For their part, some of the accused testified, denying any part in the crime and saying they
were
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 176389 December 14, 2010
ANTONIO LEJANO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 176864
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
HUBERT JEFFREY P. WEBB, ANTONIO LEJANO, MICHAEL A. GATCHALIAN, HOSPICIO
FERNANDEZ, MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ, PETER ESTRADA and GERARDO BIONG, Appellants.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
Brief Background
On June 30, 1991 Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters Carmela, nineteen years old, and Jennifer,
seven, were brutally slain at their home in Parañaque City. Following an intense investigation, the
police arrested a group of suspects, some of whom gave detailed confessions. But the trial court
smelled a frame-up and eventually ordered them discharged. Thus, the identities of the real
perpetrators remained a mystery especially to the public whose interests were aroused by the
gripping details of what everybody referred to as the Vizconde massacre.
Four years later in 1995, the National Bureau of Investigation or NBI announced that it had solved
the crime. It presented star-witness Jessica M. Alfaro, one of its informers, who claimed that she
witnessed the crime. She pointed to accused Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio "Tony Boy" Lejano,
Artemio "Dong" Ventura, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio "Pyke" Fernandez, Peter Estrada, Miguel
"Ging" Rodriguez, and Joey Filart as the culprits. She also tagged accused police officer, Gerardo
Biong, as an accessory after the fact. Relying primarily on Alfaro's testimony, on August 10, 1995
the public prosecutors filed an information for rape with homicide against Webb, et al. 1
The Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, Branch 274, presided over by Judge Amelita G.
Tolentino, tried only seven of the accused since Artemio Ventura and Joey Filart remained at
large.2 The prosecution presented Alfaro as its main witness with the others corroborating her
testimony. These included the medico-legal officer who autopsied the bodies of the victims, the
security guards of Pitong Daan Subdivision, the former laundrywoman of the Webb’s household,
police officer Biong’s former girlfriend, and Lauro G. Vizconde, Estrellita’s husband.
Evidence Cases
elsewhere when it took place. Webb’s alibi appeared the strongest since he claimed that he was
then across the ocean in the United States of America. He presented the testimonies of witnesses
as well as documentary and object evidence to prove this. In addition, the defense presented
witnesses to show Alfaro's bad reputation for truth and the incredible nature of her testimony.
But impressed by Alfaro’s detailed narration of the crime and the events surrounding it, the trial
court found a credible witness in her. It noted her categorical, straightforward, spontaneous, and
frank testimony, undamaged by grueling cross-examinations. The trial court remained unfazed by
significant discrepancies between Alfaro’s April 28 and May 22, 1995 affidavits, accepting her
explanation that she at first wanted to protect her former boyfriend, accused Estrada, and a relative,
accused Gatchalian; that no lawyer assisted her; that she did not trust the investigators who helped
her prepare her first affidavit; and that she felt unsure if she would get the support and security she
needed once she disclosed all about the Vizconde killings.
In contrast, the trial court thought little of the denials and alibis that Webb, Lejano, Rodriguez, and
Gatchalian set up for their defense. They paled, according to the court, compared to Alfaro’s
testimony that other witnesses and the physical evidence corroborated. Thus, on January 4, 2000,
after four years of arduous hearings, the trial court rendered judgment, finding all the accused guilty
as charged and imposing on Webb, Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, and Rodriguez the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and on Biong, an indeterminate prison term of eleven years, four
months, and one day to twelve years. The trial court also awarded damages to Lauro Vizconde.3
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, modifying the penalty imposed
on Biong to six years minimum and twelve years maximum and increasing the award of damages to
Lauro Vizconde.4 The appellate court did not agree that the accused were tried by publicity or that
the trial judge was biased. It found sufficient evidence of conspiracy that rendered Rodriguez,
Gatchalian, Fernandez, and Estrada equally guilty with those who had a part in raping and killing
Carmela and in executing her mother and sister.
On motion for reconsideration by the accused, the Court of Appeals' Special Division of five
members voted three against two to deny the motion,5 hence, the present appeal.
On April 20, 2010, as a result of its initial deliberation in this case, the Court issued a Resolution
granting the request of Webb to submit for DNA analysis the semen specimen taken from
Carmela’s cadaver, which specimen was then believed still under the safekeeping of the NBI. The
Court granted the request pursuant to section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence6 to give the accused
and the prosecution access to scientific evidence that they might want to avail themselves of,
leading to a correct decision in the case.
Unfortunately, on April 27, 2010 the NBI informed the Court that it no longer has custody of the
specimen, the same having been turned over to the trial court. The trial record shows, however,
that the specimen was not among the object evidence that the prosecution offered in evidence in
the case.
This outcome prompted accused Webb to file an urgent motion to acquit on the ground that the
government’s failure to preserve such vital evidence has resulted in the denial of his right to due
process.
Issues Presented
Page | 1
Accused Webb’s motion to acquit presents a threshold issue: whether or not the Court should
acquit him outright, given the government’s failure to produce the semen specimen that the NBI
found on Carmela’s cadaver, thus depriving him of evidence that would prove his innocence.
In the main, all the accused raise the central issue of whether or not Webb, acting in conspiracy
with Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, Ventura, and Filart, raped and killed
Carmela and put to death her mother and sister. But, ultimately, the controlling issues are:
1. Whether or not Alfaro’s testimony as eyewitness, describing the crime and identifying
Webb, Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, and two others as the
persons who committed it, is entitled to belief; and
2. Whether or not Webb presented sufficient evidence to prove his alibi and rebut Alfaro’s
testimony that he led the others in committing the crime.
The issue respecting accused Biong is whether or not he acted to cover up the crime after its
commission.
The Right to Acquittal
Due to Loss of DNA Evidence
Webb claims, citing Brady v. Maryland,7 that he is entitled to outright acquittal on the ground of
violation of his right to due process given the State’s failure to produce on order of the Court either
by negligence or willful suppression the semen specimen taken from Carmela.
The medical evidence clearly established that Carmela was raped and, consistent with this, semen
specimen was found in her. It is true that Alfaro identified Webb in her testimony as Carmela’s
rapist and killer but serious questions had been raised about her credibility. At the very least, there
exists a possibility that Alfaro had lied. On the other hand, the semen specimen taken from Carmela
cannot possibly lie. It cannot be coached or allured by a promise of reward or financial support. No
two persons have the same DNA fingerprint, with the exception of identical twins. 8 If, on
examination, the DNA of the subject specimen does not belong to Webb, then he did not rape
Carmela. It is that simple. Thus, the Court would have been able to determine that Alfaro committed
perjury in saying that he did.
Still, Webb is not entitled to acquittal for the failure of the State to produce the semen specimen at
this late stage. For one thing, the ruling in Brady v. Maryland9 that he cites has long be overtaken
by the decision in Arizona v. Youngblood,10 where the U.S. Supreme Court held that due process
does not require the State to preserve the semen specimen although it might be useful to the
accused unless the latter is able to show bad faith on the part of the prosecution or the police. Here,
the State presented a medical expert who testified on the existence of the specimen and Webb in
fact sought to have the same subjected to DNA test.
For, another, when Webb raised the DNA issue, the rule governing DNA evidence did not yet exist,
the country did not yet have the technology for conducting the test, and no Philippine precedent had
as yet recognized its admissibility as evidence. Consequently, the idea of keeping the specimen
secure even after the trial court rejected the motion for DNA testing did not come up. Indeed,
neither Webb nor his co-accused brought up the matter of preserving the specimen in the
meantime.
Parenthetically, after the trial court denied Webb’s application for DNA testing, he allowed the
proceeding to move on when he had on at least two occasions gone up to the Court of Appeals or
Evidence Cases
the Supreme Court to challenge alleged arbitrary actions taken against him and the other
accused.11 They raised the DNA issue before the Court of Appeals but merely as an error
committed by the trial court in rendering its decision in the case. None of the accused filed a motion
with the appeals court to have the DNA test done pending adjudication of their appeal. This, even
when the Supreme Court had in the meantime passed the rules allowing such test. Considering the
accused’s lack of interest in having such test done, the State cannot be deemed put on reasonable
notice that it would be required to produce the semen specimen at some future time.
Now, to the merit of the case.
Alfaro’s Story
Based on the prosecution’s version, culled from the decisions of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals, on June 29, 1991 at around 8:30 in the evening, Jessica Alfaro drove her Mitsubishi
Lancer, with boyfriend Peter Estrada as passenger, to the Ayala Alabang Commercial Center
parking lot to buy shabu from Artemio "Dong" Ventura. There, Ventura introduced her to his friends:
Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio "Tony Boy" Lejano, Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez, Hospicio "Pyke"
Fernandez, Michael Gatchalian, and Joey Filart. Alfaro recalled frequently seeing them at a shabu
house in Parañaque in January 1991, except Ventura whom she had known earlier in December
1990.
As Alfaro smoked her shabu, Webb approached and requested her to relay a message for him to a
girl, whom she later identified as Carmela Vizconde. Alfaro agreed. After using up their shabu, the
group drove to Carmela’s house at 80 Vinzons Street, Pitong Daan Subdivision, BF Homes,
Parañaque City. Riding in her car, Alfaro and Estrada trailed Filart and Rodriguez who rode a
Mazda pick-up and Webb, Lejano, Ventura, Fernandez, and Gatchalian who were on a Nissan
Patrol car.
On reaching their destination, Alfaro parked her car on Vinzons Street, alighted, and approached
Carmela’s house. Alfaro pressed the buzzer and a woman came out. Alfaro queried her about
Carmela. Alfaro had met Carmela twice before in January 1991. When Carmela came out, Alfaro
gave her Webb’s message that he was just around. Carmela replied, however, that she could not
go out yet since she had just arrived home. She told Alfaro to return after twenty minutes. Alfaro
relayed this to Webb who then told the group to drive back to the Ayala Alabang Commercial
Center.
The group had another shabu session at the parking lot. After sometime, they drove back but only
Alfaro proceeded to Vinzons Street where Carmela lived. The Nissan Patrol and the Mazda pick-up,
with their passengers, parked somewhere along Aguirre Avenue. Carmela was at their garden. She
approached Alfaro on seeing her and told the latter that she (Carmela) had to leave the house for a
while. Carmela requested Alfaro to return before midnight and she would leave the pedestrian gate,
the iron grills that led to the kitchen, and the kitchen door unlocked. Carmela also told Alfaro to blink
her car’s headlights twice when she approached the pedestrian gate so Carmela would know that
she had arrived.
Alfaro returned to her car but waited for Carmela to drive out of the house in her own car. Alfaro
trailed Carmela up to Aguirre Avenue where she dropped off a man whom Alfaro believed was
Carmela’s boyfriend. Alfaro looked for her group, found them, and relayed Carmela’s instructions to
Webb. They then all went back to the Ayala Alabang Commercial Center. At the parking lot, Alfaro
told the group about her talk with Carmela. When she told Webb of Carmela’s male companion,
Webb’s mood changed for the rest of the evening ("bad trip").
Page | 2
Webb gave out free cocaine. They all used it and some shabu, too. After about 40 to 45 minutes,
Webb decided that it was time for them to leave. He said, "Pipilahan natin siya [Carmela] at ako
ang mauuna." Lejano said, "Ako ang susunod" and the others responded "Okay, okay." They all left
the parking lot in a convoy of three vehicles and drove into Pitong Daan Subdivision for the third
time. They arrived at Carmela’s house shortly before midnight.
Alfaro parked her car between Vizconde’s house and the next. While waiting for the others to alight
from their cars, Fernandez approached Alfaro with a suggestion that they blow up the transformer
near the Vizconde’s residence to cause a brownout ("Pasabugin kaya natin ang transformer na
ito"). But Alfaro shrugged off the idea, telling Fernandez, "Malakas lang ang tama mo." When
Webb, Lejano, and Ventura were already before the house, Webb told the others again that they
would line up for Carmela but he would be the first. The others replied, "O sige, dito lang kami,
magbabantay lang kami."
locked. They all rode in their cars and drove away until they reached Aguirre Avenue. As they got
near an old hotel at the Tropical Palace area, Alfaro noticed the Nissan Patrol slow down. Someone
threw something out of the car into the cogonal area.
The convoy of cars went to a large house with high walls, concrete fence, steel gate, and a long
driveway at BF Executive Village. They entered the compound and gathered at the lawn where the
"blaming session" took place. It was here that Alfaro and those who remained outside the Vizconde
house learned of what happened. The first to be killed was Carmela’s mother, then Jennifer, and
finally, Carmella. Ventura blamed Webb, telling him, "Bakit naman pati yung bata?" Webb replied
that the girl woke up and on seeing him molesting Carmela, she jumped on him, bit his shoulders,
and pulled his hair. Webb got mad, grabbed the girl, pushed her to the wall, and repeatedly stabbed
her. Lejano excused himself at this point to use the telephone in the house. Meanwhile, Webb
called up someone on his cellular phone.

Alfaro was the first to pass through the pedestrian gate that had been left open. Webb, Lejano, and
Ventura followed her. On entering the garage, Ventura using a chair mounted the hood of the
Vizcondes’ Nissan Sentra and loosened the electric bulb over it ("para daw walang ilaw"). The small
group went through the open iron grill gate and passed the dirty kitchen. Carmela opened the
aluminum screen door of the kitchen for them. She and Webb looked each other in the eyes for a
moment and, together, headed for the dining area.
At around 2:00 in the morning, accused Gerardo Biong arrived. Webb ordered him to go and clean
up the Vizconde house and said to him, "Pera lang ang katapat nyan." Biong answered, "Okay
lang." Webb spoke to his companions and told them, "We don’t know each other. We haven’t seen
each other…baka maulit yan." Alfaro and Estrada left and they drove to her father’s house. 12
1. The quality of the witness

As she lost sight of Carmela and Webb, Alfaro decided to go out. Lejano asked her where she was
Was Alfaro an ordinary subdivision girl who showed up at the NBI after four years, bothered by her
going and she replied that she was going out to smoke. As she eased her way out through the
conscience or egged on by relatives or friends to come forward and do what was right? No. She
kitchen door, she saw Ventura pulling out a kitchen drawer. Alfaro smoked a cigarette at the
was, at the time she revealed her story, working for the NBI as an "asset," a stool pigeon, one who
garden. After about twenty minutes, she was surprised to hear a woman’s voice ask, "Sino yan?"
earned her living by fraternizing with criminals so she could squeal on them to her NBI handlers.
Alfaro immediately walked out of the garden to her car. She found her other companions milling
She had to live a life of lies to get rewards that would pay for her subsistence and vices.
around it. Estrada who sat in the car asked her, "Okay ba?"

According to Atty. Artemio Sacaguing, former head of the NBI Anti-Kidnapping, Hijacking, and
After sitting in the car for about ten minutes, Alfaro returned to the Vizconde house, using the same
Armed Robbery Task Force (AKHAR) Section, Alfaro had been hanging around at the NBI since
route. The interior of the house was dark but some light filtered in from outside. In the kitchen,
November or December 1994 as an "asset." She supplied her handlers with information against
Alfaro saw Ventura searching a lady’s bag that lay on the dining table. When she asked him what
drug pushers and other criminal elements. Some of this information led to the capture of notorious
he was looking for, he said: "Ikaw na nga dito, maghanap ka ng susi." She asked him what key he
drug pushers like Christopher Cruz Santos and Orlando Bacquir. Alfaro’s tip led to the arrest of the
wanted and he replied: "Basta maghanap ka ng susi ng main door pati na rin ng susi ng kotse."
leader of the "Martilyo gang" that killed a police officer. Because of her talent, the task force gave
When she found a bunch of keys in the bag, she tried them on the main door but none fitted the
her "very special treatment" and she became its "darling," allowed the privilege of spending nights
lock. She also did not find the car key.
in one of the rooms at the NBI offices.

Unable to open the main door, Alfaro returned to the kitchen. While she was at a spot leading to the
When Alfaro seemed unproductive for sometime, however, they teased her about it and she was
dining area, she heard a static noise (like a television that remained on after the station had signed
piqued. One day, she unexpectedly told Sacaguing that she knew someone who had the real story
off). Out of curiosity, she approached the master’s bedroom from where the noise came, opened
behind the Vizconde massacre. Sacaguing showed interest. Alfaro promised to bring that someone
the door a little, and peeked inside. The unusual sound grew even louder. As she walked in, she
to the NBI to tell his story. When this did not happen and Sacaguing continued to press her, she
saw Webb on top of Carmela while she lay with her back on the floor. Two bloodied bodies lay on
told him that she might as well assume the role of her informant. Sacaguing testified thus:
the bed. Lejano was at the foot of the bed about to wear his jacket. Carmela was gagged, moaning,
and in tears while Webb raped her, his bare buttocks exposed.
ATTY. ONGKIKO:
Webb gave Alfaro a meaningful look and she immediately left the room. She met Ventura at the
dining area. He told her, "Prepare an escape. Aalis na tayo." Shocked with what she saw, Alfaro Q. Atty. Sacaguing, how did Jessica Alfaro become a witness in the Vizconde murder
rushed out of the house to the others who were either sitting in her car or milling on the sidewalk. case? Will you tell the Honorable Court?
She entered her car and turned on the engine but she did not know where to go. Webb, Lejano,
and Ventura came out of the house just then. Webb suddenly picked up a stone and threw it at the
xxxx
main door, breaking its glass frame.

A. She told me. Your Honor, that she knew somebody who related to her the
As the three men approached the pedestrian gate, Webb told Ventura that he forgot his jacket in
circumstances, I mean, the details of the massacre of the Vizconde family. That’s what
the house. But Ventura told him that they could not get in anymore as the iron grills had already
she told me, Your Honor.
Evidence Cases Page | 3
ATTY. ONGKIKO: Q. All right, and what was your reaction when Ms. Alfaro stated that "papapelan ko na
lang yan?"
Q. And what did you say?
WITNESS SACAGUING:
xxxx
A. I said, "hindi puwede yan, kasi hindi ka naman eye witness."
A. I was quite interested and I tried to persuade her to introduce to me that man and she
promised that in due time, she will bring to me the man, and together with her, we will try ATTY. ONGKIKO:
to convince him to act as a state witness and help us in the solution of the case.
Q. And what was the reply of Ms. Alfaro?
xxxx
WITNESS SACAGUING:
Q. Atty. Sacaguing, were you able to interview this alleged witness?
A. Hindi siya nakakibo, until she went away.
WITNESS SACAGUING:
(TSN, May 28, 1996, pp. 49-50, 58, 77-79)
A. No, sir.
Quite significantly, Alfaro never refuted Sacaguing’s above testimony.
ATTY. ONGKIKO:
2. The suspicious details
Q. Why not?
But was it possible for Alfaro to lie with such abundant details some of which even tallied with the
WITNESS SACAGUING: physical evidence at the scene of the crime? No doubt, yes.

A. Because Jessica Alfaro was never able to comply with her promise to bring the man to Firstly, the Vizconde massacre had been reported in the media with dizzying details. Everybody
me. She told me later that she could not and the man does not like to testify. was talking about what the police found at the crime scene and there were lots of speculations
about them.
ATTY. ONGKIKO:
Secondly, the police had arrested some "akyat-bahay" group in Parañaque and charged them with
the crime. The police prepared the confessions of the men they apprehended and filled these up
Q. All right, and what happened after that?
with details that the evidence of the crime scene provided. Alfaro’s NBI handlers who were doing
their own investigation knew of these details as well. Since Alfaro hanged out at the NBI offices and
WITNESS SACAGUING: practically lived there, it was not too difficult for her to hear of these evidentiary details and gain
access to the documents.
A. She told me, "easy lang kayo, Sir," if I may quote, "easy lang Sir, huwag kayong…"
Not surprisingly, the confessions of some members of the Barroso "akyat bahay" gang, condemned
by the Makati RTC as fabricated by the police to pin the crime on them, shows how crime
COURT: investigators could make a confession ring true by matching some of its details with the physical
evidence at the crime scene. Consider the following:
How was that?
a. The Barroso gang members said that they got into Carmela’s house by breaking the glass panel
WITNESS SACAGUING: of the front door using a stone wrapped in cloth to deaden the noise. Alfaro could not use this line
since the core of her story was that Webb was Carmela’s boyfriend. Webb had no reason to smash
her front door to get to see her.
A. "Easy lang, Sir. Sir, relax lang, Sir, papapelan ko, papapelan ko na lang ‘yan."

Consequently, to explain the smashed door, Alfaro had to settle for claiming that, on the way out of
xxxx the house, Webb picked up some stone and, out of the blue, hurled it at the glass-paneled front
door of the Vizconde residence. His action really made no sense. From Alfaro’s narration, Webb
ATTY. ONGKIKO: appeared rational in his decisions. It was past midnight, the house was dark, and they wanted to

