Scratch Paper:

BAGATSING V COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION 246 SCRA 334

“The interpretation of an agency of its own rules should be given more weight than the
interpretation by that agency of the law it is merely tasked to administer.”

Record of the Constitutional Commission: Proceedings and Debates Vol. IV

MR. NOLLEDO. May I be permitted to ask a question?

What do we mean by “on the free consent and equality between spouses?” The marriage law which is
now found in the Supreme Court of the Philippines requires that marriage must be voluntary and free.
There is no problem about that. But about the word “equality,” I have some reservations. May I be
enlightened on what we mean by “equality”?

MR. VILLACORTA. This simply means that in a marital relationship, both the husband and the wife have
equal rights in that relationship, it is not a superior-subordinate relationship in which the wife or in
some cases the husband will be inferior in status and in rights compared to the other spouse

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 17, 1986

MR. VILLACORTA. Thank you for explaining that. But what we really mean when we speak of “equality of
both spouses” is not just the consent but the maintenance of equal status between the two partners in
marriage throughout the marital life.

Record of the Constitutional Commission: Proceedings and Debates Vol. V

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 24, 1986

MR. GASCON. What the Commissioner just read was with regards to the principle of encouraging the
fineness of the family, and I personally believe that marriage encourages a strong family although, there
have been also instances where families which were not founded on marriage have been successful. But
I agree with the Commissioner’s statement fully, Mr. Presiding Officer, that there is a lot of merit in
developing values and proper prospective in the family which would be beneficial to society in the long
run.

MR. TINGSON. Did I get the Commissioner right, Mr. Presiding Officer, when he said there are happy
families that are not founded on marriage?

MR. GASCON. There may be, Mr. Presiding Officer. However, as I said, marriage as an institution
encourages the development of a strong and firm family.

MR. TINGSON. But certainly, the amendment here which says: “the institution of marriage as the
foundation of the family,” is a positive suggestion that the family should be based on people who are
married to each other, man and wife, and not just living together without the sanctity of marriage.

~~

MS. NIEVA. Generally, I think, the accepted definition of marriage is the union of a man and a woman.
Source: Statutory Construction' 2003 Ed. By Ruben E. Agpalo

G.R. No. 202242 April 16, 2013

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner,

vs.
JUDICIALAND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C.
TUPAS, JR.,Respondents.

Facts:

The case is in relation to the process of selecting the nominees for the vacant seat of Supreme
Court Chief Justice following Renato Corona’s departure.

Originally, the members of the Constitutional Commission saw the need to create a separate,
competent and independent body to recommend nominees to the President. Thus, it conceived of a
body representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial appointment process and called it the
Judicial and Bar Council (JBC).

In particular, Paragraph 1 Section 8, Article VIII of the Constitution states that “(1) A Judicial and Bar
Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief
Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex
officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the
Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.” In compliance therewith, Congress, from
the moment of the creation of the JBC, designated one representative from the Congress to sit in the
JBC to act as one of the ex officio members.

In 1994 however, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered. Instead of having only seven
(7) members, an eighth (8th) member was added to the JBC as two (2) representatives from
Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the House of Representatives and one from the
Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. During the existence of the case, Senator Francis
Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sat in JBC
as representatives of the legislature.

It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition.

The respondents claimed that when the JBC was established, the framers originally envisioned a
unicameral legislative body, thereby allocating “a representative of the National Assembly” to the
JBC. The phrase, however, was not modified to aptly jive with the change to bicameralism which
was adopted by the Constitutional Commission on July 21, 1986. The respondents also contend that
if the Commissioners were made aware of the consequence of having a bicameral legislature
instead of a unicameral one, they would have made the corresponding adjustment in the
representation of Congress in the JBC; that if only one house of Congress gets to be a member of
JBC would deprive the other house of representation, defeating the principle of balance.

The respondents further argue that the allowance of two (2) representatives of Congress to be
members of the JBC does not render JBC’s purpose of providing balance nugatory; that the
presence of two (2) members from Congress will most likely provide balance as against the other six
(6) members who are undeniably presidential appointees

Supreme Court held that it has the power of review the case herein as it is an object of concern, not
just for a nominee to a judicial post, but for all the citizens who have the right to seek judicial
intervention for rectification of legal blunders.

Issue:

Whether the practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8) members, two (2) of whom are
members of Congress, defeats the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution.

Held:

No. The current practice of JBC in admitting two members of the Congress to perform the functions
of the JBC is violative of the 1987 Constitution. As such, it is unconstitutional.

