G.R. No.

147703 April 14, 2004

PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Facts: Napoleon Roman was found guilty and convicted of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to
triple homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to property and was sentenced to suffer
imprisonment and to pay damages. The court further ruled that in the event of the insolvency of
accused, petitioner shall be liable for the civil liabilities of the accused. Evidently, the judgment against
accused had become final and executory.

Admittedly, accused had jumped bail and remained at-large. The CA ruled that the institution of a
criminal case implied the institution also of the civil action arising from the offense. Thus, once
determined in the criminal case against the accused-employee, the employer’s subsidiary civil liability as
set forth in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code becomes conclusive and enforceable.

Issue: Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of its accused-employee,
may appeal the judgment of conviction independently of the accused.

Held: No. It is well-established in our jurisdiction that the appellate court may, upon motion or motu
proprio, dismiss an appeal during its pendency if the accused jumps bail. This rule is based on the
rationale that appellants lose their standing in court when they abscond.

2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure has clarified what civil actions are deemed instituted in a criminal
prosecution. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising
from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the
criminal action.

Only the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime charged is deemed impliedly instituted in a
criminal action; that is, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it
separately, or institutes it prior to the criminal action. Hence, the subsidiary civil liability of the employer
under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code may be enforced by execution on the basis of the judgment
of conviction meted out to the employee.
What is deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil liability arising from the crime or
delict per se, but not those liabilities arising from quasi-delicts, contracts or quasi-contracts. In fact, even
if a civil action is filed separately, the ex delicto civil liability in the criminal prosecution remains, and the
offended party may -- subject to the control of the prosecutor -- still intervene in the criminal action, in
order to protect the remaining civil interest therein.

The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare that, strictly speaking, they
are not parties to the criminal cases instituted against their employees. Although in substance and in
effect, they have an interest therein, this fact should be viewed in the light of their subsidiary liability.
While they may assist their employees to the extent of supplying the latter’s lawyers, as in the present
case, the former cannot act independently on their own behalf, but can only defend the accused.

As a matter of law, the subsidiary liability of petitioner now accrues. Under Article 103 of the Revised
Penal Code, employers are subsidiarily liable for the adjudicated civil liabilities of their employees in the
event of the latter’s insolvency. Thus, in the dispositive portion of its decision, the trial court need not
expressly pronounce the subsidiary liability of the employer. In the absence of any collusion between the
accused-employee and the offended party, the judgment of conviction should bind the person who is
subsidiarily liable. In effect and implication, the stigma of a criminal conviction surpasses mere civil
liability.

To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a criminal case would enable them to amend,
nullify or defeat a final judgment rendered by a competent court. By the same token, to allow them to
appeal the final criminal conviction of their employees without the latter’s consent would also result in
improperly amending, nullifying or defeating the judgment. The decision convicting an employee in a
criminal case is binding and conclusive upon the employer not only with regard to the former’s civil
liability, but also with regard to its amount. The liability of an employer cannot be separated from that of
the employee.

The subsidiary liability of petitioner is incidental to and dependent on the pecuniary civil liability of the
accused-employee. Since the civil liability of the latter has become final and enforceable by reason of his
flight, then the former’s subsidiary civil liability has also become immediately enforceable. Respondent is
correct in arguing that the concept of subsidiary liability is highly contingent on the imposition of the
primary civil liability.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed Resolutions AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, EUGENIO LOPEZ, JR., AUGUSTO

ALMEDA-LOPEZ, and OSCAR M. LOPEZ, Petitioners, versus OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, ROBERTO S.
BENEDICTO,* EXEQUIEL B. GARCIA, MIGUEL V. GONZALES, and SALVADOR (BUDDY) TAN,*
Respondents.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

2008-10-15 | G.R. No. 133347

FACTS: The day after the declaration of martial law, or on September 22, 1972, just before midnight,
military troops arrived at the ABS-CBN Broadcast Center ordering the closure of all radio and television
stations in the country.

Corollary thereto, sometime in November 1972, Eugenio Lopez, Jr., then president of ABS-CBN, wrote
then Secretary of National Defense, Juan Ponce Enrile, of their desire to sell ABS-CBN to the government.
In that same month, however, Eugenio Lopez, Jr. was arrested by the military, and detained at Fort
Bonifacio for almost five (5) years until his escape therefrom on September 30, 1977.

Subsequently, after the proposal to sell ABS-CBN to the Marcos government did not materialize,

On even date, both Benedicto and Alfredo Montelibano, relaying his plan to temporarily use

ABS-CBN's broadcast studios in Quezon City, from which to operate TV Channel 9, for such period of time
as may be necessary to rebuild KBS' burned studios.

In June 1986, President Corazon Aquino, acting on the request of ABS-CBN through Senator Tañada,
returned to ABS-CBN these radio and TV stations on a gradual and scheduled basis.

As required by the Ombudsman, the respondents, except for Garcia, filed their respective counter-
affidavits, with Benedicto adopting that of Gonzales', denying petitioners' charges.

