Philosophical Review

Whitehead's Philosophy
Author(s): John Dewey
Source: The Philosophical Review, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Mar., 1937), pp. 170-177
Published by: Duke University Press on behalf of Philosophical Review
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 WHITEHEAD'S PHILOSOPHY1

VM4R.WHITEHEAD'S philosophy
is so comprehensive
thatit
invitesdiscussion from a numberof points of view. One
may considerone of the many special topics he has treatedwith
so much illuminationor one may choose for discussionhis basic
method.Since the latterpointis basic and since it seems to me to
presenthis enduringcontributionto philosophy,I shall confine
myselfto it.
Mr. Whitehead says that the task of philosophyis to frame
"descriptivegeneralizationsof experience".In this,an empiricist
should agree withoutreservation.Descriptive generalizationof
experienceis the goal of any intelligentempiricism.Agreement
upon this special pointis the more emphaticbecause Mr. White-
head is not afraid to use the term "immediateexperience".Al-
though he calls the method of philosophythat of Rationalism,
this term need not give the empiricistpause. For the historic
school thatgoes by the name of Rationalism(with whichempiri-
cism is at odds) is concernednot with descriptivegeneralization,
but ultimatelywitha priorigeneralitiesfromwhichthe matterof
experiencecan itselfbe derived.The contrastbetweenthisposition
and Mr. Whitehead's stands out conspicuouslyin his emphasis
upon immediatelyexistentactual entities."These actual entities",
he says, "are the finalreal thingsof whichthe world is made up.
There is no goingbehindactual entities.They are the onlyreasons
for anything."The divergenceis furtheremphasizedin the fact
that Whiteheadholds thatthereis in every real occasion a dem-
onstrativeor denotativeelement that can only be pointed to:
namely,the elementreferredto in such words as 'this,here,now,
that,there,then'; elementsthat cannotbe derivedfromanything
more generaland that form,indeed,the subject-matter of one of
the main generalizations,thatof real occasions itself.2
Mr. Whitehead's definitionof philosophywas, however,just
given in an abbreviatedform.The descriptivegeneralizations,he
goes on to say, must be such as to form "a coherent,logical,
necessarysystemof generalideas in termsof whicheveryelement
'
Read to the easterndivisionof the AmericanPhilosophicalAssociation
in the symposiumon Whitehead'sphilosophy,December29, i936.
aProcess and Reality27 and 37.
I70

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 WHITEHEAD'S PHILOSOPHY I7I

of our experiencemay be interpreted. Here 'interpretation' means

thateach element shall have the character of a particular instance
of a general scheme."3The wordingof this passage suggests a
point of view nearer to that of traditionalRationalismthan the
conceptionjust set forth.If it means that philosophersshould
proceed as logicallyas possible,strivingto presentfindingsthat
are coherent,thatare even 'necessary',if the necessityin question
be that of close-knitrelationto one another withoutomissions
and superfluities in the generalizeddescriptionsof experiencethat
are obtained,the empiricistneed not dissent.The statementis,
however,open to anotherinterpretation, and to that I shall later
return.
I firstwish to dwell upon the completeextensionof Mr. White-
head's conceptionof 'experience'. It is customaryto find the
applicationof the termconfinedto human and even to conscious
experience.Denial of this restrictionis fundamental in Mr. White-
head's thought.Everythingthat characterizeshuman experience
is found in the natural world. Conversely,what is found in the
natural world is found in human experience. Hence the more
we findout about the naturalworld,the moreintellectualagencies
we have for analysing,describing,and understandinghuman ex-
perience.We cannot determinethe constituentsof the latterby
staringat it directly,but only by interpreting it in termsof the
natural world that is experienced.
The completenessof the correspondencebetweenthe elements
of human experienceand of natureis exemplifiedin each one of
Whitehead's ultimategeneralizations.I mentionfiveof these cor-
respondencesby way of illustration.(i) Change is such a marked
traitof consciousexperiencethatthe latterhas been called,rather
intemperately, a mereflux.Every actual entityin theuniverseis in
process; in some sense is process. (2) No two conscious experi-
ences exactly duplicate one another. Creativityand noveltyare
characteristicof nature. (3) Conscious experienceis markedby
retention-memory in itsbroadestsense-and anticipation.Nature
also carrieson. Every actual occasion is prehensiveof otherocca-
sions and has objectiveimmortality in its successors. (4) Every
conscious experienceinvolves a focus which is the centreof a
'P.R. 4; Adventuresof Ideas 285.

