KABATAAN PARTYLIST VS COMELEC

FACTS: On February 15, 2013, President Benigno Aquino signed into law RA 10367 which mandates the
COMELEC to implement a mandatory biometrics registration system for new voters.
On June 26, 2013, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9721 which serves as the implementing rules and
regulations of RA 10367, thus, prescribing the procedure for validation, deactivation, and reactivation of
voters' registration records (VRRs).
Petitioners pray that this Court declare RA 10367, as well as COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863, and
10013, unconstitutional and that the COMELEC be commanded to desist from deactivating registered
voters without biometric information, to reinstate voters who are compliant with the requisites of RA
8189 but have already been delisted, and to extend the system of continuing registration and capture of
biometric information of voters until January 8, 2016.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 10367, as well as COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863, and 10013, all related
thereto, are unconstitutional.
RULING: No. To reiterate, this requirement is not a "qualification" to the exercise of the right of
suffrage, but a mere aspect of the registration procedure, of which the State has the right to reasonably
regulate. It was institutionalized conformant to the limitations of the 1987 Constitution and is a mere
complement to the existing Voter's Registration Act of 1996. Thus,unless it is shown that a registration
requirement rises to the level of a literacy, property or other substantive requirement as contemplated
by the Framers of the Constitution - that is, one which propagates a socio-economic standard which is
bereft of any rational basis to a person's ability to intelligently cast his vote and to further the public
good - the same cannot be struck down as unconstitutional, as in this case.
Bagumbayan VNP Movement v. Comelec G.R. No. 222731, March 08, 2016
FACTS: Petitioners Bagumbayan Volunteers for a New Philippines Movement, Inc. (Bagumbayan-VNP,
Inc.) and Former Senator Richard J. Gordon (Gordon) filed a Petition for mandamus before the Supreme
Court to compel respondent Commission on Elections to implement the Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail
(VVPAT) security feature. Bagumbayan-VNP, Inc. operates through Bagumbayan Volunteers for a New
Philippines, a national political party duly registered with the Commission on Elections. Former Senator
Gordon is an official candidate for the Senate of the Atty. Faizah Tejero ELECTION LAWS From the joint
efforts of 2nd Year – 4 year Program 2018 Philippines and is the Chairperson of Bagumbayan-VNP, Inc.
Gordon authored Republic Act No. 9369, the law that amended Republic Act No. 8436, otherwise known
as the Automated Election System Law. On December 22, 1997, Republic Act No. 8436 authorized the
Commission on Elections to use an automated election system for electoral exercises. Republic Act No.
9369 amended Republic Act No. 8436. Republic Act No. 9369 introduced significant changes to Republic
Act No. 8436, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, and other
election-related statutes. Petitioners allege that under Republic Act No. 8436, as amended by Republic
Act No. 9369, there are several safeguards or Minimum System Capabilities to ensure the sanctity of the
ballot. Among these is the implementation of the VVPAT security feature. Petitioners claim that VVPAT
"consists of physical paper records of voter ballots as voters have cast them on an electronic voting
system." Through it, the voter can verify if the choices on the paper record match the choices that he or
she actually made in the ballot. The voter can confirm whether the machine had actually read the ballot
correctly. Petitioners seek to compel the Commission on Elections to have the vote-counting machine
issue receipts once a person has voted. The VVPAT "will ensure transparency and reduce any attempt to
alter the results of the elections." There will be "an electronic tally of the votes cast" or the vote stored
in the vote-counting machine, as well as "a paper record of the individual votes" cast or the VVPAT
receipt. Should there be any doubt, "the electronically generated results . . . can then be audited and
verified through a comparison . . . with these paper records." Petitioners claim that the Commission on
Elections refuses to implement the VVPAT function based on fears that the security feature may aid in
vote-buying, and that the voting period may take longer. At the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee on the Automated Election System on February 16, 2016, the Commission on Elections,
through its Chairperson Andres D. Bautista (Chairperson Bautista), supposedly gave its reasons for
refusing to issue paper receipts. First, "politicians can use the receipts in vote buying;" second, it may
increase voting time to five to seven hours in election precincts. The COMELEC has decided against
printing the receipt because it might be used for vote buying and that it would result in the vote-
counting process being extended from six to seven hours since it takes about 13 seconds to print a
receipt, meaning each machine would have to run for that long for the receipts. Bautista said another
"big concern" is that "there might be losing candidates who might question the results, basically
instructing their supporters that when the machine prints out the receipt, regardless of what the receipt
says, they will say that it's not correct." Petitioners argue that the Commission on Elections' fears are
"baseless and speculative." On November 10, 2015, Bagumbayan-VNP, Inc. sent Commission on
Elections Chairperson Bautista a letter demanding the implementation of the VVPAT feature for the May
9, 2016 Elections. However, the Commission on Elections never answered the letter. In view of the
foregoing, petitioners filed a Special Civil Action for Mandamus under Rule 65, Section 3 of the Rules of
Court. They ask this court to compel the Commission on Elections to comply with the provisions of
Section 6(e), (f), and (n) of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended. Petitioners argue that mandamus is
proper to "enforce a public right" and "compel the performance of a public duty."
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC may be compelled, through a writ of mandamus, to enable the
Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail system capability feature for the 2016 Elections.
RULING: YES. Mandamus is the relief sought "when any tribunal corporation, board, officer or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from
an office, trust, or station," and "there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law." Atty. Faizah Tejero ELECTION LAWS From the joint efforts of 2nd Year – 4 year Program
2018 Through a writ of mandamus, the courts "compel the performance of a clear legal duty or a
ministerial duty imposed by law upon the defendant or respondent" by operation of his or her office,
trust, or station. The petitioner must show the legal basis for the duty, and that the defendant or
respondent failed to perform the duty. Petitioners argue that the Commission on Elections unlawfully
neglected to perform its legal duty of fully implementing our election laws, specifically Republic Act No.
8436, Section 6(e), (f), and (n), as amended by Republic Act No. 9369: SEC. 6. Minimum System
Capabilities. � The automated election system must at least have the following functional capabilities: .
. . . (e)� Provision for voter verified paper audit trail; (f) System auditability which provides supporting
documentation for verifying the correctness of reported election results; . . . . (n) Provide the voter a
system of verification to find out whether or not the machine has registered his choice; Commission on
Elections Resolution No. 10057 promulgated on February 11, 2016 did not include mechanisms for
VVPAT. The inaction of the Commission on Elections in utilizing the VVPAT feature of the vote-counting
machines fails to fulfill the duty required under Republic Act No. 8436, as amended. Article XI(C), Section
2 of the 1987 Constitution empowered the Commission of Elections to "enforce and administer all laws
and regulations relative to the conduct of an election." One of the laws that the Commission on
Elections must implement is Republic Act No. 8436, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, which
requires the automated election system to have the capability of providing a voter-verified paper audit
trail. The law is clear. A "voter verified paper audit trail" requires the following: (a) individual voters can
verify whether the machines have been able to count their votes; and (b) that the verification at
minimum should be paper based. There appears to be no room for further interpretation of a "voter
verified paper audit trail." The paper audit trail cannot be considered the physical ballot, because there
may be instances where the machine may translate the ballot differently, or the voter inadvertently
spoils his or her ballot. It is true that the Commission on Elections is given ample discretion to administer
the elections, but certainly, its constitutional duty is to "enforce the law." The Commission is not given
the constitutional competence to amend or modify the law it is sworn to uphold. Section 6(e), (f), and
(n) of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, is law. Should there be policy objections to it, the remedy is
to have Congress amend it. The Commission on Elections cannot opt to breach the requirements of the
law to assuage its fears regarding the VVPAT. Vote-buying can be averted by placing proper procedures.
The Commission on Elections has the power to choose the appropriate procedure in order to enforce
the VVPAT requirement under the law, and balance it with the constitutional mandate to secure the
secrecy and sanctity of the ballot. WHEREFORE, the Petition for Mandamus is GRANTED. The
Commission on Elections is ORDERED to enable the vote verification feature of the vote-counting
machines, which prints the voter's choices without prejudice to the issuance of guidelines to regulate
the release and disposal of the issued receipts in order to ensure a clean, honest, and orderly elections
such as, but not limited to, ensuring that after voter verification, receipts should be deposited in a
separate ballot box and not taken out of the precinct.

