G.R. No.

93451 March 18, 1991

LIM KIEH TONG, INC., petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE ROGELIO M. PIZARRO, Presiding Judge of Branch 16 of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, and REGINALDO Y. LIM, respondents.

Balgos & Perez for petitioner.

Madamba, Lim & Tan for private respondent.

GANCAYCO, J.:

The issue of whether a complaint filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila is one for forcible entry
and detainer or one for specific performance is the center of this litigation.

The facts are not disputed as related by the respondent Court of Appeals in its questioned decision
dated December 7, 1988 —

The record reveals that on October 23, 1987, the appellee, Reginaldo Y. Lim, had filed a complaint before
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, in part, alleging, as follows:

3. Plaintiff and his family had for some time resided in Room 301 of the building adverted to in the next
preceding paragraph, until they transferred to their present residence at No. 3 Igdalig Street, Quezon
City;

4. The said room 301 has thereafter been utilized by plaintiff as a place where he keeps some of his
important belongings, such as his law books, important documents, appliances, etc.;

5. The aforementioned building has only one common main door through which all the occupants of the
various rooms therein, including that of plaintiff, can get in and out therefrom;

6. Accordingly, each and every occupant of any and all of the rooms of the building including plaintiff has
been given a key or a duplicate key to the doorlock by Rafael Lim, the Officer-in-Charge of defendant
corporation;

7. When plaintiff wanted to go inside his room in the following morning of September 30, 1987 to fetch
three (3) of his law books, which he needed to read in connection with a case he is handling, he was
surprised to find out that the key given him could no longer fit the door lock which was then already
changed;

8. Consequently, plaintiff had to buy three (3) new law books for which he incurred expenses in the sum
of Pl,253.00, if only to be able to prepare for his cases;

9. Plaintiff was only able to contact defendant through its Officer-in-Charge, Mr. Rafael Lim, the following
day, October 1, 1987, but his request for him to be provided with the appropriate key produced negative
result, hence, this suit where plaintiff incurred expenses in the form of attorney's fees and costs of suit.

ALLEGATIONS IN SUPPORT OF PRAYER FOR PRELIMINARY MANDATORY INJUNCTION/RESTRAINING

ORDER
10. Plaintiff repleads all the foregoing allegations by way of reference to form part of the prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction;

11. The failure and/or refusal of defendant to furnish plaintiff the appropriate key, above-cited,
constitutes a violation of the substantial rights of plaintiff, who has a clear and unmistakable right to the
use and enjoyment of Room 301 of the building owned by defendant corporation, such that there is an
urgent and paramount necessity for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction/restraining order
commanding defendant to furnish plaintiff the appropriate key in order to prevent great and and/or
irreparable damages and injury upon plaintiff.

In conclusion, the said appellee prayed, as follows:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is most respectfully prayed of the Honorable Court that a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction/restraining order commanding defendant to provide plaintiff the appropriate key
or a duplicate key to the lock of the main door of the building be immediately issued, and, after hearing
the case on its merits, judgment be rendered in favor of plaintiff and against defendant ordering:

l. the injunction prayed for in the complaint;

2. defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of Pl,253.00 as actual compensatory damages;

3. defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of P5,000.00 as and for attorney's fees; and

4. the cost of suit.

Plaintiff prays for such other reliefs and/or remedies which the Honorable Court may deem just and
proper in the premises. (p. 13, orig. rec.)

The opening paragraphs of the questioned decision relate what had happened in the courts below:

This is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, grounded on pure questions of law.

The case is simplicity itself.

The undisputed facts are as follows:

Petitioner is a duly organized domestic corporation and is the owner of a building located at 1231 Piedad
Street corner Benavidez Street, Manila;

Public respondent is the Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 16;

For sometime prior to the filing of this petition, Lim Eng Piao, father of private respondent, occupied said
premises as a dwelling unit at the above given address together with all the members of his family. Lim
Eng Piao subsequently died. Said occupancy was continued by private respondent. Later, the latter was
able to acquire a house and lot at No. 3 Igdalig Street, Quezon (sic). In spite of having transferred
residence, private respondent did not vacate Room 301 of the building in question. Instead, he utilized
the same as a place where he keeps some of his important belongings, papers, books, documents and
appliances . . .

On or about September 1987, petitioner changed the lock of the common main door of the building.
On the morning of September 30, 1987, private respondent tried to go to Room 301 but found that the
key given him could not fit and open the main door. As one of the occupants of the building in question,
private respondent demanded from petitioner's officer-in-charge the delivery to him of the appropriate
keys to the said common main door so that he could enter the premises and be restored to possession of
said Room No. 301 of the building, but his efforts proved futile as the officer in charge did not heed his
demand . . .

On October 2, 1987, by reason of the unjustifiable ouster of private respondent from said premises, he
instituted Civil Case No. 122546 entitled Reginaldo Y. Lim vs. Rafael Lim and Lim Kieh Tong & Co., Inc.
before the Metropolitan Trial Court which was raffled to Branch 25. Said complaint was denominated as
an action for damages with injunction despite the allegations contained therein . . .. The aforesaid case
was subsequently dismissed for lack of jurisdiction . . .

On October 23, 1987, private respondent again instituted another action at the Metropolitan Trial Court
docketed as Civil Case No. 122775 which was raffled to Branch 16. The complaint reiterated the same
allegations . . .

On November 2, 1987, a temporary restraining order was issued by respondent judge pending trial on
the merits, commanding petitioner to deliver the appropriate keys to private respondent and allow him
to enter the premises and occupancy of Room No. 301 of the building . . .

On November 3, 1987, petitioners instituted the instant petition;

On the same date after an ex-parte hearing, the Executive Judge of this Court, in order to obviate any
possible injustice pending the determination of the issuance of the injunctive writ, issued a temporary
restraining order, enjoining the enforcement of the temporary restraining order earlier issued by
respondent judge and from further taking cognizance of said Civil Case No. 122775; . . .

In ruling in favor of the private appellee, the appellee judge, in part, stated:

In this case force was used by petitioner to deprive private respondent of the physical possession of
Room 301 when the lock of the main door was changed without his knowledge and consent.

The issued (sic) involved is mere physical possession (possession de facto) and not juridical possession
(possession de jure) nor ownership (Mercado vs. Go Bio, 78 Phil. 279; Masallo, vs. Cesar, 39 Phil. 134).

The purpose of forcible entry is that regardless of the actual condition of the title to property, the party
in peaceable and quiet possession shall not be turned out by strong hand, violence or terror . . . In
affording this remedy, breaches of the peace and criminal disorder would be minimized. A party out of
possession must respect and resort to the law alone to obtain what he claims is his. (Supia and Batioco
vs. Quintero and Ayala, 59 Phil. 312).

Considering that respondent judge found the applicability of the Rule in Summary Procedure, the motion
to dismiss was correctly denied. A motion to dismiss being one of the prohibited pleadings and motions
under Section 15 of the 1983 Rules on Summary Procedure.

Hence, the petition must fail on this score alone.

Anent the second issue, petitioner contended that when the amount of damages claimed is not
specifically alleged in the complaint, jurisdiction over the case would fall under the Regional Trial Courts,
as the failure to so allege would characterize the subject matter as one which is incapable of pecuniary
estimation.

Petitioner's contentions is (sic) not well-taken.

In Singson vs. Aragon, 92 Phil. 514, the Supreme Court held that exemplary damages must be specified
and if not, the municipal trial court could still grant it, if together with the other money claims, the
amount of the total claim does not exceed P10,000.00 (now P20,000.00).

As to moral damages, the aforesaid ruling can likewise be made to apply.

What confers jurisdiction on the inferior court in forcible entry and illegal detainer cases is NOT the
amount of unpaid rentals or damages involved, but rather the nature of the action because the rents or
damages are only incidental to the main action (Vichanco vs. Laurilla, L-13935, June 30, 1960). 1

An appeal was taken to the Court of Appeals. The appeal was dismissed for lack of merit. 2 A motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied in a resolution dated May 9, 1990. 3

Hence, this petition for review the main thrust of which is that the action being one for specific
performance the jurisdiction thereof is vested in the Regional Trial Court.

The petition must fail.

A reading of the allegations of the complaint show that private respondent and his family resided in
Room 301 of the building of petitioner until they transferred to their present residence at No. 3 Igdalig
St., Quezon City. However, private respondent retained possession of said room to keep his important
belongings, such as his law books, important documents, appliances, etc. The building has only one
common main door through which all the occupants of the various rooms therein can get in and
out.1âwphi1 Accordingly, all occupants including private respondent were given a key to the main
doorlock by petitioner.

However, when private respondent wanted to go inside his room on September 30, 1987 to get three (3)
of his lawbooks which he needed to read in connection with a case he was then handling, he found that
the key he possessed was no longer compatible with the lock, i.e., the same was changed. Private
respondent had to buy three (3) new lawbooks for Pl,253.00 to prepare for his cases. He requested
private respondent to provide him the appropriate key but his request was denied. Petitioner also
alleges that he has a clear and unmistakable right to the use of said room entitling him to the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction to command petitioner to provide him the appropriate key to the lock
of the main building; and to pay damages in the amount of Pl,253.000, P5,000.00 attorney's fees and
costs of the suit.

From the foregoing facts alleged in the complaint, the Court holds that the suit is one for forcible entry
and detainer under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. Private respondent retained the possession of Room
301 of petitioner's building which he claimed to have the right to use and enjoy, but petitioner prevented
him from enjoying his right by depriving him of the right of egress and ingress through the main door of
the building. Through stealth, petitioner changed the key to the main door thus depriving private
respondent of the possession of his rented room.
Any person deprived of possession of any land or building or part thereof, may file an action for forcible
entry and detainer in the proper inferior court against the person unlawfully depriving or withholding
possession from him4

This relief is not only available to a landlord, vendor, or vendee, but also to a lessee or tenant or any
other person against whom the possession of any land or building, or a part thereof, is unlawfully
withheld, or is otherwise unlawfully deprived possession thereof, within one (1) year after such unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Cruz, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 116192 November 16, 1995

EUFEMIA SARMIENTO, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GENEROSA S. CRUZ, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:

The judgment promulgated on February 28, 1994 by respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R SP No.
322631reversing the decision of the regional trial court, as well as its resolution of June 29, 1994 denying
herein petitioner's motion for reconsideration, are assailed in this petition for review on certiorari.

This case originated from a complaint for ejectment with damages filed by herein private respondent
Generosa S. Cruz, as plaintiff, against herein petitioner Eufemia Sarmiento, as defendant, in the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Dinalupihan-Hermosa, Bataan as Civil Case No. 899, which complaint
alleges these material facts:

xxx xxx xxx

2. That the plaintiff acquired by purchase a parcel of land known as Lot No. 2-A of the subd. plan, Psd-03-
0345 being a portion of Lot 2, covered by TCT No. T-147219, located at Bo. Mabuco, Hermosa, Bataan,
containing as area of 280 square meters, xerox copy of the title is hereto attached as Annex "A" hereof
and for taxation purposes, the same is declared in the name of the plaintiff, xerox copy of the tax
declaration is hereto attached as Annex "B" of this complaint;

3. That the adjacent lot of plaintiff is still owned by the family of Atty. Gonzalo Nuguid but the same is
being used and occupied by the defendant where a house was constructed thereon;

4. That when the plaintiff caused the relocation of her lot herein mentioned, it was found out by the
Geodetic Engineer that the defendant is encroaching on her lot for about 71 square meters, copy of the
relocation sketch by said surveyor is hereto attached as Annex "C" hereof;

5. That when the plaintiff talked to the defendant that she would like to remove the old fence so that she
could construct a new fence which will cover the true area of her property, the defendant vehemently
refused to let the plaintiff remov(e) the said fence and menacingly alleged that if plaintiff remove(d) the
said fence to construct a new one, she would take action against the plaintiff legally or otherwise;

6. For fear that plaintiff may be charged in court should she insist on removing the fence encroaching on
her property, plaintiff now seeks judicial relief;

7. That plaintiff refer(red) this matter to the Katarungang Pambarangay of Mabuco for settlement,
however, the efforts of the Lupon Tagapamayapa turned futile, as evidenced by a certification to file
action issued by the Lupon secretary and attested by the Lupon Chairman, copy of the certification to file
action is hereto attached as Annex "D" hereof;

8. Plaintiff as much as possible would like to avoid court litigation because she is poor but nevertheless
she consulted the undersigned counsel and a demand letter was sent to the defendant for conference
and/or settlement but the defendant stood pat that she will not allow the removal of the fence, thus
depriving the plaintiff of the use and possession of the said portion of her lot (71 square meters) which is
being occupied by the defendant for several years, xerox copy of the demand letter is hereto attached as
Annex "E" of this complaint;

9. That by virtue of the willful refusal of the defendant to allow the plaintiff to have the fence dismantled
and/or to be removed, the plaintiff is deprived of the possession and she was forced to hire the services
of counsel for which she contracted to pay the sum of P2,000.00 plus acceptance of P1,000.00 until the
termination of this case before this Honorable Court. 2

xxx xxx xxx

On January 21, 1993, the trial court, on motion, issued an order giving the defendant to file her answer
to the complaint.3 This was opposed by the plaintiff therein on the ground that Section 15(e) of the Rule
on Summary Procedure does not allow the filing of motion for extension of time to file pleadings,
affidavits or any other papers.4Nonetheless, defendant filed on January 29, 1993 her "Answer with
Motion to Dismiss."5 Plaintiff filed and ex-parte motion reiterating her contention that the filing by
defendant of her aforesaid answer with motion was barred for reason that her preceding motion for
extension of time to file an answer is a prohibited pleading. 6 On February 4, 1993, the trial court, finding
merit in plaintiff's ex-parte motion, ordered that defendant's answer be stricken from the records for
having been filed out of time.7 The case was then submitted for decision.

On February 18, 1993, the trial court rendered its decision with the following decretal portion:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, ordering
the latter:

1. To vacate the area being encroached (upon) by the defendant and allowing the plaintiff to remove the
old fence permanently and (to) make the necessary enclosure of the area pertaining to the herein
plaintiff containing an area of 280 square meters, more or less;

2. Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P1,500.00 as attorney's fees. No
pronouncement as to damages;

3. To pay the cost(s) of this suit.8 (Corrections in parentheses supplied.)

Defendant filed a motion for the reconsideration of said judgment, but the same was denied by the trial
court for lack of merit in its order dated March 2, 1993. 9

On appeal to the Regional Trial Court of Dinalupihan Bataan, Branch 5, in Civil Case No DH-121-93,
defendant assailed the jurisdiction of the court a quo. On June 21, 1993, said lower appellate court
rendered judgment, stating in part as follows:

A perusal of the records of the case and the memorandum of appeal of the adversaries led this court to
the opinion that the court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction to hear, try and decide the instant appealed
case based on (the) reason that the said case should be one of question of ownership or accion
rei(vin)dicatoria rather than that of forcible entry as the(re) was no allegation of prior possession by the
plaintiff (of) the disputed lot as required by law and jurisprudence. Absence of allegations and proof by
the plaintiff in forcible entry case of prior possession of the disputed lot (sic) cannot be said that
defendant dispossesses her of the same, thus, the legal remedy sought by the plaintiff is not the proper
one as it should have been accion publiciana or accion rei(vin)dicatoria, as the case may be, and the
forum of which is the Regional Trial Court.

This Court declines to venture into other issues raised by the defendant/appellant considering that the
resolution on jurisdiction renders the same moot and academic. 10 (Corrections in parentheses ours.)

Therein plaintiffs motion for reconsideration having been denied in said lower court's order dated
August 12, 1993, 11she elevated the case to the Supreme Court through a petition for review
on certiorari, purportedly on pure questions of law. This Court, treating the petition as a special civil
action for certiorari, referred the case to respondent Court of Appeals for proper determination and
disposition pursuant to Section 9(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. 12

On February 28, 1994, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment in CA-G.R. SP No. 32263 13 reversing the
decision of the regional trial court and reinstating that of the municipal circuit trial court, hence the
present petition.

The chief issue for our resolution is whether or not the court of origin had jurisdiction over the
ejectment case. Well-settled is the rule that the jurisdiction of the court, as well as the nature of the
action, are determined by the averments in the complaint. 14 Accordingly, the issue in the instant case
can only be properly resolved by an examination and evaluation of the allegations in the complaint in
Civil Case No. 899 of said trial court.

A careful reading of the facts averred in said complaint filed by herein private respondent reveals that
the action is neither one of forcible entry nor of unlawful detainer but essentially involves a boundary
dispute which must be resolved in an accion reivindicatoria on the issue of ownership over the disputed
71 square meters involved.

Forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are two distinct actions defined in Section 1, Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court. In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of land or building by means of
force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. In unlawful detainer, one unlawfully withholds possession
thereof after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or
implied. In forcible entity, the possession is illegal from the beginning and the basic inquiry centers on
who has the prior possession de facto. In unlawful detainer, the possession was originally lawful but
became unlawful by the expiration or termination of the right to possess, hence the issue of rightful
possession is decisive for, in such action, the defendant is in actual possession and the plaintiffs cause of
action is the termination of the defendant's right to continue in possession. 15

What determines the cause of action is the nature of defendant's entry into the land. If the entry is
illegal, then the action which may be filed against the intruder within one year therefrom is forcible
entry. If, on the other hand, the entry is legal but the possession thereafter became illegal, the case is
one of unlawful detainer which must be filed within one year from the date of the last demand. 16

In the case at bar, the complaint does not characterize herein petitioner's alleged entry into the land,
that is, whether the same was legal or illegal. It does not state how petitioner entered upon the land and
constructed the house and the fence thereon. It is also silent on whether petitioner's possession became
legal before private respondent made a demand on her to remove the fence. The complaint merely avers
that the lot being occupied by petitioner is owned by a third person, not a party to the case, and that
said lot is enclosed by a fence which private respondent claims is an encroachment on the adjacent lot
belonging to her.

