CRIMPRO CASE DIGESTS A.Y.
2018-2019
Pestilos vs Generoso
G.R. No. 182601 | August 31, 2016
Rule 113, Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause
to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above, the person arrested
without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station
or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule
112.
FACTS: On February 20, 2005, at around 3:15 in the morning,
an altercation ensued between the petitioners and Atty.
Moreno Generoso. Atty. Generoso called the Central Police
District Station to report the incident. Acting on this report,
the Desk Officer dispatched policemen to go to the scene of
the crime and to render assistance. The policemen arrived at
the scene of the crime less than one hour after the alleged
altercation and they saw Atty. Generoso badly beaten. Atty.
Generoso then pointed to the petitioners as those who mauled
him. This prompted the police officers to "invite" the
petitioners to go to the Police Station for investigation. The
petitioners went with the police officers.
At the inquest proceeding, the City Prosecutor found
that the petitioners stabbed Atty. Generoso with a bladed
weapon. Atty. Generoso fortunately survived the attack. The
petitioners were indicted for attempted murder.
The petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Regular
Preliminary Investigation on the ground that they had not
been lawfully arrested. They alleged that no valid warrantless
arrest took place since the police officers had no personal
knowledge that they were the perpetrators of the crime. They
also claimed that they were just "invited" to the police station.
Thus, the inquest proceeding was improper, and a regular
procedure for preliminary investigation should have been
performed pursuant to Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.
RTC denied the motion. The court likewise denied the
petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
The petitioners challenged the lower court's ruling before the
CA on a Rule 65 petition for certiorari. They attributed grave
abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, on the RTC for the denial of their motion for
preliminary investigation.
CA dismissed the petition.
ISSUE: WON the petitioners were validly arrested
without a warrant
HELD: Yes the arrest was valid.
For purposes of resolving the issue on the validity of the
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warrantless arrest of the present petitioners, the question to
be resolved is whether the requirements for a valid
warrantless arrest under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure were complied with, namely: 1)
has the crime just been committed when they were arrested?
2) Did the arresting officer have personal knowledge of facts
and circumstances that the petitioners committed the crime?
And 3) based on these facts and circumstances that the
arresting officer possessed at the time of the petitioners'
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arrest, would a reasonably discreet and prudent person
believe that the attempted murder of Atty. Generoso was
committed by the petitioners?
The Court concluded that the police officers had
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances upon which they
had properly determined probable cause in effecting a
warrantless arrest against the petitioners.
The arresting officers went to the scene of the crime
upon the complaint of Atty. Generoso of his alleged mauling;
the police officers responded to the scene of the crime less
than one (1) hour after the alleged mauling; the alleged crime
transpired in a community where Atty. Generoso and the
petitioners reside; Atty. Generoso positively identified the
petitioners as those responsible for his mauling and, notably,
the petitioners and Atty. Generoso lived almost in the same
neighborhood; more importantly, when the petitioners were
confronted by the arresting officers, they did not deny their
participation in the incident with Atty. Generoso, although they
narrated a different version of what transpired.
With these facts and circumstances that the police
officers gathered and which they have personally observed
less than one hour from the time that they have arrived at the
scene of the crime until the time of the arrest of the
petitioners, we deem it reasonable to conclude that the police
officers had personal knowledge of facts or circumstances
justifying the petitioners' warrantless arrests. These
circumstances were well within the police officers' observation,
perception and evaluation at the time of the arrest. These
circumstances qualify as the police officers' personal
observation, which are within their personal knowledge,
prompting them to make the warrantless arrests.
Personal knowledge of a crime just committed under
the terms of the above-cited provision, does not require actual
presence at the scene while a crime was being committed; it
is enough that evidence of the recent commission of the crime
is patent (as in this case) and the police officer has probable
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances, that the person to be arrested has recently
committed the crime.
People vs Badilla
G.R. No. 218578 | August 31, 2016
Requisites of in flagrante delicto arrest
(1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and
(2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
Suffice it to state that prior justification for intrusion or prior lawful intrusion is not
an element of an arrest in flagrante delicto
Facts: On September 6, 2010, around 10:15 p.m., PO2 Paras
received a phone call from a concerned citizen informing him
that someone was indiscriminately firing a gun at BMBA
Compound, 4th Avenue, Caloocan City. PO2 Paras and his
companions, PO2 Ronquillo, PO3 Baldomero and PO2 Woo,
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responded to the call and reached the target area around
10:25 p.m. There they saw a male person, later identified as
appellant Enrico Briones Badilla, standing along the alley.
Appellant was suspiciously in the act of pulling or drawing
something from his pocket; thus, as a precautionary measure,
and thinking that a concealed weapon was inside his pocket,
PO2 Paras immediately introduced himself as a police officer,
held appellant's arm, and asked the latter to bring out his hand
from his pocket. It turned out that appellant was holding a
plastic sachet with white crystalline substance.
