China’s Decade Long Hybrid War

Against Vietnam, 1977-1987

Carlyle A. Thayer, Emeritus Professor

The University of New South Wales Canberra
Australian Defence Force Academy
Strategic Situation at the Outset

• Vietnam War overlaid by Sino-Soviet rivalry

– Shanghai Communique 27 Feb 1972
• 1975 communist-led military forces took power in
Cambodia, Vietnam and Laos
• Tripartite alliance quickly broke down
– Khmer Rouge resisted Vietnamese hegemony (so-
called Indochina Federation)
• China sought to undermine Soviet-Vietnam ties
• China initiated three front hybrid war
Hybrid War on Three Fronts

Northern
Border
Front

Domestic
Front

Southwest
Border
Front
1. Southwest Border Front

• May 1975 Khmer Rouge attack Vietnamese held

islands in Gulf of Thailand and land border
• April 1977 Khmer Rouge resume border
harassment and deep penetration raids
– China provides military advisers and weapons
– China also provides political, diplomatic, and
economic support
• December 1978 Vietnam invades and occupies
Cambodia (until withdrawal in Sept 1989)
2. Northern Border Front

• 1977 - China conducts small scale northern

border incursions in tandem with Khmer Rouge
attacks in southwest
• Chinese incursions increase in intensity 1978
• China conducts political subversion among ethnic
minority leaders in border area
– Ethnic minorities straddle northern border
– Loudspeakers broadcast propaganda
– Vietnam arrests ethnic minority generals
Northern Border War, Feb-Mar 1979

• China launches massive conventional ‘counter-

attack in self-defence’ to pacify the border
• 80,000 PLA troops invade on five fronts
– ‘teach Vietnam a lesson’ by mauling its main force
divisions
– Limited in time and space
• 15 March 1979 PLA captures Lang Son town
and announces withdrawal
– PLA lays waste to northern infrastructure
China Launches Offensive 17 Feb 1979

Lang Son
Northern Border, 1979-87

• After China’s withdrawal Beijing threatens a

‘second lesson’
• China conducts daily harassment raids and
artillery and mortar shelling of border area
• Chinese actions in response to VPA dry season
offensives in Cambodia and are designed to serve
propaganda, political & foreign policy objectives
• Six major incidents stand out – most serious since
1979 or most serious since last serious incident
Six Major Chinese Attacks, 1979-87

• Shelling of Cao Bang province town (7/80)

– Six months of border skirmishes leads to
three-day massive Chinese artillery barrage
• China seizes hills in Lang Son and Ha Tuyen
provinces along border (5/81)
– Fighting between local forces reaches
intensity of 1979 border war
• Chinese artillery conducts four-day artillery
barrage along entire northern border (4/83)
– highest level of hostilities since May 1981
Vi Xuyen district, Ha Tuyen province

Chinese artillery
shelling of Vi Xuyen
district
Six Major Attacks on Vietnam, 1979-87

• Major attack on Vi Xuyen district, Ha Tuyen

(4/84)
– 60,000 shells fired, heaviest artillery bombardment
since 1979, PLA regulars seize hills
• Shelling of Vi Xuyen district (6/85)
– China fires one million artillery rounds in retaliation
for VPA dry season offensive in Cambodia
• ‘Phony War’ (12/86-1/87)
– China concentrates massive artillery fire on Vi Xuyen
but claims shelling along entire border
3. Domestic Front, 1977-78

• China conducts political operations among Hoa

(ethnic Chinese) in northern Vietnam
– Of 300,000 an estimated 250,000 flee to China
• China conducts political operations among Hoa in
Saigon and southern Vietnam
– 1.2 million (of whom 700,000 lived in Chợ Lớn,
Saigon’s China town
– 200,000 apply for repatriation
– China unsuccessfully sends two ships to evacuate
‘ostracized and persecuted’ Hoa
China’s Local Goals

1.Prevent the emergence of an Indochina bloc

under Vietnamese hegemony
2.Provide support for the Khmer Rouge regime
in Cambodia
3.Undermine Soviet relations with Vietnam
4.Protect ethnic Chinese in Vietnam
5.Demonstrate the credibility of Chinese
commitments
China’s Local Goals

6. Pacify China’s border with Vietnam

7. Teach Vietnam a lesson through a ‘counter-
attack in self-defense’
8. Relieve pressure on Cambodia by opening a
second front
9. Evaluate tactics, equipment, logistics and
communications, and combat experience
10. Become the dominant power in Indochina
China’s Regional/Global Goals

Demonstrate that
1.China opposes Soviet ‘social imperialism’ and
hegemonism
2.Soviet Union is not a reliable ally
3.China is a regional military power
4.China is a credible and reliable ally
5.China protects its Overseas Chinese
community
Instruments of Hybrid Warfare

• Use of the Khmer Rouge as a third party to apply

military pressure on Vietnam
• Political influence on Vietnam’s leadership to
support China
– Politburo member defects to China
• Political warfare
– Political influence operations among ethnic
minorities and Hoa, local officials, and pro-Chinese
members of the Vietnamese leadership
• Kinetic – use of regular and paramilitary forces
Assessment of Chinese Effectiveness

• Chinese hybrid warfare did not achieve grand

objectives, but
– Kinetic force inflicted significant casualties
– Serious economic costs imposed on Vietnam
– Vietnam isolated internationally
– Vietnam’s client regime denied legitimacy
• PLA not able to inflict a ‘battle of quick decision’
• Vietnam not seriously destabilized
Vietnamese Responses

• Vietnam joined Council for Mutual Economic

Assistance (COMECON), June 29, 1978
• Vietnam-Soviet Union sign 25-year Treaty of
Friendship and Cooperation, November 1978
– Soviet naval forces lodged in Cam Ranh Bay
• Vietnam overthrew Khmer Rouge regime and
installed compliant Cambodian regime
– Conducted successful counter-insurgency campaign
against Khmer Rouge
• Vietnam able to achieve objectives in
Cambodia and protect territorial integrity
China’s Decade Long Hybrid War
Against Vietnam, 1977-1987

Carlyle A. Thayer, Emeritus Professor

The University of New South Wales Canberra
Australian Defence Force Academy