NATIONAL TERRITORY 1.
) Baselines laws such as RA 9522 are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS
Magallona vs. Ermita
G.R. No. 187167. August 16, 2011
Ponente: CARPIO, J. Digest Author: FABI
DOCTRINES: UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It
is a multilateral treaty regulating, among others, sea-use rights over maritime zones,
and continental shelves that UNCLOS III delimits.
Baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III States parties to mark-out
specific basepoints along their coasts from which baselines are drawn, either straight or
contoured, to serve as geographic starting points to measure the breadth of the
maritime zones and continental shelf.
UNCLOS III; Congress’ decision to classify the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the
Scarborough Shoal as ‘Regime[s] of Islands’ manifests the Philippine State’s
responsible observance of its pacta sunt servanda obligation under UNCLOS III
FACTS:
1. RA 3046 was passed which provides the demarcation lines of the baselines of the
Philippines as an archipelago which is compliant with UNCLOS I.
2. RA 5446 amended RA 3046 in terms of typographical errors and included Section 2 in
which the government reserved the drawing of baselines in Sabah in North Borneo.
3. Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA 9522. The change was prompted by the
need to make RA 3046 compliant with UNCLOS III.
4. UNCLOS III prescribes the water-land ratio, length, and contour of baselines of
archipelagic States like the Philippines and sets the deadline for the filing of application
for the extended continental shelf.
5. RA 9522 shortened one baseline, optimized the location of some basepoints around the
Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent territories, namely, the Kalayaan Island
Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal, as “regimes of islands” whose islands generate
their own applicable maritime zones.
CONTENTION OF THE PETITIONER:
Petitioner now assails the constitutionality of RA 9522 for three main reasons:
1. RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach of the
Philippine state’s sovereign power, in violation of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution;
2. It opens the country’s waters landward of the baselines to passage by all vessels
and aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security; and
3. RA 9522’s treatment of the KIG as “regime of islands” not only results in the loss of a
large maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.
ISSUE: W/N RA 9522 is unconstitutional.
RULING+RATIO: YES.
III States parties to delimit with precision the extent of their maritime zones and
continental shelves.
SC emphasized that UNCLOS III is not a mode of acquiring or losing a territory as
provided under the laws of nations. UNCLOS III is a multi-lateral treaty that is a result
of a long-time negotiation to establish uniform sea-use rights over maritime zones, and
continental shelves. In order to measure said distances, it is a must for the state parties
to have their archipelagic doctrines measured in accordance to the treaty—the role
played by RA 9522.
The contention of the petitioner that RA 9522 resulted to the loss of 15,000 square
nautical miles is devoid of merit. The truth is, RA 9522, by optimizing the location of
base points, increased the Philippines total maritime space of 145,216 square nautical
miles.
2.) The classification of KGI and Scarborough Shoal as Regime of Islands is consistent
with the Philippines’ sovereignty. (Pacta Sunt Servanda)
If RA 9522 enclosed the islands as part of the archipelago, the country will be violating
UNCLOS III since it categorically stated that the length of the baseline shall not exceed
125 nautical miles.
So what the legislators did is to carefully analyze the situation: the country, for
decades, had been claiming sovereignty over KGI and Scarborough Shoal on one hand
and on the other hand they had to consider that these are located at non-appreciable
distance from the nearest shoreline of the Philippine archipelago.
Thus, the classification is in accordance with the Philippines sovereignty and State’s
responsible observance of its pacta sunt servanda obligation under UNCLOS III.
4.) UNCLOS III and RA 9522 are not incompatible with the Constitution’s delineation of
internal waters.
The Court emphasized that the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water
lying landward of the baselines, including the air space over it and the submarine areas
underneath, regardless whether internal or archipelagic waters. However, sovereignty
will not bar the Philippines to comply with its obligation in maintaining freedom of
navigation and the generally accepted principles of international law. It can be either
passed by legislator as a municipal law or in the absence thereof, it is deemed
incorporated in the Philippines law since the right of innocent passage is a customary
international law, thus automatically incorporated thereto.
This does not mean that the states are placed in a lesser footing; it just signifies
concession of archipelagic states in exchange for their right to claim all waters inside
the baseline. In fact, the demarcation of the baselines enables the Philippines to delimit
its exclusive economic zone, reserving solely to the Philippines the exploitation of all
living and non-living resources within such zone. Such a maritime delineation binds the
international community since the delineation is in strict observance of UNCLOS III. If
the maritime delineation is contrary to UNCLOS III, the international community will of
course reject it and will refuse to be bound by it.
Conclusion: Thus, the enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine
archipelago and adjacent areas, as embodied in RA 9522, allows an internationally-recognized
delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines’ maritime zones and continental shelf.
RA 9522 is therefore a most vital step on the part of the Philippines in safeguarding its maritime
zones, consistent with the Constitution and our national interest.
DISPOSITION: petition is dismissed
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 People v. Gozo
Topic: Art.2, Sec 1. A. Sovereignty
DOCTRINE: Philippine sovereignty over American bases; Extent of –
As set forth in People v. Acierto:
“By the Agreement, it should be noted, the Philippine Government merely consents
that the United States exercise jurisdiction in certain cases. This consent was
given purely as a matter of comity, courtesy or expediency. The Philippine Government
has not abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as part of the Philippine territory or
divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses committed therein. Under the
terms of the treaty, the United States Government has prior or preferential but
not exclusive jurisdiction of such offenses. The Philippine Government retains not
only jurisdictional rights not granted, but also such ceded rights as the United States
Military authorities for reasons of their own decline to make use of.”
FACTS:
 Loreta Gozo bought a house and lot located inside the US Naval Reservation, in
Olongapo city.
 She had the house demolished and built a new one, without securing a building permit
from the Mayor.
 Gozo was charged with violation of an ordinance requiring a building permit.
Respondent’s contention:
 Gozo however, claimed that such requirement of a permit does not apply to her
because her house is located in the US Naval Reservation.
ISSUES: Whether Gozo’s property is exempted from the Municipal’s Ordinance?
RULING: No. The ordinance is applicable to Gozo’s property.
LB:
 Philippine Government merely consents that the United States exercise
jurisdiction in certain cases.
o The consent was given purely as a matter of comity, courtesy, or
expediency.
 The Philippine Government has not abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as part of
the Philippine territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses
committed therein.
o Under the terms of the treaty, the United States Government has prior or
preferential but not exclusive jurisdiction of such offenses.
 The Philippines being independent and sovereign, its authority may be exercised over
its entire domain.
o There is no portion thereof that is beyond its power. Within its limits, its
decrees are supreme, its commands paramount. Its laws govern therein, and
everyone to whom it applies must submit to its terms.
 Principle of auto-limitation
o Any state may, by its consent, express or implied, submit to a restriction of
its sovereign rights. There may thus be a curtailment of what otherwise is a
power plenary in character.
 There is merely diminution of the State’s jurisdiction, not its disappearance.
o When the State allows another country to exercise jurisdiction over part of its
territory, that territory does not become alien territory. – Still retains its
status as native soil.
It does not become foreign territory.
APP: The ordinance applies to Gozo and she is guilty of violation of such ordinance for
construction without a permit.
SOVEREIGNTY
Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration vs. Confederation of
Unions in Government Corporations and Offices (ACCFA vs. CUGCO)
G.R. No. 187167. August 16, 2011
Digest Author: FABI
DOCTRINES: In Bacani v. NACOCO, governmental functions are classified into constituent and
ministrant.
The CONSTITUENT are those which constitute the very bonds of society and are compulsory in
nature; the MINISTRANT are those that are undertaken only by way of advancing the general
interests of society, and are merely optional.
President Wilson enumerates the constituent functions as follows: (1) The keeping of order and
providing for the protection of persons and property from violence and robbery; (2) The fixing of
the legal relations between man and wife and between parents and children; (3) The regulation of
the holding, transmission, and interchange of property, and the determination of its liabilities for
debt or for crime; (4) The determination of contractual rights between individuals; (5) The
definition and punishment of crime; (6) The administration of justice in civil cases; (7) The
determination of the political duties, privileges, and relations of citizens; (8) Dealings of the state
with foreign powers: the preservation of the state from external danger or encroachment and the
advancement of its international interests.
The most important of the ministrant functions are: public works, public education, public charity,
health and safety regulations, and regulations of trade and industry.
The principles determining whether or not a government shall exercise certain of these optional
functions are (1) that a government should do for the public welfare those things which private
capital would not naturally undertake and (2)that a government should do these things which by
its very nature is better equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private
individual or group of individuals.
FACTS:
1. ACCFA was a government agency created under RA No. 821, as amended. Its
administrative machinery was reorganized and it’s named changed to Agricultural Credit
Administration under the Land Reform Code or RA 3844.
The Unions and ACCFA entered into a collective bargaining agreement effective for a
period of one year.
2. The Unions started protesting against alleged violations and non-implementation of said
agreement
3. The Unions declared a strike, which was ended when the strikers voluntarily returned to
work
4. The Unions, together with the CUGCO, filed a complaint against the ACCFA for having
allegedly committed acts of unfair labor practices and non-implementation of said
agreement.
5. Court of Industrial Relations ordered ACCFA to cease from committing further acts
tending to discourage the Union members in the exercise of their right to self-
organizatoin, to comply with and implement the provisions of the CBA, and to bargain
with good faith with the complainants.
CONTENTION OF THE ACCPA:
Court of Industrial Relations does not have jurisdiction over the case since ACCFA
performs governmental functions.
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ISSUE: W/N respondent court has jurisdiction over this case, which in turn depends on
whether or not the ACCPA performs governmental or proprietary functions.
RULING+RATIO: ACCPA performs governmental functions, not covered by the CIR’s
jurisdiction, and its employees covered by the Civil Service laws.
The implementation of the land reform program of the government according to
Republic Act No. 3844 is most certainly a governmental, not a proprietary, function.
