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PHAENOMENOLOGICA
COLLECTION PUBLlEE SOUS LE PATRONAGE DES CENTRES
D' ARCHIVES-HUSSERL
17
RICHARD M. ZANER
SOME CONTRIBUTIONS TO A
PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE BODY
SECOND EDITION
Pre/ace . . . . . . . . VII
Chapter I: Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
(1) Survey of Marcel's Philosophy. . . . . . . . 3
(2) The Genesis of the Problem in Marcel's Thought. 12
(3) Methodological Considerations: The Problem of
System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Chapter II: The Theory of the Body-Qua-Mine as Mystery 21
(1) My Body Qua Mine . . . . . . . . 22
(a) The Qui-Quid Relation in Having . . . . 2S
(b) The "Within-Without" Relation. . . . . 27
(c) Having as "Before the Other qua Other" . 28
(2) The Meaning of Sentir . . . . . . . 3S
(3) My Body as Etre-Au-Monde. . . . . 38
(4) My Body as the Repere of Existence. 42
Chapter III: Critical Remarks . . . . . . 44
(1) The Relation Between "Feeling" and "Acting" 46
(2) The Meaning of Bodily Acting. 49
(3) The Meaning of the "Urge/uhl" . . . S3
INTRODUCTION
1 In the same place, he refers to several passages in his earlier writings which
foreshadow the crucial role of this question: Cf. Etre et A voir, Aubier, Editions
Montaigne (Paris, 1935), pp. 72, 73, IS8-S9, 180-81, passim. (Cited textually as EA.);
RI, pp. 188-89; etc.
• Marcel, Pos#ion ee Approches concrcees d .. Myseere oneotogiq..e, Introduction by
Marcel de Corte, J. Vrin (Paris, 1949), pp. 46-SI. (Cited textually as PA.)
INTRODUCTION 5
Asking "Who am I?," on the other hand, I straight away recog-
nize that this question (this quest for myself) is itself its own
assuredness, it is an affirmation of myself as at least existing-in-
quest of myself. In order to utter it, I must be:
One could say in an inevitably approximate language that my inquiry
into Being presupposes an affirmation with respect to which I would in
some manner be passive,! and at which I would be the stage rather than the
subject.
But that is only a limit which I cannot realize without contradiction.
Therefore, I find myself taking the position of, or recognizing, a partici-
pation which possesses a subjective reality; this participation cannot, by
very definition, be an object of thought; it cannot function as a solution,
but appears outside the world of problems: it is metaproblematical. * (PA,
56-57)
The human condition, then, is fundamentally an exigence
which is concretely manifested as a quest: Man is that being who,
in his being, is in quest of his being, of who he is. However much
this quest may be masked or hidden in its essential meaning, 2
and in whatever ways, this metaphysical disquiet is essential to
man as such. 3 But just in so far as this exigence 4 is a quest for
one's own essential identity, it resolves into a fundamental
mystery, or synonymously, a metaproblem. This term, certainly
the most technical and rigorous one Marcel uses, should not be
understood in any theological sense whatever; he himself has
often emphasized this. (Cf. PA, 88-91) In a strictly philosophical
sense, a mystery is "a problem which encroaches on its data,
which invades them and thereby surpasses itself as a simple
1 Cf. W. E. Hocking, "Marcel and the Ground Issues of Metaphysics," PhilOSOPhy
and Phenomenological Research (hereafter referred to as PPR), Vol. xiv, NO.4 (June
1954), pp. 439-69. Hocking points out that "passive" does not mean "inert"; "Here
at the core of individual awareness, Being is no concept, no category, no vocable
'content'; neither is it an ineffable, pervasive dull thud or datum-pressure; say that it
is unsayable, and you must add that it is nevertheless passion-filled presence. Allow
that Descartes' "I am" is a statement true when uttered; it does not follow that it is
all that can be said ... There is something equally true in the New England colloqui-
alism, "I be," which suggests what Gilson calls "the act of being." It is true that my
being appears to me as something I discover, going on there without having consulted
my wishes, - something done to me. .. What happens is - if I correctly catch an
instantaneous deed-of-response - an act by me of consent and corroboration, as if
what is done to me I also do for myself - two deeds merging in one active fact, "I be."
(P·443)
2 Cf. below, pp. 16-18.
a Cf. Homo Viator, H. Regnery (Chicago, 1951), p. 138, translated by Emma
Craufurd. (Cited textually as HV.); and ME, I, p. 14; and M], p. 290.
4 Hocking, op. cit., p. 444, notes that this crucial notion is Marcel's own native air,
his own original insight, derived from nobody else, and that it is just this same exi-
gence which inspired his own intensive study of it.
6 MARCEL
1 Albert Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus and Other Essays, Vintage Books (New
York, 1959), pp. 14-15.
a Pietro Prini, Gabriel Marcel et La methodologie de l'inverifiable, Desclee de Brou-
wer (Paris, 1953)-
a Ibid., p. 31 •
INTRODUCTION 9
The "sum" of Descartes' "cogito, ergo sum," is not itself made
thematic by Descartes; when one does so, the sum is seen to be
a pure abstract, and not at all the "I am" which manifests itself
as in quest of itself (exigence).
The reality that the cogito reveals ... is of quite a different order from
the existence that we are trying not so much to establish as to identity in
the sense of taking note of its absolute metaphysical priority. The cogito
introduces us into a whole system of affirmations and guarantees their
validity. It guards the threshold ot the valid . ... 1
must acquire and keep "la morsure du reel." (RI, 89) It thus
becomes evident that, in his terms, only "second reflection" is
capable of fulfilling the task of explicating the human condition,
for only it can recover the unity of the "I exist." To take it as an
"object" would be to destroy its unity. Indeed, Marcel believes, to
explicate the meaning of this exclamatory awareness of self fully,
one should say, not "j'existe," but "jesuis manifeste" (ME, I, 106):
When I say: "I exist," I incontestably aim at something more. Obscure-
·ly, I aim at this fact that I am not only for myself, but that I manifest
myself - it would be necessary to say that I am manifest. The prefix "ex,"
in "exist," in so far as it traces a movement toward the exterior, as it
were a centrifugal tendency, is here of the greatest importance. I exist:
this means that I have the wherewithal to make myself known or recog-
nized, either by another or by myself in so far as I affect for myself a
"borrowed otherness" (une aiterite d'emprunt) . ...• (RI, 27)
1 Cf. Kierkegaard, The Sickness Unto Death, Doubleday (New York, 1943), pp.
154-161.
2 Prini, of'. cit., pp. 79-82.
18 MARCEL
all the case. Marcel's own work, along with that of many others,
stands as living testimony to its possibility, but more, to its
remarkable fruitfulness. As Hocking remarks, in fact, it is "an
aspect of the broadened and heightened empiricism which may
well be, in its completion, the major achievement in epistemology
of this present century." 1
With these preliminary remarks, it is now possible to turn to
Marcel's own study of the body.
1 As we shall see in Part III, much of the experimental material to which Merleau-
Ponty refers tends to support Marcel's views here - though he never makes use of
such material - especially the phenomena of agnosia and the "phantom-member"
give credence to these "limiting cases."
2 This distinction, unfortunately, after having been made with the intent of
developing it into a "Phenomenologie de l'avoir" (the title of the section of Etre et
Avoir to which we are here referring, pp. 223-255), is to all purposes dropped immedi-
ately after he makes it.
All he says about "l'avoir-implication" is that everything said about "l'avoir
possession" "s'applique entierement it l'avoir implication ... ," (EA, 232) with the
exception that the latter does not seem to exhibit the kind of "puissance" which the
former reveals.
THE BODy-gUA-MINE 25
Since the type of having relevant to the problem of the body
is the former (avoi,-possession), we must restrict outselves to
this. And here, on the basis of Marcel's admittedly brief study,
it is possible to delineate three moments or strata in all such
having (Cf., EA, 219, and 230-34): I) One can speak of having
only where there is a certain quid related to a certain qui, and
where the latter appears as the center of apprehension and
inherence for the relation; 2) in all having, it is necessary to
speak in terms of a "within" ("dehors") and of a "without"
(" dedans"); and 3) all having involves a reference to what is
other qua other.
For every "I," the "he has" ("we have," and so on) are all
derivative modes of having, founded on the "I have" and
derived by means of a transfer of sense. This transference is from
It is clear, to be sure, that his real interest in this brief Esquisse is in "l'avoir-
possession," since, he believes, it is this type of having which is really relevant to the
problem of my body as possessed by me. Nevertheless, it must be stated, just because
the problem of "having" is so essential to his philosophy (Cf., e.g., M], 3Il), it is
regrettable that he did not see fit to inquire further into having-as-implication. (See
also, M], 307-313; ME, I, IlO-15; and EA, Part I, passim.) ,
MARCEL
the "I have" to the other modes, moreover, because of the nature
of having itself. To "have" is to "have the power to," in the
sense of "to have the disposal of": "to have is to be able to
(pouvoir), because it is indeed in a sense to dispose of (disposer
de). Here, we touch on what is most obscure, and most fundamen-
tal, in having." (EA, 217-18) And, Marcel later emphasizes,
The latter is clarified somewhat when one thinks of the relation which
manifestly unites the "having" to the "being able to," at least where
possession is effective and literal. "Being able to," or "having the power
to," is something which I experience by exercising it or by resisting it -
which, after all, is the same thing.· (EA, 231)
stop, quite arbitrarily, along the way and say thatthe last term in
the series is the instrument of something which is not itself of the
same nature as the instrument which it has and uses. But then the
whole problem simply returns to the one with which we began;
that is, the "way out" of the difficulties simply begs the question.
The problem here, Marcel believes, can be seen and explicated
only in terms of lived experience: in what sense is my body
mine? Taking it as an instrument avoids the whole issue.
A body, certainly, can be considered as an object, since "a"
body is, precisely, no one's (or, anyone's), and hence a possible
instrument, a tool which can be used (as when a master uses his
slave to build his castle). But, if I attempt to take my body as an
instrument, I simply lose the sense, "mine." Accordingly, Marcel
argues, to the degree that I take it as an instrument, I treat it as
not-mine. Qua mine, my body is not an instrument, nor an object
over against which I would be a subject. Taking it as an instru-
ment is the position of most traditional thought, as well as that
of "first reflection"; taking it as mine is the position recovered
by means of "second reflection." In this sense, second reflection
is not a rebuttal of the results of first reflection; rather it is a re-
covery of the unity lost by first reflection, it is a recollecting
(recueillement) of the pieces which were scattered by first re-
flection. What, however, is here recovered?
My body qua mine is not something which I have: rather, it is
the prototype of having, it is "the first object, the prototype of
object ... and it seems indeed that we here are at the most secret,
the most profound, core of having. The body is the prototype of
having." (EA, 237) In this sense, Marcel wants to speak of an
"absolute instrument."My body is not itself either an object,
an instrument, nor something had, but is that which in the first
place makes possible any having whatever, any instrument, any
object. (Cf., ME, I, II2-14; Mj, 248) Am I then in an immediate
relation to my body? Denying that my body is an instrument,
and hence that it is not a term in an instrumental relation, do I
therefore deny all mediation between my body and me?
To suppose ... that lean become anything whatever, that is to say,
that I can identify myself with anything whatever, by the minimum act of
attention implied by an elementary sensation without the intervention of
any mediation whatsoever, is to undermine the very foundations of spiritual
life and pulverise the mind into purely successive acts. But I can no longer
THE BODY-QUA-MINE 33
conceive this mediation as being of an instrumental order. I will therefore
call it "sympathetic mediation." (M], 24 6) 1
The problem here is to attempt to get at the experience which
this "sympathetic mediation" describes.
It is evident that, in the first place, Marcel wants to say that
the type of relation which binds me to my body is not of the same
type as that which obtains between two objects or two instru-
ments; that it is not, furthermore, a relation of having. What,
then, is this relation?
While my connection to my body "is in reality the model, not
represented but felt, to which all possession is related," (ME, I,
II3) it is not the case that this connection is itself a manner of
possession.
The truth is rather that within all possession, of every kind of possession,
there is as it were a felt kernel, and this nucleus is nothing than the
experience, in itself non-intellectualizable, of the connection by means
of which my body is mine. * (ME, I, 113)
But obviously, this does not help us too much, since it is precisely
that "lien'" which must be explicated. There is, however, an
important clue in Marcel's statement: the "noyau senti" is, he
says, precisely "the experience. .. of the connection by means
of which my body is mine." In so far as my body is ''l'avoir-
type," it is experienced as "Ie pouvoir-type," that it is to say,
as the ensemble of powers. This ensemble, however, is more than
a mere aggregate or collection of abilities; rather, we must say,
"each of its powers is only a specification of this unity itself,"
(ME, I, IIS) the unity, namely which is completely sui generis
and which "constitutes my body qua mine." (ME, I, II3-14)
It is, then, this unity which must be focused upon. Negatively,
Marcel states,
My body is mine for as much as I do not look at it, as I do not place any
interval between it and me, or rather for as much as it is not an obiect for
me, but in so far as I am my body ... To say I am my body is to suppress
the interval which, on the other hand, I re-establish if I say that my body
is an instrument. * (ME, I, II6)
Furthermore, he goes on, to say that I am my body qua mine is
not to say that I am that body which is an object for others, the
one which others see, touch, and so on. This body, he contends,
,1 Marcel notes twenty-five years later that he still has not found any better way of
expressing what he has in mind here. We shall have to recons\der this later on.
34 MARCEL
CRITICAL REMARKS
All of these warnings only point out the necessity for con-
sidering his work as a strictly philosophical endeavor, and it is
in this spirit that we shall entertain several critical remarks. We
must keep in mind as well, in the course of these remarks, that
Marcel at no time in his career professes to have worked out
the definitive solutions to any of the "metaproblems" he has
tackled - particularly as regards the body. He even confesses
with not a little reluctance that he has left most of the work to
be done by others, claiming only to have opened up the grounds.
Our critical remarks, then, are intended only to fill some of these
gaps, take up some of his hints, and follow out some of his sug-
gestions.
It will, however, be best to leave to the side any and all minor
problems or confusions, and attempt to go straight to the heart
of his inquiry into the body. Our comments, therefore, concern
only what we consider to be the essential theory.
(I) THE RELATION BETWEEN 'FEELING' AND 'ACTING'
1 See, for example, Husserl, Ideen 114 eine, ,einen Phdnomenologie und phdnomeno-
logo.chen PMlo.opMe, Zweites Bueh, Husserliana, Band IV, Martinus Nijhoff (Haag,
1952), pp. 236-47.
CRITICAL REMARKS 49
embodiment is a complex, on going affair. On the other hand, just
because we must speak here of an act, that is, of a process, one
which goes on (and goes on, moreover, continuously), we must
say, over and above what has thus far been ~tated, that em-
bodiment is not an occurrence which is "once done, forever
done." For, it is always possible to become dis-embodied, and
even to become dis-embodied in a partial manner (as, for instance,
by means of a partial paralysis, or artifically by means of an-
esthetization). This indicates, it seems to me, that the fact of
embodiment is descriptively one of animation: my body is not
just a "body" (ein Korper), but is rather an "animate organism"
(ein Leib). Thus, we can say, to call my body an animate organ-
ism is to say that I am embodied by it by means of a complex
act: this single act reveals (thus far, at least) two components,
feeling and acting, which are related in the relation of mutual
foundedness. The mutual foundedness of feeling and acting,
conversely, or the fact that I always feel my body as mine only
in acting and that in acting I feel my body as mine, is but
another expression for the other aspect of the act of embodiment.
It is in virtue of the mutual foundedness of this feeling and
acting that I experience only this specific animate organism as
mine; but the relation between feeling and acting must not be
confused with the relation of embodiment.
(2) THE MEANING OF BODILY ACTING
concern for the "What am I?" It is not the case that, because
my body is experienced by me as mine, I, this specific person or
ego, grasp what he calls the Urgeluhl, or even that I can appre-
hend it straightforwardly (and on that basis recognize it as mine).
I do not say that Marcel argues this way; rather, it seems clear
that he simply takes it for granted. For, in stating that "I feel
my body" as mine, that my body is "me-as-acting," and so on,
he does not see clearly enough that the most originary conscious-
ness of this body as my animate organism is not at all a spon-
taneous, active, "Ich-akt," but is rather a consciousness of it
at an automatic or pre-personallevel.1 That is to say, my organ-
ism is given to me, this concrete person, as having already always
been mine (and thus, for example, I am often astonished over
certain hitherto undiscovered parts of it, or I am often unable
to recognize my hands when I see a picture of them, I find my
recorded voice "strange," and so on). When I reflectively con-
sider my body as mine, it presents itself as already mine; that is
to say, it has this sense for me. Thus, it seems to me incorrect, or
at least misleading, to say that "I am my body," in whatever
sense. To say this is to confuse the sense or meaning which this
animate organism has for me (namely, "mine"), and the "I"
who recognizes his animate organism as "mine." In other words,
those processes which give this animate organism the sense,
"mine," are not at the same level as those which explicitly
apprehend this animate organism as "mine," those by means
of which it is grasped as "mine": the former are automatic, the
latter spontaneous.
With this clarification, we can now proceed to the phenomenon
of "exteriorization," or, as we prefer to say, of the actualization
of strivings. These go on continuously and in many different
ways throughout the course of my on-going living. And, in the
great majority of cases, I myself neither actively attend to most
of them, nor actively "will" them as such. Concentrating on a
passage in a book, the itchy place on my neck gets scratched
quite automatically, without in the least interrupting the course
of my attention. Walking in the street, my feet quite automatic-
ally push ahead one after the other, while I perchance am busied
in a conversation with my friend. Again, when I advert to my
1 Cf. Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, op. cit., §§ 38-39.
CRITICAL REMARKS 51
headache, not only does it give itself to my active attending as
"having been going on all along" (though I was not attending
to it), but also it gives itself with the sense of having been disliked,
having been uncomfortable, and so on, though I was not at the
time actively disliking it.
The distinction between "active" and "automatic" conscious-
ness is not, of course, a rigid one. Described in terms of Bewusst-
seinserlebnisse, some of these show themselves as having an
"ego-quality"; that is, I "live in" some of them, directed toward
their respective objects, while as regards others I am perchance
only marginally aware of their respective objects, and finally,
there are some "in" which I, this person, cannot "live."! The
distinction, then, is rather one between two poles of a continuum
than between two sharply distinguished spheres. 2
This distinction holds for the whole sphere of mental activity.
Thus, as Husserl points out, not only are there automatic per-
ceivings (as, when I am perceiving the typewriter, there goes on
an automatic perceiving of the floor beneath my feet, of the
movements of my fingers, and so on), but also there are auto-
matic strivings, likings, dislikings, and so on. 3 And, among the
automatic intendings it is necessary to distinguish between
"habitual" ways of perceiving, "habitual" attitudes, likes and
dislikes, and the like, and what Husserl calls the sphere of
"primary automaticity." 4 Thus, I may have certain habitual
ways in which I pick up objects which I see (I reach for the book
with my right hand), but the correlation between the tactual
and visual fields is not at the same level. As we shall see, the
phenomenon of exteriorization, of "acting," is fundamentally
encountered in the automatic sphere, and more particularly, it
is descriptively a primarily automatic process.
The point of this all too brief discussion is that Marcel ap-
proaches the phenomenon of "acting" at much too high a level:
1 Ideen, II, op. cit., p. 144. This, indeed, explains the mediatizing role which the
body has according to Marcel.
I Ibid., pp. 151-52.
3 Cf. Cartesian Meditations, op. cit., § 44.
PART II
INTRODUCTION
That is to say, the encounter with the Other is, as we shall see
shortly, accomplished ontologically prior to the appearance of
any ontological dimension of the body.
1 L' Etre et Ie Neant, Librarie Galliard (Paris, 1943), p. 405. (Hereafter cited textual-
lyas EN.) Cf. also pp. 335-36.