Evidence Cases Page | 4

get away quickly to avoid detection. Hurling a stone at that glass door and causing a tremendous
noise was bizarre, like inviting the neighbors to come.
b. The crime scene showed that the house had been ransacked. The rejected confessions of the
Barroso "akyat-bahay" gang members said that they tried to rob the house. To explain this physical
evidence, Alfaro claimed that at one point Ventura was pulling a kitchen drawer, and at another
point, going through a handbag on the dining table. He said he was looking for the front-door key
and the car key.
Again, this portion of Alfaro’s story appears tortured to accommodate the physical evidence of the
ransacked house. She never mentioned Ventura having taken some valuables with him when they
left Carmela’s house. And why would Ventura rummage a bag on the table for the front-door key,
spilling the contents, when they had already gotten into the house. It is a story made to fit in with
the crime scene although robbery was supposedly not the reason Webb and his companions
entered that house.
c. It is the same thing with the garage light. The police investigators found that the bulb had been
loosened to turn off the light. The confessions of the Barroso gang claimed that one of them
climbed the parked car’s hood to reach up and darken that light. This made sense since they were
going to rob the place and they needed time to work in the dark trying to open the front door. Some
passersby might look in and see what they were doing.
Alfaro had to adjust her testimony to take into account that darkened garage light. So she claimed
that Ventura climbed the car’s hood, using a chair, to turn the light off. But, unlike the Barroso
"akyat-bahay" gang, Webb and his friends did not have anything to do in a darkened garage. They
supposedly knew in advance that Carmela left the doors to the kitchen open for them. It did not
make sense for Ventura to risk standing on the car’s hood and be seen in such an awkward
position instead of going straight into the house.
And, thirdly, Alfaro was the NBI’s star witness, their badge of excellent investigative
work.lavvphil After claiming that they had solved the crime of the decade, the NBI people had a
stake in making her sound credible and, obviously, they gave her all the preparations she needed
for the job of becoming a fairly good substitute witness. She was their "darling" of an asset. And this
is not pure speculation. As pointed out above, Sacaguing of the NBI, a lawyer and a ranking official,
confirmed this to be a cold fact. Why the trial court and the Court of Appeals failed to see this is
mystifying.
At any rate, did Alfaro at least have a fine memory for faces that had a strong effect on her, given
the circumstances? Not likely. She named Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez as one of the culprits in the
Vizconde killings. But when the NBI found a certain Michael Rodriguez, a drug dependent from the
Bicutan Rehabilitation Center, initially suspected to be Alfaro’s Miguel Rodriguez and showed him
to Alfaro at the NBI office, she ran berserk, slapping and kicking Michael, exclaiming: "How can I
forget your face. We just saw each other in a disco one month ago and you told me then that you
will kill me." As it turned out, he was not Miguel Rodriguez, the accused in this case. 13
Two possibilities exist: Michael was really the one Alfaro wanted to implicate to settle some score
with him but it was too late to change the name she already gave or she had myopic vision, tagging
the wrong people for what they did not do.
3. The quality of the testimony
Evidence Cases
There is another thing about a lying witness: her story lacks sense or suffers from inherent
inconsistencies. An understanding of the nature of things and the common behavior of people will
help expose a lie. And it has an abundant presence in this case.
One. In her desire to implicate Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, and Filart, who were
supposed to be Webb’s co-principals in the crime, Alfaro made it a point to testify that Webb
proposed twice to his friends the gang-rape of Carmela who had hurt him. And twice, they
(including, if one believes Alfaro, her own boyfriend Estrada) agreed in a chorus to his proposal. But
when they got to Carmela’s house, only Webb, Lejano, Ventura, and Alfaro entered the house.
Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, and Rodriguez supposedly stayed around Alfaro’s car, which was
parked on the street between Carmela’s house and the next. Some of these men sat on top of the
car’s lid while others milled on the sidewalk, visible under the street light to anyone who cared to
watch them, particularly to the people who were having a drinking party in a nearby house.
Obviously, the behavior of Webb’s companions out on the street did not figure in a planned gang-
rape of Carmela.
Two. Ventura, Alfaro’s dope supplier, introduced her for the first time in her life to Webb and his
friends in a parking lot by a mall. So why would she agree to act as Webb’s messenger, using her
gas, to bring his message to Carmela at her home. More inexplicably, what motivated Alfaro to stick
it out the whole night with Webb and his friends?
They were practically strangers to her and her boyfriend Estrada. When it came to a point that
Webb decided with his friends to gang-rape Carmela, clearly, there was nothing in it for Alfaro. Yet,
she stuck it out with them, as a police asset would, hanging in there until she had a crime to report,
only she was not yet an "asset" then. If, on the other hand, Alfaro had been too soaked in drugs to
think clearly and just followed along where the group took her, how could she remember so much
details that only a drug-free mind can?
Three. When Alfaro went to see Carmela at her house for the second time, Carmella told her that
she still had to go out and that Webb and his friends should come back around midnight. Alfaro
returned to her car and waited for Carmela to drive out in her own car. And she trailed her up to
Aguirre Avenue where she supposedly dropped off a man whom she thought was Carmela’s
boyfriend. Alfaro’s trailing Carmela to spy on her unfaithfulness to Webb did not make sense since
she was on limited errand. But, as a critical witness, Alfaro had to provide a reason for Webb to
freak out and decide to come with his friends and harm Carmela.
Four. According to Alfaro, when they returned to Carmela’s house the third time around midnight,
she led Webb, Lejano, and Ventura through the pedestrian gate that Carmela had left open. Now,
this is weird. Webb was the gang leader who decided what they were going to do. He decided and
his friends agreed with him to go to Carmela’s house and gang-rape her. Why would Alfaro, a
woman, a stranger to Webb before that night, and obviously with no role to play in the gang-rape of
Carmela, lead him and the others into her house? It made no sense. It would only make sense if
Alfaro wanted to feign being a witness to something she did not see.
Five. Alfaro went out of the house to smoke at the garden. After about twenty minutes, a woman
exclaimed, "Sino yan?" On hearing this, Alfaro immediately walked out of the garden and went to
her car. Apparently, she did this because she knew they came on a sly. Someone other than
Carmela became conscious of the presence of Webb and others in the house. Alfaro walked away
because, obviously, she did not want to get involved in a potential confrontation. This was
supposedly her frame of mind: fear of getting involved in what was not her business.
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But if that were the case, how could she testify based on personal knowledge of what went on in
the house? Alfaro had to change that frame of mind to one of boldness and reckless curiosity. So
that is what she next claimed. She went back into the house to watch as Webb raped Carmela on
the floor of the master’s bedroom. He had apparently stabbed to death Carmela’s mom and her
young sister whose bloodied bodies were sprawled on the bed. Now, Alfaro testified that she got
scared (another shift to fear) for she hurriedly got out of the house after Webb supposedly gave her
a meaningful look.
Alfaro quickly went to her car, not minding Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, and Filart
who sat on the car or milled on the sidewalk. She did not speak to them, even to Estrada, her
boyfriend. She entered her car and turned on the engine but she testified that she did not know
where to go. This woman who a few minutes back led Webb, Lejano, and Ventura into the house,
knowing that they were decided to rape and harm Carmela, was suddenly too shocked to know
where to go! This emotional pendulum swing indicates a witness who was confused with her own
lies.
4. The supposed corroborations
Intending to provide corroboration to Alfaro’s testimony, the prosecution presented six additional
witnesses:
Dr. Prospero A. Cabanayan, the NBI Medico-Legal Officer who autopsied the bodies of the
victims, testified on the stab wounds they sustained14 and the presence of semen in Carmela’s
genitalia,15 indicating that she had been raped.
Normal E. White, Jr., was the security guard on duty at Pitong Daan Subdivision from 7 p.m. of
June 29 to 7 a.m. of June 30, 1991. He got a report on the morning of June 30 that something
untoward happened at the Vizconde residence. He went there and saw the dead bodies in the
master’s bedroom, the bag on the dining table, as well as the loud noise emanating from a
television set.16
White claimed that he noticed Gatchalian and his companions, none of whom he could identify, go
in and out of Pitong Daan Subdivision. He also saw them along Vinzons Street. Later, they entered
Pitong Daan Subdivision in a three-car convoy. White could not, however, describe the kind of
vehicles they used or recall the time when he saw the group in those two instances. And he did not
notice anything suspicious about their coming and going.
But White’s testimony cannot be relied on. His initial claim turned out to be inaccurate. He actually
saw Gatchalian and his group enter the Pitong Daan Subdivision only once. They were not going in
and out. Furthermore, Alfaro testified that when the convoy of cars went back the second time in
the direction of Carmela’s house, she alone entered the subdivision and passed the guardhouse
without stopping. Yet, White who supposedly manned that guardhouse did not notice her.
Surprisingly, White failed to note Biong, a police officer, entering or exiting the subdivision on the
early morning of June 30 when he supposedly "cleaned up" Vizconde residence on Webb’s orders.
What is more, White did not notice Carmela arrive with her mom before Alfaro’s first visit that night.
Carmela supposedly left with a male companion in her car at around 10:30 p.m. but White did not
notice it. He also did not notice Carmela reenter the subdivision. White actually discredited Alfaro’s
testimony about the movements of the persons involved.
Further, while Alfaro testified that it was the Mazda pick-up driven by Filart that led the three-vehicle
convoy,17 White claimed it was the Nissan Patrol with Gatchalian on it that led the convoy since he
Evidence Cases
would not have let the convoy in without ascertaining that Gatchalian, a resident, was in it. Security
guard White did not, therefore, provide corroboration to Alfaro’s testimony.1avvphi1
Justo Cabanacan, the security supervisor at Pitong Daan Subdivision testified that he saw Webb
around the last week of May or the first week of June 1991 to prove his presence in the Philippines
when he claimed to be in the United States. He was manning the guard house at the entrance of
the subdivision of Pitong Daan when he flagged down a car driven by Webb. Webb said that he
would see Lilet Sy. Cabanacan asked him for an ID but he pointed to his United BF Homes sticker
and said that he resided there. Cabanacan replied, however, that Pitong Daan had a local sticker.
Cabanacan testified that, at this point, Webb introduced himself as the son of Congressman Webb.
Still, the supervisor insisted on seeing his ID. Webb grudgingly gave it and after seeing the picture
and the name on it, Cabanacan returned the same and allowed Webb to pass without being logged
in as their Standard Operating Procedure required.18
But Cabanacan's testimony could not be relied on. Although it was not common for a security guard
to challenge a Congressman’s son with such vehemence, Cabanacan did not log the incident on
the guardhouse book. Nor did he, contrary to prescribed procedure, record the visitor’s entry into
the subdivision. It did not make sense that Cabanacan was strict in the matter of seeing Webb’s ID
but not in recording the visit.
Mila Gaviola used to work as laundry woman for the Webbs at their house at BF Homes Executive
Village. She testified that she saw Webb at his parents’ house on the morning of June 30, 1991
when she got the dirty clothes from the room that he and two brothers occupied at about 4.a.m. She
saw him again pacing the floor at 9 a.m. At about 1 p.m., Webb left the house in t-shirt and shorts,
passing through a secret door near the maid’s quarters on the way out. Finally, she saw Webb at 4
p.m. of the same day.19
On cross-examination, however, Gaviola could not say what distinguished June 30, 1991 from the
other days she was on service at the Webb household as to enable her to distinctly remember, four
years later, what one of the Webb boys did and at what time. She could not remember any of the
details that happened in the household on the other days. She proved to have a selective
photographic memory and this only damaged her testimony.
Gaviola tried to corroborate Alfaro’'s testimony by claiming that on June 30, 1991 she noticed
bloodstains on Webb's t-shirt.20 She did not call the attention of anybody in the household about it
when it would have been a point of concern that Webb may have been hurt, hence the blood.
Besides, Victoria Ventoso, the Webbs' housemaid from March 1989 to May 1992, and Sgt. Miguel
Muñoz, the Webbs' security aide in 1991, testified that Gaviola worked for the Webbs only from
January 1991 to April 1991. Ventoso further testified that it was not Gaviola's duty to collect the
clothes from the 2nd floor bedrooms, this being the work of the housemaid charged with cleaning
the rooms.
What is more, it was most unlikely for a laundrywoman who had been there for only four months to
collect, as she claimed, the laundry from the rooms of her employers and their grown up children at
four in the morning while they were asleep.
And it did not make sense, if Alfaro’s testimony were to be believed that Webb, who was so careful
and clever that he called Biong to go to the Vizconde residence at 2 a.m. to clean up the evidence
against him and his group, would bring his bloodied shirt home and put it in the hamper for
laundrywoman Gaviola to collect and wash at 4 a.m. as was her supposed habit.
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Lolita De Birrer was accused Biong’s girlfriend around the time the Vizconde massacre took place.
Birrer testified that she was with Biong playing mahjong from the evening of June 29, 1991 to the
early morning of June 30, when Biong got a call at around 2 a.m. This prompted him, according to
De Birrer, to leave and go to BF. Someone sitting at the backseat of a taxi picked him up. When
Biong returned at 7 a.m. he washed off what looked like dried blood from his fingernails. And he
threw away a foul-smelling handkerchief. She also saw Biong take out a knife with aluminum cover
from his drawer and hid it in his steel cabinet.21
The security guard at Pitong Daan did not notice any police investigator flashing a badge to get into
the village although Biong supposedly came in at the unholy hour of two in the morning. His
departure before 7 a.m. also remained unnoticed by the subdivision guards. Besides, if he had
cleaned up the crime scene shortly after midnight, what was the point of his returning there on the
following morning to dispose of some of the evidence in the presence of other police investigators
and on-lookers? In fact, why would he steal valuable items from the Vizconde residence on his
return there hours later if he had the opportunity to do it earlier?
At most, Birrer’s testimony only established Biong’s theft of certain items from the Vizconde
residence and gross neglect for failing to maintain the sanctity of the crime scene by moving around
and altering the effects of the crime. Birrer’s testimony failed to connect Biong's acts to Webb and
the other accused.
Lauro Vizconde testified about how deeply he was affected by the loss of her wife and two
daughters. Carmella spoke to him of a rejected suitor she called "Bagyo," because he was a
Parañaque politician’s son. Unfortunately, Lauro did not appear curious enough to insist on finding
out who the rejected fellow was. Besides, his testimony contradicts that of Alfaro who testified that
Carmela and Webb had an on-going relation. Indeed, if Alfaro were to be believed, Carmela wanted
Webb to come to her house around midnight. She even left the kitchen door open so he could enter
the house.
5. The missing corroboration
There is something truly remarkable about this case: the prosecution’s core theory that Carmela
and Webb had been sweethearts, that she had been unfaithful to him, and that it was for this
reason that Webb brought his friends to her house to gang-rape her is totally uncorroborated!
For instance, normally, if Webb, a Congressman’s son, courted the young Carmela, that would be
news among her circle of friends if not around town. But, here, none of her friends or even those
who knew either of them came forward to affirm this. And if Webb hanged around with her, trying to
win her favors, he would surely be seen with her. And this would all the more be so if they had
become sweethearts, a relation that Alfaro tried to project with her testimony.
But, except for Alfaro, the NBI asset, no one among Carmela’s friends or her friends’ friends would
testify ever hearing of such relationship or ever seeing them together in some popular hangouts in
Parañaque or Makati. Alfaro’s claim of a five-hour drama is like an alien page, rudely and
unconnectedly inserted into Webb and Carmela’s life stories or like a piece of jigsaw puzzle
trimmed to fit into the shape on the board but does not belong because it clashes with the
surrounding pieces. It has neither antecedent nor concomitant support in the verifiable facts of their
personal histories. It is quite unreal.
What is more, Alfaro testified that she saw Carmela drive out of her house with a male passenger,
Mr. X, whom Alfaro thought the way it looked was also Carmela’s lover. This was the all-important
reason Webb supposedly had for wanting to harm her. Again, none of Carmela’s relatives, friends,
or people who knew her ever testified about the existence of Mr.X in her life. Nobody has come
Evidence Cases
forward to testify having ever seen him with Carmela. And despite the gruesome news about her
death and how Mr. X had played a role in it, he never presented himself like anyone who had lost a
special friend normally would. Obviously, Mr. X did not exist, a mere ghost of the imagination of
Alfaro, the woman who made a living informing on criminals.
Webb’s U.S. Alibi
Among the accused, Webb presented the strongest alibi.
a. The travel preparations
Webb claims that in 1991 his parents, Senator Freddie Webb and his wife, Elizabeth, sent their son
to the United States (U.S.) to learn the value of independence, hard work, and money. 22 Gloria
Webb, his aunt, accompanied him. Rajah Tours booked their flight to San Francisco via United
Airlines. Josefina Nolasco of Rajah Tours confirmed that Webb and his aunt used their plane
tickets.
Webb told his friends, including his neighbor, Jennifer Claire Cabrera, and his basketball buddy,
Joselito Orendain Escobar, of his travel plans. He even invited them to his despedida party on
March 8, 1991 at Faces Disco along Makati Ave.23 On March 8,1991, the eve of his departure, he
took girlfriend Milagros Castillo to a dinner at Bunchums at the Makati Cinema Square. His
basketball buddy Rafael Jose with Tina Calma, a blind date arranged by Webb, joined them. They
afterwards went to Faces Disco for Webb's despedida party. Among those present were his friends
Paulo Santos and Jay Ortega.24
b. The two immigration checks
The following day, March 9, 1991, Webb left for San Francisco, California, with his Aunt Gloria on
board United Airlines Flight 808.25 Before boarding his plane, Webb passed through the Philippine
Immigration booth at the airport to have his passport cleared and stamped. Immigration Officer,
Ferdinand Sampol checked Webb’s visa, stamped, and initialed his passport, and let him pass
through.26 He was listed on the United Airlines Flight’s Passenger Manifest.27
On arrival at San Francisco, Webb went through the U.S. Immigration where his entry into that
country was recorded. Thus, the U.S. Immigration Naturalization Service, checking with its Non-
immigrant Information System, confirmed Webb's entry into the U.S. on March 9, 1991. Webb
presented at the trial the INS Certification issued by the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization
Service,28 the computer-generated print-out of the US-INS indicating Webb's entry on March 9,
1991,29 and the US-INS Certification dated August 31, 1995, authenticated by the Philippine
Department of Foreign Affairs, correcting an earlier August 10, 1995 Certification.30
c. Details of U.S. sojourn
In San Francisco, Webb and his aunt Gloria were met by the latter’s daughter, Maria Teresa
Keame, who brought them to Gloria’s house in Daly City, California. During his stay with his aunt,
Webb met Christopher Paul Legaspi Esguerra, Gloria’s grandson. In April 1991, Webb,
Christopher, and a certain Daphne Domingo watched the concert of Deelite Band in San
Francisco.31 In the same month, Dorothy Wheelock and her family invited Webb to Lake Tahoe to
return the Webbs’ hospitality when she was in the Philippines.32
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In May 1991, on invitation of another aunt, Susan Brottman, Webb moved to Anaheim Hills,
California.33 During his stay there, he occupied himself with playing basketball once or twice a week
with Steven Keeler34 and working at his cousin-in-law’s pest control company.35 Webb presented
the company’s logbook showing the tasks he performed,36 his paycheck,37 his ID, and other
employment papers. On June 14, 1991 he applied for a driver's license38 and wrote three letters to
his friend Jennifer Cabrera.39
On June 28, 1991, Webb’s parents visited him at Anaheim and stayed with the Brottmans. On the
same day, his father introduced Honesto Aragon to his son when he came to visit.40 On the
following day, June 29, Webb, in the company of his father and Aragon went to Riverside,
California, to look for a car. They bought an MR2 Toyota car.41 Later that day, a visitor at the
Brottman’s, Louis Whittacker, saw Webb looking at the plates of his new car. 42 To prove the
purchase, Webb presented the Public Records of California Department of Motor Vehicle43 and a
car plate "LEW WEBB."44 In using the car in the U.S., Webb even received traffic citations.45
46
On June 30, 1991 Webb, again accompanied by his father and Aragon, bought a bicycle at
Orange Cycle Center.47 The Center issued Webb a receipt dated June 30, 1991.48 On July 4, 1991,
Independence Day, the Webbs, the Brottmans, and the Vaca family had a lakeside picnic.49
Webb stayed with the Brottmans until mid July and rented a place for less than a month. On August
4, 1991 he left for Longwood, Florida, to stay with the spouses Jack and Sonja Rodriguez.50 There,
he met Armando Rodriguez with whom he spent time, playing basketball on weekends, watching
movies, and playing billiards.51 In November 1991, Webb met performing artist Gary Valenciano, a
friend of Jack Rodriguez, who was invited for a dinner at the Rodriguez’s house.52 He left the
Rodriguez’s home in August 1992, returned to Anaheim and stayed with his aunt Imelda Pagaspas.
He stayed there until he left for the Philippines on October 26, 1992.
d. The second immigration checks
As with his trip going to the U.S., Webb also went through both the U.S. and Philippine
immigrations on his return trip. Thus, his departure from the U.S. was confirmed by the same
certifications that confirmed his entry.53 Furthermore, a Diplomatic Note of the U.S. Department of
State with enclosed letter from Acting Director Debora A. Farmer of the Records Operations, Office
of Records of the US-INS stated that the Certification dated August 31, 1995 is a true and accurate
statement. And when he boarded his plane, the Passenger Manifest of Philippine Airlines Flight No.
103,54 certified by Agnes Tabuena55 confirmed his return trip.
When he arrived in Manila, Webb again went through the Philippine Immigration. In fact, the arrival
stamp and initial on his passport indicated his return to Manila on October 27, 1992. This was
authenticated by Carmelita Alipio, the immigration officer who processed Webb’s reentry.56 Upon
his return, in October 1992, Paolo Santos, Joselito Erondain Escobar, and Rafael Jose once again
saw Webb playing basketball at the BF's Phase III basketball court.
e. Alibi versus positive identification
The trial court and the Court of Appeals are one in rejecting as weak Webb’s alibi. Their reason is
uniform: Webb’s alibi cannot stand against Alfaro’s positive identification of him as the rapist and
killer of Carmela and, apparently, the killer as well of her mother and younger sister. Because of
this, to the lower courts, Webb’s denial and alibi were fabricated.
But not all denials and alibis should be regarded as fabricated. Indeed, if the accused is truly
innocent, he can have no other defense but denial and alibi. So how can such accused penetrate a
Evidence Cases
mind that has been made cynical by the rule drilled into his head that a defense of alibi is a
hangman’s noose in the face of a witness positively swearing, "I saw him do it."? Most judges
believe that such assertion automatically dooms an alibi which is so easy to fabricate. This quick
stereotype thinking, however, is distressing. For how else can the truth that the accused is really
innocent have any chance of prevailing over such a stone-cast tenet?
There is only one way. A judge must keep an open mind. He must guard against slipping into hasty
conclusion, often arising from a desire to quickly finish the job of deciding a case. A positive
declaration from a witness that he saw the accused commit the crime should not automatically
cancel out the accused’s claim that he did not do it. A lying witness can make as positive an
identification as a truthful witness can. The lying witness can also say as forthrightly and
unequivocally, "He did it!" without blinking an eye.
Rather, to be acceptable, the positive identification must meet at least two criteria:
First, the positive identification of the offender must come from a credible witness. She is credible
who can be trusted to tell the truth, usually based on past experiences with her. Her word has, to
one who knows her, its weight in gold.
And second, the witness’ story of what she personally saw must be believable, not inherently
contrived. A witness who testifies about something she never saw runs into inconsistencies and
makes bewildering claims.
Here, as already fully discussed above, Alfaro and her testimony fail to meet the above criteria.
She did not show up at the NBI as a spontaneous witness bothered by her conscience. She had
been hanging around that agency for sometime as a stool pigeon, one paid for mixing up with
criminals and squealing on them. Police assets are often criminals themselves. She was the
prosecution’s worst possible choice for a witness. Indeed, her superior testified that she
volunteered to play the role of a witness in the Vizconde killings when she could not produce a man
she promised to the NBI.
And, although her testimony included details, Alfaro had prior access to the details that the
investigators knew of the case. She took advantage of her familiarity with these details to include in
her testimony the clearly incompatible act of Webb hurling a stone at the front door glass frames
even when they were trying to slip away quietly—just so she can accommodate this crime scene
feature. She also had Ventura rummaging a bag on the dining table for a front door key that nobody
needed just to explain the physical evidence of that bag and its scattered contents. And she had
Ventura climbing the car’s hood, risking being seen in such an awkward position, when they did not
need to darken the garage to force open the front door—just so to explain the darkened light and
foot prints on the car hood.
Further, her testimony was inherently incredible. Her story that Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada,
Rodriguez, and Filart agreed to take their turns raping Carmela is incongruent with their
indifference, exemplified by remaining outside the house, milling under a street light, visible to
neighbors and passersby, and showing no interest in the developments inside the house, like if it
was their turn to rape Carmela. Alfaro’s story that she agreed to serve as Webb’s messenger to
Carmela, using up her gas, and staying with him till the bizarre end when they were practically
strangers, also taxes incredulity.
To provide basis for Webb’s outrage, Alfaro said that she followed Carmela to the main road to
watch her let off a lover on Aguirre Avenue. And, inexplicably, although Alfaro had only played the
Page | 8
role of messenger, she claimed leading Webb, Lejano, and Ventura into the house to gang-rape
Carmella, as if Alfaro was establishing a reason for later on testifying on personal knowledge. Her
swing from an emotion of fear when a woman woke up to their presence in the house and of
absolute courage when she nonetheless returned to become the lone witness to a grim scene is
also quite inexplicable.
Ultimately, Alfaro’s quality as a witness and her inconsistent, if not inherently unbelievable,
testimony cannot be the positive identification that jurisprudence acknowledges as sufficient to
jettison a denial and an alibi.
f. A documented alibi
57
To establish alibi, the accused must prove by positive, clear, and satisfactory evidence that (a) he
was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was
physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.58
The courts below held that, despite his evidence, Webb was actually in Parañaque when the
Vizconde killings took place; he was not in the U.S. from March 9, 1991 to October 27, 1992; and if
he did leave on March 9, 1991, he actually returned before June 29, 1991, committed the crime,
erased the fact of his return to the Philippines from the records of the U.S. and Philippine
Immigrations, smuggled himself out of the Philippines and into the U.S., and returned the normal
way on October 27, 1992. But this ruling practically makes the death of Webb and his passage into
the next life the only acceptable alibi in the Philippines. Courts must abandon this unjust and
inhuman paradigm.
If one is cynical about the Philippine system, he could probably claim that Webb, with his father’s
connections, can arrange for the local immigration to put a March 9, 1991 departure stamp on his
passport and an October 27, 1992 arrival stamp on the same. But this is pure speculation since
there had been no indication that such arrangement was made. Besides, how could Webb fix a
foreign airlines’ passenger manifest, officially filed in the Philippines and at the airport in the U.S.
that had his name on them? How could Webb fix with the U.S. Immigration’s record system those
two dates in its record of his travels as well as the dates when he supposedly departed in secret
from the U.S. to commit the crime in the Philippines and then return there? No one has come up
with a logical and plausible answer to these questions.
The Court of Appeals rejected the evidence of Webb’s passport since he did not leave the original
to be attached to the record. But, while the best evidence of a document is the original, this means
that the same is exhibited in court for the adverse party to examine and for the judge to see. As
Court of Appeals Justice Tagle said in his dissent,59the practice when a party does not want to
leave an important document with the trial court is to have a photocopy of it marked as exhibit and
stipulated among the parties as a faithful reproduction of the original. Stipulations in the course of
trial are binding on the parties and on the court.
The U.S. Immigration certification and the computer print-out of Webb’s arrival in and departure
from that country were authenticated by no less than the Office of the U.S. Attorney General and
the State Department. Still the Court of Appeals refused to accept these documents for the reason
that Webb failed to present in court the immigration official who prepared the same. But this was
unnecessary. Webb’s passport is a document issued by the Philippine government, which under
international practice, is the official record of travels of the citizen to whom it is issued. The entries
in that passport are presumed true.60
The U.S. Immigration certification and computer print-out, the official certifications of which have
been authenticated by the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs, merely validated the arrival and
Evidence Cases
departure stamps of the U.S. Immigration office on Webb’s passport. They have the same
evidentiary value. The officers who issued these certifications need not be presented in court to
testify on them. Their trustworthiness arises from the sense of official duty and the penalty attached
to a breached duty, in the routine and disinterested origin of such statement and in the publicity of
the record.61
The Court of Appeals of course makes capital of the fact that an earlier certification from the U.S.
Immigration office said that it had no record of Webb entering the U.S. But that erroneous first
certification was amply explained by the U.S. Government and Court of Appeals Justice Tagle
stated it in his dissenting opinion, thus:
While it is true that an earlier Certification was issued by the U.S. INS on August 16, 1995 finding
"no evidence of lawful admission of Webb," this was already clarified and deemed erroneous by no
less than the US INS Officials. As explained by witness Leo Herrera-Lim, Consul and Second
Secretary of the Philippine Embassy in Washington D.C., said Certification did not pass through
proper diplomatic channels and was obtained in violation of the rules on protocol and standard
procedure governing such request.
The initial request was merely initiated by BID Commissioner Verceles who directly communicated
with the Philippine Consulate in San Francisco, USA, bypassing the Secretary of Foreign Affairs
which is the proper protocol procedure. Mr. Steven Bucher, the acting Chief of the Records
Services Board of US-INS Washington D.C. in his letter addressed to Philip Antweiler, Philippine
Desk Officer, State Department, declared the earlier Certification as incorrect and erroneous as it
was "not exhaustive and did not reflect all available information." Also, Richard L. Huff, Co-Director
of the Office of Information and privacy, US Department of Justice, in response to the appeal raised
by Consul General Teresita V. Marzan, explained that "the INS normally does not maintain records
on individuals who are entering the country as visitors rather than as immigrants: and that a
notation concerning the entry of a visitor may be made at the Nonimmigrant Information system.
Since appellant Webb entered the U.S. on a mere tourist visa, obviously, the initial search could not
have produced the desired result inasmuch as the data base that was looked into contained entries
of the names of IMMIGRANTS and not that of NON-IMMIGRANT visitors of the U.S..62
The trial court and the Court of Appeals expressed marked cynicism over the accuracy of travel
documents like the passport as well as the domestic and foreign records of departures and arrivals
from airports. They claim that it would not have been impossible for Webb to secretly return to the
Philippines after he supposedly left it on March 9, 1991, commit the crime, go back to the U.S., and
openly return to the Philippines again on October 26, 1992. Travel between the U.S. and the
Philippines, said the lower courts took only about twelve to fourteen hours.
If the Court were to subscribe to this extremely skeptical view, it might as well tear the rules of
evidence out of the law books and regard suspicions, surmises, or speculations as reasons for
impeaching evidence. It is not that official records, which carry the presumption of truth of what they
state, are immune to attack. They are not. That presumption can be overcome by evidence. Here,
however, the prosecution did not bother to present evidence to impeach the entries in Webb’s
passport and the certifications of the Philippine and U.S.’ immigration services regarding his travel
to the U.S. and back. The prosecution’s rebuttal evidence is the fear of the unknown that it planted
in the lower court’s minds.
7. Effect of Webb’s alibi to others
Webb’s documented alibi altogether impeaches Alfaro's testimony, not only with respect to him, but
also with respect to Lejano, Estrada, Fernandez, Gatchalian, Rodriguez, and Biong. For, if the
Court accepts the proposition that Webb was in the U.S. when the crime took place, Alfaro’s
Page | 9
testimony will not hold together. Webb’s participation is the anchor of Alfaro’s story. Without it, the
evidence against the others must necessarily fall.
CONCLUSION
In our criminal justice system, what is important is, not whether the court entertains doubts about
the innocence of the accused since an open mind is willing to explore all possibilities, but whether it
entertains a reasonable, lingering doubt as to his guilt. For, it would be a serious mistake to send an
innocent man to jail where such kind of doubt hangs on to one’s inner being, like a piece of meat
lodged immovable between teeth.
Will the Court send the accused to spend the rest of their lives in prison on the testimony of an NBI
asset who proposed to her handlers that she take the role of the witness to the Vizconde massacre
that she could not produce?
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Decision dated December 15, 2005
and Resolution dated January 26, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. 00336 and
ACQUITS accused-appellants Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio Lejano, Michael A. Gatchalian,
Hospicio Fernandez, Miguel Rodriguez, Peter Estrada and Gerardo Biong of the crimes of which
they were charged for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. They
are ordered immediately RELEASED from detention unless they are confined for another lawful
cause.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director, Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City for
immediate implementation. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED to report the
action he has taken to this Court within five days from receipt of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
DISSENTING OPINION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
With all due respect to my colleagues, I dissent from the majority decision acquitting all the
accused-appellants.
In the middle part of 1991, the gruesome deaths of 19-year old Carmela Vizconde, her mother
Estrellita and 7-year old sister Jennifer in the hands of unknown assailants inside their home in a
private subdivision shocked our countrymen and alarmed the authorities of the rise in heinous
crimes, particularly those committed by individuals under the influence of drugs. Investigations
conducted by the police and other bodies including the Senate, and even the arrest of two (2) sets
of suspects ("akyat-bahay" gang and former contractor/workers of the Vizcondes), failed to unravel
the truth behind the brutal killings – until an alleged eyewitness surfaced four (4) years later. The
ensuing courtroom saga involving sons of prominent families had become one (1) of the most
controversial cases in recent history as the entire nation awaited its long-delayed closure.
The Case
Evidence Cases
Subject of review is the Decision1 dated December 15, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR H.C. No. 00336 affirming with modifications the Decision dated January 4, 2000 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque City, Branch 274 finding the accused-appellants Hubert
Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio "Tony Boy" Lejano, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio "Pyke" Fernandez,
Peter Estrada and Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals, and
accused-appellant Gerardo Biong as accessory, of the crime of Rape with Homicide.
The petition for review on certiorari filed earlier by accused Lejano (G.R. No. 176389) is hereby
treated as an appeal, considering that said accused had in fact filed a notice of appeal with the
CA.2 In view of the judgment of the CA imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua, such appeal by
notice of appeal is in accord with A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC (Amendments to the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure to Govern Death Penalty Cases)3 which provides under Rule 124 (c):
(c) In cases where the Court of Appeals imposes reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or a lesser
penalty, it shall render and enter judgment imposing such penalty. The judgment may be appealed
to the Supreme Court by notice of appeal filed with the Court of Appeals.
Accordingly, G.R. No. 176389 was consolidated with the present appeal by all accused (G.R. No.
176864) except Artemio Ventura and Joey Filart who are still at large.4 Only Webb and Gatchalian
filed their respective supplemental briefs in compliance with our April 10, 2007 Resolution. 5
The Facts
The Information filed on August 10, 1995 reads:
That on or about the evening of June 29 up to the early morning of June 30, 1991, in the
municipality of Parañaque, province of Rizal, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb conspiring and confederating with accused
Antonio "Tony Boy" Lejano, Artemio "Dong" Ventura, Michael Gatchalian y Adviento, Hospicio
"Pyke" Fernandez, Peter Estrada, Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez and Joey Filart, mutually helping one
another, while armed with bladed instruments, with the use of force and intimidation, with lewd
design, with abuse of superior strength, nighttime and with the use of motor vehicle, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the person of Carmela Vizconde against her
will and consent.
That by reason or on the occasion of the aforesaid rape or immediately thereafter, the above-
named accused with intent to kill, conspiring and confederating together, mutually helping one
another, did then and there, and with evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength, nighttime,
with the use of motor vehicle, assault and stab with bladed instruments Carmela Vizconde,
Estrellita Vizconde and Jennifer Vizconde, thereby inflicting upon them numerous stab wounds in
different parts of their bodies which caused their instantaneous death.
That accused GERARDO BIONG and JOHN DOES having knowledge after the commission of the
above-mentioned crime, and without having participated therein as principals or accomplices, took
part subsequent to its commission by assisting, with abuse of authority as a police officer, the
above-named principal accused, to conceal or destroy the effects or instruments thereof by failing
to preserve the physical evidence and allowing their destruction in order to prevent the discovery of
the crime.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
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The RTC and CA concurred in their factual findings based mainly on the testimony of the
prosecution’s principal witness, Jessica M. Alfaro who is a confessed former drug user, the
declarations of four (4) other witnesses and documentary exhibits.
Alfaro testified that on June 29, 1991 at around 8:30 in the evening, she drove her Mitsubishi
Lancer and, with her then boyfriend Peter Estrada, went to the Ayala Alabang Commercial Center
parking lot to get her order of one (1) gram of shabu from Artemio "Dong" Ventura. There she met
and was introduced to Ventura’s friends: Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio "Tony Boy" Lejano,
Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez, Hospicio "Pyke" Fernandez, Michael Gatchalian and Joey Filart (she had
previously seen them in a shabu house located in Parañaque which they frequented as early as
January 1991,7 while she had known Ventura since December 19908). After paying for
her shabu and while she was smoking it, Webb approached her and requested a favor for her to
relay a message to a certain girl who happened to be Carmela, to which she agreed. After the
group finished their shabu session, they proceeded to Carmela’s place at No. 80 Vinzons Street,
Pitong Daan Subdivision, BF Homes, Parañaque City. She and Estrada in her car followed the two
(2) vehicles: Webb, Lejano, Ventura, Fernandez and Gatchalian on board a Nissan Patrol car; while
Filart and Rodriguez rode a Mazda pick-up.9
Upon reaching the area, Alfaro parked her car along Vinzons St. and approached the gate of the
house pointed to by Webb. She pressed the buzzer and when a woman came out, she asked for
Carmela. When she was able to talk to Carmela (an acquaintance she had met only twice in
January 199110), Alfaro relayed Webb’s message that he was around. However, Carmela said she
cannot make it as she had just arrived home and told Alfaro to come back after twenty (20)
minutes. She relayed the answer of Carmela to Webb who then instructed the group to return to
Ayala Alabang Commercial Center.11
At the same parking lot, the group had another shabu session before proceeding again to
Carmela’s residence in a convoy. Alfaro went to Vinzons St. alone while the Nissan Patrol and
Mazda parked somewhere along Aguirre Avenue. Upon seeing Carmela who was at their garden,
Alfaro was approached by Carmela saying she was going out for a while. Carmela told Alfaro that
they come back before 12:00 midnight and she would just leave the pedestrian gate, as well as the
iron grill gate leading to the kitchen door, open and unlocked.12 Carmela further instructed Alfaro to
blink her car’s headlights twice before reaching the pedestrian gate to signal her arrival. Alfaro
returned to her car but waited for Carmela’s car to get out of the gate. Carmela drove ahead and
Alfaro likewise left Vinzons St. Upon reaching the main road, Aguirre Avenue, she saw Carmela
drop off the man who was with her in the car (whom she thought to be her boyfriend13). Alfaro
looked for the group and relayed Carmela’s instructions to Webb. Thereafter, they all went back to
the Ayala Alabang Commercial Center.14
At the parking lot, Alfaro relayed to the group what transpired during her last conversation with
Carmela. She also told Webb about Carmela’s male companion; this changed his mood for the rest
of the evening ("bad trip"already15). Webb then gave out complimentary cocaine and all of them
used shabu and/or cocaine.16 After about 40 to 45 minutes, Webb decided it was time to leave,
declaring: "Pipilahan natin siya [Carmela] at ako ang mauuna."Lejano said: "Ako ang susunod" and
the others responded "Okay, okay." They all left the parking lot and their convoy of three (3)
vehicles entered Pitong Daan Subdivision for the third time. They arrived at the Vizconde residence
between 11:45 to 11:55 p.m.17
Alfaro parked her car in between the Vizconde house and its adjacent house. While waiting for the
rest of the group to alight from their cars, Fernandez approached her suggesting that they blow up
the transformer near the pedestrian gate of the Vizconde residence in order to cause a brownout
("Pasabugin kaya natin ang transformer na ito"). She shrugged off the idea and told Fernandez
"Malakas lang ang tama mo." When Webb, Lejano and Ventura were already standing infront of the
Evidence Cases
Vizconde residence, Webb repeated to the boys that they will line up for Carmela but he will be the
first, and the others said, "O sige, dito lang kami, magbabantay lang kami."18
Alfaro entered first the pedestrian gate which was left open, followed by Webb, Lejano and Ventura.
At the garage, Ventura pulled out a chair to get on top of the hood of the Vizcondes’ Nissan Sentra
car and loosened the electric bulb ("para daw walang ilaw"). They proceeded to the iron grill gate
which was likewise left open, and passed through the dirty kitchen. It was Carmela who opened the
aluminum screen door of the kitchen for them to enter. Carmela and Webb for a moment looked at
each other in the eye, and then proceeded towards the dining area. As she lost sight of Carmela
and Webb, Alfaro decided to go out of the house. Lejano asked where she was going and she told
him she will smoke outside. On her way to the screen door, she saw Ventura pulling a drawer in the
kitchen. At the garden area, she smoked a cigarette. After about twenty (20) minutes, she was
surprised upon hearing a female voice uttered "Sino yan?" and she immediately walked out towards
her car. She found the others still outside around her car and Estrada who was inside the car said:
"Okay ba?" After staying in her car for about ten (10) minutes, she returned to the house passing
through the same iron grill gate and dirty kitchen. While it was dark inside the house, there was light
coming from outside. In the kitchen, she saw Ventura searching a lady’s bag on top of the dining
table. When she asked Ventura what was it he was looking for, he said: "Ikaw na nga dito,
maghanap ka ng susi." She asked him what particular key and he replied: "Basta maghanap ka ng
susi ng main door pati na rin ng susi ng kotse." When she found a bunch of keys in the bag, she
tried them on the main door of the house but none of them fitted the lock; she also did not find any
car key.19
Unable to open the main door, Alfaro walked back towards the kitchen but upon reaching the spot
leading to the dining area, she heard a very loud static sound (like that coming from a television
which had signed off). Out of curiosity, she went to the door of the master’s bedroom where the
sound was coming from and peeped inside. She pushed the slightly ajar door with her fingers and
the sound grew even louder. After pushing the door wider, she walked into the room. There she
saw a man on top of Carmela who was lying on the floor, two (2) bloodied bodies on top of the bed
and Lejano who was at the foot of the bed about to wear his jacket. She turned her eyes on
Carmela who was gagged, moaning and in tears while Webb was pumping her, his bare buttocks
exposed. Webb gave her a look and she immediately left the room. At the dining area, she met
Ventura who told her: "Prepare an escape. Aalis na tayo." Shocked by what she saw, Alfaro rushed
out of the house and found the rest of the group outside, in her car and on the sidewalk. 20
Alfaro boarded her car and started the engine but did not know where to proceed. She saw Webb,
Lejano and Ventura leaving the house already. Webb suddenly picked up a stone and threw it to
the main door, breaking its glass frame. When the three (3) were near the pedestrian gate, Webb
told Ventura that he left behind his jacket. But Ventura said they cannot make it anymore as the iron
grills were already locked. They all rode in their cars and drove away until they reached Aguirre
Avenue. Near an old hotel in the Tropical Palace area, Alfaro saw the Nissan Patrol slow down and
something thrown out into a cogonal area. They went to a large house with high walls and concrete
fence, steel gate and long driveway located at BF Executive Village. They parked their cars inside
the compound and gathered in the lawn area where the "blaming session" took place. It was only at
this point that Alfaro and the others came to know fully what happened at the Vizconde house. The
mother was the first one (1) killed, then Jennifer and the last, Carmela.21
Ventura was blaming Webb telling him: "Bakit naman pati yung bata?" According to Webb, the girl
was awakened and upon seeing him molesting Carmela, she jumped on him, bit his shoulders and
pulled his hair. Webb got mad and grabbed the girl, pushed her to the wall and stabbed her several
times. Lejano excused himself and used the telephone inside the house, while Webb called up
someone on his cellular phone. At around 2:00 in the morning, Gerardo Biong arrived and talked to
Webb who ordered him to clean up the Vizconde house, and said "Pera lang ang katapat
nyan." Biong answered "Okay lang." Webb addressed the group and gave his final instructions:
Page | 11
"We don’t know each other. We haven’t seen each other...baka maulit yan." She and Estrada then
departed and went to her father’s house.22
Dr. Prospero A. Cabanayan, medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI),
who conducted the autopsy on the cadavers of the victims, testified on his findings as stated in the
autopsy reports he submitted to the court. The bodies were photographed showing their condition
before the start of the post-mortem examination.23Considering that they were almost in
complete rigor mortis, the victims must have been dead for twelve (12) hours. Carmela’s hands
were on her back hogtied with an electric cord and her mouth gagged with a pillow case. She had
contusions on her right forearm and thighs, ligature marks on her wrists and nine (9) stab wounds
on her chest (five [5] wounds are "connecting" or reaching to the back of the body). Further,
specimen taken from her genitalia tested positive for the presence of human spermatozoa, which is
indicative of complete penetration plus ejaculation of the male sex organ into the female sex organ.
The contusions on her thighs were probably due to the application of blunt force such as a fist
blow.24
Dr. Cabanayan further testified that Estrellita was also hogtied from behind and her wrists bore
ligature marks from an electric cord with a plug. She sustained twelve (12) stab wounds, eight (8) of
which are "communicating" or perforating (through and through stab wounds) which are fatal since
vital organs are involved.25 As to Jennifer, her stab wounds, nineteen (19) in all, had the
characteristics of one (1) which is extremely blunt, the other extremely sharp. These wounds are
located in different parts of her body, most of which are on the left anterior chest. But unlike
Carmela and Estrellita, Jennifer had two (2) stab wounds on her back and incise wounds on her left
and right forearms, the latter usually referred to as defense wounds. Seven (7) of the nine (9) stab
wounds on her chest were perforating, hence fatal wounds.26 Judging from the characteristics of the
stab wounds sustained by the victims, Dr. Cabanayan concluded that they could have been inflicted
using sharp-edged, pointed and single-bladed instruments such as a kitchen knife.27
Normal E. White, Jr., one (1) of four (4) security guards assigned at Pitong Daan Subdivision
which is part of the United BF Homes, testified that he and Edgar Mendez were the guards on duty
on the night of June 29, 1991, starting at 7:00 o’clock in the evening until 7:00 o’clock in the
morning of June 30, 1991. On June 30, 1991, at around 6:00 a.m., a homeowner called his
attention on the incident the previous night at the Vizconde house. He immediately proceeded to
said house where there were already many people. The housemaids of the Vizcondes led him to
the entrance at the kitchen and pointed to the master’s bedroom. Upon entering the room, he saw
the bloodied bodies of the victims: two (2) were on top of the bed, and one (1) lying down on the
floor. He is familiar with Mrs. Vizconde, Carmela and Jennifer because they were kind to the guards
and usually greeted them. Mrs. Vizconde was gagged and her hands tied, while Jennifer was also
lying on top of the bed. Carmela was lying on her back with one (1) of her legs raised, her dress
pulled up and her genitals exposed. He also noticed that the TV was still on with loud sound. He
went out to call the police but he met their Security Chief whom he informed about the killings at the
Vizconde house. He then proceeded directly to the entrance/guard post of the subdivision and was
told by Mendez that there were already policemen who had arrived.28
Having been apprised of the arrival of the police, White, Jr. returned to the Vizconde house to
observe what was going on. He saw the policemen already investigating the crime scene and one
(1) of them he later came to know as Gerardo Biong. There was also a woman who was with Biong
when he was conducting the investigation inside the Vizconde premises at the garage area. The
maids were being asked if they were able to hear the breaking of the main door’s glass frame, and
he saw Biong in the act of further breaking the remaining glass. He recognized other homeowners
who were also there, including Michael Gatchalian who passed by infront of the house. Afterwards,
he returned to their guard post where their Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Justo Cabanacan, probed him
and Mendez on anything they had observed the previous night. He and Mendez told Cabanacan
that they did not notice anything unusual except "Mike" (Michael Gatchalian) and his friends
entering and exiting the subdivision gate ("labas-masok").29
Evidence Cases
White, Jr. recounted that Mike’s group entered the subdivision on the night of June 29, 1991. Upon
approaching the gate, Mike’s car slowed down on the hump. He was about to flag down and verify
("sisitahin") but Mike (who was at the right front seat) immediately opened his window to show his
face and pointed to two (2) vehicles behind him as his companions. Because of their policy allowing
outsiders to enter the subdivision as long as they are accompanied by a homeowner, he and
Mendez just let the three (3) vehicles in (Mike was in the first car). That was actually the second
time he saw Mike and his "barkada" that night because he had earlier seen them at Vinzons St.
near the Gatchalian residence. However, he could no longer remember the precise time he saw the
group on these two (2) instances.30
White, Jr. further testified that on the night of June 30, 1991, policemen took him from the Pitong
Daan Subdivision Homeowners’ Association and brought him to the Parañaque Municipal Building.
Biong was forcing him to admit that he was one (1) of those who killed the Vizconde women. Biong
boxed him insisting he was among the perpetrators and had no mercy for the victims. He and
Mendez were later fetched by the Chief of Security of Pitong Daan Subdivision Homeowners’
Association, Nestor Potenciano Jr., and OIC Justo Cabanacan.31 Biong had also taken their
logbook where they list down the names of visitors, plate number of vehicles, name and street of
the homeowner they were staying at, etc. However, when presented with the alleged logbook,
White, Jr. said it was not the same logbook, he could not recognize its cover and could not
categorically confirm the entries supposedly made in his own handwriting. 32
Justo Cabanacan, another security guard assigned at the Pitong Daan Subdivision and the one (1)
supervising his co-guards White, Jr., Mendez and Tungo, testified that when he reported for duty on
June 30, 1991 at about 7:00 o’clock in the morning, he was met by Mendez who told him about the
killing of a homeowner and her family. When he asked Mendez if he and White, Jr. noticed anything
unusual during their tour of duty the previous night, Mendez said everything was alright except for
Mike and his friends who had gone in and out of the subdivision ("labas-masok") until the wee
hours in the morning of June 30, 1991. White, Jr. also reported to him that on the night of June 29,
1991, while doing his roving duty around the subdivision, he noticed vehicles parked along Vinzons
St. near the house of Mr. Almogino where there seemed to be a drinking party, and that Mike was
"labas-masok" through the subdivision gate. He confirmed it was indeed their policy that if one (1) is
a son/daughter of a homeowner, or accompanied by a homeowner or any relative of homeowner,
he/she will no longer be stopped or queried by the guards. In particular, he knows Mike and had
seen him visit the house of Lilet Sy, another homeowner. He often goes to Lilet Sy’s house because
of the various complaints of homeowners against her like the presence of too many people at her
house until midnight and the vehicles of her visitors running over her neighbors’ plants. This Lilet Sy
is also a suspected drug pusher within the subdivision.33
Cabanacan further testified that around the last week of May or first week of June 1991, he came to
know Hubert Webb because he had stopped his car at the subdivision gate as it had no local
sticker of Pitong Daan Subdivision. It was around 7:00 o’clock in the evening when Webb arrived.
He greeted Webb and asked about his destination. Webb replied he was going to see Lilet Sy.
When he asked Webb to leave an identification card, Webb pointed to his car sticker saying he is
also a BF Homes resident. He explained to Webb that the sticker on his car was for United BF
Homes and not the local sticker of Pitong Daan Subdivision. Webb then said: "Taga-diyan lang ako
sa Phase III...saka anak ako ni Congressman Webb." He insisted on seeing Webb’s ID card and
grudgingly Webb obliged and pulled out his wallet. Webb gave him a laminated ID card with Webb’s
picture and with the name "Hubert Webb" written on it. After seeing the ID card, he returned the
same to Webb and allowed him to enter the subdivision. However, he did not anymore record this
incident in their logbook because anyway Webb is the son of the Parañaque Congressman, a well-
known personality.34
In the morning of June 30, 1991, Cabanacan said he also went to the Vizconde house upon being
told by Mendez and White, Jr. of the killings. By afternoon of the same day, he came to meet Biong
who was conducting the investigation. Based on the information given by Mendez and White, Jr.,
Page | 12
he prepared a written report on the incident which he submitted to Nestor Potenciano, Jr. After the
incident, Biong frequented their place to investigate and asserting he had no female companion
while conducting his investigation at the Vizconde house on June 30, 1991. Aside from taking their
logbook, Biong also took his two (2) guards (Mendez and White, Jr.) to the police headquarters on
June 30, 1991 at around 7:00 p.m. The said guards also related to him what Biong did to them.
They said Biong punched them and forced them to admit having participated in the Vizconde
killings.35
Mila Solomon Gaviola, a laundrywoman who worked at the Webb residence located at Aguirre
Avenue, BF Homes, Parañaque from January to July 199136 testified that on June 30, 1991 at
around 4:00 in the morning, she went to the room of Hubert to get his and his brothers’ (Jason and
Michael’s) dirty clothes, using the small "secret door" at the second floor near the servants’
quarters. She noticed that Michael and Jason were still asleep while Hubert was sitting on the bed
wearing only his pants. When she finished collecting dirty clothes including those of Senator Webb,
she brought them down to the laundry area. She ate breakfast and rested for a while. Afterwards,
she started washing first Senator Webb’s clothes and then those of the sons. She washed Hubert’s
white shirt with round neck and found it had fresh blood stains at the stomach area and also
splattered blood ("tilamsik lang") on the chest. She had difficulty removing the blood stains and had
to use Chlorox. After she finished washing the clothes, she hanged them to dry on the second floor.
Returning to the servants’ quarters, she peeped into Hubert’s room through the "secret door." She
saw Hubert pacing the floor ("di mapakali"); this was about 9:00 a.m. already. She saw Hubert
again around 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon as he left the house passing through the "secret door";
he was clad in t-shirt and shorts. Hubert was back at the house by 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon.
She never saw him again until she left in July 1991.37
Gaviola further testified that on June 30, 1991 at around 7:00 o’clock in the morning, she saw
Senator Webb at the sala reading a newspaper.38
Lolita Carrera Vda. de Birrer, a widow and resident of United Parañaque Subdivision 5, testified
that on June 29, 1991 at around 6:00 p.m., Biong who was then her boyfriend, asked her to come
to the Parañaque police station to play "mahjong" at Aling Glo’s canteen located at the back of their
office. They started playing at 6:30 in the evening. Between 1:00 and 2:00 in the morning of June
30, 1991, the radio operator at the police station went down to the canteen telling Biong he has a
call. She took Biong’s place at the game while Biong went to the headquarters. After a while, she
followed Biong to ask if he was joining the next bet. Biong was on the telephone talking with
someone and visibly irked. She heard Biong’s words: "Ano?... Saan?... Mahirap yan ah! O sige,
dadating ako... Ano?... Saan?... Dilaw na taxi?" Biong then told her he was leaving and shortly
thereafter a taxicab arrived with a man seated at the back seat. Biong bade her good-bye saying he
was going to BF Homes. She continued playing "mahjong" until morning. At around 7:00 a.m.,
Biong came back and went straight to the washing area of the canteen. She followed him and saw
him cleaning blood stains on his fingernails. After wiping his face and hands with a handkerchief, he
threw it away and when she asked why, Biong said it smelled stinky. Biong was in bad mood
("aburido") and complained, "Putang inang mga batang ‘yon, pinahirapan ako nang husto".
Afterwards, Biong took out a knife with aluminum cover from his drawer and put it in his steel
cabinet. She invited him for lunch but another policeman, Galvan, came and told Biong to proceed
to BF Homes and investigate the three (3) dead persons there. Biong answered, "Oo, susunod na
ako" and then proceeded to Capt. Bartolome’s office. With Capt. Bartolome’s permission, she
joined them in going to the Vizconde residence.39
Upon arriving at the Vizconde house, Biong asked that the victims’ relatives and the homeowners’
association President be summoned. A certain Mr. Lopez and Ms. Moreno arrived and also a
security guard named White, Jr. who pointed to the location of the victims’ bodies. They entered the
master’s bedroom and she saw the mother and a small girl on top of the bed, and a young woman
sprawled on the floor. After inspecting the bodies, Biong went to the toilet and turned on the faucet;
the running water washed out the blood on the flooring of the toilet. Biong searched the drawers
Evidence Cases
using his ballpen. She saw him took a round pendant watch and pocketed it. They went out of the
room and on the top of the dining table they saw a shoulder bag and scattered next to it were
various items such as Carmela’s ATM card, her driver’s license and calling cards. Biong proceeded
to the main door and removed its chain lock. When they came out towards the garage area, Biong
saw a stone by the window. He then asked Capt. Bartolome to go inside the room of the two (2)
maids to see for himself if indeed the noise of the breaking glass could not be heard. When Capt.
Bartolome was already inside the middle room, Biong shattered the remaining glass of the main
door with the butt of his gun. When Biong asked if he could hear it, Capt. Bartolome answered in
the affirmative. Biong next inspected the garage where he saw the footmarks on the car’s hood;
Biong also found fingerprints on the electric bulb. She was just beside Biong at the time. They
followed Biong towards the back of the house but upon seeing another shoe print on the ground
just outside the master’s bedroom, he directed them not to proceed any further. They left the
Vizconde house at around 10:00 a.m. and proceeded to the Parañaque Municipal Building. 40
Birrer further testified that on July 1, 1991 at 10:00 o’clock in the morning, Biong arrived at her
house bringing along with him the two (2) maids of the Vizcondes. He asked her to cook something
for the maids to eat. Biong also instructed her to interview the maids on what they know about the
killings. She did as told but the maids said they do not know anything as they were asleep. After
they had lunch, Biong told her to let the maids rest. While she and the maids were resting at the
sala, Biong requested to use her bathroom. Before taking a bath, Biong took out the contents of his
pockets which he put on the dining table. She saw Carmela’s ATM card and driver’s license,
bracelet, earrings and the round pendant watch Biong had taken from a jewelry box while they were
inside the Vizconde house. When Biong left her house, he brought all said items with him. 41
On July 2, 1991 at around 6:00 p.m., Birrer was at the Parañaque Municipal Building inside Biong’s
office. She saw Biong open his steel cabinet and took out a brown leather jacket which she thought
was imported. When she asked him where it came from, Biong initially just said it was given as a
gift but when she further queried, he answered: "Natatandaan mo ba ‘yong nirespondehan ko
noong gabi sa BF Homes? Doon galing ‘yon." She asked Biong whether those were the youths he
had mentioned earlier and he said yes. As to the jewelries taken by Biong from the Vizconde
house, she was with Biong when the latter pawned them at a pawnshop near Chow-Chow; Biong
got ₱20,000.00 for the pawned items.42
Birrer further testified that two (2) weeks after they went to the Vizconde residence to investigate,
Biong on two (2) occasions brought her along to a certain house. It was only Biong who went inside
the said house as she waited in a taxicab. In both instances, Biong came out of the house with an
envelope containing an undisclosed amount of money. She remembered this because when she
was already staying in Pangasinan on December 7, 1995, she saw flashed on ABS-CBN’s TV
Patrol News 7:00 p.m. newscast on television, a video footage of the house of Senator Webb. She
was certain it was that house where Biong went and came out carrying cash in an envelope. 43
Lauro G. Vizconde, husband of Estrellita and father of Carmela and Jennifer, testified on the
personal circumstances of the victims. At the time of their deaths, Estrellita was engaged in
business (at one [1] time or another she was a garment manufacturer, taxi operator, canteen owner
and local employment recruiter), Carmela was a graduating B.S. Psychology student at the
University of Santo Tomas, while Jennifer was a Grade I pupil at Bloomfield Academy at BF Resort,
Las Piñas, Metro Manila. He left the Philippines in November 1989 to work in the United States of
America. He had not since returned to the country -- until this unfortunate tragedy befell his family --
but communicated with his wife through telephone once or twice a month.44
Lauro G. Vizconde further testified that his daughter, when she was still alive, was so close to him
that she confides her daily activities, dreams, ambitions and plans in life. She intended to pursue
further masteral and doctoral degrees in business psychology in the U.S.A. In fact, that was the
reason he transferred from one (1) state to another looking for a school where Carmela could
Page | 13
enroll. However, he had to come home in July 1991 and bury his wife and daughters whose violent
deaths he was informed of only upon arriving in the country and when he saw their bodies with stab
wounds at the funeral parlor just before burial. He spent burial expenses in the amount of
₱289,000.00, plus ₱103,000.00 incidental expenses, ₱300,000.00 paid for memorial lots and
around ₱100,000.00 for the construction of the mausoleum - with a grand total of ₱793,950.00. He
likewise incurred litigation expenses in the amount of ₱97,404.50. 45
In one (1) of their telephone conversations when he was still in the U.S.A., Lauro Vizconde
recounted that Carmela mentioned to him that she had turned down a suitor whom she called
"Bagyo," who is a son of politician in Parañaque and comes from an affluent family. He also
expressed his mental anguish, wounded feelings, emotional suffering due to the untimely demise of
his family. It actually cost him his life, his heart bled all the time and only time can tell when he can
fully cope with the situation. He is presently totally displaced and jobless; he misses his family and
he now lives an abnormal life with no inspiration and no more challenge to work for. When asked
how much compensation he will ask for moral damages, he answered saying he leaves the matter
to the sound discretion of the court as in truth, no amount can truly compensate him for the loss of
his loved ones. He sought justice for the death of his family and hoped that the culprits, whoever
they were, will be punished so that the souls of his departed loved ones may rest in peace. 46
Defense Evidence
The accused chiefly assailed the credibility of prosecution star witness Alfaro, in particular her
execution of two (2) allegedly inconsistent affidavits (one on April 28, 1995 and another on May 22,
1995) and raised alibi and denial as defenses to the charge of rape with homicide attended by
conspiracy. During the trial, no less than 95 witnesses47were presented, and voluminous
documentary exhibits were submitted.
The testimonies of the principal witnesses for the defense are summarized as follows:
Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb testified that at the time of the killings between June 29 and 30, 1991, he
was still in Anaheim Hills, California, U.S.A., having departed from the Philippines on March 9, 1991
on board a United Airlines flight bound for San Francisco. He was accompanied by Gloria Webb,
whose husband Richard Webb is the eldest brother of his father Senator Freddie Webb. It was the
first time he traveled to the US and he returned to the Philippines only on October 25, 1992. On the
eve of his departure, he, Rael, Tina and his then girlfriend Milagros Castillo went out and had dinner
at Bunchchums. Later that night, they went to Faces Disco at Makati Avenue where his friends
Paulo Santos and Jay Ortega followed. They went home at 3:00 o’clock in the morning already.
After driving around in the city and bringing Milagros home, he arrived at his house at around 5:00
a.m. His parents were already preparing to leave and so they headed to the airport. 48 Webb’s friend
Rafael Jose, Paulo Santos, Senator Webb’s security staff Miguel Muñoz, Webbs’ secretary Cristina
Magpusao and house girl Victoria Ventoso corroborated Webb’s testimony that he departed from
the Philippines on March 9, 1991.49
Webb further testified that he stayed at the house of her Auntie Gloria and Uncle Dinky at San
Francisco until late April to May 1991. Upon the invitation of her aunt Susan Brottman, sister of his
mother, he rode a train and went to Anaheim where he stayed until mid-July 1991. Thereafter, he
rented a nearby place but did not complete the one (1) month pre-paid lease period as he
proceeded to Longwood, Florida. He stayed at the residence of his Uncle Jack and Sonia
Rodriguez for almost a year (August 1991-August 1992). He went back to Anaheim and stayed at
the house of his godmother and sister of his mother, Imelda Pagaspas, until October 1992. He met
his relatives and other personalities while in the US; visited Lake Tahoe with the Wheelock family;
toured Disneyland where Luis Wheelock filmed them and attended a concert with Christopher
Esguerra who also took him out to the malls.50
Evidence Cases
Webb further testified that in the later part of June 1991, his parents joined him in the US. He
applied for and was issued a driver’s license on June 14, 1991. He also worked at the pest control
company of his cousin-in-law Alex del Toro. Aside from his passport and airline ticket for return
flight to the Philippines, Webb presented before the court the logbook of jobs/tasks kept by del
Toro, in which he pointed to the entries therein which were actually performed by him; and also his
purported pay check ($150 "pay to Cash"), ID and other employment papers. He also identified
some handwritten letters he mailed while he was in the US and sent to his friend Jennifer Cabrera
in the Philippines; photographs and video tape clips taken during his cousin Marie Manlapit’s
wedding to Alex del Toro which wedding he attended in the US together with his mother; and
receipt issued for the mountain bicycle he bought on June 30, 1991 from the Orange Cycle store in
Anaheim.51
Webb denied having met Carmela Vizconde and neither does he know Jessica Alfaro. He had been
jailed since August 9, 1995. When asked about his co-accused, Webb said the only ones he had
met before June 29, 1991 were Fernandez and Rodriguez. He used to play basketball with
Fernandez at BF Homes Phase III, during which he also met Rodriguez. While he admitted having
gone out on a group with Fernandez to the houses of their basketball buddies, he denied having
gone out with Rodriguez at any time.52 He also denied knowing Biong who is neither a driver nor
security aide of his father.53
Gloria Webb testified that on March 9, 1991, she traveled with Webb on a United Airlines flight to
San Francisco. Webb stayed at her residence at 639 Gellert Boulevard, Daly City, California until
May 1991 when he left to be with his mother’s sister and relatives in Anaheim. Webb and her
grandson attended a "concierto" in the evenings and he also joined and helped her son-in-law with
his business. Webb went with them to church, to the malls and in shopping. In April 1991, Webb
went on a trip to Lake Tahoe with Mr. Wheelock and family.54
Dorothy Wheelock testified that she became a US citizen in 1974 and has been residing at 877
Las Lomas Drive, Milpitas, California. Webb’s mother is her childhood friend and schoolmate. When
she heard that Webb was in the US looking for a job, she invited him, and her husband Louis
Wheelock picked him up at Daly City in April 1991. To reciprocate the Webbs’ hospitality while they
visited the Philippines in 1990, she and her family took Webb to a trip to Lake Tahoe in Nevada
during which they even took a video tape. Senator Freddie and Mrs. Webb also visited and stayed
with them for four (4) days in July 1991. They took them to a trip to Yosemite Park, also with video
footages taken by her husband.55
Steven Keeler testified that he had been an American citizen since 1982 and resident of 4002
River Street, Newport Beach, California. He met Webb at a dinner in the house of Webb’s aunt
Susan Brottman in Anaheim Hills around May or June 1991. Brottman’s son, Rey Manlapit, was his
good friend. They played basketball with Webb, went to bars, shopped and watched TV. He also
knew that Webb bought a car and worked for Alex del Toro for Environment First Termite Control.
He believed that Webb left for Florida towards the end of summer (July 1991). He could not recall
any specific dates he was with Webb.56
Honesto Aragon testified that he went to the US in 1967 and became a US citizen in 1989. On
June 28, 1991, he met then Congressman Freddie Webb at the house of the latter’s sister-in-law,
Susan, at Anaheim. Congressman Webb introduced to him his son Hubert Webb. He,
Congressman Webb and Hubert went to some stores to go shopping for a bicycle for Hubert. But
they only bought bike accessories. He invited them to snack before he brought them to his own
house where he introduced to them his son Andrew. The following day, June 29, 1991, they went to
Riverside, California to shop for a car for Hubert; though they found a Toyota MR2, they did not buy
it because it has questionable ownership. Early morning the next day, he picked up Congressman
Webb and they played tennis from 7:00 to 10:00 a.m. He and Congressman Webb were close
friends, as both of them were members of a basketball team in Letran. The first time he saw Hubert
Page | 14
was when he was still a small kid and the other time on June 28, 1991 at the Brottman’s residence
in Anaheim.57
Senator Freddie Webb testified that his son Hubert left for the US on March 9, 1991, the first time
he had gone out of the country. Hubert stayed with his sister-in-law Gloria. They wanted to show
Hubert the value of independence, hard work and perseverance, and for him to learn how to get
along and live with other people. Hubert resigned from his job at Saztec before departing for the
US. He and his wife also went to the US on June 28, 1991. They stayed at the house of his sister-
in-law, Susan Brottman at Anaheim. From San Francisco, they went to Orlando, Florida, then back
to Los Angeles and returned to the Philippines on July 21, 1991. Among the places he visited while
in the US were the Yosemite Park, Nordstrom, Disneyland, Disneyworld. Upon arriving at Anaheim,
he saw his son Hubert and also informed Honesto Aragon regarding their plan to procure a bicycle
for Hubert. Hubert was with them again on June 29, 1991 at dinner in the residence of his sister-in-
law. On July 1, 1991, they went shopping for some clothes. Together with Aragon, he and Hubert
looked for a Toyota MR2 car and paid for it with a check (the car was priced at $6,000-$7,000).58
Senator Webb further testified that he knows Mila Gaviola who used to be their "labandera." She
left their house but returned to work for them again about a couple of months after the Mt. Pinatubo
eruption. As to Alfaro’s statements implicating his son Hubert in the Vizconde killings, he said the
statements were not accurate because it was physically impossible for Hubert to have participated
in the crime as he was abroad at the time.59
Louis Whitaker testified that he left the Philippines and resided in the US since September 1964.
He met Jack Rodriguez when the latter fetched him and his wife Sonia at the Los Angeles
International Airport on June 28, 1991 upon their arrival from the Philippines. They proceeded to the
house of a mutual friend, Salvador Vaca, at Moresbay Street in Lake Forest. They went to see
Congressman Webb at a house in Anaheim. That was the first time he met Congressman Webb,
Mrs. Webb, the sister-in-law and a Mr. Aragon. On June 29, 1991, he and Rodriguez invited
Congressman Webb to see Mr. Vaca perform at La Calesa Restaurant in the City of Testin. When
they fetched Congressman Webb at his sister-in-law’s house, he met again Mrs. Webb, and also
Hubert. He saw Hubert for the second time at Orlando, Florida when he went to the house of Jack
Rodriguez there; this was about July or August 1991.60
Sonia H. Rodriguez testified that she was appointed UNESCO Commissioner by then President
Fidel V. Ramos. She has known accused Webb since he was a child. On June 28, 1991, she and
her husband boarded a plane for Los Angeles, California. They were fetched at the LA airport by
old-time friend Salvador Vaca and proceeded to the latter’s house in Orange County, California.
They had dinner that evening with spouses Freddie and Elizabeth Webb at the house of Susan
Brottman. The next day, in the afternoon of June 29, 1991, her husband and Salvador Vaca picked
up Senator Webb from the house of Susan Brottman and then came back to fetch her and Mrs.
Vaca to go to La Calesa, a restaurant owned by Mario Benitez, also a Filipino. However, she and
Mrs. Vaca decided to stay home. On June 30, 1991 at around 8:00 p.m., she and her husband went
to the house of Susan Brottman, together with Salvador and Mrs. Vaca and Louis Whitaker. She
recalled that Hubert was there at the time. She saw Hubert again on July 4, 1991 when they went
on a lakeside picnic with the Webb family, Brottmans and Vacas. After watching the fireworks, they
went to Sizzler Restaurant. The next day, she and her husband stayed overnight at San Francisco
where they also met Senator and Mrs. Webb. On August August 4, 1991, Hubert arrived in her
home in Florida with her son Tony, daughter-in-law Ana, and stayed with them for almost one (1)
year. The last time she saw Hubert was when he left Orlando, Florida on January 27, 1992. 61
Webb presented other witnesses to buttress his defense of alibi: Victor Yap (who took video shots
of Congressman Webb during a boat ride in Disneyland);62 Armando Rodriguez (who testified
seeing Hubert in Orlando either August or September 1991);63 performing artist Gary Valenciano
(who testified meeting Hubert at a dinner at the Rodriguez residence in Orlando on November 24,
Evidence Cases
1991, Jack Rodriguez being the father of his high school classmate Antonio Rodriguez;64 and
Christopher Paul Legaspi Esguerra (grandson of Gloria Webb who went with Hubert Webb to watch
the concert of the Deelite Band in San Francisco in the later part of April 1991 and saw Hubert
Webb for the last time in May 1991).65
Then a practicing lawyer, Atty. Antonio T. Carpio (now an Associate Justice of this Court) testified
that on June 29, 1991 between 10:00 and 11:00 o’clock in the morning, he had a telephone
conversation with former Congressman Webb who said he was calling from Anaheim, U.S.A.,
where he and his wife went to look for a job for their son Hubert. They also talked about bills to be
drafted as his law office had been engaged by Congressman Webb for bill drafting services as well
as preparation of his speeches and statements. When asked if he had personal knowledge that
Congressman Webb was really in the US at that time, he replied that since Webb had told him he
was leaving for the US, he just presumed it was so when Webb said he was then at Anaheim.
Neither did he have personal knowledge that Hubert Webb was in the US at the time of his
conversation with Congressman Webb.66
Webb submitted the following documentary evidence in connection with his sojourn in the US:
1) Video Tape recording of Disneyland trip on July 3, 1991;67
2) Official Receipt issued by Orange Cycle Center dated June 30, 1991,68 photographs of
the bicycle purchased by Webb from said store;69
3) Car plate with the name "Lew Webb";70
4) Passport with Philippine Immigration arrival stamp;71
5) Photographs of Webb with Rodriguez family;72
6) California Driver’s License of Webb,73 Original License Card of Webb issued on June
14, 1991;74
7) Statement of Account issued to Environment First Termite Control showing Check No.
0180;75 Bank of America Certification on Check Nos. 0122 and 0180;76
8) Public Records of California Department of Motor Vehicle on sale to Webb of Toyota
MR2 car;77 Traffic citations issued to Webb;78 Import documents of said car into the
Philippines;79
9) Certification issued by the US Immigration and Naturalization Service and
correspondence between US and Philippine Government; 80 computer-generated print-out
of the US-INS indicating date of Webb’s entry in USA as March 9, 1991 and his date of
departure as October 26, 1992;81 US-INS Certification dated August 31, 1995
authenticated by the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs, correcting the earlier
August 10, 1995 Certification;82
10) Certification issued by Agnes Tabuena;83 Passenger Manifest of PAL Flight No.
103;84 PAL ticket issued to Webb,85 Arrival in Manila Certification issued by the Philippine
Immigration,86 Diplomatic Note of the US Department of State with enclosed letter from
Acting Director Debora A. Farmer of the Records Operations, Office of Records of the
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 US-INS stating that the Certification dated August 31, 1995 is a true and accurate Accused Miguel Rodriguez maintained he was at home when the killings took place. He presented
statement;87 and Certificate of Authentication of Philippine Consul Herrera-Lim.88 as witness his first cousin Mark Josef Andres Rualo who testified that at around 1:00 in the morning
of June 30, 1991, he called up Rodriguez asking why he has not yet proceeded to the birthday
party of Rualo at their house. Rodriguez replied that he could not make it because he was not
Accused Antonio Lejano and Michael Gatchalian likewise raised the defense of alibi claiming that
fetched by his brother Art (who was the one with a car). So he handed the telephone to Art (who
they spent the night of June 29, 1991 until early morning of June 30, 1991 watching video tapes at
had arrived at the party around 9:30 to 10:00 p.m.) for them to talk. From Rodriguez’s residence at
the house of Carlos Syap at Ayala Alabang Village.
Pilar Village, it will take about fifteen (15) to twenty (20) minutes by car. It was a big party attended
by some eighty (80) guests and which ended by 3:30 to 4:00 a.m. But it was only the first time he
Lejano further testified that with the exception of Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez and Michael "Mike" had invited Rodriguez to his birthday party. He knows Lejano, Rodriguez’s close friend and
Gatchalian who are his former schoolmates, he does not know any of his co-accused. They left the classmate, because Rodriguez used to bring him along when Rodriguez comes to his house.97
house of Syap brothers early morning of June 30, 1991; it was Cas Syap who brought him and
Mike home. On July 5, 1991, he and Cas Syap went to the police station where Mike, who was
The other witnesses presented by Rodriguez, Col. Charles Calima, Jr. and Michael Rodriguez,
picked up as a suspect by the police on July 4, was detained. When they met Biong there, they told
testified on the alleged incident of "mistaken identity" wherein Alfaro supposedly pointed to one (1)
him they are willing to vouch for Mike’s innocence and even volunteered to give statements. Biong
"Michael Rodriguez," a drug dependent who was pulled out by Col. Calima from the Bicutan
told them to return the following day. However, when he returned in the morning of July 6, 1991,
Rehabilitation Center on the basis of the description given by NBI agents. They testified that when
Biong wanted his fingerprints taken right away but he told Biong he needed to consult someone
Alfaro confronted this "Michael Rodriguez," she became very emotional and immediately slapped
first. He eventually submitted himself for fingerprinting after his name came out in the media. Lejano
and kicked him telling him, "How can I forget your face. We just saw each other in a disco one
pointed out that Alfaro failed to identify him even as she passed by him three (3) times, and was
month ago and you told me then that you will kill me." Contrary to the physical description given by
able to do so only when she was coached by the prosecution camp.89
the NBI, the accused Miguel Rodriguez he saw inside the court room had no tattoo on his arm and
definitely not the same "Michael Rodriguez" whom Alfaro slapped and kicked at the NBI premises.
On the part of Michael Gatchalian, he presented nine (9) witnesses: Atty. Michael Rodriguez testified that he was blindfolded and brought to the comfort room by NBI agents
Porfirio "Perry" Pimentel, RPN 9 broadcast executive who testified that he personally took video and forced to admit that he was Miguel Rodriguez; he identified Alfaro and Atty. Figueras from a
footages of Mon Tulfo’s interviews with some persons in America (including Honesto Aragon and collage of photographs shown to him in court.98
the bicycle shop owner) who attested that Hubert Webb was there at the time of the Vizconde
killings, but which segment was edited out in the program he produced (Action 9); 90 Mark Anthony
Accused Gerardo Biong testified that the last time he handled this case was when General Filart
So, a former NBI intelligence agent who was tasked to confirm photos of Hubert Webb (his
announced the case as solved with the presentation of suspects sometime in October 1991.
classmate at DLSU St. Benilde) to familiarize Alfaro with his facial features; 91 Matthew John
However, he was subpoenaed by the NBI for the taking of his statement because Lauro Vizconde
Almogino, a childhood friend and neighbor of Gatchalian, who testified that he was among those
complained that he had stolen jewelries at the Vizconde house. He had sought the examination of
who went inside the Vizconde house in the morning of June 30, 1991 and Biong even asked him to
latent fingerprints lifted from the crime scene but the suspects turned out negative when tested. He
take pictures; thereupon at around 9:30 a.m., he saw Gatchalian in front of the Vizconde residence
denied the accusation regarding the destruction of evidence as well as missing items during his
telling him that he just woke up and exchanged pleasantries with him; and that as far as he knows,
investigation at the Vizconde residence. The bloodied bed, mats, pillows and bed sheets were
Webb, Fernandez, Lejano and Gatchalian are not "magbabarkada";92 Atty. Leny
burned by people at the funeral parlor as ordered by Mr. Gatmaitan. Among the suspects he had
Mauricio and Ana Marie Pamintuan of The Philippine Star wherein a news article was published
then were Michael Gatchalian, Tony Boy Lejano and Cas Syap. As to the testimony of Birrer that
stating that Michael Gatchalian had rejected government’s offer for him to turn state witness in the
they played "mahjong" on the night of June 29, 1991, he said it was not true because the place was
Vizconde case;93 Atty. Camilo Murillo who accompanied Gatchalian on July 19, 1991 when he
closed on Saturdays and Sundays. After a surveillance on Birrer, he discovered she had in her
gave his statement to the NBI, testified that Atty. Pete Rivera relayed to Gatchalian the request of
possession Carmela’s driver’s license and was driving a car already. He denied Birrer’s account
then NBI Director Honesto Aragon for him to turn state witness and which offer was refused by
that he went to a place after receiving a telephone call at 2:30 in the morning of June 30, 1991. As
Gatchalian and his father;94 and Atty. Manuel Sunga who accompanied Gatchalian to the
to Alfaro, he met her for the first time at the NBI on June 23, 1995. His brown jacket was given to
Department of Justice (DOJ) when he submitted his counter-affidavit (where there were already
him long ago by a couple whose dispute he was able to settle. He only met Webb and Estrada at
media people), testified that they were invited to the conference room where State Prosecutor Zuño
the NBI. Biong denied the accusations of Birrer, saying that she was angry at him because they
in the presence of then Secretary Guingona made the offer for Gatchalian to turn state witness but
separated and he had hit her after he heard about her infidelity. Neither has he seen Alfaro before
it was rejected.95
the filing of this case. He was administratively charged before the Philippine National Police (PNP)
for Grave Misconduct due to non-preservation of evidence. He was offered by the NBI to turn state
Atty. Francisco C. Gatchalian confirmed that the NBI and later the DOJ made offers for his son to witness but he declined as he found it difficult to involve his co-accused whom he does not really
turn state witness in this case but they refused for the reason that his son was innocent of the crime know.99
charged. Michael had told him that on the night of June 29, 1991 until early morning of June 30,
1991, Michael was with his friends at Ayala Alabang Village in Muntinlupa at the residence of the
Biong admitted that Birrer went along with him, Galvan and Capt. Bartolome to the Vizconde
Syaps. Gatchalian narrated that when he woke up to jog in the morning of June 30, 1991 around
residence in the morning of June 30, 1991. Upon arriving at the Vizconde house, he looked for the
7:00 to 7:30, he passed by the Vizconde house and saw people milling in front. At about 8:30 a.m.,
victims’ relatives and the homeowners’ association president; Atty. Lopez and Mrs. Mia came. In
he saw the crowd getting bigger and so he instructed Michael who had wakened up, to find out and
going inside the house, they passed through the kitchen door which was open already. On top of
check what happened to their neighbor. Michael rushed out towards the Vizconde residence and
the kitchen table, there was a lady’s bag with things scattered; he later inspected them but did not
when he came back about 10:00 o’clock that same morning, he reported that the house was robbed
think of examining the bag or taking note of the calling cards and other items for possible relevance
and people were killed inside the house. Both of them stayed in their house that day. He denied
to the investigation. Upon entering the master’s bedroom, he saw the bloodied bodies. Mrs.
Alfaro’s claim that she was their distant relative.96
Vizconde’s hands were hogtied from behind and her mouth gagged while Jennifer’s body was also
bloodied. Carmela who was lying on a floor carpet was likewise gagged, her hands hogtied from