Furthermore, it is also alleged and admitted in the complaint that the said fence was already in existence
on that lot at the time private respondent bought her own lot and it was only after a relocation survey
was made that it was found out that petitioner is allegedly encroaching on the lot of the former.
Consequently, there is here no contract, express or implied, between petitioner and private respondent
as would qualify it as a case of unlawful detainer. Neither was it alleged that the possession of the
disputed portion of said lot was acquired by petitioner through force, intimidation, threat, strategy or
stealth to make out a case of forcible entry.

Private respondent cannot now belatedly claim that petitioner's possession of the controverted portion
was by mere tolerance since that fact was never alleged in the former's basic complaint, and this
argument was raised in her later pleadings more as an afterthought. Also, it would be absurd to argue
that private respondent tolerated a state of affairs of which she was not even then aware. Finally, to
categorize a cause of action as one constitutive of unlawful detainer, plaintiff's supposed acts of
tolerance must have been present right from the start of the possession which is later sought to be
recovered. 17

Indeed, and this was definitely not the situation that obtained in and gave rise to the ejectment suit, to
hold otherwise would espouse a dangerous doctrine, for two reasons: First. Forcible entry into the land
is an open challenge to the right of the lawful possessor, the violation of which right authorizes the
speedy redress in the inferior court provided for in the Rules. If a period of one year from the forcible
entry is allowed to lapse before suit is filed, then the remedy ceases to be speedy and the aggrieved
possessor is deemed to have waived his right to seek relief in the inferior court. Second. If a forcible
entry action in the inferior court is allowed after the lapse of a number of years, then the result may well
be that no action of forcible entry can really prescribe. No matter how long such defendant is in physical
possession, plaintiff will merely make a demand, bring suit in the inferior court — upon a plea of
tolerance to prevent prescription from setting in — and summarily throw him out of the land. Such a
conclusion is unreasonable, especially if we bear in mind the postulates that proceedings of forcible
entry and unlawful detainer are summary in nature, and that the one year time-bar to the suit is but in
pursuance of the summary nature of the action. 18
To give the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant or deforciant on the land, it is
necessary that the complaint should embody such a statement of facts as brings the party clearly within
the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings are summary in
nature. 19 The complaint must show enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to
parol testimony. 20

The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the complaint fails to aver facts
constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was effected or
how and when dispossession started, as in the case at bar, the remedy should either be an accion
publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria in the proper regional trial
court. 21

If private respondent is indeed the owner of the premises subject of this suit and she was unlawfully
deprived of the real right of possession or the ownership thereof, she should present her claim before
the regional trial court in an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, and not before the municipal
trial court in a summary proceeding of unlawful detainer or forcible entry. For even if one is the owner of
the property, the possession thereof cannot be wrested from another who had been in the physical or
material possession of the same for more than one year by resorting to a summary action for ejectment.
This is especially true where his possession thereof was not obtained through the means or held under
the circumstances contemplated by the rules on summary ejectment.

We have held that in giving recognition to the action of forcible entry and unlawful detainer, the purpose
of the law is to protect the person who in fact has actual possession; and in case of a controverted
proprietary right, the law requires the parties to preserve the status quo until one or the other sees fit to
invoke the decision of a court of competent jurisdiction upon the question of ownership. 22

On the foregoing premises and with these conclusions, it is unnecessary to pass upon the other issues
raised in the petition at bar.

ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is GRANTED, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 32263 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Dinalupihan,
Bataan, Branch 5, in Civil Case No. DH-121-93 is REINSTATED, without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Francisco, J., is on leave.

G.R. No. 115814 May 26, 1995

PEDRO P. PECSON, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES JUAN NUGUID and ERLINDA NUGUID, respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to set aside the decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 32679 affirming in part the order 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 101, in
Civil Case No. Q-41470.

The factual and procedural antecedents of this case as gathered from the record are as follows:

Petitioner Pedro P. Pecson was the owner of a commercial lot located in Kamias Street, Quezon City, on
which he built a four-door two-storey apartment building. For his failure to pay realty taxes amounting to
twelve thousand pesos (P12,000.00), the lot was sold at public auction by the city Treasurer of Quezon
City to Mamerto Nepomuceno who in turn sold it on 12 October 1983 to the private respondents, the
spouses Juan Nuguid and Erlinda Tan-Nuguid, for one hundred three thousand pesos (P103,000.00).

The petitioner challenged the validity of the auction sale in Civil Case No. Q-41470 before the RTC of
Quezon City. In its decision of 8 February 1989, the RTC dismissed the complaint, but as to the private
respondents' claim that the sale included the apartment building, it held that the issue concerning it was
"not a subject of the . . . litigation." In resolving the private respondents' motion to reconsider this issue,
the trial court held that there was no legal basis for the contention that the apartment building was
included in the sale.3

Both parties then appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. CV
No. 2931. In its decision of 30 April 1992,4 the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the assailed decision. It
also agreed with the trial court that the apartment building was not included in the auction sale of the
commercial lot. Thus:

Indeed, examining the record we are fully convinced that it was only the land — without the apartment
building — which was sold at the auction sale, for plaintiff's failure to pay the taxes due thereon. Thus, in
the Certificate of Sale of Delinquent Property To Purchaser (Exh. K, p. 352, Record) the property subject
of the auction sale at which Mamerto Nepomuceno was the purchaser is referred to as Lot No. 21-A,
Block No. K-34, at Kamias, Barangay Piñahan, with an area of 256.3 sq. m., with no mention whatsoever,
of the building thereon. The same description of the subject property appears in the Final Notice To
Exercise The Right of Redemption (over subject property) dated September 14, 1981 (Exh. L, p. 353,
Record) and in the Final Bill of Sale over the same property dated April 19, 1982 (Exh. P, p. 357, Record).
Needless to say, as it was only the land without any building which Nepomuceno had acquired at the
auction sale, it was also only that land without any building which he could have legally sold to the
Nuguids. Verily, in the Deed of Absolute Sale of Registered Land executed by Mamerto Nepomuceno in
favor of the Nuguids on October 25, 1983 (Exh. U, p. 366, Record) it clearly appears that the property
subject of the sale for P103,000.00 was only the parcel of land, Lot 21-A, Blk. K-34 containing an area of
256.3 sq. meters, without any mention of any improvement, much less any building thereon. (emphases
supplied)
The petition to review the said decision was subsequently denied by this Court. 5 Entry of judgment was
made on 23 June 1993.6

On November 1993, the private respondents filed with the trial court a motion for delivery of possession
of the lot and the apartment building, citing article 546 of the Civil Code. 7 Acting thereon, the trial court
issued on 15 November 1993 the challenged order 8 which reads as follows:

Submitted for resolution before this Court is an uncontroverted [sic] for the Delivery of Possession filed
by defendants Erlinda Tan, Juan Nuguid, et al. considering that despite personal service of the Order for
plaintiff to file within five (5) days his opposition to said motion, he did not file any.

In support of defendant's motion, movant cites the law in point as Article 546 of the Civil Code . . .

Movant agrees to comply with the provisions of the law considering that plaintiff is a builder in good
faith and he has in fact, opted to pay the cost of the construction spent by plaintiff. From the complaint
itself the plaintiff stated that the construction cost of the apartment is much more than the lot, which
apartment he constructed at a cost of P53,000.00 in 1965 (par. 8 complaint). This amount of P53,000.00
is what the movant is supposed to pay under the law before a writ of possession placing him in
possession of both the lot and apartment would be issued.

However, the complaint alleges in paragraph 9 that three doors of the apartment are being leased. This
is further confirmed by the affidavit of the movant presented in support of the motion that said three
doors are being leased at a rental of P7,000.00 a month each. The movant further alleges in his said
affidavit that the present commercial value of the lot is P10,000.00 per square meter or P2,500,000.00
and the reasonable rental value of said lot is no less than P21,000.00 per month.

The decision having become final as per Entry of Judgment dated June 23, 1993 and from this date on,
being the uncontested owner of the property, the rents should be paid to him instead of the plaintiff
collecting them. From June 23, 1993, the rents collected by plaintiff amounting to more than P53,000.00
from tenants should be offset from the rents due to the lot which according to movant's affidavit is more
than P21,000.00 a month.

WHEREFORE, finding merit in the Motion, the Court hereby grants the following prayer that:

1. The movant shall reimburse plaintiff the construction cost of P53,000.00.

2. The payment of P53,000.00 as reimbursement for the construction cost, movant Juan Nuguid is
hereby entitled to immediate issuance of a writ of possession over the Lot and improvements thereon.

3. The movant having been declared as the uncontested owner of the Lot in question as per Entry of
Judgment of the Supreme Court dated June 23, 1993, the plaintiff should pay rent to the movant of no
less than P21,000.00 per month from said date as this is the very same amount paid monthly by the
tenants occupying the lot.

4. The amount of P53,000.00 due from the movant is hereby offset against the amount of rents collected
by the plaintiff from June 23, 1993, to September 23, 1993.

SO ORDERED.
The petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the order but it was not acted upon by the trial court.
Instead, on 18 November 1993, it issued a writ of possession directing the deputy sheriff "to place said
movant Juan Nuguid in possession of subject property located at No. 79 Kamias Road, Quezon City, with
all the improvements thereon and to eject therefrom all occupants therein, their agents, assignees, heirs
and representatives."9

The petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition
assailing the order of 15 November 1993, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 32679. 10 In its decision
of 7 June 1994, the Court of Appeals affirmed in part the order of the trial court citing Article 448 of the
Civil Code. In disposing of the issues, it stated:

As earlier pointed out, private respondent opted to appropriate the improvement introduced by
petitioner on the subject lot, giving rise to the right of petitioner to be reimbursed of the cost of
constructing said apartment building, in accordance with Article 546 of the . . . Civil Code, and of the
right to retain the improvements until he is reimbursed of the cost of the improvements, because,
basically, the right to retain the improvement while the corresponding indemnity is not paid implies the
tenancy or possession in fact of the land on which they are built . . . [2 TOLENTINO, CIVIL CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES (1992) p. 112]. With the facts extant and the settled principle as guides, we agree with
petitioner that respondent judge erred in ordering that "the movant having been declared as the
uncontested owner of the lot in question as per Entry of Judgment of the Supreme Court dated June 23,
1993, the plaintiff should pay rent to the movant of no less than P21,000 per month from said date as
this is the very same amount paid monthly by the tenants occupying the lot.

We, however, agree with the finding of respondent judge that the amount of P53,000.00 earlier
admitted as the cost of constructing the apartment building can be offset from the amount of rents
collected by petitioner from June 23, 1993 up to September 23, 1993 which was fixed at P7,000.00 per
month for each of the three doors. Our underlying reason is that during the period of retention,
petitioner as such possessor and receiving the fruits from the property, is obliged to account for such
fruits, so that the amount thereof may be deducted from the amount of indemnity to be paid to him by
the owner of the land, in line with Mendoza vs. De Guzman, 52 Phil. 164 . . . .

The Court of Appeals then ruled as follows:

WHEREFORE, while it appears that private respondents have not yet indemnified petitioner with the cost
of the improvements, since Annex I shows that the Deputy Sheriff has enforced the Writ of Possession
and the premises have been turned over to the possession of private respondents, the quest of
petitioner that he be restored in possession of the premises is rendered moot and academic, although it
is but fair and just that private respondents pay petitioner the construction cost of P53,000.00; and that
petitioner be ordered to account for any and all fruits of the improvements received by him starting on
June 23, 1993, with the amount of P53,000.00 to be offset therefrom.

IT IS SO ORDERED.11

Aggrieved by the Court of Appeals' decision, the petitioner filed the instant petition.

The parties agree that the petitioner was a builder in good faith of the apartment building on the theory
that he constructed it at the time when he was still the owner of the lot, and that the key issue in this
case is the application of Articles 448 and 456 of the Civil Code.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals, as well as the parties, concerned themselves with the
application of Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code. These articles read as follows:

Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall
have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity
provided for in articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the
land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy
the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay
reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after
proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the
court shall fix the terms thereof. (361a)

xxx xxx xxx

Art. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the possessor in good faith
may retain the thing until he has been reimbursed therefor.

Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith with the same right of retention,
the person who has defeated him in the possession having the option of refunding the amount of the
expenses or of paying the increase in value which the thing may have acquired by reason thereof. (453a)

By its clear language, Article 448 refers to a land whose ownership is claimed by two or more parties,
one of whom has built some works, or sown or planted something. The building, sowing or planting may
have been made in good faith or in bad faith. The rule on good faith laid down in Article 526 of the Civil
Code shall be applied in determining whether a builder, sower or planter had acted in good faith. 12

Article 448 does not apply to a case where the owner of the land is the builder, sower, or planter who
then later loses ownership of the land by sale or donation. This Court said so in Coleongco
vs. Regalado: 13

Article 361 of the old Civil Code is not applicable in this case, for Regalado constructed the house on his
own land before he sold said land to Coleongco. Article 361 applies only in cases where a person
constructs a building on the land of another in good or in bad faith, as the case may be. It does not apply
to a case where a person constructs a building on his own land, for then there can be no question as to
good or bad faith on the part of the builder.

Elsewise stated, where the true owner himself is the builder of works on his own land, the issue of good
faith or bad faith is entirely irrelevant.

Thus in strict point of law, Article 448 is not apposite to the case at bar. Nevertheless, we believe that the
provision therein on indemnity may be applied by analogy considering that the primary intent of Article
448 is to avoid a state of forced co-ownership and that the parties, including the two courts below, in the
main agree that Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code are applicable and indemnity for the
improvements may be paid although they differ as to the basis of the indemnity.

Article 546 does not specifically state how the value of the useful improvements should be determined.
The respondent court and the private respondents espouse the belief that the cost of construction of the
apartment building in 1965, and not its current market value, is sufficient reimbursement for necessary
and useful improvements made by the petitioner. This position is, however, not in consonance with
previous rulings of this Court in similar cases. In Javier vs. Concepcion, Jr., 14 this Court pegged the value
of the useful improvements consisting of various fruits, bamboos, a house and camarin made of strong
material based on the market value of the said improvements. In Sarmiento vs. Agana, 15 despite the
finding that the useful improvement, a residential house, was built in 1967 at a cost of between eight
thousand pesos (P8,000.00) to ten thousand pesos(P10,000.00), the landowner was ordered to
reimburse the builder in the amount of forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00), the value of the house at the
time of the trial. In the same way, the landowner was required to pay the "present value" of the house, a
useful improvement, in the case of De Guzman vs. De la Fuente, 16 cited by the petitioner.

The objective of Article 546 of the Civil Code is to administer justice between the parties involved. In this
regard, this Court had long ago stated in Rivera vs. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila 17 that the said
provision was formulated in trying to adjust the rights of the owner and possessor in good faith of a
piece of land, to administer complete justice to both of them in such a way as neither one nor the other
may enrich himself of that which does not belong to him. Guided by this precept, it is therefore the
current market value of the improvements which should be made the basis of reimbursement. A
contrary ruling would unjustly enrich the private respondents who would otherwise be allowed to
acquire a highly valued income-yielding four-unit apartment building for a measly amount.
Consequently, the parties should therefore be allowed to adduce evidence on the present market value
of the apartment building upon which the trial court should base its finding as to the amount of
reimbursement to be paid by the landowner.

The trial court also erred in ordering the petitioner to pay monthly rentals equal to the aggregate rentals
paid by the lessees of the apartment building. Since the private respondents have opted to appropriate
the apartment building, the petitioner is thus entitled to the possession and enjoyment of the
apartment building, until he is paid the proper indemnity, as well as of the portion of the lot where the
building has been constructed. This is so because the right to retain the improvements while the
corresponding indemnity is not paid implies the tenancy or possession in fact of the land on which it is
built, planted or sown. 18 The petitioner not having been so paid, he was entitled to retain ownership of
the building and, necessarily, the income therefrom.

It follows, too, that the Court of Appeals erred not only in upholding the trial court's determination of
the indemnity, but also in ordering the petitioner to account for the rentals of the apartment building
from 23 June 1993 to 23 September 1993.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 32679 and the Order of 15
November 1993 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 101, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-41470 are
hereby SET ASIDE.

The case is hereby remanded to the trial court for it to determine the current market value of the
apartment building on the lot. For this purpose, the parties shall be allowed to adduce evidence on the
current market value of the apartment building. The value so determined shall be forthwith paid by the
private respondents to the petitioner otherwise the petitioner shall be restored to the possession of the
apartment building until payment of the required indemnity.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Bellosillo and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

Quiason, J., is on leave.