Thereafter, with the issues having been joined, the Ombudsman issued the herein assailed Joint
Resolution dismissing petitioners' complaints. To the Ombudsman, the following circumstances did not
give rise to probable cause necessary to indict respondents for the various felonies charged.

On April 5, 1999 and June 13, 2000, the respective counsel for respondents Tan and Benedicto, in
compliance with Section 16,11 Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, filed pleadings informing the Court of their
clients' demise. Benedicto's counsel filed a Notice of Death (With Prayer for Dismissal) 12 moving that
Benedicto be dropped as respondent in the instant case for the reason "that the pending criminal cases
subject of this appeal are actions which do not survive the death of the party accused."
Petitioners opposed the move to drop Benedicto as respondent, citing Torrijos v. Court of
Appeals13 which held that "civil liability of the accused survives his death; because death is not a valid
cause for the extinguishment of civil obligations."

ISSUES:

1.WON respondent Benedicto may be dropped in the instant case for reason “that the pending criminal
cases subject of this appeal are actions which do not survive the death of the party accused

2.whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners' complaint
against the respondents.

RULING:

Our ruling on this issue need not be arduous. The rules on whether the civil liability of an accused, upon
death, is extinguished together with his criminal liability, has long been clarified and settled in the case
of People v. Bayotas:14

1. Death of an accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the
civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the
accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising
from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."

2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may
also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates
these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or
omission:

a) Law

b) Contracts

c) Quasi-contracts

d) x x x

e) Quasi-delicts

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may
be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure15 as amended. The separate civil action may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which
the same is based as explained above.

4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action
by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction,
the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of
limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case,
conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any
apprehension on a possible [de]privation of right by prescription.
Applying the foregoing rules, ABS-CBN's insistence that the case at bench survives because the civil
liability of the respondents subsists is stripped of merit.

To begin with, there is no criminal case as yet against the respondents. The Ombudsman did not find
probable cause to prosecute respondents for various felonies in the RPC. As such, the rule that a civil
action is deemed instituted along with the criminal action unless the offended party: (a) waives the civil
action, (b) reserves the right to institute it separately, or (c) institutes the civil action prior to the criminal
action,16 is not applicable.

In any event, consistent with People v. Bayotas,17 the death of the accused necessarily calls for the
dismissal of the criminal case against him, regardless of the institution of the civil case with it. The civil
action which survives the death of the accused must hinge on other sources of obligation provided in
Article 1157 of the Civil Code. In such a case, a surviving civil action against the accused founded on
other sources of obligation must be prosecuted in a separate civil action. In other words, civil liability
based solely on the criminal action is extinguished, and a different civil action cannot be continued
and prosecuted in the same criminal action.

Significantly, this Court in Benedicto v. Court of Appeals,18 taking cognizance of respondent Benedicto's
death on May 15, 2000, has ordered that the latter be dropped as a party, and declared extinguished any
criminal as well as civil liability ex delicto that might be attributable to him in Criminal Cases Nos. 91-
101879 to 91-101883, 91-101884 to 101892, and 92-101959 to 92-101969 pending before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila.

Lastly, we note that petitioners appear to have already followed our ruling in People v. Bayotas19 by
filing a separate civil action to enforce a claim against the estate of respondent Benedicto. 20 The claim
against the estate of Benedicto is based on contract-the June 8, 1973 letter- agreement-in consonance
with Section 5,21 Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. Plainly, the dropping of respondents Benedicto and Tan
as parties herein is in order.

2. We rule in the negative and, accordingly, dismiss the petition.

We cannot overemphasize the fact that the Ombudsman is a constitutional officer duty bound to
"investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official,
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or
inefficient." The raison d 'etre for its creation and endowment of broad investigative authority is to
insulate it from the long tentacles of officialdom that are able to penetrate judges' and fiscals' offices,
and others involved in the prosecution of erring public officials, and through the execution of official
pressure and influence, quash, delay, or dismiss investigations into malfeasances and misfeasances
committed by public officers.

Indeed, the Ombudsman is empowered to determine whether there exist reasonable grounds to believe
that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file
the corresponding information with the appropriate courts. The Ombudsman may thus conduct an
investigation if the complaint filed is found to be in the proper form and substance. Conversely, the
Ombudsman may also dismiss the complaint should it be found insufficient in form or substance.

Unless there are good and compelling reasons to do so, the Court will refrain from interfering with the
exercise of the Ombudsman's powers, and respect the initiative and independence inherent in the latter
who, beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people and the preserver of the integrity of public
service.

The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the
Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions of
the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory
proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in
much the same way that the courts would be extremely swamped if they would be compelled to review
the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file
an information in court or dismiss a complaint by private complainants.