Thus, ACA is not a profit-making institution.
LB: 2 types of governmental functions:
1. Constituent
 Those relating to the maintenance of peace and the prevention of crime,
those regulating property and property rights, those relating to the
administration of justice and the determination of political duties of
citizens, and those relating to national defense and foreign relations.
 Exercised by the State as attributes of sovereignty.
2. Ministrant
• Those intended to promote the welfare, progress and prosperity of the
people.
• Exercise of which is optional on the party of the government.
AP: In this case, ACA is a government office or agency engaged in governmental, not proprietary
functions.
 These functions may not be strictly what President Wilson described as “constituent” (as
distinguished from “ministrant”).
 The growing complexities of modern society, however, have rendered this traditional
classification of the functions of government quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete.
 Here as almost everywhere else the tendency is undoubtedly towards a greater
socialization of economic forces.
 It was in furtherance of such policy that the Land Reform Code was enacted and the
various agencies, the ACA among them, established to carry out its purposes.
 There can be no dispute as to the fact that the land reform program contemplated in
the said Code is beyond the capabilities of any private enterprise to translate into
reality.
 It is a purely governmental function, no less than, say, the establishment and
maintenance of public schools and public hospitals. (FUNCTION OF ACA)
 the law itself declares that the ACA is a government office, with the formulation of
policies, plans and programs vested no longer in a Board of Governors, as in the case of
the ACCFA, but in the National Land Reform Council, itself a government
instrumentality; and that its personnel are subject to Civil Service laws and to rules of
standardization with respect to positions and salaries, any vestige of doubt as to the
governmental character of its functions disappears.
DISPOSITION: Decision is modified.
Co Kim Cham v. Valdez
Topic: Topic: Art.2, Sec 1. B. Government de jure and de facto
DOCTRINE:
Kinds of de facto government:
FIRST, government de facto in a proper legal sense, is that government that gets possession and
control of, or usurps, by force or by the voice of the majority, the rightful legal government and
maintains itself against the will of the latter
SECOND, is that which is established and maintainedby military forces who invade and occupy a
territory of the enemy in the course of war, and which is denominated a government of
paramount force
THIRD, is that established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a country who rise
in insurrection against the parent state
Distinguishing Characteristics of the second kind:
a. That its existence is maintained by active military power with the territories, and against the
rightful authority of an established and lawful government; and
b. That while it exists it necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by private citizens who, by acts
of obedience rendered in submission to force, do not become responsible, or wrong doers,
for those acts, though not warranted by the laws of the rightful government.
FACTS:
 In 1942, the Japanese occupied Manila and proclaimed that all the laws now in force in
the Commonwealth, as well as executive and judicial institutions, shall continue to be
effective for the time being as in the past," and "all public officials shall remain in their
present posts and carry on faithfully their duties as before."
o The Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Courts of First Instance, and the
justices of the peace and municipal courts under the Commonwealth were
continued with the same jurisdiction
 1944: The US re-occupied Manila and restored full powers and responsibilities under the
Constitution to the Commonwealth.
ISSUES:
1) Whether the government established during the Japanese military occupation was a de
facto government?
2) Whether the judicial acts and proceedings of the court during the occupation are valid
and remained so after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the US?
RULING:
1) The government established during the Japanese military occupation was a de facto
government.
LB: 3 kinds of de facto governments:
1. De facto government, in the proper legal sense.
 That government that gets possession and control of, or usurps, by
force or by the voice of the majority, the rightful legal governments
and maintains itself against the will of the latter.
2. Government of paramount force
 That which is established and maintained by military forces who
invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war.
 Distinguishing characteristics:
c. That its existence is maintained by active military power
with the territories, and against the rightful authority of
an established and lawful government; and
3
 d. That while it exists it necessarily be obeyed in civil
matters by private citizens who, by acts of obedience
rendered in submission to force, do not become
responsible, or wrong doers, for those acts, though not
warranted by the laws of the rightful government.
3. That established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a
country who rise in insurrection against the parent state.
APP: The Philippine Executive Commission, organized by the Japanese forces, was
civil government established by the military forces of occupation and therefore a de
facto government of the second kind.
GOVERNMENT DE JURE AND DE FACTO
Letter of Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno
A.M. No. 90-11-2697-CA. June 29, 1992.*
Digest Author: FABI
DOCTRINES: The Court holds that the Court of Appeals and Intermediate Appellate Court
existing prior to Executive Order No. 33 phased out as part of the legal system abolished by the
revolution and that the Court of Appeals established under Executive Order No. 33 was an entirely
new court with appointments thereto having no relation to earlier appointments to the abolished
courts, and that the reference to precedence in rank contained in the last sentence of Sec. 2, BP
Blg. No. 129 as amended by Executive Order No. 33 refers to prospective situations as
distinguished from retroactive ones.