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PO2 Paras confiscated the plastic sachet from appellant,
informed him of his constitutional rights, and arrested him.
Appellant and the confiscated plastic sachet were brought to
the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs-Special Operation Task Group
(SAID-SOTG) Office where PO2 Paras marked the plastic
sachet with "BP/EBB 07 Sept 2010."
Thereafter, PO2 Paras turned-over appellant and the
seized item and the same was found positive for
methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, per
Physical Science Report No. D-246-10, while the urine sample
taken from appellant was found positive for
methylamphetamine.
Version of the defense
Appellant narrated he was walking along 4th Avenue,
Caloocan City when a male person called him. Recognizing the
man as a police officer who frequented their place, he
approached the man. When he got near the man, the latter's
companion poked a gun at him. By instinct, he shoved the gun
away and it fell on the ground.
The police officer then arrested him, shoved him aboard
the police vehicle, and brought him to 3rd Avenue, Caloocan
City. When the police officers failed to see their target person
at the said place, they left and went to the police station where
he was told that he would be charged with a non-bailable
offense. He only saw the plastic sachet containing shabu in
court. He denied the accusations against him and stated that
he was arrested because the police officers thought he would
fight back when he shoved the police officer's gun. The police
officers asked P20,000.00 from him allegedly because they
knew that his father had a junk shop business, but he refused
to give them money. He questioned the positive result of the
drug test because allegedly no examination was conducted on
his person.
RTC held appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the offense charged.
The CA affirmed the appellant's conviction but with
modification as to the penalty imposed from the imprisonment
of Twenty (20) years and one (1) day to life imprisonment,
fixed at 20 years and 1 day.
Appellant argues that there was no basis for his
apprehension because there was no prior knowledge that he
was the suspect in the alleged indiscriminate firing incident
and that there was no mention that he executed an overt act
reflecting any intention to commit a crime. Also, there was no
testimony that he had just committed an offense, such that, it
cannot be said that PO2 Paras had any immediate justification
for subjecting him to any search. Thus, the shabu may not be
utilized as evidence to sustain his conviction.
Issue: WON trial court gravely erred in convicting the
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accused-appellant of the crime charged despite the
existing doubt and patent illegality which attended his
arrest.
Ruling: No, the conviction of the accused-appellant is in
order.
Appellant's arrest is completely justified pursuant to
Section 5 (a) of Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure which provides that a person may be arrested
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without a warrant when in a presence of the arresting officer, concerned citizen that someone was indiscriminately firing a
the person to be arrested has committed, is actually gun in the said place. Under the circumstances, the police
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. officers did not have enough time to secure a warrant
considering the "time element" involved in the process. To
The Court stressed that the appellant failed to question
obtain a warrant would be impossible to contain the crime. In
the legality of his arrest before he entered his plea. The
view of the urgency of the matter, the police officers
established rule is that an accused may be estopped from
proceeded to the place. There, PO2 Paras saw appellant, alone
assailing the legality of his arrest if he failed to move for the
in an alley which used to be a busy place, suspiciously in the
quashing of the Information against him before his
act of pulling something from his pocket. Appellant's act of
arraignment. Any objection involving the arrest or the
pulling something from his pocket constituted an overt
procedure in the court's acquisition of jurisdiction over the
manifestation in the mind of PO2 Paras that appellant has just
person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea;
committed or is attempting to commit a crime. There was,
otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. Thus, appellant is
therefore, sufficient probable cause for PO2 Paras to believe
deemed to have waived any objection thereto since he
that appellant was, then and there, about to draw a gun from
voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court
his pocket considering the report he received about an
when he entered a plea of not guilty during the arraignment,
indiscriminate firing in the said place. Probable cause means
and thereafter actively participated in the trial. He even
an actual belief or reasonable ground of suspicion supported
entered into a stipulation, during the pre-trial of the case,
by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant
admitting the jurisdiction of the trial court over his person.
a cautious man to believe that a crime has been committed or
In any event, appellant was arrested during the about to be committed.
commission of a crime, which instance does not require a
Thus, thinking there was a concealed weapon inside
warrant in accordance with Section 5(a) of Rule 113 of the
appellant's pocket and as precautionary measure, PO2 Paras
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. Such arrest is commonly
(who was three or four meters away from appellant)
known as in flagrante delicto. For a warrantless arrest of an
immediately introduced himself as a police officer, held

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accused caught in flagrante delicto to be valid, two requisites
must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an
overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and, (2) such
overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer.
The court also emphasized that the series of events that
led the police officers to the place where appellant was when
he was arrested was triggered by a phone call from a
appellant's arm, and asked the latter to pull his hand out.