NAVAL V. COMELEC
G.R. No. 207851 July 8, 2014

FACTS: From 2004 to 2007 and 2007 to 2010, Angel Naval had been elected and had served as a
member of the Sanggunian, Second District, Province of Camarines Sur. The President approved
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9716, which reapportioned the legislative districts in Camarines Sur. In the 2010
elections, Naval once again won as among the members of the Sanggunian, Third District. He served
until 2013. In the 2013 elections, Naval ran anew and was re-elected as Member of the Sanggunian,
Third District. Nelson Julia was likewise a Sanggunian Member candidate from the Third District in the
2013 elections. On October 29, 2012, he invoked Section 7810 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) and
filed before the COMELEC a Verified Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel the Certificate of
Candidacy of Naval. Julia posited that Naval had fully served the entire Province of Camarines Sur for
three consecutive terms as a member of the Sanggunian, irrespective of the district he had been elected
from. The three-term limit rule’s application is more with reference to the same local elective post, and
not necessarily in connection with an identical territorial jurisdiction. Allowing Naval to run as a
Sanggunian member for the fourth time is violative of the inflexible three-term limit rule enshrined in
the Constitution and the LGC, which must be strictly construed.
ISSUE: WON Naval could run as a provincial board member when the legislative district he initially
served had already been reapportioned in such a way that 8 out of its 10 town constituencies are carved
out and renamed as another district.
HELD: The Court finds no compelling reason to grant the reliefs prayed for by Naval. For the Court to
declare otherwise would be to create a dangerous precedent unintended by the drafters of our
Constitution and of R.A. No. 9716. Considering that the one-term gap or rest after three consecutive
elections is a result of a compromise among the members of the Constitutional Commission, no cavalier
exemptions or exceptions to its application is to be allowed. Aldovino affirms this interpretation.
Further, sustaining Naval’s arguments would practically allow him to hold the same office for 15 years.
These are the circumstances the Constitution explicitly intends to avert. The actual difference in the
population of the old Second District from that of the current Third District amounts to less than 10% of
the population of the latter. This numerical fact renders the new Third District as essentially, although
not literally, the same as the old Second District. Hence, while Naval is correct in his argument that
Sanggunian members are elected by district, it does not alter the fact that the district which elected him
for the third and fourth time is the same one which brought him to office in 2004 and 2007.

MARUHOM V. COMELEC
FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent were both candidates for Mayor in the Municipality of
Marogong, Lanao del Sur and voted as such in the last May 11, 1998 national and local election. The
election in Marogong functioned on May 11, 1998. It was alleged that anomalies occurred as a result of
the foregoing irregularities, anomalies and electoral frauds, the petitioner was illegally proclaimed as
winner because he appeared to have obtained 2,020 votes while the private respondent garnered 2,000
votes with a slight margin of only 20 votes; On May 22, 1998, private respondent, knowing that he was
cheated and the true winner for Mayor, filed before this Honorable Commission a petition to annul the
proclamation of petitioner Abdulmadid Maruhom as the duly elected Mayor of Marogong, Lanao del
Sur. Petitioner filed an answer but withdraw then filed a motion to dismiss.
ISSUE: Whether or not a motion to dismiss, filed after an answer has been filed, is prohibited?
RULING: Yes. The filing of the motion to dismiss, in fact, appears to be part of a perfidious plot to
prevent the early termination of the proceedings in Election Case No. 4847 as evidenced by a confluence
of events clearly showing a pattern of delay employed by petitioner to avert the revision ballots. These
events, pointed out by private respondent and borne by the record.Petitioner filed his motion to dismiss
when the result of the trial appeared to be adverse to him or right after the revesion committee had
been ordered by the trial court.