2) All acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of a de FACTS:
facto government are good and valid.
 The government during the Japanese occupation being de facto governments, 1. Associate Justice Reynato Puno had been appointed as Associate Justice of the Court of
it necessarily follows that the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts of Appeals and later, the Intermediate Appellate Court.
justice of those governments, which are not of a political complexion, were
good and valid, and, by virtue of principle of postliminy (postliminium) 2. 1986 EDSA Revolution took place and brought about the reorganization the
remained good and valid after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines government, including the Judiciary.
by the American and Filipino forces under the leadership of General Douglas
MacArthur. 3. President Aquino, exercising legislative power, issued EO 33 to govern the
reorganization of the Judiciary.
 The fact that a territory which has been occupied by an enemy comes again
into the power of its legitimate government of sovereignty, "does not, except 4. Puno was appointed by President Aquino as Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals
in a very few cases, wipe out the effects of acts done by an invader, which for but his seniority ranking had changed from #11 to #26.
one reason or another it is within his competence to do.
CONTENTION OF PUNO:
 Thus judicial acts done under his control, when they are not of a political
complexion, administrative acts so done, to the extent that they take effect  Petitioner argues that, by virtue of Executive Order No. 33 read in relation to B.P. Blg.
during the continuance of his control, and the various acts done during the 129, his seniority ranking in the Court of Appeals is now number five (5) for, though
same time by private persons under the sanction of municipal law, remain President Aquino rose to power by virtue of a revolution, she had pledged at the
good. issuance of the Freedom Constitution that “no right provided under the unratified 1973
Constitution (shall) be absent in the Freedom Constitution”.

