodviapa 1, £3
anekarthakata/tva30, 34,' 35, avidya 66;- :165'
III '. badhyabadhakabhava. 11, 63,
ani~tasadhanatva 24, 162, 165 173
anugairiaka dharma 100, 119 balavadanistananuc
anugarnika '34, 99, 112 bandhitva20, 21, 24, 25,
anupapatti .115' . 38, 39, 81; 100, 102, 164,
anuvada 183 191 :. '
anuvyavasaya 68 balavaddvi~tasaadhanata
anuyogin 47 (tva) 25, 39, 102
anvaya 1,.8, 30, 54, 62, 97, '102, bhava 2, 5, 51, 57, 91, 94, .95
·109, 138; 149, 166 . bhavana."21,.25, 26,37
anvayita 46 . , bha\d~yat 13, .52, 76, 84
ativayiw:vacthedaka 45-8,108, bhrama 4 ' .
109, 131, 134, 181, 182 bhata 13,. 52, 198, 199 .
anvitabhidhiinavada 108 : bodhakata 3 ,
anyathasiddha 14B/149'; , . bodliyabuddhi :35, '112,lW
anyathiisiddhi 149, 191 buddhivi~aya1ia 120 . .
-----~-----~-----~ ~~-~-~~---------------------------

214 TIlE MEANING OF TENSES AND MOODS

cik!ir~25, 93, 96 kar<\I)ata/tva 8, 44, 142, 144 lIT 2, 16, 50, 51, 63, 67-7
dharmin 22 llliranatvavacchedaka 145 203
dhatu 29 karman 2-4, 29, 51, 64, 94 lOT 2, 50, 51, 197, 200
dhlitvartha 52, 75, 117, 141 karmatva4, 8, 95 . W:r'< 2, 50, 51, 198
dhva;qlsa 77, 199 kartr 2-4, 9, 43, 51, 55
kartradhikar<\I)a 190, 191
nn 2, 50, 51, 76, 77, 20
dravyatva 143, 144 lU:r'< 2, 50, 51, 198, 199
dvara 29, 104 kartrtvam 4, 94 lUT 2, .so, 51, 62, 76, 2(
dvesa 18, 38, 39, 101, 103, 191, karya 21, 30-3, 40, 41, 82, 84-6, LyuT 130 .
193, 195 105-7, 115, 117, .118, 137, mukhyartha 107
dyotakatva 8, 52, 54, 56, 63, 64 143, 150, 167 nan 48, 134, 164, 165, 16(
dyotya 6, 7, 52, 53, 56, 63 karyakaraI).abhiava 97, 132 186, 194, 195
gurudharma 46, 48, 133 karyata (tva) 30, 84-6, 90, 106, nantanyakatva 14, 192, 1
him.sa 43, 169, 170, 174, 177-189 138, 143, 145, 150 nimantraI).a 16, 17, 51, 7
hitasadhanatva 32. 95 llliryatavacchedaka 138, 143, nipata 6
icchia 21, 25, 93, 98,99, 111, 112, 145, 150 Ii.i~edJ-tavidhi 90
119-21, 131, 189 kriya 10, 11, 13, 26, 52, 57, 58, nityapraVf1;ta 12, 15
icchatva 161 64, 65, 69, 72 nivartana 37
i~ta 33, 34, 100 kriyajanya 37 niyoga 30, 106, 108, 112
istadevata 33, 82 kriyajanyatva_84, 89-91 ~vuL 77
istasadhana 20, 33, 77 kriyavyapya 81, 84 ~yaT 85
istasadhanatva 20, 21, 23, 29, krJ; 94, 130, 131 nyayavyutpadana 17
.. 32, 33·, 35-8, 41, ~-5, 79, krJ;i 4, 30, '31,91-6 .. . pada 1, 6, 100, 119
81, 86, 88-92, 97,' 98, 102, Iq-tisadhya 20, 22, 37, 56 paramarsa 151
104,111,120,121,127,128, Iq-tisadhyatva 18, 20-2, 36-8, 81, paramparnsadhanatva 29,
132,161,162,166,167,192, 87-9, 91, 102, 192, 196 114
196 Iq-tyudde§ya 30, 32, 39, 108, 112 pararthanumii.na 137
i~otpatti 192, 193, 195 parok~a 51, 67-9
lakiara 1, 2, 16. 49, 51, 92, 130,
itikartaryata 26, 28 parok~atva 16, 68, 69, 7:
201
janaka 103 75
lak~aI).ii 8, 54, 109, 110, 148, 164
janakiivighataka 102, 103 parok~ya 72
IAN 2, 50, 51, 198 paryudasa '37, 90, 91, 164
janyatiivacchedaka 138
IAT 2, 5, 7-9, 11, 12, 14-6,50-6, 168
janyatva 138, 143
jati 6, 132, 136, 142-4 58-66, 91, 201, 203 patnisa!11yaja 174
jmna 20, 68, 93, 98, 111, 121, lET 2,50, 51, 78, 199, 203 phala 4, 7, 20, 21, 25, 11:
160 . II:r'< 2, 16, 17, 19, 21-7, 29-41, phaleccha 124
jffiipaka 71 43-5, 47, 50, 51; 78-79, 81, pmgabhava 77
kala 10, 15, 52, 60, 64,65, 67 . 85, 88-92, 94-104, 105, 107, prakaratiikhya vi~ayata 9:
kaiaiija 24, 37, 162,' 165, 167, 111-3, 115-21, 127-9; 131-4, prarabdha 52, 59, 64, 65 .
190, 194, 195 140-2, 152, 160, 193, 194, prarthana 17, 51 .
kalavibhaga 13 198-200 prasajyaprati~edha 36, 90
karaka 6, 43, 70 liIi.ga 6 pratibandhaka 18, 20, 2E
kararia
. 27, 43, 44,.130,
.
131 . , lintva 25, 28, 92 103, 135, 136
 TENSES AND MOODS
215