Incidentally, appellant was holding a plastic sachet containing
white crystalline substance. PO2 Paras then confiscated the
plastic sachet from appellant, informed him of his
constitutional rights, and arrested him. When an accused is
caught in flagrante delicto, the police officers are not only
authorized, but are duty-bound, to arrest him even without a
warrant. And considering that appellant's arrest was legal, the
search and seizure that resulted from it were likewise lawful.

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People vs Alvario

The Supreme Court also cited the CA’s disquisition: G.R. No. 120437-41 | July 16, 1997

The police officers are completely justified for being at the

BMBA compound when appellant was arrested, since they
Personal knowledge (of the arresting officer): actual belief
were merely performing their regular duty of responding to a
or reasonable grounds of suspicion, based on actual facts, that
reported crime. When appellant was found alone, acting
the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the
suspiciously in the reported area, PO2 Paras instinctively
crime. (Umil v. Ramos, 202 SCRA 251, 263, October 3, 1991)
thought that appellant was about to pull out a gun or a weapon
from his pocket due to a previous report of indiscriminate
firing, that he approached him as a precautionary measure.
Facts: Esterlina Quintero, a 29 year old single mother took
xxxx time off her current job as housekeeper in Makati to look for
another place of employment. With the help of Aling Soling
In the course of the performance of their official duties, the
she was introduced to accused Alvario. She thereafter agreed
police officers inadvertently recovered from appellant a plastic
to cook for him and do his laundry for P800.00 /month. She
sachet of shabu which was voluntarily given by appellant
was told that she could begin that very day thus she was taken
himself. Clearly, the item recovered from appellant was not a
to a two story house in Bel Air, where the only other occupant
product of illegal search and seizure, because appellant
was Alma Barliso, another maid.
voluntarily surrendered the drugs in his possession. In short,
appellant was not forced or coerced to bring out the contents Armand Alvario on the other hand is a mere caretaker
of his pocket, thus, the recovery of evidence was appellant's of the house owned by Atty. Rogelio San Luis.
own volition.
According to Esterlina on the first day of work she was
Accordingly, appellant was arrested because he was caught not allowed to eat and on the following day she was merely
in flagrante delicto of the crime of illegal possession of

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allowed to eat two spoonfuls of left-over food. Alvario would
dangerous drugs, given that mere possession of a prohibited leave the house at 7 am and return at 5pm, directing Esterlina
drug already constitutes a criminal offense. not to go out of the house nor to talk to Alma. Esterlina relates
that every night, Alvario would come into her room and force
himself upon her. Out of fear because he had a gun and
People vs Gumilao threatened to file a case against her, Esterlina did not resist
nor defend herself. This happened for all the days she was
G.R. No. 208755 |
under the employ of Alvario, she did not make a phone call to
her sister because she was afraid and she did not try to escape

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because Alvario locked all the doors and the gate. After 7 days,
finally mustering enough courage she rang her sister, who
managed to hold her sister through her employer. Alvario was
thereafter arrested (without warrant) and was later found
guilty by the court. The court did not give credence to his
“sweetheart” defense theory.
This case was an appeal by Alvario on the conviction
against him
Issue: WON the warrantless arrest of Alvario is valid
Ruling: Yes, the arrest of Alvario is valid.
Towards the conclusion of the ruling, the Court noted
that during the trial, Alvario consistently protested his
warrantless arrest. Suffice it to say that his arrest falls within
the purview of Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, viz.:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer
or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
xxx
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he
has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to
be arrested has committed it; x x x. (Underscoring supplied)
The personal knowledge of the arresting officers in the
case at bar was culled from the information supplied by the
victim herself who pointed to Alvario as the man who raped
her at the time of his arrest.
Panaguiton vs DOJ
G.R. No. 16751 | November 25, 2008
Rule on Prescriptive Periods
Art. 90. Prescription of crime. — Crimes punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or reclusion temporal shall prescribe in twenty years.
Crimes punishable by other afflictive penalties shall prescribe in fifteen
years.
Those punishable by a correctional penalty shall prescribe in ten years; with the
exception of those punishable by arresto mayor, which shall prescribe in five years.
The crime of libel or other similar offenses shall prescribe in one year.
The crime of oral defamation and slander by deed shall prescribe in six months.
Light offenses prescribe in two months.
When the penalty fixed by law is a compound one, the highest penalty shall be made
the basis of the application of the rules contained in the first, second and third
paragraphs of this article.