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 I72 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW [VOL. XLVI.

determinateperspective.This principleis exemplifiedin nature.

(5) Every consciousexperienceis a completelyunitarypulse in a
continuousstream. The continuityof nature includes atomicity
and individualizationsof the ongoingstream.
I do not meanto implythatWhiteheadarrivedat thegeneraliza-
tions,of whichthosejust citedare examples,byinstituting directly
such a set of one-to-onesimilarities.But unless I have completely
misreadhim,the correspondencesare thereand are fundamental
in his methodand his system.As he himselfsays: "Any doctrine
that refusesto place human experienceoutside nature must find
in the descriptionof experiencefactorswhich enteralso into the
descriptionof less specializednaturaloccurrences.. . . We should
either admit dualism, at least as a provisional doctrine,or we
should pointout the identicalelementsconnectinghuman experi-
ence withphysicalscience."4
I now turn to the other aspect of the correspondence:the
utilizationof theresultsof naturalscienceas meansof interpreting
human experience.A noteworthyexample is found in his treat-
ment of the subject-objectrelation.In this treatment,it stands
out most clearly that his denial of bifurcationis not a special
epistemologicaldoctrinebut runs throughhis whole cosmology.
The subject-objectrelationis found in human experienceand in
knowledgebecause it is fundamentallycharacteristicof nature.
Philosophyhas taken this relationto be fundamental.With this,
Whitehead agrees. But it has also taken this relationto be one
of a knowerand thatwhichis known.With this,he fundamentally
disagrees. In every actual occasion the relation is found; each
occasion is subject for itself and is reciprocallyobject for that
which 'provokes'it to be what it is in its process. The interplay
of these two things "is the stuffconstitutingthose individual
thingsthat make up the sole realityof the Universe". There are
revolutionaryconsequences for the theoryof experienceand of
knowledgeinvolvedin this view of the subject-objectrelation.
I select,as illustrationof theseconsequences,the relationof his
philosophyto the idealism-realismproblem.Simplifyingthe mat-
ter, idealism resultswhen the subject-objectrelation is confined
to knowledgeand the subject is given primacy.Realism results
when the object is given primacy.But if everyactual occasion is
4A.I. 237.

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No. 2.] WHITEHEAD'S PHILOSOPHY 173

'bipolar' (to use Mr. Whitehead'sown expression)the case stands

otherwise.The terms'real' and 'ideal' can be used onlyin abstrac-
tion fromthe actual totalitiesthat exist. When we talk about the
physical and the psychicalas if there were objects which are
exclusivelyone or the other,we are, if we onlyknow what we are
about,following, and in an over-specializedway,thehistoricroutes
by whicha successionof actual occasionsbecome enduringobjects
of specifiedkinds.Nor are these routes confinedto institutionof
just twokindsof objects.Some are in thedirectionof thoseobjects
thatare called electrons;some in thatof astronomicsystems;some
in thatof plants or animals; some in thatof conscioushumanbe-
ings. The differencesin these objects are differencesin historic
routes of derivationand hereditarytransmission;they do not
presentfixedand untraversablegulfs. (I am obligedto omitrefer-
ence to the complementary principleof societiesor communities
of these objects.)
I give one furtherillustration,withoutcomment,in Mr. White-
head's own words. "The brain is continuouswith the body,and
the body is continuouswiththe restof the naturalworld. Human
experienceis an act of self-originationincludingthe whole of
nature,limitedto theperspectiveof a focalregionwithinthebody,
but not necessarilypersistingin any fixed coordinationwith a
definitepartof thebrain."5Justone moreillustration will be given
of the use of the findingsof physicalsciencein analysisof human
experience.I do not see how anyone not familiarwith modern
field-theories in physics and who did not have the courage of
imaginationto apply these theoriesto the descriptivegeneraliza-
tion of humanexperiencecould have arrivedat many of the con-
clusionsaboutthelatterwhichWhiteheadhas reached: I mention,
as a special example,the fallacyof simplelocation.
I have selected,I repeat,a few pointsin order to illustratethe
methodwhichto me is his originaland enduringcontributionto
philosophy,presentand future.I should be glad to continuein
this strain,and to suggesthow the resultsof this method,were
it widely adopted, would assuredlytake philosophyaway from
by-pathsthat have led to dead-ends and would release it from
many constraintsthat now embarrassit. But I must returnto
thataspect of his thoughtwhichseems to implythat,afterall, his
IA.I. 290.