Evidence Cases Page | 16

behind and her legs spread out, her clothes raised up and a pillow case was placed on top of her
private part. He had the bodies photographed and prepared a spot report.100
Biong also admitted that before the pictures were taken, he removed with his bare hands the object,
which was like a stocking cloth, that was wrapped around Carmela’s mouth and neck. As to the
main door glass, it was the upper part which he broke. There was a red jewelry box they saw where
a pearl necklace inside could be seen; he remembered he had it photographed but he had not seen
those pictures. They left the Vizconde house and brought the cadavers to the funeral parlor. He did
not take steps to preserve the bloodied carpet, bed sheets and blankets because they have been
previously told by NBI that no evidence can be found on such items. As for the footprint and shoe
print found on the hood of the car and at the back of the house, he also could not recall if he had
those photographed. It was only the following day that he brought an employee of the Parañaque
police to lift fingerprints from the crime scene; he was the one (1) giving instructions at the time.
However, no latent fingerprints had been taken; despite attempts, no clear fingerprint had been
lifted and he did not any more ask why.101
Biong further admitted that he was so angry with the Vizconde housemaids as he did not believe
they did not hear anything despite the loud sound of the breaking of the main door glass. He also
admitted mauling Normal E. White, Jr. because he thought he was withholding information during
the investigation. Edgar Mendez did not tell him about the entry of a three (3)-vehicle convoy into
the subdivision on the night of June 29, 1991. As for Michael Gatchalian, he knows him because on
July 3, 1991 at 4:30 a.m., they caught him at Vinzons St. at the entrance of Pitong Daan
Subdivision for possession of marijuana. However, he does not know any more what happened to
that case he filed against Gatchalian as he was already dismissed from the service.102 He also
admitted having mauled Gatchalian while interrogating him for his participation in the Vizconde
killings.103
Ruling of the Trial Court
104
On January 4, 2000, the trial court rendered its Decision finding all the accused guilty as
charged, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby finds all the principal accused GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF RAPE WITH HOMICIDE AND HEREBY SENTENCES EACH ONE OF
THEM TO SUFFER THE PENALTY OF RECLUSION PERPETUA. This Court likewise finds the
accused Gerardo Biong GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AS AN ACCESSORY AFTER
THE FACT, AND HEREBY SENTENCES HIM TO SUFFER AN IMPRISONMENT OF ELEVEN (11)
YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY TO TWELVE (12) YEARS. In addition, the Court
hereby orders all the accused to jointly and severally pay the victims’ surviving heir, Mr. Lauro
Vizconde, the following sums by way of civil indemnity:
1. The amount of P150,000.00 for wrongful death of the victims;
2. The amount of P762,450.00 representing actual damages sustained by Mr. Lauro
Vizconde;
3. The amount of P2,000,000.00 as moral damages sustained by Mr. Lauro Vizconde;
4. The amount of P97,404.55 as attorney’s fees;
Let an alias warrant of arrest be issued against the accused Artemio "Dong" Ventura and Joey
Filart for their eventual apprehension so that they can immediately be brought to trial.
Evidence Cases
SO ORDERED.105
The trial court found Alfaro as a credible and truthful witness, considering the vast details she
disclosed relative to the incident she had witnessed inside the Vizconde house. The trial court
noted that Alfaro testified in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner, and has
remained consistent in her narration of the events despite a lengthy and grueling cross-examination
conducted on her by eight (8) defense lawyers. Neither was her credibility and veracity of her
declarations in court affected by the differences and inconsistencies between her April 28, 1995
and May 22, 1995 affidavits, which she had satisfactorily explained during the trial considering the
circumstances that she initially desired to protect her former boyfriend Estrada and her relative
Gatchalian, the absence of a lawyer during the first taking of her statements by the NBI, her distrust
of the first investigators who took her statements and prepared her April 28, 1995 affidavit, and her
uncertainty if she could obtain adequate support and security for her own life were she to disclose
everything she knows about the Vizconde killings.
On the other hand, the trial court ruled that principal accused Webb, Lejano, Rodriguez and
Gatchalian failed to establish their defense of alibi, the accused having been positively identified by
Alfaro as the group who conspired and assisted one (1) another in plotting and carrying out on the
same night the rape of Carmela, on the occasion of which Carmela’s mother and sister were also
stabbed to death. The trial court held that Alfaro gave a clear, positive and convincing testimony
which was sufficiently corroborated on its material points by the testimonies of other witnesses and
confirmed by the physical evidence on record.
The Court of Appeals Ruling
By Decision of December 15, 2005, the CA affirmed with modification the trial court’s decision:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 274 of
Parañaque City in Criminal Case No. 95-404, finding accused-appellants Hubert "Jeffrey" Webb y
Pagaspas, Antonio "Tony Boy" Lejano, Michael Gatchalian y Adviento, Hospicio "Pyke" Fernandez,
Peter Estrada, Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT as principals,
and Gerardo Biong as accessory, of the crime of RAPE with HOMICIDE, is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION, as indicated:
1). We AFFIRM the sentence of accused-appellants Webb. Lejano, Gatchalian,
Fernandez, Estrada, and Rodriguez to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and its
corresponding accessory penalties under Article 41 of the Revised Penal Code;
2). We MODIFY the penalty of Gerardo Biong who is an accessory to the crime.
Accused-appellant Biong is sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of six (6) years
of prision correccional, as minimum, to twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as maximum,
and absolute perpetual disqualification under Article 58 of the Revised Penal Code; and
3). We MODIFY the civil indemnity. Accused-appellants Webb. Lejano, Gatchalian,
Fernandez, Estrada and Rodriguez are ORDERED to pay jointly and severally the
surviving heir of the victims, Mr. Lauro Vizconde. the amounts of P200,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P762,450.00 as actual damages, P2,000,000.00 as moral damages and
P97,404.55 as attorney's fees, with the corresponding subsidiary liability against
accused-appellant Biong pursuant to Article 110, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal
Code.
SO ORDERED.106
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The CA upheld the trial court in giving full weight and credence to the eyewitness testimony of MARCH 1991 AND 27 OCTOBER 1992, CONFIRM THAT IT WAS
Alfaro which was duly corroborated by other prosecution witnesses who had not been shown to PHYSICALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR APPELLANT WEBB TO HAVE
have ill-motive and malicious intent in revealing what they know about the Vizconde killings. It COMMITTED THE CRIME.
disagreed with the appellants’ view that they were victims of an unjust judgment upon their mere
allegations that they were tried by publicity, and that the trial judge was biased whose
C. THE RULING THAT APPELLANT WEBB WAS "SMUGGLED" INTO AND
discriminatory and hostile attitude was demonstrated by her rejection of 132 out of 142 exhibits of
OUT OF THE PHILIPPINES WITHIN 9 MARCH 1991 AND 27 OCTOBER
the defense during the bail hearings and her refusal to issue subpoenas to prospective defense
1992, WITH THE US INS CERTIFICATIONS BEING THE PROBABLE
witnesses such as former Secretary Teofisto Guingona and Antonio Calvento.
PRODUCT OF "MONEY, POWER, INFLUENCE, OR CONNECTIONS" IS
BASED ON PURE SPECULATION AND BIASED CONJECTURE AND NOT
The CA also fully concurred with the trial court’s conclusion that all the principal accused failed to ON A CONCLUSION THAT ANY COURT OF LAW SHOULD MAKE.
establish their defense of alibi after carefully evaluating the voluminous documentary and
testimonial evidence presented by the defense. On the issue of conspiracy, the CA found that the
D. NO LESS THAN THE HONORABLE JUSTICE ANTONIO T. CARPIO
prosecution was able to clearly and convincingly establish its presence in the commission of the
TESTIFIED IN OPEN COURT THAT IN THE MORNING OF 29 JUNE 1991,
crime, notwithstanding that appellants Rodriguez, Gatchalian, Estrada and Fernandez did not
OR BEFORE THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME, HE HAD AN OVERSEAS
actually rape Carmela, nor participated in killing her, her mother and sister.
CONVERSATION WITH SEN. FREDDIE N. WEBB ON THE LATTER’S
PRESENCE IN THE UNITED STATES WITH HIS WIFE AND APPELLANT
On motion for reconsideration filed by the appellants, the CA’s Special Division of Five, voting 3-2, WEBB.
affirmed the December 15, 2005 Decision.107 In the Resolution dated January 26, 2007, the majority
reiterated that it has fully explained in its Decision why the US-INS Certifications submitted by
II
appellant Webb deserve little weight. It stressed that it is a case of positive identification
versus alibi founded on documentary evidence. On the basis of the rule that alibi is accepted only
upon the clearest proof that the accused was not and could not have been at the crime scene when THE DISSENTING JUSTICES CORRECTLY REJECTED JESSICA ALFARO FOR NOT BEING A
it was committed, the CA in resolving the appeal considered the weight of documentary evidence in CREDIBLE WITNESS AND FOR GIVING INCONSISTENT AND UNRELIABLE TESTIMONY.
light of testimonial evidence -- an eyewitness account that the accused was the principal
malefactor. As to the issue of apparent inconsistencies between the two (2) affidavits executed by
III
Alfaro, the CA said this is a settled matter, citing the Joint Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 42285 and
CA-G.R. SP No. 42673 entitled "Rodriguez v. Tolentino" and "Webb, et al. v. Tolentino, et al.,"
which had long become final. THE COURT OF APPEALS MANIFESTLY ERRED IN DISCARDING EACH AND EVERY PIECE
OF THE ACCUSED’S EVIDENCE AND PRACTICALLY REDUCING THE APPEAL BELOW INTO
AN EXERCISE OF FINDING GROUNDS TO DOUBT, SUSPECT AND ACCORDINGLY REJECT
Appellants’ Arguments
THE PROOF OFFERED BY THEM IN THEIR DEFENSE INSTEAD OF GIVING DUE WEIGHT
AND CONSIDERATION TO EACH IN ORDER TO THOROUGHLY SATISFY ITSELF OF THE
Appellants Webb and Lejano set forth the following arguments in their Supplemental Appeal Brief "MORAL CERTAINTY" REQUIREMENT IN CRIMINAL CASES.
as grounds for the reversal of the CA Decision and their acquittal in this case:
IV
I
IN LIGHT OF THE BASIC TENETS UNDERLYING OUR CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, WHICH
THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHING APPELLANT WEBB'S ABSENCE FROM PHILIPPINE ESCHEW A FINDING OF GUILT UNLESS ESTABLISHED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AND
TERRITORY BETWEEN 9 MARCH 1991 AND 27 OCTOBER 1992 ENGENDERS A ORDAIN THE RESOLUTION OF ALL DOUBTS IN FAVOR OF THE ACCUSED, THE COURT OF
REASONABLE DOUBT AND PRECLUDES AN ABIDING CONVICTION, TO A MORAL APPEALS MANIFESTLY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION OF APPELLANT WEBB
CERTAINTY, OF HIS GUILT OF THE CRIME CHARGED. THUS, AS CORRECTLY WHEN THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI HE ESTABLISHED BY OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE IS
APPRECIATED BY JUSTICES TAGLE AND DACUDAO IN THEIR SEPARATE DISSENTING SUFFICIENT TO ENGENDER REASONABLE DOUBT AS TO HIS GUILT OF THE OFFENSE
OPINIONS - CHARGED. THE SCALES OUGHT TO HAVE BEEN TILTED IN HIS, AND NOT THE
PROSECUTION’S, FAVOR.108
A. THE PASSPORT OF APPELLANT WEBB, AS THE OFFICIAL TRAVEL
DOCUMENT ISSUED BY THE PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT TO HIM, IS Appellant Gatchalian reiterates the arguments he had raised in his appeal brief and motion for
STAMPMARKED AND INITIALED WITH THE DEPARTURE DATE OF 9 reconsideration filed before the CA, as follows:
MARCH 1991 AND ARRIVAL DATE OF 27 OCTOBER 1992, SHOWING
THAT HE WAS NOT IN THE PHILIPPINES BUT ABROAD AT THE TIME OF
I
THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME ON 29 JUNE 1991.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE INCREDIBLE