G.R. No. 172547 June 30, 2009

PRECY BUNYI and MILA BUNYI, Petitioners,

vs.
FE S. FACTOR, Respondent.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

For review on certiorari are the Decision1 dated January 16, 2006 and Resolution 2 dated April 26, 2006 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 90397, which had affirmed the Decision 3 dated March 7, 2005 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City, Branch 198 in Civil Case No. LP-04-0160.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Respondent Fe S. Factor is one of the co-owners of an 18-hectare piece of land located in Almanza, Las
Piñas City. The ownership of the land originated from respondent’s paternal grandparents Constantino
Factor and Maura Mayuga-Factor who had been in actual, continuous, peaceful, public, adverse and
exclusive possession and occupation of the land even before 1906. 4

On December 9, 1975, the children of Constantino Factor and Maura Mayuga-Factor filed a Petition for
Original Registration and Confirmation of Imperfect Title to the said parcel of land, or Lots 1, 2, 3 and 4
of Psu-253567, before the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 71. 5 On December 8, 1994, the trial court granted the
petition in LRC Case No. N-9049 and declared the children of Constantino Factor and Maura Mayuga-
Factor as co-owners of the property. 6 The children of Constantino Factor and Maura Mayuga-Factor
thereafter sold seven (7) hectares of the Factor family property during the same year. The siblings,
except Enrique Factor, respondent’s father, shared and divided the proceeds of the sale among
themselves, with the agreement that Enrique would have as his share the portion of the property
located in Antioch Street, Pilar Executive Village, Almanza I, Las Piñas City, known as the Factor
compound.

Following his acquisition thereof, Enrique caused the construction of several houses in the compound
including the subject property, a rest house, where members of the Factor family stayed during get-
togethers and visits.7Petitioners Precy Bunyi and her mother, Mila Bunyi, were tenants in one of the
houses inside the compound, particularly in No. 8 Antioch St., Pilar Village, Almanza, Las Piñas City since
1999.8

When Enrique Factor died on August 7, 1993, the administration of the Factor compound including the
subject rest house and other residential houses for lease was transferred and entrusted to Enrique’s
eldest child, Gloria Factor-Labao.
Gloria Factor-Labao, together with her husband Ruben Labao and their son Reggie F. Labao, lived in
Tipaz, Taguig, Metro Manila but visited and sometimes stayed in the rest house because Gloria collected
the rentals of the residential houses and oversaw the Factor compound. When Gloria died on January
15, 2001, the administration and management of the Factor compound including the subject rest house,
passed on to respondent Fe S. Factor as co-owner of the property. As an act of goodwill and compassion,
considering that Ruben Labao was sickly and had no means of income, respondent allowed him to stay
at the rest house for brief, transient and intermittent visits as a guest of the Factor family.

On May 31, 2002, Ruben Labao married petitioner Precy Bunyi. On November 10, 2002, Ruben Labao
died.

At about this time, respondent discovered that petitioners forcibly opened the doors of the rest house
and stole all the personal properties owned by the Factor family and then audaciously occupied the
premises. Respondent alleged that petitioners unlawfully deprived her and the Factor family of the
subject property’s lawful use and possession. Respondent also added that when she tried to enter the
rest house on December 1, 2002, an unidentified person who claimed to have been authorized by
petitioners to occupy the premises, barred, threatened and chased her with a jungle bolo. Thus, on
September 12, 2003, respondent Fe S. Factor filed a complaint 9 for forcible entry against herein
petitioners Precy Bunyi and Mila Bunyi.

Petitioners, for their part, questioned Fe’s claim of ownership of the subject property and the alleged
prior ownership of her father Enrique Factor. They asserted that the subject property was owned by
Ruben Labao, and that petitioner Precy with her husband moved into the subject property, while
petitioner Mila Bunyi, mother of Precy, remained in No. 8 Antioch St.

On July 13, 2004, the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Las Piñas City, Branch 79 ruled in favor of Fe S.
Factor. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants ordering
the latter and all persons claiming rights under them to:

1. To immediately vacate the subject premises and surrender possession thereof to the plaintiff.

2. To pay the monthly rental of ₱2,000.00 from December 1, 2002 up to the time they finally vacate the
premises.

3. To pay attorney’s fee of Php 10,000.00.

The counter-claim is dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.10

Petitioners appealed the decision to the RTC of Las Piñas City, Branch 198, which, however, affirmed in
toto the decision of the MeTC and later denied their motion for reconsideration. 11 Undaunted,
petitioners filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals but it was denied also. Hence, the
instant petition before us.

Petitioners submit the following issues for the Court’s consideration:

I.
[WHETHER] THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE
WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT THAT FORCE, THREAT, INTIMIDATION
AND STEALTH HAD BEEN COMMITTED BY THE PETITIONERS IN OCCUPYING THE SUBJECT RESIDENTIAL
HOUSE;

II.

[WHETHER] THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT MISAPPRECIATED THE
FACT THAT THE RESPONDENT HAS A BETTER RIGHT OF PHYSICAL AND MATERIAL POSSESSION OF THE
SUBJECT PROPERTY;

III.

[WHETHER] THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDING OF THE
REGIONAL [TRIAL] COURT HOLDING PETITIONERS LIABLE TO PAY THE MONTHLY RENTAL OF ₱2,000.00
FROM DECEMBER 1, 2002 UP TO THE TIME THEY FINALLY VACATE PREMISES. 12

The resolution of the first issue raised by petitioners requires us to inquire into the sufficiency of the
evidence presented below, a course of action which this Court will not do, consistent with our repeated
holding that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. 13 The resolution of factual issues is the function of
lower courts, whose findings on these matters are received with respect and considered binding by the
Supreme Court subject only to certain exceptions, none of which is present in the instant
petition.14 Noteworthy, in this case, the cited findings of the RTC have been affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.

As to the second issue, the resolution thereof boils down to a determination of who, between
petitioners and respondent, would be entitled to the physical possession of the subject property.

Both parties anchor their right of material possession of the disputed property on their respective claims
of ownership. Petitioners insist that petitioner Precy has a better right of possession over the subject
property since she inherited the subject property as the surviving spouse and sole heir of Ruben Labao,
who owned the property before his death.

Respondent, on the other hand, hinges her claim of possession on the fact that her predecessor-in-
interest had prior possession of the property as early as 1975.

After careful consideration, we find in favor of the respondent.

In ejectment cases, the only issue for resolution is who is entitled to the physical or material possession
of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership set forth by any of the party-litigants.
The one who can prove prior possession de facto may recover such possession even from the owner
himself.15 Possession de facto is the physical possession of real property. Possession de facto and not
possession de jure is the only issue in a forcible entry case. 16 This rule holds true regardless of the
character of a party’s possession, provided, that he has in his favor priority of time which entitles him to
stay on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by either accion
publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. 17

Petitioners argue that respondent was never in possession of the subject property since the latter never
occupied the same. They claim that they have been in actual possession of the disputed property from
the time petitioner Precy married Ruben Labao in 2002.
In this instance, however, petitioners’ contention is unconvincing.

For one to be considered in possession, one need not have actual or physical occupation of every square
inch of the property at all times.18 Possession can be acquired not only by material occupation, but also
by the fact that a thing is subject to the action of one’s will or by the proper acts and legal formalities
established for acquiring such right. 19 Possession can be acquired by juridical acts. These are acts to
which the law gives the force of acts of possession. Examples of these are donations, succession,
execution and registration of public instruments, and the inscription of possessory information titles. 20

While petitioners claim that respondent never physically occupied the subject property, they failed to
prove that they had prior possession of the subject property. On record, petitioner Precy Bunyi admitted
that Gloria Factor-Labao and Ruben Labao, as spouses, resided in Tipaz, Taguig, Metro Manila and used
the subject property whenever they visit the same. 21 Likewise, as pointed out by the MeTC and the RTC,
Ruben and petitioner Precy’s marriage certificate revealed that at the time of their marriage, Ruben was
residing at 123 A. Lake St., San Juan, Metro Manila. Even Ruben’s death certificate showed that his place
of death and residence was at #4 Labao St., Tipaz, Taguig, Metro Manila. Considering that her husband
was never a resident of the subject property, petitioner Precy failed to explain convincingly how she was
able to move in with Ruben Labao in the subject property during their marriage.

On the other hand, it was established that respondent’s grandparents, Constantino Factor and Maura
Mayuga-Factor, had been the occupants and in possession of various agricultural parcel of lands situated
in Almanza, Las Piñas City, in the concept of owners, for more than thirty years prior to 1975. In fact, the
RTC in its Decision dated December 8, 1994 in LRC Case No. N-9049 has confirmed the rights of
respondent’s predecessors over the subject property and ordered the issuance of the corresponding
certificate of title in their favor. 22

The right of respondent’s predecessors over the subject property is more than sufficient to uphold
respondent’s right to possession over the same. Respondent’s right to the property was vested in her
along with her siblings from the moment of their father’s death. 23 As heir, respondent had the right to
the possession of the property, which is one of the attributes of ownership. Such rights are enforced and
protected from encroachments made or attempted before the judicial declaration since respondent
acquired hereditary rights even before judicial declaration in testate or intestate proceedings. 24

After the death of Enrique Factor, it was his eldest child, Gloria Factor-Labao who took over the
administration of the subject property. And as a consequence of co-ownership, 25 soon after the death of
Gloria, respondent, as one of the surviving co-owners, may be subrogated to the rights of the deceased
co-owner, which includes the right to the administration and management of the subject property.

As found by the Court of Appeals, petitioners’ unsupported claim of possession must yield to that of the
respondent who traces her possession of the subject property to her predecessors-in-interest who have
always been in possession of the subject property. Even assuming that respondent was never a resident
of the subject property, she could legally continue possessing the property. Visiting the property on
weekends and holidays is evidence of actual or physical possession. 26 The fact of her residence
somewhere else, by itself, does not result in loss of possession of the subject property. The law does not
require one in possession of a house to reside in the house to maintain his possession. 27 For, again,
possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter
of the ground before he is deemed in possession. 28 There is no cogent reason to deviate from this
doctrine.

All things considered, this Court finds that respondent Fe S. Factor successfully proved the extent and
character of her possession over the disputed property. As a consequence of her ownership thereof,
respondent is entitled to its possession, considering petitioners’ failure to prove prior possession. The
Court stresses, however, that its determination of ownership in the instant case is not final. It is only a
provisional determination for the sole purpose of resolving the issue of possession. It would not bar or
prejudice a separate action between the same parties involving the quieting of title to the subject
property.29

As regards the means upon which the deprivation took effect, it is not necessary that the respondent
must demonstrate that the taking was done with force, intimidation threat, strategy or stealth. The
Supreme Court, in Bañes v. Lutheran Church in the Philippines, 30 explained:

In order to constitute force that would justify a forcible entry case, the trespasser does not have to
institute a state of war. The act of going to the property and excluding the lawful possessor therefrom
necessarily implies the exertion of force over the property which is all that is necessary and sufficient to
show that the action is based on the provisions of Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. 31

As expressly stated in David v. Cordova: 32

The words ‘by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth’ include every situation or condition under
which one person can wrongfully enter upon real property and exclude another, who has had prior
possession therefrom. If a trespasser enters upon land in open daylight, under the very eyes of the
person already clothed with lawful possession, but without the consent of the latter, and there plants
himself and excludes such prior possessor from the property, the action of forcible entry and detainer
can unquestionably be maintained, even though no force is used by the trespasser other than such as is
necessarily implied from the mere acts of planting himself on the ground and excluding the other party. 33

Respondent, as co-owner, has the control of the subject property even if she does not stay in it. So when
petitioners entered said property without the consent and permission of the respondent and the other
co-owners, the latter were deprived of its possession. Moreover, the presence of an unidentified man
forbidding respondent from entering the subject property constitutes force contemplated by Section
1,34 Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.1avvphi1

As to the last issue, we have previously ruled that while the courts may fix the reasonable amount of
rent for the use and occupation of a disputed property, they could not simply rely on their own
appreciation of land values without considering any evidence. The reasonable amount of any rent could
not be determined by mere judicial notice but by supporting evidence. 35 In the instant case, we find no
evidence on record to support the MeTC’s award of rent.

On the matter of attorney’s fees awarded to the respondent, we are in agreement to delete it. It is a
well-settled rule that where attorney’s fees are granted, the court must explicitly state in the body of the
decision, and not only in the dispositive portion thereof, the legal reason for the award. 36 Again, nothing
in the body of both decisions of RTC and MeTC explicitly stated the reasons for the award of attorney’s
fees.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The challenged Decision dated January 16, 2006 and
Resolution dated April 26, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 90397 are AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION that the award of rentals and attorney’s fees are DELETED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 150666 August 3, 2010

LUCIANO BRIONES and NELLY BRIONES, Petitioners,

vs.
JOSE MACABAGDAL, FE D. MACABAGDAL and VERGON REALTY INVESTMENTS
CORPORATION,Respondents.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

On appeal under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, is the Decision1 dated
December 11, 2000 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 48109 which affirmed the September
29, 1993 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 135, ordering petitioners
Luciano and Nelly Briones to remove the improvements they have made on the disputed property or to
pay respondent-spouses Jose and Fe Macabagdal the prevailing price of the land as compensation.

The undisputed factual antecedents of the case are as follows:

Respondent-spouses purchased from Vergon Realty Investments Corporation (Vergon) Lot No. 2-R, a
325-square-meter land located in Vergonville Subdivision No. 10 at Las Piñas City, Metro Manila and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 62181 of the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City. On the other
hand, petitioners are the owners of Lot No. 2-S, which is adjacent to Lot No. 2-R.

Sometime in 1984, after obtaining the necessary building permit and the approval of Vergon, petitioners
constructed a house on Lot No. 2-R which they thought was Lot No. 2-S. After being informed of the mix
up by Vergon’s manager, respondent-spouses immediately demanded petitioners to demolish the house
and vacate the property. Petitioners, however, refused to heed their demand. Thus, respondent-spouses
filed an action to recover ownership and possession of the said parcel of land with the RTC of Makati
City.3

Petitioners insisted that the lot on which they constructed their house was the lot which was consistently
pointed to them as theirs by Vergon’s agents over the seven (7)-year period they were paying for the lot.
They interposed the defense of being buyers in good faith and impleaded Vergon as third-party
defendant claiming that because of the warranty against eviction, they were entitled to indemnity from
Vergon in case the suit is decided against them. 4

The RTC ruled in favor of respondent-spouses and found that petitioners’ house was undoubtedly built
on Lot No. 2-R. The dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision reads as follows:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, let judgment be rendered declaring, to wit:

1. That plaintiffs are the owners of Lot No. 2-R of subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-147392 at Vergonville
Subdivision, No. 10, Las Piñas, Metro Manila covered by TCT No. 62181 of the Registry of Deeds of Pasay
City on which defendants have constructed their house;

2. Defendants, jointly and severally, are ordered to demolish their house and vacate the premises and
return the possession of the portion of Lot No. 2-R as above-described to plaintiffs within thirty (30) days
from receipt of this decision, or in the alternative, plaintiffs should be compensated by defendants,
jointly and severally, by the payment of the prevailing price of the lot involved as Lot No. 2-R with an
area of 325 square meters which should not be less than ₱1,500.00 per square meter, in consideration of
the fact that prices of real estate properties in the area concerned have increased rapidly;

3. Defendants, jointly and severally, pay to plaintiffs for moral damages with plaintiffs’ plans and dreams
of building their own house on their own lot being severely shattered and frustrated due to defendants’
incursion as interlopers of Lot No. 2-R in the sum of ₱50,000.00;

4. Defendants, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiffs in the amount of ₱30,000.00 as attorney’s fees; and,

5. to pay the costs of the proceedings.

Defendants’ counterclaim against plaintiffs is dismissed for lack of merit and with no cause of action.

Defendants’ third-party complaint against third-party defendant Vergonville Realty and Investments
Corporation is likewise ordered dismissed for lack of cause of action and evidently without merit.

On the other hand, defendants, jointly and severally, are liable for the litigation expenses incurred by
Vergonville Realty by way of counterclaim, which is also proven by the latter with a mere preponderance
of evidence, and are hereby ordered to pay the sum of ₱20,000.00 as compensatory damage; and
attorney’s fees in the sum of ₱10,000.00

SO ORDERED.5

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s finding that the lot upon which petitioners built their house was
not the one (1) which Vergon sold to them. Based on the documentary evidence, such as the titles of the
two (2) lots, the contracts to sell, and the survey report made by the geodetic engineer, petitioners’
house was built on the lot of the respondent-spouses. 6 There was no basis to presume that the error was
Vergon’s fault. Also the warranty against eviction under Article 1548 of the Civil Code was not applicable
as there was no deprivation of property: the lot on which petitioners built their house was not the lot
sold to them by Vergon, which remained vacant and ready for occupation. 7 The CA further ruled that
petitioners cannot use the defense of allegedly being a purchaser in good faith for wrongful occupation
of land.8

Aggrieved, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the appellate
court.9 Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

Petitioners raise the following assignment of errors:

I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE CONTRARY TO LAW AND APPLICABLE
DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT ORDERING
PETITIONERS TO DEMOLISH THEIR ONLY HOUSE AND VACATE THE LOT AND TO PAY MORAL AND
COMPENSATORY DAMAGES AS WELL AS ATTORNEY’S FEE IN THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF PS[₱] 110,000; AND

II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS SANCTIONED THE DEPARTURE OF THE LOWER COURT FROM THE ACCEPTED
AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS AS TO CALL FOR AN EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF
SUPERVISION.10

In the main, it is petitioners’ position that they must not bear the damage alone. Petitioners insist that
they relied with full faith and confidence in the reputation of Vergon’s agents when they pointed the
wrong property to them. Even the President of Vergon, Felix Gonzales, consented to the construction of
the house when he signed the building permit. 11 Also, petitioners are builders in good faith.12

The petition is partly meritorious.

At the outset, we note that petitioners raise factual issues, which are beyond the scope of a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules. Well settled is the rule that the jurisdiction of this Court
in cases brought to it from the CA via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is limited to the
review of errors of law. The Court is not bound to weigh all over again the evidence adduced by the
parties, particularly where the findings of both the trial court and the appellate court coincide. The
resolution of factual issues is a function of the trial court whose findings on these matters are, as a
general rule, binding on this Court, more so where these have been affirmed by the CA. 13 We note that
the CA and RTC did not overlook or fail to appreciate any material circumstance which, when properly
considered, would have altered the result of the case. Indeed, it is beyond cavil that petitioners
mistakenly constructed their house on Lot No. 2-R which they thought was Lot No. 2-S.