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I74 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW [VOL. XLVI.

method is to be understoodand applied in a directionwhich

assimilates it, with enormousdevelopmentin mattersof detail,
to traditionalRationalism.I say 'seems'; for it is a questionI am
raising.The issue in briefis this: Is it to be developedand applied
with fundamentalemphasis upon experimentalobservation(the
methodof the naturalsciences) ? Or does it pointto the primacy
of mathematicalmethod,in accord with historicrationalism?I
hope the word 'primacy'will be noted. This occasion is a highly
inappropriateone in which to introducebifurcation.The two
directionsare not opposed to each other.Mathematicshas its own
establishedpositionin physicalscience. But I do not see how the
two can be co-ordinate,meaning by 'co-ordinate' being upon
exactly the same level. One, I think,must lead and the other
follow.
A mathematicallogician proceeds,if I understandthe matter
aright,in some such way as the following.He findsin existence
a definitebodyof mathematicaldisciplines.The existencein ques-
tion is historical.In so far,the disciplinesare subject to the con-
tingenciesthat affecteverythinghistorical.Compared,therefore,
with the requirementsof logical structure,thereis somethingad
hoc about themas theystand.The logicianhas thena double task
to perform.He has to reduce each disciplineto the smallestnum-
ber of independentdefinitionsand postulatesthat are sufficient
and necessaryto effectlogical organizationof the subject-matter
of thatdiscipline.He has also to bringthe various definitions and
postulatesof the different branchesof mathematicsinto coherent
and necessaryrelationto one another.There is somethingin the
extendeddefinition of philosophy,which was quoted earlier,that
suggeststhatWhiteheadwould have us adopt such a mathematical
model and patternin philosophizing.On this basis a philosopher
would set himselfthe aim of discoveringin immediateexperience
the elementsthatcan be statedin a succinctsystemof independent
definitionsand postulates,they being such that when they are
deductivelywoventogethertherewill resulta coherentand neces-
sary systemin which "each elementshall have the characterof a
particularinstanceof the generalscheme". In this case, it is not
simplythe philosopherwho must proceed logically.The scheme
of nature and immediateexperienceis itself a logical system-
when we have the wit to make it out in its own terms.

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No. 2.] WHITEHEAD'S PHILOSOPHY I75

Nevertheless,thatwhichI have called Whitehead'sbasic method

is capable of another construction.As far as experience-nature
and descriptivegeneralizationsare concerned,thereis an alterna-
tive methodopen: that which I called that of the natural rather
than the mathematicalsciences. For in the former,while mathe-
matical science is indispensable,it is subordinateto the conse-
quences of experimentalobservationalinquiry.For brevityI shall
call this contrastingmethod 'genetic-functional', though I am
aware that 'genetic'in particularis exposed to serious misappre-
hension.6Upon the mathematicalmodel,the resultinggeneraliza-
tions,it seemsto me,are necessarilymorphologicaland static; they
expressan aboriginalstructure, the componentsof whichare then
deductivelywoven together.Upon the basis of the other model,
the subject-matter of the generalizationsis distinctionsthat arise
in and because of inquiryinto the subject-matterof experience-
nature,and theythenfunctionor operateas divisionsof labor in
the furthercontroland orderingof its materialsand processes.
As far as methodis -concerned, the onlyoppositeI can findfor
'genetic'is 'intuitional'.Generalizeddistinctionsare there ready-
made, so to speak, and after analysis has taken place, we just
see and acknowledgethemby a kind of rationalperceptionwhich
is final. The opposite of 'functional' is, of *course,'structural'.
Somehow,when put togetherrightly,the various generalizations
representdifferentparts of a fixed structure; they are like
morphologicalorgans when these are viewed in abstractionfrom
differentiationsof functioningactivity.Thus we are led back to
the question: Which aspect is primaryand leading and which is
auxiliary?
Adequate discussionof this issue would demand consideration
of each one of Whitehead's ultimategeneralitiesor categories,
therebeing at least seven of them."Time forbidssuch considera-
tion. I confinemyselfto the positionof 'eternalobjects'. The fact
that the word 'ingression'is constantlyused to designate their
relationto actual entitiessuggestsquite stronglythe mathematical

' Suchmisapprehensionwilloccuriftheideaofgenesisis takentobe ofa

order.It is meantin an objectivesense,thesensein which
psychological
the originand development of astronomical systemsand of animalsis
genetics.
'In AdventuresofIdeas,theseare connected, withappropriatemodifica-
tions,withthePlatonicscheme. See pp. i88,203, 240, and354.