B. THE CERTIFICATIONS AND COMPUTER PRINTOUT ISSUED BY THE
TESTIMONY OF SUPPOSED EYEWITNESS JESSICA ALFARO AND CORROBORATING
UNITED STATES INS NON-IMMIGRANT INFORMATION SYSTEM, WHICH
WITNESSES NORMAL WHITE AND JUSTO CABANACAN.
INDICATE EXACTLY THE SAME DEPARTURE AND ARRIVAL DATES OF 9
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 II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION HAS PROVED
THE CONSPIRACY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AND IN CONVICTING HEREIN ACCUSED-
APPELLANT BASED ON SUCH CONSPIRACY.
III
THE PROCEEDING BELOW WAS ATTENDED BY IRREGULARITIES SHOWING PARTIALITY
ON THE PART OF THE TRIAL JUDGE IN VIOLATION OF HEREIN ACCUSED-APPELLANT’S
RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING HEREIN ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
xxxx
I with homicide.
BY ALL STANDARDS OF FAIRNESS AND JUSTICE, THE TESTIMONY OF JESSICA ALFARO
CANNOT BE JUDICIALLY RECOGNIZED.
II
THE CRIMINAL CONNECTION OF MICHAEL GATCHALIAN TO THE GRUESOME VIZCONDE
MURDERS HAS NOT EVEN BEEN REMOTELY SHOWN TO SERVE AS A BASIS FOR
CONVICTION.
III
IN THE REQUIRED JUDICIAL EVALUATION PROCESS, THE ENVIRONMENTAL
CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE RECORD OF THIS CASE POINT UNERRINGLY TO THE
INNOCENCE OF MICHAEL GATCHALIAN.
IV
THE RULES ON EVIDENCE ON BURDEN OF PROOF AND OF THE STANDING
PRESUMPTIONS IN LAW HAVE BEEN GROSSLY VIOLATED.
V testimony that on their first trip to the subdivision she parked her car infront of the Vizconde house
MICHAEL GATCHALIAN RESPECTFULLY INVOKES HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS ON THE GROUNDS OF BIAS AND PREJUDICE, AND FOR ALL THAT IT IS WORTH,
HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL AND A SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF HIS
CASE.109
Evidence Cases
Additionally, Gatchalian assails the denial by the trial court of his motion (and also appellant
Webb’s) for DNA testing despite a certification from the NBI that the specimen semen remained
intact, which Justice Tagle in his dissenting opinion also found as unjust. He further argues that the
right to a speedy trial is violated even if the delay was not caused by the prosecution but by events
that are not within the control of the prosecution or the courts. Thus, the length of time which took
Alfaro to come forward and testify in this case is most conspicuous. Her delay of four (4) years in
reporting the crime has to be taken against her, particularly with the story behind it. She
volunteered to come forward only after the arrests of previous accused did not lead anywhere.
Moreover, it is clear that she adopted the version previously advanced by an "akyat-bahay" gang,
as noted by Justice Dacudao in his dissenting opinion. Gatchalian thus contends that the delay
occurred even before a preliminary investigation was conducted and cites cases upholding the right
of accused persons to a speedy trial where there was delay in the preliminary investigation. 110
Totality of Evidence Established the
Guilt of Appelants Beyond Reasonable Doubt
Appellants assail the lower courts in giving full faith and credence to the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses, particularly Jessica Alfaro despite inconsistencies and contradictions in her
two (2) affidavits, and the alleged "piece by piece discarding" of their voluminous documentary
exhibits and testimonies of no less than ninety-five (95) witnesses. They contend that the totality of
evidence engenders a reasonable doubt entitling them to acquittal from the grave charge of rape
After a thorough and conscientious review of the records, I firmly believe that the CA correctly
upheld the conviction of appellants.
Credibility of Prosecution
Witnesses
The determination of the competence and credibility of a witness rests primarily with the trial court,
because it has the unique position of observing the witness’ deportment on the stand while
testifying.111 It is a fundamental rule that findings of the trial courts which are factual in nature and
which involve credibility are accorded respect when no glaring errors, gross misapprehensions of
facts and speculative, arbitrary and unsupported conclusions can be gathered from such
findings.112 When the trial court’s findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings
are generally conclusive and binding upon this Court.113
Reexamining the testimony of Alfaro, who underwent exhaustive and intense cross-examination by
eight (8) defense lawyers, it is to be noted that she revealed such details and observations which
only a person who was actually with the perpetrators could have known. More importantly, her
testimony was corroborated on its material points by the declarations of other prosecution
witnesses, to wit: [1] that their convoy of three (3) vehicles repeatedly entered the Pitong Daan
Subdivision on the night of June 29, 1991 was confirmed by the security guard on duty, Normal
White, Jr., who also testified that he had seen Gatchalian and his group standing at the vicinity of
the Almogino residence located near the end of Vinzons St., which is consistent with Alfaro’s
while appellants parked their respective cars near the dead end of Vinzons St.; [2] that Ventura
climbed on the hood of the Nissan Sentra car and loosened the light bulb to turn it off was
confirmed by the testimony of Birrer and appellant Biong that they found a shoe print on the hood of
the car parked inside the garage of the Vizconde house; even defense witnesses Dennis Almogino
(neighbor of the Vizcondes) and SPO2 Reynaldo Carbonnel declared that the garage was totally
without light; [3] that a lady’s bag was on top of the dining table in the kitchen was likewise
confirmed by Birrer and Biong; [4] that a loud static sound coming from the TV set inside the
master’s bedroom which led Alfaro to the said room, matched with the observations of the Vizconde
Page | 19
housemaids, Birrer and Biong that when they went inside the Vizconde house in the morning of
June 30, 1991, the TV set inside the master’s bedroom was still turned on with a loud sound; [5] the
positioning of the dead bodies of Carmela, Estrellita and Jennifer and their physical appearance or
condition (hogtied, gagged and bloodied) was correctly described by Alfaro, consistent with the
declarations of White, Jr., Birrer and Biong who were among those who first saw the bodies in the
morning of June 30, 1991; [6] that Carmela was raped by Webb and how the three (3) women were
killed as Alfaro learned from the conversation of the appellants at the BF Executive Village house,
was consistent with the findings of Dr. Cabanayan who conducted the autopsy and post-mortem
examination of the cadavers in the morning of June 30, 1991 showing that the victims died of
multiple stab wounds, the specimen taken from Carmela’s vaginal canal tested positive for
spermatozoa and the approximate time of death based on the onset of rigor mortis, which would
place it between midnight and 2:00 o’clock in the morning of June 30, 1991; [7] that Webb, just
before going out of the gate of the Vizconde house, threw a stone which broke the glass frame of
the main door, jibed with the testimony of Birrer who likewise saw a stone near the broken glass
panel at the living room of the Vizconde house, and Biong himself testified that he even
demonstrated to Capt. Bartolome and the housemaids the loud sound by again hitting the glass of
the main door;114and [8] that after Webb made a call on his cellular phone, Biong arrived at around
2:00 o’clock in the morning of June 30, 1991 at the BF Executive Village house where she and
appellants retreated, was consistent with the testimony of Birrer that Biong left the "mahjong"
session to answer a telephone call between 1:00 to 2:00 o’clock in the morning of June 30, 1991
and thereafter Birrer asked where he was going, to which Biong replied "BF" and shortly thereafter
a taxicab with a man at the backseat fetched Biong.
Indeed, Alfaro could not have divulged the foregoing details of the crime if she did not really join the
group of Webb in going to the Vizconde residence and witness what happened during the time
Webb, Lejano and Ventura were inside the house and when the group retreated to BF Executive
Village. Contrary to appellants’ contention, Alfaro’s detailed testimony appears clear and
convincing, thus giving the Court the impression that she was sincere and credible. She even
opened her personal life to public scrutiny by admitting that she was addicted to shabu for
sometime and that was how she came to meet Webb’s group and got entangled in the plot to gang-
rape Carmela. Her being a former drug user in no way taints her credibility as a witness. The fact
that a witness is a person of unchaste character or even a drug dependent does not per se affect
her credibility.115
Alfaro’s ability to recollect events that occurred four (4) years ago with her mental condition that
night of June 29, 1991 when she admittedly took shabu three (3) times and even sniffed cocaine,
was likewise questioned by the appellants. When the question was posed to Alfaro on cross-
examination, she positively stated that while indeed she had taken shabu at that time, her
perception of persons and events around her was not diminished. Her faculties unimpaired by the
drugs she had taken that night, Alfaro was able to vividly recall what transpired the whole time she
was with appellants. Alfaro testified that even if she was then a regular shabu user, she had not
reached that point of being paranoid ("praning"). It was the first time Alfaro sniffed cocaine and she
described its initial effect as being "stoned," but lasting only five (5) to seven (7) minutes. However,
she did not fall asleep since shabu and "coke" are not downers.
Alfaro further explained her indifference and apathy in not dissuading Webb and her group from
carrying out their evil plan against Carmela as due to the numbing effect of drugs, which also
enabled her to dislodge from her mind the harrowing images of the killings for quite sometime.
Eventually, the chance to redeem herself came when she was invited to a Christian fellowship, and
with her child’s future in mind, her desire to transform her life grew stronger. As she cast off her
addiction to drugs, its desensitizing effect began to wear off and her conscience bothered her no
end. Under such circumstances, the delay of four (4) years in admitting her involvement in the
Vizconde killings cannot be taken against Alfaro. In fact, she had to muster enough courage to
finally come out in the open considering that during her last encounter with appellants at a
discotheque in 1995, she was threatened by appellant Rodriguez that if she will not keep her mouth
Evidence Cases
shut, she will be killed. He even offered her a plane ticket for her to go abroad. Coming from
wealthy and influential families, and capable of barbaric acts she had already seen, appellants
instilled such fear in Alfaro that her reluctance to report to the authorities was perfectly
understandable.
I find that the circumstances of habitual drug use and delay in reporting a crime did not affect the
competence and credibility of prosecution witness Alfaro. It bears stressing that the fact of delay
alone does not work against the witnesses. Delay or vacillation in making a criminal accusation
does not necessarily impair the credibility of the witness if such delay is satisfactorily explained. 116
Besides, appellants failed to adduce any evidence to establish any improper motive that may have
impelled Alfaro to falsely testify against them, other than their allegation that she regularly
associated with NBI agents as one (1) of their informants. The absence of evidence of improper
motive on the part of the said witness for the prosecution strongly tends to sustain the conclusion
that no such improper motive exists and that her testimony is worthy of full faith and
credit.117 Neither had appellants established any ill-motive on the part of the other prosecution
witnesses.
Inconsistencies and Discrepancies in Alfaro’s April 28, 1995 and May 22, 1995 Affidavits
Appellants, from the start of preliminary investigation, have repeatedly harped on the discrepancies
and inconsistencies in Alfaro’s first and second affidavits. However, this Court has repeatedly ruled
that whenever there is inconsistency between the affidavit and the testimony of a witness in court,
the testimony commands greater weight.118 With greater relevance should this rule apply in
situations when a subsequent affidavit of the prosecution witness is intended to amplify and correct
inconsistencies with the first affidavit, the discrepancies having been adequately explained. We
held in People v. Sanchez119
...we advert to that all-too familiar rule that discrepancies between sworn statements and
testimonies made at the witness stand do not necessarily discredit the witnesses. Sworn
statements/affidavits are generally subordinated in importance to open court declarations because
the former are often executed when an affiant’s mental faculties are not in such a state as to afford
him a fair opportunity of narrating in full the incident which has transpired. Testimonies given during
trials are much more exact and elaborate. Thus, testimonial evidence carries more weight than
sworn statements/affidavits.120
Alfaro explained the circumstances surrounding her execution of the first Affidavit dated April 28,
1995 which was done without the presence of a lawyer and at the house of agent Mario Garcia
where she was brought by Atty. Sacaguing and Moises Tamayo, another agent of task force Anti-
Kidnapping, Hijack and Robbery (AKHAR). The unusual questioning of these men gave her the
impression that she was merely being used to boost their career promotion and her distrust was
even heightened when they absolutely failed to provide her security. She was aghast upon
discovering the completed affidavit which falsely stated that it was made in the presence of her
lawyer of choice (Atty. Mercader who was not actually present). Agent Tamayo also incorporated
inaccurate or erroneous information indicating that she was a college graduate even if she tried to
correct him. Tamayo simply told her to just let it remain in the statement as it would not be noticed
anyway.121 Moreover, on account of her urgent concern for her own security and fear of implicating
herself in the case, Alfaro admitted down playing her own participation in her narration (including
the circumstance that she had previously met Carmela before the incident) and those of her ex-
boyfriend Estrada and her relative, Gatchalian.
Prosecution Evidence Sufficient to Convict Appellants
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This Court has consistently held that the rule on the trial court’s appreciation of evidence must bow
to the superior rule that the prosecution must prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt. The law presumes an accused innocent, and this presumption must prevail unless
overturned by competent and credible proof.122 Thus, we are tasked to consider two crucial points
in sustaining a judgment of conviction: first, the identification of the accused as perpetrator of the
crime, taking into account the credibility of the prosecution witness who made the identification as
well as the prosecution’s compliance with legal and constitutional standards; and second, all the
elements constituting the crime were duly proven by the prosecution to be present. 123
There appears to be no question about the fact that a horrible and most unfortunate crime has been
committed. It is, in this case, indeed a given fact, but next to it is the pivotal issue of whether or not
the prosecution has been able to discharge its equal burden in substantiating the identities of
accused-appellants as the perpetrators of the crime. As well said often, conviction must rest on the
strength of the prosecution’s case and not on the weakness of the defense.
Positive Identification
of Accused-Appellants
Eyewitness identification constitutes vital evidence and, in most cases, decisive of the success or
failure of the prosecution.124 Both the RTC and CA found the eyewitness testimony of Alfaro
credible and competent proof that appellants Webb, Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Rodriguez and
Estrada were at the scene of the crime and that Webb raped Carmela as the bloodied bodies of her
mother and sister lay on top of the bed inside the master’s bedroom, and right beside it stood
Lejano while Ventura was preparing for their escape. At another house in BF Executive Village
where the group retreated after leaving the Vizconde house, Alfaro witnessed the blaming session,
particularly between Ventura and Webb, and thereupon learned from their conversation that
Carmela’s mother and sister were stabbed to death before she herself was killed. Alfaro likewise
positively identified appellant Biong, whom somebody from the group described as the driver and
bodyguard of the Webb family, as the person ordered by Webb to "clean the Vizconde house."
The testimony of Alfaro on its material points was corroborated by Birrer, Dr. Cabanayan, White,
Jr., Cabanacan and Gaviola. Appellants’ presence at the scene of the crime before, during and
after its commission was duly established. Their respective participation, acts and declarations
were likewise detailed by Alfaro who was shown to be a credible witness. It is axiomatic that a
witness who testifies in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner and remains
consistent on cross-examination is a credible witness.125
A criminal case rises or falls on the strength of the prosecution’s case, not on the weakness of the
defense. Once the prosecution overcomes the presumption of innocence by proving the elements
of the crime and the identity of the accused as perpetrator beyond reasonable doubt, the burden of
evidence then shifts to the defense which shall then test the strength of the prosecution’s case
either by showing that no crime was in fact committed or that the accused could not have
committed or did not commit the imputed crime, or at the very least, by casting doubt on the guilt of
the accused.126
Appellants’ Alibi and Denial
We have held in a number of cases that alibi is an inherently weak and unreliable defense, for it is
easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove.127 To establish alibi, the accused must prove (a) that he
was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was
physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime. Physical impossibility "refers to the
distance between the place where the accused was when the crime transpired and the place where
Evidence Cases
it was committed, as well as the facility of access between the two places."128 Due to its doubtful
nature, alibi must be supported by clear and convincing proof.129
"Alibi, the plea of having been elsewhere than at the scene of the crime at the time of the
commission of the felony, is a plausible excuse for the accused. Let there be no mistake about it.
Contrary to the common notion, alibi is in fact a good defense. But, to be valid for purposes of
exoneration from a criminal charge, the defense of alibi must be such that it would have been
physically impossible for the person charged with the crime to be at the locus criminis at the
time of its commission, the reason being that no person can be in two places at the same
time. The excuse must be so airtight that it would admit of no exception. Where there is the
least possibility of accused’s presence at the crime scene, the alibi will not hold
water. 130 [emphasis supplied.]
The claim of appellant Webb that he could not have committed the crime because he left for the
United States on March 9, 1991 and returned to the Philippines only on October 26, 1992 was
correctly rejected by the RTC and CA. These dates are so distant from the time of the commission
of the crime, June 29, 1991 and June 30, 1991, and it would not have been impossible during the
interregnum for Webb to travel back to the country and again fly to the US several times
considering that the travel time on board an airline from the Philippines to San Francisco, and from
San Francisco to the Philippines takes only about twelve (12) to fourteen (14) hours. Given the
financial resources and political influence of his family, it was not unlikely that Webb could have
traveled back to the Philippines before June 29-30, 1991 and then departed for the US again, and
returning to the Philippines in October 1992. There clearly exists, therefore, such possibility of
Webb’s presence at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission, and his excuse cannot be
deemed airtight.
This Court in People v. Larrañaga131 had similarly rejected the defense of alibi of an accused,
involving a shorter travel distance (Quezon City to Cebu) and even shorter period of time showing
the least possibility of an accused’s presence at the time of the commission of the crime (a matter
of hours) than in the case at bar (March 9, 1991 to June 29, 1991 which is three [3] months). In
denying the motion for reconsideration of accused Larrañaga, we held that accused Larrañaga
failed to establish his defense of alibi, which is futile in the face of positive identification:
This case presents to us a balance scale whereby perched on one end is appellants’ alibi
supported by witnesses who were either their relatives, friends or classmates, while on the other
end is the positive identification of the herein appellants by the prosecution witnesses who were
not, in any way, related to the victims. With the above jurisprudence as guide, we are certain that
the balance must tilt in favor of the latter.
Besides, a thorough examination of the evidence for the prosecution shows that the appellants
failed to meet the requirements of alibi, i.e., the requirements of time and place. They failed to
establish by clear and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for them to be at the
Ayala Center, Cebu City when the Chiong sisters were abducted. What is clear from the evidence is
that Rowen, Josman, Ariel, Alberto, James Anthony and James Andrew were all within the vicinity
of Cebu City on July 16, 1997.
Not even Larrañaga who claimed to be in Quezon City satisfied the required proof of physical
impossibility. During the hearing, it was shown that it takes only one (1) hour to travel by plane
from Manila to Cebu and that there are four (4) airline companies plying the route. One of the
defense witnesses admitted that there are several flights from Manila to Cebu each morning,
afternoon and evening. Indeed, Larrañaga’s presence in Cebu City on July 16, 1997 was
proved to be not only a possibility but a reality. Four (4) witnesses identified Larrañaga as
one of the two men talking to Marijoy and Jacqueline on the night of July 16, 1997. Shiela
Singson testified that on July 16, 1997, at around 7:20 in the evening, she saw Larrañaga approach
Page | 21
Marijoy and Jacqueline at the West Entry of Ayala Center. The incident reminded her of incompetent or irrelevant. I quote with approval the CA’s findings which are well-supported by the
Jacqueline’s prior story that he was Marijoy’s admirer. Shiela confirmed that she knows Larrañaga evidence on record:
since she had seen him on five (5) occasions. Analie Konahap also testified that on the same
evening of July 16, 1997, at about 8:00 o’clock, she saw Marijoy and Jacqueline talking to two (2)
(a) U.S. INS Certifications
men at the West Entry of Ayala Center. She recognized the two (2) men as Larrañaga and Josman,
having seen them several times at Glicos, a game zone, located across her office at the third level
of Ayala Center. Williard Redobles, the security guard then assigned at Ayala Center, corroborated xxxx
the foregoing testimonies of Shiela and Analie. In addition, Rosendo Rio, a businessman from
Cogon, Carcar, declared that he saw Larrañaga at Tan-awan at about 3:30 in the morning of July
The Court seriously doubts that evidentiary weight could be ascribed to the August 31, 1995 and
17, 1997. The latter was leaning against the hood of a white van. And over and above all, Rusia
October 13, 1995 Certifications of the U.S. INS and computer print-out of the Nonimmigrant
categorically identified Larrañaga as one of the participes criminis. 132[emphasis supplied]
Information System (NIIS) which allegedly established Webb’s entry to and exit from the United
States. This is due to the fallibility demonstrated by the US INS with regard to the certifications
In the light of relevant precedents, I find no reversible error committed by the RTC in refusing to which the said office issued regarding the basic information under its direct control and custody.
give credence to appellant Webb’s argument that he could not have committed the crime of rape
with homicide because he was still in the US on June 29 and 30, 1991. The RTC thus correctly
It is to be remembered that as part of his evidence, Webb presented the explanation of one Steven
ruled:
P. Bucher, Acting Chief of Records Services Branch of the U.S. INS, who admitted that the U.S.
INS had previously reported on August 10, 1995, erroneously, that it had no record of the arrival
Granting for the sake of argument that the claim of departure for the United States of the accused and departure of Webb to and from the United States. The said office later on admitted that it failed
Webb on March 9, 1991 and his arrival in the Philippines on October 26, 1992 had been duly to exhaustively study all information available to it. We are not convinced with this explanation. It is
established by the defense, it cannot prove that he remained in the United States during the to be noted that the U.S. INS is an agency well known for its stringent criteria and rigid procedure in
intervening period. During the long span of time between March, 1991 to October, 1992, it was handling documents relating to one’s travel into and out of its territory. Such being the case, it
not physically impossible for the accused Webb to have returned to the Philippines, would therefore be hard to imagine that the said agency would issue a certification that it had no
perpetrate the criminal act, and travel back to the United States. record of a person’s entry into and exit from the United States without first conducting an efficient
verification of its records.
It must be noted that the accused Webb is a scion of a rich, influential, and politically powerful
family with the financial capacity to travel back and forth from the Philippines to the United States. We do not also believe that a second search could give rise to a different conclusion, considering
He could very well afford the price of a plane ticket to free him from all sorts of trouble. Since there that there is no showing that the records searched were different from those viewed in the first
are numerous airlines plying the route from Manila to the United States, it cannot be said that there search. The later certifications issued by the U.S. INS modifying its first certification and which was
was lack of available means to transport. Moreover, the lapse of more than three (3) months from issued only a few weeks earlier, come across as a strained effort by Webb at establishing his
the time the accused Webb left the Philippines for the United States on March 9, 1991 to June 29 presence in the United States in order to reinforce his flimsy alibi.
and 30, 1991 when the crime was committed is more than enough time for the accused Webb to
have made several trips from the United States to the Philippines and back. The Court takes judicial
It is not amiss to note that a reading of the first Certificate of Non-existence of Record (Exhibit "212-
notice of the fact that it only requires the short period of approximately eighteen (18) hours to
D") subscribed by Debora A. Farmer of the U.S. INS would show that the U.S. INS had made a
reach the Philippines from the United States, with the advent of modern travel.
"diligent" search, and found no record of admission into the United States of Webb. The search
allegedly included an inquiry into the automated and non-automated records systems of the U.S.
It must likewise be noted that the father of the accused Webb, besides being rich and influential, INS. Be it also noted that the basis of the U.S. INS second certification (Exhibit "218") was a
was at that time in 1991, the Congressman of Parañaque and later became a Senator of the printout coming also from automated information systems.
Republic of the Philippines. Thus, the Webb money and connections were at the disposal of the
accused Webb, and it is worthy of belief that the accused Webb could have departed and entered
As pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General in its appeal brief, "how it became possible
the country without any traces whatsoever of his having done so. In fact, defense witness Andrea
for the U.S. INS Archives in Washington, which is supposed to merely download and copy
Domingo, former Commissioner of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation testified on the
the information given by the San Francisco INS, to have an entry on accused-appellant
practice of "human smuggling" at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport.
Webb when the said port of entry had no such record was never sufficiently addressed by
the defense."
On this point, the Supreme Court has declared in a case that even the lapse of the short period of
one (1) week was sufficient for an accused to go to one place, to go to another place to commit a
It is with this view that the Court recognizes little if not nil probative value in the second certification
crime, and then return to his point of origin. The principal factor considered by the Supreme Court in
of the U.S. INS.
denying the defense of alibi in People vs. Jamero(24 SCRA 206) was the availability to the
accused of the means by which to commit a crime elsewhere and then return to his refuge. x
x x133 [emphasis supplied] xxxx

There is likewise no merit in appellant Webb’s contention that the CA misappreciated his (b) Passenger Manifest of United Airlines Flight
voluminous documentary evidence and numerous witnesses who testified on his stay in the US.
The CA, after a meticulous and painstaking reevaluation of Webb’s documentary and testimonial
evidence, sustained the RTC’s conclusion that these pieces of evidence were either inadmissible,
Evidence Cases Page | 22
The purported passenger manifest for the United Airlines flight that allegedly conveyed accused-
appellant Webb for the United States, was not identified by the United Airlines personnel who
actually prepared and completed the same. Instead, the defense presented Dulcisimo Daluz, the
supervisor of customer services of United Airlines in Manila, who had no hand in the actual
preparation or safekeeping of the said passenger manifest. It must be stressed that to satisfactorily
prove the due execution of a private document, the testimony of the witness with regard to the
execution of the said document must be positive. Such being the case, his testimony thereto is at
most hearsay and therefore not worthy of any credit.
Likewise, we note that the said passenger manifest produced in court is a mere photocopy and
the same did not comply with the strict procedural requirement of the airline company, that
is, all the checking agents who were on duty on March 9, 1991 must sign or initial the
passenger manifest. This further lessens the credibility of the said document.
(c) United Airline Ticket
...the alleged United Airline ticket of accused-appellant Webb offered in evidence is a mere
photocopy of an alleged original, which was never presented below. Other than the
submission that the original could no longer be produced in evidence, there is no other proof that
there ever was an original airline ticket in the name of Webb. This does not satisfy the requirements
set forth under Section 5 of Rule 130. x x x we find that the photocopy presented in evidence has
little if no probative value. Even assuming there was such an original ticket in existence, the same
is hardly of any weight, in the absence of clear proof that the same was indeed used by accused-
appellant Webb to go to the United States.
(d) Philippine passport
The passport of accused-appellant Webb produced in evidence, and the inscriptions appearing
thereon, also offer little support of Webb’s alibi. Be it noted that what appears on record is only
the photocopy of the pages of Webb’s passport. The Court therefore can only rely on the
appreciation of the trial court as regards the authenticity of the passport and the marks appearing
thereon, as it is the trial court that had the exclusive opportunity to view at first hand the original of
the document, and determine for itself whether the same is entitled to any weight in evidence.
(e) Video footage of accused-appellant Webb’s parents in Disneyland and Yosemite Park.
The video footage serendipitously taken by Victor Yap allegedly of Senator Webb and his family
while on vacation at Disneyland in Anaheim, California on July 3, 1991 does little to support
the alibi of accused-appellant Webb for it is quite interesting to note that nowhere did accused-
appellant Webb appear in this footage. None of the people shown in the film was identified as
the accused-appellant Webb. Moreover, the records disclose that just before the segment of the
film that showed Senator Webb, there was a gap or portion of static that appeared which did not
appear in any other portion of the footage. We find that this supports the conclusion that the
videotape was possibly tampered as an additional support to the alibi of accused-appellant that
he was in the United States.
xxxx
(f) Video footage at Lake Tahoe and the del Toro-Manlapit Wedding
...the video footage showing accused-appellant Webb seemingly on holiday at Lake Tahoe with the
Wheelocks, to our mind does not disprove that Webb was in the country at the time of the Vizconde
Evidence Cases
killing. Firstly, the date being shown intermittently in the footage was not the same or near the
date of the Vizconde killing. As we have earlier stated, we do not discount the possibility that
Webb was in the Philippines during the time he was supposed to have been in the United States,
especially, when there are eyewitnesses who testified to the effect that Webb was in the Philippines
only a couple of weeks before the killing and who also testified of Webb’s participation in the crime.
In any case, we take judicial notice that modern electronic and photographic advances could offer a
means to splice or modify recorded images to configure to a desired impression, including the
insertion or annotation of numeric figures on a recorded image.
Likewise, the videotape and photographs taken on Alex del Toro’s wedding also fail to convince, as
this was allegedly taken on October 10, 1992 well after the fateful days of June 29 and 30,
1991.
(g) Photograph of Webb and Christopher Esguerra before the Dee Lite Concert
The photograph of accused-appellant Webb with Esguerra allegedly taken in late April 1991 before
they went to a band concert has little probative value. It must be pointed out that the image in the
picture itself does not depict the date or place it was taken, or of any Dee Lite concert
allegedly attended by Webb. Likewise, we observed that the photograph appears to have
been trimmed down from a bigger size, possibly to remove the date printed therein. It is also to
be noted that Esguerra admitted that the inscription appearing at the back of the photograph of,
"Hubert and I before the Dee Lite Concert, April 1991" was only written by him in 1995, after it was
given to him by accused-appellant’s mother, Elizabeth, before he took the witness stand. The Court
cannot therefore but cast suspicion as to its authenticity.
(h) Webb’s Driver’s License
We agree with the trial court's observation that the Driver’s License allegedly obtained by
accused-appellant from the California Department of Motor Vehicle sometime in the first
week of June 1991 is unworthy of credit, because of the inconsistencies in Webb’s
testimony as to how he obtained the same. In one testimony, Webb claimed he did not make an
application but just walked in the licensing office and he did not submit any photograph relative to
his application. In a later testimony, he claimed that he submitted an ID picture for his driver’s
license, and that the picture appearing on his driver’s license was the very same picture he
submitted together with his application for the driver’s license. These are two inconsistent
testimonies on the same subject matter, which render the said driver’s license and the alleged date
when the same was obtained, unworthy of credit.
(i) Logbook of Alex del Toro and Check Payments of Webb’s salary
The employment records of accused-appellant, which include the alleged logbook of del Toro in his
pest control business, and check payments to Webb were also offered to support the latter’s
alleged presence in the United States on the dates near the day of the Vizconde killings. A review
of the logbook shows that the same is unworthy of any evidentiary weight. The entries where the
accused Webb were indicated to have performed work for del Toro, showed that the name of
Webb ("Hubie"/"U.B.") was merely superimposed on the actual entries and could have been
easily fabricated to create the impression that Webb had some participation in the business of del
Toro, and therefore, are not reliable proofs of Webb’s presence and occupation in the United States
around the time of the Vizconde killing.
The alleged check payments of Webb’s salary are also unreliable. The check dated June 13, 1991
was made payable to "Cash", while the other check which appeared to be payable to "Hubert
Webb" was however dated only July 10, 1991. Neither of the said checks squarely placed
Page | 23
accused-appellant Webb in the United States at the time of the Vizconde killings. Simply put,
neither check is therefore clear proof to support Webb’s alibi.
(j) Bicycle/Sportscar
The Toyota MR2 sportscar and Cannondale bicycle allegedly purchased by accused-appellant
Webb and his father in the United States appear to have been purchased with great haste, and
under suspicious circumstances.
Consider that immediately after the accused-appellant’s father, former Senator Freddie Webb,
arrived in the United States, the first thing he did was go out with his friend Honesto Aragon and
accused-appellant to look for a bicycle and a car to be used by the latter in going to and from work.
The car was bought sometime in early July 1991 and the bicycle sometime on June 30, 1991. It is a
wonder to this Court that the accused-appellant and his father would buy a bicycle and a sportscar
at practically the same time to provide the accused-appellant transportation to his work. Would not
just a car or a bicycle do for him? Also, the hurried purchase of the car right after the arrival of
Freddie Webb appears at the very least, suspicious, as a prospective car-buyer would
understandably want to make a canvas first for the best car to buy, and not just to purchase the first
car he sees.
Moreover, as aptly observed by the trial court, though it was made clear that the purpose of
purchasing the said bicycle and car was for accused-appellant’s convenience in going to and from
his work -- we find, that this contradicts the other evidence presented by accused-appellant
because it appears from his evidence that other than his brief stint in del Toro’s pest control
company business and his employment as a gasoline station attendant which incidentally was not
sufficiently proven, all that accused-appellant did in the United States was to go sightseeing,
shopping and meet with family and friends.
Lastly, the fact that the car and the bicycle were allegedly purchased in close proximity to the date
of the rape and killing of the Vizconde women does little to dissuade the perception that the car and
bicycle were purchased only for the purpose of providing a plausible defense of alibi for Webb.
(k) Letters to Jennifer Claire Cabrera
Cabrera, a friend and neighbor of accused-appellant in BF Homes, Parañaque, produced four (4)
letters allegedly written and sent to her by Webb while he was in the United States, in order to
support the accused-appellant’s alibi. These were allegedly the only letters sent by Webb to her.
The letters were allegedly written and posted at around the same time the Vizconde rape and killing
happened, such that, if the letters were to be duly considered, they would place Webb in the United
States at the same time the June 30, 1991 killings occurred; thus, bolstering Webb’s defense
of alibi.
However, the said letters, to our mind, are not convincing proof of alibi, inasmuch said letters were
produced only in 1995 at the time she gave a statement, and the same time Webb was charged.
However, Cabrera admitted that she knew Webb was being involved or accused in the Vizconde
killings as early as 1991 and that she was shocked upon learning that he was being implicated
therein.
The Court finds it incredible that despite being shocked in 1991, about the involvement of her
friend, accused-appellant in the Vizconde rape-slay, Cabrera would wait until 1995 to "produce" the
letters that could have cleared her friend’s name. An interregnum of four years before coming out
Evidence Cases
with valuable proof in support of a friend is to our mind, a telling factor on the credibility of the
alleged letters.
Also, the impression that may be inferred from reading the letters was one of a man who was pining
away for his ladylove. Webb was quite expressive with his feelings when he wrote that he missed
Cabrera, "a lot," yet after only four letters that was conveniently written sometime in June 1991, he
thereafter stopped writing letters to Cabrera as if the whole matter was already forgotten. It is highly
suspicious therefore that the only letters of accused-appellant Webb to Cabrera were written and
sent at the exact opportune time that the Vizconde killings occurred which conveniently supplied a
basis for his defense of alibi.
Moreover, from the contents of the letters, we can deduce that there was some sort of romantic
relationship with the accused-appellant Webb and Cabrera. In fact, Webb in his letters referred to
Cabrera as his "sweetheart" and "dearest", and confessed to her that all he thinks about was her,
and he was hoping he would dream of her at night. It is not improbable, therefore, that Cabrera
could have prevaricated herself to save her friend.
In sum, accused-appellant tried vainly to establish his defense of alibi with the presentation of not
only a substantial volume of documentary evidence but also testimonies of an overwhelming
number of witnesses which were comprised mostly of relatives and family friends who obviously
wanted him to be exonerated of the crime charged. It is for this reason that we regard their
testimonies with an eye of suspicion for it is but natural, although morally unfair, for a close relative
or friend to give weight to blood ties and close relationship in times of dire needs especially when a
criminal case is involved.134 [emphasis supplied]
The rule is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that in determining the value and credibility of
evidence, witnesses are to be weighed, not numbered. The testimony of only one witness, if
credible and positive, is sufficient to convict.135As to appellant Webb’s voluminous documentary
evidence, both the RTC and CA judiciously examined each exhibit and concluded that these do not
pass the test of admissibility and materiality insofar as proving the physical impossibility of his
presence at the Vizconde residence on June 29, 1991 until the early morning of June 30, 1991.
Appellant Webb cites the opposite view taken by Justices Tagle and Dacudao in their dissenting
opinions and urges this Court to accord the US INS certification and other documents relative to his
arrival and departure in the US on the dates March 9, 1991 and October 26, 1992, respectively, the
presumption of regularity being official documents issued by US authorities. Justices Tagle and
Dacudao concurred in stating that the conclusion of their three (3) colleagues (majority) that the US
INS certifications did not exclude the possibility of Webb traveling back to the Philippines and again
departing for the US between March 9, 1991 and October 26, 1992 -- is nothing but speculation and
conjecture. Webb further mentions that since a Justice of this Court "confirmed appellant Webb’s
alibi of being in the United States on 29 June 1991[,] [a]t the very least, such exculpatory testimony
coupled with the plethora of appellant Webb’s other documentary and testimonial evidence on his
presence in the United States on 29 June 1991 raises reasonable doubt as to appellant Webb’s
guilt of the crime charged."136
I find the contentions bereft of merit.
In the first place, let it be emphasized that Justice Carpio’s testimony before the trial court
confirmed merely the fact that his conversation with then Congressman Webb took place on June
29, 1991 and what the latter relayed to him about his location at the time such telephone call was
made, who was with him in the US (his wife and appellant Webb) and the purpose of their US trip
(to find a job for appellant Webb). Said witness even admitted that he had no personal knowledge
Page | 24
that appellant Webb was in fact in the United States at the time of his telephone conversation with
Congressman Webb.137
As to the travel documents consisting of his US passport, US INS certifications and other evidence
presented by appellant Webb in support of his alibi, while it is true that such presentation of
passport, plane ticket and other travel documents can serve as proof that he was indeed out of the
country at the time of the Vizconde killings,138 it must still be shown that the evidence is clear and
convincing, and the totality of such evidence constitutes an airtight excuse as to exclude the least
possibility of his presence at the crime scene. However, appellant Webb failed in this regard and
the RTC and CA did not err in giving scant weight to his arsenal of evidence, particularly so on the
strength of the positive identification of appellant Webb as Carmela’s rapist and one of those who
actually took part in the brutal killing of Carmela, her mother and sister between midnight of June
29, 1991 and early morning of June 30, 1991.
Indeed, alibi cannot be sustained where it is not only without credible corroboration, but also where
it does not, on its face, demonstrate the physical impossibility of the accused’s presence at the
place and time of the commission of the crime.139 Against positive evidence, alibi becomes most
unsatisfactory. Alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of a credible witness.140 Appellant
Webb was placed at the crime scene by Alfaro who positively identified him as the one (1) who
plotted and committed the rape of Carmela, and later fatally stabbed her, her mother and sister,
aided by or in concert with Lejano and Ventura. Gaviola and Cabanacan gave corroborating
testimonies that appellant Webb was here in the country, as he was just in his house at BF Homes
Subdivision Phase III, at least a few weeks prior to and on June 29 to 30, 1991.
Verily, it is only when the identification of the accused as the author of the crime charged is
inconclusive or unreliable that alibi assumes importance. Such is not the situation in the case at bar
where the identification of the perpetrators by a lone eyewitness satisfied the moral certainty
standard.
It is the prosecution’s burden to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Definitely,
"reasonable doubt" is not mere guesswork whether or not the accused is guilty, but such
uncertainty that "a reasonable man may entertain after a fair review and consideration of the
evidence." Reasonable doubt is present when --
after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidences, leaves the minds of the [judges]
in that condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the
truth of the charge; a certainty that convinces and directs the understanding, and satisfies the
reason and judgment of those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it.141
That reasonable doubt is not engendered by the presentation of certifications of entry into and exit
from the US, passport with stamp marks of departure and declarations of witnesses who are mostly
relatives and friends of appellant Webb, can be gleaned from the fact that passports and plane
tickets indicating dates of arrival and departure do not necessarily prove that the very same person
actually took the flight. This Court takes judicial notice of reported irregularities and tampering of
passports in the years prior to the recent issuance by the DFA of machine-readable passports. In
fact, the proliferation of photo-substituted passports, fake immigration stamps, assumed identity
and double passports, among others, have been cited as grounds to justify the necessity of
amending the Philippine Passport Act of 1996 (R.A. No. 8239) as proposed in the Senate, "x x x to
rally for the issuance of passports using tamper proof and the latest data encryption technology;
and provide stiffer penalties against proliferators of fake passports."142
It is worthy of note I note that the original of Webb's passport was not offered in evidence and made
part of the records, which only gives credence to the prosecution’s allegation that it bore signs of
Evidence Cases
tampering and irregularities. And as earlier mentioned, the much vaunted US-INS second
certification dated August 31, 1995 based on a mere computer print-out from the Non-immigrant
Information System (Exhibit "213-1-D") retrieved from the US- INS Archives in Washington, and the
accompanying certifications, have little probative value, the truth of their contents had not been
testified to by the persons who issued the same. Moreover, the issuance of this certification only a
couple of weeks after the August 10, 1995 US-INS Office in San Francisco was issued, only raised
questions as to its accuracy. Said earlier certification through Debora A. Farmer stated that:
[a]fter diligent search no record is found to exist in the records of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service. The search included a review of the Service automated and
nonautomated records system; there is no evidence of any lawful admission to the United
States as an immigrant, or as a nonimmigrant, relating to Hubert P. Webb, born November 7,
1968, in the Philippines. The records searched are current as of July 1, 1995 for the
immigrants and nonimmigrants.143 [emphasis supplied]
The above finding was relayed by Thomas Schiltgen, District Director of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service, San Francisco to Ms. Teresita V. Marzan, Consul General of the Philippines:
SUBJECT: WEBB, HUBERT
RE: Hubert Jeffrey Webb
Dear Requester:
YOUR REQUEST WAS RECEIVED BY THIS OFFICE ON 07/10/95.
WE HAVE COMPLETED OUR SEARCH FOR RECORDS RESPONSIVE TO YOUR REQUEST
BUT DID NOT LOCATE ANY. IF YOU STILL BELIEVE THAT WE HAVE RECORDS WITHIN THE
SCOPE OF YOUR REQUEST, AND CAN PROVIDE US WITH ADDITIONAL INFORMATION, WE
WILL CONDUCT ANOTHER SEARCH. IF YOU ELECT TO REQUEST ANOTHER SEARCH, WE
RECOMMEND THAT YOU NOT FOLLOW THE APPEALS PROCEDURE DESCRIBED BELOW
UNTIL WE HAVE COMPLETED THAT SEARCH.
YOU MAY APPEAL THE FINDING IN THIS MATTER BY WRITING TO THE OFFICE OF
INFORMATION AND PRIVACY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SUITE 570, 1310
G. STREET, N.W., FLAG BUILDING, WASHINGTON D.C., 20530 WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS OF
RECEIPT OF THIS LETTER. YOUR LETTER SHOULD REFERENCE THE INS CONTROL
NUMBER ABOVE AND THE LETTER AND THE ENVELOPE SHOULD BE CLEARLY MARKED
FOIA/PA APPEAL.
SINCERELY,
(SGD.) DISTRICT DIRECTOR144 [emphasis supplied]
To show that the August 10, 1995 US-INS Certification was erroneous, appellant Webb presented
the Memorandum addressed to Secretary Domingo L. Siazon signed by Consul Leo M. Herrera-
Lim, the Diplomatic Note dated October 30, 1995 and the letter of Debora Farmer stating that the
San Francisco certification was erroneous.145 The prosecution, however, presented another
document which indicated that an appeal to the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Information
and Privacy yielded a negative result on any record on file that one (1) Hubert Webb arrived in the
United States on March 9, 1991, and further that Richard L. Huff, Co-Director of the Office of
Page | 25
Information and Privacy had in effect sustained as correct the US-INS San Francisco report that
there is no such data on Hubert Webb in the San Francisco database so that the Philippine
Embassy in Washington, D.C. should instead ask the assistance of other U.S. government
agencies in their search for data on appellant Webb.146
The defense endeavored to explain why the US-INS Archives in Washington could have made the
"mistake" of stating that it had no data or information on the alleged entry of appellant Webb on
March 9, 1991 and his exit on October 26, 1992. However, it had not satisfactorily addressed the
nagging question of how it became possible for the US-INS Archives in Washington, which is
supposed to merely download and copy the information given by the San Francisco INS, to have an
entry on appellant Webb when the said port of entry had no such record. Considering that many
visitors (nonimmigrants) are admittedly not entered into the NIIS database, and that diligent search
already yielded a negative response on appellant Webb’s entry into the US on March 9, 1991 as
per the August 10, 1995 Certification, as to what US government agency the alleged computer-
generated print-out in the August 31, 1995 certification actually came from remains unclear.
Appellant Webb’s reliance on the presumption of regularity of official functions, stressing the fact
that the US-INS certifications are official documents, is misplaced. The presumption leaned on is
disputable and can be overcome by evidence to the contrary.147 In this case, the existence of an
earlier negative report on the NIIS record on file concerning the entry of appellant Webb into and
his exit from the US on March 9, 1991 and October 26, 1992, respectively, had raised serious doubt
on the veracity and accuracy of the subsequently issued second certification dated August 31, 1995
which is based merely on a computer print-out of his alleged entry on March 9, 1991 and departure
on October 26, 1992.
As to the testimony of former Foreign Affairs Secretary Domingo L. Siazon, the same cannot be
given due credence since he is incompetent to testify on the contents of the August 31, 1995 US-
INS Certification, having merely received the said document in his capacity as the head of the
Department of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines. Consul Leo M. Herrera-Lim’s testimony likewise
did not carry much weight considering that its significance is confined to the fact that the document
from the US-INS was transmitted and received by the DFA. It is to be noted that the certification
issued by the Philippine Embassy with respect to the US-INS Certifications contained a disclaimer,
specifically stating that the Embassy assumed no responsibility for the contents of the annexed
document.148 The same observations regarding the "consularized certifications" was reflected in the
Decision dated April 16, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP No. 42285 ("Miguel Rodriguez v. Amelita Tolentino")
and CA-G.R. SP No. 42673 ("Hubert P. Webb v. Amelita Tolentino").149
Appellant Webb’s travel documents and other supposed paper trail of his stay in the US are
unreliable proof of his absence in the Philippines at the time of the commission of the crime
charged. The non-submission in evidence of his original passport, which was not formally
offered and made part of the records, had deprived the RTC, CA and this Court the opportunity to
examine the same. Such original is a crucial piece of evidence which unfortunately was placed
beyond judicial scrutiny.
IWe quote the following observations made by the prosecution on Webb’s passport from the appeal
brief of the OSG:
In tandem with the presentation of the various U.S. INS certifications to bolster appellant Webb’s
story of a U.S. sojourn before, during and after the commission of the offense charged, he further
anchors his defense on his passport (Exh. AAAAAA and 294) ostensibly to show, among others,
that the grant by the United States government granted him a visa effective from April 6, 1989 to
April 6, 1994 and the U.S. Immigration in San Francisco stampmarked it on March 9, 1991 (Exh.
AAAAAA-6) on page 30 thereof (Exh. AAAAAA-2 and 294-D).
Evidence Cases
On its face, what the entries in the passport plainly suggest is that appellant Webb violated U.S.
immigration laws by "overstaying" beyond the usual six-(6) month period allowed for tourists.
However, he being the son of a Senator would not unnecessarily violate U.S. immigration laws. It
would be quite easy for him to apply for and secure an extension of his authorized stay in the U.S.,
if only he requested. But why did not he or his parents secure the extension? Why was there no
evidence to show that he ever requested an extension? Did he really overstay in the U.S. or could
he simply enter and leave the U.S. and the Philippines without marking his passport? These raise
serious questions on the integrity of the passport.
Is appellant Webb really untouchable that even U.S. authorities in various states would let him get
"off the hook" without much of a fuss after his alleged brushes with the law (TSN - Hubert Webb
dated September 10, 1997, p. 82)? This is especially incredible considering that he was allegedly
apprehended in the United States near the U.S. border (Ibid., pp. 82-83) where authorities are
always on the look out for illegal aliens.
The questions involving appellant Webb’s passport are not limited to the stamp marks (or lack of
stamp marks) therein. There are unusual things about his passport which he has been unable to
explain satisfactorily.
The passport of her mother, Elizabeth Webb, for example, appears to be well preserved despite
having been used more frequently than that of appellant Webb who supposedly used it in only one
trip abroad. Not only do some of the pages appear smudged or untidy, but more significantly, the
perforations on the passport pages indicating the serial number of appellant Webb’s passport no
longer fit exactly on the pages -- that is, they are no longer aligned. The perforations are intended
not only to indicate the serial number of the passport but more importantly to countercheck
intercalations and tampering. The "non-alignment" of the perforations is thus significant.
In addition to the over-all shabby appearance of appellant Webb’s passport, what is evident is the
torn plastic portion of the dorsal page thereof near the holder’s signature. There is also the matter
of the marked difference in the signatures of appellant Webb as appearing on the dorsal side of the
passport (Exh. AAAAAA-3 and 294-A-1) as compared with that appearing on his laminated
photograph (Exh. AAAAAA-5 and 294-C-1). Of course, he tried to offer an explanation on the
variance in the two (2) signatures. All he could reason out, however, was that he wrote his name
using his normal penmanship when in a lazy mood (TSN -- Hubert Webb dated August 14, 1997, p.
27), implying that the signature appearing on his laminated photograph is his real signature. A
review of his other documentary evidence supposedly bearing his signature shows that what
appears therein is his name written in his "normal penmanship," and that it is only in the laminated
picture (Exh. AAAAAA-5 and 294-C) that such "real signature" appears. Following appellant Webb’s
explanation, it means that he was in a lazy mood all the time! 150
Two (2) more documents presented by appellant Webb deserve a close look -- his US Driver’s
License supposedly issued on June 14, 1991, and the Passenger Manifest. The RTC’s evaluation
of said documents revealed their lack of probative value, thus:
On August 14, 1997, [Webb] testified that he did not make any application since the procedure in
California provides for a walk-in system, that he did not submit any photograph relative to his
application for a Californian Driver’s License, inasmuch as a photograph of him was taken, and that,
his driver’s license was issued sometime on the first week of June, 1991. On the other hand, on
September 1, 1997, the accused suddenly and completely changed his testimony while still on
direct examination. He claims that the picture appearing on the driver’s license was the very same
he submitted together with his application for the driver’s license. Thus, the discrepancy as to the
source of the photograph (Exhibit "334-E") between the testimony given on August 14, 1997 where
the accused Webb said that the California Department of Motor Vehicle took his picture, and the
testimony given on September 1, 1997 where he said that he submitted it to the California DMV as
Page | 26
an attachment to his supposed driver’s license application renders the accused Webb’s testimony
as unbelievable and unworthy of credence.
It is beyond belief that the same picture submitted by the accused Webb became the picture in the
driver’s license allegedly issued on June 14, 1991. Moreover, it is contrary to human nature and
experience, aside from the fact that it is likewise contrary to the procedure described by the
accused Webb in obtaining a driver’s license in the State of California. Since a driver’s license is
one of the principal means of identification in the United States as well as in the Philippines, to
allow the applicants to produce their own pictures would surely defeat the purpose in requiring them
to appear before the Department of Motor Vehicle, that is, to ensure the integrity and genuineness
of the driver’s license.
The Court takes note that the accused Webb, in his fervent desire to exculpate himself from
criminal liability, earlier offered in evidence the letter dated January 10, 1992 of Mr. Robert L.
Heafner, Legal Attache of the Embassy of the United States to the then Director of the National
Bureau of Investigation, Alfredo S. Lim, (Exhibit "61") which stated in very clear terms that the
accused Webb’s California Driver’s License Number A8818707 was issued on August 9,
1991. Furthermore, the said letter states the listed address of the accused Webb at the time of the
issuance of the driver’s license was 532 So. Avenida Faro Ave., Anaheim, California 92807. The
said listed address of the accused Webb at the time his driver’s license was issued has demolished
the testimony of the defense witness Sonia Rodriguez that the accused Webb was supposed to be
already living with the Rodriguez family in Longwood, Florida by the first week of August, 1991.
The accused Webb likewise offered in evidence the official communication coming from the
Federal Bureau of Investigation dated December 31, 1991 (Exhibit "MMM" and submarkings;
Exhibit "66-C" and submarkings) which likewise gave the information that the accused Webb was
issued California Driver’s License No. 8818707 on August 9, 1991, and that as of August 9,
1991, the address of the accused Webb was 532 South Avenida Faro, Anaheim, California 92807.
The fact that the alleged Driver’s License No. A8818707 was issued on two (2) different dates
(August 9, 1991 and June 14, 1991) casts a serious doubt on its provenance and authenticity.
xxxx
In order to establish that the accused Hubert Webb departed from the Philippines on 09 March
1991 on board UA flight 808 the defense also presented witness Dulcisimo Daluz, Station Manager
of United Airlines for Manila who in turn presented a document purporting to be the Passenger
Manifest for the flight departing on 09 March 1991(Exhibits "233-A" to "233-N").
This document merits outright rejection considering that the defense witness Daluz confirmed that
the same was prepared by the UA departure area personnel and not by himself. Thus, this
document is merely hearsay and is devoid of any merit whatsoever.
In respect of the plane ticket of the accused Hubert Webb, what was likewise offered as part of the
testimony of Daluz was a mere photo copy, wherein Daluz also admitted not having any direct
participation in its preparation.
The spurious nature of the document was observed by the witness Daluz himself who admitted that
there were irregularities in the Passenger Manifest presented by the defense. According to
Daluz, it is a strict procedural requirement that all the checking agents who were on duty on March
9, 1991 were supposed to initial the Passenger Manifest, However, he admitted that Exhibits
"223" and "223-N" did not contain the initials of the checking agents who were supposed to
initial the same.
Evidence Cases
The defense presented Agnes Tabuena, Vice-President for Finance and Administration of the
Philippine Airlines for the purpose of establishing that Hubert Webb arrived in the Philippines only
on 26 October 1992.
Like witnesses Daluz and Nolasco, Tabuena’s statements on the witness stand and the
Certification was based exclusively on the Passenger Manifest of PAL’s PR 103. Unfortunately for
the defense, the said testimony is of no probative value and of doubtful veracity considering that the
witness did not prepare the same, nor did the witness identify the persons who prepared the same
other than that they were "airport staff", nor did she had any idea when the document was
transmitted to her office. In fact, the witness could not even interpret the contents of the said
Passenger Manifest, much more testify as to the due execution and genuineness thereof.
In view of the vital necessity to the other accused of establishing accused Webb’s alibi, it is
important to note that Atty. Francisco Gatchalian, father of the accused Michael Gatchalian was
then a high ranking PAL Official and a colleague of Tabuena. This makes the source of the
document, even ignoring the fact of its inadmissibility, suspicious.151 [emphasis supplied.]
The alibi of appellants Gatchalian and Lejano, who claimed they were at the Syap residence at
Ayala Alabang Village watching video tapes the whole night of June 29, 1991 until early morning of
June 30, 1991, was even less plausible considering the distance of that place from Pitong Daan
Subdivision, which is just a few minutes ride away. The RTC noted the manifestation of the defense
on Andrew Syap’s refusal to testify on Gatchalian and Lejano’s whereabouts during the night in
question, despite their efforts to convince him to do so. It further noted the testimony of Assistant
NBI Director Pedro Rivera that Carlos Syap upon seeing Gatchalian with their group even berated
Gatchalian for dragging him into his (Gatchalian’s) own problem. Aside from Alfaro, security guard
Normal White, Jr. also testified that the presence of Gatchalian (son of a homeowner), who pointed
to the other appellants in the two (2) cars behind him as his companions, was the reason they
allowed his friends to enter the subdivision on the night of June 29, 1991. White, Jr. also
categorically declared he had, earlier that same night, seen Gatchalian with his friends standing at
Vinzons St. Thus, other than the hearsay declaration of his father who merely testified on what his
son told him about spending the night watching video tapes at the Syap residence on June 29,
1991, Gatchalian presented no corroborative evidence of his alibi.
As to appellant Lejano, he was positively identified by Alfaro as the first to express approval of
Webb’s plan to gang-rape Carmela by saying, "Ako ang susunod." Lejano was also with Alfaro,
Webb and Ventura in going inside the Vizconde house, and whom she later saw inside the master’s
bedroom, at the foot of the bed where the bloodied bodies of Estrellita and Jennifer lay, and just
standing there about to wear his jacket while Webb was pumping the hogtied and gagged Carmela
on the floor. His alibi is likewise feeble, as he could have easily gone to the Vizconde house within
a few minutes from the Syap residence where he and Gatchalian allegedly watched video tapes.
Appellant Fernandez, on his part, insisted that Alfaro’s story was simply fabricated by her "hidden
mentors" who considered the sworn statement of Roberto D. Barroso taken on November 4, 1991.
Barroso was one (1) of the members of the "Akyat Bahay" gang who were earlier charged before
the Makati City RTC in Criminal Case Nos. 91-7135-37 for Rape with Homicide and for Robbery
with Homicide in connection with the Vizconde killings. There is an uncanny congruence in the
details of the incident as testified to by Alfaro, with the sworn statement of Barroso particularly
pertaining to the manner by which the garage light of the Vizconde house was put out, the
smashing of the glass panel of the main door, and the appearance of a woman who opened the
main door saying "Sino kayo?"152
Such submissions are inane, in view of the dismissal of those cases filed against the first set of
suspects based on lack of evidence. Contrary to Fernandez’s insinuation of a fabricated eyewitness
account, Alfaro gave much more minute details than the limited narration given by Barroso. More
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important, Alfaro’s testimony was sufficiently corroborated on its material points, not only by the
physical evidence, but also by the testimonies of four (4) disinterested witnesses for the
prosecution: White, Jr., Cabanacan, Gaviola and Birrer.
Fernandez also cited as among the reasons why Alfaro’s declarations were far from positive, the
non-recovery of the fatal weapons used in the killings. He contended that a crucial link in the
prosecution’s physical evidence was thus missing, as Alfaro could not even say what was the
"object" or "thing" which she saw thrown out of the Nissan Patrol while the group was on their way
to the BF Executive Village. Hence, her suggestion that what she saw Ventura took from the
kitchen drawer may have been kitchen knives used to kill the victims must fail. 153
Such proposition fails to persuade. The failure to present the murder weapon will not exculpate the
accused from criminal liability. The presentation and identification of the weapon used
are not indispensable to prove the guilt of the accused, much more so where the perpetrator has
been positively identified by a credible witness.154
Appellant Rodriguez denies being a conspirator with Webb’s group in the commission of the crime,
asserting that his presence and participation in the Vizconde killings, from the time of its inception
up to its consummation, was not established beyond reasonable doubt. He cites the failure of Alfaro
to mention his name as part of the "group" twice in her testimony. These instances refer to Alfaro’s
direct examination when she was asked to name the persons riding the convoy of three (3) vehicles
when they left Ayala Alabang Commercial Center parking lot to proceed to the Vizconde residence
at Pitong Daan Subdivision,155 and the second time when she was asked to enumerate the
members of the "group" who were waiting along Aguirre Avenue during their second trip to the
Vizconde residence.156 Thus, when Alfaro testified that the rest of the group acted as lookouts while
she, Webb, Lejano and Ventura went inside the Vizconde house, it must be understood as limited
only to those she had previously enumerated, which definitely did not include Rodriguez. 157
The argument is untenable. The mere fact that Alfaro missed out naming Rodriguez in two (2)
instances during her direct examination does not give rise to the conclusion that he was not
positively identified by Alfaro as among those present and participated prior to, during and after the
commission of the crime as lookouts along with the rest of the group. Contrary to Rodriguez’s claim,
the first time that Alfaro referred to and enumerated the members of the "group" which she had
unexpectedly joined that night, was at the beginning of her narration on how she met Ventura’s
friends when she got her order of shabu at the Ayala Alabang Commercial Center parking lot.
Q. And you said that Dong Ventura introduced you to this group, will you name the group
that was introduced to you by Dong Ventura?
A. First, he introduced me to Hubert Webb, then Fyke Fernandez, Miguel Rodriguez,
and then Tonyboy Lejano, Michael Gatchalian.158
Alfaro was again asked to enumerate the members of the "group" when the prosecution asked her
to name the members of the group, in the later part of her direct examination during the same
hearing.159 She also testified that after everyone, including Rodriguez, took part in a shabu session,
they left the parking lot.160 It thus logically follows that whenever Alfaro made reference to the
"group" in her entire narration, it necessarily included those she had enumerated she had met and
had a shabu session with at the Ayala Alabang Commercial Center parking lot. This same group
was with her from their first trip to the Vizconde residence until the time they left Pitong Daan
Subdivision and retreated to a house at BF Executive Village early morning of June 30, 1991. Alfaro
had specifically mentioned Rodriguez when asked by Prosecutor Zuño to describe their relative
positions at the lawn area of the BF Executive Village house, thus establishing his presence during
the "blaming session":
Evidence Cases
A. x x x kalat kami, sir, pero hindi kami magkakalayo x x x
xxxx
Q. How about Miguel Rodriguez, how far was he from Hubert?
A. Two meters away.
xxxx
A. Mike is very very near Ging Rodriguez.161
It must be stressed that Alfaro categorically declared it was Rodriguez who approached her at
Faces Disco on March 30, 1995 and told her to shut up or she would be killed. Aside from making
that threat, Rodriguez also offered Alfaro a plane ticket so she could leave the
country.162 Rodriguez’s bare denial cannot be given any evidentiary weight. We have ruled that
denial is a self-serving negative evidence that cannot be given greater weight than the declaration
of a credible witness who testified on affirmative matters.163
Rodriguez’s attempt to set up an alibi through the testimony of his cousin Mark Rualo was equally
frail. Even assuming as true Rualo’s testimony that he had indeed invited Rodriguez to attend his
birthday party on June 29, 1991 but Rodriguez opted to stay in his house and even talked to him on
the phone when he called Rodriguez to ask why he was not yet at the party, it cannot serve as
proof of Rodriguez’s whereabouts at the time of the commission of the crime. It did not rule out the
actual presence of Rodriguez at the crime scene.
Appellant Estrada, just like Rodriguez and Fernandez, did not take the witness stand and simply
relied on the alibidefense of his co-accused, principally that of Webb. Alfaro testified that it was
Estrada, then her boyfriend, who was together with her in her car throughout the night of June 29,
1991 until early morning of June 30, 1991. Estrada was among those who acted as lookouts
outside the Vizconde house after they all concurred in the plan of Webb to gang-rape Carmela
while they were still at the parking lot of the Ayala Alabang Commercial Center.
Conspiracy among appellants duly proven
The existence of conspiracy between appellants Webb, Ventura, Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez,
Rodriguez and Filart was satisfactorily proven by the prosecution. Conspiracy exists when two or
more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit
it. Conspiracy comes to life at the very instant the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit
the felony and forthwith decide to actually pursue it. It may be proved by direct or circumstantial
evidence.164 Although only one (1) rape was actually proven by the prosecution, as conspirators
who mutually agreed to commit the crime and assisted one (1) another in its commission, on the
occasion of which the rape victim Carmela, her mother Estrellita and sister Jennifer, were killed,
each of the accused-appellants shall be criminally liable for rape with homicide.
Indeed, appellants by their individual acts, taken as a whole, showed that they were acting in
unison and cooperation to achieve the same unlawful objective, even if it was only Webb, Ventura
and Lejano who actually went inside the Vizconde house while Estrada, Fernandez, Rodriguez,
Gatchalian and Filart stood as lookouts outside the house. Under these premises, it is not even
necessary to pinpoint the precise participation of each of the accused-appellants, the act of one
being the act of all.165
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One who participates in the material execution of the crime by standing guard or lending moral
support to the actual perpetrators thereof is criminally responsible to the same extent as the latter.
There being conspiracy among the accused-appellants, they are liable as co-principals regardless
of the manner and extent of their participation.166
Biong guilty as accessory after the fact
Appellant Biong contends that he cannot be convicted as accessory to the crime of rape with
homicide because the acts imputed to him did not result in the hiding of the case. There was no
evidence that such indeed was his intent or motive. He points out that the bodies of the victims
were found at their respective places where they were assaulted and there was no evidence that
they had been moved an inch from where they breathed their last. He asserts that non-preservation
of the evidence is not an accessory crime under the Revised Penal Code.167
The contentions have no merit.
On the basis of strong evidence of appellant Biong’s effort to destroy crucial physical evidence at
the crime scene, I hold that the RTC did not err in convicting him as an accessory to the crime of
rape with homicide.
Penalty
The CA was correct in affirming the sentence imposed by the RTC upon each of the accused-
appellants Webb, Lejano, Gatchalian, Rodriguez, Fernandez and Estrada. The proper penalty
is reclusion perpetua because the imposition of the death penalty under the Revised Penal Code (in
Article 335 thereof, as amended by R.A. No. 2632 and R.A. No. 4111, when by reason or on the
occasion of rape, a homicide is committed), was prohibited by the Constitution at the time the
offense was committed.169 At any rate, the subsequent passage of R.A. No. 9346 entitled "An Act
Prohibiting the Imposition of the Death Penalty in the Philippines," which was signed into law on
June 24, 2006, would have mandated the imposition on accused-appellants the same penalty
of reclusion perpetua.