va 8, 44, 142, 144 lIT 2, 16, 50, 51, 63, 67-75, 200, pratiyogin 45, 77, 134, 182
racchedaka 145 203 . pratiyogita 45, 134, 182
4, 29, 51, 64, 94 lOT 2, 50, 51, 197, 200 pratiyogitacacchediika 45-8, 134
4, 8, 95 lRN 2, 50, 51, 198 pratyavaya 122, 166,. 186
9, 43, 51, 5'5 lB.T 2, 50; 51, 76, 77, 200, 203 pravartaka 17, 19, 80, 89, 142,
arajQa 190, 191 lUN 2, 50, 51, 198, 199 152, 160, 161
4,94 lUT 2,50, 51, 62, 76, 203 pravartakata (tva) 217"~0, 81.
30-3,40,41, 82, 84-6, LyuT 130 . 97, 116, 117, 120, 125, 193
115, 117, J18, 137, mukhyartha 107 pravartana 17-21, 26, 28, 29,.33,
.50, 167 naii 48, 134, 164, 165, 166, 181, 78,81 .
rlabhava 97, 132. 186, 194, 195 prawttinimitta 99; 119
ia) 30, 84-6, 90, 106, nantariyakatva 14, 192, 193 pravrttoparata ·15
.43, 145, 150 nimantral).a 16, 17, 51, 78 pliayadarSana 169, 170
:chedaka 138, 143, nipata 6 preral).a 20 '
L50 .. ni~edhavidhi 90 sabdabrahman 16, 53
n, 13, 26, 52, 57, 58, nityapravrJ;ta 12, 15 sabdi bhavana 26-8
5, 69, 72 nivartana 37 sadhana 20, 23, 26, 28, 68-70,
137 niyoga 30, 106, 108, 112 88,116
ltva.84, 89-91 ~vuL 77 sadhanata (tva) 24, 44, 72, 88,
ya 81, 84 ~yaT 85 100, 105, 113, 116, 129, 148,
0, 131 nyayavyutpadana 17 166
, 31, 91·6 padal, 6, 100, 119 sadhya 13; 23, 26,'28
;! l 20, 22, 37, 56 paramarsa 151 sadhy~tatva 140
'f ltva 18, 20~2, 36-8, 81, paramparas~dhanatva .29, 105, sak~t 6, 161
!'I: 91, 102, 192, 196 114 saktigraha '35'
pararthlinumana 137 sakti 3, 7, 53, 70, 95, 106, 109..
i' ya 30, 32, 39, 108, 112
parok~a 51, 67-9 161, 191. 195
,; 2, 16. 49, 51, 92, 130,
", parok~atva 16, 68, 69, 72, 73, saktigraha 35
75 saktyiidhliyaka 8, 54
t 54, 109, 110, 148, 164 parok~ya 72 saktyadhliyakatva 8, 52, 56
I l, 51, 1 9 8 ' " paryudasa 37, 90, 91, 164, 165, sakya 99, 103, 192, 193
i 7-9, 11, 12, 14-6, 50-6, 168 sakyata (tva) 81, 99
I ,91, 201, 203 patnisa71lyaja 174 sakyatavacchedaka 34, 99, 112
l, 51, 78, 199, 203 phala 4, 7, 20, 21, 25, 112. sakyatavacchedakatva161
i, 17, 19, 21-7, 29-41, phalecchli 124 samarndhikarat)ya 135, 136,
47, 50, 51, 78-79, 81, pregabhliva 77 139
8-92, 94-104, 105, 107, prakaratakhya vi~ayata 93 samavaya 144
;, 115-21, 127-9, 131-4, prarabdha 52, 59, 64, 65 samavayikara.IJ.a 14;3, 144
:, 152, 160, 193, 194, prarthana 17, 51 sa:rpketagraha 34, 82, 99
:00' prasajyaprati~edha 36, 90 . saI!1prasna 17, 51
pratibandhaka 18, 20, 25, 38 sarpsargatakhya vr~ayata 93 .
28,92 103, 135, 136 . satta 144, 145
.~---~--.----