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RA 3326 AN ACT TO ESTABLISH PERIODS OF PRESCRIPTION FOR
VIOLATIONS PENALIZED BY SPECIAL ACTS AND MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES
AND TO PROVIDE WHEN PRESCRIPTION SHALL BEGIN TO RUN
Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise
provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: (a)
after a year for offenses punished only by a fine or by imprisonment for
not more than one month, or both; (b) after four years for those punished
by imprisonment for more than one month, but less than two years; (c)
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after eight years for those punished by imprisonment for two years or
more, but less than six years; and (d) after twelve years for any other
offense punished by imprisonment for six years or more, except the crime
of treason, which shall prescribe after twenty years. Violations penalized
by municipal ordinances shall prescribe after two months.
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the
commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be
not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the
institution of judicial proceeding for its investigation and
punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are
instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run
again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting jeopardy.
Facts: In 1992, Cawili borrowed money from Panaguiton
amounting to P1,979,459.
In 1993, Cawili with his ‘business associate’ Tongson
issued 3 checks as payment. Significantly, all three (3) checks
bore the signatures of both Cawili and Tongson. Upon
presentment for payment on 18 March 1993, the checks were
dishonored, either for insufficiency of funds or by the closure
of the account.
During preliminary investigation, Tongson claimed that
he was not Cawili’s business associate. On Dec. 6 1995 City
Prosecutor III Eliodoro V. Lara found probable cause only
against Cawili and dismissed the charges against Tongson.
Petitioner then appeal before DOJ and in 1997 DOJ
found that it was indeed possible for Tongson to co-signed the
checks. It then directed the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to
conduct a reinvestigation of the case against Tongson and to
refer the questioned signatures to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI)
Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Lelibet S. Sampaga (ACP
Sampaga) dismissed the complaint against Tongson without
referring the matter to the NBI per the Chief State Prosecutor’s
resolution. ACP Sampaga held that the case had already
prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326, as amended, which
provides that violations penalized by B.P. Blg. 22 shall
prescribe after four (4) years.
Moreover, ACP Sampaga stated that the order of the
Chief State Prosecutor to refer the matter to the NBI could no
longer be sanctioned under Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules
of Criminal Procedure because the initiative should come from
petitioner himself and not the investigating prosecutor.
Issue: WON the rule on prescription as provided for in
Act No. 3326 applies to offenses under B.P. 22
Ruling: Yes, Act. No. 3326 applies to offenses under B.P.
Blg. 22. An offense under B.P. Blg. 22 merits the penalty of
imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more
than one year or by a fine, hence, under Act No. 3326, a
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violation of B.P. Blg. 22 prescribes in four (4) years from the
commission of the offense or, if the same be not known at the
time, from the discovery thereof. Nevertheless, we cannot
uphold the position that only the filing of a case in court can
toll the running of the prescriptive period.
It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was
passed on 4 December 1926, preliminary investigation of
criminal offenses was conducted by justices of the peace, thus,
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the phraseology in the law, “institution of judicial proceedings
for its investigation and punishment,”[39] and the prevailing
rule at the time was that once a complaint is filed with the
justice of the peace for preliminary investigation, the
prescription of the offense is halted.
Indeed, to rule otherwise would deprive the injured
party the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that
are not under his control. A clear example would be this case,
wherein petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit on 24 August
1995, well within the four (4)-year prescriptive period. He
likewise timely filed his appeals and his motions for
reconsideration on the dismissal of the charges
against
 Tongson. He went through the proper channels, within
the prescribed periods. However, from the time petitioner filed
his complaint-affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor
(24 August 1995) up to the time the DOJ issued the assailed
resolution, an aggregate period of nine (9) years had elapsed.
Clearly, the delay was beyond petitioner’s control. After all, he
had already initiated the active prosecution of the case as
early as 24 August 1995, only to suffer setbacks because of
the DOJ’s flip-flopping resolutions and its misapplication of Act
No. 3326. Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep
on their rights and actively pursue their causes, should not be
allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply because of
circumstances beyond their control, like the accused’s
delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the
investigating agencies.
The court held that the offense has not yet prescribed.
Petitioner ’s filing of his complaint–affidavit before the Office
of the City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 signified the
commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the
accused and thus effectively interrupted the prescriptive
period for the offenses they had been charged under B.P. Blg.
22. Moreover, since there is a definite finding of probable
cause, with the debunking of the claim of prescription there is
no longer any impediment to the filing of the information
against petitioner.
People vs Peñaflor
G.R. No. 206296 | Aug 12, 2015
Facts: Estur, a COA Auditor, discovered in July 1993 rice
stocks unaccounted for in the bodega of the NFA. The stocks
were under the account of Matas. Upon the recommendation
of Estur, COA State Auditor IV, Betonio, who was the Provincial
Manager of NFA, Lanao del Norte, suspended accused Matas.
On 21 August 1993, at about 8:00 p.m., Betonio, upon
disembarking from the Ford Fiera driven by Fajardo, was
stabbed and shot in front of his rented apartment at Bertumen
Compound, Palao, Iligan City. Upon hearing her husband
shout, “If you want to kill me, don’t include my wife,” quickly
followed by two gunshots, Vicenta hid inside their apartment.