B Cf. EN, P.347. We shall return to these points in the second section of this
chapter. The author is responsible for all translations of Sartre. The original texts of
important passages will be found in the Appendix.
60 SARTRE
1 Sartre does not attempt to justify or establish this position here; this task is
reserved for the first few sections of the text.
a The Transcendence of the Ego, Noonday Press (New York, 1957), ct. pp. SO-53.
SARTRE
1 Sartre's discussion of this seems to involve a serious ambiguity in the term, "act."
Putting it in terms of activity-passivity, especially in regard to the Husserlian
analysis of hyletic data, merely confuses the issues. There is no question at all, for
Husserl, of consciousness in some magical fashion acting on (in the sense of effectively
modifying) hyletic data. Rather, consciousness intent'vel" const,ues them. I.e., they
are components of the Erlebnisstrom, the non-intentive components. Thus, if "act"
means "intend," there is no problem; and, if "act" means "effectively alter or
modify," there is no problem, since Husserl never claims this anyway. As we shall see,
this is Sa,tre's own problem, one generated strictly from his own ontology.
66 SARTRE
1 Without going into the matter in detail, it must be pointed out here that Sartre's
treatment of Hussed's theory of intentionality is not a little barbaric: "Pour Hussed,
... l'animation du noyau hy16tique par les seules intentions qui peuvent trouver leur
remplissement (El'jullung) dans cette hyle ne saurait suffire a nous faire sortir de la
subjectivite. Les intentions verltablement objectivantes, ce sont les intentions vides,
celles qui visent par dela l'apparition et subjective la totalite infinie de la serle d'appa-
rition presente et subjective la totalite infinie de la serle d'apparitions ... Presentes,
ces impressions - fussent-elles en nombre infini - se fondraient dans Ie subjt'Ctif, c'est
leur absence qui leur donne I'Hre objectif. Ainsi I'Hre de l'objet est un pur non-~tre."
(EN, 27-28).
Among other things, it makes no sense, for Husser!, to speak of "empty" intentions
in this respect, just as it makes no sense to speak of "the" object as an "absence." It
is Saril'e's ontology which requires this interpretation. For, the object is "present,"
for Husser!, precisely as horlzonally predelineated as the object of future perceivings,
or other intendings, of it as the same object. Finally, as we saw, Sartre's treatment of
"hyte" is hardly Hussed's.
a M. Natanson, "Phenomenology and Existentialism: Hussed and Sartre on
Intentionality," The Modern Schoolman, Vol. xxxvii (November, 1959), pp. 1-10.
S Ibid., p. 3. Natanson's reference is to Sartre, "A Fundamental Idea of the
Phenomenology of Husser!: Intentionality," SitluUions, I, Gallimard (Paris, 1947),
PP·3 1 -35·
INTRODUCTION
Shame is the feeling of original fall - not from the fact that I have
committed such and such a sin, but simply because I have "fallen" into
the world, into the midst of things, and because I need the mediation of
the Other in order to be what I am.· (EN, 349)
This "fall" is precisely the fall from nothingness to being-
something-for-the-Other, from interiority to exteriority, to
being-oneself-as-body. Thus the experience of one's own body,
for Sartre, is fundamentally that of nausea.
Accordingly the Other can become an object-for-me only
subsequent to my being-an-object-for-the-Other; it is the "second
moment of my relation to the Other," (EN, 347) and is experi-
enced by me as pride:
In a word there are two authentic attitudes: the one by which I recog-
nize the Other as the subject by whom I acquire objectity - that is shame;
the other by which I apprehend myself as the free project by means of
which the Other acquires his being-an-Other - that is pride or the affir-
mation of my freedom in the face of the Other-as-object. (EN, 351)
Consciousness, forced to become what is most contrary to its
inmost being, experiences itself than as ashamed. The real force
of Sartre's argument, however, is that by being made an object
consciousness becomes constituted as "in the world"; that is to
say, this encounter causes the embodiment of consciousness to
emerge: pour-soi takes on its body as that which it has-to-be-for-
the-Other. This "self" which the Other's look causes to arise by
his look, in other words, is "my being-outside." (EN, 346) And,
thus, as Sartre stated already in The Transcendence of the Ego,
my body serves as a visible and tangible symbol for the 1;1 it
is "the illusory fulfillment of the I-concept."2
Accordingly, the body is subsequent to the encounter with the
Other. If is by means of the Other's look that I acquire spatial-
ity,S an outside, or a "nature." (EN, 321) One cannot say,
furthermore, that "to-be-Iooked-at" is to apprehend the body
of the Other (e.g. his eyes),
. .. because his eye is not at first apprehended as a sensible organ of
vision but as the support for the Look ... if I apprehend his Look, I cease
to perceive his eyes. .. The Other's Look hides his eyes, it seems to go
before them . .. The point is that to perceive is to look-at, and to apprehend
a Look is not to apprehend the Look as an object in the world ... it is to
become conscious of being-looked-at.· (EN, 315-16)
1 The Transcendence of the Ego, op. cit., p. go.
a Ibid., p. 91.
8 "The Look of the Other confers spatiality on me. To apprehend oneself as looked-
at is to apprehend oneself as a spatializing-spatialized." (EN, 325).
INTRODUCTION 79
There thus appears to be an underlying argument to Sartre's
theory, one which he does not state in so many words but which
appears manifest when one reflects critically on the organization
of his study itself. We may express this argument as follows: (r)
consciousness is essentially an interiority, a subject in its being-
for-itself as regards everything else (which is thus "object");
(2) as such, consciousness can be limited only by consciousness;
(3) hence, it cannot be an object for itself, nor for another object;
(4) however, consciousness suddenly experiences its being-an-
object; (5) since an object is possible only for a subject,
since consciousness can be limited only by consciousness, and
since it cannot be an object for itself nor for another object, but
nevertheless experiences itself as an object - there must then be
another consciousness, another subjectivity, which this first
consciousness is not and for whom it is then object; (6) yet, the
interiority of the pour-soi is still preserved - it cannot be an object
for any consciousness, itself or another; (7) therefore, a new mode of
being of consciousness must have emerged: its being-for-Others.
This new mode of being, be it noted, emerges strictly and only
through consciousness' experiencing itself as an object: Here,
that is to say, the "body" is simply taken for granted as spatial
and external, and thus can emerge for consciousness only after
the encounter with the Other. The body is the spatialization and
externalization of consciousness effected by means of the Other's
look. Similarly, the Other's body is his external and spatial
manifestation effected by my dialectically second "look" which
renders him an object.
We have already remarked that this entire argument is
subject to Sartre's own charge against Husser! and Heidegger,
as well as Hegel: it is itself "optimistic" in the sense that it
presupposes the "Other" all along. The view of the body, on the
other hand, seems understandable only on the basis of the
rigidification of the Cartesian dualism which Sartre effects by
means of his criticism and subsequent transformation of the
Cartesian cogito. This transformation, finally, is itself effected
by means of the non-thematic transformation of Husserl's
doctrine of intentionality.1 To be sure, as we shall shortly see,
1 Sartre's notion of "intentionality" seems closer to Bergson's notion of "action"
than to Husserl's "intentionality." Cf. our general conclusions, below pp. 242-49.
80 SARTRE
have seen, the Other is encountered first of all in the pure cogito.
(EN, 308) And, " ... my consciousness of being a consciousness,
in the pure effectuation of the cogito, is not connected to my own
body . ... " (EN, 336; see also, 299-300) Thus so far as the Other
is grasped in a "pure monition" (EN, 336), my body is subsequent,
just as is his body, to our originary encounter through my ob-
jectity, my being-an-object for the Other's look. Indeed, Sartre
says explicitly that, " ... the spontaneous and unreflected
consciousness is no longer a consciousness of the body." (EN,
394) The radical shock of encountering the Other is precisely
the "original fall" of consciousness into its body; it can now
no longer "pass by in silence" its own body-for-itself.
Thus, the study of the body is at each point founded on the
encounter with the Other. Sartre delineates three "ontological
dimensions" of the being of the body; we shall consider each of
them in the order prescribed by Sartre himself.
(I) THE BODY AS BEING-FOR-ITSELF: FACTICITY
The eye, then, as the organ of visual perception, is not only the
center of the visual field but is as well, qua center, continuously
referred to by the objects oriented with respect to it. Hence it is
itself "in the world" and itself is the world of seen things. Thus
the visual figure-ground relation requires a third structure - the
eye as the center of orientation for the appearance of visual
things as ordered in the figure-ground relation. But just because
this center is the center, defining the visual world and thus being
defined by it, it cannot itself become an object within that world.
In order for this to take place it would itself have to be oriented
with respect to another center. In short, the eye would have to
see itself seeing, and this it cannot do; if it could, it would not
be the "center." The eye then is only "indicated," it is the
"referred-to" of visual objects; I cannot see it, since I am it.
Therefore, Sartre emphasizes,
My being-in-the-world, by the very fact that it realizes a world, makes
itself be indicated to itself as a being-in-the-midst-of-the-world by the
world which it realizes ... My body is everywhere on the world ... My
body is at once coextensive with the world, spread out across things, and
at the same time gathered into this single point which all these things
indicate and which I am without being able to know it.· (EN,381-82)
This being the case, Sartre argues that in order to know and
objectively to define my sense organs I must take myself as an object,
and this is tantamount to destroying the wordliness of my world.
Cutting myself off from what I am, from my body-for-itself, I
cut myself off from the world established by means of my body-
for-itself. To objectify my visual sense organs is to cease to live
my world in respect ofits visual aspect, it is no longer to" surpass"
1 In a similar way, we encounter this crucial problem in Merleau-Ponty's analysis.
For him, the unity of the senses, as well as the unity of anyone sense, takes place by
way of the objects of the senseIs) and in virtue of what he calls the "intentional arc;"
but what precisely this "arc" is, and how this unification occurs, he simply does not
state. Marcel, on the other hand, never even concerns himself with this problem.
S It should be noted that Sartre uses "sense" and "sense organ" synonymously.
Thus, he talks equivalently of the eye as a sense organ, and as a sense.
3 Cf. above, pp. 65-69.
94 SARTRE
my eyes "in order to" (move to the door, look at the movie, and
so on).
Accordingly, we can say, my body-for-itself is the total system
and center of reference of things; it is "also the instrument and the
goal of our actions." (EN, 383) It is necessary to be cautious in
this regard, however: "my action" is not an object for me, any
more than "my body"; rather, only the action-of-another can
be an object for' me. Hence I cannot know my own action, but
only that of the Other (which I know as a "peculiar" instrument,
since it is that instrument which itself handles things, uses tools,
and so on). One cannot say then that I use my body.l Since the
instrument must be of the same kind and nature as what uses
it (for otherwise he could not use it), and since instruments are
objects-used over against a subject-user, to take my body-for-
itself as something used is to make of it an object - and thus to
lose its being as for-itself. Furthermore, to continue Sartre's
argument, if one says "my body" is an instrument, then I,
who "use" it, must be of the same community of nature as the
instrument; this, though, would be to make me as psychical
reality something physical, spatially located and determinable
in physical terms - and this simply destroys "my body-for-it-
self." In the end, the Cartesian dilemma is irresolvable in its own
terms: it loses at the outset just what it seeks to understand.
To clarify this strange state of affairs, Sartre turns to an
analysis of the connections between perception and action.
Objects are what they are 2 only within a nexus of actual and
possible actions on them; i.e., Sartre maintains, "In this sense
perception is in no way distinguished from the practical organ-
ization of existents in the world." (EN, 385) The characteristics
which make a hammer a hammer are disclosed, as Heidegger
had seen, not in a "conceptual" consciousness, but rather in a
"practical-using" consciousness (not by mere "looking," but
by "using"). For only in the latter does the hammer refer to
nails, to the board to be hammered into place, to the ultimate
1 As Marcel had already seen with clarity. Unfortunately, however, Sartre seems
not to have been aware of Marcel's analysis of the body; one looks in vain for refer-
ences to Marcel.
I As Bergson and Marcel had already recognized, though, again, Sartre seems to be
unaware of this, or, at least, he does not acknowledge it.
ONTOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS 95
project-at-hand - and only as such is the hammer a hammer. 1
Similarly, the space in which I live is not geometrical, not, as
Merleau-Ponty will say, a space of location. Rather, it is a space
of situation, or, in Sartre's term, it is "hodological" - furrowed
with paths, places, by-ways, routes, locales, ways of going and
coming, of using, doing, and the like. Thus, the world for pour-
soi in its upsurge is constituted as a concatenated texture of
instrumentalities and ways of doing things: acts refer to other
acts; tools to other tools and to ways of using them, to purposes
for which they were made, to other purposes which can be actu-
alized (an ashtray can also serve as a paper-weight, a weapon,
and the like), to Others, and so on. Nevertheless, while perception
and action are thus inseparable, action proper is presented as
transcending the perceived simpliciter towards future efficacies,
while what is perceived in the strict sense presents itself as a
presence (co-presence with my body), but one which cannot be
fully apprehended "at present" and is thus "full of promises,"
which engages the future by predelineating future possible
perceivings of it as the same. This pure presence of things,
Sartre calls their "being-there."
In this way, the world is conceived as the correlate of my
possible action on it, i.e., the system of possibilities which I am.
As such, for Sartre, the world is the skeleton of my possible
action, the outline which my actions "fill in." Hence, "Per-
ception is naturally surpassed towards action; better, it can be
unfolded only in and by projects of action." (EN, 386) Even
though action is not itself an objectivating (is not "thetic,"
as Sartre puts it), this structurization of the world is obiective.
The world as the correlate of my actions is objectively articulated,
it refers to me but also to an infinity of instrumental complexes
- to my future possible actions, my past actions, to the actions
of Others, and so on. All of this complex, nevertheless, refers to
a center, one which is only indicated by the complex and never
itself grasped as such. Using a hammer, I do not grasp my hand
but only the hammer hammering the board to be nailed. I use
1 "Objects disclose themselves to us at the heart of a complex of utetlsility wherein
they occupy a determined place. This place is not defined by purely spatial coordi-
nates but in relation to the axes of practical reference. 'The glass is 0tJ the self,' which
means that it is necessary to take care not to upset the glass if one moves the shelf."
(EN,385)
96 SARTRE
the hammer to pound the nail, but I do not use my hand to hold
the hammer: my hand is only indicated by the complex. I am not
in the same relation to it as I am to the hammer, for I am my
hand. My hand, thus, vanishes in this complex of instrumental-
ities and is now strictly the orientation, the order and meaning,
of the complex. My body is then a tool objectively defined by
the instrumental field referring to it as its own center, but a tool
we cannot use,
since we would then be referred to infinity. We cannot use this instru-
ment; we are it. It is given to us in no other way than by the instrumental
order of the world, by hodological space ... but it cannot be given to my
action. I do not have to adapt myself to it nor to adapt it to another uten-
sil; rather it is my very adaptation to utensils, the adaptation which I
am. * (EN, 388)
1 Schiitz has pointed out that this identification involves a basic "optimism," in
Sartre's sense of the term. Cf. Schiitz, "Sartre's Theory of the Alter Ego," PPR, vol.
ix, NO.2 (December, 1948), pp. 184-98; and above, pp. 72-75.
ONTOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS 99
As we saw, the Other is not first given to me by means of his
body; were this so, the I-Other relation would be merely external,
Sartre argues, whereas in fact it is an internal relation - that of
negation. Thus, he argues, "I must apprehend the Other first as
he for whom I exist as object. ... " (EN, 405)
The Other-as-object is grasped by me as a transcendence-
transcended, as one among many other instrumentalities. Never-
theless, I apprehend his body as a "peculiar" instrument, for
it is grasped as itself a possible "center" of orientation. In so far
as I apprehend the Other's body as a center, this center is itself
now an object for me. In other words, whereas my body-for-itself
is that "point of view" on which no other point of view is possible
(for me), the Other's body is precisely that "point of view" on
which I can (and do) take a point of view - just as the Other
can (and does) take one on my point of view, whereas I myself
cannot. Thus, in Van Den Berg's example of the mountainer,
when I see him climbing, I see precisely what he has to "forget"
for the sake of the task-at-hand: I notice his boots, his reaching
hand, his face straining with effort, and so on. I see his body,
and Isee it precisely as the center of his situation, around which
are centered the mountain, the path, the valley below, and so
on. 1 In this sense, I know his body as he cannot know it. Since
I encounter the Other first by means of my being-an-object for
him, however, and thus discover his possibility of knowing me,
I now see his sense organs as themselves the means by which he
knows me: I know his senses as themselves means of knowing me.
they are now seen as the "known-as-knowing," transcendences-
transcended by my own looking at him. 2
The Other, that is to say, is known by me through my senses:
"he is the ensemble of sensible organs which disclose themselves
to my sensible knowledge . ... " (EN, 407) The "greatest function"
of the sense organs, for Sartre, is thus to know (as opposed to what
Bergson had maintained, and to what Merleau-Panty will
maintain). In so far as I apprehend the Other as an ensemble of
sense organs, as a center of orientation indicated by a system of
1 Cf. Van Den Berg, op. cit., p. 173.
2 Just the opposite is true for Husserl: by means of the automatic synthesis of
associative transfer of sense, appresentative "pairing," the Other's animate organism
is constituted as the intrinsically first Object. Cf. Carlesian Meditations, op. cit.,
§§ 51-55·
roo SARTRE
That is to say, the body over there, the Other's body, is appre-
hended by me as body-in-situation, defined by the instrumental-
ities surrounding it as their center of orientation. The Other's
body then is precisely that by means of which there is a situation.
"Far from the relation of the body to objects being a problem,
1 Cf. the study by Ludwig Binswanger, "The Case of Ellen West: An Anthropolo-
gical-Clinical Study," in: May, et al. (editors), Existence, Basic Books (New York,
1958), pp. 237-364, esp. pp. 277-90 on the body.
ONTOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS 101
1 The Other's body can be "magical" only because Sartre has already reified
"subject" and "object," making the Other's body an apprehended "en-soi" to begin
with. This goes together with his radical Cartesianism.
ONTOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS I03
CRITICAL REMARKS
aspect. Thus it is not at all the case that, for example, when I go
to the doctor with a broken leg, we are both in the same relation
to my leg, i.e., that we both equally are observers and in the same
sense. To be sure, I do observe my leg, and so does the doctor;
but it is always "my" leg and not "his" which is oberved by us.
It seems to me that Sartre's analysis of the body, while it is
undoubtedly a subtle and penetrating study, is infected with a
bias deriving from his implicit acceptance of the Cartesian
dualism, an acceptance moreover which does not seem to be
noticed by him. And, the prime consequence of this is the reification
of "object" and "subject" (it makes no difference in this sense
whether one speaks of "subject-object" or "pour-soi - en-soi").
To be sure, consciousness for Sartre is no longer Descartes' res
cogitans, nor is being the res extensa. Consciousness is not an
absolute self-certainty of knowledge but is now, for Sartre, an
absolute interiority of negation which exists itself as a lack of
being in its temporal ekstases. Being, on the other hand, is now
conceived as a primal stuff, the "viscous," the "packed," "the
solid," and no longer conceived in terms of extension which is
by essence determinable in mathematical formulae. Nevertheless,
the essentially Cartesian position remains: pour-soi and en-soi,
consciousness and world, are co-givens; they are simultaneous
and absolute. For both, consciousness and world are two domains
of being. But whereas Descartes maintained only that the res
extensa and the res cogitans are distinct as regards their respective
natures, Sartre goes much farther to maintain that pour-soi and
en-soi are radically separate in their being. Pour-soi is-not en-soi;
en-soi is, pour-soi is nothingness. Pour-soi's connection with the
en-soi is to be understood now, not in terms of Descartes' "ideas,"
but in terms of Sartre's version of the intentiveness of conscious-
ness, its bursting-forth onto the world as not-being the world.