As petitioners have ratified the letter-agreement, even after the lifting of martial law and the toppling of
the Marcos government, and advanced the validity of the letter-agreement in their claim against the
estate of Benedicto, they cannot, in the same breath, aver that respondents' actuations in the execution
of the letter-agreement were criminal in nature, or that the letter-agreement was more ostensible than
real and to insist on the prosecution of respondents for felonies supposedly committed in connection
with this ubiquitous letter-agreement.[30]

In fine, the Ombudsman did not abuse his discretion in determining that the allegations of petitioners
against respondents are civil in nature, bereft of criminal character. Perforce, he was correct in dismissing
petitioners' complaint-affidavits.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Roberto S. Benedicto and Salvador
Tan are dropped as private respondents without prejudice to the filing of separate civil actions against
their respective estates. The assailed Joint Resolution and Order of the Ombudsman in OMB-0-94-1109
are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JORIE WAHIMAN y RAYOS (EN BANC)
G.R. No. 200942 June 16, 2015
G.R. No. 200942 June 16, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
JORIE WAHIMAN y RAYOS, Accused-Appellant.

RESOLUTION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Facts:

On April 2, 2003, Jose Buensuceso, the manager of Stanfilco-Dole, Phils. in Malaybalay City, was on his
way back to the company staff house on board his Isuzu pick-up after attending a despedida for one of
his employees. When he was about to enter the gate of the staff house, he was gunned down by persons
riding in tandem on a black motorcycle. The guard on duty, David Azucena, who was then opening the
gate identified one of the assailants as herein appellant. During trial, the prosecution submitted in
evidence the extrajudicial confession of appellant taken during the preliminary investigation of the case,
admitting the killing of Buensuceso.

However, when it was appellant’s turn to testify, he narrated that at the time of the killing, he was at
Landing Casisang, Malaybalay City attending the birthday celebration of his brother-in-law. The RTC
rendered its Decision finding appellant guilty as charged. On appeal, the CA found no reason to depart
from the trial court’s findings.

Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution was able to prove petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Ruling:

Yes, the prosecution was able to prove petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The Revised Penal Code provides the elements of murder, to wit:
(1) Person was killed;
(2) Accused killed him;
(3) Killing attended by any of the following qualifying circumstances –
(b) in consideration of a price, reward or promise.

In the present case, the Court held that appellant’s contention that he lacked legal intervention and
assistance during the taking of his extrajudicial confession was totally belied by the testimony of Atty.
Dumlao that he rendered assistance to the appellant throughout the entire proceedings and carefully
explained to the latter the consequences of his admission. He informed appellant of his rights and that
anything he says may be used in evidence against him. Appellant then proceeded to narrate that he was
hired by Laranjo and Canadilla, for and in behalf of a certain Alonzo who owns a quarry in San Isidro,
Valencia, to kill the victim for a fee. Appellant then narrated how he met with Laranjo, Canadilla and
Alonzo; how he received payments and instructions; how he planned the killing; and how he executed
the plan. Appellant insisted on giving his extrajudicial confession.

Notwithstanding, it must be stressed that appellant’s conviction was not based solely on his extrajudicial
confession. The prosecution likewise presented the eyewitness account of Azucena who testified that
immediately after hearing gunshots, he saw appellant about five meters away from the Isuzu pick-up of
the victim. Appellant was riding in tandem aboard a black motorcycle and was holding a gun. The
ballistic report also confirmed that the slugs found at the crime scene were fired from the firearm earlier
confiscated from the appellant.Moreover, appellant was not able to establish that it was physically
impossible for him to be present at the crime scene at the time of its commission.

Hence, the prosecution was able to prove petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the assailed October 13, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR H.C. No.
00830-MIN finding appellant Jorie Wahiman y Rayos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS in that appellant is not eligible for parole; the award for lost
earnings is reduced to ₱9,878,100.00; the award of actual damages is deleted; in lieu thereof, appellant
is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages; he is likewise ordered to pay
the heirs of the victim exemplary damages in the amount of ₱30,000.00; and all damages awarded shall
earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of this resolution until full payment.

SO ORDERED.

Ricarze v. CA, G.R. No. 151785, Dec. 10, 2007

Crim Pro - Rule 110

G.R. No. 160451 February 9, 2007

EDUARDO G. RICARZE, Petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, CALTEX PHILIPPINES, INC., PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL
AND INDUSTRIAL BANK (PCIBANK), Respondents.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Facts:

Eduardo Ricarze was a collector-messenger of City Service Corporation. He was assigned to collect
checks payable to Caltex. He then opened a bank account in the name of Dante Gutierrez, a regular
customer of caltex. He did so by forging the signatures of the dorsal portions of the stolen check and
deposited it in that same bank account. Upon knowledge of his crimes, he was charged by the officers of
Caltex with estafa through falsification of commercial documents.
 In the original infomation filed by the prosecutor, Caltex appeared to be the only offended party
because the prosecutor was not informed that PCI Bank credited certain amount to Caltex.

After the arraignment and enter of plea, PCIBank appeared as the complainant. Then, Ricarze
averred that the information can no longer be amended because he had already been arraigned under
the original information, and that doing so would place him in double jeopardy.

PCIBank argued that it had re-credited the amount to Caltex to the extent of the indemnity; hence,
the PCIB had been subrogated to the rights and interests of Caltex as private complainant.

Issue: Whether or not an information can be amended even after the accused had been arraigned and
had entered his plea.