One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are
clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction that the language
employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are
employed. As such, it can be clearly and unambiguously discerned from Paragraph 1, Section 8,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution that in the phrase, “a representative of Congress,” the use of the
singular letter “a” preceding “representative of Congress” is unequivocal and leaves no room for any
other construction. It is indicative of what the members of the Constitutional Commission had in
mind, that is, Congress may designate only one (1) representative to the JBC. Had it been the
intention that more than one (1) representative from the legislature would sit in the JBC, the Framers
could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided.

Moreover, under the maxim noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in
itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made clear and
specific by considering the company of words in which it is founded or with which it is associated.
Every meaning to be given to each word or phrase must be ascertained from the context of the body
of the statute since a word or phrase in a statute is always used in association with other words or
phrases and its meaning may be modified or restricted by the latter. Applying the foregoing principle
to this case, it becomes apparent that the word “Congress” used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the
Constitution is used in its generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the
Senate or the House of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular
representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC

Considering that the language of the subject constitutional provision is plain and unambiguous, there
is no need to resort extrinsic aids such as records of the Constitutional Commission. Nevertheless,
even if the Court should proceed to look into the minds of the members of the Constitutional
Commission, it is undeniable from the records thereof that it was intended that the JBC be
composed of seven (7) members only. The underlying reason leads the Court to conclude that a
single vote may not be divided into half (1/2), between two representatives of Congress, or among
any of the sitting members of the JBC for that matter.

With the respondents’ contention that each representative should be admitted from the Congress
and House of Representatives, the Supreme Court, after the perusal of the records of Constitutional
Commission, held that “Congress,” in the context of JBC representation, should be considered as
one body. While it is true that there are still differences between the two houses and that an inter-
play between the two houses is necessary in the realization of the legislative powers conferred to
them by the Constitution, the same cannot be applied in the case of JBC representation because no
liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. No mechanism is required
between the Senate and the House of Representatives in the screening and nomination of judicial
officers. Hence, the term “Congress” must be taken to mean the entire legislative department.

The framers of Constitution, in creating JBC, hoped that the private sector and the three branches of
government would have an active role and equal voice in the selection of the members of the
Judiciary. Therefore, to allow the Legislature to have more quantitative influence in the JBC by
having more than one voice speak, whether with one full vote or one-half (1/2) a vote each, would
“negate the principle of equality among the three branches of government which is enshrined in the
Constitution.”

It is clear, therefore, that the Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7)
members only. Thus, any inclusion of another member, whether with one whole vote or half (1/2) of
it, goes against that mandate. Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution, providing Congress with
an equal voice with other members of the JBC in recommending appointees to the Judiciary is
explicit. Any circumvention of the constitutional mandate should not be countenanced for the
Constitution is the supreme law of the land. The Constitution is the basic and paramount law to
which all other laws must conform and to which all persons, including the highest officials of the land,
must defer. Constitutional doctrines must remain steadfast no matter what may be the tides of time.
It cannot be simply made to sway and accommodate the call of situations and much more tailor itself
to the whims and caprices of the government and the people who run it.

Notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all its prior
official actions are nonetheless valid. In the interest of fair play under the doctrine of operative facts,
actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not
nullified.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The current numerical composition of the Judicial and Bar
Council IS declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Judicial and Bar Council is hereby enjoined to
reconstitute itself so that only one ( 1) member of Congress will sit as a representative in its
proceedings, in accordance with Section 8( 1 ), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. This disposition
is immediately executory.

~~~ Excerpts from the full text:

Indeed, the spirit and reason of the statute may be passed upon where a literal meaning would
lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers. (42) Not
any of these instances, however, is present in the case at bench. Considering that the language of
the subject constitutional provision is plain and unambiguous, there is no need to resort extrinsic
aids such as records of the Constitutional Commission.
Nevertheless, even if the Court should proceed to look into the minds of the members of the
Constitutional Commission, it is undeniable from the records thereof that it was intended that the
JBC be composed of seven (7) members only.Thus:
MR. RODRIGO: Let me go to another point then. On page 2, Section 5, there is a novel
provision about the appointments of members of the Supreme Court and judges of the lower
courts. At present it is the President who appoints them. If there is a Commission on
Appointments, then it is the President with the confirmation of the Commission on Appointment.
In this proposal, we would like to establish a new office, a sort of a board composed of seven
members called the Judicial and Bar Council. And while the President will still appoint the
member of the judiciary, he will be limited to the recommendees of this Council. xxx xxx xxx
MR. RODRIGO. Of the seven members of the Judicial and Bar Council, the President appoints
four of them who are regular members.
42 Ursua v. Court of Appeals, 326 Phil. 157, 163 (1996).