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 176 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW [VOL. XLVI.

model. For ingressionsuggestsan independentand ready-made

subsistenceof eternalobjects,thelatterbeingguaranteedby direct
intuition.The conceptionof God in the total systemseems to
indicatethatthisis the properinterpretation, since some principle
is certainlynecessary,upon this premise,to act selectivelyin
determining what eternalobjects ingressin any given immediate
occasion. The alternativeview is thatof the egressionof natures,
characters,or universals,as a consequenceof thenecessityof gen-
eralizationfromimmediateoccasionsthatexistsin orderto direct
their furthermovementand its consequences.This capacity of
intelligenceperformsthe officefor whichDeity has to be invoked
upon the otherpremise.
Upon the genetic-functional view, such objects (which are
'eternal' in the sense of not being spatio-temporalexistences)
emergebecause of the existenceof problematicsituations.They
emergeoriginallyas suggestions.They are thenoperativelyapplied
to actual existences.When they succeed in resolvingproblematic
situations(in organizingotherwiseconflicting elements)theypart
withsomeor mostof theirhypothetical qualityand becomeroutine
methodsof behavior.
Upon the basis of the generalizedidea of experienceof White-
head, there is somethingcorrespondingto this in nature. There
exist in nature indeterminatesituations.Because of their inde-
terminatenature,the subsequentprocess is hesitantand tentative.
The activitythatis 'provoked'is incipient.If it becomeshabitual,
it is finallydeterminately egressiveas a routineof nature,and it
harmonizesthe aggressivelyconflicting elementsto which is due
the indeterminacy of the original natural situation.When this
routine-established mode of processiveactivityis observedit be-
comes the subject-matter of a naturallaw.
I am not affirming positivelythat this way of interpretingthe
basic conceptionof experienceand the relationsof its generalized
descriptionsto one anotheris necessary.It does decidedlyappear
to me to be a genuinealternativeway. While my own preference
is markedlyin its favor,I am presentingit,as I have alreadysaid,
for the purpose of presentingand makingclear, as far as limits
of time permit,a question.8Upon the negativeside, the absence
The point of the choice betweenalternativeswould be clearer still if
there were time to discuss immediatequalities (usually called sensory

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No. 2.] WHITEHEAD'S PHILOSOPHY I77

of any attemptin Mr. Whitehead'swritingsto place the ultimate

generalitiesin any schemeof analytic-genetic derivationpointsto
his adoptionof whatI have called themathematicalpattern.Upon
thepositiveside thereis therathercomplexintermediary apparatus
of God, harmony,mathematicalrelations,natural laws, that is
requiredto effectthe interweavingof eternalobjects and immedi-
ate occasions. I do not thinkthat the difficulties
foundin reading
Mr. Whiteheadare due to his fundamentalconceptionof experi-
ence. On the contrary,given a reasonabledegreeof emancipation
of philosophicimaginationfromphilosophictraditionand its lan-
guage, that idea seems to me extraordinarily luminousas well as
productive.The difficulties seem to me to arise fromthe inter-
mediaryapparatus requiredin the interweavingof elements;the
interweavingbeing required only because of the assumptionof
original independenceand not being required if they emergeto
serve functionally ends whichexperienceitselfinstitutes.
Because Whitehead's philosophyis fraughtwith such poten-
tialitiesfor the futureof the philosophizingof all of us, I have
raised the questionof basic method,insteadof limitingmyselfto
the more congenialtask of selectingsome one of its many sug-
gestive developmentsfor special comment.As currentsof phi-
losophyare runningat present,it is altogetherlikelythat its im-
mediate influencewill be mainlyupon the side of what I called
the mathematicalmodel. Its enduringinfluencein behalf of the
integratedNaturalismto which Whitehead is devoted seems to
me to demandthe otherinterpretation. There is, withoutdoubt,a
certainironyin givingto Mr. Whitehead'sthoughta mathematical
interpretation, for thatimplies,afterall, the primacyof the static
over process,the latter,upon this interpretation, being limitedto
immediateoccasions and theirsecondaryreactionsback intowhat
is fixed by nature; as in the case of the change in Primordial
God. The plea, then,for the alternativedirectionof development
of his thoughtis in essence a plea for recognizingthe infinite
fertilityof actual occasionsin theirfullactuality.
JOH N DEWEY

becauseof one of theircausalconditions)whichWhiteheadregardsas

eternalobjects;forupontheothertheory theyare just whatgivesactual
occasions so thatthereis no actualentity
theiruniquesingularity, without
them.

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