MARUHOM V. COMELEC FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent were both candidates for Mayor in
the Municipality of Marogong, Lanao del Sur and voted as such in the last May 11, 1998 national and
local election. The election in Marogong functioned on May 11, 1998. It was alleged that anomalies
occurred as a result of the foregoing irregularities, anomalies and electoral frauds, the petitioner was
illegally proclaimed as winner because he appeared to have obtained 2,020 votes while the private
respondent garnered 2,000 votes with a slight margin of only 20 votes; On May 22, 1998, private
respondent, knowing that he was cheated and the true winner for Mayor, filed before this Honorable
Commission a petition to annul the proclamation of petitioner Abdulmadid Maruhom as the duly
elected Mayor of Marogong, Lanao del Sur. Petitioner filed an answer but withdraw then filed a motion
to dismiss. ISSUE: Whether or not a motion to dismiss, filed after an answer has been filed, is
prohibited? RULING: Yes. The filing of the motion to dismiss, in fact, appears to be part of a perfidious
plot to prevent the early termination of the proceedings in Election Case No. 4847 as evidenced by a
confluence of events clearly showing a pattern of delay employed by petitioner to avert the revision
ballots. These events, pointed out by private respondent and borne by the record.Petitioner filed his
motion to dismiss when the result of the trial appeared to be adverse to him or right after the revesion
committee had been ordered by the trial court.
MARUHOM V. COMELEC
FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent were both candidates for Mayor in the Municipality of
Marogong, Lanao del Sur and voted as such in the last May 11, 1998 national and local election. The
election in Marogong functioned on May 11, 1998. It was alleged that anomalies occurred as a result of
the foregoing irregularities, anomalies and electoral frauds, the petitioner was illegally proclaimed as
winner because he appeared to have obtained 2,020 votes while the private respondent garnered 2,000
votes with a slight margin of only 20 votes; On May 22, 1998, private respondent, knowing that he was
cheated and the true winner for Mayor, filed before this Honorable Commission a petition to annul the
proclamation of petitioner Abdulmadid Maruhom as the duly elected Mayor of Marogong, Lanao del
Sur. Petitioner filed an answer but withdraw then filed a motion to dismiss.
ISSUE: Whether or not a motion to dismiss, filed after an answer has been filed, is prohibited?
RULING: Yes. The filing of the motion to dismiss, in fact, appears to be part of a perfidious plot to
prevent the early termination of the proceedings in Election Case No. 4847 as evidenced by a confluence
of events clearly showing a pattern of delay employed by petitioner to avert the revision ballots. These
events, pointed out by private respondent and borne by the record. Petitioner filed his motion to
dismiss when the result of the trial appeared to be adverse to him or right after the revesion committee
had been ordered by the trial court.
PEÑA vs HRET
G.R. No. 123037 March 21, 1997
FACTS:
Pena and Abueg were rivals for the Congressional seat in Palawan during the May elections. Abueg was
proclaimed winner. On May22, Pena filed a petition ADCAUTELAM with the HRET, claiming that the
election in the 2nd district of Palawan were tainted with massive fraud, widespread vote-buying,
intimidation and terrorism and other serious irregularities committed before, during and after the
voting, during the counting of vote the preparation of election returns and certificates of canvass
which affected the results of the election.
Because of these irregularities, Pena stated that he lost the election b almost 7k votes. H then assailed
Abueg’s proclamation. Abueg filed an answer and a motion to dismiss on June 23 averring that the
HRET ha no acquired jurisdiction over the petition, the same being insufficient in form and substance.
In essence, the motion to dismiss anchors its challenge on the fact that the petiti on failed to allege the
precincts where the massive fraud and disenfranchisement of vote occurred, nor did it point out how
many votes would be gained by the protestant as a result of the same.
Pena later submitted a list of specific contested precincts on Jul 10, or days after Abueg’s answer. In
October, the HRET ruled that while it had jurisdiction over the petition, as the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, return and qualification of the member of the House of Representatives, the
said petition, however, fails to state a cause of action, and is therefore, insufficient in form and
substance, meriting its dismissal. Pena filed a petition for certiorari with the SC.

ISSUE: Whether the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing Pena’s petition ad
cautelam for lack of substance which Pena later cured). NO

HELD:
A perusal of the PetitionAd Cautelam reveals that Petitioner makes no specific mention of the precincts
where widespread election, fraud and irregularities occurred. This is a fatal omission, as it goes into the
very substance of the protest. Under
Section 21 of the Revised Rules of Procedure of HRET, insufficiency in form and substance of the petition
constitutes a ground for the immediate dismissal of the Petition.
The prescription that the petition must be sufficient in form and substance means that the petition must
be more than merely rhetorical. If the allegations contained therein are unsupported by even the
faintest whisper of authority in fact and law, then there is no other course than to dismiss the petition,
otherwise, the assumption of an elected public official may, and will always be held up by petitions of
this sort by the losing candidate.
The defect in the instant case arises from the failure to allege the contested precincts. Only a bare
allegation of "massive fraud, widespread intimidation and terrorism and other serious irregularities",
without specification, and substantiation, of where and how these occurrences took place, appears in
the petition. The Court cannot allow election protest based on such flimsy averments to prosper,
otherwise, the whole election process will deteriorate into endless stream of crabs pulling at each other,
racing to disembark from the water. The Court has already ruled in Joker P. Arroyo vs HRET, that
substantial amendment to the protest may be allowed only within the same period for filing the
election protest, which, under Rule of the HRET Rules of Procedure is ten (10) days after the
proclamation of the winner.
 BINCE JR vs COMELEC
G.R.Nos.111624 March 9, 1995
FACTS:
Bince and Micu were Sangguniang Panlalawigan candidates in Pangasinaduring the elections. During the
canvassing of the COCs for the 10 municipalities of the 6th district, Micu objected the inclusion of the
COC of Quintin, claiming that it contained false statements. Micu later secured resolution from the
COMELEC directing the Provincial Board of Canvassers the correct number of votes from the
municipality of San Quintin. Meanwhile, Micu filed several petitions for correction of the Statements of
Votes (SOVs) for all errors in other municipalities of the 6th district (Tayug and San Miguel). Note that
the errors were committed by the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBCs). However, after canvassing
the COCs for the 10municipalities, it turns out Bince garnered27,370 votes against Micu’s 27,639,
margin of vote. Bince was not yet proclaimed at this time because of the absence of authority
from the COMELEC. On June 29, the COMELEC en banc promulgated a resolution directing the PBC to
continue with the provincial canvass and proclaim the winning candidates. On June 24, the PBC acted on
Micu’s petitions for correction of the SOVs for Tayug and San Miguel. Bince appealed, claiming that the
PBC had no jursidiction. Subsequently, the PBC filed petition with the COMELE seeking definitive ruling
as to who should be proclaimed.
Apparently, if the corrections to the SOVs of Tayug and SM were to be included, Emiliano Micu would
gain plurality by 72 votes. The COMELEC resolved the PBC to proclaim the winning candidate on the
basis of the completed and corrected Certificates of Canvass. However on July 21, Bince was proclaimed
winner. Micu filed an Urgent Motion for Contempt and to Annul Proclamation and Amendment
Urgent Petition for Contempt and Annul Proclamation alleging that the PBC defied the directive of
the COMELEC. The COMELEC held the officers who proclaimed Bince in contempt, and directed the PBC
to proclaim the true winner.
The case later turned to the legality of the PBC’s granting of the petitions for the correction of the Tayug
and SM SOVs. Micu claim that his petitions for correction was valid under Section of Rule of the Comelec
Rules of Procedure. Eventually, Bince’s proclamation was affirmed, but Micu’s MFR to the en banc, was
set aside and declared null and void. Bince appealed to the SC in special civil action for certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC committed GAOD in nullifying Bince’s proclamation. NO