However, the conclusiveness of the factual findings notwithstanding, we find that the trial court
nonetheless erred in outrightly ordering petitioners to vacate the subject property or to pay respondent
spouses the prevailing price of the land as compensation. Article 527 14 of the Civil Code presumes good
faith, and since no proof exists to show that the mistake was done by petitioners in bad faith, the latter
should be presumed to have built the house in good faith.

When a person builds in good faith on the land of another, Article 448 of the Civil Code governs. Said
article provides,

ART. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall
have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity
provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the
land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy
the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay
reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after
proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the
court shall fix the terms thereof. (Emphasis ours.)

The above-cited article covers cases in which the builders, sowers or planters believe themselves to be
owners of the land or, at least, to have a claim of title thereto. 15 The builder in good faith can compel the
landowner to make a choice between appropriating the building by paying the proper indemnity or
obliging the builder to pay the price of the land. The choice belongs to the owner of the land, a rule that
accords with the principle of accession, i.e., that the accessory follows the principal and not the other
way around. However, even as the option lies with the landowner, the grant to him, nevertheless, is
preclusive. He must choose one.16 He cannot, for instance, compel the owner of the building to remove
the building from the land without first exercising either option. It is only if the owner chooses to sell his
land, and the builder or planter fails to purchase it where its value is not more than the value of the
improvements, that the owner may remove the improvements from the land. The owner is entitled to
such remotion only when, after having chosen to sell his land, the other party fails to pay for the same. 17

Moreover, petitioners have the right to be indemnified for the necessary and useful expenses they may
have made on the subject property. Articles 546 and 548 of the Civil Code provide,

ART. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the possessor in good faith
may retain the thing until he has been reimbursed therefor.

Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith with the same right of retention,
the person who has defeated him in the possession having the option of refunding the amount of the
expenses or of paying the increase in value which the thing may have acquired by reason thereof.

ART. 548. Expenses for pure luxury or mere pleasure shall not be refunded to the possessor in good faith;
but he may remove the ornaments with which he has embellished the principal thing if it suffers no
injury thereby, and if his successor in the possession does not prefer to refund the amount expended.

Consequently, the respondent-spouses have the option to appropriate the house on the subject land
after payment to petitioners of the appropriate indemnity or to oblige petitioners to pay the price of the
land, unless its value is considerably more than the value of the structures, in which case petitioners
shall pay reasonable rent.

In accordance with Depra v. Dumlao, 18 this case must be remanded to the RTC which shall conduct the
appropriate proceedings to assess the respective values of the improvement and of the land, as well as
the amounts of reasonable rentals and indemnity, fix the terms of the lease if the parties so agree, and
to determine other matters necessary for the proper application of Article 448, in relation to Articles 546
and 548, of the Civil Code.

As to the liability of Vergon, petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to show negligence on
Vergon’s part. Petitioners’ claim is obviously one (1) for tort, governed by Article 2176 of the Civil Code,
which provides:

ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no preexisting contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
(Emphasis ours.)

Under this provision, it is the plaintiff who has to prove by a preponderance of evidence: (1) the
damages suffered by the plaintiff; (2) the fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person for
whose act he must respond; and (3) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence
and the damages incurred.19 This the petitioners failed to do. The President of Vergon signed the building
permit as a precondition for its approval by the local government, but it did not guarantee that
petitioners were constructing the structure within the metes and bounds of petitioners’ lot. The
signature of the President of Vergon on the building permit merely proved that petitioners were
authorized to make constructions within the subdivision project of Vergon. And while petitioners acted
in good faith in building their house on Lot No. 2-R, petitioners did not show by what authority the
agents or employees of Vergon were acting when they pointed to the lot where the construction was
made nor was petitioners’ claim on this matter corroborated by sufficient evidence.

One (1) last note on the award of damages. Considering that petitioners acted in good faith in building
their house on the subject property of the respondent-spouses, there is no basis for the award of moral
damages to respondent-spouses. Likewise, the Court deletes the award to Vergon of compensatory
damages and attorney’s fees for the litigation expenses Vergon had incurred as such amounts were not
specifically prayed for in its Answer to petitioners’ third-party complaint. Under Article 2208 20 of the Civil
Code, attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation are recoverable only in the concept of actual damages,
not as moral damages nor judicial costs. Hence, such must be specifically prayed for—as was not done in
this case—and may not be deemed incorporated within a general prayer for "such other relief and
remedy as this court may deem just and equitable." 21 It must also be noted that aside from the
following, the body of the trial court’s decision was devoid of any statement regarding attorney’s fees.
In Scott Consultants & Resource Development Corporation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 22 we reiterated that
attorney’s fees are not to be awarded every time a party wins a suit. The power of the court to award
attorney’s fees under Article 2208 of the Civil Code demands factual, legal, and equitable justification; its
basis cannot be left to speculation or conjecture. Where granted, the court must explicitly state in the
body of the decision, and not only in the dispositive portion thereof, the legal reason for the award of
attorney’s fees.1avvphi1

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated December 11, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 48109 is
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The award of moral damages in favor of respondent-spouses Jose and
Fe Macabagdal and the award of compensatory damages and attorney’s fees to respondent Vergon
Realty Investments Corporation are DELETED. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 135, for further proceedings consistent with the proper application of Articles 448,
546 and 548 of the Civil Code, as follows:

1. The trial court shall determine:

a. the present fair price of the respondent-spouses’ lot;

b. the amount of the expenses spent by petitioners for the building of their house;

c. the increase in value ("plus value") which the said lot may have acquired by reason thereof; and

d. whether the value of said land is considerably more than that of the house built thereon.

2. After said amounts shall have been determined by competent evidence, the Regional Trial Court shall
render judgment, as follows:

a. The trial court shall grant the respondent-spouses a period of fifteen (15) days within which to exercise
their option under Article 448 of the Civil Code, whether to appropriate the house as their own by paying
to petitioners either the amount of the expenses spent by petitioners for the building of the house, or
the increase in value ("plus value") which the said lot may have acquired by reason thereof, or to oblige
petitioners to pay the price of said land. The amounts to be respectively paid by the respondent-spouses
and petitioners, in accordance with the option thus exercised by written notice of the other party and to
the Court, shall be paid by the obligor within fifteen (15) days from such notice of the option by
tendering the amount to the Court in favor of the party entitled to receive it;

b. The trial court shall further order that if the respondent-spouses exercises the option to oblige
petitioners to pay the price of the land but the latter rejects such purchase because, as found by the trial
court, the value of the land is considerably more than that of the house, petitioners shall give written
notice of such rejection to the respondent-spouses and to the Court within fifteen (15) days from notice
of the respondent-spouses’ option to sell the land. In that event, the parties shall be given a period of
fifteen (15) days from such notice of rejection within which to agree upon the terms of the lease, and
give the Court formal written notice of such agreement and its provisos. If no agreement is reached by
the parties, the trial court, within fifteen (15) days from and after the termination of the said period fixed
for negotiation, shall then fix the terms of the lease, payable within the first five (5) days of each
calendar month. The period for the forced lease shall not be more than two (2) years, counted from the
finality of the judgment, considering the long period of time since petitioners have occupied the subject
area. The rental thus fixed shall be increased by ten percent (10%) for the second year of the forced
lease. Petitioners shall not make any further constructions or improvements on the house. Upon
expiration of the two (2)-year period, or upon default by petitioners in the payment of rentals for two (2)
consecutive months, the respondent-spouses shall be entitled to terminate the forced lease, to recover
their land, and to have the house removed by petitioners or at the latter’s expense. The rentals herein
provided shall be tendered by petitioners to the Court for payment to the respondent-spouses, and such
tender shall constitute evidence of whether or not compliance was made within the period fixed by the
Court.

c. In any event, petitioners shall pay the respondent-spouses reasonable compensation for the
occupancy of the respondent-spouses’ land for the period counted from the year petitioners occupied
the subject area, up to the commencement date of the forced lease referred to in the preceding
paragraph;

d. The periods to be fixed by the trial court in its Decision shall be inextendible, and upon failure of the
party obliged to tender to the trial court the amount due to the obligee, the party entitled to such
payment shall be entitled to an order of execution for the enforcement of payment of the amount due
and for compliance with such other acts as may be required by the prestation due the obligee.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 174191 January 30, 2013

NENITA QUALITY FOODS CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
CRISOSTOMO GALABO, ADELAIDA GALABO, and ZENAIDA GALABO-ALMACBAR, Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari 1 of petitioner Nenita Quality Foods Corporation (NQFC)
to nullity the February 22, 2006 Decision 2 and the July 13, 2006 resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. SP No. 77006. The CA reversed the decision 4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City,
Branch 17, which affirmed in toto the decision 5 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Davao City,
Branch 5, in Civil Case No. 10,958-E-01. The MTCC dismissed the complaint for forcible entry and
damages, which respondents Crisostomo Galabo, Adelaida Galabo, and Zenaida Galabo-Almachar filed
against NQFC.

The Factual Antecedents

The dispute in the case relates to the possession of a parcel of land described as Lot No. 102, PSD-40060,
the former Arakaki Plantation in Marapangi, Toril, Davao City with an area of six thousand seventy-four
square meters (6,074 sq. m.).

As the CA summarized in the assailed decision, the respondents are the heirs of Donato Galabo. In 1948,
Donato obtained Lot No. 722, Cad-102, a portion of the Arakaki Plantation in Marapangi, Toril, Davao
City, owned by National Abaca and Other Fibers Corporation. Donato and the respondents assumed that
Lot No. 722 included Lot No. 102, per the original survey of 1916 to 1920.

When the Board of Liquidators (BOL) took over the administration of the Arakaki Plantation in the 1950s,
it had Lot No. 722 resurveyed. Allegedly, the resurvey did not include Lot No. 102; thus, when Donato
acquired Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-21496 6 for Lot No. 722 on April 26, 1953, Lot No. 102 was not
included. The respondents, however, continue to posses, occupy and cultivate Lot No. 102.

When NQFC opened its business in Marapangi, Toril, Davao City in the late 1950s, it allegedly offered to
buy Lot No. 102. Donato declined and to ward off further offers, put up "Not For Sale" and "No
Trespassing" signs on the property. In the 1970s, Crisostomo fenced off the entire perimeter of Lot No.
102 and built his house on it.

On August 19, 1994, the respondents received a letter from Santos Nantin demanding that they vacate
Lot No. 102. Santos claimed ownership of this lot per the Deed of Transfer of Rights (Deed of
Transfer)7 dated July 10, 1972, which the respondents and their mother allegedly executed in Santos’
favor. The respondents denied this claim and maintained that they had been occupying Lot No. 102,
which the BOL itself recognized per its letters 8 and the Certification9 dated April 12, 2000 confirming
Donato as the long-time occupant and awardee of the property. To perfect their title, the respondents
applied for free patent over Lot No. 102 on September 6, 2000.

On January 3, 2001 and again on a later date, NQFC’s workers, with armed policemen of Toril, Davao City,
entered by force Lot No. 102 to fence it. The respondents reported the entry to the authorities. On April
16, 2001, Crisostomo received a letter from NQFC’s counsel demanding that he remove his house from
Lot No. 102. NQFC subsequently removed the existing fence and cut down various trees that the
respondents had planted on the property.

NQFC, for its part, claimed that Santos immediately occupied and possessed Lot No. 102 after he
purchased it from the respondents in 1972 and declared it under his name for taxation purposes. Santos
was also granted Free Patent over the property by the Bureau of Lands, and obtained Original Certificate
of Title No. (OCT) P-403510 on June 18, 1974. On December 29, 2000, the heirs of Santos conveyed Lot
No. 102 to NQFC via the Deed of Absolute Sale 11of even date. NQFC then filed a petition for cancellation
of the respondents’ patent application over Lot No. 102, which the BOL-Manila granted on April 19,
2001, on the ground that Donato failed to perfect his title over Lot No. 102 which has long been titled in
Santos’ name.

When conciliation failed, the respondents filed on September 17, 2001 a complaint 12 for forcible entry
with damages before the MTCC against NQFC, alleging that: (1) they had been in prior physical
possession of Lot No. 102; and (2) NQFC deprived them of possession through force, intimidation,
strategy, threats and stealth.

The Ruling of the MTCC

Relying on the ruling of the BOL-Manila, the MTCC dismissed the respondents’ complaint, 13 explaining
that the questions raised before it required technical determination by the administrative agency with
the expertise to determine such matters, which the BOL-Manila did in this case. 14

The MTCC held that the pieces of evidence NQFC presented – the Deed of Transfer the respondents
executed in Santos’ favor, Santos’ OCT P-4035 over Lot No. 102, the Deed of Absolute Sale in NQFC’s
favor, and the findings of the BOL-Manila – established NQFC’s rightful possession over the property. It
further held that: (1) the respondents relinquished their rights over Lot No. 102 when they executed the
Deed of Transfer in Santos’ favor; (2) the certificate of title over Lot No. 102 in Santos’ name shows that
he was in actual physical possession since actual occupation is required before an application for free
patent can be approved; and (3) NQFC validly acquired ownership over Lot No. 102 when it purchased it
from Santos, entitling it to the right, among others, to possess the property as ancillary to such
ownership.

The Ruling of the RTC

The respondents appealed the MTCC decision to the RTC but the latter court denied the appeal. 15 As the
MTCC did, the RTC relied on the findings of the BOL-Manila. It held that: (1) the respondents failed to
perfect whatever right they might have had over Lot No. 102; and (2) they are estopped from asserting
any right over Lot No. 102 since they have long transferred the property and their right thereto, to
Santos in 1972.

In resolving the issue of possession of Lot No. 102, the RTC also resolved the question of ownership, as
justified under the Rules, explaining that the NQFC’s possession of Lot No. 102 was anchored on a Deed
of Absolute Sale, while that of the respondents was based merely on the allegation of possession and
occupation by Donato, and not on any title.16

Thus, the question of concurrent possession of Lot No. 102 between NQFC and the respondents should
tilt in NQFC’s favor.

When the RTC denied the respondents’ motion for reconsideration in an order 17 dated March 5, 2003,
the respondents elevated their case to the CA via a petition for review. 18

The Ruling of the CA

The respondents claimed before the CA that the RTC erred when it held that NQFC had prior possession
of Lot No. 102, based solely on its Deed of Absolute Sale. They argued, among others, that: (1) Santos
should have taken the necessary steps to oust the respondents had he been in possession of Lot No. 102
beginning 1972; (2) Santos could not have validly obtained title over Lot No. 102 since it was still in the
name of the Republic of the Philippines (Republic) as of 1980; 19 and (3) NQFC no longer had to forcibly
evict the respondents in January 2001 if it had been in possession of Lot No. 102 after it bought this land
from Santos in 2000.

The CA found reversible error in the RTC’s decision; thus, it granted the respondents’ petition and
ordered NQFC to vacate Lot No. 102. The CA explained that a plaintiff, in a forcible entry case, only has to
prove prior material and physical possession of the property in litigation and undue deprivation of it by
means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. These, the respondents averred in the complaint
and sufficiently proved, thus entitling them to recover possession of Lot No. 102. Relying on the doctrine
of presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, the CA especially took note of the letters
and the Certification which the BOL sent to the respondents acknowledging Donato as the awardee of
Lot No. 102 and the respondents as the actual occupants and possessors.

In brushing aside the RTC’s findings, the CA ruled that: (1) Donato’s failure to perfect his title over Lot No.
102 should not weigh against the respondents as the issue in a forcible entry case is one of possession
de facto and not of possession de jure; and (2) NQFC’s ownership of Lot No. 102 is beside the point as
ownership is beyond the purview of an ejectment case. The title or right of possession, it stressed, is
never an issue in a forcible entry suit. The CA, however, denied the respondents’ prayer for moral
damages and attorney’s fees, and rejected the other issues raised for being irrelevant.

In its July 13, 2006 resolution,20 the CA denied NQFC’s motion for reconsideration, prompting the NQFC’s
present recourse.

The Petition

NQFC argues that the CA erred in holding that the respondents had prior physical possession of Lot No.
102.21 It claims that, first, in reversing the RTC findings, the CA relied solely on the letters and the
Certification of the BOL,22which has been controverted by the following pieces of evidence, among
others: (1) the Deed of Transfer that the respondents executed in favor of Santos; (2) the order of the
Bureau of Lands approving Santos’ patent application; (3) Santos’ OCT P-4035; and (4) the Deed of
Absolute Sale that Santos executed in favor of NQFC.