Held:

A separate action for the purpose would only prove to be costly, burdensome and time-consuming for
both parties and further delay the final disposition of the case. The multiplicity of suits must be avoided.
With the implied institution of the civil action in the criminal action, the two actions are merged into one
composite proceeding, with the criminal action predominating the civil. The prime purpose of the
criminal action is to punish the offender in order to deter him and others from committing the same or
similar offense, to isolate him from society, reform and rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social
order.21

On the other hand, the sole purpose of the civil action is for the resolution, reparation or indemnification
of the private offended party for the damage or injury he sustained by reason of the delictual or
felonious act of the accused.22 Under Article 104 of the Revised Penal Code, the following are the civil
liabilities of the accused:

ART. 104. What is included in civil liability. – The civil liability established in Articles 100, 101, 102 and
103 of this Code includes:

1. Restitution;

2. Reparation of the damage caused;

3. Indemnification for consequential damages.

Yes, because the amendment in the name of the complainant is one of form. Before the accused enters
his plea, a formal or substantial amendment of the complaint or information may be made without leave
of court. After the entry of a plea, only a formal amendment may be made but with leave of court and if
it does not prejudice the rights of the accused. After arraignment, a substantial amendment is proscribed
except if the same is beneficial to the accused.
 The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment is whether a defense under the
information as it originally stood would be available after the amendment is made, and whether any
evidence defendant might have would be equally applicable to the information in the one form as in the
other. An amendment to an information which does not change the nature of the crime alleged therein
does not affect the essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to
meet the new averment had each been held to be one of form and not of substance.

In the case at bar, the substitution of Caltex by PCIB as private complaint is not a substantial
amendment. The substitution did not alter the basis of the charge in both Informations, nor did it result
in any prejudice to petitioner. The documentary evidence in the form of the forged checks remained the
same, and all such evidence was available to petitioner well before the trial. Thus, he cannot claim any
surprise by virtue of the substitution.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are
AFFIRMED. This case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 63, for further
proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 149357. March 04, 2005

MOBILIA PRODUCTS, INC., Petitioners,

vs.
HAJIME UMEZAWA, Respondent.

G.R. No. 149403. March 04, 2005

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUDGE RUMOLDO R. FERNANDEZ and HAJIME UMEZAWA, Responde

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Umezawa, then the President and General Manager of MPI, organized another company with his
wifeKimiko, and his sister, Mitsuyo Yaguchi, to be known as Astem Philippines Corporation,
withoutknowledge of the Board of Directors of MPI. The said company would be engaged in the same
businessas Mobilia. Umezawa stole products from MPI amounting to P3,219,875.00.MPI and public
prosecutor filed criminal complaints against Umezawa. The trial court asserted that thecontroversy
involving the criminal cases was between Umezawa and the other stockholders of MPI. It also held
that the SEC, not the trial court, had jurisdiction over intra-corporate controversies.CA affirmed the
ruling of the RTC that the dispute between Umezawa and the other stockholders and officers over the
implementation of the MPI’s standard procedure is intra-corporate in nature; hence,within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the SEC. The petitioner MPI filed the instant petition for review oncertiorari

.ISSUE:WON CA is correct.

petitioner People of the Philippines insists that while the public prosecutor did not expressly conform to
the motion for reconsideration of the January 29, 1999 Joint Order of the trial court filed by the private
prosecutor, through the public prosecutor’s presence during the hearing of the said motion, his
supervision and control over the private prosecutor during the said hearing, he in effect adopted and
conformed to the said motion for reconsideration.

HELD:

The contention of the petitioner People of the Philippines is not correct. All criminal actions commenced
by complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the public
prosecutor.16 When the civil action for civil liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule
111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the offended party may intervene, by counsel, in the
prosecution of the offense.17 In Ramiscal, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,18 we held that under Section 16, Rule 110
of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the offended party may intervene in the criminal action personally or
by counsel, who will then act as private prosecutor for the protection of his interests and in the interest
of the speedy and inexpensive administration of justice. A separate action for the purpose would only
prove to be costly, burdensome and time-consuming for both parties and further delay the final
disposition of the case. The multiplicity of suits must be avoided. With the implied institution of the civil
action in the criminal action, the two actions are merged into one composite proceeding, with the
criminal action predominating the civil. The prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the
offender in order to deter him and others from committing the same or similar offense, to isolate him
from society, reform and rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social order. 19

The intervention of the private offended party, through counsel, and his prosecution of the case shall be
under the control and supervision of the public prosecutor until the final termination of the case. A
public prosecutor who has been entrusted by law with the prosecution of criminal cases is duty-bound to
take charge thereof until its final termination, for under the law, he assumes full responsibility for his
failure or success since he is the one more adequately prepared to pursue it to its termination. 20 The
prosecution of offenses is a public function. Indeed, the sole purpose of the civil action is the resolution,
reparation or indemnification of the private offended party for the damage or injury he sustained by
reason of the delictual or felonious act of the accused. 21 Under Article 104 of the Revised Penal Code,
the following are the civil liabilities of the accused:

ART. 104. What is included in civil liability.— The civil liability established in Articles 100, 101, 102 and
103 of this Code includes:

1. Restitution;

2. Reparation of the damage caused;

3. Indemnification for consequential damages.

Thus, when the offended party, through counsel, has asserted his right to intervene in the proceedings, it
is error to consider his appearance merely as a matter of tolerance. 22

The public prosecutor may turn over the actual prosecution of the criminal case, in the exercise of his
discretion, but he may, at any time, take over the actual conduct of the trial. However, it is necessary that
the public prosecutor be present at the trial until the final termination of the case; otherwise, if he is
absent, it cannot be gainsaid that the trial is under his supervision and control. 23

In a criminal case in which the offended party is the State, the interest of the private complainant or the
offended party is limited to the civil liability arising therefrom. Hence, if a criminal case is dismissed by
the trial court or if there is an acquittal, a reconsideration of the order of dismissal or acquittal may be
undertaken, whenever legally feasible, insofar as the criminal aspect thereof is concerned and may be
made only by the public prosecutor; or in the case of an appeal, by the State only, through the OSG. The
private complainant or offended party may not undertake such motion for reconsideration or appeal on
the criminal aspect of the case.24 However, the offended party or private complainant may file a motion
for reconsideration of such dismissal or acquittal or appeal therefrom but only insofar as the civil aspect
thereof is concerned.25 In so doing, the private complainant or offended party need not secure the
conformity of the public prosecutor. If the court denies his motion for reconsideration, the private
complainant or offended party may appeal or file a petition for certiorari or mandamus, if grave abuse
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction is shown and the aggrieved party has no right of appeal or
given an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

The public and private prosecutors are not precluded, whenever feasible, from filing a joint motion for
the reconsideration of the dismissal of the case or the acquittal of the accused, on the criminal and civil
aspects of the cases.
In the present case, only petitioner MPI, through counsel, filed a motion for the reconsideration of the
trial court’s Joint Order dated January 29, 1999, praying for the reinstatement of the cases insofar as the
civil aspect thereof is concerned. The public prosecutor did not approve nor conform to the said motion.
Although petitioner MPI provided ample space for the said conformity of the public prosecutor, the
latter did not do so; he merely appeared during the hearing of the said motion with the private
prosecutor when the latter presented his oral arguments in support of the said motion.

The fact that the public prosecutor did not conform to the said motion, however, does not mean that the
same is pro forma. It must be stressed that the propriety and efficacy of the motion, insofar as the civil
aspect of the cases is concerned, is not dependent upon the conformity of the public prosecutor. Hence,
the filing of the joint motion for reconsideration effectively suspended the running of the period for
petitioner MPI to assail the joint order in the CA via an appeal or a special civil action
for certiorari or mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

However, since the public prosecutor did not file any motion for the reconsideration of the joint order
nor conform to the motion of petitioner MPI, insofar as the criminal aspect of the cases is concerned,
the period for the State to assail the said joint order was not suspended. Only the motion for
reconsideration filed by the public prosecutor of the joint order of dismissal of the cases could have
tolled the period within which the State could appeal, insofar as the criminal aspect of the cases was
concerned. The bare fact that the public prosecutor appeared for the State during the hearing of the
motion for reconsideration of petitioner MPI does not amount to or constitute his adoption of the said
motion as that of the State. As ruled by this Court in Cabral v. Puno:26

While it is true that the offended party, Silvino San Diego, through the private prosecutor, filed a motion
for reconsideration within the reglementary fifteen-day period, such move did not stop the running of
the period for appeal. He did not have the legal personality to appeal or file the motion for
reconsideration on his behalf. The prosecution in a criminal case through the private prosecutor is under
the direction and control of the Fiscal, and only the motion for reconsideration or appeal filed by the
Fiscal could have interrupted the period for appeal. 27

We agree with the ruling of the CA that the petition for certiorari filed by the petitioner People of the
Philippines with the CA on April 26, 1999 was filed beyond the 60-day period as provided in Section 4,
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, 28 it appearing that the public prosecutor received a copy of the joint order
of the trial court on February 2, 1999, and, thus, had only until April 3, 1999 within which to file the said
petition.

Even then, the Court still holds that the CA erred in dismissing the petition of the People of the
Philippines simply because the public prosecutor erred in not himself filing a motion for reconsideration
of the joint order of the trial court, on his perception that by being present during the hearing of the
motion for reconsideration of petitioner MPI, he thereby adopted the said motion as that of the State’s.
The settled rule is that the State is not estopped by the mistakes of its officers and employees. Indeed,
in Cruz, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,29 the Court declared:

… Estoppel does not lie against the government because of the supposedly mistaken acts or omissions of
its agents. As we declared in People v. Castañeda, "there is the long familiar rule that erroneous
application and enforcement of the law by public officers do not block subsequent correct application of
the statute and that the government is never estopped by mistake or error on the part of its agents."
The Court also held in Chua v. Court of Appeals:30