As to the penalty imposed by the CA on appellant Biong as accessory after the fact to the crime of
The Revised Penal Code in Article 19 defines an accessory as one who has knowledge of the
rape with homicide, we find the same proper and in order.
commission of the crime, yet did not take part in its commission as principal or accomplice, but took
part in it subsequent to its commission by any of three modes: (1) profiting himself or assisting the
offender to profit by the effects of the crime; (2) concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or DNA Testing
the effects or instruments thereof in order to prevent its discovery; and (3) harboring, concealing, or
assisting in the escape of the principals of the crime, provided the accessory acts with abuse of his
Appellant Gatchalian reiterates his and appellant Webb’s motion for DNA testing of the semen
public functions or when the offender is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to take
specimen taken from the vaginal cavity of Carmela during the autopsy conducted by Dr.
the life of the Chief Executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime. 168
Cabanayan, which motion was denied by the RTC for lack of available scientific expertise and
technology at the time.
Under paragraph 3 of Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, there are two (2) classes
of accessories, one of which is a public officer who harbors, conceals or assists in the escape of the
With the great advances in forensic science and under pertinent state laws, American courts allow
principal. Such public officer must have acted with abuse of his public functions, and the crime
post-conviction DNA testing when its application has strong indications that the result could
committed by the principal is any crime, provided it is not a light felony. Appellant Biong is one (1)
potentially exonerate the convict. Indeed, even a convicted felon has the right to avail of new
such public officer, and he abused his public function when, instead of immediately arresting the
technology not available during his trial.
perpetrators of the crime, he acceded to the bidding of appellant Webb to "clean the Vizconde
house," which means he must help hide any possible trace or sign linking them to the crime, and
not necessarily to prevent the discovery of the bodies in such actual condition upon their deaths. On October 2, 2007, this Court approved the Rule on DNA Evidence170 which took effect on
Hence, such "cleaning" would include obliterating fingerprints and other identifying marks which October 15, 2007.
appellants Webb, Lejano and Ventura might have left at the scene of the crime.
Pursuant to Section 4 of the Rule, the court may at any time, either motu proprio or on application
Contrary to Biong’s assertion, his failure to preserve evidence at the crime scene such as of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, order a DNA testing after due
fingerprints on the doors and objects inside the master’s bedroom where the bodies were found, the notice and hearing. Such order shall issue upon showing of the following:
bloodied floor of the toilet, the actual material used in gagging Carmela and Estrellita, the bloodied
blankets and bed sheets, the original condition of the broken glass panel of the main door, the shoe
(a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;
print and foot prints on the car hood and at the back of the house, fingerprints on the light bulb at
the garage -- was a form of assistance to help the perpetrators evade apprehension by confusing
the investigators in determining initially what happened and the possible (b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing now
suspects. Consequently, Biong’s unlawful taking of the jewelries and Carmela’s ATM card and requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA testing, but the results may require
driver’s license, his act of breaking the larger portion of the main door glass, the washing out of the confirmation for good reasons;
blood on the toilet floor and permitting the relatives to burn the bloodied bed sheets and blankets --
had in fact misled the authorities in identifying potential suspects. Thus, the police had a difficult
time figuring out whether it was robbers who entered the Vizconde house and perpetrated the rape- (c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique;
slay, or drug-crazed addicts on the loose, or other persons having motive against the Vizconde
family had exacted revenge, or a brutal sexual assault on Carmela by men who were not strangers (d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new information that is
to her which also led to the killings. relevant to the proper resolution of the case; and

Evidence Cases Page | 29

 (e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as potentially
affecting the accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing.171
By Resolution dated April 20, 2010, this Court granted appellant Webb’s request to submit for DNA
analysis the semen specimen taken from the cadaver of Carmela Vizconde under the custody of
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). We ordered (1) the NBI to assist the parties in facilitating
the submission of the said specimen to the UP-Natural Science and Research Institute (UP-NSRI),
Diliman, Quezon City; and (2) the NBI and UP-NSRI to report to this Court within fifteen (15) days
from notice regarding compliance with and implementation of the said resolution.
In his Compliance and Manifestation dated April 27, 2010, Atty. Reynaldo O. Esmeralda, NBI
Deputy Director for Technical Services, informed this Court that the semen specimen/vaginal smear
taken from the cadaver of Carmela Vizconde and all original documents (autopsy and laboratory
reports, and photographs) are no longer in the custody of the NBI as these were submitted as
evidence to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque City, Branch 274 by then NBI Medico-
Legal Chief, Prospero A. Cabanayan, M.D., when the latter testified on direct and cross-
examination on January 30, 31, February 1, 5, 6 and 7, 1996. Attached thereto are certified true
copies of Laboratory Report No. SN-91-17 (stating positive result for the presence of human
spermatozoa), Autopsy Report No. N-91-1665 (with remarks: "Smear for presence of
spermatozoa"), copy of the sworn statement of Dr. Cabanayan and certified true copy of the
envelope bearing his signed handwritten notation that all original photographs have been submitted
as evidence during the aforementioned hearing dates.172
On May 11, 2010, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
our Resolution dated April 20, 2010 on grounds that (a) the DNA testing order was issued in
disregard of Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence which requires prior hearing and notice; (b) a
determination of propriety of DNA testing at this stage under the present Rule, separate from that
filed by Webb before the trial court on October 6, 1997, is necessary as there was no opportunity
back then to establish the requisites for a DNA testing order under the Rule which took effect only
in 2007; (c) the result of the DNA testing will constitute new evidence, which cannot be received
and appreciated for the first time on appeal; and (d) this Court failed to elucidate an exceptional
circumstance to justify its decision to consider a question of fact, as this Court itself acknowledged
in its April 20, 2010 Resolution that the result of DNA testing is not crucial or indispensable in the
determination of appellant Webb’s guilt for the crime charged.173
On May 21, 2010, Atty. Roberto Makalintal, Jr., Branch Clerk of RTC Parañaque City, Branch 274,
submitted his Comment on The Compliance and Manifestation Dated April 27, 2010 of the NBI
stating that: (a) There is no showing of actual receipt by RTC Branch 274 of the specimen/vaginal
smear mentioned in Dr. Cabanayan’s affidavit dated April 27, 2010; (b) Based on available records
such as the TSN of January 31, 1996 and February 7, 1996 during which Dr. Cabanayan testified,
no such specimen/vaginal smear was submitted to RTC Branch 274; (c) The TSN of January 31,
1996 on pages 57, 58 and 69 suggest that marked in evidence as Exhibits "S", "T" and "U" by then
Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito Zuño were only the photographs of the three slides containing the
semen specimen; (c) In the hearing of February 7, 1996, Dr. Cabanayan’s last testimony before
RTC Branch 274 in this case, he testified that the last time he saw those slides was when he had
the photographs thereof taken in 1995 (the first time was when he examined them in 1991), and as
far as he knows between 1991 and 1995, those slides were kept in the Pathology Laboratory of the
NBI; and (d) The entire records of the cases were already forwarded to this Court a long time ago,
including the evidence formally offered by the prosecution and the accused. 174
Under our Resolution of June 15, 2010, we required the NBI to (a) show proof of the release of the
semen specimen to the RTC of Parañaque City, Branch 274 in 1996; and (b) comment on the
alleged conflicting representations in its Compliance and Manifestation dated April 27, 2010, both
within ten days from notice. However, the NBI has not complied with said directive.
Evidence Cases
In his Comment on the OSG’s motion for reconsideration, appellant Fernandez argued that when
this Court, in the higher interest of justice, relaxed the Rule on DNA Evidence to afford Webb the
fullest extent of his constitutional rights, the prosecution was not thereby denied its equally
important right to due process. Contrary to the OSG’s claim that this Court immediately granted
DNA testing without observing the requisites under Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence, and
without due notice and hearing, appellant asserts that the Resolution dated April 20, 2010 clearly
defines the parameters of the DNA analysis to be conducted by the UP-NSRI assisted by the NBI.
Indeed, there are ample safeguards in the Rule to assure the reliability and acceptability of the
results of the DNA testing. Fernandez, however, objected to the statement of the OSG that "in the
light of positive identification" of appellant Webb by the principal witness for the prosecution,
Jessica Alfaro, the existing circumstances more than warrant the affirmation of Webb’s guilt.
Alfaro’s cross-examination exposed her as an "out-and-out perjurer, a bold and intentional liar
under oath" and a "fake witness" whose account of the incident is "shot-through with fatal
omissions, self-contradictions, inconsistencies and inherent improbabilities."175
Appellant Lejano likewise filed his comment, pointing out that the trial court denied Webb’s motion
to direct the NBI to submit semen specimen for DNA analysis on November 25, 1997 only after
lengthy exchange of pleadings between the defense and prosecution, the latter having properly
opposed said motion. Hence, the People cannot now rightfully claim that there was no notice or
hearing on the issue of submitting the semen specimen for DNA analysis. Citing Brady v.
Maryland,176 Lejano contended that the suppression of exculpatory evidence – or evidence that will
show reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different had the evidence been
disclosed – grossly violates an accused’s right to due process. In this case, the evidence needs
only to be subjected to DNA analysis to establish the innocence of appellant Webb, as well as of
petitioner and appellant Lejano. It was further asserted that the semen specimen was already
existing at the time of the trial, and hence can hardly be considered as "new evidence" and that
DNA testing of said semen specimen taken from the victim Carmela Vizconde "has the scientific
potential to produce new information that is relevant to the proper resolution of the case" (Sec. 4
(d), Rule on DNA Evidence).177
On his part, appellant Webb stressed that there are exceptional circumstances that justify this
Court’s order to immediately conduct the DNA analysis. He has been behind bars for more than
fifteen (15) years. He has filed a motion for DNA analysis as early as 1997 or thirteen (13) years
ago. The result of such test could yield evidence that could acquit him while no damage will be
suffered by the prosecution considering that this Court emphasized in its Resolution of April 20,
2010 that the prosecution’s evidences and concerns regarding the proper preservation of evidence
in the custody of the NBI would have to be addressed in the light of the requirements laid down by
the Rule on DNA Evidence. As to the prosecution’s argument that this Court cannot receive and
appreciate "new evidence," Section 4 of the Rule states that "the appropriate court may, at any
time, either motu proprio or on application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, order a DNA testing"; DNA testing is even available post-conviction (Ibid, Sec. 6). This
Court in accordance with proper procedure thus decided to receive DNA evidence in order not to
further delay the case, appellants after all, were convicted more than ten (10) years ago in 2000
and have been incarcerated for fifteen (15) years now.
Webb further underscored that where the evidence has not been offered, it is the prosecution who
should have the legal custody and responsibility over it.178 The NBI’s letter dated April 23, 1997
confirmed that the semen specimen was in its custody. The NBI’s repudiation of such fact is belied
by the records; the Prosecution’s Formal Offer of Evidence shows that Exhibits "S", "T" and "U"
were merely photographs of the slides containing the vaginal smear. Also, nowhere in the transcript
of stenographic notes taken during Dr. Cabanayan’s testimony was it shown that he turned over the
actual slides to the trial court. On the contrary, when Dr. Cabanayan was asked on February 6,
1996 to produce the slides, which he had promised to bring during the previous hearing, he
admitted that he "forgot all about it" when he came to the hearing. Thus, it appears from the record
Page | 30
that from the time the semen specimen was taken from Carmela Vizconde’s cadaver, it has always
been in the custody of the NBI.179
Evidently, the NBI could no longer produce the semen specimen/vaginal smear taken from the
cadaver of Carmela Vizconde and consequently DNA analysis of said physical evidence can no
longer be done. Hence, this Court set aside the April 20, 2010 resolution and forthwith proceeded to
resolve the present appeal on the basis of existing evidence which have been formally offered by
the parties and/or made part of the records.
Appellant Webb’s Urgent
Motion To Acquit
With the recall of the order for DNA testing, appellant Webb moved for his acquittal on the ground
of violation of his constitutional right to due process by reason of the State’s failure to produce the
semen specimen, either through negligence or willful suppression. Webb argues that the loss or
suppression by the prosecution of the semen specimen denied him the right to avail of the latest
DNA technology and prove his innocence. Citing American jurisprudence (Matter of Dabbs v.
Vergari,180 California v. Trombetta181 and Brady v. Maryland182), Webb contends that in disallowing
the DNA examination he had requested, the RTC denied him from presenting a "complete defense"
through that "singular piece of evidence that could have definitively established his innocence," the
trial court relying instead on the identification of Jessica Alfaro, a "perjured witness." The
constitutional duty of the prosecution to turn over exculpatory evidence to the accused includes the
duty to preserve such evidence.
Webb maintains that the semen specimen extracted from the cadaver of Carmela had exculpatory
value, as even NBI’s Dr. Cabanayan testified during the hearing of February 7, 1996, that it was still
possible to subject the same to DNA analysis to identify the person to whom the sperm belonged.
Thus, a DNA analysis of said semen specimen excluding appellant Webb as the source thereof
would disprove the prosecution’s evidence against him. Further, Webb points out that the
prosecution considered the presence of spermatozoa on the body of Carmela as evidence that she
was raped, offering the photographs of the glass slides containing the sperm cells as proof that she
was in fact raped on or about the late evening of June 29, 1991 or early morning of June 30, 1991.
But the only evidence of the prosecution that it was Webb who raped Carmela was the testimony of
Alfaro which was given full credit by the RTC and CA despite all its inconsistencies, and despite all
documentary and testimonial evidence presented by the defense proving that Webb was at the
United States at the time the crime was committed.
On the matter of preserving DNA evidence, Webb cites Section 12 of the Rule on DNA Evidence
which authorizes the court to order the appropriate government agency to preserve the DNA
evidence during trial and even when the accused is already serving sentence, until such time the
decision of the court has become final and executory. While this Court has given Webb the best
opportunity to prove his innocence in the order granting DNA analysis of the sperm specimen taken
from Carmela’s cadaver, such potentially exculpatory evidence could not be produced by the State.
Webb now claims that as a result of the destruction or loss of evidence under the NBI’s custody, he
was effectively deprived of his right to present a complete defense, in violation of his constitutional
right to due process, thus entitling him to an acquittal.
Loss of Semen Specimen
Not Ground For
Acquittal of Webb
Evidence Cases
Webb’s argument that under the facts of this case and applying the cited rulings from American
jurisprudence, he is entitled to acquittal on the ground of violation of his constitutional right to due
process,is without merit.
In Brady v. Maryland183 it was held that "the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable
to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." In said case, the
petitioner was convicted of murder committed in the course of robbery and sentenced to death. He
later learned that the prosecution suppressed an extrajudicial confession made by his accomplice
who admitted he did the actual killing. The US Supreme Court granted a new trial and remanded
the case but only on the question of punishment.
In Matter of Dabbs v. Vergari,184 the court ordered DNA testing of specimen taken from a rape
victim after the sexual assault and from the accused who was convicted, DNA testing being
unavailable at the time of the trial. Accused therein was identified by the victim as her attacker. The
court found the factual circumstances clearly showed that the semen specimen could have come
only from the accused. It noted that the witness testified that accused acted alone, had ejaculated
and she did not have sexual intercourse with any other person within 24 hours prior to the sexual
assault. DNA testing ultimately revealed that petitioner’s DNA composition did not match with that
found on the victim’s underwear. Consequently, the court granted petitioner’s subsequent motions
to vacate the judgment of conviction.
In California v. Trombetta,185 a case involving the prosecution for drunk driving, the US Supreme
Court ruled that the Due Process Clause of the Constitution does not require that law enforcement
agencies preserve breath samples in order to introduce breath-analysis tests at trial.
Given our precedents in this area, we cannot agree with the California Court of Appeal that the
State’s failure to retain breath samples for respondents constitutes a violation of the Federal
Constitution. To begin with, California authorities in this case did not destroy respondents’ breath
samples in a calculated effort to circumvent the disclosure requirements established by Brady v.
Maryland and its progeny. In failing to preserve breath samples for respondents, the officers here
were acting "in good faith and in accord with their normal practice." x x x The record contains no
allegation of official animus towards respondents or of a conscious effort to suppress exculpatory
evidence.
More importantly, California’s policy of not preserving breath samples is without constitutional
defect. Whatever duty the Constitution imposes on the States to preserve evidence, that duty must
be limited to evidence that might be expected to play a significant role in the suspect’s defense.
To meet this standard of constitutional materiality, x x x evidence must both possess an exculpatory
value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and be of such a nature that the
defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means.
Neither of these conditions is met on the facts of this case. [italics supplied.]
From the above cases, it is clear that what is crucial is the requirement of materiality of the semen
specimen sought for DNA testing. Appellant Webb must be able to demonstrate a reasonable
probability that the DNA sample would prove his innocence. Evidence is material where "there is
reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the
proceeding would have been different."186
In People v. Yatar,187 decided before the promulgation of the Rule on DNA Evidence, the Court
expounded on the nature of DNA evidence and the factors to be considered in assessing its
probative value in the context of scientific and legal developments. The proper judicial approach is
Page | 31
founded on the concurrence of relevancy and reliability. Most important, forensic identification
though useful does not preclude independent evidence of identification.
DNA is a molecule that encodes the genetic information in all living organisms. A person’s DNA is
the same in each cell and it does not change throughout a person’s lifetime; the DNA in a person’s
blood is the same as the DNA found in his saliva, sweat, bone, the root and shaft of hair, earwax,
mucus, urine, skin tissue, and vaginal and rectal cells. Most importantly, because of polymorphisms
in human genetic structure, no two individuals have the same DNA, with the notable exception of
identical twins.
DNA print or identification technology has been advanced as a uniquely effective means to link a
suspect to a crime, or to exonerate a wrongly accused suspect, where biological evidence has been
left. For purposes of criminal investigation, DNA identification is a fertile source of both inculpatory
and exculpatory evidence. It can assist immensely in effecting a more accurate account of the
crime committed, efficiently facilitating the conviction of the guilty, securing the acquittal of the
innocent, and ensuring the proper administration of justice in every case.
DNA evidence collected from a crime scene can link a suspect to a crime or eliminate one from
suspicion in the same principle as fingerprints are used. Incidents involving sexual assault would
leave biological evidence such as hair, skin tissue, semen, blood, or saliva which can be left on the
victim’s body or at the crime scene. Hair and fiber from clothing, carpets, bedding, or furniture could
also be transferred to the victim’s body during the assault. Forensic DNA evidence is helpful in
proving that there was physical contact between an assailant and a victim. If properly collected from
the victim, crime scene or assailant, DNA can be compared with known samples to place the
suspect at the scene of the crime.
The U.P. National Science Research Institute (NSRI), which conducted the DNA tests in this case,
used the Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) amplification method by Short Tandem Repeat (STR)
analysis. With PCR testing, tiny amounts of a specific DNA sequence can be copied exponentially
within hours. Thus, getting sufficient DNA for analysis has become much easier since it became
possible to reliably amplify small samples using the PCR method.
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider, inter alia, the following
factors: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of
the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and
procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who
conducted the tests.
In the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria was duly qualified by the prosecution as
an expert witness on DNA print or identification techniques. Based on Dr. de Ungria’s testimony, it
was determined that the gene type and DNA profile of appellant are identical to that of the extracts
subject of examination. The blood sample taken from the appellant showed that he was of the
following gene types: vWA 15/19, TH01 7/8, DHFRP2 9/10 and CSF1PO 10/11, which are identical
with semen taken from the victim’s vaginal canal. Verily, a DNA match exists between the semen
found in the victim and the blood sample given by the appellant in open court during the course of
the trial.
Admittedly, we are just beginning to integrate these advances in science and technology in the
Philippine criminal justice system, so we must be cautious as we traverse these relatively
unchartered waters. Fortunately, we can benefit from the wealth of persuasive jurisprudence that
has developed in other jurisdictions. Specifically, the prevailing doctrine in the U.S. has proven
instructive.
Evidence Cases
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow, it was ruled that pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid
principles could be used as long as it was relevant and reliable. Judges, under Daubert, were
allowed greater discretion over which testimony they would allow at trial, including the introduction
of new kinds of scientific techniques. DNA typing is one such novel procedure.
Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue as to induce
belief in its existence or non-existence. Applying the Daubert test to the case at bar, the DNA
evidence obtained through PCR testing and utilizing STR analysis, and which was appreciated by
the court a quo is relevant and reliable since it is reasonably based on scientifically valid principles
of human genetics and molecular biology.
Independently of the physical evidence of appellant’s semen found in the victim’s vaginal canal, the
trial court appreciated the following circumstantial evidence as being sufficient to sustain a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt: (1) Appellant and his wife were living in the house of Isabel
Dawang together with the victim, Kathylyn Uba; (2) In June 1998, appellant’s wife left the house
because of their frequent quarrels; (3) Appellant received from the victim, Kathylyn Uba, a letter
from his estranged wife in the early morning of June 30, 1998; (4) Appellant was seen by Apolonia
Wania and Beverly Denneng at 1:00 p.m. of June 30, 1998 near the kitchen of the house of Isabel
Dawang, acting strangely and wearing a dirty white shirt with collar; (5) Judilyn Pas-a saw appellant
going down the ladder of the house of Isabel at 12:30 p.m., wearing a dirty white shirt, and again at
1:30 p.m., this time wearing a black shirt; (6) Appellant hurriedly left when the husband of Judilyn
Pas-a was approaching; (7) Salmalina Tandagan saw appellant in a dirty white shirt coming down
the ladder of the house of Isabel on the day Kathylyn Uba was found dead; (8) The door leading to
the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang was tied by a rope; (9) The victim, Kathylyn Uba,
lay naked in a pool of blood with her intestines protruding from her body on the second floor of the
house of Isabel Dawang, with her stained pants, bra, underwear and shoes scattered along the
periphery; (10) Laboratory examination revealed sperm in the victim’s vagina (Exhibits "H" and "J");
(11) The stained or dirty white shirt found in the crime scene was found to be positive with blood;
(12) DNA of slide, Exhibits "J" and "H", compared with the DNA profile of the appellant are identical;
and (13) Appellant escaped two days after he was detained but was subsequently apprehended,
such flight being indicative of guilt.188 [emphasis supplied.]
Indeed, in other jurisdictions it has been recognized that DNA test results are not always
exculpatory.
Postconviction test results are not always exculpatory. In addition, exculpatory test results will not
necessarily free the convicted individual. If the evidence does exclude the petitioner, the court must
weigh the significance of the exclusion in relation to all the other evidence. Convicted offenders
often believe that if crime scene evidence does not contain their DNA they will automatically be
exonerated. Not finding the petitioner’s DNA does not automatically indicate the case should be
overturned, however. In a rape case, for example, the perpetrator may have worn a condom, or not
ejaculated. In some cases, the absence of evidence is not necessarily evidence of the defendant’s
absence or lack of involvement in the crime.189
We hold that the source of the semen extracted from the vaginal cavity of the deceased victim is
immaterial in determining Webb’s guilt. From the totality of the evidence presented by both the
prosecution and the defense, Webb was positively identified as Carmela’s rapist.
As the records bear out, the positive identification of appellant Webb as Carmela’s rapist satisfied
the test of moral certainty, and the prosecution had equally established beyond reasonable doubt
the fact of rape and the unlawful killing of Carmela, Estrellita and Jennifer on the occasion thereof.
Even assuming that the DNA analysis of the semen specimen taken from Carmela’s body hours
after her death excludes Webb as the source thereof, it will not exonerate him from the crime
charged. Alfaro did not testify that Webb had ejaculated or did not use a condom while raping
Page | 32
Carmela. She testified that she saw Webb rape Carmela and it was only him she had witnessed to
have committed the rape inside the Vizconde residence between late evening of June 29, 1991 and
early morning of June 30, 1991. Moreover, she did not testify that Carmela had no sexual relations
with any other man at least 24 hours prior to that time. On the other hand, a positive result of DNA
examination of the semen specimen extracted by Dr. Cabanayan from Carmela’s cadaver would
merely serve as corroborative evidence.
As to the loss of the semen specimen in the custody of the NBI, appellant Webb’s contention that
this would entitle him to an acquittal on the basis of Brady v. Maryland is misplaced.
In Arizona v. Youngblood,190 a 10-year old boy was molested and sodomized by the accused, a
middle-aged man, for 1½ hours. After the assault, the boy was examined in a hospital where the
physician used swab to collect specimen from the boy’s rectum and mouth, but did not examine
them at anytime. These samples were refrigerated but the boy’s clothing was not. Accused was
identified by the victim in a photographic lineup and was convicted of child molestation, sexual
assault and kidnapping. During the trial, expert witnesses had testified that timely performance of
tests with properly preserved semen samples could have produced results that might have
completely exonerated the accused. The Court held:
There is no question but that the State complied with Brady and Agurs here. The State disclosed
relevant police reports to respondent, which contained information about the existence of the swab
and the clothing, and the boy’s examination at the hospital. The State provided respondents’ expert
with the laboratory reports and notes prepared by the police criminologist, and respondent’s expert
had access to the swab and to the clothing.
Curiously, despite Dr. Cabanayan’s admission during the hearing that it was still possible to subject
the semen specimen to DNA analysis, the defense never raised the issue thereafter and
resurrected the matter only in October 1997 when Webb’s counsel filed his motion.
It bears to stress that the vaginal smear itself was not formally offered by the prosecution, but only
the photographs of the glass slide containing the semen specimen for the purpose only of proving
that Carmela was in fact raped and not that Webb was the source of the sperm/semen. As noted by
the RTC when it denied Webb’s motion for DNA on November 25, 1997, prevailing jurisprudence
stated that DNA being a relatively new science then, has not yet been accorded official recognition
by our courts. The RTC also considered the more than six (6) years that have elapsed since the
commission of the crime in June 1991, thus the possibility of the specimen having been tampered
with or contaminated. Acting on reasonable belief that the proposed DNA examination will not serve
the ends of justice but instead lead to complication and confusion of the issues of the case, the trial
court properly denied Webb’s request for DNA testing.
We thus reiterate that the vaginal smear confirming the presence of spermatozoa merely
corroborated Alfaro’s testimony that Carmela was raped before she was killed. Indeed, the
presence or absence of spermatozoa is immaterial in a prosecution for rape. The important
consideration in rape cases is not the emission of semen but the unlawful penetration of the female
genitalia by the male organ.191 On the other hand, a negative result of DNA examination of the
semen specimen could not have exonerated Webb of the crime charged as his identity as a
principal in the rape-slay of Carmela was satisfactorily established by the totality of the evidence. A
finding that the semen specimen did not match Webb’s DNA does not necessarily negate his
presence at the locus criminis.