NQFC maintains that the Bureau of Lands would not have granted Santos’ free patent application had he
not been in possession of Lot No. 102 because continued occupation and cultivation, either by himself or
by his predecessor-in-interest, of the property is a requirement for such grant under the Public Land Act.
By the very definition of "occupy," Santos is therefore deemed to have possessed Lot No. 102 prior to
1974, the year his free patent application was granted, 23 and under the principle of tacking of
possession, he is deemed to have had possession of Lot No. 102 not only from 1972, when the
respondents transferred it to him, but also from the time Donato acquired the lot in 1948. Thus, Santos
had no reason to oust the respondents since he had been in possession of Lot No. 102 beginning 1972,
by virtue of the transfer. 24

Second, the respondents had no documents to prove that they were in actual occupation and cultivation
of Lot No. 102 – the reason they did not heed the BOL’s request to perfect their title over it. Finally, citing
jurisprudence,25NQFC argues that the RTC rightly ruled on the issue of its ownership over Lot No. 102 in
deciding the issue of prior physical possession as the Rules allow this, by way of exception. 26

The Case for Respondents

The respondents’ arguments closely adhere to the CA’s ruling. They argue that NQFC, rather than
meeting the issues, focused on its alleged ownership of Lot No. 102 and the possession flowing out of its
ownership. They deny ever meeting Santos and they maintain that their continued possession and
occupation of Lot No. 102 belie this supposed sale. Even granting that this sale occurred, Santos could
still not have acquired any right over Lot No. 102 for as of 1980, it was still in the name of the
Republic.27 Thus, they could not have transferred ownership of Lot No. 102 to Santos, and he cannot
claim ownership of Lot No. 102 by reason of this sale. 28

On the other hand, the respondents’ open, continuous, exclusive, notorious and adverse possession of
Lot No. 102 for three decades, coupled by a claim of ownership, gave them vested right or interest over
the property.29 This vested right is equivalent to an actually issued certificate of title so that the
execution and delivery of the title is a mere formality. To say the least, NQFC did not have to send them a
formal demand to vacate30 and violently oust them from the premises had it been in actual possession of
the property as claimed.31

Lastly, the respondents invoked the settled rule that the Court’s jurisdiction in a Rule 45 petition is
limited only to reviewing errors of law. NQFC failed to show misapprehension of facts in the CA’s findings
to justify a departure from this rule.32

The Court’s Ruling

We first address the procedural issue raised. Resolving the contentions raised necessarily requires us to
delve into factual issues, a course not proper in a petition for review on certiorari, for a Rule 45 petition
resolves only questions of law, not questions of fact. 33 This rule is read with the equally settled dictum
that factual findings of the CA are generally conclusive on the parties and are therefore not reviewable
by this Court.34 By way of exception, we resolve factual issues when, as here, conflict attended the
findings of the MTCC and of the RTC, on one hand, and of the CA, on the other. Of minor note, but which
we deem important to point, the petition needlessly impleaded the CA, in breach of Section 4, Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court.35

Substantively, the key issue this case presents is prior physical possession – whether NQFC had been in
prior physical possession of Lot No. 102.

We rule in the negative.

First, on the reliance on the BOL letters and Certification and the CA’s alleged disregard of NQFC’s
evidence. To prove prior physical possession of Lot No. 102, NQFC presented the Deed of Transfer,
Santos’ OCT P-4035, the Deed of Absolute Sale, and the Order of the Bureau of Lands approving Santos’
free patent application. In presenting these pieces of evidence, NQFC is apparently mistaken as it may
have equated possession that is at issue as an attribute of ownership to actual possession. The latter
type of possession is, however, different from and has different legal implications than the former. While
these documents may bear weight and are material in contests over ownership of Lot No. 102, they do
not per se show NQFC’s actual possession of this property.

We agree that ownership carries the right of possession, but the possession contemplated by the
concept of ownership is not exactly the same as the possession in issue in a forcible entry case.
Possession in forcible entry suits refers only to possession de facto, or actual or material possession, and
not possession flowing out of ownership; these are different legal concepts 36 for which the law provides
different remedies for recovery of possession.37 As we explained in Pajuyo v. Court of Appeals,38 and
again in the more recent cases of Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals, 39 De Grano v. Lacaba,40 and Lagazo v.
Soriano,41 the word "possession" in forcible entry suits refers to nothing more than prior physical
possession or possession de facto, not possession de jure 42 or legal possession in the sense
contemplated in civil law.43 Title is not the issue,44 and the absence of it "is not a ground for the courts to
withhold relief from the parties in an ejectment case." 45

Thus, in a forcible entry case, "a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even
against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his possession, if he has in his favor prior
possession in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until a person with a
better right lawfully ejects him."46He cannot be ejected by force, violence or terror -- not even by its
owners.47 For these reasons, an action for forcible entry is summary in nature aimed only at providing an
expeditious means of protecting actual possession. 48Ejectment suits are intended to "prevent breach of x
x x peace and criminal disorder and to compel the party out of possession to respect and resort to the
law alone to obtain what he claims is his."49 Thus, lest the purpose of these summary proceedings be
defeated, any discussion or issue of ownership is avoided unless it is necessary to resolve the issue of de
facto possession.

We agree with the respondents that instead of squarely addressing the issue of possession and
presenting evidence showing that NQFC or Santos had been in actual possession of Lot No. 102, the
former merely narrated how it acquired ownership of Lot No. 102 and presented documents to this
effect. Its allegation that Santos occupied Lot No. 102 in 1972 is uncorroborated. Even the tax
declarations under Santos’ name are hardly of weight; "tax declarations and realty tax payments are not
conclusive proof of possession. They are merely good indicia of possession in the concept of
owner"50 but not necessarily of the actual possession required in forcible entry cases.

Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides when an action for forcible entry, and unlawful detainer,
is proper:

SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. — Subject to the provisions of the next
succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation,
threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of
any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold
possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any
such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person may at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the
person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming
under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs. [emphasis ours;
italics supplied]

Under this provision, for a forcible entry suit to prosper, the plaintiff must allege and prove: (1) prior
physical possession of the property; and (2) unlawful deprivation of it by the defendant through force,
intimidation, strategy, threat or stealth. 51 As in any civil case, the burden of proof lies with the
complainants (the respondents in this case) who must establish their case by preponderance of
evidence. In the present case, the respondents sufficiently alleged and proved the required elements.
To support its position, NQFC invokes the principle of tacking of possession, that is, when it bought Lot
No. 102 from Santos on December 29, 2000, its possession is, by operation of law, tacked to that of
Santos and even earlier, or at the time Donato acquired Lot No. 102 in 1948.

NQFC’s reliance on this principle is misplaced. True, the law 52 allows a present possessor to tack his
possession to that of his predecessor-in-interest to be deemed in possession of the property for the
period required by law. Possession in this regard, however, pertains to possession de jure and the tacking
is made for the purpose of completing the time required for acquiring or losing ownership through
prescription. We reiterate – possession in forcible entry suits refers to nothing more than physical
possession, not legal possession.

The CA brushed aside NQFC’s argument on the respondents’ failure to perfect their title over Lot No.
102. It held that the issue in this case is not of possession de jure, let alone ownership or title, but of
possession de facto.1âwphi1 We agree with the CA; the discussions above are clear on this point.

We agree, too, as we have indicated in passing above, that the issue of ownership can be material and
relevant in resolving the issue of possession. The Rules in fact expressly allow this: Section 16, Rule 70 of
the Rules of Court53provides that the issue of ownership shall be resolved in deciding the issue of
possession if the question of possession is intertwined with the issue of ownership. But this provision is
only an exception and is allowed only in this limited instance-- to determine the issue of possession and
only if the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership. 54 Save for
this instance, evidence of ownership is not at all material, as in the present case. 55

As a final reiterative note, this Decision deals only with de facto possession and is without prejudice to
an appropriate action for recovery of possession based on ownership.

WHEREFORE, in light of these considerations, we hereby DENY the petition; the decision dated February
22, 2006 and the resolution dated July 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 77006 are
hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 147951 December 14, 2009

ARSENIO OLEGARIO and Heirs of ARISTOTELES F. OLEGARIO, represented by CARMELITA GUZMAN-

OLEGARIO, Petitioners,
vs.
PEDRO C. MARI, represented by LILIA C. MARI-CAMBA, Respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Possession, to constitute the foundation of acquisitive prescription, must be possession under a claim of
title or must be adverse. Acts of a possessory character performed by one who holds the property by
mere tolerance of the owner are clearly not in the concept of an owner and such possessory acts, no
matter how long continued, do not start the running of the period of prescription.

In the present Petition for Review on Certiorari,1 petitioners assail the April 18, 2001 Decision2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 52124, reversing the October 13, 1995 Decision 3 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Pangasinan, Branch 39. The CA declared the respondent herein as the owner of Lot
Nos. 17553, 17526 and 14356 of the Mangatarem cadastral survey.

Factual antecedents

As early as 1916,4 Juan Mari, the father of respondent, declared his ownership over a parcel of land in
Nancasalan, Mangatarem for tax purposes. He took possession of the same by delineating the limits with
a bamboo fence,5planting various fruit bearing trees and bamboos 6 and constructing a house
thereon.7 After a survey made in 1950, Tax Declaration No. 8048 8 for the year 1951 specified the subject
realty as a residential land with an area of 897 square meters and as having the following boundaries:
North - Magdalena Fernandez; South - Catalina Cacayorin; East - Camino Vecinal; and West - Norberto
Bugarin. In 1974, the subject realty was transferred to respondent, Pedro Mari, by virtue of a deed of
sale.

Meanwhile, in 1947, Wenceslao Olegario, the husband of Magdalena Fernandez and father of petitioner
Arsenio Olegario, filed a new tax declaration 9 for a certain 50-square meter parcel of land, indicating the
following boundaries: North - Cesario and Antonio Fernandez; South - Juan Mari; East - Barrio Road; and
West - Norberto Bugarin. Then on May 14, 1961, Wenceslao Olegario executed a "Deed of Quit-Claim of
Unregistered Property"10 in favor of Arsenio Olegario transferring to the latter inter alia the
aforementioned 50-square meter property.

In the cadastral survey conducted from 1961 to 1962, the subject realty was identified as Lot Nos. 17526,
17553 and 14356 of the Mangatarem Cadastre. At this time, Wenceslao Olegario disputed Juan Mari’s
claim over Lot Nos. 17526 and 17553. Hence, on the two corresponding survey notification cards dated
September 28, 1968,11 the claimant appeared as "Juan Mari v. Wenceslao Olegario". With regard to Lot
No. 14356, the survey notification card named Juan Mari as the claimant.

Sometime around 1988, respondent filed with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
Regional Office in Pangasinan a protest against the petitioners because of their encroachment into the
disputed realty. After investigation, said office decided in favor of the respondent and found the latter to
be the owner of Lot Nos. 17526, 17553 and 14356. Petitioners did not appeal and the said decision
became final and executory.

In 1989, Arsenio Olegario caused the amendment of his tax declaration 12 for the 50-square meter
property to reflect 1) an increased area of 341 square meters; 2) the Cadastral Lot No. as 17526, Pls-768-
D;13 and 3) the boundaries as: North-NE Lot 16385 & Road; South-NW-Lots 14363 & 6385, Pls-768-D;
East-SE-Lot 17552, Pls-768-D and West-SW-Lot 14358, Pls-768-D.

Proceedings before the Regional Trial Court

In 1990, after discovering the amended entries in Arsenio Olegario's Tax Declaration No. 4107-R,
respondent filed a complaint14 with the RTC of Lingayen, Pangasinan, for Recovery of Possession and
Annulment of Tax Declaration No. 4107-R. Respondent alleged, inter alia, that Juan Mari, and
subsequently his successor, was deprived by the Olegarios of the possession of portions of subject realty
which respondent owned. Trial thereafter ensued.

On October 13, 1995, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioners, viz:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Declaring the defendants-Olegario the owners of Lots 17553 and 17526 of the Mangatarem cadastral
survey.

2. Dismissing the plaintiff's Complaint on the ground of prescription of action and on the further ground
that [he] failed to prove [his] ownership of any portion of the two lots mentioned in the next preceding
paragraph (assuming arguendo that [his] action has not prescribed);

3. Ordering the plaintiff to pay the costs of this suit. No damages are awarded by the Court.

SO ORDERED.15

Proceedings before the Court of Appeals

Respondent appealed to the CA which reversed the trial court's findings. The CA found respondent to
have adduced stronger evidence of prior possession and ownership of the disputed realty. The
dispositive portion of the CA Decision states:

WHEREFORE, the trial court's Decision dated October 13, 1995 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new
one is hereby entered declaring appellant Pedro C. Mari represented by Lilia C. Mari-Camba the lawful
owner of Lot Nos. 17526, 17553 and 14356 of the Mangatarem Cadastre, without pronouncement as to
costs.

SO ORDERED.16

Petitioners, without filing a motion for reconsideration of the CA Decision, thereafter filed the present
petition for review.

Issues

Petitioners raise the following issues:

1. Whether or not there was failure on [the part of] the Court of Appeals to appreciate and give weight
to the evidence presented by the petitioners;

2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in its decision in adjudicating ownership of the said lots in
favor of the respondent and [in] giving great weight to the respondent’s evidence;

3. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in its failure to declare the action as barred by laches;

4. Whether or not the Court of Appeals failed to find an[d] declare the petitioners as having acquired
ownership of the disputed lots by acquisitive prescription;

5. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in adjudicating the lot in favor of respondent and also [in]
denying award of damages to petitioners.17

Petitioners' Arguments

Petitioners contend that they have been in possession of the disputed lots since 1948 or thereabouts, or
for more than 30 years already. Hence, they acquired ownership thereover by virtue of prescription.
They also impute negligence or failure on the part of respondent to assert his alleged rights within a
reasonable time.

Respondent's Arguments
On the other hand, respondent asserts that petitioners claim ownership over only a certain 50-square
meter parcel of land, as evidenced by their tax declaration which consistently declared only such area. It
was only in September 1989 that petitioners sought to expand the area of their claim to 341 square
meters by virtue of a letter to the Provincial Assessor of Pangasinan. Hence, respondent asserts that
prescription has not set in. Respondent also contends that petitioners' occupancy has been illegal from
the point of inception and thus, such possession can never ripen into a legal status.

Our Ruling

The petition has no merit.

Petitioners' Evidence is Weak

Considering the conflicting findings of the RTC and the CA, a circumstance that constitutes an
exception18 to the general rule that only questions of law are proper subjects of a petition under Rule 45,
we shall assess and weigh the evidence adduced by the parties and shall resolve the questions of fact
raised by petitioners.

A study of the evidence presented by petitioners shows that the CA did not err in finding such evidence
weaker than that of respondent. Arsenio Olegario testified that as early as 1937 their family had built a
nipa house on the land where they lived. Yet he also testified that the former owner of the land was his
mother, Magdalena Fernandez. 19Significantly, Magdalena Fernandez has never claimed and was never in
possession or ownership of Lot Nos. 17553, 17526 and 14356. Petitioners’ evidence thus supports the
conclusion that in 1937 they were in possession, not of Lot No. 17526, but of their mother’s land,
possibly 50 square meters of it, which is the approximate floor area of the house. Conversely, petitioners'
evidence fails to clearly prove that in 1937 they were already occupying the disputed lots. The records, in
fact, do not show exactly when the Olegarios entered and started occupying the disputed lots.

The evidence shows that a hollow block fence, an improvement introduced by the Olegarios in 1965,
now exists somewhere along the disputed lots. Petitioners' claim that they were in possession of the
disputed lots even prior to 1965 based on the existence of the bamboo fence on the boundary of their
land preceding the existence of the hollow block fence, however, holds no water. The testimony of
Marcelino Gutierrez shows that formerly there was a bamboo fence demarcating between the land of
the Olegarios and the Maris and that in 1964 or 1965 a hollow block fence was constructed. He did not
say, however, that the place where the hollow block fence was constructed was the exact same place
where the bamboo boundary fence once stood. Even the testimony of Arsenio Olegario was ambiguous
on this matter, viz:

Q When was the [concrete] hollow block [fence] separating your property [from] the property of Juan
Mari constructed?

A It was constructed in 1965.

Q Before the construction of that concrete hollow block fence between your land and the land of Juan
Mari [in] 1965, what was the visible boundary between your land and the land of Juan Mari?

A Bamboo fence, sir.20

Arsenio merely testified that a bamboo fence was formerly the visible boundary between his land and
the land of Juan Mari; and that a concrete hollow block fence was constructed in 1965. His testimony
failed to show that the concrete hollow block fence was constructed in the same position where the
bamboo boundary fence once stood.

On the other hand, there is ample evidence on record, embodied in Tax Declaration No. 9404 for the
year 1947; the survey sketch plan of 1961; and the survey plan of 1992, that the boundary claimed by
the Olegarios kept moving in such a way that the portion they occupied expanded from 50 square
meters (in the land of his mother) to 377 square meters. 21 Viewed in relation to the entire body of
evidence presented by the parties in this case, these documents cannot plausibly all be mistaken in the
areas specified therein. As against the bare claim of Arsenio 22 that his predecessor merely made an
inaccurate estimate in providing 50 square meters as the area claimed by the latter in 1947 in the tax
declaration,23 we find it more plausible to believe that each of the documents on record stated the true
area measurements of the parties' claims at the particular time each document was executed.1avvphi1

As correctly found by the CA, the earliest that petitioners can be considered to have occupied the
disputed property was in 1965 when the concrete hollow block fence was constructed on the disputed
lots.

Ownership and Prescription

As previously mentioned, respondent's predecessor, Juan Mari, had declared the disputed realty 24 for tax
purposes as early as 1916. The tax declarations show that he had a two storey house on the realty. He
also planted fruit bearing trees and bamboos thereon. The records 25 also show that the 897-square
meter property had a bamboo fence along its perimeter. All these circumstances clearly show that Juan
Mari was in possession of subject realty in the concept of owner, publicly and peacefully since 1916 or
long before petitioners entered the disputed realty sometime in 1965.

Based on Article 538 of the Civil Code, 26 the respondent is the preferred possessor because, benefiting
from his father's tax declaration of the subject realty since 1916, he has been in possession thereof for a
longer period. On the other hand, petitioners acquired joint possession only sometime in 1965.