… While ordinarily, certiorari is unavailing where the appeal period has lapsed, there are exceptions.
Among them are (a) when public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictates; (b) when the
broader interest of justice so requires; (c) when the writs issued are null and void; or (d) when the
questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority. …31

Patently, then, based on the material allegations of the Informations, the courta quo had
exclusive jurisdiction over the crimes charged. CA erred in holding that the dispute between it and the
respondentis intra-corporate in nature; hence, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the SEC. As gleaned
from thematerial allegations of the Informations, the RTC had exclusive jurisdiction over
the crimescharged. According to Section 20 of B.P. Blg. 129 Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or
body,except those now falling under the exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
whichshall hereafter be exclusively taken cognizance of by the latter.Case law has it that in order to
determine the jurisdiction of the court in criminal cases, the complaint orInformation must be examined
for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not the facts set out thereinand the prescribed period
provided for by law are within the jurisdiction of the court, and where thesaid Information or complaint
is filed. It is settled that the jurisdiction of the court in criminal cases isdetermined by the allegations of
the complaint or Information and not by the findings based on theevidence of the court after trial.
Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by the law in forceat the time of the filing of the
Information or complaint. Once jurisdiction is vested in the court, it isretained up to the end of the
litigation.

G.R. No. 191256 September 18, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
GARY ALINAO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Facts:

Gary Alinao and his son, Jocel Alinao (at large), was found guilty of murder, with the use of illegally
possessed firearm. Alinao set on fire the house of the victim Artonio Ardet, who was his brother in law,
and then shot him seven times at the face when he came out from the burning house which caused the
victim’s instant death.

Nestor Ardet, half-brother of the victim Antonio Ardet, testified that on February 27, 2006 at around
11:00 p.m., he was inside his house, which was eight meters away from the house of the deceased
Antonio Ardet. He was awakened by the barking of dogs. He stood and slowly opened his window, and
saw Antonio Ardet’s house burning. Gary Alinao was pointing his gun at the door of Antonio Ardet, with
Jocel Alinao behind him.

Antonio Ardet tried to get out of his house, but Gary Alinao shot him and fell inside the burning house.

Gary Alinao is sentenced to reclusion perpetua and was ordered to pay the aggrieved party the sum of
FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) by way of civil indemnity for the death of Antonio Ardet, plus
moral damages in the amount of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS(P120,000.00) and actual
and exemplary damages in the amount of SEVENTY-FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P75,000.00) and
THIRTYTHOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00) respectively. On appeal, CA modified the amount of damages to
be paid to the victim’s heir as follows: P75,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto, P50,000.00 as moral
damages, and P25,000.00 as temperate damages.The award of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages was
deleted on the ground the no aggravating circumstance was established in evidence.

ISSUE: Whether or not evident premedition should be considered

Ruling of the Supreme Court on Exemplary Damages:

Accused-appellant likewise claims that there was no evidence categorically showing evident
premeditation.

For evident premeditation to be appreciated, the following elements must be proved: a) the time when
the accused determined to commit the crime; b) an act manifestly indicating that the accused has clung
to his determination; and, c) sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution to allow
him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. 49 The essence of evident premeditation is that the
execution of the criminal act must be preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to
carryout the criminal intent during a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. 50
Supreme Court ruled that an award of exemplary damages is justified if an aggravating circumstance,
either qualifying or generic, accompanies the crime. In the case at bar, the qualifying circumstance of
evident premeditation was duly alleged in the Information and proved during the trial. Therefore, in line
with current jurisprudence, SC reinstate the trial court's award of the amount of P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages to heirs of the victim.

Alinao, in razing Antonio Ardet’s house in order to drive him out and shooting him the moment he
appears at his front door, clearly had a previously and carefully crafted plan to kill his victim. The court
was convinced that the time it took accused-appellant and his son to device their plan, plot where the
gasoline should be poured, and procure the gasoline and the firearms, as well as the time it took to go to
Antonio Ardet’s house, and even the time when they waited for Antonio Ardet to come out of the house,
all afforded accused-appellant sufficient opportunity to reflect upon the consequences of his act to kill
his brother-in-law and his determination to commit the cold-blooded deed from the time of its
conception until it was carried out.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October28, 2009 in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03567,
which affirmed with modification the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Luna, Apayao in Crim. Case
No. 38-2006 finding accused-appellant Gary Alinao GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder is hereby AFFIRMED, with MODIFICATION reinstating the trial court's award of the amount of P-
30,000.00 as exemplary damages to the heirs of the victim, Antonio Ardet. Accused-appellant Gary
Alinao is likewise ORDERED to pay the heirs of Antonio Ardet interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%)
per annum on all the amounts of damages awarded, commencing from the date of finality of this
Decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

GR No. 191240, July 30, 2014

CRISTINA B. CASTILLO, Petitioner,

vs.

PHILLIP R. SALVADOR, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Facts:

Petition for review on certiorari which assails the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) with respect only
to the civil aspect of the case as respondent Phillip R. Salvador had been acquitted of the crime of Estafa.

