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06 Dacasin vs. Dacasin

ObliCon

Court Supreme Court, Second Division

Citation G.R. No. 168785
Date February 5, 2010
Petitioner Herald Black Dacasin
Respondent Sharon Del Mundo Dacasin
Ponente J. Carpio

Relevant topic/s ● NCC Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.

FACTS:
 Petitioner Herald Dacasin (American) and respondent Sharon Del Mundo Dacasin (Filipino) were married in
Manila in April 1994. They had one daughter named Stephanie who was born on September 21, 1995.
 In June 1999, respondent Sharon sought and obtained from the Circuit Court, 19th Judicial Circuit, Lake County,
Illinois a divorce decree against petitioner Herald. In its ruling, the Illinois court dissolved the marriage of
petitioner Herald and respondent Sharon, awarded to respondent Sharon sole custody of Stephanie and
retained jurisdiction over the case for enforcement purposes.
 On January 28, 2002, petitioner Herald and respondent Sharon executed in Manila a contract (Agreement)
for the joint custody of Stephanie. The parties chose Philippine courts as exclusive forum to adjudicate
disputes arising from the Agreement. Respondent undertook to obtain from the Illinois court an order
relinquishing jurisdiction to Philippine courts.
 In 2004, petitioner Herald sued respondent Sharon in the RTC of Makati City Branch 60 to enforce the
agreement, alleging that respondent Sharon violated the Agreement by exercising sole custody over
Stephanie.
 Respondent Sharon sought the dismissal of the complaint for, among others, lack of jurisdiction because of the
Illinois court’s retention of jurisdiction to enforce the divorce decree.

RTC RULING:
 The trial court sustained respondent Sharon’s motion and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The trial
court held that: 1) It is precluded from taking cognizance of the suit considering Illinois court’s retention of
jurisdiction to enforce the divorce decree, including its order awarding sole custody of Stephanie to respondent
Sharon; 2) The divorce decree is binding on petitioner Herald following the “nationality rule” prevailing in this
jurisdiction; and 3) The Agreement is void for contravening Art. 2035, par. 5 of the Civil Code prohibiting
compromise agreements on jurisdiction.

 Petitioner Herald sought reconsideration, raising the new argument that the divorce decree obtained by
respondent Sharon is void. Thus, the divorce decree is no bar to the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the
case.
 On June 23, 2005, the trial court denied reconsideration, holding that unlike in the case of respondent Sharon,
the divorce decree is binding on petitioner under the laws of his nationality.
 Petitioner then submits that: 1) The Agreement novated the valid divorce decree, modifying the terms of child
custody from sole (maternal) to joint; or 2) The Agreement is independent of the divorce decree obtained by
respondent.

ISSUE-HELD-RATIO:

ISSUE AND HELD RATIO

W/N the trial court has
jurisdiction to take
cognizance of
petitioner’s suit and
enforce the Agreement
RTCs Vested With Jurisdiction to Enforce Contracts
on the joint custody of
the parties’ child.
YES/NO
 The trial has jurisdiction to entertain petitioner’s suit but not to enforce the
Agreement which is void. However, factual and equity considerations militate
against the dismissal of petitioner’s suit and call for remand of the case to settle
question of Stephanie’s custody.
 At the time petitioner filed his suit in the trial court, statutory law vests on RTCs
exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions incapable of pecuniary estimation.
 An action for specific performance, such as petitioner’s suit to enforce the
Agreement on joint custody, belongs to these “civil actions incapable of pecuniary
estimation.”

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06 Dacasin vs. Dacasin
ObliCon
 The trial court’s refusal to entertain the petition was grounded not on its lack of
power to do so but on its thinking that the Illinois court’s divorce decree stripped it
of jurisdiction.
 What the Illinois court actually retained was jurisdiction for the purpose of enforcing
all and sundry the various provisions of its Judgment for Dissolution.
 Petitioner’s suit seeks not the enforcement of these various provisions but of
the post-divorce Agreement on joint custody.

Petitioner’s Suit Lacks Cause of Action

 In this jurisdiction, parties to a contract are free to stipulate the terms of
agreement subject to the minimum ban on stipulations contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order or public policy. Otherwise, the contract is
denied legal existence, deemed “inexistent and void from the beginning.”
 At the time the Agreement was executed, Stephanie was under seven and the
parties were no longer married under US laws. The relevant law on child custody
for spouses separated in fact or in law (Art 213 of the Family Code) provides, “no
child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother…” Clearly, the
Agreement’s object to establish a post-divorce joint custody regime between
the parties contravenes Philippine law.
 Indeed, the separated parents cannot contract away the provision of the Family
Code on the maternal custody of children below seven years anymore than they
can privately agree that a mother who is unemployed, immoral, habitually drunk,
drug addict, insane or afflicted with a communicable disease will have sole custody
as these are reasons deemed compelling to preclude the application of exclusive
maternal custody regime.
 It could very well be that Art. 213’s bias in favor of the mother over the father
encourages paternal neglect, presumes incapacity for joint parental authority, robs
the parents of custodial options, or hijacks decision-making between the parents.
These objections, however, question’s the law’s wisdom and not its validity or
uniform enforceability.
 From the eighth year until the child’s emancipation, the law gives the separated
parents freedom, subject to the usual contractual limitations, to agree on custody
regimes they see fit to adopt.
 Even supposing that petitioner and respondent are not barred from entering into the
Agreement for the joint custody of Stephanie, respondent repudiated the
Agreement by asserting sole custody over Stephanie. Respondent's act effectively
brought the parties back to ambit of the default custodial regime in the second
paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code vesting on respondent sole custody of
Stephanie.

The Facts of the Case and Nature of Proceeding Justify Remand

 Stephanie is now nearly 15 years old, thus removing this case outside of the ambit
of the mandatory maternal custody regime under Art. 213 of the FC and bringing it
within the coverage of the default standard on child custody proceedings – the best
interest of the child.
 As the question of custody is already before the trial court and the child's parents,
by executing the Agreement, initially showed inclination to share custody, it is in the
interest of swift and efficient rendition of justice to allow the parties to take
advantage of the court's jurisdiction, submit evidence on the custodial arrangement
best serving Stephanie's interest, and let the trial court render judgment.

RULING:
WHEREFORE, we REVERSE the Orders dated 1 March 2005 and 23 June 2005 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, Branch 60. The case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this ruling.

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