And thus, as we have pointed out, the intensification and
reification of the dualism occurs by way of the transformation
of the theory of intentionality.
This transformation of Husserl's theory of intentionality is
already implicit in the very formulation of the ontological
problem in the Introduction to L'Etre et Ie Neant. To say that
consciousness is consciousness 0/ ... , he states there, is to say
that it is either constitutive 0/ the being of its object, or that it is
II2 SARTRE
This being so, either one can talk of objects (ultimately, the
world, or en-soi) only as intended; or else he must give up the
claim to phenomenology, and expecially to the theory of in..,
tentionality. But if objects are thus considered strictly as in-
tended, then it is not only possible but quite essential to investi-
gate them as such: if the body is experienced by consciousness as
for-itself, then ipso facto it is accessible to phenomenological
explication.
(2) THE BODY AS A CENTER OF REFERENCE
1 Formale lind T,anSliendentale Logik, § 86, p. 187; ct. also § 97, p. 216.
a A. de Waelhens, Une PhiloSOPhic de l'Ambigllite, Universitaires de Louvain
(1951), esp. pp. 4-8.
CRITICAL REMARKS
1 Piaget, e.g., has shown that this is by no means an innate endowment, but the
result of a complicated history. Cf. Origins of Intelligence in Children, International
Universities Press (New York, 1952), pp. 62-122.
2 Contrary to Mrs. Hazel Barnes' interpretation in her "Translator's Introduction"
to"Being and Nothingness, Philosophical Library (New York, 1956), pp. xl-xlii.
3 Ct., e.g., EN, 290, 297, and 300.
120 SARTRE
To. say that the "dimensio.ns" o.f the bo.dy are radically, o.nto.-
lo.gically separate, is to. lo.se the bo.dy as the unitary embo.diment
o.f co.nscio.usness (that which is "beso.uled" by co.nscio.usness).
To. say that the being o.f the po.ur-so.i is no.t co.nnected to. the
being o.f the bqdy o.f co.nscio.usness, is to. raise the insuperable
Cartesian pro.blem o.f ho.w the o.ne being can ever be united with
the o.ther being. And, to. maintain that there is no. questio.n o.f a
unificatio.n o.f the two., that co.nscio.usness is the bo.dy (in the
mo.de o.f the fo.r-itself), is simply to. o.bscure the central pheno.me-
no.n: the bo.dy is the "beso.uled" ("animated") embo.diment o.f
co.nscio.usness. Co.nscio.usness is no.t the bo.dy, no.r is the bo.dy
co.nscio.usness, fro.m any po.int o.f view; co.nscio.usness is embodied
by its bo.dy, the bo.dy is "beso.uled" by co.nscio.usness, and o.nly
in virtue o.f this embo.diment do.es the wo.rld appear to. co.nscio.us-
ness. "To. appear" means to. appear to a co.nscio.usness, and means
that co.nscio.usness is embo.died in a world by means o.f its
bo.dy.
Thus, it seems to. us, if we may speak o.f "dimensio.ns" here,
this is po.ssible o.nly if we reco.gnize they must be the specific
ways in which the embodiment of consciousness occurs; o.r, they
are the ways in which consciousness experiences itself as embodied
by its own specific animate organism - which is "animate," that
is a Leib, and no.t merely a Korper,2 in virtue o.f co.nscio.usness's
animation o.f it. In this sense it beco.mes po.ssible to. acco.unt fo.r
the "things themselves," fo.r the fact that these "dimensio.ns"
are dimensio.ns o.f o.ne specific animate o.rganism: the vario.us
manners in which co.nscio.usness beco.mes embo.died are in-
tentively synthesized by co.nscio.usness as its o.wn specific em-
bo.diment. The "dimensio.ns," that is to. say, must no.t be reified
as strata o.f being, but must be seen as intentional structures
implicit in embo.diment. The unitary pheno.meno.n intended,
intentively co.nstituted, as having different "dimensio.ns" is
precisely my o.wn o.rganism co.nsidered as my o.wn specific em-
bo.diment.
1 Sartre does not rehearse the argument, nor even refer to the specific place where
this was purportedly established. I assume he means the section on Others, since this
is the first place that "for-Others" is discussed in detail.
2 Sartre analyzes the other's body-for-me as the second dimension, and my own
body-as-known-by-the-Other, as the third dimension. But, one could suggest, this
way makes the identification in question superfluous, since, precisely, his body-for-
me and my body-for-him have each been studied separately as different dimensions.
But then there would be only two dimensions to the body, since his body-for-me is
not a structure of my body, but of his.
124 SARTRE
1 Cf. Schlitz, "Sartre's Theory of the Alter Ego," PPR, Vol. ix, No.2 (December,
1948), pp. 184-98.
CRITICAL REMARKS 12 5
MERLEAU-PONTY'S THEORY OF
THE BODY-PROPER
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
1 Cf. Husserl, "Philosophy as a Strict Science," CI'OSS Currents, Vol. vi, NO.3
(Summer, 1956), pp. 230-33.
INTRODUCTION 135
that they can no longer be considered "from outside," that is
"objectively." As de Waelhens states,
We are ... confronted once more with the paramount problem of every
philosophy of embodiment: to show, not a causal relation or a parallelism,
but to the contrary how an existential attitude of consciousness constitutes
the signification of a physiological fact.!
science. The world is our home, our habitat,l the materialization of our
subjectivity. Who wants to become acquainted with man, should listen
to the language spoken by the things in his existence [Le., to what things
mean to him). Who wants to describe man should make an analysis of the
"landscape" within which he demonstrates, explains, and reveals him-
self. 2
But what sort of reflection is this? It is clear what its task is;
but how will this subtle and difficult task be carried out? What
is required, to let Merleau-Ponty state the matter, is a kind of
reflection that
apprehends its object in a nascent state such as it appears to the one
who lives it, with the atmosphere of meaning in which it is enclosed, and
which seeks to slip into this atmosphere in order to relocate, behind
dispersed facts and symptoms, the total being of the subject (in the case
of a normal person), or the fundamental ailment (in the case of a sick
person).· 3 (PP, 140)
But now when we ask ourselves what sort of reflection this is,
how it is accomplished, what its structure is, and so on, we are
confronted with a serious confusion. Merleau-Ponty maintains I
can comprehend the body-as-lived only "by performing it myself
and in the degree to which I am a body which raises itself toward
the world." * (PP, 90) It is only by experiencing my body-proper
that I can apprehend it as experienced by me. In short, it would
appear that a genuine reflective withdrawal is for Merleau-Ponty
intrinsically unable to grasp my body-as-lived (as Sartre had
maintained); I know my body-proper only by living it (as Sartre
would deny), and apparently in no other manner.4 Indeed, as
de Waelhens points out, this constitutes one of the major diffi-
culties in Merleau-Ponty's work, since it is decisive for his funda-
mental effort: to write a phenomenology of perception while at
the same time maintaining that one can never leave the domain 01
perception. And thus, de Waelhens goes on,
1 Cf. on this, PP, 491; and below, pp. 182-89.
2 J. H. Van Den Berg, The Phenomenological Approach to Psychiatry, op. cit., p. 32.
3. Compare with this Marcel's notion of pensee pensante, above, Part I, Chapter I,
pp. 9-12; 14-20. And, in PP, 253: "Radical reflection is the one which reapprehends
me while I am in the process of forming and formulating the ideas of subject and
object; it puts into play the source of these two ideas; it is not only an operative
reflection, but again conscious of itself in its operation.".
4 Cf. the interpretations Medeau-Ponty gives of Hussed's theory of "phenome-
nological reduction" in his essay: "Le philosophe et son ombre", Signes, Librairie
Gallimard (Paris, 1960), pp. 204-209. This essay is also included in: Edmund Husserl:
1859-1959, Phaenomenologica 4, Martinus Nijhoff (Hague, the Netherlands, 1959),
pp. 195-220).
INTRODUCTION I39
Expressed in other terms, and it is necessary to note this, the funda-
mental thesis of Medeau-Ponty's philosophy: all knowledge is rooted in
perception, is itself ambiguous. If it signifies that all human knowledge
originates in the concrete and follows the explication of it, everything said
in his work seems to be established. If on the contrary one understands by
that thesis that in no way whatsoever can we ever leave the immediate
and that to render this immediate concrete explicit means simply to live
it, one cannot doubt that the enterprise of philosophy becomes forthwith
contradictory. Now, that's an opinion to which the author seems at times
to make concessions .• 1
1 Thus, he writes, "The world is not what I think but what I live; I am open to the
world ... but I do not possess it, it is inexhaustible. 'There is a world,' or rather, 'there
is the world' - I can never give entirely the ground of this constant theme of my life.
This facticity of the world is what makes the 'worldliness of the world' ., . just as the
facticity of the cogito is not an imperfection in it but to the contrary what makes me
certain of my existence ... • (PP, xii) Thus, for him, the intentionality of consciousness is
interpreted as the being of consciousness: "je suis ouvert au monde."
2 Cf. Cartesian Meditations, op. cit., p. 41.
144 MERLEAU-PONTY
And if, as we shall see, the body is this "expressive unity," which
can be known only by "living," or performing, it, and this
structure is communicated to the sensory world itself, then
traditional theories of sensuousness will be shown to be false
because they were misled by a fallacious assumption regarding
the nature of the body and of sentiI'.
We shall have to restrict ourselves to the few comments already
made regarding both the problem of sentiI' and that of traditional
theories - and thus must ignore much of Merleau-Ponty's
1 It might be pointed out that Merleau·Ponty's discussion of the unity of the per-
ceived object and the unity of the body-proper (the corporeal scheme) conceals a
crucial problem: he argues both that the former dePends upon the latter, and that they
are but two sides of the same act. Is it the case that the perceiving of a thing as
identically the same depends on (or, is a function of) the nonthematic consciousness
of one's body as identical throughout the phases of the perception? Or: is the synthesis
of the body-proper and that of the perceivp.d thing simultaneous? At least, we believe,
this is a problem which is left unciarified by Merleau-Ponty's analysis. '
B As Marcel had maintained already: objects "exist" for me only to the extent that
I maintain with them (through my body) the same sort of relation I maintain with my
body. (Cf. above, Part I, Chapter II, p. 42.)
MERLEAU-PONTY
1 This argument, which at first sight seems rather curious and not a little far-
fetched, becomes more intelligible when one realizes that it is connected with Merleau-
Ponty's contention that the body itself is a sort of non-thematic consciousness of
things. Thus, if the "project-at-hand" determines the milieu, this project is most
fundamentally a corporeal project, which structures its milieu by means of motor
projects. We return to this later.
a Husserl, though he does not speak in terms of the body, had described the same
phenomenon in Er/ahrung und Urteil, op. cit., pp. 79-80: "We say, for example, that
what emerges out of the homogeneous background through its dissimilarity [with the
background] 'falls out' saliently; and that means that it [i.e., the outstandingness]
displays an aftective tendency on the 1. The syntheses of coincidence - be it now the
overlapping or coinciding in undifferentiated fusion, or the overlapping, in antagonism
of what is not precisely similar - have their affective power, solicit the Ego's attention
whether or not the stimulus is followed. If a sensuous datum in the field is then grasped
that always occurs on the ground of such an outstandingness." What Merleau-Ponty
describes as a "problem" posed to the body by sensible qualities seems to be just
this "solicitation" of attention. See above, p. 131.
THEORY OF THE BODY r6r
situation is only to talk of products 01 one's analysis, but never of
lived unities, perceptually experienced states of affairs en situation.
Thus, following and going far beyond the Gestalt psychologists,
Merleau-Ponty maintains that "form" is the fundamental
phenomenon in perception:
When Gestalt theory tells us that a figure on a ground is the most
simple sensory datum we can obtain ... that is the very definition of the
perceptual phenomenon, that without which a phenomenon cannot be
called perception. (PP, 10)
are not simply juxtaposed beside one another, nor is the pipe only
experienced as "on" the table, "on" the pipe-stand, "next to"
the book, and so on. These spatial relations include intrincisally
the reference to my body as that by means of which there are
things at all, and hence that by means of which these things are
displayed in definite spatial relations.
Now it is not possible, by means of an "objective" or "geo-
metrical" space, to account for the circumstance that when
my back itches, I "know" precisely "where" the irritation is
(such that, e.g., I can tell another just where to rub). Similarly I
do not need to attend to every movement necessary to put on my
hat properly; and if a cigarette ash falls on my trousers, I do not
hesitate a moment in knocking it off "where" it landed. The
members of my body-proper reveal a spatiality which is sui
generis, so that my various movements seem to be enclosed in
one another and not at all "beside" one another.! It is in virtue
of the fact that my various organs and members form a system (a
"corporeal scheme"), that I know at any moment of my normal
experience, and know automatically, where they are, and where
they are in relation to other objects around me. Quite without
attending actively to him, I move out of the way of another person
when we chance to meet in the street. The woman wearing a
hat with a long feather in it keeps a proper distance from things
which might brush it; and, as Piaget has observed,2 the very
young baby is not long in learning to turn toward the left when
his left cheek is touched.
It is necessary then to conceive of a lived-space, one which
is constituted and organized in terms of a corporeal scheme,
which is itself constituted by means of bodily movements and
actions in specific situations. At first inspection, this corporeal
scheme seems to be a sort of "global consciousness of my posture
in the inter-sensory world, a 'form' in the sense of Gestalt
psychology.... (PP, II6) This "form," however is not a static, but
rather a dynamic, one; that is to say, the corporeal scheme of my
body is a certain posture
which, in the inter-sensory world, we adopt in view of a determinate
on." From the very b~ginning of the child's life, Piaget believes,
there is "an historical development such that each episode
depends on preceding episodes and conditions those that follow
in a truly organic evolution. "1 This process, not simply of growth,
but of progressive accumulation and augmentation of the activi-
ties of the child, he describes as occurring by means of assimi-
lation, accommodation, and internal organization.
As we have already seen, every genuine activity reveals two
fundamental features: (r) it exhibits a sui generis "need" to be
used in order to adapt itself and thus to become crystallized into
a scheme of activity; and (2) it is capable of gradual accommo-
dation to the "objects" encountered through its assimilative
tendencies. 2 Thus, every activity, by the very fact that it tends
to function simply for the sake of functioning,S reveals two
further phases: it tends to incorporate an increasing number of
objects capable of serving as aliments for its activity,4 that is, it
tends to become generalized. And it tends, because of this gener-
alization, to become recognitory as regards the objects capable of
serving as aliments. 5
These three phases of assimilation, however, are but one
process, or tendency, of every activity. The reflex is one func-
tioning totality, and thus it is organized progressively as it
assimilates and accommodates itself to objects. An activity
(whether reflex, or higher level) tends sui generis to grow and
augment, and with this there goes hand in hand a progressive
construction of objects and a progressive separation of "subject"
from "object." The "self" and the "world" are co-constituted
simultaneously, in an historical process whose movements are
described by Piaget in terms of the functional concepts of assimi-
lation, accommodation, and organization.
But, as well, by means of this complex process, the various
activities become crystallized into "schemes;" these "functions
crystallize in sequential structures," 6 which henceforth serve
1 Ibid., p. 142. There are certain problems with his analysis which we cannot show
in this place.
S Ibid., p. 46.
172 MERLEAU-PONTY
our being situated under all of these relations. It is this intentional arc
which institutes the unity of the senses, that of the senses and the intelli-
gence, that of sensibility and motivity. * 1 (PP, 158)
1 As this passage indicates, Merleau-Ponty places a great many tasks on this "arc;"
for something so crucial, though, it is strange that he devotes next to no analysis to it.
We shall return to this phenomenon later.
a Cf. PP, 6I: we shall contest this opposition which he sets up between "absolute"
and "operative."
a St1uctu1e 4u Comportement, op. cit., p. 286.
THEORY OF THE BODY 175
unity in a multi-form and changeable multiplicity of manners of appearing
which belong determinately to it.
These, in this temporal flow, are not an incoherent sequence of sub-
jective processes. Rather they flow away in the unity of a synthesis, such
that in them "one and the same" is intended as appearing. 1
By this he means that the body itself has its own intentionality,
such that all perception presupposes as its condition a sort of
"preliminary constitution" (PP, 249) by virtue of which the body
is
1 Ibid., p. 185.
THEORY OF THE BODY 177
a synergetic system, all the functions of which are taken up again and
connected in the general movement of being-to-the-world, in so far as it is
the congealed form of existence.· (PP, 270)
Hence, the unity of the body and its objects is realized by means
of "autochthonous organization," (PP, 270, footnote) which is
the "arc intentionnel" of the body itself. The body-proper, then,
is "already established" as such for all perception.! As such every
perception profits from an already accomplished synthesis,
once done forever done.
The body-proper exists as an anonymous and generalized
existence, a kind of sub-structure on which all personal life is
built. Hence, too, the intentionality at work in it cannot be at the
level of cognition, of consciousness 2:
If my consciousness actually constituted the world which it perceives
there would be no distance whatever, nor any possible displacement,
between them. My consciousness would penetrate the perceptual world
even to its most hidden articulations; intentionality would carry us to the
heart of the object; and at the same stroke the perceived would not have
the density of something present. Consciousness would not lose itself,
would not become caught up, in the perceptual world.· (PP, 275)
1 How he can then maintain that "le corps propre" is yet "Ie mien," is a problem
central to this argument. We shall return to it later.
2 Cf. Cartesian Meditations, op. cit., §§ 17-18.
I80 MERLEAU-PONTY
That is to say, the unity and the diversity of the senses (and
thus of the body and its objects) are at the same level, just be-
cause they become differentiated and unified on a common
ground. (Cf. PP, I50, 260) Each sense, then, implicates the entire
body, refers simultaneously to all the other senses, and thus is
intrinsically intersensory. It is only by breaking up this lived
unity and simultaneous diversity that the diverse senses of one
body, and correlatively diverse "sense qualities" of one object,
appear - and thus these are strictly artificial, products of the
analysis. (PP, 278).
There is, therefore, "an 'originary stratum' of feeling which is
anterior to the division of the senses;" (PP, 262) and on this
1 De Waelhens, op. cit., p. 175.
THEORY OF THE BODY 181
ground, the diverse senses "lead over into one another." (PP,
265) This "originary stratum" (couche originaire), the intentional
arc which founds all unity, Merleau-Ponty has argued, is temporal.
Indeed, he states, "subjectivity, at the level of perception, is
nothing other than temporality." (PP, 276) This is to say that the
body-proper exists itself as an ek-stasis: to perceive a thing is not
to perform a series of syntheses but rather to encounter it, to
come before it by means of one's sensory fields, to manifest
oneself to it as a presence to him in virtue of his bodily presence to
it - in so far as my body inhabits time (as it inhabits space and
the world), it lives itself as present. "In the same way as it is
necessarily 'here,' the body exists necessarily 'now.' It can never
become 'past.''' 1 When I visually perceive a thing, as de Wael-
hens puts it, "this regarding is a presence or a present because its
unfolding supposes and promises the mobilization of all the
potencies ofthe body." 2
In short, the intentionality of the body-proper is essentially its
temporality; and its temporality is its being: phenomenology, as
Merleau-Ponty understands it, gives way to ontology. In so far as
consciousness is always and essentially conscience-engagee, its
being is always and essentially etre-au-monde; and, its etre-au-
monde is its engagement, its opening-out-onto-the-world, that is,
its etre-corps.
My body-proper, then, manifests me to the world, puts me at
the world, by means of my various senses - which themselves
must now be conceived as modes of access to the various spheres
of being accessible to them. The interiority which Descartes and
others had taken as the essence of mind or consciousness, and
which Sartre had reaffirmed in his ontology, is shown to be quite
erroneous, for it fails to recognize the fundamental dimension of
human-reality: its etre-au-monde. To be perceptive of a world
is not only to be open to it; it is to be opened out onto it, to be at it.