The respondent Phillip R. Salvador was charged with Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the
Revised Penal Code. While, petitioner Cristina B. Castillo is a businesswoman engaged in real
estate business, educational institution, boutique, and trading business. She was then enticed by
Salvador and his brother, Ramon Salvador to engage in freight and remittance business.

As petitioner had deeply fallen in love with respondent Salvador and since she trusted him very much as
he even acted as a father to her children while her annulment was ongoing, she agreed to embark on the
remittance business. She agreed with respondent and Ramon that any profit derived from the business
would be equally divided among them and that respondent would be in charge of promotion and
marketing in Hong Kong, and Ramon would take charge of the operations of business in the Philippines
and she would be financing the business.

The business has not operated yet as petitioner was still raising the amount of US$100,000.00 as capital
for the actual operation. When petitioner already had the money, she handed the same to respondent
Salvador which was witnessed by her disabled half-brother Enrico B. Tan. However, the
proposed business never operated as respondent only stayed in Hong Kong for three days. When she
asked respondent about the money and the business, the latter told her that the money was deposited
in a bank. However, upon further query, respondent confessed that he used the money to pay for his
other obligations. Since then, the US$100,000.00 was not returned at all.

Respondent’s defense that he and petitioner became close friends and eventually fell in love and had an
affair. They traveled to Hong Kong and Bangkok where petitioner saw how popular he was among the
Filipino domestic helpers, which led her to suggest a remittance business. Although hesitant, he has
friends with such business. He denied that petitioner gave him US$10,000.00 when he went to Hong
Kong and Bangkok. After he came back from the United States, petitioner had asked him and his brother
Ramon for a meeting. During the meeting, petitioner brought up the money remittance business, but
Ramon told her that they should make a study of it first. He was introduced to Roy Singun, owner of a
money remittance business in Pasay City. Upon the advice of Roy, respondent and petitioner, her
husband and Ramon went to Palau. He denied receiving US$20,000.00 from petitioner but admitted that
it was petitioner who paid for the plane tickets. After their Palau trip, they went into training at Western
Union at the First World Center in Makati City. Ramon, petitioner and her mother went to Hong Kong to
register the business, while he took care of petitioner’s children here. He and Ramon went back to Hong
Kong but denied having received the amount of US$100,000.00 from petitioner but then admitted
receipt of the amount of P100, 000.00 which petitioner asked him to give to Charlie Chau as payment for
the pieces of diamond jewelry she got from him, which Chau had duly acknowledged. He denied Enrico’s
testimony that petitioner gave him the amount of US$100,000.00 in his mother’s house. He claimed that
no remittance business was started in Hong Kong as they had no license, equipment, personnel and
money to operate the same. Upon his return to the Philippines, petitioner never asked him about the
business, as she never gave him such amount. He intimated that he and petitioner even went to Hong
Kong again to buy some goods for the latter’s boutique. He admitted that he loved petitioner and her
children very much as there was a time when petitioner’s finances were short; he gave her P600, 000.00
for the enrollment of her children in very expensive schools. It is also not true that he and Ramon
initiated the Hong Kong and Bangkok trips

Petitioner files the instant petition on the civil aspect of the case alleging that even if the Court Of
Appeals decided to acquit him it should have at least retained the award of damages to the petitioner.

ISSUE:
WON the award of damages or the civil aspect be retained.

RULING:

The award of damages must be removed. Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects
on the civil liability of the accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author
of the actor omission complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has
been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be held liable for
such act or omission. There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the
civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict complained
of. This is the situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. The second instance is an
acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the
accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved
by preponderance of evidence only. This is the situation contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code,
where the civil action for damages is “for the same act or omission.

A reading of the CA decision would show that respondent was acquitted because the prosecution failed
to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Said the CA:

The evidence for the prosecution being insufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the crime as
charged had been committed by appellant, the general presumption, “that a person is innocent of the
crime or wrong, stands in his favor. The prosecution failed to prove that all the elements of Estafa are
present in this case as would overcome the presumption of innocence in favor of appellant. For in fact,
the prosecution’s primary witness herself could not even establish clearly and precisely how appellant
committed the alleged fraud. She failed to convince us that she was deceived through
misrepresentations and/or insidious actions, in venturing into a remittance business. Quite the contrary,
the obtaining circumstance in this case indicate the weakness of her submissions.

Thus, since the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt, respondent is not exempt from civil liability
which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. In Encinas v. National Bookstore, Inc., the
higher court explained the concept of preponderance of evidence as follows:

Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and
is usually considered to be synonymous with the term “greater weight of the evidence” or “greater
weight of the credible evidence.” Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in the last analysis,
means probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief
than that which is offered in opposition thereto.

However, in this case, no such civil liability is proved even by preponderance of evidence.