HELD:
COMELEC acted within its jurisdiction. Respondent COMELEC did not act without jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion in annulling the proclamation of Alfonso Bince, Jr. and in directing the
Provincial Board of Canvassers of Pangasinan to order the Municipal Boards of Canvassers of Tayugan
San Manuel to make the necessary correction in the SOV and COC in said municipalities a to proclaim
the winner in the sixth legislative district of Pangasinan. Nullification was justified as the basis was a
mathematical error committed by the MBCs in the computation of votes. The COMELEC cannot be
faulted for subsequently annulling the proclamation of petitioner Bince on account of a
mathematical error in addition committed by respondent MBCs in the computation of the votes
received by both petitioner and private respondent.
As to timeliness of Micu’s petitions for correction: The petitions to correct manifest errors were filed o
time, that is, before the petitioner's proclamation on July21, 1992. Thepetition of the MBC of San
Manuel was filed on June4, 1992 while that of still the MBC of Tayugan was filed on June 5, 1992.Still,
private respondent's petition was filed with the MBCs of Tayugan and San Manuel on Jun 10, an Jun 11,
1992, respectively, definitely well within the prescribed period required by Section 6 (now Section 7),
Rule of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
Section 6 clearly provides that the petition for correction may be file at any time before proclamation of
a winner. What if the petitions for correction were filed out of time? No effect. Assuming for the sake of
argument that the petition was filed out of time, this incident alone will not thwart the proper
determination of the resolution of the instant case substantial grounds.
Adherence to a technicality that would put a stamp of validity on a palpable void proclamation, with the
inevitable result of frustrating the people's will cannot be countenanced. Adjudication of cases on
substantive merits and not on technicalities has been consistently observed by this Court.
Well settled in the doctrine that election contest involve public interest, and technicalities and
procedural barriers should not be allowed to stay if they constitute an obstacle to the determination of
the true will of the elect orate in the choice of their elective officials. And also settled is the rule that
laws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the
choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections.
Was allowing the correction of mathematical errors proper? YES
Does not involve the opening of the ballot boxes; neither does it involve the examination and/or
appreciation of ballots.
The correction sought by private respondent and respondent MBC of Tayug and San Manuel is
correction of manifest mistakes in mathematical addition. Certainly this only calls for mere clerical act
of reflecting the true and correct votes received by the candidate by the mbc involved.
In this case, the manifest error sought to be corrected involved the proper and diligent addition
of the votes in the municipalities of Tayug and San Manuel, Pangasinan. Consequently, by margin of
votes, private respondent indisputably won the challenged seat in the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the
sixth district of Pangasinan. Bince's proclamation and assumption in the public office was therefore
flawed from the beginning, the same having been based on a faulty tabulation.

PUNZALAN vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 126669 April 27, 1998
FACTS:
This decision is a consolidation of multiple cases arising from the mayoralty race in Pampanga, wherein
Punzalan and Meneses were candidates. On May 24, Meneses was proclaimed Mayor. Punzalan placed
third. On June 2, Punzalan filed an election protest questioning the results in 57 precincts. Because of
the many irregularities attending the election, the trial court examined the contested ballots and the
handwriting, etc. and declared that Pun zalan was the true winner.
Over the next few months, Meneses and Punzalan made many legal manuevers, leading up to December
of 1997 when the COMELEC affirmed Meneses’ earlier proclamation. Punzalan filed a petition for
certiorari after his MFR was denied by the En Banc. In his petition, Punzalan claimed that the COMELEC
committed GAOD: When it credited votes to Meneses from ballots that did not contain the BEI
chairman’s signature; When it declared valid ballots where the signature of the BEI chairman appea red
different compared to other documents bearing the same signatures.

ISSUE: Whether ballots without the signature of the BEI Chairman can be considered valid. YES

HELD:
(Ruling in Libanan reiterated)
While Section 24 of Republic Act No. 7166, otherwise known as "An Act Providing For Synchronized
National and Local Elections and For Electoral Reforms," requires the BEI chairman to affix his signature
at the back of the ballot,the mere failure to do so does not invalidate the same although it may
constitute an election offense imputable to said BEI chairman. Nowhere in said provision does it state
that the vote contained therein shall be nullified.
It is a well-settled rule that the failure of the BEI chairman or any of the members of the board to
comply with their mandated administrative responsibility, i.e. signing authenticating and thumb marking
of ballots, should not penalize the vote with disenfranchisement, thereby frustrating the will of the
people.
The appreciation of the contested ballots and election documents involves a question of fact best left to
the determination of the COMELEC, specialized agency tasked with the supervision of elections all over
the countr y. It is the constitutional commission vested with the exclusive and original jurisdiction over
election contests involving regional, provincial and city officials, as well as appellate jurisdiction over
election protests involving elective municipal and barangay officials. With respect to the contention that
a technical examination of the ballots should had been ordered to determine whether they had been
written by two or more persons, or in groups written by only one hand, the Court held that the
Commissi on en banc did not commit an abuse of its discretion in denying petitioner protestee's
request. The rule is settled that the Commission itself can make the determination without the need of
calling hand writing experts.
Handwriting experts, while probably useful, are not indispensable in examining or comparing hand
writing this can be done by the COMELEC itself. We have rule that evidence aliunde is not
allowed to prove that a ballot is marked, an inspection of the ballot itself being sufficient. Expert
opinions are not ordinarily conclusive in the sense that they must be accepted as true on the subject of
their testimony, but are generally regarded a purely advisory in character; the courts may place
whatever weight they choose upon such testimony and may reject it, if they find that it is consistent
with the fact in the case or otherwise unreasonable.