To act on the world is to disclose the world as a contexture of
possible ways-to-be, possible ways in which consciousness is to-the-
world. In this way, the body-proper becomes
1 Cf. above, p. 96: Merleau-Ponty contests Sartre's placement of the body in the
past; for the former, the body is the fundamental locus of ~tre-au mantle as presence.
2 De Waelhens, op. cit., p. 18x.
I82 MERLEAU-PONTY
The world as the primordial unity and "point d'appui" of all our
projects and perceptions is the "home" of consciousness:
The world such as we have tried to show it ... is no longer the visible
unfolding of a constituting Thought, nor is it a fortuitous assemblage of
parts; nor, correctly understood, is it the operation of a directive Thought
on an indifferent matter, but rather the native land of all rationality.·
(PP,492 )
1 Metaphysical Jou,nal, op. cit., pp. 258, 274, and 281. Merleau-Ponty, however,
again does not refer to Marcel.
186 MERLEAU-PONTY
1 He continues: "In concrete movement, the patient has neither a thetic conscious-
ness of the stimulus, nor a thetic consciousness of the reaction; simply, he is his body
and his body is the potency ofa certain world." (PP, 124)
In spite of this position, however, he goes right on to claim that just this "familiarity"
and "communion" with things is what has become severed in brain-injuries. (PP, 153)
This seems to be quite inconsistent; for what, after all, is so-called "concrete move-
THEORY OF THE BODY 187
2. BUT while conscience-incarnee is this system open onto the
world, that by means of which there is a world at all for con-
sciousness, its body-proper is not just a single entity. Or, rather,
we must say that the body-proper, being itself a unity in diversity,
reveals the world as a unity in diversity, reveals the world in
respect of the dimensions which correspond to the various manners
in which the body-proper manifests itself: vision discloses
visual beings, touch tactual beings, and so on. Not only this,
however: for, the phenomenon of synesthesis reveals the body as a
synergetic system. As Merleau-Ponty points out, by virtue of the
fact that each sensory field opens out onto an intersensory
world (PP, 261, 279), they "commune" with one another as they
do with objects:
The senses lead over into one another by opening themselves up to the
structure of the thing. One sees the rigidity and fragility of the glass and
when it is broken with a crystal sound, this sound is carried by the visible
glass. .. The form of objects is not their geometrical contour: it has a
certain relation with their own nature and speaks to all of our senses at
the same time as to sight .... In the swaying of a branch from which a
bird has just flown, one reads its flexibility or its elasticity, and it is in
this way that a branch of an apple tree and one of a birch tree are immedi-
ately distinguished .• 1 (PP, 265)
The senses are thus modes of access to one and the same world,
and the body-proper, as the synergetic unity of these senses, is a
being-to-the-world disclosed by its diverse modes of access. 2 "To
be a body is to be connected to a certain world ... ," (PP, 173) and
to be connected in multiple ways at the level of the "je peux." 3
Accordingly, it is necessary to recast our usual conception of the
fundamental stratum of the body. It is not the case, Merleau-
Ponty argues against Husserl, that sense-contents are construed
(aufgefasst) as adumbrations of objects. This notion (Auffassung,
and correlatively that of A uffassungsinhalt), he argues,
masks the organic relation of the subject and of his world, the active
transcendence of consciousness,l the movement by means of which it
thrusts itself into a thing and a world by means of its organs and its
instruments. (PP, 178)
close to me that it does not even form a picture before me and I cannot
see it, as I cannot see my face. There is time for me because I have a
present ... None of the dimensions of time can be deduced from the
others. But the present (in the broad sense ... ) has, nevertheless, a
privileged status because it is the zone where being and consciousness
coincide.· (PP,484-85)
1 "At each instant of a movement, the preceding instant is not ignored but it is as it
were joined in the present, and present perception consists in sum in reapprehending
(by depending on the actual position) the series of previous positions which mutually
enclose one another. But the immanent position is also enclosed in the present, and
by means of it those which will come up to the end of the movement." (PP, 164) As
we have already had occasion to remark, Merleau-Ponty's descriptions of movement
(ilnd especially this one) are quite close to Bergson's descriptions of "graceful"
movements.
I9 2 MERLEAU-PONTY
But the matter is not quite so simple; for, he asks, does all exis-
tence have a sexual signification, or does every sexual phenome-
non have an existential signification? A straightforward answer
to either question cannot be given, for we cannot reduce one to
the other.
For one thing, Merleau-Ponty points out, we cannot ignore
biological structure; human existence as thus far described is
never indifferent to the rhythms of biological existence. The
body's "need" for ingestion, respiration, sleep, and the like; the
periodical changes and transformations in body-structure, which
require one to maintain his body (having haircuts, wearing
glasses, using crutches, washing and grooming, and the like) -
and similar necessities, all have their bearing on the structures
and functions of human existence. Similarly, sexuality is inte-
grated in concreto with the stream of lived experiences. As Buy-
tendijk has emphasized, "it is especially important to realize
that man is in this world with his body and that the body itself is
a situation .... " 1 And, he continues, the body discloses itself as
1 F. J. J. Buytendijk, "Femininity and Existential Psychology," Perspectives in
Personality (edited by David and von Bracken), New York (1957), p. 200.
THEORY OF THE BODY I93
meaningful in its attitudes, gestures, and actions, all of which
are inseparably connected to and made possible by the biological
structure of the body. Thus, Buytendijk believes, one can, by
studying these bodily attitudes and postures, come to an under-
standing of the distinctively "feminine" and "masculine"
Umwelten. 1
Similarly, Merleau-Ponty insists that
Sight, hearing, sexuality, the body are not only the passage-ways, the
instruments or manifestations of personal existence: the latter takes and
gathers them into itself in their given and anonymous existence.· (PP, 186)
But, he goes on, we must say even more: not only is the
signification embodied in the sign, but
if the body can symbolize existence this is because the body actualizes
(realiser) it and is the actuality (actualite) of it. (pP, 191-(2)
1 Ibid., pp. 204-08; ct. also Buytendijk's work, Attitudes et Mouvements, op. cit.
I94 MERLEA U-PONTY
has its source in the root facticity of embodiment, that is, the
body-proper. 1
CRITICAL REMARKS
The proper task of reflection, however, is not to repeat the original process
but to consider it and explicate what can be found in it... Precisely
thereby an experiential knowing (which is at first descriptive) becomes
possible, that experiental knowing (Erjahrungswissen) to which we owe all
conceivable cognizance (Kenntnis) and cognition (Erkenntnis) of our
intentional living. 1
to the activities for which they are poles. But this reference is
itself a reference to another "deja-etabli": the body-proper as
"un acquis," a "tout fait" which is "constitue une fois pour
toutes." Hence, consciousness lives itself as engagee in a sort of
double "deja-fait" - and, apparently, this indicates for him the
fundamental ambiguity to all existence. If we rehearse his
argument briefly, we shall be able to see more clearly the several
errors he commits.
First of all, following from his discussion of reflection, he is led
of necessity (as we saw in our introduction) to seek another means
than reflection for apprehending lived experience. He claims to
find this new access in lived experience itself: the body-proper,
perception itself, are a "latent science of the world," an "habitual
knowledge" (he speaks of them as both "savoir" and "connais-
sance"). (PP, 269, 275, and passim.) Second, he goes on, just in
so far as the world, on the one hand, and the body-proper, on
the other, are touiours-deia-la, always-already-acquired struc-
tures, and just in so far as the body and perception are thereby
an implicit knowledge of the world as itself "deja-fait," - therefore,
he concludes, the basic connection between them is one of ano-
nymity, generality, typicality, and implicit familiarity. The body
becomes this way, that is to say, becomes an already-acquired-
acquisition, by virtue of its corporeal scheme; the corporeal
scheme, in tum, is realized by means of the intentional arc; and,
finally, the intentional arc makes of the body "un acquis"
because it is fundamentally an "intentionnalite operante" -
which is itself a temporal flux of syntheses of transitions.
That, in barest outline, is what he takes as the phenome-
nological structure of the body as latent knowledge. Let us start
from the top and work down, considering each thesis in tum.
1 Medeau-Ponty's use of this term is quite inaccurate, taken over from Sartre and
not from Hussed. For, Husser! maintains (Ideen, I, pp. 213-19), every consciousness is
"positional," i.e., "thetic;" only, some are "automatic" and others are "active";
none is "non-thetic."
• Cf. PP, pp. 237ff, 269ff, an-76, 3,50-,51, 376--77, and passjm.
3 Gurwitsch, TMorie du Champ de la Conscience, op. cit., p. 245.
CRITICAL REMARKS 20 7
in which consciousness at a certain level of its activity experiences
(or, better, intends) its objects, its own body, indeed even itself,
as living straightforwardly in these and those processes as directed
toward their specific objects. To talk as if the body were itself a
"knowledge," whether implicit or not, is simply to confuse the
descriptively evident situation.
We cannot say, then, that the body "knows" anything, even
in the broadest possible sense of the term. For, in the first place,
if it were a "knowledge," it would not be at the level of non-
thematizing experience of the world, since "knowing" is precisely
a thematizing, presupposing an active attending to and explicating
of the object(s) "known," a formulating of judgments based upon
the active attending and the actively attended-to objects. And
all such activities (grasping, explicating, relating, even at the
level of sensuous perception), as Husserl has shown, are "Ich-
Akte." 1
In the second place, even non-thematizing consciousness is, as
Gurwitsch emphasizes, "a consciousness all the same." To be
sure, it is not as yet an activity in the strict sense, a process lived-
in by the Ego; but this by no means suggests that the body itself
has its own peculiar brand of intentionality.
In the third place, he maintains, on the one hand, that the body
is essentially that by means of which there are objects in the world,
and on the other, that the body itself is a "knowing" of these
same objects. But, if the first part of this claim is the case, then
the body would be consciousness, since consciousness, qua
intentive, is that by means of which there are objects of any sort
whatever, and is at the same time that which "knows" these
objects. If the latter is the case, if the body is that which knows,
then consciousness, as regards the objects which the body would
purportedly "know," would become superfluous.
Finally, taking the body as a "knower" necessitates taking it
as a "subject," a "self," and there results, on the one hand, a
doubling of "subjects" - precisely what Merleau-Ponty deplores
in traditional philosophy - and on the other, it becomes im-
possible to account for the descriptively evident fact that the
body has as its essential sense that it is "my" body. Descriptively
1 Cf. Er/ahrung und Uneil, op. cit., § 17; these are the lowest levels of ego-activity.
See also Ideen, I, op. cit., § 1I5.
208 MERLEA U-PONTY
objects do not occupy him. I can see, moreover, that there are
some processes in w~ch he as ego cannot live. For instance, as
Husser! points out,l the consciousness of inner time (of the
Erlebnisstrom) is in principle an automatic consciousness; the
automatic retention of past phases of the same mental life always
goes on, even during the phases of an active recollecting, just as
the automatic protention of future phases of the same mental
life goes on even during the phases of an active expecting. Thus,
for instance, while I was a moment ago busied with the ashtray
(perceivingly, actionally, or however), there was going on a
number of other intentional processes as well, in which I was not
engaged: a consciousness of the floor beneath my feet; an audi-
tory consciousness of the radio program, and at the same,
perhaps, a disliking of it, or a willing to stop work for a time in
order to attend to it. Before I actively advert and attend to a
headache, there was going on all along an automatic awareness
of it, with, perhaps, an automatic disliking of it - and so on
throughout the whole range of mental life. In fact, moreover,
all my active consciousnesses stand out from a background of such
automatic processes, and are made possible by them: it is only
because the headache was automatically intended as "bother-
some," "irritating," and so on, that I now can and do advert to
it, perhaps dislikingly. As Husserl emphasizes,
anything built by activity necessarily presupposes, as the lowest level, a
passivity that gives something beforehand; and, when we trace anything
built actively, we run into constitution by passive generation ... in the
synthesis of passive experience. 2
1 Cf. Formale und transzendentale Logik, §§ 3-4. We shall return to this phenomenon
later on.
2 Cartesian Meditations, op. cit., p. 78.
3 Erjahrung und Urteil, op. cit., §§ I6-2I, and 63.
CRITICAL REMARKS 21 7
not me myself, the "I" who chooses, thinks, wills, values, and
so on, but "un autre moi qui a deja pris parti pour Ie monde" -
this "other '1'," my body-proper, is thus a sort of "acquis origi-
naite" interposed between me and sensations, and because of
this, I am, as embodied, locked in an irrevocable ambiguity,
anonymity, and generality as regards my own existence and the
world disclosed to me by means of my body. This, in other words,
is the tacticity of the subject.
Such is Merleau-Ponty's position. In the first place, to argue
that each sensation is unique and non-repeatable is one thing.
But to go on and claim that "the subject" who senses this sen-
sation is born and dies with it, and that therefore, since the sen-
sation is (if it is) immersed in a "milieu de generalite," so is the
subject - to argue in this fashion is simply to beg the question.
Whether or not a sensation is anonymous in no way implies that
the subject who perceives that sensation is for that reason
anonymous as well. Whether or not the sensation appearing to
the "subject" appears in a "milieu de generalite," in no way
means that this subject begins and ends with that sensation.
Merleau-Ponty concludes that the subject of perception is anony-
mous (begins and ends with the sensed sensation) from the
premise that the subject begins and ends with the sensed sen-
sation (is anonymous).
Now, in the second place, as has been pointed out, the device
resorted to by him to account for this facticity - intentionality
conceived as corporeal - is completely unacceptable. The body
is not an animate organism because it is itself an intentionality (or
even a "natural 'I"'), but rather because it is the body of a specific
consciousness. To take it as somehow an existence all on its own,
is simply to gloss over this, that consciousness, at whatever
level, is consciousness all the same, and that it itself intends its
own animate organism as its own, and not at all as being a
"natural 'I'." No matter how many quotation-marks one places
around the "I," one can never make the body a subject in the
strict sense. Several other difficulties emerge from these con-
siderations.
Why is it the case that I cannot say that "[ see the blue of the
sky," but only that "it is seen in me," or that "one sees it?" Who
does the seeing? For Merleau-Ponty, it is a "Moi naturel,"
220 MERLEAU-PONTY
1 Cf. de Waelhens, op. cit., pp.8, and 109-10. The remark is to the effect that
Merleau-Ponty, as opposed to Sartre (Marcel is not even mentioned), accounts for the
body qua mine.
222 MERLEA U-PONTY
typical is not yet the general, and certainly not the anonymous.
From this quite correct recognition, then, to Merleau-Ponty's
final position, is a leap concealing a nest of irresovable difficulties.
Over and above these, there is another difficulty involved in
this thesis. Why should it "necessarily" be the case that per-
ception takes place in a milieu of generality? Even if it were
true that, like each sensation, the subject who experiences it
begins and ends with it, can neither precede nor survive it -
even if this were the case (and this is highly questionable), does
it follow that perception of sensations must occur in a milieu of
generality? What permits such a conclusion? The obvious
problem is that the meaning of "generality" is left completely
vague, unanalyzed and unclarified as to its meaning.
And, I must confess, his argument escapes me. It may be, on
the one hand, that his point is that, by means of the temporal
flux of all perception and of all corporeal activity in general (in
virtue of which they become sedimented as typicalities), the
body-proper becomes constituted "une fois pour toutes" as a
complex of habits, typicalities, in the sense of acquiring typical
and usual ways of doing, seeing, touching, assuming postures,
and so on. Again, however, the typical is not the same thing as
the general. Moreover, how this complex sedimentation can occur
by means of temporal flux which, for him, is essentially a series
of syntheses of transition, Merleau-Ponty simply does not tell us.
Over and above these, however, supposing that sedimentation
does occur, and ignoring for the moment how it occurs, does it
follow from this, i.e., from the fact of crystallization of corporeal
activities into schemes of activity, that perception goes on in a
milieu of generality? An habitually familiar milieu is not the
same thing as a generalized milieu.
In short, that "generality" means "typicality," or that
"anonymity" signifies "habitual," is not true. And, that the
evident process of sedimentation signifies that consciousness, as
habituated to certain corporeal typicalities (of posture, conduct,
perception, and the like), is anonymous and given to itself as
generalized, is, I submit, but another ingenious way to smuggle
in by the backdoor what evident inspection of the matters them-
selves will not admit by the front. That, on my first reflection on
myself, I find myself as "already living," as embodied in a body
CRITICAL REMARKS 223
, (Husserl,
protentional ' ..... C-l as expanded
by D. Cairns)
impressional Etc.
retentional
ABC
2.
(Merleau-Ponty)
. 1 It should be noted that here Merleau-Ponty goes counter to his own expressed
intentions, viz. to give a noematic description of lived experience.
228 MERLEA U-PONTY
'"--------~
IZlylll
1 Ibid., p. II3.
MERLEAU-PONTY
actively. Suppose there goes on, now, in the mental life of a very
young infant, a global 'perceiving of a rattle. As Piaget 1 has
pointed out, the infant at first seeks not simply to see the rattle,
but to see its noise, to grasp the noise and perchance the color. In
Husserlian terms, once a particular process with its object occurs,
henceforth every other process and object acquires the sense of
the first (by way of transfer of sense). As Piaget expressed it, the
tendency of reflex and other activity is to assimilate the whole
universe to its activity. But it cannot; hence, it must accommo-
date itself to it; and this double process involves of necessity
a process of internal organization. In Husserlilm terms, which, of
course, are not precisely equivalent to Piaget's, the transferred
sense, "seeable" (as regards the noise) conflicts with the presented
sense; and, as a consequence, in the on-going course of the
infant's experience the two eventually become constituted as
"different" (but "similar," precisely in respect to their seeming
to occur "at the same place and time," being sensuous qualities,
and so on).
There thus occurs, after a series of failures to transfer sense,
a synthesis of dissimilarity in respect of the qualities in question
(what is "seeable" and what is "audible"). In virtue of this,
these consequences of the transfer of sense (whatever harmoni-
ously carries over and whatever is annuled, in respect of sense),
is automatically carried over into subsequent experience. For
instance, when the infant sees "red" at one time and touches the
"object" which is red, henceforth all "red" objects acquire the
sense, "touchable". He then, suppose, sees the red of an electric
heater and reaches out to touch it .. , and gets burned: here
the transferred sense, "touchable" (like all other such reds
before this), is abruptly annuled. Henceforth, "red" objects will,
at least, be approached with a good deal of caution in respect of
the sense, "touchable." Or, in a reverse case: there can occur
transfers of sense in the past, such that past perceived objects
can undergo an alteration in sense for consciousness: when the
infant touches the "red" heater, other "red" objects can acquire
the sense, "don't touch," even those seen and touched inJhe
past. There is a sense, then, in which the past has its own style
1 There is here a close parallel to Husserl which should be carried further, though
we cannot do it here.
CRITICAL REMARKS 233
of change: e.g., finding a quicker way to do some task, past
attempts to do it acquire the sense, "I could have done it quicker
if .... "
Now, although we have not fully circumscribed this universal
principle, it is clear, I think, that just this automatic synthesis
of associative pairing accounts for the phenomenon of sedi-
mentation - if we remember that it is founded on the more
fundamental syntheses of identification and differentiation. And,
just because Merleau-Ponty completely ignores, nor does not see
it, he in no way can account for what even he takes as essential
to all consciousness. His effort to account for sedimentation by
means of "syntheses of transition" is not so much a complete
failure (since, in a sense such syntheses do occur), as it is wholly
inadequate, presupposing just those syntheses which fully and
descriptively give this account.
It now remains, after our critical appraisal of the central
theses of his theory, to attempt to state what, fundamentally,
Merleau-Ponty has attempted to achieve.
(3) THE MEANING OF MERLEAU-PONTY'S 'EXISTENTIALISM'
1 Ortega y Gasset agrees with this as well, which he calls man's ensimismamiento,
literally, "within-one's-selfness." Cf. Man and People, W. W. Norton (New York,
1957), pp. 16-18.