After a few minutes, she went out of the house and saw
Betonio, barely alive, slumped on the ground with a knife, with
a handle like that of an eagle and a carving like that of a
dragon, still pierced through his chest. Before Betonio was
brought to the Dr. Uy Hospital, where he was later pronounced
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dead on arrival, he whispered to his wife the names, Delfin
and Matas.
Based on the necropsy conducted by Dr. Villarin,
Betonio died of cardiorespiratory arrest hypovolemic shock
due to a gunshot and deep stab wounds.
During the investigation, SPO4 Lubang initially
identified the following as suspects: Edgar Matas, Anacleto
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Matas, Jr., and Oscar Ondo. However, in the course of the Issue: Are extra-judicial confession executed during
investigation, after publishing a sketch of the knife which was preliminary investigation covered by rules on custodial
found embedded in Betonio’s chest, they were informed that investigation ?
a certain Ramil Peñaflor was the actual killer.

On 12 November 1993, SPO4 Lubang and SPO3

Ruling: Yes, the import of the distinction between custodial
Badelles went to the house of one Dioscora Praquilles. There
interrogation and preliminary investigation relates to the
they found accused-appellant Peñaflor, whom they invited to
inherently coercive nature of a custodial intereogation which
the Iligan City Police Station for interrogation. During the
is conducted by the police authorities. Due to the interrogatory
investigation, accused-appellant Peñaflor admitted killing
procedures employed by police authorities, which are
Betonio and that he was hired by accused Ondo, the brother-
conductive to physical and psychological coercion, the law
in-law of Matas, for the amount of P15,000.00, to kill Betonio.
affords arrested persons constitutional rights to guarantee the
At 3:00 p.m. of that same day, the police brought accused-
voluntariness of their confession and admissions, and to act
appellant Peñaflor to the Office of the City Prosecutor to obtain
as deterrnt from coercion by police authorities. These
his admission,11 which was conducted by Assistant City
safeguards are found in Article III, Section 12(1) of the
Prosecutor Albulario, with the assistance of Atty. Cristobal, as
Constitution and Section 2 of RA No. 7438. Sans proper
counsel de officio.
safeguards, custodial investigation is a fertile means to obtain
The following day, 13 November 1993, Praquilles went confessions and admissions in dures.
to the Padilla Law Office to engage the latter’s services as
In this case, even if accused-appellant Peñaflor’s
counsel for accused-appellant Peñaflor. Pursuant to the
extrajudicial confessions were obtained under custodial
agreement, the Padilla Law Office, through Atty. Gerardo
investigation, these are admissible. To be admissible, a
Padilla, entered its appearance as counsel for accused-
confession must comply with the following requirements. It
appellant Peñaflor in a letter, which was received by the Office
must be:
of the City Prosecutor on 15 November 1993.12
1 voluntary

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However, on the same day that the Padilla Law Office 2 made with the assistance of a competent and independent
entered its appearance as counsel for accused-appellant counsel
Peña-flor, or three days after accused-appellant Peñaflor’s first 3 express
extra-judicial confession/admission, accused-appellant 4 in writing
Peñaflor discharged the Padilla Law Office as counsel and
entered a second extrajudicial confession.13 This time,
In the case at bar, the prosecution dis not present proof
however, the second extrajudicial confession was conducted
of the absence of any of these requirements.
by City Prosecutor Lagcao, with the assistance of Atty.
Cavales, as counsel de officio.

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Juan Ponce Enrile v. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 213455 | 11 August 2015.
FACTS:
The Office of the Ombudsman filed an Information for plunder
against Enrile, Jessica Lucila Reyes, Janet Lim Napoles, Ronald
John Lim, and John Raymund de Asis before the
Sandiganbayan.
The Information reads:
xxxx
In 2004 to 2010 or thereabout, in the Philippines, and within
this Honorable Court’s jurisdiction, above-named accused
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, then a Philippine Senator, JESSICA
LUCILA G. REYES, then Chief of Staff of Senator Enrile’s Office,
both public officers, committing the offense in relation to their
respective offices, conspiring with one another and with JANET
LIM NAPOLES, RONALD JOHN LIM, and JOHN RAYMUND DE
ASIS, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and criminally
amass, accumulate, and/or acquire ill-gotten wealth
amounting to at least ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY TWO MILLION
EIGHT HUNDRED THIRTY FOUR THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
PESOS (Php172,834,500.00) through a combination or series
of overt criminal acts, as follows:
by repeatedly receiving from NAPOLES and/or her
representatives LIM, DE ASIS, and others, kickbacks or
commissions under the following circumstances: before,
during and/or after the project identification, NAPOLES gave,
and ENRILE and/or REYES received, a percentage of the cost
of a project to be funded from ENRILE’S Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF), in consideration of ENRILE’S
endorsement, directly or through REYES, to the appropriate
government agencies, of NAPOLES’ non-government
organizations which became the recipients and/or target
implementors of ENRILE’S PDAF projects, which duly-funded
projects turned out to be ghosts or fictitious, thus enabling
NAPOLES to misappropriate the PDAF proceeds for her
personal gain;
by taking undue advantage, on several occasions, of their
official positions, authority, relationships, connections, and
influence to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense and to
the damage and prejudice, of the Filipino people and the
Republic of the Philippines.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Enrile filed a motion for bill of particulars before the
Sandiganbayan. On the same date, he filed a motion for
deferment of arraignment since he was to undergo medical
examination at the Philippine General Hospital (PGH).
