REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, Petitioner, - versus - HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL

TRIBUNAL, Respondent.
G.R. No. 221103, EN BANC, October 16, 2018, CARPIO, J.

Rule 6 of the 2015 HRET Rules does not grant additional powers to the Justices but rather maintains the
balance of power between the members from the Judicial and Legislative departments as envisioned by
the framers of the 1935 and 1987 Constitutions. The presence of the three Justices is meant to tone down
the political nature of the cases involved and do away with the impression that party interests play a
part in the decision-making process. It was held that said rule does not violate the equal protection
clause because there is a substantial distinction between the Justices of the Supreme Court and the
members of the House of Representatives. There are only three Justice-members while there are six
Legislator-members of the HRET.

FACTS:

Petitioner alleges that she has two pending quo warranto cases before the HRET. On 1 November
2015, the HRET published the 2015 Revised Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(2015 HRET Rules). Petitioner alleges that Rule 6 of the 2015 HRET Rules is unconstitutional as it
gives the Justices denial or veto powers over the proceedings by simply absenting themselves from
any hearing. In addition, petitioner alleges the following:
1. That the 2015 HRET Rules grant more powers to the Justices, individually, than the legislators
by requiring the presence of at least one Justice in order to constitute a quorum. That even
when all six legislators are present, they cannot constitute themselves as a body and cannot
act as an Executive Committee without the presence of any of the Justices.
2. That the rule violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution by conferring the
privilege of being indispensable members upon the Justices.
3. That the quorum requirement under the 2015 HRET Rules is ambiguous because it requires
only the presence of at least one Justice and four Members of the Tribunal. According to
petitioner, the four Members are not limited to legislators and may include the other two
Justices.
4. That Rule 15, in relation to Rules 17 and 18, of the 2015 HRET Rules unconstitutionally
expanded the jurisdiction of the COMELEC. That under Section 17, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution as well as the 2011 Rules of the HRET, a petition may be filed within 15 days
from the date of the proclamation of the winner, making such proclamation the operative fact
for the HRET to acquire jurisdiction. However, Rule 15 of the 2015 HRET Rules requires that
to be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there should be (1) a valid
proclamation; (2) a proper oath; and (3) assumption of office.

Petitioner alleges that the application of the 2015 HRET Rules to all pending cases could prejudice
her cases before the HRET.

ISSUE:

The issue before this Court is the constitutionality of the following provisions of the 2015 HRET
Rules:
(1) Rule 6(a) requiring the presence of at least one Justice in order to constitute a quorum
(2) ;(2) Rule 15, paragraph 2, in relation to Rule 17; and
 (3) (3) Rule 6, in relation to Rule 69.

RULING:

The petition has no merit.

Petitioner alleges that the requirement under Rule 6 of the 2015HRET Rules that at least one Justice
should be present to constitute a quorum violates the equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution
and gives undue power to the Justices over the legislators.

The argument has no merit. The main objective of the framers of our Constitution in providing for
the establishment, first, of an Electoral Commission, and then of one Electoral Tribunal for each
House of Congress, was to insure the exercise of judicial impartiality in the disposition of election
contests affecting members of the lawmaking body. To achieve this purpose, two devices were
resorted to, namely: (a) the party having the largest number of votes, and the party having the second
largest number of votes, in the National Assembly or in each House of Congress, were given the same
number of representatives in the Electoral Commission or Tribunal, so that they may realize that
partisan considerations could not control the adjudication of said cases, and thus be induced to act
with greater impartiality; and (b) the Supreme Court was given in said body the same number of
representatives as each one of said political parties, so that the influence of the former may be
decisive and endow said Commission or Tribunal with judicial temper.

Rule 6 of the 2015 HRET Rules does not grant additional powers to the Justices but rather maintains
the balance of power between the members from the Judicial and Legislative departments as
envisioned by the framers of the 1935 and 1987 Constitutions. The presence of the three Justices
is meant to tone down the political nature of the cases involved and do away with the impression that
party interests play a part in the decision-making process.