 Moreover, since the last sentence of Section 2 of Executive Order No. 33 virtually re-
enacted the last sentence of Sec. 3, Chapter 1 of B.P. Blg. 129, statutory construction
rules on simultaneous repeal and re-enactment mandate, according to positioner, the
preservation and enforcement of all rights and liabilities which had accrued under the
original statute.

 Furthermore, petitioner avers that, although the power of appointment is executive in

character and cannot be usurped by any other branch of the Government, such power
can still be regulated by the Constitution and by the appropriate law, in this case, by
the limits set by Executive Order No. 33 for the power of appointment cannot be
wielded in violation of law

ISSUE: W/N the present Court of Appeals is a new court such that it would negate any
claim to precedence or seniority admittedly enjoyed by Puno in the Court of Appeals and
Intermediate Appellate Court existing prior to Executive Order No. 33?

RULING+RATIO: YES.

The present Court of Appeals is a new entity, different and distinct from the Court of Appeals or
the Intermediate Appellate Court existing prior to Executive Order No. 33, for it was created in the
wake of the massive reorganization launched by the revolutionary government of Corazon C.
Aquino in the aftermath of the people power (EDSA) revolution in 1986.

4
LB:
Revolution has been defined as “the complete overthrow of the established government
in any country or state by those who were previously subject to it”, or as “a sudden,
radical and fundamental change in the government or political system usually effected
with violence or at least some acts of violence.”
Right of Revolution - It has been said that “the locus of positive law-making power lies
with the people of the state” and from there is derived “the right of the people to
abolish, to reform and to alter any existing form of government without regard to the
existing constitution.”
AP: The Aquino administration was a de jure government, established by authority of the
legitimate sovereign, the people, at the time of the issuance of EO 33.
 The earlier Court of Appeals and Intermediate Appellate Court had been abolished by
the revolution.
 The Court of Appeals established under Executive Order No. 33 is an entirely new court
with appointments thereto having no relation to earlier appointments to the abolished
courts.
 At the time of the issuance of Executive Order No. 33, President Aquino was still
exercising the powers of a revolutionary government, encompassing both executive and
legislative powers, such that she could, if she so desired, amend, modify or repeal any
part of B.P. Blg. 129 or her own Executive Order No. 33.
 Thus, President Aquino could disregard or set aside such precedence or seniority in
ranking when she made her appointments to the reorganized Court of Appeals in 1986.
DISPOSITION: The seniority rankings of members of the Court of Appeals, including that of the
petitioner, at the time the appointments were made by the President in 1986, are recognized and
upheld.
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan
Topic: Topic: Art.2, Sec 1. B. Government de jure and de facto
DOCTRINE:
- During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the revolutionary
government were the supreme law because no constitution limited the extent
and scope of such directives and orders.
- As the de jure government, the revolutionary government could not escape
responsibility for the State’s good faith compliance with its treaty obligations
under international law.
FACTS:
 Following EDSA Revolution, President Aquino issued EO No. 1 creating the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (“PCGG”).
 PCGG was tasked to recover all ill-gotten wealth of former President Marcos and his
associates It is also mandate to conduct investigation as may be necessary.
 PCGG created an AFP Anti-Graft Board (“AFP Board”) tasked to investigate reports of
unexplained wealth and corrupt practices by AFP personnel, whether in the active service or
retired.
 AFP Board investigated various reports of alleged unexplained wealth of respondent Major
General Josephus Q. Ramas
 He was eventually found guilty of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices.
- Ramas allegedly “acquired funds, assets and properties manifestly out of proportion to
his salary as an army officer and his other income from legitimately acquired property
by taking undue advantage of his public office and/or using his power, authority and
influence as such officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and as a subordinate
and close associate of the deposed President Ferdinand Marcos.”
Contention of Ramas:
- Ramas claims that the searches and seizures conducted were illegal.
Contention of the Petitioner:
- Petitioner contends that a revolutionary government was operative at that time
by virtue of Proclamation No. 1 announcing that President Aquino and Vice President
Laurel were “taking power in the name and by the will of the Filipino people.”
- Petitioner asserts that the revolutionary government effectively withheld the
operation of the 1973 Constitution which guaranteed private respondents’
exclusionary right, or that the right against unlawful searches is suspended.
ISSUE/S:
1) Whether the revolutionary government was bound by the Bill of Rights of the 1973
Constitution during the interregnum?
2) Whether the protection accorded to individuals under the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (“Covenant”) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(“Declaration”) remained in effect during the interregnum.
Held:
1) The Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during the interregnum.
However, the protection accorded to individuals under the Covenant and the Declaration remained
in effect during the interregnum.
5
LB: During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the revolutionary government
were the supreme law because no constitution limited the extent and scope of such
directives and orders.
APP: With the abrogation of the 1973 Constitution by the successful revolution, there was no
municipal law higher than the directives and orders of the revolutionary government. Thus,
during the interregnum, a person could not invoke any exclusionary right under a Bill of
Rights because there was neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights.
During the interregnum, the government in power was concededly a revolutionary government
bound by no constitution. No one could validly question the sequestration orders as violative of
the Bill of Rights because there was no Bill of Rights during the interregnum. However, upon the
adoption of the Freedom Constitution, the sequestered companies assailed the sequestration
orders as contrary to the Bill of Rights of the Freedom Constitution.
2) The revolutionary government, after installing itself as the de jure government, assumed
responsibility for the State’s good faith compliance with the Covenant to which the
Philippines is a signatory.
- It did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration during the interregnum. Whether the
revolutionary government could have repudiated all its obligations under the Covenant or the
Declaration is another matter and is not the issue here.
- The SC considers the Declaration as part of customary international law, and that
Filipinos as human beings are proper subjects of the rules of international law laid down in the
Covenant. The fact is the revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the
Declaration in the same way it repudiated the 1973 Constitution. As the de jure government,
the revolutionary government could not escape responsibility for the State’s good faith
compliance with its treaty obligations under international law.
RIGHT TO LIFE OF THE UNBORN
Imbong vs. Ochoa
Digest Author: FABI
DOCTRINES: Textually, the Constitution affords protection to the unborn from conception. This is
undisputable because before conception, there is no unborn to speak of. For said reason, it is no
surprise that the Constitution is mute as to any proscription prior to conception or when life
begins.
The problem has arisen because, amazingly, there are quarters who have conveniently
disregarded the scientific fact that conception is reckoned from fertilization. They are waving the
view that life begins at implantation. Hence, the issue of when life begins.
In a nutshell, those opposing the RH Law contend that conception is synonymous with
“fertilization” of the female ovum by the male sperm. On the other side of the spectrum are those
who assert that conception refers to the “implantation” of the fertilized ovum in the uterus.
FACTS:
1. Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21,
2012.
2. Challengers from various sectors of society are questioning the constitutionality of the
said Act.
3. The petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law.