The Court denied Enrile’s motion for bill of particulars.
ISSUE: Is a Motion to Quash the proper remedy if the
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information is vague or indefinite resulting in the
serious violation of Enrile’s constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him?
HELD: NO. When allegations in an Information are vague or
indefinite, the remedy of the accused is not a motion to quash,
but a motion for a bill of particulars.
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The purpose of a bill of particulars is to supply vague
facts or allegations in the complaint or information to enable
the accused to properly plead and prepare for trial. It
presupposes a valid Information, one that presents all the
elements of the crime charged, albeit under vague terms.
Notably, the specifications that a bill of particulars may supply
are only formal amendments to the complaint or Information.
Thus, if the Information is lacking, a court should take a liberal
attitude towards its granting and order the government to file
a bill of particulars elaborating on the charges. Doubts should
be resolved in favor of granting the bill to give full meaning to
the accused’s Constitutionally guaranteed rights.
Notably, the government cannot put the accused in the
position of disclosing certain overt acts through the
Information and withholding others subsequently discovered,
all of which it intends to prove at the trial. This is the type of
surprise a bill of particulars is designed to avoid. The accused
is entitled to the observance of all the rules designated to bring
about a fair verdict. This becomes more relevant in the present
case where the crime charged carries with it the severe
penalty of capital punishment and entails the commission of
several predicate criminal acts involving a great number of
transactions spread over a considerable period of time.
Notably, conviction for plunder carries with it the penalty of
capital punishment; for this reason, more process is due, not
less. When a person’s life interest – protected by the life,
liberty, and property language recognized in the due process
clause – is at stake in the proceeding, all measures must be
taken to ensure the protection of those fundamental rights.
While both the motion to dismiss the Information and
the motion for bill of particulars involved the right of an
accused to due process, the enumeration of the details desired
in Enrile’s supplemental opposition to issuance of a warrant of
arrest and for dismissal of information and in his motion for
bill of particulars are different viewed particularly from the
prism of their respective objectives. In the former, Enrile took
the position that the Information did not state a crime for
which he can be convicted; thus, the Information is void; he
alleged a defect of substance. In the latter, he already
impliedly admits that the Information sufficiently alleged a
crime but is unclear and lacking in details that would allow him
to properly plead and prepare his defense; he essentially
alleged here a defect of form. Note that in the former, the
purpose is to dismiss the Information for its failure to state the
nature and cause of the accusation against Enrile; while the
details desired in the latter (the motion for bill of particulars)
are required to be specified in sufficient detail because the
allegations in the Information are vague, indefinite, or in the
form of conclusions and will not allow Enrile to adequately
prepare his defense unless specifications are made.That every
element constituting the offense had been alleged in the
Information does not preclude the accused from requesting for
more specific details of the various acts or omissions he is
alleged to have committed. The request for details is precisely
the function of a bill of particulars. Hence, while the
information may be sufficient for purposes of stating the cause
Ab Initio Group DVOREF 2-Exec
and the crime an accused is charged, the allegations may still
be inadequate for purposes of enabling him to properly plead
and prepare for trial.
We DIRECT the People of the Philippines to SUBMIT,
within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from finality
of this Decision, with copy furnished to Enrile, a bill of
particulars containing the facts sought that we herein rule to
be material and necessary. The bill of particulars shall
specifically contain the following:
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CRIMPRO CASE DIGESTS A.Y. 2018-2019
The particular overt act/s alleged to constitute the
“combination or series of overt criminal acts” charged in the
Information.
A breakdown of the amounts of the “kickbacks or
commissions” allegedly received, stating how the amount of
P172,834,500.00 was arrived at.
A brief description of the ‘identified’ projects where kickbacks
or commissions were received.
The approximate dates of receipt, “in 2004 to 2010 or
thereabout,” of the alleged kickbacks and commissions from
the identified projects. At the very least, the prosecution
should state the year when the kickbacks and transactions
from the identified projects were received.