Rule 6(a) of the 2015 HRET Rules requires the presence of at least one Justice and four members of
the Tribunal to constitute a quorum. This means that even when all the Justices are present, at least
two members of the House of Representatives need to be present to constitute a quorum. Without
this rule, it would be possible for five members of the House of Representatives to convene
and have a quorum even when no Justice is present. This would render ineffective the
rationale contemplated by the framers of the 1935 and 1987 Constitutions for placing the
Justices as members of the HRET. Indeed, petitioner is nitpicking in claiming that Rule 6(a) unduly
favors the Justices because under the same rule, it is possible for four members of the House of
Representatives and only one Justice to constitute a quorum. Rule 6(a) of the 2015 HRET Rules does
not make the Justices indispensable members to constitute a quorum but ensures that
representatives from both the Judicial and Legislative departments are present to constitute a
quorum.

Contrary to petitioner's allegation, Rule 6(a) of the 2015 HRET Rules does not violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea
of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in
no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is
that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions
which make for real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not
be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class.
In the case of the HRET, there is a substantial distinction between the Justices of the Supreme
Court and the members of the House of Representatives. There are only three Justice-members
while there are six Legislator-members of the HRET. Hence, there is a valid classification. The
classification is justified because it was placed to ensure the presence of members from both the
Judicial and Legislative branches of the government to constitute a quorum. There is no violation of
the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

Petitioner likewise questions Rule 6 in relation to Rule 69 of the 2015 HRET Rules for being
ambiguous, questionable, and undemocratic.

The ambiguity referred to by petitioner is absurd and stems from an erroneous understanding of the
Rules. As pointed out by the HRET, a member of the Tribunal who inhibits or is disqualified from
participating in the deliberations cannot be considered present for the purpose of having a quorum.
In addition, Rule 69 clearly shows that the Supreme Court and the House of Representatives have the
authority to designate a Special Member or Members who could act as temporary replacement or
replacements in cases where one or some of the Members of the Tribunal inhibit from a case or are
disqualified from participating in the deliberations of a particular election contest when the required
quorum cannot be met. There is no basis to petitioner's claim that a member who inhibits or
otherwise disqualified can sit in the deliberations to achieve the required quorum.

The Rules clearly state that any action or resolution of the Executive Committee "shall be included in
the order of business of the immediately succeeding meeting of the Tribunal for its confirmation."
Hence, even if only three members of the HRET acted as an Executive Committee, and even if all these
three members are Justices of the Supreme Court, their actions are subject to the confirmation by the
entire Tribunal or at least five of its members who constitute a quorum.

Petitioner alleges that the HRET unduly expanded the jurisdiction of the COMELEC.

Petitioner alleges that these Rules will allow the COMELEC to assume jurisdiction between the time
of the election and within 15 days from June 30 of the election year or the date of actual assumption
of office, whichever is later. Further, the requirements of a valid proclamation and a proper oath will
allow the COMELEC to look into these matters until there is an actual assumption of office.

However, the Court takes judicial notice that in its Resolution No. 16, Series of 2018, the HRET
amended Rules 17 and 18 of the 2015 HRET Rules. The amendments to Rules 17 and 18 of the 2015
HRET Rules were made "with respect to the reckoning point within which to file an election protest
or a petition for quo warranto, respectively, in order to further promote a just and expeditious
determination and disposition of every election contest brought before the Tribunal." The recent
amendments clarified and removed any doubt as to the reckoning date for the filing of an election
protest. The losing candidate can determine with certainty when to file his election protest.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, QUEZON CITY & PABLO MENDOZA, Petitioner, - versus
- ROMEO C. CARRIEDO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 176549, SPECIAL THIRD DIVISION, October 10, 2018, JARDALEZA, J.

Both the Constitution and CARL underscore the underlying principle of the agrarian reform program,
that is, to endeavor a more equitable and just distribution of agricultural lands taking into account,
among others, equity considerations. There is merit in the DAR's contention that the objective of AO 05-
06 is equitable—that in order to ensure the effective implementation of the CARL, previous sales of
landholding (without DAR clearance) should be treated as the exercise of retention rights of the
landowner, as embodied in Item No. 4 of the said administrative order.

FACTS:

In this case, the court resolves the motion for reconsideration filed by the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) of the Decision dated January 20, 2016. The DAR was not given the opportunity to
participate in the proceedings before the Court of Appeals and before this Court, until it filed its
motion for reconsideration of this Court's Decision. The DAR contends that the agency had been
denied due process when it was not afforded the opportunity to refute the allegations against the
validity of DAR AO 05-06 before the Court of Appeals and before this Court. It argues that it was not
even notified of the petition filed before the Court of Appeals; nor did the Court of Appeals notify the
DAR of the proceedings and its Decision. The DAR, therefore, insists that the Decision dated January
20, 2016 be reconsidered by this Court especially so that the issues involve the enforcement and
validity of its regulations.