ISSUE: One of the issue in this is W/N RA 10354 or Reproductive Health (RH) Law is
unconstitutional for violating the right to life of the unborn.
RULING+RATIO: NO.
LB: Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: “The State recognizes the sanctity of family
life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall
equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.”
AP:
 In its plain and ordinary meaning, the traditional meaning of “conception” according
to reputable dictionaries cited by the ponente is that life begins at fertilization. Medical
sources also support the view that conception begins at fertilization.
 The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) “conception” to refer to the
moment of “fertilization” and (b) the protection of the unborn child upon fertilization.
 In addition, they did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being unconstitutional; only
those that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum would be prohibited.
 Contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and female ovum, and
those that similarly take action before fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and
thus constitutionally permissible.
 The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the
unborn child was to prevent the Legislature from passing a measure prevents
abortion. The Court cannot interpret this otherwise.
 The RH Law is in line with this intent and actually prohibits abortion. By using the word
“or” in defining abortifacient (Section 4(a)), the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or
devices that prevent implantation but also those that induce abortion and induce the
destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb.
6
  The RH Law recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the
State has a bounded duty to protect it.
 However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the
meaning of abortifacient by using the term “primarily”.
 Recognizing as abortifacients only those that “primarily induce abortion or the
destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum
to reach and be implanted in the mother’s womb” (Sec. 3.01(a) of the IRR) would pave
the way for the approval of contraceptives that may harm or destroy the life of the
unborn from conception/fertilization. This violates Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution. For the same reason, the definition of contraceptives under the IRR (Sec
3.01(j)), which also uses the term “primarily”, must be struck down.
DISPOSITION: Petitions partially granted, R.A. No. 10354 declared not unconstitutional except
for some provisions.
Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.
Art. II, Sec. 16 Right to a Balanced and healthful Ecology
DOCTRINE:
- The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative
duty to refrain from impairing the environment.
- The minors’ assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes at the
same time the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of
that right for the generation to come. - Every generation has a responsibility
to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a
balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors’ assertion
of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the
performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the
generations to come.
FACTS:
 Petitioners, minors duly joined by their parents, had a valid cause of action
in questioning the continued grant of Timber License Agreements
(TLAs) for commercial logging purposes, because the cause focuses
on a fundamental legal right, the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology.
 Petitioners, represented by their parents, filed a petition praying for the
cancellation of existing timber license agreements and for the ceasing of
granting new ones, invoking their constitutional right to a balanced and
healthful ecology.
 Petition was opposed by respondents, claiming that the petitioners did not
have a cause of action and that they did no specific right violated.
Issue: Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to
“prevent the misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforests?”
Ruling: YES
 Focus is on the fundamental right to a balanced and healthful ecology,
incorporated in the Constitution:
o Section 16, Article II: The State shall protect and advance the right
of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the
rhythm and harmony of nature.
 This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the
preceding section
o Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of
the people and instill health consciousness among them.
 While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it
does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political
rights enumerated in the latter.
 Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it
concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly
and fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the advancement of which may
even be said to predate all governments and constitutions.
 As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the
Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind.
o If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is
because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the
rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are
mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby
highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the
state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and
advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else
would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those
to come — generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched
earth incapable of sustaining life.
 The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative
duty to refrain from impairing the environment.
7
 RIGHT TO A BALANCE AND HEALTHFUL ECOLOGY
Concerned Residents of Manila Bay v. MMDA
Digest Author: FABI
DOCTRINES: Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., 224 SCRA 792 (1993), the Court stated that the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology need not even be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like
other civil and political rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of
mankind and it is an issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational implications. Even
assuming the absence of a categorical legal provision specifically prodding petitioners to clean up
the bay, they and the men and women representing them cannot escape their obligation to future
generations of Filipinos to keep the waters of the Manila Bay clean and clear as humanly as
possible. Anything less would be a betrayal of the trust reposed in them.
FACTS:
1. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay filed a complaint for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and
protection of the Manila Bay against several government agencies, among them is the
MMDA, alleging that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below the
allowable standards set by law..
2. This environmental aberration, the complaint stated, stemmed from the reckless,
wholesale, accumulated and ongoing acts of omission or commission of the
respondents.
3. It demanded that Respondents be held jointly and/or solidarily liable and be collectively
ordered to clean up Manila Bay and to restore its water quality to class B waters fit for
swimming, skin-diving, and other forms of contact recreation.
hiding behind two untenable claims: (1) that there ought to be a specific pollution incident before
they are required to act; and (2) that the cleanup of the bay is a discretionary duty.
LB: RA 9003 is a sweeping piece of legislation enacted to radically transform and improve waste
management.
It implements Sec. 16, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, which explicitly provides that the State
shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord
with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
So it was that in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. the Court stated that the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology need not even be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like
other civil and political rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the
inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental importance with
intergenerational implications.
Even assuming the absence of a categorical legal provision specifically prodding petitioners to
clean up the bay, they and the men and women representing them cannot escape their
obligation to future generations of Filipinos to keep the waters of the Manila Bay clean
and clear as humanly as possible. Anything less would be a betrayal of the trust
reposed in them.
Disposition: Decision of the RTC in Civil Case Nare AFFIRMED but with MODIFICATIONS