216 THE MEANING OF TENSES AND i\IQODS!

. savi~ayatva: 68 vattamana 13-5, 51, 52, 56, 60, i

siddhadhartna 23 76,77
sthanin 3 vartamanatva 12, 52, 54, 59. .
sthitalaksana 1 vidhi 17, 20, 21, 27, 51,64, 78, ;
sUP 202' '. 111, 133, 160, 161, 166! [
taddhita 173 173, 191-6
takrakClUJ;lc;iinyanyaya 10, 55, 64 . vidhilqt'93, 94, 96
tatparya 8, 54, 107, 108, 131 vighataka 1 0 3 "
tatparyagrahaka 8, 54, 165
tatparyagrahakatva 8, 54
visaya 169
vi9aya 69, 79; 161 . I
I
tatprakhyadhikaraJ).a 183 vi1)ayata 30, 68, 69, 79, 93, 94, I
tiD. 4, 128, 129 96, 9 7 . I
tiiltva 92,93 vi9ayatakJara 68 !
!
tiP 3
Triv[ccarvadhikarat,la-
nyaya 179, 171
vi~ayitakara 68
vi'sistabh'ava 163
vrddhavyavahara' 82 . :
I
tumUN 77 vrttavirata 15 I
upadana pramal,la 32, 40, 107, vrtti 53, 107 !
109 . vyabhiaara 47, 132, 133, 1'35-7, I'
upalak~al).a: 76 141, 145, 147, 149 •
upaya 20, 21 vyakti 6 . !
upayeccha 25 . vyapaka 34, 100, 140 . ~.
utpadyatva 8 vyapa:ra4, 7, 1.0' 17, 20, 25, 26, I
. va<;akatva 53, 62, 63
v;acya 6, 7, 52~4, 56, 63, 64, 129 .
v;acyatva55,56, 58,64,79,113,
28-30,57-61,.69,71,79, 104 I
vyaparasantana 10, 11, 56!8
vY1apti 136, 137, 142
I
114, 116 . vya~ya 34, 84, 100 \
vaijatya 45, 47, 48, 132, 133,
138, 142, 143,148,151, 152,
vyatrreka 1:, 62, 97,· 102, 137,
138, 140, 146, 149, 166
I
,
154, i55, 157-9 . vyatirekavyabhicara 132
vaktrabhipraya 161 yacitama'l;lc;iananyaya 68
vaktrbuddhivi~ayatva '34, 100,' yogyata 40, ~36 .
119 yogyatavacchedaka 40, 108~ 114
vakyase~a 170, 171

.. ' ..
.'

\
'·W Jt.imi' me-iJ