Civil Liability of Appellants

xxxx

The Court sustains the award of ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity, pursuant to current jurisprudence
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as interpreted in Brady, makes the good
that in cases of rape with homicide, civil indemnity in the amount of ₱100,000.00 should be
or bad faith of the State irrelevant when the State fails to disclose to the defendant material
awarded to the heirs of the victim.192Civil indemnity is mandatory and granted to the heirs of the
exculpatory evidence. But we think the Due Process Clause requires a different result when we
victims without need of proof other than the commission of the crime. For the deaths of Estrellita
deal with the failure of the State to preserve evidentiary material of which no more can be said than
and Jennifer, the award of civil indemnity ex delicto to their heirs, was likewise in order, in the
that it could have been subjected to tests, the results of which might have exonerated the
amount of ₱50,000.00 each.193 Following People v. Dela Cruz,194 ₱75,000.00 civil indemnity and
defendant. x x x We think that requiring a defendant to show bad faith on the part of the police both
₱75,000 moral damages in rape cases are awarded only if they are classified as heinous. 195 As the
limits the extent of the police’s obligation to preserve evidence to reasonable bounds and confines it
rape-slay of Carmela took place in 1991, R.A. No. 7659 entitled "AN ACT TO IMPOSE DEATH
to that class of cases where the interests of justice most clearly require it, i.e., those cases in which
PENALTY ON CERTAIN HEINOUS CRIMES, AMENDING FOR THAT PURPOSE THE REVISED
the police themselves by their conduct indicate that the evidence could form a basis for exonerating
PENAL LAWS, AS AMENDED, OTHER SPECIAL PENAL LAWS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES,"
the defendant. We therefore hold that unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of
which was approved on December 13, 1993 and was to become effective fifteen (15) days after its
the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due
publication in two national newspapers of general circulation, was not yet effective. 196
process of law.

As to moral damages, recent jurisprudence allows the amount of ₱75,000.00 to be awarded in

In this case, the police collected the rectal swab and clothing on the night of the crime: respondent
cases of rape with homicide.197 We find the amount of ₱2,000,000.00 as moral damages awarded
was not taken into custody until six weeks later. The failure of the police to refrigerate the clothing
by the RTC as affirmed by the CA, rather excessive. While courts have a wide latitude in
and to perform tests on the semen samples can at worst be described as negligent. None of this
ascertaining the proper award for moral damages, the award should not be to such an extent that it
information was concealed from respondent at trial, and the evidence – such as it was – was made
inflicts injustice on the accused.198 The award of ₱2,000,000.00 as moral damages to the heir of the
available to respondent’s expert who declined to perform any tests on the samples. The Arizona
victims should accordingly be reduced to ₱500,000.00. The rest of the awards given by the trial
Court of Appeals noted in its opinion – and we agree—that there was no suggestion of bad faith on
court are affirmed.
the part of the police. It follows, therefore, from what we have said, that there was no violation of the
Due Process Clause. [emphasis supplied.]
In view of the foregoing, I respectfully vote that the appeals in the above-entitled cases
be DISMISSED and the Decision dated December 15, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
In this case, there is no showing of bad faith on the part of the police investigators, specifically the
H.C. No. 00336 be AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION only as to the award of damages.
NBI, for the non-production of the vaginal swab and glass slide containing the semen specimen,
during the trial and upon our recent order for DNA testing. The prosecution did not conceal at
anytime the existence of those vaginal swab and glass slide containing the vaginal smear.

Evidence Cases Page | 33

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-12449 May 30, 1961
Murder case
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ESPIRIDION ALIDO, ET AL., defendants.
INOCENCIO HERVAS and MARCELO HERVAS, defendants-appellants.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Felipe R. Hipolito for defendants-appellants.
LABRADOR, J.:
Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Hon. F. Imperial Reyes, presiding,
finding accused-appellants Inocencio Hervas and Marcelo Hervas guilty of the murder of their
cousin, Francisco Hervas, and sentencing each of them to reclusion perpetua and to pay 1/3 of the
indemnity of P6,000. Espiridion Alido was also sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
from 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal, to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased Francisco Hervas 1/3 of the sum of P6,000, and to pay a
proportionate share of the costs, but he did not appeal.
On or before May 29, 1955, Francisco Hervas, his wife and their children were living in their house
on a land situated in the barrio of Dagami, Municipality of Maasin, Province of Iloilo. At about 6:00
in the evening of that day, Francisco Hervas seemed to have heard some noise coming from his
cornfield near their house, so he went to the batalan adjacent to their house to find out what was
the noise about, but suddenly a shotgun exploded from the neighboring field, and the shot from it hit
Francisco on the chest and he fell down dead. The following morning, the widow, Concepcion
Laserna sent her eldest child, Ofelia Hervas, to the house of Inocencio Hervas, one of the accused,
which was nearest their house, and to the house of the brother of the deceased, Proceso Hervas,
farther away, to inform them of the incident. The brother of the deceased happened to be away
from home and as Ofelia returned, she passed by the house of Inocencio Hervas, informing him
that the brother of the deceased could not come, so Inocencio went to the house of the victim,
accompanied by three individuals who helped him dig the grave some distance away from the
house and there interred him.
No steps were taken by the family or by relatives of the deceased to Investigate who the author of
the crime was. But news of the killing came to the ears of the Philippine Constabulary. So one day
the Philippine Constabulary had the remains of the deceased exhumed. Those present at the
exhumation were the investigator of the Constabulary, Sgt. Pelagio Agraviador the Chief of Police,
the sanitary inspector and the municipal mayor. They proceeded to the barrio of Dagami, passing
first by the house of Inocencio Hervas, and with the latter they went to the place where the body of
the deceased had been interred. The grave was dug and the dead body was brought out. They
found out that there were nine pellet holes.
Evidence Cases
Thereafter, the Constabulary began questioning the widow, Concepcion Laserna. Her statement
was taken at the municipal building and she declared that she was able to recognize Espiridion
Alido as the one who shot her husband, accompanied at the time of the shooting by two persons
whom she could not recognize. This statement (Exhibit "1" Alido, 2 Hervas), of Concepcion Laserna
was made on June 13, 1955. A similar statement was made by her daughter, Ofelia Hervas, and to
the same effect.
The municipal police of Maasin could not effect the arrest of Alido, but before July 13, 1955, he
surrendered to the Philippine Constabulary at Sta. Barbara, Iloilo. He surrendered to Sgt. Silverio
Balmaceda at the barracks. Balmaceda referred him to Cpl. Delfin de la Torre, who was then
investigator of the company. Alido's statement was taken down in writing and was presented in
court during the trial as Exhibit "C". According to this statement, Inocencio Hervas invited him on
May 29, 1955 to the house of one Carlos Camral, on the occasion of the killing of a pig that in the
afternoon of that day, Inocencio, he and Marcelo proceeded to the house of Francisco Hervas,
armed as follows: Inocencio, with a shot gun (paltik), Marcelo with a rifle, and he with a bolo; that
once near the house of Francisco Hervas, he heard one shot and upon hearing it he ran away,
returning to the house of Carlos Camral that about 9:00 that evening, Inocencio Hervas came back
to the house of Camral with a shotgun, boasting that they could now live in peace because the
arrogant man is already dead (referring to the deceased Francisco Hervas.) .
As a result of this affidavit of Alido further investigation petitions were made. Concepcion Laserna
was again examined this time before the Justice of the Peace of Maasin, and she then, declared in
her affidavit (Exhibit I, Alido, 3 Hervas) dated July 20, 1955 that it was Inocencio Hervas who fired
the shot that killed her husband, and that Marcelo Hervas and Espiridion Alido were with Inocencio
at the time of the shooting. On July 20, 1955, the information was filed in the Justice of the Peace
Court of Maasin, charging the three accused with the murder of the deceased. The information
charges the accused with having committed the crime with treachery and evident premeditation.
Concepcion Laserna testified at the trial that three persons had approached their house on the
afternoon of May 29, 1955, namely, Inocencio Hervas, Marcelo Hervas and Espiridion Alido that
Inocencio was provided with a paltik, Espiridion had a rifle and Marcelo had a bolo; that she actually
saw that it was Inocencio who fired the shot that killed her husband; and that as soon as her
husband had fallen down after the shot, the three persons ran away. She further declared that she
saw the assailant because she was at the time of the shooting at the window of their house.
Demetrio Hervas, a son of the deceased, also testified and declared that when his father went to
the batalanattracted by a noise in the cornfield, he (witness) was at the door of the house; that
when he heard the shot which felled his father, he immediately directed his eyes towards the place
where the explosion had come and saw the aggressor, Inocencio Hervas, and his companions,
Marcelo Hervas and Espiridion Alido.
Upon being asked why in her statement made before the Municipal Mayor on June 13, 1955
(Exhibit "2" — Hervas; Exhibit "1" — Alido), she declared that she saw Espiridion Alido fired the
shot that killed her husband and that she did not recognize Alido's companions, she explained that
at that time she was under the influence of fear of Inocencio Hervas. Explaining this, she declared
that the morning after the shooting she sent her daughter Ofelia to the house of Inocencio Hervas
to tell him that she should bury her husband; that Inocencio Hervas threatened to kill her if she
should disclose or point to him as the author of the death; that he just suggested to her that she
should explain that the cause of her husband's death was his having bolo wounds, instead of
gunshot wounds. Upon being asked the probable reason why her husband was killed by the
accused, she declared that it was because the accused had taken away bamboos from the land
which the deceased was taking care of, and her husband had denounced them to the owner of the
land, namely, Eugenio Maquiling.
Page | 34
The Constabulary investigator, Sgt. Pelagio Agraviador, who had seen the exhumation,
corroborates this alleged fear of Inocencio Hervas of Concepcion Laserna. He testified that at the
time he was investigating Concepcion Laserna, Inocencio Hervas was present, and that every time
Concepcion was asked a question she would first look at Inocencio before answering the question.
Further elaborating on the matter, this witness declared that when the investigation was being
made in the building of the puericulture center, the persons who were present were Concepcion
Laserna, her daughter Ofelia Hervas, Inocencio Hervas, a policeman and himself, and that he
observed that every time a question was directed to Concepcion Laserna, she would look at
Inocencio who, in turn would look at her with sharp eyes; that he noticed such interest on the part of
Inocencio that in the middle part of the questioning of Concepcion, he had to ask Inocencio to go
out. He also declared that when Ofelia Hervas was investigated, Inocencio Hervas again went
inside the room where the investigation was being conducted and again he had to ask him to go out
of the room, because he wanted to have secrecy in the investigation.
All of the three accused denied having participated in the commission of the crime, including
Espiridion Alido, who did not appeal from the decision. Inocencio Hervas declared that he was
always in good terms with Francisco Hervas and his wife; that he was living at a distance of one-
half kilometer from the house of Francisco Hervas, and that the one carrying the work of the family
was the wife, Concepcion Laserna, because one of the hands of Francisco Hervas had been cut in
a fight during the Japanese regime; that about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the day of the
shooting, he had to go to the house of one Carlos to help in the slaughter of a pig, and did not know
of the death of Francisco Hervas until the following morning when the daughter of the deceased,
Ofelia, informed him thereof; that when she went to the house of Francisco there was no one there
except the wife and the children, and when he asked her if she recognized the persons who killed
her husband, she answered she did not because it was very dark; that thereafter she left the house
and went home, with the instruction that when the brother of the deceased would arrive he (the
accused) would be called. Further testifying, he declared that he returned at about 4:00 in the
afternoon, and that since the younger brother of the deceased, Proceso Hervas, did not come, they
buried the deceased with the help of his children, namely, Carlos, Martin and Juan. Testifying on
the exhumation, he declared that the mayor, the Chief of Police and some policemen came on the
Sunday following the burial on Monday; that the Chief of Police and the mayor called for him at his
house; that the son of Francisco Hervas, named Demetrio Hervas, Juan and Martin were also
called; that some Philippine Constabulary soldiers were also with the party, and that it was he and
the son of Francisco that indicated to them where the body was buried; that they did not make any
investigation that afternoon because it was already very late when the exhumation was finished;
that they passed the night at his house and the following morning the party returned back to the
poblacion together with the wife of the deceased. He also testified that he, the widow and her
children were brought to town, as the Mayor had asked him to accompany the widow. He denied
that at the time the widow was being investigated, he used to look at her with sharp eyes. On being
asked the possible reason why he was being accused, he declared that he had an altercation with
one Estong Amorte and Fabian Resano, because when a certain parcel of land was surveyed, he
stopped them because his brother Marcelo was not present. (It is important to note that the land
which was supposed to be surveyed appears to be the cause of the trouble, as it is the very land
occupied by Francisco Hervas. Francisco Hervas was the one named by the original owner,
Eugenio Maquiling, to cultivate and stay on the land. Later, Maquiling transferred it to Estong
Amorte and Fabian Resano.)
The accused Marcelo Hervas also denied the imputation, declaring that on the day of the shooting,
he was away from his house, and that he learned of the death of Francisco Hervas only when he
arrived home on Tuesday (killing occurred on Monday). He stated. that he had come from the
poblacion because he was engaged in the business of making gold teeth for his patients, so he had
to go to the poblacion very often; that on the day following his arrival on Tuesday, he asked for the
wife of the deceased, and he inquired from her what was the cause of her husbands death, and she
had answered that the deceased had stepped on a bolo; that she told him that at the time of the
wounding of her husband she had heard a sound similar to a falling can. Asked if there was any ill-
feeling between Francisco Hervas and his family, he declared that there was none and the
Evidence Cases
deceased even frequented his house to drink tuba, the deceased being his first cousin. Asked what
the probable reason was why the widow had pointed to him as one of the authors of the death of
her husband, he declared that she acted under the advice of their enemies Estong Amorte and
Fabian Resano. Explaining this matter he said that Fabian Resano had purchased a piece of land
from Arcadio Maquiling, the son of Eugenio Maquiling and as Resano surveyed the land, he
(Resano) tried to include the land belonging to him (Marcelo), and that he (Marcelo), did not agree
to this. As to the charge that he had been stealing bamboos, he answered that the bamboos were
not Maquiling's but his own.
A consideration of the circumstances brought out at trial both by the prosecution as well as by the
defense, indicate that the probable cause of the killing is, as indicated by the widow, Concepcion
Laserna, that is, Inocencio Hervas and Marcelo Hervas resented the act of Francisco Hervas in
denouncing them for cutting bamboos on the land of Maquiling. The land on which the house of
Francisco Hervas is erected belonged to Eugenio Maquiling. Marcelo Hervas claimed that the
bamboos that he cut were his own; that when the land of Maquiling was sold to Fabian Resano and
the latter was trying to survey it, Marcelo objected to the survey on the ground that Resano was
including a portion of his own land. Both accused-appellants Inocencio and Marcelo, both
surnamed Hervas, admitted that the relationship between them and the deceased and his family
was cordial. There is, therefore, no reason why the widow should point out to Marcelo and to
Inocencio as the authors of the death of her husband, unless she and her children had actually
seen them do the criminal act.
Her statement when she was brought to the municipal building for investigation on June 13, 1955
pointing to Espiridion Alido as the one who killed her husband and that his companions could not be
recognized by her must have been due to the fact that she was then under the influence of fear of
Inocencio Hervas. The conduct of Inocencio Hervas, a first cousin of the deceased, in not initiating
the move to have the authors of the death of his cousin investigated and his advice of a prompt
burial, in locate a guilty conscience — he must have had part therein and he wanted to be saved
from being held to account for he murder. His advice that the widow should declare hat the
deceased had been killed by a bolo wound, also attests to his interest in suppressing the truth,
certainly to save himself. The testimony of Marcelo to the effect hat the widow had told him that the
deceased died of a bolo wound is the very explanation that was taught by Inocencio Hervas to the
widow. Both of them, Inocencio and Marcelo, must have thought of pretending that the death of
Francisco Hervas was due to a bolo wound, not from a gunshot wound, to suppress or prevent the
investigation of the crime. Marcelo Hervas was the barrio lieutenant. Why did he not take steps to
have the matter reported to the authorities for investigation? His only excuse was that the widow
supposedly told him that he lied of a bolo wound. If he was satisfied with this false explanation, it
must have been because he wanted to shelter he culprits from investigation, which fact in turn
shows also a guilty mind.
The statement of the widow on June 13, 1955, when examined by the municipal mayor, is
explained away by he testimony of the sergeant of the Constabulary who was resent at the time of
the taking of the statement, to the effect that every time a question was asked the widow, he would
look at Inocencio for an answer. This corroborates the story of the widow that she was then under
influence of Inocencio and her fear of him.
We are satisfied with the above circumstances and explanation of the widow that her statement on
June 13, was induced by her fear of Inocencio. Proceeding now to the consideration of the direct
evidence, we find that both Demetrio Hervas, 15 years old, and his mother, Concepcion Laserna,
positively asserted that they saw the three accused Espiridion Alido, Marcelo Hervas and Inocencio
Hervas near their house on May 29, 1955 and that they recognized the latter as the one who fired
the shot from the "Paltik", that killed Francisco Hervas. Demetrio Her was testified that it was in the
afternoon when the assault was made. The statement of the widow before the mayor on June 13,
1955 placed the time of the assault at 6:10 in the afternoon. We take judicial notice of the fact that
in the month of May and June, the days are long and the sun sets after 6:00 in the afternoon, for
Page | 35
which reason even though it was actually 6:00 in the afternoon, when the assault was made, both
Demetrio Hervas and his mother could easily see and recognize the assailants of the deceased
because it was not yet dark. The assailants are well known to them, two of them being first cousins
of the deceased; so was Alido known to them. It is not that their faces were clearly seen a person
can necessary easily be recognized from his stature, by the way he stands and moves. We are,
therefore, satisfied that the two witnesses, — the widow and her son, actually recognized the
assailants as Espiridion Alido, Inocencio Hervas and Marcelo Hervas. The testimony of the boy,
Demetrio, could not be impeached on the cross-examination. His testimony was positive and direct,
leaving absolutely no doubt as to the circumstances under which he saw the shooting and the
certainty of his identification of the accused-appellants. As to the widow, the explanation given as
hereinabove stated, to the fact that she was under the influence of fear of Inocencio Hervas,
sufficiently explains why in her statement before the mayor on June 13, 1955, she pretended not to
have recognized the companions of Espiridion Alido on the evening of May 29, 1955.
There was one other last incident which proves the consciousness of guilt of Marcelo Hervas. This
is the fact that he pretended to be away and was not in his house when Ofelia went to notify him of
the death of her father. When the Constabulary also went to his house, when the matter was
investigated, after the surrender of Alido, he again was not at home. As a barrio lieutenant, he
should have been the first to make steps to report the crime, but he pretended to be away. These
are the circumstances which show consciousness of guilt on his part.
With the above circumstances and the testimony of two witnesses identifying the two accused-
appellants and the finding of the trial judge who heard the witnesses and the appellants testify, that
the appellants are guilty, we are forced to the conclusion that the said accused-appellants
participated in the commission of the offense charged, jointly with Espiridion Alido and are guilty
thereof. The crime committed is that of murder, qualified by the circumstance of alevosia, as the
attack was unexpected and the victim was even no opportunity to defend himself. As to the
aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation, it is true that the confession of Espiridion Alido,
Exhibit "C" is to the effect that Inocencio had invited Alido, to go with them to kill the deceased, and
that he provided his companions with requisite arms. However, this confession of Alido is not
admissible in evidence against Inocencio Hervas and Marcelo Hervas. We therefore had no
sufficient evidence of the evident premeditation.
WHEREFORE, we affirm the judgment of the court below finding the appellants guilty of murder
and the sentence imposed upon each of them with costs of this appeal against the appellants.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon, De Leon and
Natividad, JJ.,concur.
Barrera, J., took no part.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-16664 March 30, 1962
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JUAN AYONAYON and GASPAR ACERADOR, defendants-appellants.
Evidence Cases
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Bonifacio T. Doria for defendants-appellants.
LABRADOR, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, Hon. Felix Q. Antonio,
presiding, finding Juan Ayonayon and Gaspar Acerador guilty of murder, for the killing of Florentino
Lazo and Jose Lazo and, frustrated murder, for the wounding of Genoveva Lazo, and sentencing
each of them to death for the crime of murder, and to an indeterminate penalty of from 8 years
of prision mayor as minimum, to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum,
for the frustrated murder, with the proper indemnities and the accessories of the law, and to pay
each his proportional part of the costs.
The evidence for the prosecution shows that on August 5, 1959, while Florentino Lazo and
members of his family, namely, his wife, Juana Resuello, his children, Jose Lazo, 25 years,
Pergentino Lazo, 17 years, Genoveva Lazo, 21 years, Samuel Lazo, 7 years, and Juan Lazo, 12
years, were taking their supper around a low table in the bamboo kitchen of their house at barrio
Namalpalan, Municipality of Magsingal, Ilocos Sur, their two dogs suddenly started barking and
running to and fro, below and near the house. Genoveva Lazo called the attention of her father to
the unusual behaviour of the dogs and commented that there must be some persons on the
ground. So she stood up and peeped thru the window of the kitchen and saw a man dressed in
dark green fatigue clothes, standing on the ground on the opposite end of the kitchen, peeping at
the southwestern part thereof in a semi-stooping position, with his gun pointed thru the corner of the
kitchen. The kitchen floor was about four feet eight inches from the ground. The wall of the kitchen
was made of bamboo split and flattened as in "sawali". She heard a burst of gunfire (parac-pac-
pac) and she felt that she was hit on her left shoulder. She fell to the floor of the kitchen wounded,
and lying flat on the floor hid herself near the stove.
With the first burst of the gunfire, Jose Lazo was also hit and he fell dead on the floor of the kitchen.
Pergentino Lazo, upon observing the gunfire and what had happened to his brother and sister,
promptly ran away from the kitchen, crossing the batalan that separated the kitchen from the sala,
and to the sala, towards a side beside a wardrobe. Here, behind the wardrobe, he hid himself. From
this position, behind the wardrobe, he heard gunfire from the batalan near the stairs of the house,
and, directed his eyes to the place where the gunfire came from, he saw through the opening of the
window just above the stairs, the accused Juan Ayonayon and his companion, the other accused
Gaspar Acerador. From the top of the stairs, the accused fired at his father who had run to the sala,
but who fell down on the other side opposite the wardrobe.1äwphï1.ñët
Juana Resuello, got her two minor sons in her arms, Juan and Samuel, and tried to run away from
the kitchen also. It so happened, however, that her husband Florentino was already ahead of her
and was already crossing the batalan that separated the kitchen from the sala, running to escape
from the gunfire.
As she was about to cross the batalan to the sala, she saw towards the left the two accused Juan
Ayonayon and Gaspar Acerador. At that time, Ayonayon was already on top of the stairs, while his
companion was on the last rung of the stairs.
The prosecution also proved that, that same evening, upon receipt of news of the murders in the
barrio of Namalpalan, a group of Constabulary soldiers stationed in the poblacion, together with the
municipal health officers and others, went to the scene of the murders. The soldiers found 30-
calibre empty shells on the ground near the kitchen, also on the batalan above the stairs. They also
found that the walls of the kitchen and a wall of the sala was pierced by bullet holes. The dead body
of Florentino Lazo was found lying on the floor of the sala, and that of Jose Lazo also in the kitchen,
Page | 36
both of them riddled with bullets. Genoveva Lazo was found near the stove. Pergentino Lazo, upon
being questioned by the Constabulary sergeant, gave details of the incident, also already described
by the witnesses for the prosecution, and pointed to the two accused herein as the ones
responsible for the assault.
It is also shown that paraffin casts were taken of the hands of both accused and the casts, upon
examination in the National Bureau of Investigation, had positive traces of nitrate.
Various slugs were extracted from the body of the deceased Jose Lazo and another was also
extracted from that of Genoveva Lazo, and these, upon examination, were found to have been fired
from a semi-automatic or an automatic .30-caliber carbine, from the same gun firing the empty
shells.
It was further shown that upon learning who the assailants were, as per information by Pergentino
Lazo, two soldiers went to the house of accused Gaspar Acerador. He was not in his house and as
he was then wearing undershirt and drawers, he had to be taken to his house so he could put on
his clothes, before being brought to town for examination. The constabulary men who accompanied
him to his house saw that a green fatigue suit and poncho were hanging on the wall. On the other
hand, Juan Ayonayon was arrested by a Constabulary captain and his company that same evening
in the house of Marcelino Uberita in Santo Domingo, about seven kilometers from Magsingal.
As possible motive for the crime, it was shown that accused Gaspar Acerador had been accused of
the murder of Pablo Resuello, the brother of Juana Resuello, wife of Florentino Lazo, the deceased.
On the other hand, Florentino Lazo used to drive a carromata where Hipolito Peralta, who was
accused of the murder of a relative of a cousin of Ayonayon, usually rode in going to court. While
nobody could testify as to the motive of the murder, it is apparent from these circumstances that
enmity must have existed between Florentino Lazo and his wife Juana Resuello on one hand, and
the accused Gaspar Acerador and Juan Ayonayon, on the other.
The defenses presented by the accused are alibis testified to by their respective relatives. Juan
Ayonayon stated that at about 6:00 o'clock in the evening of the day in question, he was in the
house of his cousin Engineer Uberita in Santo Domingo, with whom he was living then. But the
barrio of Santo Domingo is only seven kilometers from the house of the Lazos, the victims, and he
could easily have gone from his place of residence to the house of the Lazos in 10 minutes by
jeepney. For his part, Acerador was living in a barrio of Panay, which is only a kilometer away from
the scene of the crime. The fact, therefore, that the relatives of the accused stated that they were in
their respective houses around 6:00 o'clock in the evening of the day of the crime, does not
discount the possibility that the accused themselves had actually gone to the house of their victims
at about the time of 6: 00 o'clock in the evening. It must be noted that the time given was merely a
calculation, and what may have been considered by one witness as six o'clock may actually have
been 5:30, etc. So that the defenses of alibis appear to Us as of very little weight or value,
especially in view of the fact that the witnesses for the prosecution clearly identified the accused,
such identification being positive and immediate because given as soon as the officers of the
Constabulary arrived.
We will now proceed to the principal issue, namely, whether the three witnesses who testified to
having identified the accused were really in a position to and did actually identify them. The first
witness was Genoveva Lazo who said that she peeped out of the window and saw the face and
figure of a man who later she identified as Gaspar Acerador. The description that she gave at the
trial coincides with the physical features that the court saw in the person of the said accused at the
time of the trial. Gaspar Acerador was also identified by the wife of the deceased, Juana Resuello,
who declared that Acerador was seen by her on the last rung of the stairs leading to their batalan.
Pergentino Lazo also identified both accused when, looking thru the window near the stairs, he saw
them firing their guns at the deceased Florentino Lazo.
Evidence Cases
With respect to Juan Ayonayon, his identification by Juana Resuello is beyond question. As Juana
was going to cross the batalan, she saw Juan Ayonayon already on the batalan and was about to
speak to him. He, Ayonayon, was known to her, consequently, the identification was prompt and
immediate. It is a fact that when one meets a person known to him, identification takes place at first
sight, so the testimony of Juana Resuello that she identified Ayonayon, who was known to her,
should be accepted. The same fact of identification is true as to the accused Gaspar Acerador, also
known to Juana Resuello..
As to the testimony of Pergentino Lazo, which testimony is being attacked, it is to be noted that he
saw the two accused while the latter were already on the batalan. From a diagram of the house, We
note that place where the accused were standing, while firing at the decease Florentino Lazo, was
visible through a window from the place beside the aparador where Pergentino Lazo, had stationed
himself. But the fact that Pergentino Lazo, when the officers came in the same evening, declared to
the Constabulary officers that the assailants were Ayonayon and Acerador, this readiness, shows
that he was able positively identify them at the time of the assault, the accused being known to him.
Counsel for Acerador argues that since at the time of the assault, which was 6:00 o'clock in the
evening, it was already dark, the accused could not have been identified by Genoveva Lazo, Juana
Resuello or Pergentino Lazo. We checked the time when the sun set on August 5, 1959 and We
have been informed that the sun set on that date at about 6:38 in the evening, which shows that at
6:00 o'clock, the surrounding of the house where the victims were shot, were not yet dark. The use
of a kerosene lamp inside a house does not mean that outside the house, where the assailants
were seen, was also dark. The inside of a house is necessarily darker than the outside; so the use
of a kerosene lamp while the inmates are taking supper, does not mean that persons outside
cannot be identified from within the house.
Capital is made of the fact that the witness Genoveva Lazo said that during the day there were
stars. She did not say that during the daytime there were stars; she must have meant that during
the time when the assault was made there were stars in the sky at night. Beside we take judicial
notice of the fact that while it is true that the month of August is characterized by showers or rains,
they generally are passing showers and rains, after which the atmosphere becomes clear.
But as the most compelling reason why the witnesses for the prosecution must be believed as to
the identification of the accused by them, is the fact that they had no cause or reason to charge or
point out the accused as the ones responsible for the offense, there being no strong reason why
they should violate their oaths and declare falsely.
After a review of all the evidence, We are convinced that the two accused were really the ones who
assaulted and fired at Genoveva, Florentino and Jose Lazo, and killed Florentino Lazo and Jose
Lazo, and that their guilt has been proved beyond reasonable doubt. The penalty that was imposed
by the lower court is that of death for the murders of Florentino Lazo and Jose Lazo. There is no
question that the murders were committed with the qualifying circumstance of evident
premeditation, and with the aggravating circumstances of treachery and dwelling of the offended
party. But while the penalty imposed appears justified by the aggravating circumstances, there is no
sufficient number of votes to affirm the penalty of death for the reason that it does not appear from
the evidence that the accused-appellants were so perverse as to deserve the supreme penalty.
Hence, no sufficient number of Justices voted to affirm the imposition of the death penalty.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby modified by imposing upon each of the
accused-appellants the penalty of reclusion perpetua for the murder of Florentino Lazo and Jose
Lazo, but the judgment is hereby affirmed in all other respects. The judgment and sentence
imposed upon them for the wounding of Genoveva Lazo is affirmed, with costs against accused-
appellants. So ordered.
Page | 37
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and De Leon, JJ.,
concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-35133 May 31, 1974
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RAYMUNDO MADERA @ "Mundo", MARIANITO V. ANDRES @ "Totoy", GENEROSO
ANDRES @ "Ross", defendants-appellants.
Francisco G. Munsayac, Sr. for appellant Madera.
Apolinar F. Tolentino and Jose C. Vitug for appellant Andres, et al.
Office of the Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Dominador L. Quiroz
and Solicitor Sinfronio I. Ancheta for appellee.
FERNANDEZ, J.:p
This case is now before Us on appeal of the three appellants from a decision of the Circuit Criminal
Court 1 finding them guilty of the crime of murder, and sentencing them to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of
P12,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the cost
proportionately.
There is no question that at about 2:00 o'clock in the early morning of April 20, 1970, three men
barged at the doorstep of the house of the victim Elino Bana in Sitio Baag, Barrio Bantug,
Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija. The gunman, standing on the first rung of the stairs of the house, fired a
volley of shots from a .45 caliber gun at Elino Bana who was then sleeping on the floor of his house
near the stairs. Two gunshot wounds were inflicted on the victim but the fatal one was the one that
hit him on the abdominal region. Elino Bana did not die immediately. He stood up and told his wife
to call for his brother Conrado who lives not far away from their house. The victim's wife fetched
Conrado; but when they returned, the wounded man was no longer at home for he was already
brought to the Municipal Building of Gabaldon. He was carried by his son-in-law, Francisco Viloria,
with the assistance of some people. From the Municipal Building, he was brought to the Nueva
Ecija General Hospital, but he died on the way that same day, April 20,1970.
We affirm the lower court's finding that the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt that
appellant Raymundo Madera was the one who fired the shots at the victim Elino Bana, one of which
Evidence Cases
was the fatal shot, and that appellants Marianito Andres and Generoso Andres were with Madera at
the time.
Juanita Bana, a son of the victim, testified that he was awakened by the gunfire and saw the
appellant Raymundo Madera standing on the first step of their stairs holding a .45 caliber firearm.
He also saw the appellants Marianito Andres and Generoso Andres just behind the appellant
Madera, at a distance of 1 1/2 meters from the stairs. Bernarda Bana, wife of the victim, declared
that she saw Raymundo Madem as the one who shot her husband with a foot-long firearm, and
appellants Marianito Andres and Generoso Andres were then with Madera.
In addition to the testimonies of these two witnesses, the prosecution presented the dying,
declaration of the victim Elino Bana. The trip from the house of Elino Bana to the Municipal Building
took only about thirty minutes. On the way, they were met by policeman Ambrosio Feliciano from
Gabaldon who was fetched from his house by Barrio Captain Emiliano Jornadal of Bantug to look
into the shooting incident. Upon reaching the Municipal Building, Patrolman Feliciano told Elino
Bana that he would have to take down his written statement regarding the shooting incident, and
the latter agreed. The latter was then in agony. It was then 3:00 o'clock in the morning. In said
dying declaration, he was asked who shot him and the answer was: Mundo Madera and two others
whom he could not recognize.
The lower court was correct in refusing to give credence to the testimony of Patrolman Feliciano
that while they were on their way to the Municipal Building, Elino Bana told him that he could not
identify the persons who shot him. Said policeman has been an investigator in the police force
since 1964. He should have asked Elino Bana while he was giving his dying declaration in the
Municipal Building why he said earlier that he did not know who shot him. But Patrolman Feliciano
did not do this. It must be noted that not only Patrolman Feliciano but also Francisco Viloria, a
witness to the dying declaration, testified to its lawful execution.
The fact that Juanito Bana and Bernarda Bana failed to reveal right away the identities of the
appellants to the Victim himself and to their relatives Conrado Bana and Francisco Viloria, does not
militate against their credibility. There is no evidence on record that they were asked by their
relatives about the identity of the appellants. Had they been asked, they would have readily
revealed appellants' identities as they did to the Chief of Police and Municipal Mayor of Gabaldon
only a few hours after the fateful incident, during a formal investigation of the case in the Office of
the Chief of Police when and where they executed their respective sworn statements.
In their respective written statements taken on April 20, 1970, subscribed and sworn on the same
date before the Mayor of Gabaldon, Bernardo Bana and Juanito Bana categorically stated that
Elino Bana was shot by Raymundo Madera @ Mundo, while Ross and Totoy Andres were
downstairs.
Juanito Bana was then living with his parents. He must be familiar with their house. He testified on
direct examination that he slept in the balcony of their house. On cross examination, he said that he
slept inside their house. That does not show any inconsistency in his testimony, because on further
questioning, he said that the balcony referred to by him was inside their house. Yes, he said that
after he heard the shots, he jumped to the ground through the back portion of their house. The
falsity of this statement has not been shown by the defense. The pictures presented by it which
apparently show that there was no such opening, can be explained by the fact that the tall grasses
could obscure the back portion of the house where the kitchen door was located.
Juanito Bana admitted that he was gripped with fear when he heard the burst of gunfire. But that
would not prove that he failed to recognize the appellants.
Page | 38
 An excited person may overlook the presence of another whom he would
otherwise have observed.

Under some circumstance, however, excitement may whet the attention to a

keen edge. In some other cases, it has been observed, in effect, that the
emotion incident to the impending peril may not be the kind of excitement
which confuses, but that which focalizes the faculties to scrutinize. the
circumstance of the threatened danger in order to avoid it.2

The appellants asserted in their briefs3 that "the evidence on record does not show that there was a
moon shining in the early morning of April 20, 1970, at Barrio Bantug, Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija;" that
it was then "a moonless night;" hence, Juanito Bana and Bernarda Bana could not have recognized
the appellants. This position is untenable. Why?

The Court can take judicial notice of the "laws of nature"4 and, under this rule, of the time when the
moon rises or sets on a particular day.5 This not withstanding and for certainty, We took it unto
Ourselves to get a certification from the Weather Bureau6 which shows that the moon was bright at
the time of the shooting incident. It reads:

To whom It May Concern:

This is to certify that, based on the computations made by this office, the
following astronomical data for Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija are true and correct:

1. that the moon rose at 4:11 P.M. on April 19, 1970 and set the following day,
April 20, at 4:27 A.M.;

2. that at 2:00 A.M. on April 20, 1970, the moon was at an altitude of 34
degrees above the western horizon with bearing of South 73 degrees West;

3. and that the moon was illumined 97% at 2:00 A.M. on April 20, 1970, full
moon having occurred at 00.21 A.M. on April 22,1970.

This certification is issued upon the request of Mr. Estanislao Fernandez,

Associate Justice, Supreme Court, Manila.

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r
a
Evidence Cases Page | 39

It was not necessary for the prosecution to prove motive on the part of the appellants for there is no
doubt as to their identities.
It is true that, according to Maximo A. Obra, the forensic chemist of the NBI, appellant Raymundo
Madera was found negative in a paraffin test. But Obra himself admitted that, the paraffin test
having been conducted fourteen days after the incident, the test could have given a negative result
even if the appellant had fired a gun fourteen days earlier, because the nitrate deposits on his
hands could have been washed off by washing or could have been removed by perspiration.
person charged asl accomplice, but it is further necessary that the latter, with
knowledge of the criminal
D intent, should cooperate with the intention of
supplying material ior moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious
way." ... From our vview of the evidence it has not been convincingly established
that appellant cooperated
i in the commission of the offense, either morally,
through advice, encouragement
s or agreement or materially through external
acts indicating a manifest
i intent of supplying aid in the perpetration of the crime
in an efficacious way.
o Such circumstances being absent, his mere passive
presence at the scene
n of the crime certainly does not make him either a co-
principal or an accomplice in the commission of the offense.7
This is good a time as any to emphasize upon those in charge of the prosecution of criminal cases
that the prosecutor's finest hour is not when he wins a case with the conviction of the accused. His
finest hour is still when, overcoming the advocate's natural obsession for victory, he stands up
before the Court and pleads not for the conviction of the accused but for his acquittal. For indeed,
his noble task is to prosecute only the guilty and to protect the innocent. We, therefore, commend
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor Dominador L. Quiroz and Solicitor
Sinfronio I. Ancheta for having correctly recommended the acquittal of the appellants Marianito
Andres and Generoso Andres.