4. They claimed that the continued neglect of petitioners in abating the pollution of the
Manila Bay constitutes a violation:
a. Petitioners’ constitutional right to life, health, and a balanced ecology;
b. The Environment Code (PD 1152);
c. The Pollution Control Law (PD 984);
d. The Water Code (PD 1067);
e. The Sanitation Code (PD 856);
f. The Illegal Disposal of Wastes Decree (PD 825);
g. The Marine Pollution Law (PD 979);
h. Executive Order No. 192;
i. The Toxic and Hazardous Wastes Law (Republic Act No. 6969);
j. Civil Code provisions on nuisance and human relations;
k. The Trust Doctrine and the Principle of Guardianship; and
l. International Law

ISSUE: W/N petitioners be compelled by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the Manila Bay.

RULING+RATIO: YES, the Court wishes to emphasize the extreme necessity for all concerned
executive departments and agencies to immediately act and discharge their respective official
duties and obligations.

Indeed, time is of the essence; hence, there is a need to set timetables for the performance and
completion of the tasks, some of them as defined for them by law and the nature of their
respective offices and mandates.

The importance of the Manila Bay as a sea resource, playground, and as a historical landmark
cannot be overemphasized. This means that the State, through Respondents, has to take the lead
in the preservation and protection of the Manila Bay.

Petitioners must transcend their limitations, real or imaginary, and buckle down to work before
the problem at hand becomes unmanageable. The Court reiterated that different government
agencies and instrumentalities cannot shirk from their mandates; they must perform their basic
functions in cleaning up and rehabilitating the Manila Bay. The Court is disturbed by petitioners