EPILOGUE 243
With this conception, which we need not consider for its own
sake here,! Bergson attempts to cut away with one stroke the
underbrush of confusion and excess within the idealist-realist
feud, and to re-establish the relations between l' esprit and la
matiere. In thp course of his inquiry, however, he encounters
a peculiarity - precisely the one which henceforth plays such an
important role in the discussions of the body after him. If, he
argues, all matter whatever consists in an ensemble of images
then
there is one such image which cuts across all others in that I know it
not only from without by means of perceptions, but also from within by
affections: this is my body. (MM, II)
1 After setting up this terminology, however, Bergson then goes on to use "l'image"
and "l'objet" interchangeably. In a way, it might be suggested, had he not insisted on
speaking of "l'image" as "une existence," and had he taken it instead as "un sens,"
his descriptions of things as images would have been quite close to Hussed's meaning
of "phenomenon."
EPILOGUE
is part of the material world; the material world is not part of the
brain." (MM, 13) Indeed, if one made the brain (or the body itself)
the condition of the "image totale," he would be involved in an
absurdity, just because of that part-whole relation.
"But if," Bergson continues, "my body is an object capable
of exercising a real and new action on the objects which surround
it, it must occupy in respect of them a privileged situation."
(MM, 14-15) In that my body is a "centre d'action" for objects,
changing their mutual relations, working on them, and so on,
these objects must themselves be what Merleau-Ponty later will
call "poles of action." That is to say, by being able "to exercise a
real influence on other images, and thus to be able to choose
between several materially possible steps," Bergson concludes, in
a way strikingly similar to what Merleau-Ponty argues later, that
It is indeed necessary that these images in some manner outline (on the
side which they turn toward my body) the part which my body can take
from them ... (the objects) are organized according to the increasmg or
decreasing powers of my body. The objects which su"ouna my body reflect
the possible action of my body on them.· (MM, 15-16)
1 Cf. Cartesian Meditations, op. cit., pp. II-IB, for the systematic treatment of
Evidenz.
2 Always, we must remember, such reflection is reflection within the phenomeno-
logical reduction.
3 Ibid., p. 50; cf. also, pp. 51-53.
EPILOGUE
1 Ibid., p. 97.
2 Cf. ibid., pp. 77-80.
• Cf. above, Part III, Chapter III, pp. 204-233.
4 Cf. Cartesian Meditations, Meditations IV and V.
EPILOGUE 253
If we now abstractively isolate these strata of sense, the
animate organism still has a complex objective sense for conscious-
ness - namely, those strata we have already delineated above.
The problem now is to determine which of the remaining strata
are founded and which are founding. The organism, that is to say,
even when one abstractively isolates the cultural and intersubjec-
tive senses, still has the sense of being a synthetically constituted
system of organs by means of which objects in the surrounding
field are given to the correlatively abstractively isolated noetic
stratum of consciousness.
In the on-going course of its harmonious experiencing of the
world at this level, which has the sense for it, "spatio-temporally
existent world," consciousness intends its own organism as that
by means 0/ which there are sensuously perceivable and practico-
instrumental things within that world. More particularly, by
means of its own organism, consciousness experiences some
particular milieu as structured in terms of its own particular
projects-at-hand which are actualized by means of its bodily
activities, and as organized around and orien ted to its own
organism as the "center" of this milieu. Not only do "actions" (in
the broad sense) issue from "here and now," but also the per-
ceived things are oriented, and refer back, to this same "here
and now" which is the animate organism embodying the conscious-
ness for whom the milieu is milieu. Thus, my animate organism
has the sense of being the bearer of an orientational point, "0,"
from which spatio-temporal coordinates organize and structure
the milieu.
This sense becomes constituted on the basis of a number of
processes whose exact nature is extremely difficult to describe.
In the first place, my animate organism functions as this single
Null-point only as the consequence of a continuously on-going
series of automatic syntheses in virtue of which it is continuously
experienced as a corporeal system of body-members,-components,
and -organs, each of which can also function as a relative null-
point for specific purposes and with regard to specific objects.
My hand, with which I grasp and feel within my "manipulatory
sphere" 1 is itself an orientational point relative to that which is
1 We borrow this apt phrase from Alfred Schlitz, "Symbol, Reality and Society," in:
L. Bryson, et al (editors), Symbols and Society, 14th Symposium of the Conference on
Science, Philosophy and Religion, Harper Bros. (New York, 1955), pp. 154-56.
254 EPILOGUE
1 Ibid., Idem.
EPILOGUE 255
out as one and the same object, by means of one and the same
organism. In this sense, my organism is automatically constituted
as one, single Wahrnehmungsorgan, by means of continuously
on-going but automatic syntheses of corporeal unification, which,
moreover, are of different kinds: identification, differentiation,
and associative sense-transfer. And, it is by means of these
syntheses that objects can be intended as self-identical throughout
a multiplicity of changes of appearance.
In order to trace back the constitution of this Leibkorper as a
Wahrnehmungsorgan, it would be necessary to take it as the clue
pointing back to those syntheses which unify it, which connect
the various sensuous organs and members into one corporeal
system. This task calls for an abstractive isolation of each Of
these fields as to their respective sense-strata, for only thereby
would it be possible to see how, from the sense-strata of each
field, the occurs a synthesis of unification, itself made up of more
fundamental syntheses.
Once this abstractive isolation has been effectuated, it be-
comes possible, first of all, to show how each field is constituted
in itself as a self-identical sensuous field functioning as a center,
0, for a milieu of data disclosed by means of it, and second, to
show how the several fields become constituted by consciousness
as one corporeal system.
In this manner, the organism acquires the sense of being a
Sinnesorgan: that "on" and "in" which the various fields of
sensation are "spread out." My animate organism, that is to say,
becomes singled out from all other objects in the surrounding
world
namely as the only one of them that is not just a body but precisely
an animate organism: the sole Object ... to which, in accordance with
experience, I ascribe /ields 0/ sensation (belonging to it, however, in
different manners - a field of tactual sensations, a field of warmth and
coldness, and so forth) . . . . 1
but also at the same time my psychic life; and, finally, both of these at
once: the self-embodying of the latter (the psychic life) in the former (my
organism), and the self-expressing of the one in the other .• 1
1 Idee", 1, op. cit., p. 103. The significance of the relation of the body to the consti-
tution of Others and thereby to the common social world is also indicated here.
APPENDIX
Page Reference
et il nous faut prendre ici ce mot dans son
indetermination maxima. La langue alle-
mande est ici beaucoup plus adequate que la
nOtre: ien erlebe . .. a un point oil ce len erlebe
ne se distingue pas de Es wlebt in mir . ...
II RI,27 Lorsque je dis: j'existe, je vise incontes-
tablement quelque chose de plus; je vise
obscurement ce fait que je ne suis pas
seulement pour moi, mais que je me mani-
feste - il vaudrait mieux dire que je suis
manifeste; Ie prMixe ex, dans exister, en
tant qu'il traduit un mouvement vers
l'exterieur, et comme une tendance centri-
fuge, est ici de la plus grande importance.
J'existe: cela veut dire j'ai de quoi me faire
connaitre ou reconnaltre soit par autrui, soit
par moi-m~me en tant que j'affecte pour moi
une alterite d'emprunt ....
15 EA,138 II est de l'essence de la liberte de pouvoir
s'exercer en se trahissant. Rien d'exterieur
a nous ne peut fermer la porte au desespoir.
La voie est ouverte; on peut encore dire que
la structure du monde est telle que Ie deses-
poir absolu y paralt possible.
18 EA,I8I peut~tre dans Ie mesure oil je prends
conscience de eet appel en tant qu' appel, suis-
je amene a reconnattre que cet appel n'est
possible que parce qu'au fond de moi il y a
quelque chose de plus interieur a moi-m~me
que moi-m~me - et du m~me coup l'appel
change de signe.
18 RI,40 mais elle a l'avantage de mettre en lumiere
cette verite essentieUe que Ie progres philo-
sophique consiste dans l'ensemble des
demarches successives par lesqueUes une
liberte, qui se saisit d'abord comme simple
pouvoir du oui et du non, s'incarne, ou, si
l'on veut, se constitue comme puissance
reelle en se conferant a elle-m~me un contenu
au sein duquel elle se decouvre et se recon-
natt.
19 ME, I, 49 invariablement ... a remonter de la vie vers
la pensee et ulterieurement a redescendre de
la pensee vers la vie pour tenter d'eclairer
celle-ci.
21 EA,I5 Rompre, par consequent, une fois pour
toutes avec les metaphores qui representent
la conscience comme un cercle lumineux
autour duquel il n'y aurait pour elle que
tenebres. C'est, au contraire, l'ombre qui est
au centre.
APPENDIX
Page Retuence
25 EA,23 1 Toute affirmation portant sur un avoir
semble bien &tre bMie en quelque sorte sur Ie
modele d'une sorte de position prototype ou
Ie qui n'est autre que moi-meme. II semble
bien que l'avoir ne soit senti dans sa force,
qu'il ne prenne sa valeur qu'a l'interieur du
j'ai. Si un tu as ou un il a est possible, ce n'est
qu'en vertu d'une sorte de transfert qui
d'ailleurs ne peut jamais s'effectuer sans
une certaine deperdition.
26 EA,23 1 Ceci s'eclaire dans une certaine mesure si
l'on songe a la relation qui unit manifeste-
ment l'avoir au pouvoir, tout au moins Ill. ou
la possession est effective et litterale. Le
pouvoir est quelque chose que j'eprouve en
l'exer~ant ou en y resistant, ce qui apres tout
revient au m&me.
26 EA,23 1 et ceci est capital, que Ie contenu lui-m&me
ne se laisse pas definir en termes de pure
spatialite. II me paratt qu'il implique
tourjours l'idee d'une potentialite; contenir,
c'est enclore; mais enclore c'est emp&cher,
c'est resister, c'est s'opposer a ce que quelque
chose se repande, se deverse, s'echappe, etc.
EA,234 En tant que je me con~ois moi-m&me comme
ayant en moi ou plus precisement a moi
certains caracteres, certains apanages, je me
considere du point du vue d'un autre auquel
je ne m'oppose qu'a condition de m'&tre
d'abord implicitement identifie a lui ....
29 EA,236-37 Sans doute il y a dans l'avoir une double per-
manence: permanence du qui, permanence
du quid; mais cette permanence est par
essence menacee; elle se veut, ou du moins
elle se voudrait; et elle s'echappe a elle-m&me.
Et cette menace, c'est la prise de l'autre en
tant qu'autre, l'autre qui peut &tre Ie monde
en lui-m&me, et en face duquel je me sens si
douloureusement moi; je serre contre moi
cette chose qui va m'&tre arrachee peut~tre,
je tente desesperement de me l'incorporer,
de former avec elle un complexe unique,
indecomposable. Desesperement, vaine-
ment ....
33 ME, I, II3 Le verite est bien plut6t qu'a l'interieur de
toute possession, de tout mode de possession
il y a comme un noyau senti, et ce noyau
n'est autre que l'experience, en elle-meme
non intellectualisable, du lien par lequel
mon corps est mien.
33 ME, 1,116 Mon corps est mien pour autant que je ne Ie
APPENDIX
Page Refe,ence
regarde pas, que je ne mets pas entre lui
et moi d'intervalle ou encore pour autant
qu'il n'est pas objet pour moi, mais que je
suis mon corps... Dire je suis mon corps
c'est supprimer l'intervalle que je retablis
au contraire si je dis que mon corps est mon
instrument.
36 RI,37 Quand nous employons les termes recepteur,
emetteur, etc., nous assimilons l'organisme
a un poste auquel parvient un certain messa-
ge. Plus exactement, ce qui est capte par ce
poste, ce n'est pas Ie message lui-m8me,
c'est un ensemble de donnees transcriptibles
a la faveur d'un certain code. Le message au
sens strict implique m8me une double trans-
mission, Ie premiere operation se produisant
au depart, la seconde a l'arrivee; peu
importe d'ailleurs les modalitees materielles
infiniment variables qu'elle comporte.
nous sommes dupes d'une illusion lorsque
nous imaginons confusement que la con-
science receptive vient tfadui,e en .sensation
quelque chose qui lui est donne initialement
comme phenomene physique, comme ebran-
lement par exemple. Q'est-ce en effet que
traduire? c'est dans tous les cas substituer un
groupe de donnees a un autre groupe de
donnees. Mais ce terme de donnees demande a
8tre pris ici a la rigueur. Le choc eprouve par
l'organisme ou par telle de ses parties n'est
aucunement donne; ou plus exactement il est
une donnee pour l'observateur qui Ie per~oit
d'une certaine maniere, non pour l'organisme
qui Ie subit.
39 RI, 122-23 Recevoir, c'est admettre chez soi quelqu'un
du dehors, c'est l'introduire ... sentir, c'est
recevoir; mais il faudra aussitOt specifier que
recevoir, ici, c'est m'ouvrir, et par conse-
quent me donner, bien plutOt que ce n'est
subir une action exMrieure.
39 RI,I20 par rapport a un soi qui peut d'ailleurs 8tre
Ie soi d'autrui et j'entends par soi quelqu'un
qui dit ou qui est au moins cense pouvoir dire
moi, se poser au 8tre pose comme moi ...
Encore faut-il- et c'est m8me ici l'essentiel-
que ce soi eprouve comme sien un certain
domaine.
52 Ideen II, 152 einsige Objekt, das fiir den Willen meines
reinen Ich unmittelba, spontan beweglich ist
und Mittel, urn eine mittelbare spontane
Bewegung anderer Dinge zu erzeugen ...
266 APPENDIX
Page Refe,ence
(Das Ich) hat das "Vermogen" ("ich kann")
diesen Leib, bzw. die Organe, in die er sich
gliedert, frei zu bewegen, und mittels ihrer
eine Aussenwelt wahrzunehmen.
56 Ideen II, 144 bei aller Erfahrung von raumdinglichen
Objekten de, Leib als Wahrnehmungsorgan
des erfahrenden Subjektes "mit dabei ist" . ..
59 EN,336 Si donc Z'Ot,e-rega,de, degage dans toute sa
purete, n'est lie au carps d'aut,ui plus que
rna conscience d'etre conscience, dans 1a
pure realisation du cogito, n'est Me a man
propre carps, il faut considerer l'apparition de
certains objets dans Ie champ de mon experi-
ence, en particulier la confergence des yeux
d'autrui dans rna direction, comme une pure
monition, comme l'occasion pure de realiser
mon Ot,e-rega,de . ...
60 EN,330 Si l'on me regarde, en effet, j'ai conscience
d' Ot,e objet. Mais cette conscience ne peut se
produire que dans et par l'existence de l'autre.
En cela Hegel avait raison. Seulement, cette
aut,e conscience et cette aut,e liberte ne me
sont jamais donnees, puisque, si elles l'etaient,
elles seraient connues, donc objets et que je
cesserais d'etre objet.
60 EN,329 Et lorsque je pose naivement qu'il est possi-
ble que je sois, sans m'en rendre compte, un
etre objectif, je suppose implicitement par la
meme l'existence d'autrui, car comment
serais-je objet si ce n'est pour un sujet? Ainsi
autrui est d'abord pour moi l'etre pour qui je
suis objet, c'est-a-dire l'etre pa, qui je gagne
mon objectite.
61 EN,I5 L'existant est phenomene, c'est-a-dire qu'il
se designe lui-meme comme ensemble organi-
se de qualites... L'etre est simplement la
condition de tout devoilement: il est etre-
pour-devoiler et non etre devoile ....
62 EN,I6 . . . l'etre du phenomene, quoique coextensif
au phenomene, doit echapper a la condition
phenomenale - qui est de n'exister que pour
autant qu'on se revele - et que, par conse-
quent, il deborde et fonde la connaissance
qu'on en prend.
63 EN,18 la condition necessaire et suffisante pour
qU'une conscience soit connaissante de son
objet, c'est qU'elle soit conscience d'elle-
meme comme etant cette connaissance. C'est
une condition necessaire: si rna conscience
n'etait pas conscience d'etre conscience de
table, e1le serait donc conscience de cette
APPENDIX
Page RejereneB
table sans avoir conscience de l'8tre ou, si l'on
veut, une conscience qui s'ignorerait soi-
m8me, une conscience inconsciente - ce qui
est absurde. C' est une condition suffisante:
il suffit qui j'aie conscience d'avoir conscience
de cette table pour que j'en aie en effet
conscience. Cela ne suffir certes pas pour me
permettre d'affirmer que cette table existe en
soi - mais bien qu'elle existe pour moi.
65 EN,26 tout activite, toute spontaneite. C'est precise-
ment parce qu'elle est spontaneite pure,
parce que rien ne peut mordre sur e1le, que la
conscience ne peut agir sur rien.
67 EN,29 La subjectivite absolue ne peut se constituer
qu'en face d'un reveIe, l'immanence ne peut
se definir que dans la saisie d'un transcen-
dant ... la conscience implique dans son 8tre
un 8tre non conscient et transphenomenal.
67 EN,29 la conscience est un Btre pour lequel il est dans
son Btre question de son Btye en tant que cet Btre
implique un Btys autye que lui.
70 EN,222 Le rapport originel de presence, comme
fondement de la connaissance, est negatif.
Mais comme la negation vient au monde par
Ie pour-soi et que la chose est ce qu'elle
est, dans l'indifference absolue de l'identite,
ce ne peut etre la chose qui se pose comme
n'etant pas Ie pour-soi. La negation vient du
pour-soi lui-m8me ... Mais par la negation
originelle, c'est Ie pour-soi qui se constitue
comme n' etant pas la chose.
71 EN,226 Ce qui signifie que dans ce type d'8tre qu'on
appelle Ie connaitre, Ie seul Btre qu'on puisse
rencontrer et qui est perpetuellement ltl, c'est
Ie connu. Le connaissant n'est pas, il n'est
pas saisissable. II n'est rien d'autre que ce
qui fait qu'il y a un Btre-Ztl du connu, une
presence - car de Iui-meme Ie connu n'est
ni present ni absent, il est simplement. Mais
cette presence du connu est presence a yien,
puisque Ie connaissant est pur reflet d'un
n'etre pas, elle parait donc, a travers Ia
translucidite total edu connaissant connu,
presence absolue .
72 EN,298 . . . si m8me je pouvais tenter de me faire
objet, deja je serais moi au coeur de cet objet
que je suis et du centre m8me de cet objet
j 'aurais a etre Ie sujet qui Ie regarde ...
(Mais) precisement etre objet c'est n'Btre.pas-
moi ....
73 EN,359 La contradiction est flagrante: pour pouvoir
268 APPENDIX
Page Reference
saisir ma transcendance, il faudrait que je
la transcende. Mais, precisement, ma propre
transcendance ne peut que transcender,
je la suis, je ne puis me servir d'elle pour la
constituer comme transcendance transcend6e
je suis condamne a 8tre perpetuellement ma
propre neantisation. En un mot, la reflexion
est Ie reflechi.
74 EN,298-99 Mais si precisement 8tre objet c'est n'Otre-pas-
mai, Ie fait d'etre objet pour une conscience
modifie radicalement la conscience non dans
ce qu'elle est pour soi, mais dans son appari-
tion a autrui ... En un mot, Ie pour-sai est
inconnaissable par autrui comme pour-soi.
L'objet que je saisis sous Ie nom d'autrui
m'apparait sous une forme radicalement
autre; autrui n'est pas pour sai comme il
m'apparait, je ne m'apparais pas comme je
suis pour autrui; je suis aussi incapable de
me saisir pour moi comme je suis pour autrui,
que de saisir ce qu'est autrui pour soi a
partir de l'objet-autrui qui m'apparatt ...
C'est ce que nous appellerons leur separation
ontologique.
75 EN,297 En fait, notre experience ne nous presente
que des individus conscients et vivants; mais
en droit, il faut remarquer qu'autrui est objet
pour moi parce qu'il est autrui et non parce
qu'il apparait a l'occasion d'un corps-objet;
sinon nous retomberions dans l'illusion
spatialisante ....