Despite 25 years of occupying the disputed lots, therefore, petitioners did not acquire ownership. Firstly,
they had no just title. Petitioners did not present any document to show how the titles over Lot Nos.
17526 and 17533 were transferred to them, whether from respondent, his predecessor, or any other
person.27 Petitioners, therefore, could not acquire the disputed real property by ordinary prescription
through possession for 10 years. Secondly, it is settled that ownership cannot be acquired by mere
occupation. Unless coupled with the element of hostility towards the true owner, occupation and use,
however long, will not confer title by prescription or adverse possession. 28 In other words, possession, to
constitute the foundation of a prescriptive right, must be possession under claim of title, that is, it must
be adverse.29lawphil

Petitioners' acts of a possessory character - acts that might have been merely tolerated by the owner -
did not constitute possession. No matter how long tolerated possession is continued, it does not start
the running of the prescriptive period. 30 Mere material possession of land is not adverse possession as
against the owner and is insufficient to vest title, unless such possession is accompanied by the intent to
possess as an owner. There should be a hostile use of such a nature and exercised under such
circumstance as to manifest and give notice that the possession is under a claim of right. 31
Petitioners have failed to prove that their possession was adverse or under claim of title or right. Unlike
respondent, petitioners did not have either the courage or forthrightness to publicly declare the
disputed lots as owned by them for tax purposes. Tax declarations "prove that the holder has a claim of
title over the property. Aside from manifesting a sincere desire to obtain title thereto, they announce the
holder's adverse claim against the state and other interested parties". 32 Petitioners' omission, when
viewed in conjunction with respondent's continued unequivocal declaration of ownership over, payment
of taxes on and possession of the subject realty, shows a lack of sufficient adverseness of the formers’
possession to qualify as being one in the concept of owner.

The only instance petitioners assumed a legal position sufficiently adverse to respondent's ownership of
the disputed properties was when they declared Lot No. 17526 for tax purposes in their name in
1989.33 Since then and until the filing of the complaint for recovery of possession in 1990, only one year
had elapsed. Hence, petitioners never acquired ownership through extraordinary prescription of the
subject realty.

On the other hand, being the sole transferree of his father, respondent showed through his tax
declarations which were coupled with possessory acts that he, through his predecessor, had been in
possession of the land for more than 30 years since 1916. "Open, exclusive and undisputed possession of
alienable public land for the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon
completion of the requisite period - ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases
to be public land and becomes private property." 34 Ownership of immovable property is acquired by
extraordinary prescription through possession for 30 years. 35 For purposes of deciding the instant case,
therefore, the possession by respondent and his predecessor had already ripened into ownership of the
subject realty by virtue of prescription as early as 1946.

Laches

Petitioners cannot find refuge in the principle of laches. It is not just the lapse of time or delay that
constitutes laches. The essence of laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained
length of time, to do that which, through due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, thus
giving rise to a presumption that the party entitled to assert it had earlier abandoned or declined to
assert it.

The essential elements of laches are: (a) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he
claims, giving rise to the situation complained of; (b) delay in asserting complainant's rights after he had
knowledge of defendant's acts and after he has had the opportunity to sue; (c) lack of knowledge or
notice by defendant that the complainant will assert the right on which he bases his suit and (d) injury or
prejudice to the defendant in the event the relief is accorded to the complainant. 36

In the instant case, the second and third elements are missing. Petitioners had notice and knew all along
the position of the respondent and his predecessor Juan Mari - they were standing pat on his ownership
over the subject realty. This stand of respondent and his predecessor was recorded and clearly visible
from the notification survey cards.37 From 1968, the date of the cards, until 1989 there was nothing to
indicate any change in the position of any of the parties. Moreover, that respondent had not conceded
ownership and possession of the land to petitioners is clear also from the fact that Pedro Mari continued
to declare the entire 897-square meter property in his name and pay taxes for the entire area after his
father transferred the property to him.
On the other hand, it was petitioners who suddenly changed their position in 1989 by changing the area
of the property declared in their name from 50 square meters to 341 square meters and specifying the
details to make it appear that the tax declaration for the 50-square meter property pertained to Lot No.
17526. As previously discussed, it was only at this point, in 1989, that it can be clearly stated that
petitioners were making their claim of ownership public and unequivocal and converting their
possession over Lot No. 17526 into one in the concept of owner.

Upon discovery of this clear and unequivocal change in status of petitioners’ position over the disputed
land respondent immediately acted. He filed in 1990 the complaint for recovery of possession and
nullification of tax declaration. Hence, we find no laches in the instant case.

In conclusion, we find no reversible error on the part of the CA in recognizing the ownership and right of
possession of respondent over Lot Nos. 17526, 17553 and 14356. There is, thus, also no basis for an
award of damages and attorney’s fees in favor of petitioners.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated April
18, 2001 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 169956 January 19, 2009

SPOUSES JONEL PADILLA and SARAH PADILLA, Petitioners,

vs.
ISAURO A. VELASCO, TEODORA A. VELASCO, DELIA A. VELASCO, VALERIANO A. VELASCO, JR., IDA A.
VELASCO, AMELITA C. VELASCO, ERIBERTO C. VELASCO, JR., and CELIA C. VELASCO, Respondents.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
Decision1dated February 11, 2005 and the Resolution 2 dated October 4, 2005 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 69997 entitled “Isauro A. Velasco, Teodora A. Velasco, Delia A. Velasco, Valeriano
A. Velasco, Jr., Ida A. Velasco, Amelita C. Velasco, Eriberto C. Velasco, Jr. and Celia C. Velasco v. Spouses
Jonel Padilla and Sarah Padilla.”

The facts

The facts of the case are as follows:

Respondents are the heirs of Dr. Artemio A. Velasco (Artemio), who died single and without any issue on
January 22, 1949. During his lifetime, Artemio acquired Lot No. 2161 consisting of 7,791 square meters
situated at Barangay Pinagsanjan, Pagsanjan, Laguna, covered by Tax Declaration No. 4739. Artemio
acquired the lot from spouses Brigido Sacluti and Melitona Obial, evidenced by a deed of sale dated
February 14, 1944.

In October 1987, petitioners entered the property as trustees by virtue of a deed of sale executed by the
Rural Bank of Pagsanjan in favor of spouses Bartolome Solomon, Jr. and Teresita Padilla (Solomon
spouses).
Respondents demanded that petitioners vacate the property, but the latter refused. The matter was
referred to the barangay for conciliation; however, the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement.
Thereafter, petitioners caused the cutting of trees in the area, fenced it and built a house thereon. They
harvested the crops and performed other acts of dominion over the property.

On October 14, 1991, respondents filed a complaint for accion publiciana, accounting and damages
against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santa Cruz, Laguna. They asked the court to
order petitioners to vacate the property and to pay moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and
cost of suit.

Isauro A. Velasco (Isauro), the brother of the deceased Artemio, as administrator of the property, was
presented as a witness. He testified that Artemio owned the property. As evidence thereof, he presented
the Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan executed by spouses Brigido Sacluti and Melitona Obial in favor of
Artemio, and declared that he (Isauro) was present during the signing of the instrument. He offered in
evidence tax declarations and tax receipts covering Lot No. 2161 which were all in the name of Artemio.
A certification from the Land Registration Authority (LRA) was likewise presented by Isauro which states
that based on the records of the LRA, Decree No. 403348 was issued on October 10, 1930 covering Lot
No. 2161.3

Rolando R. Flores, a geodetic engineer, also testified that on January 16, 1993, upon prior notice to
petitioners, he conducted a survey of the land based on the technical description of the property and the
map from the Bureau of Lands. The purpose of the survey was to verify if the area occupied by
petitioners was Lot No. 2161. Upon his examination and based on his survey, he concluded that the land
occupied by petitioners was Lot No. 2161.4

On the other hand, petitioners averred that the Solomon spouses owned the property; that the said
spouses bought it from the Rural Bank of Pagsanjan as evidenced by a deed of sale dated September 4,
1987; that the land was identified as Lot No. 76-pt, consisting of 10,000 square meters, located at
Pinagsanjan, Pagsanjan, Laguna; and that the spouses authorized petitioners to occupy the land and
introduce improvements thereon.

Petitioners further claimed that subsequent to the sale of the property to the Solomon spouses, Lot No.
76-pt. was levied on in Civil Case No. 320 under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court of Pagsanjan,
Laguna. The case was entitled “Rural Bank of Pagsanjan, Inc. v. Spouses Hector and Emma Velasco,
Valeriano Velasco and Virginia Miso.” Petitioners alleged that Valeriano Velasco obtained a loan from the
Rural Bank of Pagsanjan, with Hector Velasco as co-maker, and the land was mortgaged by Valeriano as
collateral. Valeriano’s failure to pay the loan caused the foreclosure of the land, and on September 17,
1980, Lot No. 76-pt was sold at a public auction by the Provincial Sheriff. The Rural Bank of Pagsanjan
was the highest bidder.

Pedro Zalameda Trinidad, Jr. (Pedro), as a witness for the petitioners, testified that he was born in
Barangay Pinagsanjan, Pagsanjan, Laguna, and had been residing there since birth. He said that based on
his knowledge, the land belonged to Nonong (Valeriano) Velasco because he used to buy coconuts
harvested from the said land and it was Nonong Velasco who caused the gathering of coconuts thereon. 5

Petitioner Jonel Padilla also took the witness stand. He testified that Pedro was occupying the land when
he initially visited it. A representative of the Rural Bank of Pagsanjan disclosed to him that the land
previously belonged to Valeriano. He verified from the Municipal Assessor the technical description of
the land, but no longer verified from the Bureau of Lands because he trusted the bank. Upon his
recommendation, his sister and his brother-in-law purchased the property after verifying the supporting
documents. It was his brother-in-law who went to the Bureau of Lands and found that it was Lot No.
2161.6

On July 27, 1999, the RTC rendered a Decision, 7 the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the [respondents]

ordering the [petitioners] to vacate the land presently occupied by them and restore possession thereof
to the [respondents], to render an accounting of the proceeds from the crop harvested therefrom
starting September 1987 up to the time the property is returned to the [respondents], and to remove at
their expense all the structures they constructed thereon. 8

Petitioners filed an appeal before the CA, but on February 11, 2005, the CA issued the assailed decision
affirming the decision of the RTC. They consequently filed a motion for reconsideration. However, the
same was denied in the assailed resolution dated October 4, 2005.

Hence, the instant petition.

The Issues

Petitioners anchor their petition on the following grounds:

I. The alleged sale executed between Brigido Sacluti and Melitona Obial as seller and Dr. Artemio
[Velasco] as buyer was never established, respondents having failed to present the original copy thereof
during the trial despite their clear and categorical commitment to do so. Furthermore, the purported
Original Certificate of Title issued in the name of Brigido Sacluti and Melitona Obial was never presented
in evidence, thus, creating the presumption that had it been presented, the same would have been
adverse to respondents.9

II. The spouses Solomon acquired the subject property from its lawful owner in good faith and for
value.10

III. The spouses Solomon acquired the subject property at the public auction sale conducted by the
provincial sheriff of Laguna based on the judgment and writ of execution issued by the Municipal Trial
Court of Laguna against respondent Valeriano Velasco for non-payment of a loan considering that (1) the
issuance of Tax Declaration No. 4624 in the name of respondent Valeriano Velasco is entitled to the
presumption of regularity especially since respondents have not explained how and why it was wrongly
issued in the name of their own brother, respondent Valeriano Velasco and without any of them taking
any action to correct the alleged mistake; and (2) by their failure to assert their alleged ownership of the
property and their inaction [by not] questioning the legal action taken by the bank against their co-
respondent Valeriano Velasco and the subject property despite their full awareness since 1980,
respondents are barred by estoppel from denying the title of the bank and the Solomon spouses. 11

IV. The action a quo was barred by prescription considering that respondents filed their legal action
against the petitioners only on October 14, 1991, more than ten (10) years after the bank had acquired
the subject property on September 17, 1980 at the public auction conducted by the Provincial Sheriff of
Laguna.12
V. At the very least, respondents are guilty of laches, they having slept on their rights for an
unreasonable length of time such that to dispossess petitioners of the property after they had
introduced substantial improvements thereon in good faith would result in undue damage and injury to
them all due to the silence and inaction of respondents in asserting their alleged ownership over the
property.13

VI. The evidence proves that Lot no. 2161 and Lot no. 76-pt are one and the same. 14

VII. The failure of Atty. Asinas to present other witnesses, additional documents and to respond to
certain pleadings brought about by his serious illnesses constitutes excusable negligence or
incompetency to warrant a new trial considering that the Supreme Court itself had recognized
“negligence or incompetency of counsel as a ground for new trial” especially if it has resulted in serious
injustice or to an uneven playing field.15

VIII. The overwhelming testimonial and documentary evidence, if presented, would have altered the
result and the decision now appealed from. 16

IX. The petitioners should be awarded their counterclaim for exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and
litigation expenses.17

The arguments submitted by petitioners may be summed up in the following issues:

I. Who, as between the parties, have a better right of possession of Lot No. 2161;

II. Whether the complaint for accion publiciana has already prescribed; and

III. Whether the negligence of respondent’s counsel entitles them to a new trial.

The Ruling of the Court

We deny the instant petition.

First. The instant case is for accion publiciana, or for recovery of the right to possess. This was a plenary
action filed in the regional trial court to determine the better right to possession of realty independently
of the title.18 Accion publiciana is also used to refer to an ejectment suit where the cause of
dispossession is not among the grounds for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, or when possession has
been lost for more than one year and can no longer be maintained under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.
The objective of the plaintiffs in accion publiciana is to recover possession only, not ownership. 19

Based on the findings of facts of the RTC which were affirmed by the CA, respondents were able to
establish lawful possession of Lot No. 2161 when the petitioners occupied the property. Lot No. 2161
was the subject of Decree No. 403348 based on the decision dated October 10, 1930 in Cadastre (Cad.)
Case No. 11, LRC Record No. 208. The Original Certificate of Title to the land was issued to Brigido Sacluti
and Melitona Obial. On February 14, 1944, the original owners of the land sold the same to Artemio.
From the date of sale, until Artemio’s death on January 22, 1949, he was in continuous possession of the
land. When Artemio died, Isauro acted as administrator of the land with Tomas Vivero as caretaker. In
1987, petitioners occupied the property by virtue of a deed of sale between the Rural Bank of Pagsanjan
and the Solomon spouses. The land bought by the Solomon spouses from the Bank is denominated as
Lot No. 76-pt and previously owned by Valeriano. However, it was proved during trial that the land
occupied by petitioners was Lot No. 2161 in the name of Artemio, whereas the land sold by the bank to
the petitioners was Lot No. 76-pt.

Given this factual milieu, it can readily be deduced that respondents are legally entitled to the
possession of Lot No. 2161.

It is a long-standing policy of this Court that the findings of facts of the RTC which were adopted and
affirmed by the CA are generally deemed conclusive and binding. This Court is not a trier of facts and will
not disturb the factual findings of the lower courts unless there are substantial reasons for doing so. 20 In
the instant case, we find no exceptional reason to depart from this policy.

Second. The case filed by respondents for accion publiciana has not prescribed. The action was filed with
the RTC on October 14, 1991. Petitioners dispossessed respondents of the property in October 1987. At
the time of the filing of the complaint, only four (4) years had elapsed from the time of dispossession.

Under Article 555(4) of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the real right of possession is not lost till after
the lapse of ten years. It is settled that the remedy of accion publiciana prescribes after the lapse of ten
years.21 Thus, the instant case was filed within the allowable period.

Third. Petitioners put in issue that Lot No. 2161 and Lot 76-pt are one and the same, and that the land
was owned by Valeriano when it was foreclosed by the bank. This, in effect, is a collateral attack on the
title over the property which is registered in the name of Artemio.

We cannot countenance this stance of the petitioners, and perforce, must strike it down. Title to a
registered land cannot be collaterally attacked. 22 A separate action is necessary to raise the issue of
ownership.

In accion publiciana, the principal issue is possession, and ownership is merely ancillary thereto. Only in
cases where the possession cannot be resolved without resolving the issue of ownership may the trial
court delve into the claim of ownership. This rule is enunciated in Refugia v. CA,23 where the Court
declared, viz.:

Where the question of who has prior possession hinges on the question of who the real owner of the
disputed portion is, the inferior court may resolve the issue of ownership and make a declaration as to
who among the contending parties is the real owner. In the same vein, where the resolution of the issue
of possession hinges on a determination of the validity and interpretation of the document of title or any
other contract on which the claim of possession is premised, the inferior court may likewise pass upon
these issues. This is because, and it must be so understood, that any such pronouncement made
affecting ownership of the disputed portion is to be regarded merely as provisional, hence, does not bar
nor prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the land.

Fourth. Petitioners aver that they are entitled to a new trial due to the failure of their counsel in the
proceedings before the RTC to present testimonial and documentary evidence necessary for them to
obtain a favorable judgment. They maintain that the failure of their counsel to present these other
evidence was due to counsel’s lingering illness at that time, and therefore, constitutes excusable
negligence.