LIBANAN v HRET
G.R. No. 129783 December 22, 1997

FACTS:
In the May 1995 elections, PR Ramirez was proclaimed the winner for the congressional se at of Eastern
Samar over petitionerLibanabyamargiof654votes. Libanan timely filed an election protest at the HRET
claiming election irregularities in multiple districts, and praying that Ramirez’ proclamation be annulled
and that he be proclaimed in his place. The HRET the started the revision of ballots. The HRET reviewed
and passed upon the validity of all the ballots in the protested and counter-protested precincts,
including those not contested and claimed by the parties. The issue of spurious ballots arose. Libanan
claimed that the absence of the thumb mark of the BEI Chairman’s signature at the back of the ballot
rendered it spurious. The HRET ruled in favor of Ramirez, stating that while Section 210 of the OEC
requires the BEI Chair to affix his thumb mark on the ballot, the present law (Sec 24,RA 7166 did not
have the same requirement.
Libanan moved for reconsideration, claiming that the absence of the BEI Chairman's signature at the
back of the ballots could not but indicate that the ballots were not those issued to the voters during the
elections. He averred that the law would require the Chairman of the BEI to authenticate or sign the
ballot before issuing it to the voter. The HRET acted upon this MFR, but Ramirez still obtained the
plurality of votes. Libanan filed petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether the HRET committed Grave Abuse of Discretion in upholding the ballots without BEI
Chair’s signat ures
valid. NO.
HELD:
Strict interpretation proposed by Libanan would invalidate ballot even if duly accomplished by voter.
The cardinal objective in the appreciation of the ballots is to discover and give effect to the intention of
the voter. That intention would be nullified by the strict interpretation of the said section as suggested
by Libanan for it would result in the invalidation of the ballot even if duly accomplished by the voter,
and simply because of an omission not imputable to him but to the election officials.
The citizen cannot be deprived of his constitutional right of suffrage on the specious ground that
other persons were negligent in performing their own duty, which in the case at bar was purely
ministerial and technical, by no means mandatory but a mere antecedent measure intended to
authenticate the ballot.
Nothing in the law stated that ballots not authenticated by the BEI Chair is spurious. The pertinent
provision of the law, Section 24 of R.A. No. 7166, provides:
Sec. 24. Signature of Chairman at the back of Every Ballot. – In every case before delivering an official
ballot to the voter, the Chairman of the Boar of Election Inspector shall, in the presence of the voter,
affix his signature at the back thereof. Failure to authenticate shall be noted in the minutes of the Board
of Election Inspectors and shall constitute an election offense punishable under Section 263 and 264 of
the Omnibus Election Code.
There is really nothing in the above law to the effect that a ballot which is no t so authenticated shall
thereby be deemed spurious. The law merely renders the BEI Chairman accountable for such
failure. The courts may not in the guise of interpretation enlarge the scope of a statute and embrace
situations neither provided nor intended by the lawmakers. Where the words and phrases of a statute
are not obscure and ambiguous, the meaning and intention of the legislature should be
determined from the language employed, and where there is no ambiguity in the words, there
should be no room for construction.
Libanan can’t rely on BP222 as the same only applies to barangay officials. The stringent requirements
in B.P. Blg. 222 should be justifiable considering that the official barangay ballot would be provided by
the city or municipality concerned with the COMELEC merely prescribing their size and color. Thus, the
official ballots in B.P. Blg. 222, being supplied and furnished by the local government themselves, the
possibility of the ballots being easily counterfeited might not have been discounted. The absence of
authenticating marks prescribed by law, i.e the signature of the chairman of the Board of Election Tellers
at the back of the ballot, could have well been really thought of to be fatal to the validity of the ballot.

Santiago, et. al. v. Comelec, et. al.

270 SCRA 106
Facts: Atty. Jesus Delfin filed a petition with the Comelec to amend the constitution, specifically to lift
the term limits of elective officials, by people’s initiative. Atty. Delfin asked the Comelec for an order:
(1) to fix the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country (2) to cause the necessary
publications of said Order and the said petition in newspapers of general and local circulation and (3)
instruct the municipal election registrars in all regions in the Philippines to assist petitioners and
volunteers in establishing signing station at the time and on the dates designated for the purpose.
The Comelec issued an Order granting the petition. Santiago filed this special civil action for
prohibitionraising among other grounds that RA 6735 does not provide for people’s initiative to amend
the constitution considering that the same is still pending with the Senate of which she is the author.
The petition of Atty. Delfin was not validly initiated as it failed to comply with the signature requirement
for initiating an initiative. The Comelec never acquired jurisdiction over the petition as jurisdiction is
acquired only after its filing – the petition being the initiatory pleading.

Issue: WON Delfin’s Petition complied with the requirements to be validly recognized by the COMELEC.
Ruling: No.
The SC gave due course to the Petition on the legal premise that the Constitution recognizes
only two (2) methods of proposing amendments to the Constitution, viz (1) by Congress upon a vote
of ¾ of all its members and (2) by constitutional convention.
The SC interpreted Sec. 2 of RA 6735 which provides that “the power of the people under a system of
initiative and referendum to directly propose, enact, approved or reject, in whole or in part the
Constitution, laws, ordinance or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon compliance with
the requirements of this Act, is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed.” It held that the
inclusion of the word “constitution” here is neither germane nor relevant to said action which
exclusively relates to initiative and referendum on national and local laws, ordinances and resolution.
Therefore, the people are not accorded the power to “directly propose, enact, approved or reject, in
whole or in part the Constitution, through the system of initiative.
The SC further declared that Comelec cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the
exercise of the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the
system of initiative. The power of Comelec to issue rules and regulations (QJ power) is limited only to
what is provided under –
(a) Section 2 of Article IX-C of the Constitution and
(b) by a law where subordinate legislation is authorized and which satisfied the “completeness”
and the “sufficient standard” tests.

Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority v. Comelec

252 SCRA 492 (1996)
Facts: The Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan on April 1993, passed Pambayang Kapasyahan
Blg. 10, Serye 1993, expressing therein its absolute concurrence to join the Subic Special Economic
Zone (SSEZ) as required by Sec. 12 of RA 7227 (Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992). On
September 5, 1993, the SB submitted the Kapasyahan to the Office of the President. On May 24, 1993,
respondent Garcia, et. al. filed a petition with the SB of Morong to annul PK Blg. 10, Serye 1993 and
therein proposed for amendments to the said law.
Not satisfied and within 30 days from submission of their petition, respondent resorted to their power
of initiative under the LGC of 1991. On June 18, 1996 Comelec issued Resolution No. 2845 adopting a
calendar of activities for local referendum to annul or repeal Kapasyahan Bldg. 10.
Petitioner SBMA seeks to nullify the Order of Comelec denying petitioner’s plea to stop the holding of a
local initiative and referendum on the proposition to recall the Kapasyahan as it was proceeding
with a local initiative that proposes an amendment of a national law.