75 EN,3 00 retrouver 1'8tre d'autrui comme une trans-
cendance qui conditionne 1'8tre m8me de
cette int6riorite. .. La dispersion et la lutte
des consciences demeureront ce qu'elles sont:
nous aurons simplement decouvert leur
fondement et leur veritable terrain.
77 EN,3 1 4 ma liaison fondamentale avec autrui-sujet
doit pouvoir se ramener a ma possibilit6 per-
manente d'Otre vu par autrui. C'est dans et
par la revelation de mon 8tre-objet pour
autrui que je dois pouvoir saisir la presence
de son 8tre-sujet ... (Car) je ne saurais etre
objet pour un objet. .. Et, d'ailleurs, mon
objectivit6 ne saurait elle-meme decouler
pour moi de l'objectivite du monde puisque,
precisement, je suis celui par qui it y a un
monde ... "l'etre-vu-par-autrui" est la verite
du "voir-autrui."
78 EN,349 La honte est sentiment de chute originelle,
non du fait que j'aurais commis telle ou telle
APPENDIX 269
Page Rele1'enu
£aute, mais simplement du fait que je suis
"tombe" dans Ie monde, au milieu des choses,
et que j'ai besoin de la mediation d'autrui
pour 8tre ce que je suis .
78 EN, 315-16 . . . car l'reil n'est pas saisi d'abord comme
organe sensible de vision, mais comme
support du regard ... si j'apprehende Ie
regard, je cesse de percevoir les yeux. .. Le
regard d'autrui masque ses yeux, il semble
aller devant eux . .. C'est que percevoir, c'est
regarder, et saisir un regard n'est pas appre-
hender un objet-regard dans Ie monde ...
c'est prendre conscience d'Atre regarae.
82 EN, 368 C'est tout entier que 1'8tre-pour-soi doit
8tre corps et tout entier qu'il doit 8tre
conscience: il ne saurait 8tre uni a un corps.
Pareillement 1'8tre-pour-autrui est corps
tout entier; il n'y a rien derriere Ie corps.
Mais Ie corps est tout entier "psychique."
84 EN, 571 Le seul emplacement concret qui puisse se
decouvrir a moi, c'est l'Hendue absolue,
c'est-a-dire, justement, celIe qui est definie
par ma place consideree comme centre et
pour laquelle les distances se comptent
absolument de l'objet a moi, sans reciprocite.
Et la seule etendue absolue est celIe qui se
deplie a partir d'un lieu que je suis absoIu-
ment. Aucun autre point ne pourrait 8tre
choisi comme centre absolu de reference,
a moins d'etre entraine aussit6t dans la
relativite universelle.
89 EN, 378 Aucun groupement syntMtique ne peut
conferer la qualite objective a ce qui est par
principe du vecu. S'il doit y avoir perception
d'objets dans Ie monde, il faut que nous
soyons des notre surgissement m8me en
presence du monde et des objets. La sensation
notion hybride entre Ie subjectif et l'objectif,
conyue a partir de l'objet, et appliquee
ensuite au sujet, existence b~tarde dont on
ne saurait dire si elle est de fait ou de droit,
la sensation est une pure r8verie de psycholo-
gue, il faut la rejeter deliberement de toute
tMorie serieuse sur les rapports de la
conscience et du monde.
91 EN, 380 C'est cette contingence, entre la necessite
et la liberte de mon choix que nous nommons
Ie sens. Elle implique que l'objet m' apparaisse
toujours tout entier a la lois - c'est Ie cube,
l'encrier, la tasse que je vois - mais que cette
apparition ait toujours lieu dans une per-
270 APPENDIX
Page Reference
spective particuliere qui traduise ses relations
au fond de monde et aux autres ceu.
92 EN,38I Les references intra-mondaines ne peuvent
se faire qu'a. des objets du monde et Ie monde
vu definit perpetuellement un objet visible
auquel renvoient ses perspectives et ses
dispositions. Cet objet apparatt au milieu de
monde et en m~me temps que Ie monde; il
est toujours donne par surcrott avec n'impor-
te quel groupement d'objets, puisqu'il est
defini par l'orientation de ces objets: sans
lui, il n'y aurait aucune orientation, puisque
toutes les orientations seraient equivalentes.
mon atre-dans-le~monde, par Ie seul fait
qu'il rBalise un monde, se fait indiquer a. lui-
mame comme un ~-au-milieu-du-monde
par Ie monde qu'il realise ... mon corps est
partout sur Ie monde ... Mon corps est a. la
fois coextensif au m~nde, epandu tout a.
travers les choses et, a. la fois, ramasse en ce
seul point qu'elles indiquent toutes et que je
suis, sans pouvoir Ie connaltre.
Ainsi, c'est Ie surgissement du pour-soi dans
Ie monde qui fait exister du m~e coup Ie
monde comme totalite des choses et les sens
comme la maniere objective dont les qualites
des choses se presentent.
96 EN,388 puisque nous serions renvoyes a. l'infini. Cet
instrument, nous ne l'employons pas, nous
Ie sommes. 11 ne nous est pas donne autre-
ment que par l'ordre utensile du monde, par
l'espace hodologique ... mais il ne saurait
~e donnA a. mon action: je n'ai pas a. m'y
adapter ni a. y adapter un autre outil, mais
i1 est mon adaptation mame aux outils,
l'adaptation que je suis.
96 EN,392-93 Naissance, passe, contingence, necessite d'un
point de vue, condition de fait de toute
action possible sur Ie monde; tel est Ie corps,
tel il est pour moi. .. (C'est) condition neces-
saire de l'existence d'un monde et ... realisa-
tion contingente de cette condition.
L'affectivite coenestMsique est alors pure
saisie non-positionnelle d'une contingence
sans couleur, pure apprehension de soi comme
existence de fait. Cette saisie perpetuelle par
mon pour-soi d'un goflt fade et sans distance
qui m'accompagne jusque dans mes efforts
pour m'en delivrer et qui est mon goU, c'est
ce que nous avons decrit ailleurs sous Ie nom
de Nausee. Une nausee discrete et insurmon-
APPENDIX 271
Page Reference
table revele perpetuellement mon corps a ma
conscience ....
98 EN,405 II revient au meme d'etudier la f~on dont
mon corps apparait a autrui ou celIe dont
Ie corps d'autrui m'apparait. Nous avons
etabli, en effet, que les structures de mon
etre-pour-autrui sont identiques a celles de
l'etre d'autrui pour moi.
100 EN,410 Mais,de meme, on ne saurait percevoir Ie
corps d'autrui comme chair a titre d'objet
isole ayant avec les autres ceci de pures
relations d'exteriorite. Ceci n'est vrai que
pour Ie cadavre. Le corps d'autrui comme
chair m'est immediatement donne comme
centre de reference d'une situation qui s'or-
ganise synthetiquement autour de lui et il est
inseparable de cette situation ....
101 EN,413 ... etre objet-pour-autrui ou etre-corps, ces
deux modalites ontologiques sont traductions
rigoureusement equivalentes de l'etre-pour-
autrui du pour-soi. Ainsi, les significations
ne renvoient-elles pas a. un psychisme
mysterieux: elles sont ce psychisme, en tant
qu'il est transcendance-transcendee ... En
particulier ... manifestations emotionnelles
ou, d'une fa~on plus generale, Ies phenomenes
improprement appeles d' expression ne nous
indiquent nullement une affection cachee et
vecue par quelque psychisme ... ces fronce-
ments de sourcils, cette rougeur, ce begaie-
ment, ce leger tremblement des mains, ces
regards en dessous qui semblent a. la fois
timides et mena~nts n'expriment pas la cole-
re, ils sont la colere.
103 EN,42o Ainsi, la relativite de mes sens, que je ne puis
penser abstraitement sans detruire mon
monde, est en meme temps' perpetuellement
presentifiee a. moi par l'existence de I'autre;
mais c'est une pure et insaisissable appresen-
tation.
104 EN, 421-22 que j'aie rencontre autrui dans sa subjectivite
objectivante, puis comme objet; il faut, pour
que je juge Ie corps d'autrui comme objet
semblable a. mon corps, qu'il m'ait He
donne comme objet et que mon corps m'ait
devoiIe de son c6te une dimension-objet.
Jamais l'analogie ou la ressemblance ne peut
constituer d'abOYd l'objet-corps d'autrui et
l'objectivite de mOD corps; mais au contraire,
ces deux objectites doivent exister prealable-
ment pour qu'un principe analogique puisse
27 2 APPENDIX
Page Ref81'ence
jouer. lci donc, c'est Ie langage qui m'apprend
les structures pour autrui de mon corps.
108 EN,202 La. reflexion est une connaissance, cela n'est
pas douteux, elle est pourvue d'un caractere
positionnel; elle affirme la conscience refle-
cbie. Mais toute affirmation ... est condition-
nee par une negation: affirmer cet objet, c'est
nier simultanement que je sois cet objet.
Connaitre, c'est se faire autre.
113 Ideen zu einer rei- Wohl zu beachten ist dabei, dass hi81' nicht
nen Phanomenolo- die Rede ist von ein81' Beziehung zwischen
gie und phanomeno- irgendeinem psychologischen Vorkommnis -
logischen Philoso- genannt Erlebnis - und einem anderen realen
phie, Band l, 64 Dasein - genannt Gegenstand - oder von einer
psychologischen Verknupfung, die in obiektiv81'
Wirklichkeit zwischen dem einen und anderen
statthatte. Vielmehr ist von Erlebnissen rein
ihrem Wesen nach, bzw. von reinen Wesen
die Rede und von dem, was in den Wesen,
"a priori," in unbedingter Notwendigkeit be-
schlossen ist.
116 Formate und trans- Es ist zu betonen, dass dieses Zuriickverwei-
zendentale Logik, sen nicht abgeleitet ist aus einer inductiven
187 Empirie des psychologischen Beobachters •..
sondem es ist, wie in der Phli.nomenologie zu
zeigen ist, ein Wesensbestand der I ntentionali-
tat, aus ihrem eigenen intentionalen Gehalt in
den entsprechenden Erfiillungsleistungen zu
enthiillen.
131 PP,58 les psychologues qui pratiquent la description
des phenomenes n'aperyoivent pas d 'ordinaire
la portee pbilosopbique de leur methode. Ils
ne voient pas que Ie retour a. l'experience
perceptive, si cette reforme est consequente
et radicale, condamne toutes les formes de
realisme ... que Ie veritable defaut de l'intel-
lectualisme est justement de prendre pour
donne l'univers determine de la science, que
ce reproche s'applique a fortiori a la pensee
psychologique, puisqu'elle place la conscience
perceptive au milieu d'un monde tout fait,
et que la critique de l'hypotbese de constance
si elle est conduite jusqu'au bout, prend la
valeur d'une veritable "reduction phenome-
nologique" ... elle n'a jamais rompu avec Ie
naturalisme. Mais du m8me coup elle devient
infidele a ses propre descriptions.
136 PP,iv I.e monde est 130 avant toute analyse que je
puisse en faire et il serait artificiel de Ie
Wre deriver d'une serie de syntMses qui
relieraient les sensations, puis les aspects
APPENDIX 273
Page Re/wen&e
perspectifs de l'objet, alors que les unes et
les autres sont justement des produits de
l'analyse et ne doivent pas Mre r6aJis&; avant
elle.
137 PP,412- 13 son objet ne peut pas iui echapperabsolument
puisque noUB n'en avons notion que par elle.
n faut bien que la rMlexion donne en quelque
maniere l'irrMl6chi, car, autrement, nous
n'aurions rien a lui opposer et elle ne devien-
drait pas probleme pour nous ... Ce qui est
donne et vrai initialement, c'est une reflexion
ouverte sur l'irreflechi,le reprise reflexive de
l'irreflechi ....
PP,140 prend son objet a l'etat naissant, tel qu'il
apparait a celui qui Ie vit, avec l'atmosphere
de sens dont il est alors enveloppe, et qui
cherche a se glisser dans cette atmosphere,
pour retrouver, derriere les faits et les
sympt6mes disperses, l'~tre total du sujet,
s'il s'agit d'un normal, Ie trouble fondamen-
tal, s'il s'agit d'un malade.
PP,253 La reflexion radicale est celIe qui me ressaisit
pendant que je suis en train de former et de
formuler l'id6e du sujet et celIe de l'objet,
elle met au jour la source de ces deux idees,
elle est reflexion non seulement operante,
inais encore consciente d'elle-m~me dans son
operation.
PP,90 en l'accomplissant moi-m~me et dans la
mesure ou je suis un corps qui se leve vers Ie
monde.
139 Une Philosophie de Autrement dit, el it fallait s'y attendre, la
l'ambiguiti, 386 these fondamentale de la philosophie de
Merleau-Ponty: toute connaissance s'enra-
cine dans la perception, est elle-m~me ambi-
gue. Si elle signifie que tpute connaissance
humaine s'origine dans Ie concret et en
poursuit l'explicatition, tout ce qui a et6 dit
dans ce livre nous parait l'etablir. Si, au
contraire, on veut entendre par Ia qu'en
aucun sens nous ne sortons jamais de l'imm6-
diat et qu'expliciter cet immediat revient
simplement aIe vivre, on ne peut douter que
l'entreprise du philosophe ne devienne aussi-
t6t contradictoire. Or c'est une opinion a
laquelle l'auteur semble parfois faire des
concessions.
139 PP,xi resolution de faire apparaitre Ie monde tel
qu'il est avant tout retour sur nous-m~mes,
c'est l'ambition d'egaler la reflexion a la
vie irreflechie de la conscience.
PP, vili-ix il faut rompre notre familiarite avec lui
274 APPENDIX
Page Reference
[i.e., with the world], et que cette rupture
ne peut rien nous apprendre que Ie jaillisse-
ment immotive du monde. Le plus grand
enseignement de la reduction est l'impos-
sibilite d'une reduction complete. .. Si nous
etions l'esprit absolu, la reduction ne serait
pas problematique. Mais puisque au contraire
nous SOmmes au monde, puisque m8me nos
reflexions prennent place dans Ie flux
temporel qu'elles cherchent acapter (puisqu'-
elles sich einstromen comme dit Husserl), il
n'y a pas de pensee qui embrasse toute
notre pensee.
143 PP, xii Le monde est non pas ce que je pense,
mais ce que je vis, je suis ouvert au monde ...
mais je ne Ie possede pas, il est inepuisable.
"n y a un monde," ou plut6t "il y a Ie mon-
de," de cette these constante de rna vie je ne
puis jamais rendre entierement raison. Cette
facticite du monde est ce qui fait la Weltlich-
keit der Welt ... comme la factiticite du
cogito n'est pas une imperfection en lui,
mais au contraire ce qui me rend certain de
mon existence .
. . . la question est toujours de savoir com-
ment je peux Hre ouvert a des phenomenes
qui me depassent et qui, cependant, n'exis-
tent que dans la mesure ou je les reprends et
les vis, comment la presence a moi-mOme
(Urpriisenz) qui me definit et conditionne toute
presence etrangere est en mOme temps de-pre-
sentation (Entgegenwartigung) et me jette hors
de moi.
15 1 PP,237 La chose et Ie monde me sont donnes avec les
parties de mon corps, non par un "geometrie
naturelle," mais dans une connexion vivante
comparable ou plut6t identique a celle qui
existe entre les parties de mon corps lui-m8-
me.
La perception exterieure et la perception
du corps propre varient ensemble parce
qu'elles sont les deux faces d'un m8me acte ...
La synthese du corps propre, elle en est la
replique ou Ie correlatif et c'est a la lettre la
m8me chose de perce voir une seule bille et de
disposer des deux doigts comme d'un organe
unique.
151 PP,239 Toute perception exterieure est immediate-
ment synonyme d'une certaine perception de
mon corps comme toute perception de mon
corps s'explicite dans la Iangage de Ia per-
APPENDIX 275
Page Reference
ception exterieure. Si maintenant, ... le corps
n'est pas un objet transparent et ne nous est
pas donne comme Ie cercle au geometre par
sa loi de constitution, s'il est une unite ex-
pressive qu'on ne peut apprendre a connaitre
qu'en l'assumant, cette structure va se com-
muniquer au monde sensible. La tMorie du
scMma corporel est implicitement une theorie
de la perception.
La structure du les reactions d'un organisme ne sont pas des
compOYtement, 140 edifices de mouvements elementaires, mais
des gestes doues d'une unite interieure ...
L'experience dans un organisme n'est pas
l'enregistrement et la fixation de certains
mouvements reellement accomplis: elle
monte des aptitudes, c'est-a-dire Ie pouvoir
general de repondre a des situations d'un
certain type par des reactions variees qui
n'ont de commun que Ie sens. Les reactions
ne sont donc pas une suite d' evenements, elles
portent en elles-m~mes une "intelligibilite."
156 Une pkilosopkie de consiste en ceci qie la pulsation existentielle
l' ambiguite, II 2-13 qui m'engage vers les objets de mon Um-
welt ordinaire, continue de me pousser et fait
appel au corps susceptible de m'y conduire
et de me Ie reveler. .. Mais comme je "sais"
desormais - et ne veux pas savoir - que la
mediation ne pourra plus s'effectuer, que je
ne puis plus m'ouvrir a ce monde ni ce monde
s'offrir a moi, je "ruse," je continue de Ie
viser mais seulement de maniere magique.
157 Une pkilosopkie de n'ont de sens que par la pulsionexistentielle,
I' ambiguite, II4 concretisee dans Ie membre-fant6me. Inver-
sement Ie membre-fant6me et l'elan existen-
tiel dont il est la traduction dans l'experience
immediate, ne puisent de realite que dans
l'epreuve des excitations interoceptives.
157 Une Pkilosopkie de En realite, Ie corps n'est rien d'autre que Ie
I'ambiguite, log maniere m~me dont nous accedons au monde,
et, en m~me temps ou correlativement, un
certain mode d'apparition du monde lui-m~
me ... Le corps est l'ensemble des conditions
concretes sous lesquelles un projet existentiel
s'actualise et defient, en s'actualisent,
proprement mien.
157 PP,8g de "concevoir" une certaine forme d'excita-
tion. L'''evenement psychophysique" n'est
donc plus du type de la causalite "mondaine."
160 PP,245 Ainsi avant d'etre un spectacle objectif la
qualite se laisse reconnaitre par un type de
comportement qui la vise dans son essence
276 APPENDIX
Pag6 Reference
et c'est pourquoi des que mon corps adopte
l'attitude du bleu j'obtiens une quasi-presen-
ce du bleu ... il faut (donc) rea.pprendre a
vivre ces couleurs comme les vit notre corps.
161 TheMie du champ L'integration d'un constituant dans une
de la conscience, 101 totalite qui possMe la caractere d'une Forme,
entraine l'absorption du constituant dans la
structure de l'organisation de cette totalite.
Etre un constituant et, dans ce sens, une
partie d'une Forme, signifie exister aune
certain place a l'interieur de la structure de la
totalite, et occuper un certain lieu dans
l'organisation de la Forme, un lieu qui ne
peut ~tre defini qu'en reference avec la
topographie de la contexture. En vertu de
son absorption ... le constituant en question
est doue d'une signification fonctionnelle par
rapport a cette contexture.
161 TheMie du champ Les constituants sont lies par la coherence
de la conscience, II4 de Forme ... ils se determinent et se condition-
nent mutuellement. lis derivent les uns des
autres et s' assignent les uns aux autres, dans
une reciprocite complete, la signification
fonctionnelle .. . chacun n'existe que dans un
systems de significations . ...
163 PP,94 En rea.lite les reflexes eux-m~mes ne sont
jamais des processus aveugles: ils s'ajustent a
un "sens" de la situation, ils expriment notre
orientation vers un "milieu de comporte-
ment" tout autant que l'action du "milieu
geographique" sur nous. IIs dessinent a dis-
tance la structure de l'objet sans en attendre
les stimulations ponctuelles. C'est cette
presence globale de la situation qui donne un
sens aux stimuli partiels et qui les fait
compter, valoir ou exister pour l'organisme.