The defense of the appellants was alibi. But said defense cannot prevail over the positive
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed with respect to the appellant
identification of the appellants by the prosecution witnesses. The house of appellant Raymundo
Raymundo Madera alias "Mundo", with 1/3 of the cost charged against him; and it is hereby
Madera is just about 400 meters away from that of the victim Elino Bana.
reversed as regards appellants Marianito Andres alias "Totoy" and Generoso Andres alias "Ross",
who are hereby acquitted of the crime charged with proportionate costs de oficio. Their immediate
We need not discuss further the defense of alibi of the appellants Marianito Andres and Generoso release from confinement is hereby ordered unless they are held for another legal cause.
Andres because the Solicitor General recommended their acquittal. And We agree.
Zaldivar (Chairman), Fernando, Barredo, Antonio and Aquino, JJ., concur.
The fact that these two appellants were standing behind appellant Madera when the latter fired
shots at Elino Bana, did not make them liable for what Madera did, there being no proof whatsoever
Republic of the Philippines
of any conspiracy among the three appellants. They were not armed. They did nothing to help
SUPREME COURT
Madera. Their mere passive presence at the scene of the crime did not make them liable either as
Manila
co-principals or accomplices. In one of the latest decisions of this Court, penned by Justice Felix Q.
Antonio, We held:
EN BANC
It is well to recall the settled rule that conspiracy presupposes the existence of
a preconceived plan or agreement and in order to establish the existence of G.R. No. L-45857 October 27, 1983
such a circumstance, it is not enough that the persons supposedly engaged or
connected with the same be present when the crime was perpetrated. There
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
must be established a logical relationship between the commission of the crime
vs.
and the supposed conspirators, evidencing a clear and more intimate
ERNESTO SISON Y AVILES, defendant-appellant.
connection between and among the latter, such as by their overt acts
committed in pursuance of a common design. Considering the far-reaching
consequences, of criminal conspiracy, the same degree of proof required for Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
establishing the crime is required to support a finding of its presence that is, it
must be shown to exist as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the
Emilio Abrogena for defendant-appellant.
offense itself.

The evidence fails to meet such requirements. To hold him liable, upon the
other hand, as an accomplice, it must be shown that he had knowledge of the
criminal intention of the principal, which may be demonstrated by previous or MAKASIAR, J:
simultaneous acts which contributes to the commission of the offense as aid
thereto whether physical or moral. As aptly stated in People v. Tamayo: "It is
an essential condition to the existence of complicity, not only that there should In her sworn complaint, complainant Violeta Begino y Aquino accused defendant-appellant of
be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the forcible abduction with rape allegedly committed as follows:

Evidence Cases Page | 40

 That on or about the 15th day of July, 1973, in Quezon City Philippines, the
above-named accused with lewd design, and then and there wilfully, unlawfully
appeal feloniously, by means of force and intimidation abduct the undersigned,
by then and there forcibly dragging her into a tricycle, after which the
undersigned was brought to a house located at Novaliches. this City where
said accused by means of force and intimidation had carnal knowledge of the
undersigned, all against the will and without the consent of the undersigned, to
her damage and prejudice in such amount as may be awarded to her under the
provisions of the Civil Code.
Contrary to law (p. 2, rec.).
The trial court convicted him of the charge and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua with accessories of the law, to indemnify the complainant in the sum of P10,000.00 as
moral damages and to pay the costs, crediting him however with the entire period of his temporary
detention.
Complainant Violeta Begino, a native of Cabcab Catanduanes, was about 15 years and 10 months
old on July 15, 1973, a Sunday. About 4 feet and 7 inches tall and weighing about 93 lbs., she was
the housemaid of Jose Baruela of Galas, Quezon City.
Between 3 and 4 o'clock in the afternoon of Sunday, July 15, 1973, Violeta was standing at the
corner of Luzon Avenue and Union Civica St., Galas, Quezon City, waiting for a ride to Quiapo,
Manila to buy slippers for her employer. Appellant Ernesto Sison, then about 23 years old, who was
courting her, approached her and invited her to take the tricycle then driving. When she refused,
appellant allegedly drew 7-inch knife and poked it at her abdomen, threatening to kill her if she did
not board his tricycle. He allegedly seized her and forced her to get into the tricycle.
This is quite incredible because on such Sunday afternoon, with many people passing by or walking
in the vicinity, as Galas is thickly populated by low-income and middle-class groups - of which fact
the Supreme Court can take judicial notice - she could have resisted and shouted for help. It was
not easy for appellant to grab her and force her into the tricycle without being noticed by passersby
and bystanders. She claims that after she was seated inside the tricycle, appellant drove his tricycle
to the España Rotonda, a busy intersection of España St., Manila, Quezon Avenue, España
Extension (now E. Rodriguez Ave.), Mayon St., and Pulog St. going towards Galas, Quezon City.
Said rotonda is over one kilometer from Galas, with several street corners to pass along the way.
With appellant driving the tricycle, complainant could have shouted for help while seated in the rear
compartment for passengers behind him, since as aforestated, from the corner where she was
allegedly forced to board the tricycle up to España Rotonda is quite a distance, with so many
houses and several persons along the way. And children would be playing on the streets. Or she
could have jumped out of the tricycle for a tricycle does not run fast and the tricycle is always open
at its right side just behind appellant who was on the driver's seat. Appellant could not be poking a
knife with one hand at Violeta and driving the tricycle with the other hand.
From the España Rotonda, they took a passenger jeepney for Balintawak, Quezon City. They were
allegedly the only passengers of the jeepney, with appellant holding her hands and telling her that
he would kill her if she tried to go home. From España Rotonda to Balintawak is a distance of about
five kilometers. Being a passenger jeepney, it presumably took the usual passenger jeepney
routes. It would be unbelievable that all throughout the distance of about five kilometers, a Sunday
afternoon, no other passenger boarded the jeepney between España Rotonda and Balintawak. The
route of said jeepney must pass through Mayon St. towards North Cemetery beside Balintawak. But
even assuming that they were the lone passengers of the jeepney throughout the distance she
Evidence Cases
could have shouted for help or created a commotion to alert the jeepney driver. It is also possible
that she must have seen policemen along the route, especially near the gate of the North
Cemetery. The various jeepney routes from Quezon City to North Cemetery include Mayor
Norberto Amoranto St. (formerly Retiro), Del Monte Avenue, Dapitan, Laong-Laan St., and from
Manila to the North Cemetery then to Balintawak, via Dimasalang St., and coming from Rizal
Avenue Extension and passing the Chinese General Hospital via Blumentritt. Upon reaching the
busy intersection in front of the North Cemetery gate, with a lot of people around, including
employees of the gas station just across the gate of the North Cemetery, she could have screamed
for help, but she did not.
At Balintawak, appellant allegedly brought her to the house of his aunt, to whom he allegedly
introduced her as his girlfriend. After talking to her aunt, he and complainant left the house and rode
in a passenger jeepney bound for Novaliches, passengers inside the jeepney Quezon City. There
were other pass but she did not make any outcry nor ask help from the other passengers during
that long trip from Balintawak to Novaliches, which is a lot farther than from España Rotonda to
Balintawak. Balintawak is also a busy street all the way to Clover Leaf (the hub connecting to
Novaliches) and there are many houses' and shops along the way - more so upon reaching the
busy market near the Clover Leaf. And then from Clover Leaf through Quirino Avenue towards
Novaliches, there must have been numerous persons that Sunday afternoon, because Quirino
Avenue is likewise a busy avenue, being the only route to Novaliches from the Clover Leaf and the
traffic along that thoroughfare is heavy at all hours of the day because of the numerous passenger
buses, jeepneys, cargo trucks, and private cars on the road. But she did not cry for help.
At Novaliches, appellant led her to the house of another aunt, Maria Aviles Reyes and took her
purse containing P12.00. After eating their supper, appellant allegedly brought her to a room and
ordered her to lie down. She resisted and appellant slapped her repeatedly. She became
unconscious and upon regaining consciousness, she found herself naked with appellant on top of
her and his penis inside her vagina "up to her stomach." If she resisted as she claimed, there
should have been some commotion and maybe pieces of furniture like chairs and tables being
pushed or the sound of shuffling feet, accompanied by her cries or screaming indicating resistance.
When he slapped her repeatedly, she must have shouted in pain and even cursed him aloud with
the usual vulgar rivectives With such commotion, screaming, cries of pain and vulgar purses it is
unthinkable that the aunt and the rest of the inmates of the house would not have heard the same.
They could have been curious about the commotion and could have frustrated whatever criminal
Intention appellant might have towards her.
She alleged that he had sexual intercourse with her three times that July 15 even as she was
experiencing pain. The following day (July 16), he had sexual intercourse with her four times. Then
on the third day (July 17), he did the same to her. They stayed in Novaliches from July 15 to July
21, 1973. .Never did she complain to his aunt or to the other inmates of the house about what
appellant did to her. During those six days, she must have gone out of the room to eat or to attend
to personal necessities in the bathroom. During those six days too, his aunt and the other members
of the family would have noticed her painful expression or her moaning in pain and would have
asked her the cause of the same.
In the afternoon of July 21, 1973, appellant, with his mother and his aunt Maria, brought Violeta to
his house in Sampaloc, Manila, and from there, to Violeta's mother at 11-B Luzon Avenue, Galas,
Quezon City. All the mother did was to slap her.
It should be stressed, as heretofore intimated, that this Court sitting in Metro Manila, can take
judicial notice of the geography of said metropolis, and the approximate distance from Galas to
España Rotonda, from España Rotonda to Balintawak, and from Balintawak to Novaliches, the
passenger routes to said place, the nature of traffic along said routes, the heavy population in
Metropolitan Manila, and the habits of the residents therein.
Page | 41
There is nothing in the record to indicate as to why her mother and her employer did not look for her
during the six days that she was missing from the house of her employer and why they did not
report to the police authorities said fact of her being missing for almost a week. Neither is there any
intimation that her employer inquired about the money he gave to her to purchase slippers, which is
quite unnatural.
All the foregoing circumstances not only negate the conclusion that she was sexually assaulted by
appellant against her will, but also affirm that she went willingly with the appellant and submitted to
his lewd design.
Consequently, the only possible conclusion is that she voluntarily went with appellant on that six-
day tryst with him. for which appellant could have been convicted of consented abduction as Violeta
was then over 12 but under 18 years of age (Art. 343, R.P.C.), if the complaint included the
essential elements of abduction with consent Valdepeha vs. People, 16 SCRA 871, April 30, 1966;
U.S. vs. Asuncion, 31 Phil. 614, Oct. 2, 1915). Unfortunately, the complaint as aforequoted does
not allege that the offended party was a virgin, over 12 years and under 18 years of age Barba vs.
People, 89 SCRA 112, March 28,1979; People vs. Castro, 58 SCRA 473, Aug. 19, 1974; People
vs. Samillano, 56 SCRA 573, April 22, 1974; People vs. Magat, 94 Phil. 118, Dec. 29, 1953).
Hence, the appellant should be acquitted of the charge.
WHEREFORE, APPELLANT ERNESTO SISON Y AVILES IS HEREBY ACQUITTED. WITH
COSTS DE OFICIO.
HIS IMMEDIATE RELEASE IS HEREBY ORDERED UNLESS HE IS HELD FOR SOME OTHER
VALID CHARGES.
Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Plana, Escolin, Relova and Gutierrez, Jr.,
JJ., concur.
De Castro, J., on leave.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-54886 September 10, 1981
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (Special Second Division), COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF BULACAN, TURANDOT, TRAVIATA, MARCELITA, MARLENE, PACITA,
MATTHEW, VICTORIA and ROSARY, all surnamed ALDABA, respondents.
MAKASIAR, J.:
Evidence Cases
Petitioner, through this petition for review by certiorari, seeks to annul and set aside the respondent
Court of Appeals' April 29, 1980 decision and August 15, 1980 resolution in CA G.R. No. 10081-SP,
entitled "Republic of the Philippines versus Hon. Roque Tamayo, et al. " — a special action for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus — sustaining the lower court's action in dismissing petitioner's
appeal as not having been perfected on time.
The root case is an expropriation proceedings initiated by the petitioner over a 15,000 square meter
lot of private respondents situated in Barrio Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan, docketed in the lower court as
Civil Case No. 525, entitled " Republic of the Philippines vs. Turandot Aldaba, et al. " The subject
parcel of land is needed by the petitioner to set up a permanent site for the Bulacan Area Shop,
Bureau of Equipment, Department of Public Highways, a public purpose authorized by law to be
undertaken by the Ministry of Public Highways. On March 2, 1978, the lower court issued a writ of
possession placing the petitioner in possession of the land in question, upon its deposit of the
amount of P7,200.00 as provisional value. On March 31, 1978, counsel for private respondents filed
a motion praying for the creation of a three (3)- man committee in accordance with Section 5, Rule
67 of the Rules of Court, to study and submit a report as to the just and reasonable compensation
for the parcel of land subject of expropriation. On July 31, 1978, the lower court issued an order
naming the chairman and members of the committee of three. On November 17. 1978, the three-
man committee submitted a joint report to the lower court, recommending that the just
compensation of the expropriated land be fixed at P50.00 per square meter. In this petition, the
Solicitor General claims that he was not served copies of the aforementioned March 31, 1978
motion of private respondents, July 31, 1978 order of the respondent lower court and the November
17, 1978 report of the three-man committee. The records reveal that the Solicitor General
authorized the provincial fiscal of Bulacan to represent him in that proceedings (pp. 11-12, C.A.
rec.). Parenthetically, private respondents in their comment to this petition, alleged "that the
Provincial Fiscal, being duly authorized by the office of the Solicitor General to represent the latter
in this case, the court merely furnished the office of the Provincial Fiscal with all the pleadings and
other papers of the case,, (p. 53, rec.).
On December 18, 1978, the Solicitor General received a copy of the lower court's order dated
December 8, 1978. The order reads in part:
The joint report filed by the three-man committee charged with the
determination of the just compensation of the property herein sought to be
condemned is hereby APPROVED, such that the just compensation of the land
described in Paragraph 11 of the Complaint is fixed at Thirty Pesos (P30.00)
per square meter.
The defendant may now withdraw from the Philippine National Bank, Malolos,
Branch, the sum of P7,200.00 deposited by the Third Regional Equipment
Services, Department of Public Highways under Account No, 35109, said sum
to be part of the total amount of P450,000.00 (15,000 square meters at P30.00
per square meter), which the Department of Public Highways, Third Regional
Equipment Services, Malolos, Bulacan, shall, and is hereby ordered, to pay to
the herein defendants as just compensation for the subject property.
On December 22, 1978, the Solicitor General filed through the mail a notice of appeal as well as
a first motion for extension of time of 30 days from January 17, 1979 within which to file record on
appeal. The extension sought for was granted by the lower court in its order dated January 17,
1979.
On February 13, 1979, the lower court, acting upon petitioner's manifestation filed on January 9,
1979 and motion filed on February 8, 1979, allowed the Solicitor General to borrow the records of
the expropriation case "under proper receipt, the Clerk of Court taking the necessary steps to index
Page | 42
and number the pages thereof and to ensure its integrity; and granted a second extension of thirty
(30) days from February 17, 1979, within which to file the record on appeal of the Republic of the
Philippines" (p. 79, C.A. rec.).
Again, on March 22, 1979, the lower court granted petitioner's third motion for an extension of thirty
(30) days from March 19, 1979 within which to file its record on appeal (p. 80, C.A. rec.).
Subsequently, the lower court, in an order dated April 24, 1980, acted favorably upon petitioner's
motion for a fourth extension of thirty (30) days from April 19, 1979 within which to file its record on
appeal and petitioner's request that the records of the expropriation case be forwarded to the
Solicitor General (p. 81, C.A. rec.).
In a motion dated May 17, 1979, the petitioner, invoking heavy pressure of work, asked for a fifth
extension of thirty (30) days from May 18, 1979 or until June 17, 1979, within which to file its record
on appeal (pp. 82-83, C.A. rec.).
On June 7, 1979, when its motion for a fifth extension has not yet been acted upon by the lower
court, petitioner filed its record on appeal (p. 13, rec.).
On June 15, 1979, eight (8) days after petitioner had filed its record on appeal, private respondents
filed an opposition to the aforesaid fifth motion for extension (pp. 85-87, C.A. rec.), and an objection
to petitioner's record on appeal (pp. 88-89, C.A. rec.), on the ground that the same was filed
beyond the reglementary period, because petitioner's motion dated May 17, 1979 for extension to
file record on appeal was mailed only on May 21, 1979 (pp. 13-14, rec.).
On June 27, 1979, petitioner filed its opposition to the aforesaid objection to its record on appeal,
contending that the said May 17, 1979 motion for extension of time was actually mailed on May 18,
1979, which was the last day of the extended period allowed by the lower court's order of April 24,
1979 (p. 14, rec.).
In an order dated August 13, 1979 but received by the Solicitor General only on September 10,
1979, the lower court dismissed the appeal of petitioner on the ground that the fifth motion for
extension of time dated May 17,1979 within which to file the record on appeal and the record on
appeal were filed out of time. The lower court found that the said fifth motion for extension of time
was actually mailed on May 21, 1979 and not on May 18, 1979 as claimed by petitioner (pp. 14, 34-
35, rec.). The order of dismissal reads:
Upon consideration of the approval of the record on appeal filed by the
Republic and acting on the manifestation filed on July 25, 1979 by the
defendants thru counsel, the Court finds no merit in the same.
The last motion of the Office of the Solicitor General for extension of time to file
record on appeal was on May 17, 1979, seeking for an additional extension of
thirty (30) days from April 18, 1979.
The thirty-day period requested by the Solicitor General from May 18, 1979
therefore expired on June 17, 1979. But this last request for extension was not
acted upon by the court. The Republic of the Philippines had therefore only up
to May 17, 1979, within which to file record on appeal. The record on appeal
was filed only on June 11, 1979 (should be June 7), which is well beyond the
period to file record on appeal Moreover, the last motion for extension which
was not acted upon by the Court had only been filed on May 21, 1979 as
Evidence Cases
shown by the stamp of the Manila Post Office, the date of the mailing which
should be reckoned with in computing periods of mailed pleadings, and
received by the Court on June 22, 1979. Both the motion for extension filed on
May 21, 1979 and the record on appeal filed on June 11, 1979 (should be June
7), have therefore been filed beyond the reglementary period of 30 days from
April 18, 1979, or up to May 18,1979.
xxx xxx xxx
(pp. 34-35, rec.).
On October 4, 1979, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration claiming that "l) there is merit in
plaintiff's appeal from tills Honorable Court's order of December 8, 1978, a copy of which was
received on December 18, 1978; 2) plaintiff's May 17, 1979 motion for 30 days extension from May
17, 1979 to file Record on Appeal, was actually filed on May 18, 1919; and 3) the Honorable Court
denied plaintiff's appeal without first resolving plaintiff's motion for a 30-day extension, from May 18,
1979 to file Record on Appeal" (pp. 14-15, rec.; pp. 52-66, C.A. rec.). Relative to the timeliness of
the filing of its fifth motion for extension of time, petitioner submitted a certification of the
Postmaster of the Central Office of the Bureau of Posts, Manila, that registered letter No. 3273
containing the aforesaid motion addressed to the Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance of
Malolos, Bulacan ... was received by this Office late Friday afternoon, May 18, 1979. The letter was
not included in the only morning dispatch of May 19 to Bulacan and was dispatched May 21, 1979,
Monday (May 20, being a Sunday) under the Manila — Malolos Bill No. 202, page 1, line 15" (p. 66,
C.A. rec.).
On the merits of the dismissed appeal, petitioner stressed that the creation of a three-man
committee to fix the just compensation of the expropriated lot was without legal basis, because
Section 5, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court upon which the same was anchored had already been
repealed by the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 76 which took effect on December 6, 1972 —
under which the court has no alternative but to base the just compensation of expropriated property
upon the current and fair market value declared by the owner or administrator. or such market value
as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower.
On October 31, 1979, the lower court denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration for lack of merit
(pp. 36-40, rec.; pp. 2832, C.A. rec.), thus:
The grounds advanced by the plaintiff Republic of the Philippines have been
fully taken into account by the Court in its order of August 13, 1979, particularly
the late filing of the record on appeal. Plaintiff's counsel should not have
assumed that the motion for extension of the period for filing of the record on
appeal would be granted.
The plaintiff's counsel's belief that their May 17, 1979 motion would be granted
cannot be the basis for the plaintiff to be absolved of the effect of late filing of
the record on appeal considering that the Court had liberally extended for five
times *, each for thirty (30) days, the filing of said record. This Court considers
said extensions as sufficient time for the counsel for plaintiff to prepare its
record on appeal. Plaintiff's counsel, with all the resources it has to protect its
client's interests, should have been vigilant enough not to assume and should
not expect that their motion for extension would be granted. It is not correct
therefore that only three days had elapsed after the reglementary period to
perfect appeal because the reglementary period ended not on June 17, 1979,
Page | 43
but on May 17, 1979, because the last motion for extension was not granted by
the Court.
The Court deplores the insinuation of plaintiff's counsel that it took hook, line
and sinker, defendant's allegation about the fact of mailing. I t has carefully
gone over the record and found that the date of mailing of the motion for
extension is May 21, 1979, as shown by the stamp 'Registered, Manila,
Philippines, May 1, 1979 appearing on the covering envelope containing the
motion for extension. Therefore, the explanation contained in Annex B of the
motion for reconsideration to the effect that registered Letter No. 3273,
addressed to the Clerk of Court, Court of First Instance of Malolos, Bulacan,
was received by the Manila Post Office late Friday afternoon, May 18, 1979,
but was not included in the "only" morning dispatch of May 19 to Bulacan and
was dispatched May 21, 1979, Monday (May 20 being a Sunday), under the
Manila—Malolos Bill No. 202, page 1, line 15', can not overturn the fact of date
of actual mailing which is May 21, 1979, because it is of judicial knowledge that
a registered letter when posted is immediately stamped with the date of its
receipt, indicating therein the number of the registry, both on the covering
envelope itself and on the receipt delivered to the person who delivered the
letter to the post office. The letter Annex B of the motion therefore lacks
sufficient weight and persuasiveness to prove the fact that the letter asking for
another extension was actually filed on May 18, 1979, and not May 21, 1979.
Regarding the creation of a three-man committee which according to plaintiff
the Court sorely lacked the prerogative to create pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 67 of
the Rules of Court because it has been superseded by the provisions of PD 76
which definitely fixed the guidelines for the determination of just compensation
of private property acquired by the State for public use, the Court had to resort
to this old method of determining fair market value, which is defined as:
The "current and fair market value" shall be understood to
mean the "price of which a willing seller would sell and a
willing buyer would buy neither being under abnormal
pressure", because, firstly; the plaintiff failed to show
evidence thereof as declared by the owner or administrator
of the property under the provisions of PD 76, or the
valuation or assessment of the value as determined by the
assessor, whichever is lower. Hence, for all intents and
purposes, the findings of the three-man committee have
become the basis of the evaluation, Paragraph Ill of the
complaint notwithstanding, because allegation in the
complaint, unless proved, are not binding as evidence.
Presidential Decree No. 42, from its very caption, which reads:
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 42 AUTHORIZING THE
PLAINTIFF IN EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEEDINGS TO
TAKE POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY INVOLVED
UPON DEPOSITING THE ASSESSED VALUE FOR
PURPOSES OF TAXATION
or any of its branches or agencies. This is borne out by the first Whereas of the
decree which finds the existing procedure for the exercise of the right of
eminent domain not expeditious enough to enable the plaintiff to take or enter
upon the possession of the real property involved, when needed for public
purposes. The second Whereas states that the measure is in the national
interest in order to effect the desired changes and reforms to create a new
society and economic order for the benefit of the country and its people.
The body of the law does not specify the valuation of the property, but rather
the method by which seizure of the property could be done immediately, and
that is by the act of depositing with the Philippine National Bank, in its main
office or any of its branches or agencies, an amount equivalent to the assessed
value of the property for purposes of taxation, to be held by said bank subject
to the orders and final disposition of the Court.
Only in this respect are the provisions of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court and or
any other existing law contrary to or inconsistent therewith repealed. If at an,
the decree, PD 42, fixes only a provisional valueof the property which does not
necessarily represent the true and correct value of the land as defined in PD
76. It is only provisional or tentative to serve as the basis for the immediate
occupancy of the property being expropriated by the condemnor. This is in line
with the recent decision of the Honorable Supreme Court promulgated on
October 18, 1979, in the case of the Municipality of Daet, Petitioner, vs. Court
of Appeals and Li Seng Giap & Co., Inc., Respondents, G.R. No. L-45861,
which states in part:
..., it can already be gleaned that said decree fixes only the
provisional value of the property. As a provisional value, it
does not necessarily represent the true and correct value
of the land. The value is only "provisional" or "tentative" to
serve as the basis for the immediate occupancy of the
property being expropriated by the condemnor.
xxx xxx xxx
(pp. 28-32, rec.).
Dissatisfied with the aforesaid orders of the lower court, petitioner on December 3, 1979 filed with
the respondent Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary
injunction in CA-G.R. No. 10081-Sp, entitled: Republic of the Philippines versus Court of First
Instance of Bulacan, Branch VI, presided over by Hon. Roque Tamayo, et al., whereby it prayed
that: 1) This petition be given due course; 2) A writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
retraining order be issued ex-parte restraining respondent court from executing, enforcing and/or
implementing its Order dated December 8, 1978, ... and its orders dated August 13, 1979 and
October 31, 1979 ...; 3) After hearing on the merits, judgment be rendered: [a] annulling and setting
aside respondent court's Orders of August 13, 1979 ... : [b] Directing and compelling respondent
court to allow and approve petitioner's record on appeal and to certify and elevate the same to this
Honorable Court; [c] Declaring the writ of preliminary injunction and/or restraining order herein
prayed for to be made permanent and perpetual" and for such other relief as the Court may deem
just and equitable in the premises.

does not fix the value of the property to be expropriated, but rather for the
purpose of taking possession of the property involved, the assessed value for
purposes of taxation is required to be deposited in the Philippine National Bank
Evidence Cases Page | 44
On December 14, 1979, respondent Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order to
maintain the status quo, and required private respondents to file their comment (pp. 67-68, C.A.
rec.).
On January 2, 1980, private respondents filed the required comment (pp. 69-91, C.A. rec.).
On April 29, 1980, respondent Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner's action and set aside its
December 14, 1979 restraining order. The respondent Court of Appeals ruled that "A review of the
whole record convinces Us that the challenged orders are not a capricious and whimsical exercise
of judgment as to constitute a grave abuse of discretion ..." (pp. 44-45, rec.). The Solicitor General
received a copy of the aforesaid decision on May 19, 1980.
On May 30, 1980, the Solicitor General sought a thirty-day extension from June 3, 1980 within
which to file a motion for reconsideration (pp. 106-107, C.A. rec.).
On June 20, 1980, the respondent Court of Appeals granted the extension sought (p. 108, C.A.
rec.).
On June 23, 1980, the Solicitor General filed his motion for reconsideration on the ground that,
"The Honorable Court of Appeals was misled by private respondents' counsel in holding that
petitioner's motion for extension of time to file record on appeal dated May 17, 1979 ... was filed on
May 21, 1979, not on May 18, 1979 (which was the last day within which to file petitioner's record
on appeal); hence, this Honorable Court was not correct in ARRIVING AT THE CONCLUSION
THAT PETITIONER'S AFORESAID MOTION FOR EXTENSION was filed beyond the reglementary
period" (pp. 109-118, C.A. rec.). Petitioner also moved to set the case for oral argument (p. 119,
C.A. rec.). Petitioner vehemently insisted as it did in the main action (pp. 10-12, C.A. rec.), that it is
erroneous to conclude that its
... motion for extension dated May 17, 1979 ... was filed on May 21, 1979 and
not on May 18, 1979 which is the last day of the extended period fixed by
respondent court for petitioner to file its record on appeal. It is submitted that
the motion for extension dated May 17, 1979 ... was actually filed on May
18,1979 as there is incontrovertible proof that the same was in fact mailed on
May 18, 1979 via registered mail (Registry Letter 3273) at the Manila Central
Office of the Bureau of Posts. A letter dated September 26, 1979 of Delfin
Celis, postmaster of Central Post Office, Manila, to the Chief of the Records
Section of the Office of the Solicitor General shows that the envelope
containing the May 17, 1979 motion was received by the Post Office of Manila
on May 17, 1979. Said letter states:
In compliance to your request in your letter dated
September 20, 1979 in connection with registered letter
No. 3273 addressed to the Clerk of Court, Court of First
Instance Malolos, Bulacan, please be informed that it was
received by this Office late Friday afternoon, May 18,
1979. The letter was not included in the only morning
dispatch of May 19 to Bulacan and was dispatched May
21, 19719, Monday (May 20, being a Sunday) under the
Manila- Malolos Bill No. 202, page 1, line 15.
Thus, it is conceded that the envelope containing the registered letter of
petitioner's motion for extension to file record on appeal dated May 17, 1979
has on its face the date May 21, 1979 stamped thereon ... . If the aforesaid
Evidence Cases
proof of mailing presented by private respondent is taken into account solely
without taking into consideration the letter of postmaster Delfin Celis dated
September 25, 1979 ... , then it could be said that petitioner's motion for
extension to file record on appeal dated May 17, 1979 was filed out of time.
However, the certification of the Postmaster stating that the letter was actually
received in the Post Office on May 18, 1979 conclusively shows that such date
is the date of mailing, and the date May 21, was thus wrongly stamped thereon
by an employee of the Post Office. Petitioner should not be blamed for the
mistake committed by the personnel of the Post Office of stamping May 21,
1979 on the envelope of said Registered Letter No. 3273. Petitioner's counsel
had nothing to do with the aforesaid mistake that had been committed by the
personnel of the Post Office.
In resume it can be said with certainty that the records of the Office of the
Solicitor General and the Post Office of Manila clearly show that the petitioner's
motion for extension dated May 17, 1979 was seasonably filed on May 18,
1979 as the latter was actually the date of its mailing and therefore said date
should be deemed as the actual date of its filing before respondent court.
At this juncture, it may be stated that undersigned counsel were constrained to
seek extension to file record on appeal because of the pressure of work and
their need to borrow the records of the case from the trial court. Thus, as early
as January 9, 19-i 9, they were borrowing the expediente of the case so as to
enable them to prepare an accurate record on appeal. Petitioner in its motion
and manifestation of January 9, 1979 stated why it wanted to borrow the
expediente of the case at bar, as follows:
3. The records of the undersigned counsel may not be
complete as it had authorized the Provincial Fiscal of
Bulacan to appear in the hearings before this honorable
Court, thus it is possible that the Office of the Solicitor
General may not have been furnished copies of Orders of
this honorable Court, as well as pleadings that may have
been furnished the provincial Fiscal of Bulacan.
4. This being the case, undersigned counsel can not
prepare an accurate and concise record on appeal, hence
it is necessary that the records of the case be lent to the
undersigned counsel pursuant to Sec. 14, Rule 1:36, of the
Revised Rules of Court' (pp. 6-7 Motion for
Reconsideration [in the CFI of Bulacan]; see pp. 52, 57-58,
C.A. rec.),
On April 10, 1979, undersigned counsel reiterated their desire to borrow
said expediente but it was not until May 3, 1979 that the expediente of the case
consisting of 164 pages were received by the Docket Section of the Office of
the Solicitor General. It was only on May 16, 1979 that said expediente were
delivered to undersigned Solicitor, thus compelling him to prepare the May 17,
1979 motion. And for the same reasons, it was only on June 7, 1979 that the
record on appeal was filed, which was well within the 30 days extension from
May 18, 1979 prayed for in petitioner's motion of May 17, 1979.
xxx xxx xxx
Page | 45
 (pp. 109-113, C.A. rec.). The other reason given by the Office of the Solicitor General was that they
have asked for the complete record of the case but that it was only forwarded
to their office sometime on May 3, 1979.
On July 14, 1980, respondent Court of Appeals resolved to require private respondents to comment
on the motion for reconsideration within ten (10) days from receipt of the resolution (p. 12 1, C.A.
rec.). The record of the case cannot be easily forwarded to the Solicitor General
because there was the case of motion for intervention filed in connection with
the case.
Earlier, however, or on July 8, 1980, private respondents mailed their opposition to the motion for
reconsideration and their waiver to appear for oral argument (pp. 122-123, C.A. rec.), Both were
received by the Court of Appeals on July 14, 1980, the very day the resolution requiring private The failure on the part of the court to immediately comply with the request of
respondents to comment on the motion for reconsideration, was released by the Court of Appeals. the office of the Solicitor General cannot be a justifying reason for failure to
In the petition before this Court, the Solicitor General laments the fact that no copies of the comply with the rules of court and of the order of filing the record on appeal
aforesaid pleadings of the private respondents were ever served on and received by him (p. 18, within the reglementary period, or time given by the court.
rec.). Indeed, said pleadings of the private respondents do not show nor indicate that copies thereof
were served on the Solicitor General (pp. 121-123, C.A. rec.).
The office of the Solicitor General gave the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan the
power to handle the case for (them) and the office of the Provincial Fiscal was
In the aforesaid opposition of private respondents, they claimed that furnished with all pleadings, orders and other papers of the case. The record
therefore of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal can easily be available to them.
Besides no less than five (5) extensions of time had been requested and the
The undersigned counsel merely stated that the date of filing the fifth motion for
last one was not acted upon by the Court and yet the Office of the Solicitor
extension to file record on appeal by the office of the Solicitor General was on
General filed the Record on Appeal only on June 17, 1979 should be June 7,
May 21, 1979, as shown on the envelope bearing the stamp of the Manila Post
1979), which is far beyond the reglementary period which was May 17, 1979
Office, which clearly reads 'May 21, 1979 and the undersigned counsel brought
(should be May 18, 1979).
to the attention of the lower court that the date of filing of this fifth extension
was the date shown when the mailing was made as stamped on the envelope.
That there can be no other date than the date stamped on the envelope made xxx xxx xxx
by the Manila Post Office when the fifth request for extension of filing the
record on appeal was mailed. This fact of the date of mailing, May 21, 1979,
(pp. 123-125, C.A. rec.).
was stamped on the envelope.

On August 15, 1980, respondent Court of Appeals issued a resolution denying the motion for
The office of the Solicitor General further alleged:
reconsideration, thus:

If ... taken into account solely without taking into

Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration dated June 23, 1980 filed by the
consideration the letter of the Post Master Delfin Cells,
Solicitor General and the opposition thereto filed on July 8, 1980 by the
dated September 25, 1979 x x, then it could be said that
respondents and considering that the said motion does not cite new matters
petitioner's motion for extension to file record on appeal,
which have not been considered in the decision promulgated on April 29, 1980,
dated May 17, 1979, was filed out of time.
the said motion is hereby denied.

From the above statement of the Office of the Solicitor General there can never
Petitioner's Motion to Set Case for Oral Argument' dated June 23, 1980 is
be any abuse in the exercise of judgment as to constitute a grave abuse of
likewise DENIED.
discretion. the lower court chose to rely on the date stamped on the envelope
by the Manila Post Office rather than considering as paramount a mere letter
from the Manila Post Office employee, Delfin Cells. Aforesaid resolution was received by the Solicitor General on August 20, 1980.

xxx xxx xxx Hence, this recourse.