It may be reiterated that mistakes of counsel as to the competency of witnesses, the sufficiency and
relevancy of evidence, the proper defense, or the burden of proof, as well as his failure to introduce
certain evidence or to summon witnesses and to argue the case, are not proper grounds for a new trial,
unless the incompetence of counsel be so great that his client is prejudiced and prevented from fairly
presenting his case.24

In this case, the illness of petitioners’ counsel and his alleged failure to present additional evidence
during the trial of the case do not constitute sufficient ground for a new trial. The Order 25 issued by the
trial court in its denial of the motion for new trial filed by petitioners aptly explains the reason why a
new trial is unnecessary, viz.:

Assuming that Atty. Asinas failed to perform the imputed acts by reason of his ailments, still, the same is
insufficient ground to grant a new trial. The evidence on record established the fact that [respondents]
and their predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the subject realty for a long time. Their
possession was interrupted by [petitioners] who entered the property in [1987] pursuant to a deed of
sale between the Rural Bank of Pagsanjan and spouses Bartolome C. Solomon and Teresita Padilla.
Considering that this is an accion publiciana and [respondents’] earlier rightful possession of the subject
parcel of land has been adequately established, the testimonial and documentary evidence sought to be
adduced in a new trial would not adversely affect the findings of the Court. The ownership and
possession of the property purchased by the Solomon spouses from the Rural Bank of Pagsanjan could
be the subject of an appropriate action.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

March 12, 2014

G.R. No. 187944

VARMENCITA SUAREZ, Petitioner,

vs.
MR. and MRS. FELIX E. EMBOY, JR. and MARILOU P. EMBOY-DELANTAR, Respondents.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

For review in the instant Petition1 is the Decision2 rendered on March 19, 2009 and Resolution3 issued
on May 5, 2009 by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 03489. The CA granted the Petition for
Review4 filed by Mr. and Mrs. Felix Emboy, Jr. (Felix) and Marilou Emboy-Delantar (Marilou)
(respondents), seeking to reverse the decisions of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12, 5 and
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 3, 6 of Cebu City, rendered on February 26, 2008 in Civil
Case No. CEB-33328,7 and on September 25, 2006 in Civil Case No. R-49832, respectively. The RTC
affirmed the MTCC in upholding the claims of Carmencita Suarez (Carmencita) in her complaint for
unlawful detainer instituted against the respondents.

Antecedents
At the center of the dispute is a 222-square meter parcel of land, designated as Lot No. 1907-A-2
(subject lot) of the subdivision plan Psd-165686, situated in Barangay Duljo, Cebu City, and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-174880 issued in the name of Carmencita on February 9, 2005.
The subject lot used to be a part of Lot No. 1907-A, 8 which was partitioned in the following manner
among the heirs of Spouses Carlos Padilla (Carlos) and Asuncion Pacres (Asuncion): 9

Lot No. TCT No. Heirs

1907-A-1 T-543459 Spouses Rogelio and Praxedes Padilla

1907-A-2 T-543460 Heirs of Vicente Padilla (Vicente), namely: (1) Azucena Padilla,
married to Felly Carrera; (2) Remedios Padilla (Remedios),
married to Oscar Dimay; (3) Veronica Padilla (Veronica); 10 and (4)
Moreno Padilla (Moreno), married to Teresita Curso (Teresita)

1907-A-3 T-543461 Cresencio Padilla

1907-A-4 T-543462 Fructousa Baricuatro

1907-A-5 T-543463 Claudia Padilla-Emboy (Claudia)

A house, which is occupied by respondents Felix and Marilou, stands in the subject lot. The respondents
claim that their mother, Claudia, had occupied the subject lot during her lifetime and it was earmarked
to become her share in Lot No. 1907-A. They had thereafter stayed in the subject lot for decades after
inheriting the same from Claudia, who had in turn succeeded her own parents, Carlos and Asuncion. 11

In 2004, respondents Felix and Marilou were asked by their cousins, who are the Heirs of Vicente, to
vacate the subject lot and to transfer to Lot No. 1907-A-5, a landlocked portion sans a right of way. They
refused to comply insisting that Claudia’s inheritance pertained to Lot No. 1907-A-2. 12

Not long after, the respondents received from Carmencita’s counsel, Atty. Jufelenito R. Pareja (Atty.
Pareja), a demand letter, dated February 23, 2004, requiring them to vacate the subject lot. They were
informed that Carmencita had already purchased on February 12, 2004 the subject lot from the former’s
relatives. However, the respondents did not heed the demand. Instead, they examined the records
pertaining to the subject lot and uncovered possible anomalies, i.e., forged signatures and alterations, in
the execution of a series of deeds of partition relative to Lot No. 1907-A. On August 13, 2004, they filed
before the RTC of Cebu City a complaint13 for nullification of the partition and for the issuance of new
TCTs covering the heirs’ respective portions of Lot No. 1907-A. 14

On December 8, 2004, Carmencita filed before the MTCC and against the respondents a complaint for
unlawful detainer, the origin of the instant petition.1âwphi1 She alleged that she bought the subject lot
from Remedios, Moreno, Veronica and Dionesia, 15 the registered owners thereof and the persons who
allowed the respondents to occupy the same by mere tolerance. As their successor-in-interest, she
claimed her entitlement to possession of the subject lot and the right to demand from the respondents
to vacate the same.16
The MTCC upheld Carmencita’s claims in its decision rendered on September 25, 2006. The respondents
were ordered to vacate the subject lot and remove at their expense all the improvements they had built
thereon. They were likewise made solidarily liable to pay Carmencita Php 20,000.00 as attorney’s fees. 17

In the Decision dated February 26, 2008, the RTC affirmed in its entirety the MTCC ruling. 18

The respondents challenged the MTCC and RTC judgments through a Petition for Review 19 filed before
the CA.

The respondents argued that they have been occupying the subject lot in the concept of owners for
several decades. Carmencita, on the other hand, was a buyer in bad faith for having purchased the
property despite the notice of lis pendens clearly annotated on the subject lot’s title. Even her complaint
for unlawful detainer was filed on December 8, 2004 subsequent to the respondents’ institution on
August 13, 2004 of a petition for nullification of the partition. Citing Sarmiento v. CA, 20 the respondents
emphasized that "even if one is the owner of the property, the possession thereof cannot be wrested
from another who had been in the physical or material possession of the same for more than one year
by resorting to a summary action of ejectment."21 The respondents also invoked the doctrine enunciated
in Amagan v. Marayag22 that the pendency of another action anchored on the issue of ownership justifies
the suspension of an ejectment suit involving the same real property. The foregoing is especially true in
the case at bar where the issue of possession is so interwoven with that of ownership. Besides, the
resolution of the question of ownership would necessarily result in the disposition of the issue of
possession.

The respondents also stressed that the deed of sale dated April 1, 2004, which was attached to the
complaint for unlawful detainer, bore tell-tale signs of being spurious. First, Atty. Pareja’s demand letter
sent to the respondents instead referred to a deed of sale dated February 12, 2004. Secondly, Teresita,
who now lives in Luzon and has been estranged from Moreno since the 1980s, was a signatory in the
deed of sale. Thirdly, a certain Veronida Padilla, a fictitious person, also signed the deed of sale as among
the vendors, but she, too, was impleaded as a co-defendant in the ejectment suit. Fourthly, the deed was
only registered the following year after its supposed execution.

The respondents insisted that the Heirs of Vicente, who had allegedly sold the subject lot to Carmencita,
had never physically occupied the same. Hence, there was no basis at all for Carmencita’s claim that the
respondents’ possession of the subject lot was by mere tolerance of the alleged owners.

The respondents also presented before the CA a newly discovered evidence, which they found in an old
wooden chest in their ancestral home. A duly notarized document captioned as an "Agreement," 23 dated
February 23, 1957, showed that Vicente and his spouse, Dionesia, had waived their hereditary rights to
Lot No. 1907-A. The document stated that Vicente obtained a loan from the Philippine National Bank
using Lot No. 1907-A as a collateral. The loan was paid by Carlos and Asuncion and the waiver must have
been executed in order to be fair to Vicente’s siblings. Prescinding from the above, the Heirs of Vicente
no longer had ownership rights over the subject lot to convey to Carmencita.

The respondents also averred that Carmencita’s complaint lacked a cause of action. The certification to
file an action was issued by the officials of Barangay Duljo in the name of James Tan Suarez, Carmencita’s
brother, who had no real rights or interests over the subject lot. Further, while Carmencita based her
claim over the subject lot by virtue of a deed of sale executed on April 1, 2004, no demand to vacate was
made upon the respondents after that date. The absence of such demand rendered the complaint fatally
defective, as the date of its service should be the reckoning point of the one-year period within which
the suit can be filed.

In support of the respondents’ prayer for the issuance of injunctive reliefs, they argued that their loss
would be irreparable. Moreover, the resolution of the respondents’ petition for nullification of the
partition of Lot No. 1907-A, in which Carmencita was likewise impleaded as a defendant, would be
rendered useless in the event that the latter’s complaint for unlawful detainer would be granted and the
former’s ancestral house demolished.

The Ruling of the CA

On March 19, 2009, the CA rendered the herein assailed Decision reversing the disquisitions of the
courts a quo and dismissing Carmencita’s complaint for unlawful detainer. The CA explained:

Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when.—Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding
section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat,
strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land
or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by
virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor,
vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or
withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or
persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under
them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs.

The distinction between forcible entry and unlawful detainer was lucidly explained in Sarmiento vs.
Court of Appeals,:

Forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are two distinct actions defined in Section 1, Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court. [In] forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of land or building by means of
force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. In unlawful detainer, one unlawfully withholds possession
thereof after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or
implied. In forcible entry, the possession is illegal from the beginning and the basic inquiry centers on
who has the prior possession de facto. In unlawful detainer, the possession was originally lawful but
became unlawful by the expiration or termination of the right to possess, hence the issue of rightful
possession is decisive for, in such action, the defendant is in actual possession and the plaintiffs cause of
action is the termination of the defendant’s right to continue in possession.

What determines the cause of action is the nature of defendant’s entry into the land. If the entry is
illegal, then the action which may be filed against the intruder within one (1) year therefrom is forcible
entry. If, on the other hand, the entry is legal but the possession thereafter became illegal, the case is
one of unlawful detainer which must be filed within one (1) year from the date of the last demand.

A close perusal of [Carmencita’s] complaint a quo reveals that the action was neither one of forcible
entry nor unlawful detainer but essentially involved an issue of ownership which must be resolved in an
accion reivindicatoria. It did not characterize [the respondents’] alleged entry into the land: whether the
same was legal or illegal. It did not state how [the respondents] entered the land and constructed a
house thereon. It was also silent on whether [the respondents’] possession became legal before
[Carmencita] demanded from them to vacate the land. The complaint merely averred that their relatives
previously owned the lot [the respondents] were occupying and that after [Carmencita] purchased it[,]
she, as its new owner, demanded [for the respondents] to vacate the land. Moreover, it is undisputed
that [the respondents] and their ancestors have been occupying the land for several decades already.
There was no averment as to how or when [Carmencita’s] predecessors tolerated [the respondents’]
possession of the land. Consequently, there was no contract to speak of, whether express or implied,
between [the respondents], on one hand, and [Carmencita] or her predecessors, on the other, as would
qualify [the respondents’] possession of the land as a case of unlawful detainer. Neither was it alleged
that [the respondents] took possession of the land through force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth
to make out a case of forcible entry. In any event, [Carmencita] cannot legally assert that [the
respondents’] possession of the land was by mere tolerance. This is because [Carmencita’s]
predecessors-in-interest did not yet own the property when [Claudia] took possession thereof. Take note
that [Carmencita’s] predecessors-in-interest merely stepped into the shoes of their parents who were
also co-heirs of [Claudia]. Finally, to categorize a cause of action as one constitutive of unlawful detainer,
plaintiff’s supposed acts of tolerance must have been present from the start of the possession which he
later seek[s] to recover. This is clearly wanting in the case at bar.

Indeed, when the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as
where it does not state how entry was effected or how and when dispossession started, as in the case at
bar, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria in the proper RTC. If
[Carmencita] is truly the owner of the subject property and she was unlawfully deprived of the real right
of possession or ownership thereof, she should present her claim before the RTC in an accion publiciana
or an accion reivindicatoria, and not before the municipal trial court in a summary proceeding of
unlawful detainer or forcible entry.

Munoz vs. Court of Appeals enunciated:

For even if he is the owner, possession of the property cannot be wrested from another who had been in
possession thereof for more than twelve (12) years through a summary action for ejectment. Although
admittedly[,] petitioner may validly claim ownership based on the muniments of title it presented, such
evidence does not responsibly address the issue of prior actual possession raised in a forcible entry case.
It must be stated that regardless of actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable
quiet possession shall not be turned out by a strong hand, violence or terror. Thus, a party who can
prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be
the character of his prior possession, if he has in his favor priority in time, he has the security that
entitles him to remain on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by
accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. 24 (Citations omitted and underscoring supplied)

In Carmencita’s Motion for Reconsideration 25 filed before the CA, she alleged that the case of Sarmiento
cited by the respondents is not applicable to the present controversy since it involves a boundary
dispute, which is properly the subject of an accion reivindicatoria and over which the MTCC has no
jurisdiction. She claimed that Rivera v. Rivera 26 finds more relevance in the case at bar. In Rivera, the
contending parties were each other’s relatives and the Court ruled that in an unlawful detainer case,
prior physical possession by the complainant is not necessary. 27Instead, what is required is a better right
of possession. Further, the MTCC cannot be divested of jurisdiction just because the defendants assert
ownership over the disputed property.
In the herein assailed Resolution dated May 5, 2009, the CA denied Carmencita’s Motion for
Reconsideration.

In essence, the instant petition presents the following issues:

Whether or not Carmencita’s complaint against the respondents had sufficiently alleged and proven a
cause of action for unlawful detainer.

II

Whether or not the pendency of the respondents’ petition for nullification of partition of Lot No. 1907-A
and for the issuance of new certificates of title can abate Carmencita’s ejectment suit.

Carmencita’s Allegations

In support of the petition, Carmencita reiterates that she purchased the subject lot from the Heirs of
Vicente, who were then the registered owners thereof. At the time of the sale, respondents Felix and
Marilou were occupying the subject lot. Thus, Atty. Pareja, in Carmencita’s behalf, demanded that they
vacate the property. The respondents’ refusal to comply with the demand turned them into deforciants
unlawfully withholding the possession of the subject lot from Carmencita, the new owner, whose
recourse was to file a complaint for unlawful detainer.

Further, Carmencita insists that a certificate of title shall not be subject to a collateral attack 28 and the
issue of ownership cannot be resolved in an action for unlawful detainer. A pending suit involving the
question of ownership of a piece of real property will not abate an ejectment complaint as the two are
not based on the same cause of action and are seeking different reliefs. 29

Additionally, Carmencita invokes the doctrine in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. CA 30 that the registered
owner of a property is entitled to its possession. In Arcal v. CA, 31 the Court also explained that the
occupation of a property not by its registered owner but by others depends on the former’s tolerance,
and the occupants are bound by an implied promise to vacate upon demand, failing at which, a suit for
ejectment would be proper. 32

The Respondents’Arguments

In their Comment33 to the instant petition, the respondents stress that Carmencita’s complaint for
unlawful detainer was fundamentally inadequate. There was practically no specific averment as to when
and how possession by tolerance of the respondents began. In the complaint, Carmencita made a
general claim that the respondents possessed "the property by mere tolerance ‘with the understanding
that they would voluntarily vacate the premises and remove their house(s) thereon upon demand by the
owners’."34 In Spouses Valdez, Jr. v. CA,35 the Court ruled that the failure of the complainants to allege key
jurisdictional facts constitutive of unlawful detainer is fatal and deprives the MTCC of jurisdiction over
the action.

In their rejoinder,36 the respondents likewise argue that the issues of possession and ownership are
inseparably linked in the case at bar. Carmencita’s complaint for ejectment was based solely on her
spurious title, which is already the subject of the respondents’ petition for nullification of partition of Lot
No. 1907-A.
Our Disquisition

The instant petition lacks merit.

Carmencita had not amply alleged and proven that all the requisites for unlawful detainer are present in
the case at bar.

"Without a doubt, the registered owner of real property is entitled to its possession. However, the owner
cannot simply wrest possession thereof from whoever is in actual occupation of the property. To recover
possession, he must resort to the proper judicial remedy and, once he chooses what action to file, he is
required to satisfy the conditions necessary for such action to prosper." 37

In Spouses Valdez, Jr.,38 the Court is instructive anent the three kinds of actions available to recover
possession of real property, viz:

(a) accion interdictal; (b) accion publiciana; and (c) accion reivindicatoria.

Accion interdictal comprises two distinct causes of action, namely, forcible entry (detentacion) and
unlawful detainer (desahuico) [sic]. In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of real
property by means of force, intimidation, strategy, threats, or stealth whereas in unlawful detainer, one
illegally withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under
any contract, express or implied. The two are distinguished from each other in that in forcible entry, the
possession of the defendant is illegal from the beginning, and that the issue is which party has prior de
facto possession while in unlawful detainer, possession of the defendant is originally legal but became
illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess.

The jurisdiction of these two actions, which are summary in nature, lies in the proper municipal trial
court or metropolitan trial court. Both actions must be brought within one year from the date of actual
entry on the land, in case of forcible entry, and from the date of last demand, in case of unlawful
detainer. The issue in said cases is the right to physical possession.

Accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession which should be brought in the
proper regional trial court when dispossession has lasted for more than one year. It is an ordinary civil
proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty independently of title. In other words, if
at the time of the filing of the complaint more than one year had elapsed since defendant had turned
plaintiff out of possession or defendant’s possession had become illegal, the action will be, not one of
the forcible entry or illegal detainer, but an accion publiciana. On the other hand, accion reivindicatoria is
an action to recover ownership also brought in the proper regional trial court in an ordinary civil
proceeding.39 (Citations omitted)

In a complaint for unlawful detainer, the following key jurisdictional facts must be alleged and sufficiently
established:

(1)initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;

(2)eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of
the latter’s right of possession;

(3)thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the
enjoyment thereof; and
(4)within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the
complaint for ejectment.40

In the case at bar, the first requisite mentioned above is markedly absent. Carmencita failed to clearly
allege and prove how and when the respondents entered the subject lot and constructed a house upon
it.41 Carmencita was likewise conspicuously silent about the details on who specifically permitted the
respondents to occupy the lot, and how and when such tolerance came about. 42 Instead, Carmencita
cavalierly formulated a legal conclusion, sans factual substantiation, that (a) the respondents’ initial
occupation of the subject lot was lawful by virtue of tolerance by the registered owners, and (b) the
respondents became deforciants unlawfully withholding the subject lot’s possession after Carmencita, as
purchaser and new registered owner, had demanded for the former to vacate the property. 43 It is worth
noting that the absence of the first requisite assumes even more importance in the light of the
respondents’ claim that for decades, they have been occupying the subject lot as owners thereof.