Le reflexe ne resulte pas des stimuli objectifs,
il se retourne vers eux, il les investit d'un
sens qu'ils n'ont pas pris un a. un et comme
agents physiques, qu'ils ont seulement
comme situation. II les fait 8tre comme
situation, il est avec eux dans un rapport de
"connaissance," c'est-a-dire qu'illes indique
comme ce qu'il est destine a affronter.
164 PP, 107 En d'autre termes, j'observe les objets
exterieurs avec mon corps, je les manie,
je les inspecte, j'en fais Ie tour, mais quant a
.mon corps je ne l'observe pas lui-m~me: il
faudrait, pour pouvoir Ie faire, disposer d'un
second corps qui lui-m~me ne serait pas ob-
servable.
APPENDIX 277
Page Reference
165 Une Philosophie de la permanence du corps n'est pas celle d'un
l' ambiguite, 119 spectacle immuable s'offrant dans Ie monde,
mais celle d'une sorte de facteur lateral qui
accompagne tous les points de vue, san 8tre
capable ni de s'eliroiner ni de se definir soi-
m8me comme point de vue.
PP,I08 ... c'est qu'il est ce par quoi il y a des objets.
II n'est ni tangible ni visible dans la mesure
oil il est ce qui voit et ce qui touche. Le
corps n'est donc pas l'un quelconque des
objets exterieurs, qui offrirait seulement
cette particularite d'8tre toujours la.
Ideen, II, 159 Wahrend ich allen anderen Dingen gegeniiber
die Freiheit habe, meine Stellung zu ihnen
beliebig zu wechseln und damit zugleich die
Erscheinungsmannigfaltigkeiten, in denen
sie mir zur Gegebenheit kommen, beliebig
zu variieren, babe ich nicht die Moglichkeit,
mich von meinem Leibe oder ihn von mir zu
entfernen, und dem entsprechend sind die
Erscheinungsmannigfaltigkeiten des Leibes
in bestimmter Weise beschrankt: gewisse
Korperteile kann ich nur in eigentiimlichen
perspektivischen Verkiirzung sehen, und
andere (z.B. der Kopf) sind iiberhaupt fiir
mich unsichtbar. Derselbe Leib, der mir
als Mittel aIler Wahrnehmung dient, steht
mir bei der Wahrnehmung seiner selbst im
Wege und ist ein merkwiirdig unvoIlkommen
konstituiertes Ding.
166 U ne Philosophie de que, dans Ie monde intersensoriel, nous
l'ambiguite, 121 prenons en vue d'une tAche determinee. Le
projet de cette tAche suscite une attitude
d'ensemble du corps, attitude qui s'inscrit
en lui.
PP,II7 si mon corps peut 8tre une "forme" et s'il
peut y avoir devant lui des figures priviIe-
giees sur des fonds indifferents, c'est en tant
qu'il est polarise par ses tAches, qu'il existe
vers elles, qu'il se ramasse sur lui-m8me pour
atteindre son but, et Ie "schema corporel"
est finalement une maniere d'exprlmer que
mon corps est au monde.
168 PP, I2 5 Nous constatons que Ie malade interroge sur
la position de ses membres ou sur celle d'un
stimulus tactile cherche, par des mouvements
preparatoires, a faire de son corps un objet
de perception actuelle; interroge sur la forme
d'un objet au contact de son corps, il cherche
a la tracer lui-m8me en suivant Ie contour de
l'objet. Rien ne serait plus trompeur que de
278 APPENDIX
Page Re/eyence
supposer chez Ie normalles m8mes operations,
abregees seulement par l'habitude. Le malade
ne recherche ces perceptions explicites que
pour suppleer une certain presence du corps
et de l'objet qui est donnee chez Ie normal. . "
PP,27 1 Le mouvement, compris non pas comme
mouvement objectif et deplacement dans
l'espace, mais comme projet de mouvement
ou "mouvement virtuel" est Ie fondement de
l'unite des sens ... mon corps est justement
un systeme tout fait d'equivalences et de
transpositions intersensorielles. Les sens se
traduisent l'un l'autre sans avoir besoin
d'un interprete, se comprennent l'un l'autre
sans avoir a passer par l'idee ... Avec Ie
notion de schema corporel, ce n'est pas
seulement l'unite du corps qui est decrite
d'une maniere neuve, c'est aussi, a travers
elle, l'unite des sens et l'u,nite de l'objet.
172 PP,15 0 moyen d'acces a un m8me monde, c'est qu'il a
l'evidence antepredicative d'un monde uni
que, de sorte que l'equivalence des "organes
des sens" et leur analogie se lit sur les choses
et peut 8tre vecue avant d'8tre con~ue.
17 2 PP, 165 C'est que Ie sujet normal a son corps non
seulement comme systeme de positions
actuelles, mais encore et par la m8me comme
systeme ouvert d'une infinite de positions
equivalentes dans d'autre orientations. Ce
que nous avons appeIe Ie schema corporel est
justement ce systeme d'equivalences, cet
invariant immediatement donne par lequel
les differentes taches motrices sont instanta-
nement transposables. C'est dire qu'il n'est
pas seulement une experience de mon corps
mais encore une experience de mon corps
dans Ie monde ....
173 la vie de la conscience - vie connaissante,
vie du desir ou vie perceptive - est sous-
tendue par un "arc intentionnel" qui projette
autou.r de nous notre passe, notre avenir,
notre milieu humain, notre situation physi-
que, notre situation ideologique, notre
situation morale, ou plutOt qui fait que nous
soyons situes sous tous ces rapports. C'est
cet arc intentionnel qui fait l'unite des sens,
celIe des sens et de l'intelIigence, celIe de la
sensibilite et de la motricite.
174 La styuctuye de cam- l'ensemble de chemins deja traces, de
pOYtement, 286 pouvoirs deja constitues, Ie sol dialectique
APPENDIX 279
l'age ~eference
acquis sur lequel s'opere une mise en forme
superieure,
174 PP,99 organisme, comme adhesion prepersonelle a
la forme generale du monde, comme existence
anonyme et generale ... (il) joue, au-dessous
de ma vie personnelle, Ie r6le d'un complexe
inne.
176 Formale und trans- Diese wundersame Eigenheit gehort zur
zendentale Logik, Universalitat des Bewusstseins iiberhaupt
185 als leistender Intentionalitat. Alle intentio-
nalen Einheiten sind aus einer intentionalen
Genesis, sind "konstituierte" Einheiten, und
iiberall kann man die "fertigen" Einheiten
nach ihrer Konstitution, nach ihrer gesamten
Genesis befragen und zwar nach deren
eidetisch zu fassender Wesensform. Diese
fundamentale Tatsache, in ihrer Universali-
tat das gesamte intentionale Leben umspan-
nend, ist es, die den eigentlichen Sinn der
intentionalen Analyse bestimmt als Enthullung
der intentionalen Implikationen, mit denen,
gegeniiber dem offen fertigen Sinn der Ein-
heiten, ihre verborgenen Sinnesmomente und
"kausalen" Sinnesbeziehungen hervortreten.
PP,275 Prenant l'attitude analytique, je decompose
la perception en qualites et en sensations
et ... je suis oblige de supposer un acte de
synthCse qui n'est que la contre-partie de
mon analyse. Mon acte de perception, pris
dans sa naivete, n'effectue pas lui-m~me cette
synthCse, il profite d'un travail deia fait, d'une
synthese generale constituee une lois pour tou-
tes, c'est ce que j'exprime en disant que je
peryois avec mon corps ou avec mes sens,
mon corps, mes sens etant justement ce
savoir habituel du monde, cette science
implicite ou sedimentee. (my emphasis)
PP,270 un systeme synergique dont toutes les
fonctions sont reprises et lires dans Ie
mouvement general de l'~tre au monde,
en tant qu'il est la figure figee de l'existence.
PP,275 Si ma conscience constituait actuellement
Ie monde qu'elle peryoit, il n'y aurait d'elle
a lui aucune distance et entre eux aucun
decalage possible, elle Ie penetrerait jusque
dans ses articulations les plus secretes,
l'intentionnalite nous transporterait au
coeur de l'objet, et du m~me coup Ie peryu
n'aurait pas l'epaisseur d'un present, la
conscience ne se perdrait pas, ne s'engluerait
pas en lui.
280 APPENDIX
Page Reference
178 PP,269 Ce n'est pas Ie sujet epistemologique qui
effectue la synthese, c'est Ie corps quand
il s'arrache a. sa dispersion, se rassemble,
se porte par tous les moyens vers un terme
unique de son mouvement, et quand une
intention unique se con~oit en lui par Ie
pMnomene de synergie... En disant que
cette intentionnalite n'est pas une pensee,
nous voulons dire qu'elle ne s'effectue pas
dans la transparence d'une conscience et
qu'elle prend pour acquis tout Ie savoir
latent qu'a mon corps de lui-m8me.
PP,249-5° que je vois Ie bleu du ciel au sens ou je dis
que je comprends un livre .... Ma perception,
m8me vue de 1'interieur, exprime une situation
donnee: je vois du bleu parce que je suis sensi-
ble aux couleurs ... si je voulais traduire exac-
tement l'experience perceptive, je devrais dire
qu'on per~oit en moi et non pas que je
per~is ... Entre ma sensation et moi, il y a
toujours 1'epaisseur d'un acquis cwiginai,e qui
emp8che mon experience d'8tre claire pour
elle-m8me ... le moi qui voit ou Ie moi qui
entend est en quelque sorte un moi specialise,
familier d'un seul secteur de l'8tre ....
179 PP,277 Mon corps prend possession du temps, il fait
exister un passe et un avenir pour un present,
il n'est pas une chose, il fait Ie temps au
lieu de la subir. Mais tout acte de fixation
doit etre renouvele, sans quoi il tombe a.
1'inconscience ... La prise qu'il nous donne
sur un segment de temps, la syntMse qu'il
effectue sont elles-m8mes des pMnomenes
temporels, s'ecoulent et ne peuvent subsister
que ressaisies dans un nouvel acte lui-meme
temporel... Celui qui, dans 1'exploration
sensorielle, donne un passe au present et
1'oriente vers un avenir, ce n'est pas moi
comme sujet autonome, c'est moi en tant
qu j'ai un corps et que je sais "regarder."
180 En tant que j'ai un corps et que j'agis a.
travers lui dans Ie monde, 1'espace et Ie
temps ne sont pas pour moi une somme de
points juxtaposes, pas davantage d'ailleurs
une infinite de relations dont ma conscience
opererait la synthese et ou elle impliquerait
mon corps; je ne suis pas dans 1'espace et
Ie temps; je suis a. 1'espace et au temps,
mon corps s'applique a. eux et les embrasse.
L'ampleur de cette prise mesure celle de mon
existence ....
APPENDIX 28r
Page Reference
180 Une philosophie de Si mon existence est par nature aupres des
l'ambiguite, 119 choses, elle doit les approcher d'autant de
manieres que celles-ci se manifestent a elle et
etre capable de passer tout entiere en chacu-
ne. Mais, inversement, si ces modes de pre-
sence offrent une chose unique, il £aut aussi
que ces diverses modalites d'apprehension
communiquent entre elles et que l'existence,
si elle se plonge en chacune, ne se noie
pourtant en aucune.
une maniere d'acceder au monde et a l'objet,
une "praktognosie" qui doit etre reconnu
comme originale et peut-8tre comme origi-
naire. Mon corps a son monde ou comprend
son monde sans avoir a passer par des
"representations," sans se subordonner a une
"fonction symbolique" ou "objectivante."
PP,II7 il existe vers elles, qu'il se ramasse sur lui-
meme pour atteindre son but, et Ie "scMma
corporel" est finalement une maniere d'ex-
primer que mon corps est au monde.
PP,402 ]' ai Ie monde comme individu inacMve a
travers mon corps comme puissance de ce
monde, et j'ai la position des objets par
celIe de mon corps ou inversement la posi-
tion de mon corps par celIe des objets .. ~ dans
une implication reelIe, et parce que mon
corps est mouvement vers Ie monde, le
monde, point d'appui de mon corps.
PP,247 La sensation de bleu ... est sans doute
intentionnelIe, c'est-a-dire qu'eUe ne repose
pas en soi comme une chose, qu'elle vise et
signifie au-dela d'elle meme. Mais Ie terme
qu'elle vise n'est reconnu qu'aveuglement
par la familiarite de mon corps avec lui, il
n'est pas constitue en pleine clarte, il est
reconstitue ou repris par un savoir qui reste
latent et qui lui laisse son opacite et son
ecceite.
PP, viii pour voir Ie monde et Ie saisir comme
paradoxe, il faut rompre notre familiariM
avec lui, et ... cette rupture ne peut rien
nous apprendre que Ie jaillissement immotive
du monde. Le plus grand enseignement de la
reduction est l'impossibilite d'une reduction
complete.
PP, 1I 3 c'est communiquer interieurement avec Ie
monde, Ie corps et les autres, etre avec eux
au lieu d'etre acMe d'eux ....
PP,245 n'est ni un penseur qui note une qualiM, ni
un milieu inerte qui serait affecte ou modifie
APPENDIX
Page Reftyenee
par e11e, il est une puissance qui co-natt a
un certain milieu d'existence ou se synchro-
nise avec lui.
185 PP,247 Si les qualit:es rayonnent autour d'elles un
certain mode d'existence ... c'est parce que
Ie sujet sentant ne les pose pas comme des
objets, mais sympathise avec e11es, les fait
siennes et trouve en elles sa loi momentanee.
185 PP,492 Le monde tel que' nous avons essaye de Ie
montrer ... n'est plus Ie deploiement visible
d'une Pensee constituante, ni un assemblage
fortuit de parties, ni, bien entendu, l'ope-
ration d'une Pensee directrice sur une ma-
tiere indifierente, mais la patrie de toute
rationnalite.
186 PP,I23 Ce n'est jamais notre corps objectif que nous
mou,vons, mais notre corps phenomenal,
et cela sans mystere, puisque c'est notre
corps deja, comme puissance de te11es et
te11es regions du monde, qui se levait vers
les objets a saisir et qui les percevait ....
Les sens communiquent entre eux en s'ou-
vrant a la structure. de la chose. On voit la
rigidite et la fragilite du verre et, quand il
se brise avec un son cristallin, ce son est por-
te par Ie verre visible. . . La forme des objets
n'en est pas Ie contour geometrique: e11e a
un certain rapport avec leur nature propre
et parle a tous nos sens en m&ne temps
qu'a la vue ... Dans Ie mouvement de la
branche qu'un oiseau vient de quitter, on lit
sa flexibilite ou son eIasticite, et c'est ainsi
qu'une branche de pommier et une branche
de bouleau se distinguent immeruatement.
188 PP,403 II nous faut concevoir les perspectives et Ie
point de vue comme notre insertion dans Ie
monde-individu, et la perception, non plus
comme une constitution de l'objet vrai, mais
comme notre inherence aux choses.
189 PP, 49o-g1 L'analyse du corps propre et de la percep-
tion nous a reveIe un rapport a l'objet, une
signification plus profonde que ce11e-la (i.e.
synthese) ... je n'en opere pas actue11ement
la synthese, ie viens au-devant d' elle avec mes
champs sensoriels, man champ perceptif, et
finalement avec une typique de tout I' etre pos-
sible, un montage universel al'igard du monde.
Au creux du suiet lui-mOme, nous decouvrions
done la presenee du mantle. .. Nous retrou-
vions sous l'intentionnalite d'acte ou the-
tique. et comme sa condition de possibilite,
APPENDIX
Page Relwence
une intentionnaliti ope,ante, deja a l'reuvre
avant toute these ou tout jugement, un
"Logos du monde estMtique," un "art
cache dans les profondeurs de l'fune hu-
maine," et qui, comme tout art, ne se con-
nait que dans ses resultats. (my emphasis)
189 PP,520 Rien ne me determine du dehors, non que
rien ne me sollicite, mais au contraire parce
que je suis d'embIee hors de moi et ouvert au
monde. .. de seul fait que nous sommes au
monde .
190 PP,478 . . . au-dessous de l'''intentionnalite d'acte"
qui est la conscience tMtique d'un objet ...
il nous faut reconnaitre une intentionnalite
"operante" (fungie,ende Intentionalitat), qui
rend possible la premiere et qui est ce que
Heidegger appelle transcendance. Mon pre-
sent se depasse vers un avenir et vers un
passe prochains et les touche Ia ou ils sont,
dans Ie passe, dans l'avenir eux-m@mes.
II n'y a de temps pour moi que parce que
j'y suis situe, c'est-a-dire parce que je m'y
decouvre deja engage, qui tout l'~tre ne
m'est pas donne en personne, et enfin, parce
qu'un secteur de l'~tre m'est si proche qu'il
ne fait pas m~me tableau devant moi et que
je ne peux pas Ie voi" comme je ne peux pas
voir mon visage. II y a du temps pour moi
parce que j'ai un present ... Aucune des di-
mensions du temps ne peut etre deduite des
autres. Mais Ie present (au sens large ... ) a
cependant un privilege parce qu'il est la
zone ou l'~tre et la conscience coincident.
191 PP, 493-94 Ce qui est vrai seulement, c'est que notre
existence ouverte et personnelle repose sur
une premiere assise d'existence acquise et
figre. Mais il ne saurait en ~tre autrement si
nous somme temporalite, puisque la dialec-
tique de l'acquis et de l'avenir est constitu-
tive du temps.
193 PP,I86 la vue, l'ouie, la sexualit6, Ie corps ne sont
pas seulement les points de passage, les in-
struments ou les manifestations de l'exis-
tence personnelle: elle reprend et recueille
en elle leur existence donnee et anonyme.
193 PP,I88 il est habite par elle, il est d'une certaine
maniere ce qu'il signifie, comme un portrait
est la quasi presence de Pierre absent ...
194 PP,I93 En des:a des moyens d'expression conven-
tionnels, qui ne manifestent a autrui ma
pen see que parce que deja chez moi comme
APPENDIX
Page Reference
chez lui sont donnees, pour chaque signe, des
significations,et qui en ce sens ne rWisent
pas une communication veritable, il faut
bien ... reconnaitre une operation primor-
diale de signification ou l'exprime n'existe
pas a part l'expression et ou les signes eux-
m~mes induisent au dehors leurs sens.
195 PP,I95 la tension d'une existence vers une autre
existence qui la nie et sans laquelle pourtant
elle ne se soutient pas.
195 PP,196-91 se cache a elle-m~me sous un masque de
generalite, elle tente sans cesse d'echapper
a la tension et au drame qu'elle institue ...
Elle y est constamment presents comme une
atmosphere. .. La sexualite se diffuse en
images qui ne retiennent d'elle que certaines
relations typiques, qu'une certaine physio-
nomie affective... Prise ainsi, c'est-a-dire
comme atmosphere ambigue, la sexualite
est coextensive a la vie. Autrement dit,
l'equivoque est ~ntielle a l'existence hu-
maine, et tout ce que nous vivons ou pen-
sons a toujours plusieurs sens.
196 Attitudes et moufle- 11 est important de noter que la subjectivite
ment,59 est "per~ue." L'idee communement repan-
due d'une subjectivite "supposee" par l'ana-
logie entre Ie mouvement d'autrui ou de
l'animal et notre propre mouvement est
donc parfaitement fausse. Nous n'avons pas
seulement Ie pouvoir de reconnaltre une
fonction, nous pouvons en outre la saisir
comme un mouvement propre ayant une
signification (comme fonction animale ou
humaine). Par la nous perceflons les hommes
et les animaux comme des "sujets" ou com-
me des centres de connaissances et de ten-
dances.