8
 Garcia v. Board of Investments
Sec. 19 Independent National Economy/ Filipino First Policy
DOCTRINE:
An approval of a business’ intent to move to another location without any cogent advantage to the
government is a repudiation of the independent policy of the government expressed in numerous
laws and the Constitution to run its own affairs the way it deems best for the national interest.
FACTS:
 Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC), composed of Taiwanese investors, applied for
registration with the BOI as a new domestic producer of petrochemicals.
o Bataan was specified as the plant site, where a site had already been
reserved for the purpose.
 BPC was granted registration and pioneer status, which resulted to it being granted
several financial incentives, among them exemption from taxes.
 BPC, however, expressed its desire to move the site of the plant from Bataan to
Batangas which was opposed by petitioner.
 The BOI approved the change of site, arguing that the investors had the final choice of
where to construct the plant.
ISSUE: Whether the BOI committed grave abuse of discretion in yielding to the application of the
investors without considering the national interest?
Ruling: YES. The BOI committed grave abuse of discretion in approving the transfer of the
petrochemical plant from Bataan to Batangas.
LB: An approval of a business’ intent to move to another location without any cogent advantage
to the government is a repudiation of the independent policy of the government expressed in
numerous laws and the Constitution to run its own affairs the way it deems best for the national
interest.
o Under Section 10, Article XII, it is the duty of the State to "regulate and
exercise authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction and
in accordance with its national goals and priorities."
o The development of a self-reliant and independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipinos is mandated in Section 19, Article II.
o Article 2 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 "the sound development
of the national economy in consonance with the principles and objectives of
economic nationalism" is the set goal of government.
o Section 1, Article XII provides that The State shall promote industrialization
and full employment based on sound agricultural development and agrarian
reform, through industries that make full and efficient use of human and
natural resources, and which are competitive in both domestic and foreign
markets. However, the State shall protect Filipino enterprises against unfair
foreign competition and trade practices.
o Every provision of the Constitution on the national economy and patrimony is
infused with the spirit of national interest. The non-alienation of natural
resources, the State's full control over the development and utilization of our
scarce resources, agreements with foreigners being based on real
contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country and
the regulation of foreign investments in accordance with national goals and
priorities are too explicit
APP: A petrochemical industry is not an ordinary investment opportunity, it is one essential
to the national interest.
INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ECONOMY/ FILIPINO FIRST POLICY
Manila Prince Hotel vs. Government Service Insurance System
Digest Author: FABI
DOCTRINES: When the Constitution mandates that in the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified
Filipinos, it means just that—qualified Filipinos shall be preferred.
FACTS:
 GSIS, pursuant to the government’s privatization program, decided to sell 30-51% of
the outstanding shares of Manila Hotel, through public bidding.
 There were only 2 bidders:
1) Manila Prince Hotel Corporation
o A Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or
15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share.
2) Renong Berhad
o A Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid
for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more
than the bid of petitioner.
 Before Renong Berhad could be declared a winner, Manila Prince matched their offer.
 Manila Prince also claimed that its offer should be preferred, invoking Sec. 10 of Art.
XII, which provides that qualified Filipinos should be given preference in the granting of
rights privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony.
o Renong Berhad however, countered that Sec. 10 of Art. XII is not self-
executing.
ISSUE: 1.) W/N Sec. 10 of Art. XII is self-executing.
Ruling:
1.) Yes, Sec. 10 of Art. XII is self-executing.
 Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and principles.
o Their provisions command the legislature to enact laws and carry out the
purposes of the framers who merely establish an outline of government
providing for the different departments of the governmental machinery and
securing certain fundamental and inalienable rights of citizens.
o A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II
of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing.
 But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of
supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of
which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.
o It is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the
liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be
determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no
language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action.
 Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a
constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution
are self-executing.
 Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive
command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or
implementing laws or rules for its enforcement.
o From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in
operation.
o Judicially enforceable
 The Filipino First Policy is a product of Philippine nationalism.
o It is embodied in the 1987 Constitution not merely to be used as a guideline
for future legislation but primarily to be enforced; so must it be enforced.
9
  It is not the intention of this Court to impede and diminish, much less undermine, the Pamatong v. Comelec
influx of foreign investments. Sec. 26 Equal Access to Opportunities for Public Service
The Court encourages and welcomes more business opportunities but avowedly sanctions the
preference for Filipinos whenever such preference is ordained by the Constitution.
DOCTRINE:
ISSUE: 2.) W/N GSIS should give preference to the petitioner, a Filipino corporation, over Renong
Berhad, a foreign corporation, in the sale of the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation - There is no constitutional right to run for or hold public office and, particularly, to seek
the presidency —what is recognized is merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed
RULING: YES, GSIS should give preference to the petitioner in the sale of the controlling by law
shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation.
- The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self- executing, and there
is no plausible reason for according a differenttreatment to the “equal access”
provision—like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not
It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is not yet the winning
contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for
bidder.
legislative or executive action.
The bidding rules expressly provide that the highest bidder shall only be declared the winning
FACTS:
bidder after it has negotiated and executed the necessary contracts, and secured the requisite
approvals.
 Rev. Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy for President.
 COMELEC refused to give due course of his Certificate of Candidacy.
LB: Since the Filipino First Policy provision of the Constitution bestows preference
o He, along with 35, were declared nuisance candidates.
on qualified Filipinos the mere tending of the highest bid is not an assurance that the highest
 That they could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not
bidder will be declared the winning bidder.
nominated by a political party or are not supported by a registered
political party with a national constituency.
Resultantly, respondents are not bound to make the award yet, nor are they under obligation to
 Pamatong seeks reversal of the COMELEC decision, claiming violation of his right to
enter into one with the highest bidder.
equal access to opportunities for public service, provided by Sec. 26, Art. II.
For in choosing the awardee respondents are mandated to abide by the dictates of the 1987
Issue: Whether the petitioner’s interpretation of Sec. 26, Article II gives him a constitutional right
Constitution the provisions of which are presumed to be known to all the bidders and other
to run or hold for public office?
interested parties.
Ruling: NO. There is no constitutional right to run or hold public office. – There is merely
AP: In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding
a privilege.
concerning the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have
LB:
to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity.
 The “equal access” provision, Sec. 26, is included in Art. II, entitled Declaration of
Principles and State policies.
And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to the Filipino.
o The provisions in Art. II are generally not self-executing. – Not judicially
enforceable.
It must be so if we are to give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987
o
Constitution.
 The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to
limitations, provided by the Omnibus Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates" and
For, while this may neither be expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the
COMELEC Resolution No. 6452, outlining the instances where the COMELEC may refuse
constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a
to give due course to a Certificate of Candidacy.
perilous skirting of the basic law.
o As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination,
however, the equal access clause is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as
long as the burdens engendered by the limitations are meant to be borne by
anyone who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar,
there is no showing that any person is exempt from limitations or burdens
they create.
 The State has a compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational,
objective, and orderly.
o The greater the number of candidates, the greater the opportunities for
logistical confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time and
resources in preparation for the election.
o There is a need to limit the number of candidates especially in the case of
candidates for national positions because the election process becomes a
mockery even if those who cannot clearly wage a national campaign are
allowed to run. Their names would have to be printed in the Certified List of
Candidates, Voters Information Sheet and the Official Ballots. These would
entail additional costs to the government.

10