The name of Napoles’ non-government organizations (NGOs)
which were the alleged “recipients and/or target implementors
of Enrile’s PDAF projects.”
The government agencies to whom Enrile allegedly endorsed
Napoles’ NGOs. The particular person/s in each government
agency who facilitated the transactions need not be named as
a particular.
Los Banos vs Pedro
G.R. No. 173588 | April 22, 2009
FACTS: Joel Pedro was charged in court for carrying a
loaded firearm without authorization from the COMELEC
a day before the elections. Pedro, then filed a Motion to
Quash after his Motion for Preliminary Investigation did
not materialize. The RTC granted the quashal.
The RTC reopened the case for further proceedings
in which Pedro objected to citing Rule 117, Sec. 8 on
provisional dismissal, arguing that the dismissal had
become permanent.
The public prosecutor manifested his express
conformity with the motion to reopen the case saying
that the provision used applies where both the
prosecution and the accused mutually consented to the
dismissal of the case, or where the prosecution or the
offended party failed to object to the dismissal of the
case, and not to a situation where the information was
quashed upon motion of the accused and over the
objection of the prosecution. The RTC, thus, set Pedro’s
arraignment date.
Pedro filed with the CA a petition for certiorari and
prohibition to nullify the RTC’s mandated reopening.
The CA, at first granted the reopening of the case
but through Pedro's Motion for Reconsideration, his
argument that a year has passed by from the receipt of
the quashal order, the CA's decision was reversed.
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Petitioner now argues using the same argument of
the public prosecutor.
ISSUE: WON the rule on provision dismissal is
applicable
RULING: The SC granted the petition and remanded the
case to the RTC.
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CRIMPRO CASE DIGESTS A.Y. 2018-2019
The SC differentiated Motion to Quash and
Provisional Dismissal. Primarily, they are two separate
concepts. In Motion to Quash, the Information itself has
deficiency while in Provisional Dismissal, the Information
has no deficiencies. It does not follow that a motion to
quash results in a provisional dismissal to which Section
8, Rule 117 applies.
In the case, the SC finds that the granting of the
quashal of the RTC had no merit on the ground that there
is a legal excuse or justification in Pedro's offense. Pedro
misappreciated the natures of a motion to quash and
provisional dismissal. As a consequence, a valid
Information still stands, on the basis of which Pedro
should now be arraigned and stand trial.
People vs Elpedes
G.R. No. 137106-07 | January 31, 2001
FACTS: On the basis of two (2) sworn criminal complaints
executed by the offended party, accused Jose Elpedes y Sunas
was charged with the crime of Rape in two (2) informations,
one on February 11, 1997 and second on sometime in year
1991. Uponarraignment, accused entered a plea of not guilty.
The cases, which were consolidated, thereafter proceeded to
joint trial.
After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment finding
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of one count of rape,
while acquitting him of the other charge. Accused-appellant
assails his conviction on the grounds that, among others: the
lower court gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant
of the crime of rape allegedly committed on February 11, 1997
despite the fact that the complaining witness categorically
testified during the trial that she was sexually violated on
august 11, 1997.
ISSUE: Whether the accused should be acquitted since
the evidence showed that the date of the commission of
the crime was different from the date indicated in the
information?
HELD: No. The remedy against an indictment that fails
to allege the time of commission of the offense with
sufficient definiteness is a motion for bill of particulars.
The record reveals that accused-appellant did not ask for a bill
of particulars in accordance with Rule 116, Section 10 of the
Rules of Court, which provides: SEC. 10. Bill of particulars.
Accused may, at or before arraignment, move for a bill of
particulars to enable him properly to plead and to prepare for
trial. The motion shall specify the alleged defects and details
desired.
The failure to move for specifications or the quashal of
the information on any of the grounds provided for in the Rules
of Court deprives accused of the right to object to evidence
which could be lawfully introduced and admitted under an
information of more or less general terms but which
sufficiently charges the accused with a definite crime. It is too
late in the day for accused-appellant to raise this issue now
Ab Initio Group DVOREF 2-Exec
because objections as to matters of form or substance in the
information can not be made for the first time on appeal.
Besides, the exact date of the commission of the crime of rape
is not an essential element of the crime. In accordance with
Rule 110, Section 11. As long as it alleges that the offense was
committed at any time as near to the actual date at which the
offense was committed, an information is sufficient.
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Quisay vs People
G.R. No. 216920 |
FACTS: On December 28,2012, Office of the City Prosecutor
of Makati City issued Pasiya or Resolution finding probable
cause against petitioner for violation of Sec. 10 of R.A. No.
7610 (Special Protection of Children Against Abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination Act) Consequently a Pabatid or
Information was filed to RTC charging petitioner such crime.