The Decision adjudged Item No. 4 of AO 05-06 as ultra vires for providing terms which appear to
expand or modify some provisions of the CARL. The DAR argues that this ruling sets back the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program by upsetting its established substantive and procedural
components. Particularly, the DAR contends that the nullification of Item No. 4 of AO 05-06
disregarded the long-standing procedure where the DAR treats a sale (without its clearance) as valid
based on the doctrine of estoppel, and that the sold portion is treated as the landowner's retained
area

ISSUE:

Whether Item No. 4 of AO 05-06 and the relevant provisions of the CARL are valid.

RULING:

On the validity of Item No. 4, AO 05-06

The DAR's argument has merit. The Constitution mandates for an agrarian reform program, to wit:

Art. 8, Section 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right
of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they
till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the
State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such
priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account
ecological, developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to the payment of just compensation.
In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small landowners. The State shall
further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing.
To give life to the foregoing Constitutional provision, the CARL provides, among others:

Sec. 2. Declaration of Principles and Policies. -It is the policy of the State to pursue a Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). The welfare of the landless farmers and farmworkers will receive
the highest consideration to promote social justice and to move the nation toward sound rural
development and industrialization, and the establishment of owner cultivatorship of economic-size
farms as the basis of Philippine agriculture. To this end, a more equitable distribution and ownership
of land, with due regard to the rights of landowners to just compensation and to the ecological needs
of the nation, shall be undertaken to provide farmers and farmworkers with the opportunity to
enhance their dignity and improve the quality of their lives through greater productivity of agricultural
lands.

Both the Constitution and CARL underscore the underlying principle of the agrarian reform program,
that is, to endeavor a more equitable and just distribution of agricultural lands taking into account,
among others, equity considerations. There is merit in the DAR's contention that the objective of AO
05-06 is equitable—that in order to ensure the effective implementation of the CARL, previous sales
of landholding (without DAR clearance) should be treated as the exercise of retention rights of the
landowner, as embodied in Item No. 4 of the said administrative order.

DAR posits that the Decision "will provide landowners unbridled freedom to dispose any or all of
their agricultural properties without DAR clearance and still at a moment's notice decide which of
those lands he wishes to retain, to the prejudice not only of the tenants and/or farmer beneficiaries
but of the entire CARP as well." The DAR, therefore, maintains that AO 05-06 is the regulation
adopted by the agency precisely in order to prevent these perceived dangers in the implementation
of the CARL.

The court agrees. AO 05-06 is in consonance with the Stewardship Doctrine, which has been held
to be the property concept in Section 6, Article II of the 1973 Constitution. Under this concept, private
property is supposed to be held by the individual only as a trustee for the people in general, who are
its real owners. As a mere steward, the individual must exercise his rights to the property not for his
own exclusive and selfish benefit but for the good of the entire community or nation.

This interpretation is consistent with the objective of the agrarian reform program, which is, of
course, land distribution to the landless farmers and farmworkers. Further, Item No. 4 of AO 05-06
is consistent with Section 70 of the CARL as the former likewise treats the sale of the first five hectares
(in case of multiple/series of transactions) as valid, such that the same already constitutes the
retained area of the landowner. This legal consequence arising from the previous sale of land
therefore eliminates the prejudice, in terms of equitable land distribution, that may befall the landless
farmers and farmworkers. Therefore, Item No. 4 of AO 05-06 is valid.

***The Decision also adjudged that CLOAs are not equivalent to a Torrens certificate of title, and thus
are not indefeasible. The DAR disagrees and submits that this ruling relegated Emancipation Patents
and CLOAs to the status of a Certificate of Land Transfer, which is merely part of the preparatory
steps for the eventual issuance of a certificate of title. We agree with the DAR. A Certificate of Land
Ownership Award or CLOA is a document evidencing ownership of the land granted or awarded to
the beneficiary by the DAR, and contains the restrictions and conditions provided for in the CARL and
other applicable laws.