Issue: WON Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating and implementing its Res.
No. 2842 which govern the conduct of the referendum proposing to annul or repeal PK Blg.

Ruling: In this case, the SC was compelled to distinguish Initiative from Referendum. To begin with, the
process started by Garcia et. al., was an Initiative but respondent Comelec made preparations for a
referendum. In the body of the Comelec Resolution No. 2842, the word “referendum” is repeated at
least 27 times, but initiative is not mentioned at all. The Comelec labeled the exercise as a referendum,
the counting of votes was entrusted to a referendum committee, the documents were called
referendum returns and so forth. As distinguished, initiative is a process of law making by the people
themselves without the participation and against the wishes of their elected representatives while
referendum consists merely with the electorate approving or rejecting what has been drawn up or
enacted by the legislative body by simply indicating yes or no in the ballot.
In initiative, there is a need for the Comelec to supervise the process closely, it’s authority therein
extending not only to the counting and canvassing of votes but also to seeing to it that the matter or act
submitted to the people is in the proper form and language so it may be easily understood and voted
upon by the electorate. Care in this activity must be exercise that “no petition embracing more than one
subject shall be submitted to the electorate, although two or more propositions may be submitted in an
initiative. “

Raul Lambino, et. al. vs. Comelec

G.R. No. 174153
Facts: Raul Lambino of Sigaw ng Bayan and Erico Aumentado of the Union of Local Authorities of the
Philippines (ULAP) filed a petition for people’s initiative before the Commission on Elections on August
26, 2006, after months of gathering signatures all over the country. Lambino claimed that the petition is
backed by 6.3M registered voters. constituting at least 12% of all registered voters, with each legislative
district represented by at least 3% of the registered voters. They further claimed that the provincial and
city Comelec officials had already verified the 6.3M signaturesThe Comelec denied the petition,
reasoning that a lack of enabling law keeps them from entertaining such petitions. It
invoked the 1997 Supreme Court ruling in Santiago vs. Comelec (336 SCRA 843), where it declared RA
6735 inadequate to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution. The
Comelec ruling prompted Lambino and Aumentado to bring their case before the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the initiative petition of the Lambino group complied with the provisions of Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution.

Ruling: No.
The Lambino Group miserably failed to comply with the basic requirement of the Constitution for the
conduct of people’s initiative. The Constitution require that the amendment must be “directly proposed
by the people through initiative upon a petition.”
Lambino’s group failed to include the full text of the proposed changes in the signature sheets –a fatal
omission, according to the Supreme Court ruling, because it means a majority of the 6.3M people who
signed the signature sheets could not have known the nature and effect of the proposed changes. For
the petition to be valid, two essential requisites must be complied with, namely:
(a) the people must author, and thus sign, the entire proposal; no agent or representative can sign on
their behalf; and
(b) as an initiative upon a petition, the proposed amendments must be embodied in the petition itself.
A people’s initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment of the Constitution and
not to its revision. Only Congress or a constitutional convention may propose revisions to the
Constitution. A people’s initiative may propose only amendments to the Constitution.
There can be no dispute that a people’s initiative can only propose amendments to the Constitution
since the Constitution itself limits initiatives to amendments. There can be no deviation from the
constitutionally prescribed modes of revising the Constitution. A popular clamor, even one backed by
6.3M signatures, cannot justify a deviation from the specific modes prescribed in the Constitution itself.
The Lambino’s group proposed changes constituted not just an amendment but a revision, because of
the change in the form of government from Presidential to Parliamentary, and the shift from a
bicameral to a unicameral legislature.
 PARAS vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 123169 November 1, 1996
FACTS:
In 1994, Danilo Paras won as Punong barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan City. A petition for his recall was
filed by the registered voters of Pula. The COMELE set recall election for November of 1995. The recall
election was rescheduled three more times. The latest being on for Jaunary of 1996. This time Paras
filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court. Paras claims that under Section 74 (b) of Republic
Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, “no recall shall take place within one (1
year from the date of the official’ assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular
local election.”Also, Paras claims that his recall election cannot take place as it will happen in the same
year as the Sangguniang Kabataan election for May 1996. Moreover, Paras invokes the ruling of the
court in Associated Labor Union v Montejo, where the SC considered the SK election as a regular local
election.

ISSUE: Whether Paras’ recall election is barred by the SK election in happening in the same year. NO.

HELD:
The Court said that the intent of Section 74 is to subject an elective local official the recall election once
during his term of office. Paragraph (b) construed together with paragraph (a) merely designates the
period when such elective local official may be subject of a recall election, that is, during the second
year of his term of office. If Paras’ interpretation were to be
believed, then no recall election would take place as RA 7808 sets SK elections to happen every
three years – thereby rendering inutile the recall provision of the LGC.
It would, therefore, be more in keeping with the intent of the recall provision of the Code to co nstrue
regular local election as one referring to an election where the office held by the local elective
official sought to be recalled will be contested and be filled by the electorate.
Finally, recall election is potentially disruptive of the normal working of the local government unit
necessitating additional expenses, hence the prohibition against the conduct of recall election one year
immediately preceding the regular local election. The proscription is due to the proximity of the next
regular election for the office of the local elective official concerned. The electorate could choose the
official’s replacement in the said election who certainly has a longer tenure in office than a successor
elected through a recall election.*** Even so, the Court found that the recall election against Paras
could not take place as the regular election involving the
barangay office was only months away.

ANGOBUNG V. COMELEC
G.R. No. 126576. March 5, 1997
FACTS:
Angobung was the elected Mayor of the Municipality of Tumauini, Isabela in the local elections of 1995.
Private respondent Atty. de Alban was also a candidate in said elections. In September 1996, de Alban
filed with the Local Election Registrar of Tumauini, Isabela, a Petition for Recall against Angobung.
COMELEC recommends for the approval of the petition for recall filed by de Alban and its signing by
other qualified voters in order to garner at least 25% of the total number of registered voters as
required by law. The COMELEC en banc, acting on said Memorandum, issued the herein assailed
Resolution No. 96-2951. Petitioner now attacks the aforementioned resolution as being
unconstitutional and therefore invalid.
ISSUE:
Whether the Resolution violated the statutory minimum requirement of 25% as to the number of
signatures supporting any petition for recall.