In discrediting petitioner’s allegation that she gave respondent US$100,000.00 in May 2002, the CA
found that: (1) petitioner failed to show how she was able to raise the money in such a short period of
time and even gave conflicting versions on the source of the same; (2) petitioner failed to require
respondent to sign a receipt so she could have a record of the transaction and offered no plausible
reason why the money was allegedly hand-carried to Hong Kong; (3) petitioner’s claim of trust as reason
for not requiring respondent to sign a receipt was inconsistent with the way she conducted her previous
transactions with him; and (4) petitioner’s behavior after the alleged fraud perpetrated against her was
inconsistent with the actuation of someone who had been swindled.
The petition for the award of damages is denied.

G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVA, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.

ROMERO, J.:

Facts:

Bayotas died on February 4, 1992 at the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory
arrest. Consequently, the Supreme Court in its Resolution of May 20, 1992 dismissed the criminal aspect
of the appeal. However, it required the Solicitor General to file its comment with regard to Bayotas' civil
liability arising from his commission of the offense charged.

Issue: WON the death of the accused Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability and civil liability based
solely on the act complained.

Held: Yes

Ratio:

The Supreme Court held that the death of the accused Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability
and civil liability based solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape. The Court ruled that: (1) death of the
accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability
based solely thereon; (2) the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the
same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict, such as law, contracts, quasi-
contracts or quasi-delicts; (3) where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action
for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure; and (4) the private offended party need not
fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the
prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted
together therewith the civil action for in such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is
deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case.

WHEREFORE, the appeal of the late Rogelio Bayotas is DISMISSED with costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

VILLEGAS VS. CA

G.R. No. 82562 April 11, 1997

LYDIA VILLEGAS, MA TERESITA VILLEGAS, ANTONIO VILLEGAS, JR., and ANTONIETTE VILLEGAS vs. THE
COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ANTONIO V. RAQUIZA

G.R. No. 82592 April 11, 1997

ANTONIO V. RAQUIZA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, LYDIA A. VILLEGAS, ANTONIO VILLEGAS, JR., MA.
ANTONETTE VILLEGAS, MA. LYDIA VILLEGAS and ESTATE OF ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS

ROMERO, J.:

FACTS: This case originated from a libel suit filed by then Assemblyman Antonio V. Raquiza against then
Manila Mayor Antonio J. Villegas, who allegedly publicly imputed to him acts constituting violations of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. He did this on several occasions in August 1968 xxx

An Information for libel was filed against Villegas who denied the charge. After losing in the 1971
elections, Villegas left for the United States where he stayed until his death. Nevertheless, trial
proceeded on absentia. Two months after the prosecution rested its case, the court issued an order
dismissing the criminal aspect of the case but reserving the right to resolve its civil aspect.
Subsequently the Court awarded Raquiza actual, moral, exemplary damages and cost of suit. On appeal,
the CA affirmed but reduced the amount of damages. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: (related to the subject matter) did the death of the accused before final judgment extinguish his
civil liability?

HELD: NO (Guys, take note of Article 33 of the Civil Code. Raquiza’s right to recover damages arose from
this article not from delict)
Fortunately, this Court has already settled this issue with the promulgation of the case of People v.
Bayotas (G.R. No. 102007) on September 2, 1994, 4 viz.:

1 Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the
civil liability xxx
2 Corollarily the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of (the) accused, if the same
may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code
enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the
same act or omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) x x x x x x x x x
e) Quasi-delicts

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may
be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. 8 This separate civil action may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator o(f) the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which
the same is based as explained above.

4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action
by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction,
the private offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of
limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case (Art.
1155)

The source of Villegas’ civil liability in the present case is the felonious act of libel he allegedly
committed. Yet, this act could also be deemed a quasi-delict within the purview of Article 33 9 in relation
to Article 1157 of the Civil Code.
The Bayotas ruling, however, makes the enforcement of a deceased accused’s civil liability dependent on
two factors, namely, that it be pursued by filing a separate civil action and that it be made subject to
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended.

Obviously, in the case at bar, the civil action was deemed instituted with the criminal. There was no
waiver of the civil action and no reservation of the right to institute the same, nor was it instituted prior
to the criminal action. What then is the recourse of the private offended party in a criminal case such as
this which must be dismissed in accordance with the Bayotas doctrine.
Now, where the civil action was impliedly instituted with it?

The answer is likewise provided in Bayatas, thus:

Assuming that for lack of express reservation, Belamala’s civil civil for damages was to be considered
instituted together with the criminal action still, since both proceedings were terminated without finals
adjudication, the civil action of the offended party under Article 33 may yet be enforced separately

The resolution of the civil aspect of the case after the dismissal of the main criminal action by the trial
court was technically defective. There was no proper substitution of parties, as correctly pointed out by
the Heirs and repeatedly put in issue by Atty. Quisumbing. What should have been followed by the court
a quo was the procedure laid down in the Rules of Court, specifically, Section 17, Rule 3, in connection
with Section 1, Rule 87.

WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 82562 is GRANTED and the petition in G.R. No. 82592 is DENIED xxx
without prejudice to the right of the private offended party Antonio V. Raquiza, to file the appropriate
civil action for damages against the executor or administrator of the estate or the heirs of the late
Antonto J. Villegas in accordance with the foregoing procedure.