191 PP, 21 5-16 Le sens des gestes n'est pas donne mais
compris, c'est-a-dire ressaisi par un acte du
spectateur. . . La communication ou la
comprehension des gestes s'obtient par la
reciprocite de mes intentions et des gestes
d'autrui, de mes gestes et des intentions li-
sibles dans la conduite d'autrui. Tout se
passe comme si l'intention d'autrui habitait
mon corps ou comme si mes intentions habi-
taient Ie sien. Le geste dont je suis la temoin
dessine en pointille un objet intentionnel.
Cet objet devient actuel et il est pleinement
compris lorsque les pouvoirs de mon corps
s'ajustent a lui et Ie recouvrent.
APPENDIX 285
Page Reference
197 PP, 215-16 C'est par mon corps que je comprends
autrui, comme c'est par mon corps que je
per~ois des "choses." Le sens du geste ainsi
"compris" n'est pas derriere lui, il se confond
avec la structure du monde que la geste
dessine et que je reprends a. mon compte, il
s'etale sur Ie geste lui-meme ...
197 PP,216--17 Le probleme du m~nde, et pour commencer
celui du corps propre, consiste en ceci que
tout y demeure.
206 Theorie du champ A proprement parler, il s'agit moins de
de la conscience, 245 l'existence corporelle elle·meme en tant que
une realite, que de la conscience specifique
que nous en avons. Certes, cette conscience
n'est pas necessairement une conscience
tMmatisante, positionnelle, et explicite; et
nous convenons tres volontiers avec M.
Merieay-Ponty de ce qu"'il y a ... plusieurs
manieres pour la conscience d'etre cons-
science." (PP, 144)
Mais il nous faut souligner qu'une conscience
ante-predicative, prepositionnelle, et non-
thematisante, est une conscience tout de
m8me.
211 PP,xii "Toute conscience est conscience de quelque
chose," cela n'est pas nouveau. Kant a
montre, dans Ie Refutation de 1'1dealisme,
que la perception interieure est impossible
sans perception exterieure, que Ie monde,
comme connexion des phenomenes, est anti-
cipe dans la conscience de mon unite, est Ie
moyen pour moi de me realiser comme
conscience.
21 7 ThBorie du champ les problemes de constitution se posent non
de la conscience, 245 seulement a. propos des simples choses ma-
terielles de la nature, des objets culturels,
des objets ideaux de toute sorte, tels que les
nombres, ... mais aussi a. propos de notre
corps propre et de notre existence corporelle.
En nous en tenant aux principes etablis par
Husseri, nous soutenons que les problemes
constitutifs doivent etre formules et traites
exclusivement en terme de conscience, soit
positionelle, soit pre-positionnelle.
218 PP,249-5 0 Je ne peux pas dire que je vois Ie bleu du ciel
au sens oil je dis que je comprends un li-
vre. .. Ma perception, meme vue de l'inte-
rieur, exprime une situation donnee ...
De sorte que, si je voulais traduire exacte-
ment l'experience perceptive, je devrais dire
qu'on per~oit en moi et non pas que je per-
286 APPENDIX
Page Reference
~ois ... je n'ai pas plus conscience d'~tre Ie
vrai sujet de ma sensation que de rna nais-
sance ou de ma mort ... je sais qu'on natt et
qu'on meurt, je ne puis connaitre rna nais-
sance et ma mort. Chaque sensation, etant
a la rigueur la premiere, Ie demiere et la
seule de son espece, est une naissance et une
mort. Le sujet qui en a l'experience com-
mence et finit avec elle, et comme il ne peut
se preceder ni se survivre, la sensation
s'apparait necessairement a elle-m~me dans
un milieu de generalite, elle vient d'en de~
de moi-m~me, elle releve d'une sensibilite
qui l'a precedee et qui lui survivra, comme
ma naissance et ma mort appartiennent a
une natalite et a une mortalite anonymes.
227 PP,479 un seul pMnomene d'ecoulement. Le temps
est l'unique mouvement qui convient a soi-
m~me dans toutes ses parties, comme un
geste enveloppe toutes les contractions
musculaires qui sont necessaires pour Ie rea-
liser.
229 PP,478 Si les Abscnattungen A' et A" m'apparaissent
comme Abschattungen de A, ce n'est pas
parce qu'elles participent toutes a une unite
ideale qui serait leur raison commune. C'est
parce que j'ai a travers elles Ie point A lui-
m~me dans son individ:ualite irrecusable,
fondre une fois pour toutes par son passage
dans Ie present, et que je vois jaillir de lui
les Abscnattungen A', A", ...
235 PP,4 1 3 Le pMnomene central, qui fonde a la fois
ma subjectivite et ma transcendance ... ,
consiste en ceci que je suis donne a moi-
m~me. Je suis donne, c'est-a-dire que je me
trouve deja situe et engage dans un monde
physique et social- ie suis donne amoi-m§me,
c'est-a-dire que cette situation ne m'est ja-
mais dissumulee, elle n'est jamais autour de
moi comme une necessite etrangere, et je n'y
suis jamais effectivement enferme comme
un objet dans une botte.
il est essentiel au temps de n'~tre pas seule-
ment temp effectif ou qui s'ecoule, mais en-
core temps qui se sait, car l'explosion ou la
dehiscence du present vers un avenir est
l'arcMtype du rapport de soi a soi et dessine
une interiorite ou une ipseite (Selbstheit).
Ie temps est quelqu'un, c'est-a-dire que les
dimensions temporelles. .. expriment toutes
un seul eclatement ou une seule poussee qui
APPENDIX
Page Reference
est Ia subjectivite elle-m~me. II faut com-
prende Ie temps comme sujet et Ie sujet
comme temps.
236 PP, 491--92 nous sommes ainsi toujours amenes a une
conception du sujet comme ek-stase et a un
rapport de transcendance active entre Ie
sujet et Ie monde. Le monde est inseparable
du sujet, mais d'un sujet qui n'est rien que
projet du monde, et Ie sujet est inseparable
du monde, mais d'un monde qu'il projette
Iui-m~me. Le sujet est Hre-au-monde et Ie
monde reste "subjectif" puisque sa texture
et ses articulations sont dessinees par Ie
mouvement de transcendance du sujet.
246 MM, 15-16 il faut bien que ces images dessinent en quel-
que maniere, sur la face qu'elles tournent
vers mon corps, Ie parti que mon corps pour-
rait tirer d'elles ... (Les objets) s'ordonnent
selon les puissances croissantes ou decrois-
santes de mon corps. Les objets qui entourent
mon corps reftechissent l' action possible de
mon corps sur eux.
246 MM, 17 ces ~mes images rapportees Ii l'action pos-
sible d'une certaine image determinee, mon
corps.
246 MM,57 ... nous avons considere Ie corps comme une
espece de centre d'ou se reflechit, sur les ob-
jets environnants, l'action que ces objets
exercent sur lui: en cette reflexion consiste
la perception exterieure... La percep-
tion. .. mesure notre action possible sur les
choses et par la, inversement, l'action pos-
sible des choses sur nous.
255 Ideen, II, 145-146 AIle die bewirkten Empfindungen haben
ihre Lokalisation, d.h. sie unterscheiden sich
durch die Stellen der erscheinenden Leib-
lichkeit und gehoren phanomenal zu ihr.
Der Leib konstituiert sich also urspriinglich
auf doppelte Weise: einerseits ist er phy-
sisches Ding, Materie, er hat seine Exten-
sion, in die seine realen Eigenschaften, die
Farbigkeit, Glatte, Harte, Warme und was
dergleichen materielle Eigenschaften mehr
sind, eingehen; andererseits finde ich auf
ihm, und empfinde ich "auf" ibm und "in"
ihm: die Warme auf dem Handriicken, die
KlUte in den Fiissen, die Beriihrungsempfin-
dungen an den Fingerspitzen. Ich empfinde
ausgebreitet iiber die Flachen weiter Leibes-
strecken den Druck und Zug der Kleider ...
256 Ideen, II, 146 Die lokalisierten Empfindungen sind nicht
288 APPENDIX
Page Refe'Yence
Eigenschaften des Leibes als physischen
Dinges, aber andererseits sind sie Eigen-
schaften des Dinges Leib, und zwar Wir-
kungseigenschaften. Sie treten auf, wenn der
Leib beriihrt, gedriickt, gestochen, etc. wird,
und treten da auf, wo er es wird, und in der
Zeit, wann er es wird; sie dauern nur unter
Umstanden noch lange nach der Beriih-
rung fort.
259 Idem, II, 68 Das System der Kausalitat, in welches del'
Leib in der normalen Apperzeption ver-
flochten ist, ist von einer Art, d,ass der Leib
bei allen Veranderungen, die er erfahrt,
doch im Rahmen eine'Y typiscken I dentitiit
ve'Ybleibt. Die Veranderungen des Leibes als
eines Systems von Wahrnehmungsorganen
sind f'Yeie Leibesbewegungen, und die Or-
gane konnen willkiirlich wieder in dieselbe
Grundstellung zuriickkehren; sie andern
sich dabei nicht so, dass die Empfindlichkeit
sich typisch modifiziert: sie konnen immer
des Gleiche leisten, immer in gleicher Weise
namlich fUr die Konstitution von ausseren
Erfahrungen ...
259 Idem, II, 68 "Empfindlichkeit" hat hier aber Beziehung
auf Objektives: ich muss eben in normaler
Weise Ruhe als Ruhe, Unveranderung als
Unveranderung erfassen konnen, und darin
miissen alle Sinne zusammensti.mmen.
259 E'Yste Pkilosopkie, Ein Leib ist dabei in merkwiirdiger Weise
60--61 fUr mich bevorzugt, und somit ein animali-
sches Wesen, und speziell ein Mensch, vor
allen anderen. Es ist mein Leib, und dem-
gemass bin ich fiir mich vor allen Erfah-
rungsgegenstiinden ausgezeichnet, rch im
gewohnlichen empirischen Wortsinn, d.h.
rch dieser Mensch, dem dieser Leib, mein
Leib, zugehOrt. Mein Leib ist der einzige, an
dem ich die Verleiblichung eines Seelens-
lebens, namlich eines Empfindens, Vorstel-
lens, Fiihlens, usw., das mein eigenes Leben
ist, oder das sich in leiblicher Gestalt, in
wechselnden leiblichdinglichen Vorkomm-
nissen "ausdriickt," in absolut unmittel-
barer Weise erfahre, derart dass ich in eins
nicht nur das Ding Leib und sein dingliches
Gehaben wahrnehme, sondern zugleich mein
psychisches Leben, und endlich beides eben
in eins: das Sich-verleiblichen des letztcrcn
im ersteren, das Sich-ausdrticken des cincn
im anderen.
APPENDIX
Page Reference
260 Erste Philosophie, Zug urn Zug gibt sich der mir erscheinende
II,61 Leib - und gibt sich der Wandel seiner Er-
scheinungsweisen - als dieses oder jenes
Psycbische in sich geborgen tragend, als
Ausserlichkeit, die bier noch die Innerlich-
keit, die sich darin "ausdriickt," originaliter
in sich hat. Beides gibt sich ungetrennt, in
Deckung ...
261 Ideen, I, 103 Wir sehen sogleich, dass es das nur kann
durch eine gewisse Teilnahme an der Tran-
szendenz im ersten, originaren Sinn, und das
ist offenbar die Transzendenz der materiel-
len Natur. Nur durch die Erfahrnngsbezie-
hung zum Leibe wird Bewusstsein zum real
menschlichen und tierischen, und nur da-
durch gewinnt es Stellung im Raum der Na-
tur und in der Zeit der Natur ....
INDEX
181. 188. 234-38. 240-42; as sense- dialectics, 18-20. See mystery, sell
bestowing. 109. II5. 122. 208-II. existence: exclamatory consciousness
216-17. 249-61 passim.; naturali- of. 10; masking of. loml, 16-17; not
zation of. 154n; of inner-time. 18g- object, 42-43 (see body); meaning
92. 225-28; Kantian theory of. of for Merleau-Ponty, 186; of self,
214-15; as flux. 228. See consti- 233-38. See being, exigence
tution. embodiment. synthesis existential indubitable, 8, 9. 21
constitution: Sartre on. 1II-I2; criti- existential ontology. See philOSOPhical
cism of Sartre. 112-14; Merleau- anthropology
Ponty on. 135-46 passim.; criticism
of Merleau-Ponty. 208-18; as syn- FEELING: experience of body by, 34-
thetic intentiveness. 213-14. 230- 42; coenesthetic (see sensations);
32. 250-52. 255-60 passim. See as Urgeluhl, 38, 47-50, 53-56; as
intentionality. synthesis receptive response. 39, 40-41, 43,
context: basic perceptual datum. 46-49; kinaesthetic flow-patterns
159-62. See Ioym and, 53-54 (see sensations). See
corporeal attitudes: and sensations. bodily acting, embodiment
15g-OO. 16g-71; and spatiality. first reflection. See rellection
164-69. See body. sensations . form: perceptual, 131. 132, 160-64,
corporeal movement: abstract and 16g-71; physiological. 154-59. See
concrete. 167-69. 173 perceptual obiect, sense perception
corporeal scheme: Merleau-Ponty's freedom: logic of. 18; and facticity.
theory of. 164-71; constitution of. 96. See exigence
17~1. 172- 80• 224· See body.
synthesis GENERALITY: criticism of 'body as.
de Corte. Marcel. 12 218-24. See ambiguity
Gestalt psychology: Merleau-Ponty
DEMOCRITUS. 150 and. 130-35, 154, 161, 166;re1ation
Descartes. Rene: relation to Marcel. to phenomenology. 131
8--9. 14. 44; Sartre's criticism of. Goldstein. Kurt. 130. 167-68, 173
60. 63. 6g-70. 81. 82. 94; Sartre's Gurwitsch, Aron. ix. II2n6, 131na.
intensification of. 71-73. 79. III. 132n3. 161. 161na. 207. 214-15.
239; Merleau-Ponty's criticism of. 217. 236n. 248; criticism of Merleau-
133-34. 135. 150n. 181. 188-89; Ponty, 206; on Kant and Husserl.
and Kant. 2II. 212n. 213; and 150na. 212n. 213
existentialism. 240; Bergson's
struggle with dualism of. 243-44 HAVING: my body-qua-mine and, 22-
descriptive analysis: noetic-noematic. 25. 30-35; qui/quid relation of. 25-
201-02. 249-51. 252. 253. 255. 260- 26; within/without relation of.
61. See phenomenology 27-28; as before Other qua Other.
despair. 16. 17. 29-30 28-30; exists as threatened, 28-29;
is sphere of despair. 29-30; body as
ECCEITY, 188 prototype of. 32-33. 55. See mystery
embodiment: mystery of, II-I2. 14. Hegel. G. W. F .• 14. 48. 60. 72, 79. 199
41; connected to feeling. 23-24, Heidegger. Martin. 61. 74n, 79. 94.
33-35. 46-49. 55, 255-59; as Owe- 130• 13an. 144. 146. 190
au-monde. 38-42. 182-89; as on- Hocking. William E .• 5nI. 5n4. 10,
going act. 48-49. 249-50; is sui 15. 20
generis. 48-49, 260; is conscience- human condition. See philosophical
engagee. 181. 183-85. 186-87. 190- anthropology
92; as self-reflexive temporality. Hume. David, 133. 150. 153. 2I2n
235-37; phenomenology of. 249-61. Husserl. Edmund: on intentionality,
See body. being-to-the.wOYld vii-viii. 51-52. II2-13. 114-17. 119,
Erlebnisstl'om. 225-28 174-76; on animate organism. 23-
exigence. ontological: central theme 24. 48-52 passim .• 53-54, 56. 252-
for Marcel. 3-6. 15-20; and loss 61 passim.; Sartre's interpretations
of sense of being. 4-5. 17; masking of, 60. 62. 65-68. 69, 7lna. 74na.76.
of. 15-20 passim.; and ascending 79-80. 89--90, 99na. 102. 104. 108-
INDEX
II, 242 (see Sartre); on reflection, 10, 12, 17-18; relation to Descartes,
1091', II2, I12n2-6, 199-204; Mer- 8-9, 14, 44; on being-free, 15-18;
leau-Ponty's inteIpretations of, 135- early reflections on body, 12-14
46 passim., 165n2, 179, 187-89, problem of system, 14-20; method
190nI, 199n, 242; on sensations, as concrete approaches, 18-20; as
I 6on2 , 183n, 254, 255-59 (see philosopher, 44-46; relation to
sensations); relation to Kant, 2II- Sartre,90,92,93nI,94nI-3,104-o5,
15; on inner-time consciousness, 107, 120-21, 125, 147n3 (see Sartre);
225-26; parallel to Piaget, 232, relation to Merleau-Ponty, 134,
257n2; relation to Bergson, 245n, I 38n3, 147n3, 151n2, 152, 164,
247,248 182n2, 184-85, 188, 199, 200, 237
hyletic data. See sensations (see Merleau-Ponty); as existen-
tialist, 239-42; relation to Bergson,
INTENTIONAL ARC: unification of body 243,247; relation to phenomenology
by, 172-80; is temporal synthesis, of the body, 13n, 249, 250, 251, 256
179, 224-25; as originary stratum meaning: perceptual form as, 130-35.
of feeling, 180-81; criticism of, See form, sense perception
225-33. See synthesis mediation, sympathetic and instru-
intentionality: Husserlian concept of, mental. See body
51-52, 112-13, 114-17, 119, 174-76 ; Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, I29-338:
Sartre's interpretation of, 60, 62-64; relation to Marcel, 24nI, 35n, 37n,
criticism of Sartre on, 66-67, 109- 41n, 43, 44, 56 (see Marcel) ; relation
16; Merleau-Ponty's inteIpretation to Sartre, 75, 90, 93nI, 95, 96n, 99,
of, 143-44, 173-74, 17£r77, 178n2, 102, 107, 119, 125 (see Sartre);
179, 189-90; criticism of Merleau- difficulties in inteIpretation of,
Ponty on, 20£r08, 2II-18. See 129-30; essential bearing of his
Husserl philosophy, 139, 145-46, 14£r48,
intersubjectivity: relation of to body, 233-38; parallel to Piaget, 162-63,
59,74-75; Sartre's theory of, 69-80; 169-71; inteIpretation of Gelb-
criticism of Sartre on, 72-75, gS, Goldstein studies, 155-57, 167-69,
124-25; revealed through body's 173-74; as existentialist, 233-38,
expressions,19fr97 239-42; relation to Bergson, 243,
246, 247n, 248; relation to pheno-
JAMES, William, 3on2, 190 menology of the body, 249, 251, 256,
260 (see Husserl)
KANT, Immanuel, 62n, 135, 149, 1991', metaproblem. See mystery
211-15, 21 7 method: of Marcel, 5-12, 14-20; of
Kierkegaard, Soren, 14, 17nI, 30, 85, Sartre, 59-60, 61-62, 65-68, 72-73,
242 75, 76, 107-16 ; of Merleau-Ponty,
kinaesthetic data. See sensations 129-30, 135-39, 140-42, 143-46,
knowledge: as a relation of being, 60, 199-204. See phenomenology
62-64, 70-71; body as a latent, 177- mystery: technical meaning of, 5-6;
80 (see body); criticism of body as apprehension of, 7-8, 11-12; my
latent, 205-08. See being body as, 12, 21-22. See body
KOhler, Wolfgang, 131, 248
NATANSON, Maurice: on existential
LEUKIPPOS, 150 categories, 19, 191', 152, 241; criti-
life: man's degradation of, 17 cism of SartIe, 66-67, 68n, 69, 69nI,
Locke, John, 133-34, 149, 213 71, 108; also, 236n, 258n3
look: is encounter with Other, 77-78; nausea: mode of givenness of body, 78,
and experience of body, 99-105. 98. See body
See intersubiectivity negation, 70-71, 114-15. See being,
Lucretius, 150 intersubiectivity