Again, this Court stresses that to give the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant or
deforciant on the land, it is necessary that the complaint must sufficiently show such a statement of facts
as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, without
resort to parol testimony, as these proceedings are summary in nature. In short, the jurisdictional facts
must appear on the face of the complaint. When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible
entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was effected or how and when
dispossession started, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. 44

As an exception to the general rule, the respondents’ petition for nullification of the partition of Lot No.
1907-A can abate Carmencita’s suit for unlawful detainer.

In Amagan, the Court is emphatic that:

As a general rule, therefore, a pending civil action involving ownership of the same property does not
justify the suspension of ejectment proceedings. "The underlying reasons for the above ruling were that
the actions in the Regional Trial Court did not involve physical or de facto possession, and, on not a few
occasions, that the case in the Regional Trial Court was merely a ploy to delay disposition of the
ejectment proceeding, or that the issues presented in the former could quite as easily be set up as
defenses in the ejectment action and there resolved."

Only in rare instances is suspension allowed to await the outcome of the pending civil action. One such
exception is Vda. de Legaspi v. Avendaño, wherein the Court declared:

"x x x. Where the action, therefore, is one of illegal detainer, as distinguished from one of forcible entry,
and the right of the plaintiff to recover the premises is seriously placed in issue in a proper judicial
proceeding, it is more equitable and just and less productive of confusion and disturbance of physical
possession, with all its concomitant inconvenience and expenses. For the Court in which the issue of
legal possession, whether involving ownership or not, is brought to restrain, should a petition for
preliminary injunction be filed with it, the effects of any order or decision in the unlawful detainer case
in order to await the final judgment in the more substantive case involving legal possession or
ownership. It is only where there has been forcible entry that as a matter of public policy the right to
physical possession should be immediately set at rest in favor of the prior possession regardless of the
fact that the other party might ultimately be found to have superior claim to the premises involved,
thereby to discourage any attempt to recover possession thru force, strategy or stealth and without
resorting to the courts."

xxxx

Indisputably, the execution of the MCTC Decision would have resulted in the demolition of the house
subject of the ejectment suit; thus, by parity of reasoning, considerations of equity require the
suspension of the ejectment proceedings. We note that, like Vda. de Legaspi, the respondent’s suit is one
of unlawful detainer and not of forcible entry. And most certainly, the ejectment of petitioners would
mean a demolition of their house, a matter that is likely to create the "confusion, disturbance,
inconveniences and expenses" mentioned in the said exceptional case.

Necessarily, the affirmance of the MCTC Decision would cause the respondent to go through the whole
gamut of enforcing it by physically removing the petitioners from the premises they claim to have been
occupying since 1937. (Respondent is claiming ownership only of the land, not of the house.) Needlessly,
the litigants as well as the courts will be wasting much time and effort by proceeding at a stage wherein
the outcome is at best temporary, but the result of enforcement is permanent, unjust and probably
irreparable.

We should stress that respondent’s claim to physical possession is based not on an expired or a violated
contract of lease, but allegedly on "mere tolerance." Without in any way prejudging the proceedings for
the quieting of title, we deem it judicious under the present exceptional circumstances to suspend the
ejectment case.45 (Citations omitted)

The Court then quoted with favor the following portion of the Decision dated July 8, 1997, penned by
Associate Justice Artemio G. Tuquero in CA-G.R. No. 43611-SP, from which the Amagan case sprang:

"ONE. Private respondent Teodorico T. Marayag anchors his action for unlawful detainer on the theory
that petitioners’ possession of the property in question was by mere tolerance. However, in answer to
his demand letter dated April 13, 1996 x x x, petitioners categorically denied having any agreement with
him, verbal or written, asserting that they are ‘owners of the premises we are occupying at 108 J.P. Rizal
Street, San Vicente, Silang, Cavite.’ In other words, it is not merely physical possession but ownership as
well that is involved in this case.["]

"TWO. In fact, to protect their rights to the premises in question, petitioners filed an action for
reconveyance, quieting of title and damages against private respondents, docketed as Civil Case No. TG-
1682 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City. The issue of ownership is squarely raised in
this action. Undoubtedly, the resolution of this issue will be determinative of who is entitled to the
possession of the premises in question.["]

"THREE. The immediate execution of the judgment in the unlawful detainer case will include the removal
of the petitioners’ house [from] the lot in question.["]

"To the mind of the Court it is injudicious, nay inequitable, to allow demolition of petitioners’ house prior
to the determination of the question of ownership [of] the lot on which it stands." 46 (Citation omitted)

We find the doctrines enunciated in Amagan squarely applicable to the instant petition for reasons
discussed hereunder.
Carmencita’s complaint for unlawful detainer is anchored upon the proposition that the respondents
have been in possession of the subject lot by mere tolerance of the owners. The respondents, on the
other hand, raise the defense of ownership of the subject lot and point to the pendency of Civil Case No.
CEB-30548, a petition for nullification of the partition of Lot No. 1907-A, in which Carmencita and the
Heirs of Vicente were impleaded as parties. Further, should Carmencita’s complaint be granted, the
respondents’ house, which has been standing in the subject lot for decades, would be subject to
demolition. The foregoing circumstances, thus, justify the exclusion of the instant petition from the
purview of the general rule.

All told, we find no reversible error committed by the CA in dismissing Carmencita's complaint for
unlawful detainer. As discussed above, the jurisdictional requirement of possession by mere tolerance of
the owners had not been amply alleged and proven. Moreover, circumstances exist which justify the
abatement of the ejectment proceedings. Carmencita can ventilate her ownership claims in an action
more suited for the purpose. The respondents, on other hand, need not be exposed to the risk of having
their house demolished pending the resolution of their petition for nullification of the partition of Lot
No. 1907-A, where ownership over the subject lot is likewise presented as an issue.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is DENIED.

The Decision rendered on March 19, 2009 and Resolution issued on May 5, 2009 by the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 03489 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 80298 April 26, 1990

EDCA PUBLISHING & DISTRIBUTING CORP., petitioner,

vs.
THE SPOUSES LEONOR and GERARDO SANTOS, doing business under the name and style of "SANTOS
BOOKSTORE," and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

Emiliano S. Samson, R. Balderrama-Samson, Mary Anne B. Samson for petitioner.

Cendana Santos, Delmundo & Cendana for private respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

The case before us calls for the interpretation of Article 559 of the Civil Code and raises the particular
question of when a person may be deemed to have been "unlawfully deprived" of movable property in
the hands of another. The article runs in full as follows:

Art. 559. The possession of movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title. Nevertheless,
one who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof, may recover it from the person
in possession of the same.
If the possessor of a movable lost or of which the owner has been unlawfully deprived has acquired it in
good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid
therefor.

The movable property in this case consists of books, which were bought from the petitioner by an
impostor who sold it to the private respondents. Ownership of the books was recognized in the private
respondents by the Municipal Trial Court, 1 which was sustained by the Regional Trial Court, 2 which was
in turn sustained by the Court of Appeals. 3 The petitioner asks us to declare that all these courts have
erred and should be reversed.

This case arose when on October 5, 1981, a person identifying himself as Professor Jose Cruz placed an
order by telephone with the petitioner company for 406 books, payable on delivery. 4 EDCA prepared the
corresponding invoice and delivered the books as ordered, for which Cruz issued a personal check
covering the purchase price of P8,995.65. 5 On October 7, 1981, Cruz sold 120 of the books to private
respondent Leonor Santos who, after verifying the seller's ownership from the invoice he showed her,
paid him P1,700.00. 6

Meanwhile, EDCA having become suspicious over a second order placed by Cruz even before clearing of
his first check, made inquiries with the De la Salle College where he had claimed to be a dean and was
informed that there was no such person in its employ. Further verification revealed that Cruz had no
more account or deposit with the Philippine Amanah Bank, against which he had drawn the payment
check. 7 EDCA then went to the police, which set a trap and arrested Cruz on October 7, 1981.
Investigation disclosed his real name as Tomas de la Peña and his sale of 120 of the books he had
ordered from EDCA to the private respondents. 8

On the night of the same date, EDCA sought the assistance of the police in Precinct 5 at the UN Avenue,
which forced their way into the store of the private respondents and threatened Leonor Santos with
prosecution for buying stolen property. They seized the 120 books without warrant, loading them in a
van belonging to EDCA, and thereafter turned them over to the petitioner. 9

Protesting this high-handed action, the private respondents sued for recovery of the books after demand
for their return was rejected by EDCA. A writ of preliminary attachment was issued and the petitioner,
after initial refusal, finally surrendered the books to the private respondents. 10 As previously stated, the
petitioner was successively rebuffed in the three courts below and now hopes to secure relief from us.

To begin with, the Court expresses its disapproval of the arbitrary action of the petitioner in taking the
law into its own hands and forcibly recovering the disputed books from the private respondents. The
circumstance that it did so with the assistance of the police, which should have been the first to uphold
legal and peaceful processes, has compounded the wrong even more deplorably. Questions like the one
at bar are decided not by policemen but by judges and with the use not of brute force but of lawful
writs.

Now to the merits

It is the contention of the petitioner that the private respondents have not established their ownership
of the disputed books because they have not even produced a receipt to prove they had bought the
stock. This is unacceptable. Precisely, the first sentence of Article 559 provides that "the possession of
movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title," thus dispensing with further proof.
The argument that the private respondents did not acquire the books in good faith has been dismissed
by the lower courts, and we agree. Leonor Santos first ascertained the ownership of the books from the
EDCA invoice showing that they had been sold to Cruz, who said he was selling them for a discount
because he was in financial need. Private respondents are in the business of buying and selling books
and often deal with hard-up sellers who urgently have to part with their books at reduced prices. To
Leonor Santos, Cruz must have been only one of the many such sellers she was accustomed to dealing
with. It is hardly bad faith for any one in the business of buying and selling books to buy them at a
discount and resell them for a profit.

But the real issue here is whether the petitioner has been unlawfully deprived of the books because the
check issued by the impostor in payment therefor was dishonored.

In its extended memorandum, EDCA cites numerous cases holding that the owner who has been
unlawfully deprived of personal property is entitled to its recovery except only where the property was
purchased at a public sale, in which event its return is subject to reimbursement of the purchase price.
The petitioner is begging the question. It is putting the cart before the horse. Unlike in the cases invoked,
it has yet to be established in the case at bar that EDCA has been unlawfully deprived of the books.

The petitioner argues that it was, because the impostor acquired no title to the books that he could have
validly transferred to the private respondents. Its reason is that as the payment check bounced for lack
of funds, there was a failure of consideration that nullified the contract of sale between it and Cruz.

The contract of sale is consensual and is perfected once agreement is reached between the parties on
the subject matter and the consideration. According to the Civil Code:

Art. 1475. The contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of minds upon the thing
which is the object of the contract and upon the price.

From that moment, the parties may reciprocally demand performance, subject to the provisions of the
law governing the form of contracts.

xxx xxx xxx

Art. 1477. The ownership of the thing sold shall be transferred to the vendee upon the actual or
constructive delivery thereof.

Art. 1478. The parties may stipulate that ownership in the thing shall not pass to the purchaser until he
has fully paid the price.

It is clear from the above provisions, particularly the last one quoted, that ownership in the thing sold
shall not pass to the buyer until full payment of the purchase only if there is a stipulation to that effect.
Otherwise, the rule is that such ownership shall pass from the vendor to the vendee upon the actual or
constructive delivery of the thing sold even if the purchase price has not yet been paid.

Non-payment only creates a right to demand payment or to rescind the contract, or to criminal
prosecution in the case of bouncing checks. But absent the stipulation above noted, delivery of the thing
sold will effectively transfer ownership to the buyer who can in turn transfer it to another.

In Asiatic Commercial Corporation v. Ang,11 the plaintiff sold some cosmetics to Francisco Ang, who in
turn sold them to Tan Sit Bin. Asiatic not having been paid by Ang, it sued for the recovery of the articles
from Tan, who claimed he had validly bought them from Ang, paying for the same in cash. Finding that
there was no conspiracy between Tan and Ang to deceive Asiatic the Court of Appeals declared:

Yet the defendant invoked Article 464 12 of the Civil Code providing, among other things that "one who
has been unlawfully deprived of personal property may recover it from any person possessing it." We do
not believe that the plaintiff has been unlawfully deprived of the cartons of Gloco Tonic within the scope
of this legal provision. It has voluntarily parted with them pursuant to a contract of purchase and sale.
The circumstance that the price was not subsequently paid did not render illegal a transaction which was
valid and legal at the beginning.

In Tagatac v. Jimenez,13 the plaintiff sold her car to Feist, who sold it to Sanchez, who sold it to Jimenez.
When the payment check issued to Tagatac by Feist was dishonored, the plaintiff sued to recover the
vehicle from Jimenez on the ground that she had been unlawfully deprived of it by reason of Feist's
deception. In ruling for Jimenez, the Court of Appeals held:

The point of inquiry is whether plaintiff-appellant Trinidad C. Tagatac has been unlawfully deprived of her
car. At first blush, it would seem that she was unlawfully deprived thereof, considering that she was
induced to part with it by reason of the chicanery practiced on her by Warner L. Feist. Certainly,
swindling, like robbery, is an illegal method of deprivation of property. In a manner of speaking, plaintiff-
appellant was "illegally deprived" of her car, for the way by which Warner L. Feist induced her to part
with it is illegal and is punished by law. But does this "unlawful deprivation" come within the scope of
Article 559 of the New Civil Code?

xxx xxx xxx

. . . The fraud and deceit practiced by Warner L. Feist earmarks this sale as a voidable contract (Article
1390 N.C.C.). Being a voidable contract, it is susceptible of either ratification or annulment. If the
contract is ratified, the action to annul it is extinguished (Article 1392, N.C.C.) and the contract is
cleansed from all its defects (Article 1396, N.C.C.); if the contract is annulled, the contracting parties are
restored to their respective situations before the contract and mutual restitution follows as a
consequence (Article 1398, N.C.C.).

However, as long as no action is taken by the party entitled, either that of annulment or of ratification,
the contract of sale remains valid and binding. When plaintiff-appellant Trinidad C. Tagatac delivered the
car to Feist by virtue of said voidable contract of sale, the title to the car passed to Feist. Of course, the
title that Feist acquired was defective and voidable. Nevertheless, at the time he sold the car to Felix
Sanchez, his title thereto had not been avoided and he therefore conferred a good title on the latter,
provided he bought the car in good faith, for value and without notice of the defect in Feist's title (Article
1506, N.C.C.). There being no proof on record that Felix Sanchez acted in bad faith, it is safe to assume
that he acted in good faith.

The above rulings are sound doctrine and reflect our own interpretation of Article 559 as applied to the
case before us.

Actual delivery of the books having been made, Cruz acquired ownership over the books which he could
then validly transfer to the private respondents. The fact that he had not yet paid for them to EDCA was
a matter between him and EDCA and did not impair the title acquired by the private respondents to the
books.
One may well imagine the adverse consequences if the phrase "unlawfully deprived" were to be
interpreted in the manner suggested by the petitioner. A person relying on the seller's title who buys a
movable property from him would have to surrender it to another person claiming to be the original
owner who had not yet been paid the purchase price therefor. The buyer in the second sale would be
left holding the bag, so to speak, and would be compelled to return the thing bought by him in good
faith without even the right to reimbursement of the amount he had paid for it.

It bears repeating that in the case before us, Leonor Santos took care to ascertain first that the books
belonged to Cruz before she agreed to purchase them. The EDCA invoice Cruz showed her assured her
that the books had been paid for on delivery. By contrast, EDCA was less than cautious — in fact, too
trusting in dealing with the impostor. Although it had never transacted with him before, it readily
delivered the books he had ordered (by telephone) and as readily accepted his personal check in
payment. It did not verify his identity although it was easy enough to do this. It did not wait to clear the
check of this unknown drawer. Worse, it indicated in the sales invoice issued to him, by the printed terms
thereon, that the books had been paid for on delivery, thereby vesting ownership in the buyer.

Surely, the private respondent did not have to go beyond that invoice to satisfy herself that the books
being offered for sale by Cruz belonged to him; yet she did. Although the title of Cruz was presumed
under Article 559 by his mere possession of the books, these being movable property, Leonor Santos
nevertheless demanded more proof before deciding to buy them.

It would certainly be unfair now to make the private respondents bear the prejudice sustained by EDCA
as a result of its own negligence.1âwphi1 We cannot see the justice in transferring EDCA's loss to the
Santoses who had acted in good faith, and with proper care, when they bought the books from Cruz.

While we sympathize with the petitioner for its plight, it is clear that its remedy is not against the private
respondents but against Tomas de la Peña, who has apparently caused all this trouble. The private
respondents have themselves been unduly inconvenienced, and for merely transacting a customary deal
not really unusual in their kind of business. It is they and not EDCA who have a right to complain.

WHEREFORE, the challenged decision is AFFIRMED and the petition is DENIED, with costs against the
petitioner.

Narvasa, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.