RULING:
YES. Private respondent de Alban filed the petition for recall with only herself as the filer and initiato r.
She claims in her petition that she has, together with many others in Tumauini, Isabela, lost confidence
in the leadership of petitioner. The petition, however, does not bear the names of all these other
citizens of Tumauini who have reportedly also become anxious to oust petitioner from the post of
mayor. The law is plain and unequivocal as to what initiates recall proceedings: only a petition of at least
25% of the total number of registered voters may validly initiate recall proceedings. The law does not
state that the petition must be signed by at least 25% of the registered voters but rather it must be "of"
or by, at least 25 % of the registered voters, i.e., the petition must be filed, not by one person only, but
by at least 25% of the total number of registered voters.

MALONZO V. COMELEC
G.R. No. 127066, March 11, 1997
FACTS:
1,057 Punong Barangays, Sangguniang Barangay members and SK chairmen constituting a majority of
the Preparatory Recall Assembly (PRA) of Caloocan passed a resolution expressing loss of confidence in
incumbent Mayor Malonzo, and calling for the initiation of recall proceedings against him.
Malonzo filed a petition with COMELEC challenging the validity of recall process. The COMELEC,
however, rejected the petition. It then declared the recall proceedings to be in order. Malonzo
challenged the recall proceedings, essentially claiming that the notices for the meeting of the PRA
were not properly served. Moreover, he argued that it was the Liga ng mga Barangay and not the PRA
which initiated the recall, contrary to the requirements of law. He also claimed that the proceeding
followed for adopting the recall resolution was defective and therefore void.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the recall proceeding was valid.

RULING:
Yes. Malonzo’s insistence, that the initiation of the recall proceedings was infirm since it was convened
by the Liga ng mga Barangays, is misplaced. The Liga ng mga Barangay is undoubtedly an entity distinct
from the Preparatory Recall Assembly. It just so happens that the personalities representing the
barangays in the Liga are the very members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly, the majority of whom
met on July 7, 1996, and voted in favor of the resolution calling for the recall of Mayor Malonzo, after
deliberation reported in the record, in accordance with the existing law. Thus, the Punong Barangays
and Sangguniang Barangay members convened and voted as members of the Preparatory Recall
Assembly of the City of Caloocan, and not as members of the Liga ng mga Barangay. The recall
proceedings, therefore, cannot be denied merit on this ground. The law on recall did not prescribe
an elaborate proceeding. Neither did it demand a specific procedure. What is fundamental is
compliance with the provision that there should be a session called for the purpose of initiating recall
proceedings, attended by a majority of all the members of the preparatory recall assembly, in a public
place and that the resolution resulting from such assembly be adopted by a majority of all the PRA
members.
 Sanidad vs. COMELEC
Facts:
On October 23, 1989, Republic Act No. 6766, entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR AN ORGANIC
ACT FOR THE CORDILLERA AUTONOMOUS REGION" was enacted into law. The Commission on
Elections, by virtue of the power vested by the 1987 Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881),
said R.A. 6766 and other pertinent election laws, promulgated Resolution No. 2167, to govern the
conduct of the plebiscite on the said Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region. In a
petition dated November 20, 1989, herein petitioner Pablito V. Sanidad, who claims to be a
newspaper columnist of the "OVERVIEW" for the BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER, a weekly newspaper
circulated in the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras, assailed the constitutionality of Section 19 of
Comelec Resolution No. 2167, which provides: Section 19. Prohibition on columnists, commentators
or announcers. — During the plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and on the plebiscite day,
no mass media columnist, commentator, announcer or personality shall use his column or radio or
television time to campaign for or against the plebiscite issues It is alleged by petitioner that
said provision is void and unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional guarantees of the
freedom of expression and of the press enshrined in the Constitution.

Issue : WON the said Section 19 of resolution No 2167 is unconstitutional

Held:
It is clear from Art. IX-C of the 1987 Constitution that what was granted to the Comelec was the power
to supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises, permits or other grants issued for the
operation of transportation or other public utilities, media of communication or information to the end
that equal opportunity, time and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates
therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among candidates are ensured Neither
Article IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11 (b), 2nd par. of R.A. 6646 can be construed to mean that
the Comelec has also been granted the right to supervise and regulate the exercise by media
practitioners themselves of their right to expression during plebiscite periods. Media practitioners
exercising their freedom of expression during plebiscite periods are neither the franchise holders nor
the candidates. In fact, there are no candidates involved in a plebiscite. Therefore, Section 19 of
Comelec Resolution No. 2167 has no statutory basis. While the limitation does not absolutely bar
petitioner's freedom of expression, it is still a restriction on his choice of the forum where he may
express his view. No reason was advanced by respondent to justify such abridgement. We hold that this
form of regulation is tantamount to a restriction of petitioner's freedom of expression for no justifiable
reason. Plebiscite issues are ma tters of public concern and importance. The people's right to be
informed and to be able to freel y and intelligently make a decision would be better served by access to
an unabridged discussion of the issues, including the forum. The people affected by the issues
presented in a plebiscite should not be unduly burdened by restrictions on the forum where the right to
expression may be exercised. Comelec spaces and Comelec radio time may provide a forum for
expression but they do not guarantee full dissemination of information to the public concerned because
they are limited to either specific portions in newspapers or to specific radio or television times

Padilla Jr. v. Comelec

214 SCRA 735
Facts: Petitioner Gov. of Camarines Norte in a Special Civil Action for Certiorari, seek to set aside the
Plebiscite asserting that it was a complete failure and that the results obtained were invalid and illegal
because the Plebiscite as mandated by Comelec Res. No. 2312 should have been conducted only in the
political unit or units affected (which is the 12 barangays and should not have included the mother unit
of the Municipality of Labo.)

Issue: WON the plebiscite conducted in Labo was valid.