Petitioner moved for the quashal of the Information
against her on the ground of lack of authority of the person
who filed the same before the RTC. In support to her motion,
petitioner pointed out that the Pasiya and Pabatid Sakdal was
issued without the approval or authority from the City
Prosecutor. As such, the Information must be quashed for
being tainted with a jurisdictional defect that cannot be cured.
The RTC ruled to deny the petitioner’s motion to quash
due to the lack of merit since it found that the certification
attached to the Pabatid Sakdal have sufficiently complied with
Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which requires the
prior written authority or approval by, among others, the City
Prosecutor, in filing of Information. Petitioner then moved for
reconsideration but denied. Petitioner elevated the matter to
the CA that consequently, affirmed the ruling of the RTC.
ISSUE: WON the CA correctly held that RCT did not
gravely abuse its discretion in dismissing petitioner’s
motion to quash.
HELD: NO, CA erred in affirming CA’s ruling.
Sec. 4 Rule 112 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure states that the filing of a complaint or information
requires a prior written authority or approval of the named
officers therein before a complaint or information may be filed
before the courts, to wit:
Sec. 4 Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its
review- if the investigating prosecutor finds cause to hold the
respondent for trial, he shall prepare the resolution and
information. He shall certify under oath in the information that
he, or as shown by the record an authorized officer, has
personally examined the complaint and his witnesses; that
there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been
committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof;
that the accused was informed of the complaint and of the
evidence submitted against him; and that he was given
opportunity to submit controverting evidence. Otherwise, he
shall recommend the dismissal of the complaint.
No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed
by an investigation prosecutor without the prior written
authority or approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or
chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy.
Thus, as a general rule, complaints or information filed
before the courts without prior written authority or approval
of the authorized officers renders the same as defective and
therefor subject to quashal.
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In this case, there was no proof that a certain officer
was authorized to perform the written authority with the
approval and in behalf of the City Prosecutor. In the prior
circumstances, the CA erred in affirming RTC’s ruling, that the
officer who filed the same before the RTC had no authority to
do so. Thus, Paabatid Sakdal must be quashed resulting in the
dismissal of the criminal case against petitioner.
Finally, it must be stressed that the Rule of Court
governs the pleading, practice and procedure in all courts of
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the Philippines. For an orderly administration of justice, the
provisions contained therein should be followed by all litigants,
but especially by the prosecution arm of the Government.
Anlud Metal Recycling Corp vs Ang
G.R. No. 182157 | August 15, 2015
Rule 112, SEC. 6 Although courts must respect the executive
determination of probable cause, the trail courts may still
independently determine probable cause by the prosecutor and the
DOJ
FACTS: San Miguel Packaging Products-Metal Closures
Lithography Plant (SMC-MCLP) allegedly awarded petitioner
an exclusive contract to purchase its aluminum- and tin-based
scrap materials. Based on the narration of petitioner, Dela
Cruz pretended to be an agent of Anlud Metal Recyling
Corporation when she arranged for the transport of the scrap
materials. She had allegedly coordinated the hauling with
Alday, who was then working for SMC-MCLP. Alday
purportedly allowed the trucks driven by Paniergo and Bagaua
to enter the plant and load the scrap materials in the cargoes
based on a false representation that the transaction was
authorized by petitioner. Fortunately, the two trucks were not
able to leave the premises of SMC-MCLP. Petitioner lodged a
Complaint for attempted Estafa through falsification of
commercial/private documents against Dela Cruz, et al. An
information was filed and the RTC issued a warrant of arrest.
ISSUE: WON the RTC have jurisdiction to determine
probable cause
HELD: YES, Petitioner explains that there are two
determinations of probable cause: the first is for the purpose
of filing a criminal information in the court, and the second is
for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Petitioner submits that
since the first kind is executive in nature, then the RTC had
absolutely no jurisdiction to determine the existence of
probable cause to hold respondent as an accused in the crime
of estafa. Petitioner’s interpretation of the rules on the
determination of probable cause is inaccurate. Although courts
must respect the executive determination of probable cause,
the trail courts may still independently determine probable
cause. They are not irrevocably bound to the determination of
probable cause by the prosecutor and the DOJ.
The trial court actually has the option upon the filing of a
criminal information:
1) Immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record
clearly fails to establish probable cause;
2) Issue a warrant of arrest if it founds probable cause;
3) Order the prosecutor to present additional evidence
within 5 days from notice in case of doubt as to the
existence of probable cause. These option are provided
in Rule 112, Section 6 (a) of the Rules of Court.
Indeed, the RTC is allowed to dismiss the charge of estafa
against Ang (one of those originally charged) notwithstanding
the executive determination of probable cause by the
prosecutor. If we were to construe otherwise, we would be
contradicting the basic principle that “once an information is
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filed in RTC, any disposition of the case rest already in the
sound discretion of the court.
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