Ruling: With the approval and ratification of the 1987 Constitution, more specifically, Art. X,
Section 10, the creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of the boundaries of any political unit
shall be subject to the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a Plebiscite in the ‘POLITICAL UNITS
AFFECTED” was held to mean that residents of the political entity who would be economically dislocated
by the separation of a portion thereof have a right to vote in the said Plebiscite or the plurality of
political units which would participate in the Plebiscite. The Court reiterated its ruling in Tan v. Comelec
142 SCRA 727 (1986), that “in the conduct of a Plebiscite, it is imperative that all the constituents of the
mother and daughter units affected shall be included.

City of Pasig v. Comelec

Sept. 10, 1999
Facts: The City of Pasig passed an Ordinance creating barangays Karangalan and Napico. The
Municipality of Cainta moved to suspend or cancel the respective plebiscite due to the pending case
before the RTC of Antipolo for the settlement of the boundary dispute and that the said activities await
the decision of the RTC on the matter. The Comelec suspended the holding of the plebiscite for the
creation of Brgy. Karangalan but rendered the creation of Napico as moot as the same has already been
ratified in the plebiscite held for the purpose.

Issue: WON the COMELEC can suspend plebiscites.

Ruling: Yes. The creation of Napico cannot be considered as moot and it is most proper that the
plebiscite be declared null and void in view of the pending boundary dispute between Pasig and Cainta
which presents a prejudicial question and must be decided first before the plebiscite for the proposed
barangays be conducted.

SALVA vs. MAKALINTAL

G.R. No. 132603 (September 8, 2000)
FACTS:
The petitioners filed with the RTC a class suit against the Sangguniang Panglalawigan of Batangas,
Sangguniang Pambayan of Calaca, Batangas, and the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) for annulment
of Ordinance No. 05 an d Resolution No. 345 both enacted by the Sangguniang Panglalawigan of
Batangas, and COMELEC Resolution No. 2987. Ordinance No. 05 declared the abolition of Barangay San
Rafael and its merger with Barangay Dacanlao, Municipality ofCalaca, Batangas and accordingly
instructed the COMELEC to conduct the required plebiscite. Resolution No. 345 affirmed the effectivity
of Ordinance No. 05, thereby overriding the veto exercised by the governor of Batangas. Ordinance No.
05 was vetoed by the Governor of Batangas for being ultra vires, particularly, as it was not shown that
the essential requirements regarding the attestations or certifications of several government agencies
were obtained. The COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2987, providing for the rules and
regulations governing the conduct of the required plebiscite scheduled on February 28, 1998, to
decide the issue of the abolition of barangay San Rafael and its merger with barangay Dacanlao,
Calaca, Batangas. The trial court denied the petition saying that any petition or action questioning an
act, resolution or decision of the COMELEC must be brought before the Supreme Court. The petitioners
contend that when the COMELEC exercises its quasi-judicial functions under Section 52 of the Omnibus
Election Code, its acts are subject to the exclusive review by this Court; but when the COMELEC
performs a purely ministerial duty, such act is subject to scrutiny by the Regional Trial Court.
Petitioners submit that the conduct of a plebiscite, pursuant to Ordinance No. 05 and Resolution No.
345, is not adjudicatory or quasi-judicial in nature but simply ministerial or administrative in nature and
only in obedience to the aforesaid Ordinance and Resolution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent court has jurisdiction to enjoin the comelec from implementing its
resolution no. 2987, series of 1998, which provided for the rules and regulations for the conduct of the
plebiscite scheduled on february 28, 1998 to decide on the abolition of barangay san rafael and its
merger with barangay dacanlao, calaca, batangas, pending the determination of civil case no. 3442
for the annulment of ordinance no. 05, resolution no. 345 and comelec resolution no.
2987.
HELD:
Section 7, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution provides in part that: SEC. 7. xxx. Unless
otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty
days from receipt of a copy thereof.
The Court ruled that “…What is contemplated by the term final orders, rulings and decisions of the
COMELEC reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court as provided by law are those rendered in
actions or proceedings before the COMELEC and taken cognizance of by the said body in the exercise of
its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. Briefly, COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 which provides for the
rules and regulations governing the conduct of the required plebiscite, was not issued pursuant to the
COMELECs quasi-judicial functions but merely as an incident of its inherent administrative
functions over the conduct of plebiscites, thus, the said resolution may not be deemed as a fin
al order reviewable by certiorari by this Court. Any question pertaining to the validity of said
resolution may be well taken in an ordinary civil action before the trial courts.

Ma. Salvacion Buac v. COMELEC

Facts: In April 1988, a plebiscite was held in Taguig for the ratification of the Taguig Cityhood Law (RA
No. 8487) proposing the conversion of Taguig from a municipality i nto a city. Without completing the
canvass of 64 other election returns, the Plebiscite Board of Canvassers (PBOC) declared that the “NO”
votes won and that the people rejected the conversion of Taguig to a city. The PBOC was however
ordered by the Comelec en banc to reconvene and complete the canvass which the board did and in due
time issued an Order proclaiming that the negative votes prevailed.
Petitioners filed with the Comelec a petition to annul the results of the plebiscite with a prayer for
revision and recount of the ballots. Cayetano intervened and moved to dismiss the petition on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Comelec. He claimed that a plebiscite cannot be the subject of
an election protest and that the jurisdiction to hear a complaint involving the conduct of a
plebiscite is lodged with the RTC.
Hence, the petition before the SC.

Issue: WON the COMELEC can take cognizance of plebiscite disputes.

Ruling: Yes. The SC held that the key to the case is its nature, which involves the determination of
whether the electorate of Taguig voted in favor of or against the conversion of the municipality of
Taguig. The invocation of judicial power to settle disputes involving the conduct of a plebiscite is
misplaced. Judicial power as defined under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution as the duty of the
court of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandableand
enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.
This case assailing the regularity of the conduct of the Taguig plebiscite does not fit the kind of a case
calling for the exercise of judicial power. There is no plaintiff or defendant in the case for it merely
involves the ascertainment of the vote of the electorate on whether they approve or disapprove the
conversion of their municipality into a highly urbanized city. In referring to Article IX-C, Section 2(1), the
SC said that the said provision is explicit that Comelec has power to “enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall.
To enforce means to cause to take effect or to cause the performance of such act or acts necessary to
bring into actual effect or operation, a plan or measure which entails all the necessary and incidental
power for it to achieve the holding of honest, orderly, peaceful, free and credible elections (HOPE
FRECRE). The SC was surprised that for the first time, Comelec yielded its historic jurisdiction over a
motion for reconsideration which was even filed out of ti me, thus rendering it without
jurisdiction to entertain the same.