If we are to believe that the stamped date, May 21, 1979, was wrongly
stamped by an employee of the Manila Post Office, then thousands of mails
received and or mailed on that date were all wrongly stamped. How can the
lower court believe that the date May 21, 1979, was merely erroneously
stamped on the envelope? The lower court's finding of facts on this regard,
must also be sustained.
Evidence Cases
Petition was filed on October 24, 1980; two extensions of time of thirty (30) days each having been
previously asked by and granted to petitioner Republic of the Philippines.
On October 29, 1980, WE resolved to require respondents to comment on the petition within ten
(10) days from notice of the resolution and at the same time issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining respondents from executing, enforcing and/or implementing the decision dated April 28,
1980 issued in CA G.R. No. SP-10081, entitled "Republic of the Philippines, Petitioner, versus Hon.
Roque Tamayo, etc., et al., Respondents" of the Court of Appeals, and the Order dated December
Page | 46
8, 1978 issued in Civil Case No. 5257-M, entitled "Republic of the Philippines. Plaintiff, versus
Turandot Aldaba, et al., Defendants" of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch VI at
Malolos, Bulacan, (pp. 49-51, rec.).
On November 14, 1980, private respondents filed their comment to the petition contending that no
abuse of discretion or act in excess of jurisdiction exists as to require a review by this honorable
Court (pp. 52-64, rec.).
On November 24, 1980, WE resolved to give due course to the petition and to declare the case
submitted for decision (p. 65, rec.).
But on December 22, 1980, private respondent filed a motion, praying for the outright dismissal of
the instant petition on the main ground that the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals sought
to be reviewed has already become final and executors hence, unappealable, because this petition
was filed out of time as the petitioner's motion for reconsideration iii the Court of Appeals was pro
forma (pp. 66-67, rec.).
The main issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not respondent Court of Appeals itself
committed a grave abuse of discretion in not finding that the respondent trial court committed a
grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioner's appeal. The questioned orders should be set
aside.
I. It must be underscored that the basic provisions of the Rules of Court basis of the dismissal of the
petitioner's appeal by the Court of First Instance of Bulacan as sustained by the respondent Court
of Appeals are Section 13, Rule 41; Where the notice of appeal, appeal bond or record on appeal
are not filed within the period of time herein provided, the appeal shall be dismissed; and Section
14, Rule 41; A motion to dismiss an appeal on any of the grounds mentioned in the preceding
section may be filed in the Court of First Instance prior to the transmittal of the record to the
appellate court.
The Court of First Instance of Bulacan dismissed herein petitioner's appeal on the bases of the
foregoing provision upon its finding that the record on appeal of petitioner was filed out of time as it
was filed only on June 7, 1979 or twenty (20) days after May 18, 1979, the last day of the appeal
period s extended petitioner fifth extension of time of thirty days from May 18, 1979, not having
been favorably acted upon by the Court of First Instance of Bulacan upon its finding that the same
was also filed late or three days after the last day of the extended appeal period. The implication of
the questioned orders of the Court of First Instance is that since the fifth extension of time was filed
out of time, no action may be taken thereon by it; hence, petitioner Republic had only up to May 18,
1979 within which to file the record on appeal. Consequently, the filing thereof only on June 7, 1979
was too late.
The petitioner, however, herein contends as it did before the Court of First Instance of Bulacan and
before the respondent Court of Appeals, that its fifth extension of time was actually filed on May 18,
1979, not on May 21, 1979 as found out by the Court of First Instance and Court of Appeals and in
support thereof, pointed to the certification of the postmaster of the Central Office of the Bureau of
Posts, dated September 25, 1949 (P. 47, rec.) to the effect that the said motion for extension of
time as contained in registered mail No. 3273 addressed to the Clerk of Court of First Instance of
Bulacan (Malolos) ... was received by this office late Friday afternoon, May 8, 1979. The letter was
not included in the only morning dispatch of May 19, to Bulacan and was dispatched May 21, 1979,
Monday (May 20 being a Sunday) under the Manila-Malolos Bill No. 202 page 1, line 15."
But the Court of First Instance of Bulacan opined that said certification cannot override the
prevailing practice in post offices "that a registered letter when posted is immediately stamped with
Evidence Cases
the date of its receipt, indicating therein the number of the registry, both on the covering envelope
itself and on the receipt delivered to the person who delivered the letter to the office" of which it
took judicial notice.
WE entertain grave doubts that the aforesaid post office practice is a proper subject of judicial
notice.
Section 1 of Rule 129 on judicial notice provides that "The existence and territorial extent of states,
their forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime
courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official
acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the
measure of time, the geographical divisions and political history of the world and all similar matters
which are of public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be
known to judges because of their judicial functions, shall be judicially recognized by the court
without the introduction of proof; but the court may receive evidence upon any of the subjects in this
section stated, when it shag find it necessary for its own information, and may resort for its aid to
appropriate books or documents or reference."
Undoubtedly, the post office practice of which the Court of First Instance took judicial notice is not
covered by any of the specific instances cited above. Neither can it be classified under "matters
which are of public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be
known to judges because of their judicial functions ... . " For a matter to be taken judicial notice of
by the courts of law, it must be a subject of common and general knowledge. In other words,
Judicial notice of facts is measured by general knowledge of the same facts. A fact is said to be
generally recognized or known when its existence or operation is accepted by the public without
qualification or contention. The test is whether the 'act involved is so notoriously known as to make
it proper to assume its existence without proof. The fact that a belief is not universal, however, is
not controlling for it is very seldom that any belief is accepted by everyone. It is enough that the
matters are familiarly known to the majority of mankind or those persons f with the particular matter
in question (20 Am Jur 49-50; Martin, Rules of Court 37, Second Edition). Furthermore, a matter
may be personally known to the judge and yet tot be a matter of judicial knowledge and vice versa,
a matter may not be actually known to an individual judge, and nevertheless be a proper subject of
judicial cognizance.
The post office practice herein involved is not tested by the aforestated considerations, a proper
matter of judicial notice. Moreover, the certification issued by the very postmaster of the post office
where the letter containing the questioned motion for extension of time was posted, is a very clear
manifestation that the said post office practice is not of unquestionable demonstration. Indeed, the
doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the courts. The power to take
judicial notice is to be exercised by the courts with caution; care must be taken that the requisite
notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubts upon the subject should be promptly resolved in the
negative (31 CJS 522; Martin, Rules of Court 38, Second Edition).
It is therefore manifest from the foregoing that the Court of First Instance of Bulacan committed a
palpable error amounting to a grave abuse of discretion in relying on the alleged post office practice
aforementioned over the uncontroverted certification of the postmaster earlier referred to. That
being so, the dismissal of petitioner's appeal therefore lacks factual basis. It should have acted on
petitioner's fifth motion for extension of time which WE find to have been filed on time.
The records reveal that a favorable action on the aforesaid fifth motion for extension of time is
warranted by the following circumstances: (1) the record on appeal was filed by petitioner even
before the lower court could consider the questioned motion for extension of time; and private
respondents objected to the said motion only after petitioner had filed the record on appeal; (2) the
order of the lower court granting the fourth extension of time did not contain any caveat that no
Page | 47
further extension shall be allowed; (3) the fact that the CFI records of the case were sent to the
Solicitor General only on May 3, 1979 and ostensibly handed to the Solicitor assigned to the case
only on May .16, 1979 or barely two (2) days before the expiration of the extended appeal period;
and (4) pressure of work in the undermanned Office of the Solicitor General who is the counsel of
the National Government and all other governmental agencies and instrumentalities; and (5) and
the unconscionable amount of P450,000.00 for a parcel of 1.5 hectares situated in a barrio of
Malolos, Bulacan, with only a provisional value of P7,200.00 obviously based upon its assessed
value appearing on its tax declaration. No sugar, rice or coconut land of only 15,000 square meters
could command such a fabulous price.
WE therefore rule that the respondent Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in affirming
the disputed orders of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan.
II. But even assuming that the motion for extension to file record on appeal dated May 17, 1979
was filed not on May 18, 1979 but on May 21, 1979 as claimed by private respondents, which is a
delay of only one (1) working day, May 19 and 20 being Saturday and Sunday, respectively, that
circumstance alone would not justify the outright dismissal of the appeal of petitioner Republic of
the Philippines, especially so in the light of the undisputed fact that petitioner had already filed with
the lower court the record on appeal at the time the questioned dismissal order was issued by the
lower court. For, as ruled in one case, "... the delay of four days in filing a notice of appeal and a
motion for an extension of time to file a record on appeal can be excused on the basis of equity and
considering that the record on appeal is now with the respondent judge. ( Ramos vs. Bagasao, et
al., G.R. No. 51552, February 28, 1980, Second Division; emphasis supplied). Moreover, WE have
already liberalized in a number of cases the jurisprudence on the matter of perfection of appeals.
For one, in De Las Alas vs. Court of Appeals (83 SCRA 200-216 [19781), WE ruled that:
... litigation should, as much as possible, be decided on their merits and not on
technicality, and under the circumstances obtaining in this case, We said in the
case of Gregorio vs. Court of Appeals (L-4351 1, July 23, 1976, 72 SCRA 120,
126), thus:
... Dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is
frowned upon where the policy of the courts is to
encourage hearing of appeals on their merits. The rules of
procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical
sense; rules of procedure are used only to help secure, not
override, substantial justice. If a technical and rigid
enforcement of the rules is made, their aim would be
defeated.
xxx xxx xxx
III. Moreover, a special circumstance which is the subject of one of the main issues raised by
petitioner in its appeal warrants US to exercise once more OUR exclusive prerogative to suspend
OUR own rules or to exempt a particular case from its operation as in the recent case of Republic
of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al. (83 SCRA 459, 478-480 119781), thus: ... The Rules
have been drafted with the primary objective of enhancing fair trials and expediting justice. As a
corollary, if their application and operation tend to subvert and defeat instead of promote and
enhance it, their suspension is justified. In the words of Justice Antonio P. Barredo in his concurring
opinion in Estrada vs. Sto. Domingo, '(T)his Court, through the revered and eminent Mr. Justice
Abad Santos, found occasion in the case of C. Viuda de Ordoverza v. Raymundo, to lay down for
recognition in holding that ' "it is always in the power of the court (Supreme Court) to suspend its
own rules or to except a particular case from its operation whenever the purposes of justice require
it . . . . .' " (Emphasis supplied). As emphasized by the Solicitor General, if the questioned orders
Evidence Cases
are not annulled and set aside, its enforcement and implementation will result to the prejudice of,
and irreparable injury to, public interest." This is so because the Government would lose its
opportunity to assail the order of the lower court dated December 8, 1978, the dispositive portion of
which reads, as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
The joint report filed by the three-man committee charged with the
determination of the just compensation of the property herein sought to be
condemned is hereby approved, such that the just compensation of the land
described in Paragraph 11 of the Complaint is fixed at Thirty Pesos (P30.00)
per square meter.
The defendant may now withdraw from the Philippine National Bank, Malolos
Branch, the sum of P7,200.00 deposited by the Third Regional Equipment
Services, Department of Public Highways under Account No. 35109, said sum
to be part of the total amount of P450,000.00 (15,000 square meters at P30.00
per square meter), which the Department of Public Highways, Third Regional
Equipment Services, Malolos, Bulacan, shall, and is hereby ordered, to pay to
the herein defendants as just compensation for the subject property.
SO ORDERED (pp. 3-4, Order dated December 8, 1978).
It must be stressed at this stage that the Government would lose no less than
P425,000.00 if the lower court's order of December 8, 1978 is not scrutinized
on appeal. It must be stated that the lower court was without jurisdiction to
create a three-man committee because Sec. 5, Rule 67 of the Revised Rules
of Court was repealed by P.D. 76 which took effect on December 6, 1972, the
salient features of which read, as follows:
The "current and fair market value" shall be understood to
mean the price of which a willing seller would sell and a
willing buyer would buy neither being under abnormal
pressure.
For purposes of just compensation in cases of private
property acquired by the government for public use, the
basis shall be the current and fair market value declared
by the owner or administrator or such market value as
determined by the assessor, whichever is lower.
Thus, from December 6, 1972, the effectivity date of PD 76, the just
compensation to be paid for private property acquired by the government for
public use is the current and fair market value declared by the owner or
administrator or such market value as determined by the Assessor whichever
is lower. Pursuant to said Decree, the government's obligation to private
respondent would only be P24,376.00. The lower court thus had no jurisdiction
to fix an amount of just compensation higher than P24,376.00. It follows
therefore that the joint report submitted by the three-man committee created by
the lower court could not serve as a legal basis for the determination of the just
compensation of the property sought to be condemned.
Page | 48
 xxx xxx xxx IV-20855-78-T entitled, "Amancio Manuel, Complainant-Appellant, v. F.E. Zuellig (M), Inc.,
Respondent-Appellee," which dismissed the appeal of petitioners herein and in effect affirmed the
decision of the Labor Arbiter ordering private respondent to pay petitioners separation pay
(pp. 19-21, rec.).
equivalent to their one month salary (exclusive of commissions, allowances, etc.) for every year of
service.
IV. With respect to the motion to dismiss filed on December 22, 1980 by private respondents, WE
find no merit therein. The contention of private respondents that the June 23, 1980 motion for
The antecedent facts are as follows:
reconsideration of petitioner with the Court of Appeals was pro forma is belied by the results
obtained in this petition before US.
Private respondent F.E. Zuellig (M), Inc., (hereinafter referred to as Zuellig) filed with the
Department of Labor (Regional Office No. 4) an application seeking clearance to terminate the
WHEREFORE, PETITION IS HEREBY GRANTED; THE DECISION DATED APRIL 29, 1980 AND
services of petitioners Jose Songco, Romeo Cipres, and Amancio Manuel (hereinafter referred to
THE RESOLUTION DATED AUGUST 15, 1980 OF THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
as petitioners) allegedly on the ground of retrenchment due to financial losses. This application was
ARE HEREBY ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE; AND THE RESPONDENT COURT OF FIRST
seasonably opposed by petitioners alleging that the company is not suffering from any losses. They
INSTANCE OF BULACAN IS HEREBY DIRECTED TO APPROVE PETITIONER'S RECORD ON
alleged further that they are being dismissed because of their membership in the union. At the last
APPEAL AND TO ELEVATE THE SAME TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS. NO
hearing of the case, however, petitioners manifested that they are no longer contesting their
COST.
dismissal. The parties then agreed that the sole issue to be resolved is the basis of the separation
pay due to petitioners. Petitioners, who were in the sales force of Zuellig received monthly salaries
SO ORDERED. of at least P40,000. In addition, they received commissions for every sale they made.

Teehankee (Chairman), Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur. The collective Bargaining Agreement entered into between Zuellig and F.E. Zuellig Employees
Association, of which petitioners are members, contains the following provision (p. 71, Rollo):
Melencio-Herrera, J., concur in the result.
ARTICLE XIV — Retirement Gratuity
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT Section l(a)-Any employee, who is separated from employment due to old age,
Manila sickness, death or permanent lay-off not due to the fault of said employee shall
receive from the company a retirement gratuity in an amount equivalent to one
(1) month's salary per year of service. One month of salary as used in this
FIRST DIVISION paragraph shall be deemed equivalent to the salary at date of retirement; years
of service shall be deemed equivalent to total service credits, a fraction of at
G.R. No. L-50999 March 23, 1990 least six months being considered one year, including probationary
employment. (Emphasis supplied)
JOSE SONGCO, ROMEO CIPRES, and AMANCIO MANUEL, petitioners,
vs On the other hand, Article 284 of the Labor Code then prevailing provides:
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (FIRST DIVISION), LABOR ARBITER FLAVIO
AGUAS, and F.E. ZUELLIG (M), INC., respondents.
Art. 284. Reduction of personnel. — The termination of employment of any
employee due to the installation of labor saving-devices, redundancy,
Raul E. Espinosa for petitioners. retrenchment to prevent losses, and other similar causes, shall entitle the
employee affected thereby to separation pay. In case of termination due to the
installation of labor-saving devices or redundancy, the separation pay shall be
Lucas Emmanuel B. Canilao for petitioner A. Manuel. equivalent to one (1) month pay or to at least one (1) month pay for every year
of service, whichever is higher. In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and
Atienza, Tabora, Del Rosario & Castillo for private respondent. other similar causes, the separation pay shall be equivalent to one (1) month
pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever is
higher. A fraction of at least six (6) months shall be considered one (1) whole
year. (Emphasis supplied)

MEDIALDEA, J.: In addition, Sections 9(b) and 10, Rule 1, Book VI of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code
provide:
This is a petition for certiorari seeking to modify the decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission in NLRC Case No. RB-IV-20840-78-T entitled, "Jose Songco and Romeo Cipres, xxx
Complainants-Appellants, v. F.E. Zuellig (M), Inc., Respondent-Appellee" and NLRC Case No. RN-

Evidence Cases Page | 49

 Sec. 9(b). Where the termination of employment is due to retrechment initiated
by the employer to prevent losses or other similar causes, or where the
employee suffers from a disease and his continued employment is prohibited
by law or is prejudicial to his health or to the health of his co-employees, the
employee shall be entitled to termination pay equivalent at least to his one
month salary, or to one-half month pay for every year of service, whichever is
higher, a fraction of at least six (6) months being considered as one whole
year.
xxx
Sec. 10. Basis of termination pay. — The computation of the termination pay of
an employee as provided herein shall be based on his latest salary rate, unless
the same was reduced by the employer to defeat the intention of the Code, in
which case the basis of computation shall be the rate before its deduction.
(Emphasis supplied)
On June 26,1978, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads (p.
78, Rollo):
RESPONSIVE TO THE FOREGOING, respondent should be as it is hereby,
ordered to pay the complainants separation pay equivalent to their one month
salary (exclusive of commissions, allowances, etc.) for every year of service
that they have worked with the company.
SO ORDERED.
The appeal by petitioners to the National Labor Relations Commission was dismissed for lack of
merit.
Hence, the present petition.
On June 2, 1980, the Court, acting on the verified "Notice of Voluntary Abandonment and
Withdrawal of Petition dated April 7, 1980 filed by petitioner Romeo Cipres, based on the ground
that he wants "to abide by the decision appealed from" since he had "received, to his full and
complete satisfaction, his separation pay," resolved to dismiss the petition as to him.
The issue is whether or not earned sales commissions and allowances should be included in the
monthly salary of petitioners for the purpose of computation of their separation pay.
The petition is impressed with merit.
Petitioners' position was that in arriving at the correct and legal amount of separation pay due them,
whether under the Labor Code or the CBA, their basic salary, earned sales commissions and
allowances should be added together. They cited Article 97(f) of the Labor Code which includes
commission as part on one's salary, to wit;
(f) 'Wage' paid to any employee shall mean the remuneration or earnings,
however designated, capable of being expressed in terms of money, whether
fixed or ascertained on a time, task, piece, or commission basis, or other
method of calculating the same, which is payable by an employer to an
Evidence Cases
employee under a written or unwritten contract of employment for work done or
to be done, or for services rendered or to be rendered, and includes the fair
and reasonable value, as determined by the Secretary of Labor, of board,
lodging, or other facilities customarily furnished by the employer to the
employee. 'Fair reasonable value' shall not include any profit to the employer or
to any person affiliated with the employer.
Zuellig argues that if it were really the intention of the Labor Code as well as its implementing rules
to include commission in the computation of separation pay, it could have explicitly said so in clear
and unequivocal terms. Furthermore, in the definition of the term "wage", "commission" is used only
as one of the features or designations attached to the word remuneration or earnings.
Insofar as the issue of whether or not allowances should be included in the monthly salary of
petitioners for the purpose of computation of their separation pay is concerned, this has been
settled in the case of Santos v. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 76721, September 21, 1987, 154 SCRA 166,
where We ruled that "in the computation of backwages and separation pay, account must be taken
not only of the basic salary of petitioner but also of her transportation and emergency living
allowances." This ruling was reiterated in Soriano v. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 75510, October 27,
1987, 155 SCRA 124 and recently, in Planters Products, Inc. v. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 78524,
January 20, 1989.
We shall concern ourselves now with the issue of whether or not earned sales commission should
be included in the monthly salary of petitioner for the purpose of computation of their separation
pay.
Article 97(f) by itself is explicit that commission is included in the definition of the term "wage". It has
been repeatedly declared by the courts that where the law speaks in clear and categorical
language, there is no room for interpretation or construction; there is only room for application
(Cebu Portland Cement Co. v. Municipality of Naga, G.R. Nos. 24116-17, August 22, 1968, 24
SCRA 708; Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals, G.R.No. L-2 7455, June 28,1973, 51 SCRA 381). A plain
and unambiguous statute speaks for itself, and any attempt to make it clearer is vain labor and
tends only to obscurity. How ever, it may be argued that if We correlate Article 97(f) with Article XIV
of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, Article 284 of the Labor Code and Sections 9(b) and 10 of
the Implementing Rules, there appears to be an ambiguity. In this regard, the Labor Arbiter
rationalized his decision in this manner (pp. 74-76, Rollo):
The definition of 'wage' provided in Article 96 (sic) of the Code can be correctly
be (sic) stated as a general definition. It is 'wage ' in its generic sense. A
careful perusal of the same does not show any indication that commission is
part of salary. We can say that commission by itself may be considered a
wage. This is not something novel for it cannot be gainsaid that certain types of
employees like agents, field personnel and salesmen do not earn any regular
daily, weekly or monthly salaries, but rely mainly on commission earned.
Upon the other hand, the provisions of Section 10, Rule 1, Book VI of the
implementing rules in conjunction with Articles 273 and 274 (sic) of the Code
specifically states that the basis of the termination pay due to one who is
sought to be legally separated from the service is 'his latest salary rates.
x x x.
Even Articles 273 and 274 (sic) invariably use 'monthly pay or monthly salary'.
Page | 50
 The above terms found in those Articles and the particular Rules were
intentionally used to express the intent of the framers of the law that for
purposes of separation pay they mean to be specifically referring to salary only.
.... Each particular benefit provided in the Code and other Decrees on Labor
has its own pecularities and nuances and should be interpreted in that light.
Thus, for a specific provision, a specific meaning is attached to simplify matters
that may arise there from. The general guidelines in (sic) the formation of
specific rules for particular purpose. Thus, that what should be controlling in
matters concerning termination pay should be the specific provisions of both
Book VI of the Code and the Rules. At any rate, settled is the rule that in
matters of conflict between the general provision of law and that of a particular-
or specific provision, the latter should prevail.
On its part, the NLRC ruled (p. 110, Rollo):
From the aforequoted provisions of the law and the implementing rules, it could
be deduced that wage is used in its generic sense and obviously refers to the
basic wage rate to be ascertained on a time, task, piece or commission basis
or other method of calculating the same. It does not, however, mean that
commission, allowances or analogous income necessarily forms part of the
employee's salary because to do so would lead to anomalies (sic), if not
absurd, construction of the word "salary." For what will prevent the employee
from insisting that emergency living allowance, 13th month pay, overtime, and
premium pay, and other fringe benefits should be added to the computation of
their separation pay. This situation, to our mind, is not the real intent of the
Code and its rules.
We rule otherwise. The ambiguity between Article 97(f), which defines the term 'wage' and Article
XIV of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, Article 284 of the Labor Code and Sections 9(b) and
10 of the Implementing Rules, which mention the terms "pay" and "salary", is more apparent than
real. Broadly, the word "salary" means a recompense or consideration made to a person for his
pains or industry in another man's business. Whether it be derived from "salarium," or more
fancifully from "sal," the pay of the Roman soldier, it carries with it the fundamental idea of
compensation for services rendered. Indeed, there is eminent authority for holding that the words
"wages" and "salary" are in essence synonymous (Words and Phrases, Vol. 38 Permanent Edition,
p. 44 citing Hopkins vs. Cromwell, 85 N.Y.S. 839,841,89 App. Div. 481; 38 Am. Jur. 496). "Salary,"
the etymology of which is the Latin word "salarium," is often used interchangeably with "wage", the
etymology of which is the Middle English word "wagen". Both words generally refer to one and the
same meaning, that is, a reward or recompense for services performed. Likewise, "pay" is the
synonym of "wages" and "salary" (Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed.). Inasmuch as the words
"wages", "pay" and "salary" have the same meaning, and commission is included in the definition of
"wage", the logical conclusion, therefore, is, in the computation of the separation pay of petitioners,
their salary base should include also their earned sales commissions.
The aforequoted provisions are not the only consideration for deciding the petition in favor of the
petitioners.
We agree with the Solicitor General that granting, in gratia argumenti, that the commissions were in
the form of incentives or encouragement, so that the petitioners would be inspired to put a little
more industry on the jobs particularly assigned to them, still these commissions are direct
remuneration services rendered which contributed to the increase of income of Zuellig .
Commission is the recompense, compensation or reward of an agent, salesman, executor,
trustees, receiver, factor, broker or bailee, when the same is calculated as a percentage on the
Evidence Cases
amount of his transactions or on the profit to the principal (Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed., citing
Weiner v. Swales, 217 Md. 123, 141 A.2d 749, 750). The nature of the work of a salesman and the
reason for such type of remuneration for services rendered demonstrate clearly that commission
are part of petitioners' wage or salary. We take judicial notice of the fact that some salesmen do not
receive any basic salary but depend on commissions and allowances or commissions alone, are
part of petitioners' wage or salary. We take judicial notice of the fact that some salesman do not
received any basic salary but depend on commissions and allowances or commissions alone,
although an employer-employee relationship exists. Bearing in mind the preceeding dicussions, if
we adopt the opposite view that commissions, do not form part of wage or salary, then, in effect,
We will be saying that this kind of salesmen do not receive any salary and therefore, not entitled to
separation pay in the event of discharge from employment. Will this not be absurd? This narrow
interpretation is not in accord with the liberal spirit of our labor laws and considering the purpose of
separation pay which is, to alleviate the difficulties which confront a dismissed employee thrown the
the streets to face the harsh necessities of life.
Additionally, in Soriano v. NLRC, et al., supra, in resolving the issue of the salary base that should
be used in computing the separation pay, We held that:
The commissions also claimed by petitioner ('override commission' plus 'net
deposit incentive') are not properly includible in such base figure since such
commissions must be earned by actual market transactions attributable to
petitioner.
Applying this by analogy, since the commissions in the present case were earned by actual market
transactions attributable to petitioners, these should be included in their separation pay. In the
computation thereof, what should be taken into account is the average commissions earned during
their last year of employment.
The final consideration is, in carrying out and interpreting the Labor Code's provisions and its
implementing regulations, the workingman's welfare should be the primordial and paramount
consideration. This kind of interpretation gives meaning and substance to the liberal and
compassionate spirit of the law as provided for in Article 4 of the Labor Code which states that "all
doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code including its
implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor" (Abella v. NLRC, G.R. No.
71812, July 30,1987,152 SCRA 140; Manila Electric Company v. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 78763,
July 12,1989), and Article 1702 of the Civil Code which provides that "in case of doubt, all labor
legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent living for the
laborer.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the respondent National Labor
Relations Commission is MODIFIED by including allowances and commissions in the separation
pay of petitioners Jose Songco and Amancio Manuel. The case is remanded to the Labor Arbiter for
the proper computation of said separation pay.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (Chairman), Cruz, Gancayco and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
Page | 51
 THIRD DIVISION 3. Reducing moral damages awarded to appellee to TWENTY FIVE
THOUSAND and 00/100 (P25,000.00) PESOS;

4. Reducing exemplary damages awarded to appellee to TEN THOUSAND

and 00/100 (P10,000.00) PESOS;
G.R. No. 119850 June 20, 1996

5. Reversing and setting aside the award of P250,000.00 for attorney's fees as
MANDARIN VILLA, INC., petitioner,
well as interest awarded, and
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, and CLODUALDO DE JESUS, respondents.
6. AFFIRMING the dismissal of all counterclaims and cross-claims.
RESOLUTION
Costs against appellant Mandarin.

SO ORDERED.5
FRANCISCO, J.:p
Mandarin Villa, thus, interposed this present petition, faulting the respondent court with six (6)
assigned errors which may be reduced to the following issues, to wit: (1) whether or not petitioner is
With ample evidentiary support are the following antecedent facts:
bound to accept payment by means of credit card; (2) whether or not petitioner is negligent under
the circumstances obtaining in this case; and (3) if negligent, whether or not such negligence is the
In the evening of October 19, 1989, private respondent, Clodualdo de Jesus, a practicing lawyer proximate cause of the private respondent's damage.
and businessman, hosted a dinner for his friends at the petitioner's restaurant, the Mandarin Villa
Seafoods Village Greenhills, Mandaluyong City. After dinner the waiter handed to him the bill in the
Petitioner contends that it cannot be faulted for its cashier's refusal to accept private respondent's
amount of P2,658.50. Private respondent offered to pay the bill through his credit card issued by
BANKARD credit card, the same not being a legal tender. It argues that private respondent's offer
Philippine Commercial Credit Card Inc. (BANKARD). This card was accepted by the waiter who
to pay by means of credit card partook of the nature of a proposal to novate an existing obligation
immediately proceeded to the restaurant's cashier for card verification. Ten minutes later, however,
for which petitioner, as creditor, must first give its consent otherwise there will be no binding
the waiter returned and audibly informed private respondent that his credit card had
contract between them. Petitioner cannot seek refuge behind this averment.
expired.1 Private respondent remonstrated that said credit card had yet to expire on September
1990, as embossed on its face. 2 The waiter was unmoved, thus, private respondent and two of his
guests approached the restaurant's cashier who again passed the credit card over the verification We note that Mandarin Villa Seafood Village is affiliated with BANKARD. In fact, an
computer. The same information was produced, i.e., CARD EXPIRED. Private respondent and his "Agreement"6 entered into by petitioner and BANKARD dated June 23, 1989, provides inter alia:
guests returned to their table and at this juncture, Professor Lirag, another guest, uttered the
following remarks: "Clody [referring to Clodualdo de Jesus], may problema ba? Baka kailangang
The MERCHANT shall honor validly issued PCCCI credit cards presented by
maghugas na kami ng pinggan?"3 Thereupon, private respondent left the restaurant and got his BPI
their corresponding holders in the purchase of goods and/or services supplied
Express Credit Card from his car and offered it to pay their bill. This was accepted and honored by
by it provided that the card expiration date has not elapsed and the card
the cashier after verification.4 Petitioner and his companions left afterwards.
number does not appear on the latest cancellation bulletin of lost, suspended
and canceled PCCCI credit cards and, no signs of tampering, alterations or
The incident triggered the filing of a suit for damages by private respondent. Following a full-dress irregularities appear on the face of the credit card.7
trial, judgment was rendered directing the petitioner and BANKARD to pay jointly and severally the
private respondent: (a) moral damages in the amount of P250,000.00; (b) exemplary damages in
While private respondent, may not be a party to the said agreement, the above-quoted stipulation
the amount of P100,000.00, and (c) attorney's fees and litigation expenses in the amount of
conferred a favor upon the private respondent, a holder of credit card validly issued by BANKARD.
P50,000.00.
This stipulation is a stipulation pour autri and under Article 1311 of the Civil Code private
respondent may demand its fulfillment provided he communicated his acceptance to the petitioner
Both the petitioner and BANKARD appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals which rendered a before its revocation.8 In this case, private respondent's offer to pay by means of his BANKARD
decision, thus: credit card constitutes not only an acceptance of the said stipulation but also an explicit
communication of his acceptance to the obligor.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED by:
In addition, the record shows that petitioner posted a logo inside Mandarin Villa Seafood Village
stating that "Bankard is accepted here.9 This representation is conclusive upon the petitioner which
1. Finding appellant MANDARIN solely responsible for damages in favor of
it cannot deny or disprove as against the private respondent, the party relying thereon. Petitioner,
appellee;
therefore, cannot disclaim its obligation to accept private respondent's BANKARD credit card
without violating the equitable principle of estoppel. 10
2. Absolving appellant BANKARD of any responsibility for damages;

Evidence Cases Page | 52

Anent the second issue, petitioner insists that it is not negligent. In support thereof, petitioner cites
its good faith in checking, not just once but twice, the validity of the aforementioned credit card prior
to its dishonor. It argues that since the verification machine flashed an information that the credit
card has expired, petitioner could not be expected to honor the same much less be adjudged
negligent for dishonoring it. Further, petitioner asseverates that it only followed the guidelines and
instructions issued by BANKARD in dishonoring the aforementioned credit card. The argument is
untenable.
The test for determining the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows:
Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use the reasonable care and caution which an
ordinary prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of
negligence. 11 The Point of Sale (POS) Guidelines which outlined the steps that petitioner must
follow under the circumstances provides.
xxx xxx xxx
CARD EXPIRED
a. Check expiry date on card.
b. If unexpired, refer to CB.
b.1. If valid, honor up to maximum of SPL only.
b.2. If in CB as Lost, do procedures 2a to 2e.,
b.3. If in CB as Suspended/Cancelled, do not honor card.
c. If expired, do not honor card. 12
A cursory reading of said rule reveals that whenever the words CARD EXPIRED flashes on the
screen of the verification machine, petitioner should check the credit card's expiry date embossed
on the card itself. If unexpired, petitioner should honor the card provided it is not invalid, cancelled
or otherwise suspended. But if expired, petitioner should not honor the card. In this case, private
respondent's BANKARD credit card has an embossed expiry date of September 1990. 13 Clearly, it
has not yet expired on October 19, 1989, when the same was wrongfully dishonored by the
petitioner. Hence, petitioner did not use the reasonable care and caution which an ordinary prudent
person would have used in the same situation and as such petitioner is guilty of negligence. In this
connection, we quote with approval the following observations of the respondent Court.
Mandarin argues that based on the POS Guidelines (supra), it has three
options in case the verification machine flashes "CARD EXPIRED". It chose to
exercise option (c) by not honoring appellee's credit card. However, appellant
apparently intentionally glossed over option "(a) Check expiry date on card"
(id.) which would have shown without any shadow of doubt that the expiry date
embossed on the BANKARD was "SEP 90". (Exhibit "D".) A cursory look at the
appellee's BANKARD would also reveal that appellee had been as of that date
a cardholder since 1982, a fact which would have entitled the customer the
courtesy of better treatment. 14
Evidence Cases
Petitioner, however, argues that private respondent's own negligence in not bringing with him
sufficient cash was the proximate cause of his damage. It likewise sought exculpation by
contending that the remark of Professor Lirag 15 is a supervening event and at the same time the
proximate cause of private respondent's injury.
We find this contention also devoid of merit. While it is true that private respondent did not have
sufficient cash on hand when he hosted a dinner at petitioner's restaurant, this fact alone does not
constitute negligence on his part. Neither can it be claimed that the same was the proximate cause
of private respondent's damage. We take judicial notice 16 of the current practice among major
establishments, petitioner included, to accept payment by means of credit cards in lieu of cash.
Thus, petitioner accepted private respondent's BPI Express Credit Card after verifying its
validity, 17 a fact which all the more refutes petitioner's imputation of negligence on the private
respondent.
Neither can we conclude that the remark of Professor Lirag was a supervening event and the
proximate cause of private respondent's injury. The humiliation and embarrassment of the private
respondent was brought about not by such a remark of Professor Lirag but by the fact of dishonor
by the petitioner of private respondent's valid BANKARD credit card. If at all, the remark of
Professor Lirag served only to aggravate the embarrassment then felt by private respondent, albeit
silently within himself.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 137278-79 February 17, 2003
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FRIVALDO BESMONTE y LORENO and SONNY APUYAN y MORIN, accused-appellants.
D E C I S I ON
QUISUMBING, J.:
On appeal is the consolidated judgment1 of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch
52, dated September 7, 1998, in Criminal Cases Nos. 95-3918-19, finding herein appellants
Frivaldo Besmonte y Loreno and Sonny Apuyan y Morin guilty of rape and sentencing them to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The young victim in these cases, Melanie A. Gozmo,2 is related to the appellants. Apuyan is the
brother of her mother, while Besmonte is the second husband of Melanie’s maternal grandmother.
She was staying at the house of the appellant Apuyan, where appellant Besmonte likewise resided,
at the time of the rapes complained of.
On June 6, 1995, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for Sorsogon filed an information for rape
against appellant Besmonte. Docketed as Criminal Case No. 95-3918, the accusatory portion of the
charge sheet read as follows:
Page | 53
That on or about the 15th day of December, 1994, at about 12:00 o’clock noon at Barangay Hubo,
Municipality of Magallanes, Province of Sorsogon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a bladed instrument, with lewd designs
and by means of force, violence and/or intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of one Melanie A. Gozmo, a 15 year old minor, against her will
and consent, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
That same day, another information for the same offense was filed against appellant Apuyan.
Docketed as Criminal Case No. 95-3919, it averred:
That on or about the 31st day of May 1994 at about 12:00 o’clock midnight and for several
occasions and dates thereafter, at barangay Hubo, Municipality of Magallanes, Province of
Sorsogon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, armed with a knife, with lewd designs and by means of force, violence and/or intimidation,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have carnal knowledge of one Melanie A.
Gozmo, a 15 year old minor, against her will and consent, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
On July 27, 1995, appellant Besmonte was arraigned in Criminal Case No. 95-3918 and with
assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge.
Appellant Apuyan was, in turn, arraigned on September 25, 1995 and duly assisted by counsel de
officio, likewise entered a plea of not guilty.
The two cases were then consolidated and jointly tried.
The prosecution presented two witnesses: Agnes Hinanay, a paternal first cousin of the victim, and
the private complainant, Melanie A. Gozmo.
Agnes Hinanay testified that on April 17, 1995, she paid the victim a visit at appellant Apuyan’s
house in Hubo, Magallanes, Sorsogon.5 Agnes noticed that private complainant was
pregnant.6 When Agnes asked Melanie about her pregnancy, the latter revealed that she was raped
by appellant Apuyan on May 31, 1994 and on several other occasions thereafter. 7 Melanie further
disclosed to her that on December 15, 1994, appellant Besmonte also raped her.8 1a\^/phi1.net
After learning about the rapes, Agnes then took Melanie and her siblings to live with her at
Binisitihan Norte, Magallanes, Sorsogon.9
On April 17, 1995, Agnes reported the rape of Melanie at the Magallanes Police Station where she
executed a sworn statement.10
Agnes likewise brought the victim to a doctor where an examination confirmed that she was
pregnant.11 The victim gave birth to a baby boy in 1995.12
Private complainant testified that after the death of her father in 1992, she was brought by her
mother to Hubo, Magallanes, Sorsogon to live in the house of her uncle, appellant Apuyan. 13 At
about midnight of May 31, 1994, while complainant was sleeping in said house, Apuyan undressed
Evidence Cases
her and placed himself on top of her.14 She was awakened and found herself in the nude. She tried
to resist appellant but she was overpowered when he poked a knife at her neck.15 Appellant then
thrust his phallus into her vagina16 and "let it in and let it out."17 Melanie felt pain and her private
parts bled as a result.18 After, Apuyan had satiated his libidinous desires, he warned her not to tell
anybody about the incident, as otherwise, he would kill her and her siblings. 19
Melanie also claimed that on the night of December 15, 1994, while she was sleeping at Apuyan’s
house, her grandmother’s husband, Besmonte, placed himself on top of her and inserted his penis
inside her vagina.20 She was not able to resist as Besmonte threatened to kill her and her siblings, if
she would report the matter.21 Although it was dark, she was able to recognize Besmonte by his
voice and underarm odor.22 1a\^/phi1.net
Despite the threats, Melanie reported the incidents to her mother and her grandmother. The mother
did nothing while the grandmother struck her with a piece of bamboo and told her not to make any
fuss lest the matter reach the barrio folks of Hubo, Magallanes.23 Melanie then revealed her plight to
her cousin, prosecution witness Agnes Hinanay, and her aunt, Elsa Mirandilla. 24 The two took her
and her siblings away from the house of appellant Apuyan, reported the matter to the police, and
had her examined by a doctor who advised her that she was pregnant. She delivered a boy on
August 25, 1995.25 At the time she was raped, Melanie was only 15 years old.26
Appellants raised the defenses of denial and alibi.
In his defense, appellant Apuyan testified that on May 31, 1994, he was in the barangay proper of
Hubo, Magallanes having a drinking spree with his friends Rowan Perdigon, Ryan de los Santos,
and Noel de los Santos.27 They started drinking gin from four o’clock in the afternoon to ten o’clock
in the evening.28 They consumed a dozen bottles of gin. He then staggered home and upon
reaching his house, he fell into a drunken sleep.29 He only woke up the following morning. At that
time, there were 13 persons inside his house, which had two rooms.30 He slept alone while the rest
slept side by side.31 He denied raping Melanie. He likewise denied executing a counter-affidavit
which stated that he was ready to marry Melanie as she was carrying his child.32
For his part, appellant Besmonte declared that he could not have raped Melanie on December 15,
1994 since on that date he was in Sorsogon, Sorsogon buying bamboo to be used in the mussel
farm (tahungan) of a certain Zaldy.33 He worked at said mussel farm from May 30, 1994 to January
1, 1995.34 It was only on the latter date that he found time to return to Hubo, Magallanes and he
stayed there only for three days. Afterwards, he returned to Sorsogon,
Sorsogon.1a\^/phi1.net Besmonte could not think of any reason why the victim should charge him
with rape.35 He said he treated her like his own child and even sent her to school.36 He was also
unaware of any bad blood between him and Agnes Hinanay.37
To corroborate appellant Besmonte’s alibi his wife, Rosalina Apuyan, testified that from May 1994
to December 1994, he was in Sorsogon, Sorsogon.38 It was only on January 1995 that he visited
them.39 According to Rosalina, her granddaughter, Melanie, could not have been raped given the
circumstance that she slept side by side with several persons. There were 12 persons who called
Apuyan’s house their home. Melanie slept close to the room of the Besmontes, according to
Rosalina. She could see Melanie from their room, if any of the appellants approached her at
night,40 said the witness.
On September 7, 1998, the trial court promulgated its consolidated decision, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused Frivaldo Besmonte y Loreno in
Criminal Case No. 95-3918 and Sonny Apuyan y Morin in Criminal Case No. 95-3919 guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape under Art. 335 [of the Revised Penal Code] and hereby
Page | 54
sentences each of them [to] the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay the sum of
P50,000.00 each as civil indemnity and P10,000.00 as moral damages to the complainant without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the cost.1awphi1.nét
In the service of their sentence, they shall be credited with the full period of their confinement
pursuant to law.
SO ORDERED.41
Before us, appellants now appeal their conviction, imputing to the trial court the following errors:
I could hardly remember her birthday.1awphi1.nét Hence, they conclude that the trial court should
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RELYING HEAVILY ON THE INCREDIBLE TESTIMONY OF
PRIVATE COMPLAINANT MELANIE GOZMO.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS ON THE
GROUND THAT HIS (sic) GUILT WAS NOT PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT FRIVALDO
BESMONTE DESPITE THE FACT THAT HE WAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY IDENTIFIED. 42
In sum, we find the issues to be: (1) the credibility of complaining witness; (2) the sufficiency of the
prosecution’s evidence; and (3) the identification of appellant Besmonte as one of the rapists.
Appellants submit that the first and second issues are interrelated, hence jointly discussed.
On the first and second issues, appellants assail Melanie’s testimony as unworthy of belief and
hence, a flimsy ground for their conviction. In describing private complainant’s testimony as
"incredible," they ask us to note the fact that both times when she was allegedly raped, complainant
was lying beside and very close to her siblings. Yet neither her brother nor her sister was
awakened. Appellants assert that this is very much contrary to common knowledge and human
experience. Appellants argue that it is difficult to believe that appellants raped her at times when
almost all members of the family were present in the house.
For the appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) points out jurisprudence has recognized
that rape can take place in circumstances of crowding similar to that of the instant cases.
Appellants cannot exonerate themselves by claiming that the crimes charged could not possibly
take place since there were several other persons present inside the house. Precedents abound
undermining appellants’ contention.
The presence of people nearby is no guarantee that rape will not be committed, for lust is no
respecter of time and place.43 Rape has been committed in places where people congregate, like
parks or school premises and even in a house where there are other occupants. 44 There is no rule
or norm that a woman can only be raped in seclusion.45 It has been committed in a room adjacent to
where other members of the family stay or in a room, which the victim shared with others. 46 We
Evidence Cases
have more than once observed that rape could take place in the same room where other members
of the family were sleeping.47 In the instant cases, both rapes complained of were committed in the
middle of the night. It is of judicial notice that it is at this time when children are in deep slumber and
could not be easily awakened.48 The fact that Melanie’s siblings were not awakened at the times
she was ravished is not improbable. Hence, appellants’ thesis that it was impossible for them to
have committed the rape in the presence of private complainant’s siblings who were sleeping next
to her deserves scant consideration.
Appellants ask us to discredit private complainant’s testimony because she was inconsistent in her
account. They point out that when she testified as to how Apuyan raped her at knifepoint, she
initially claimed that he poked a knife at her neck using her right hand, while his left hand was
cupped over her mouth. When grilled further, she changed her statement and said that he propped
himself up on the mat with his right hand. Moreover, they say complainant had a poor memory and
have taken great caution in giving credence to her testimony.
The OSG counters that the alleged inconsistency is minor or trivial. It pertains only to peripheral
matters. Hence, it cannot impair private complainant’s credibility as a witness.
In ruling upon Melanie’s credibility, the trial court found her testimony to be "forthright, clear, and
free from serious contradictions."49 The trial court’s assessment of complainant’s credibility,
considering that it had the advantage of observing her demeanor as she testified, is not easily
discarded. The trial court judge is in the best position to determine the truthfulness of the
complainant’s testimony. Unless it is shown that the trial court overlooked, misunderstood, or
misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight or substance that would otherwise affect the result
of the case, its findings will not be disturbed on appeal.50 We find no compelling reason now to
depart from said rule. We have carefully read the victim’s testimony and find that the discrepancy
harped upon by appellants focused more on her account of events immediately preceding the rape
by Apuyan. They did not zero in on her narration of the crime itself. Complainant’s testimony may
not be flawless, but its substance, veracity, and weight were unaffected by the triviality of the
alleged inconsistency.
What is material here is Melanie’s testimony on how she was sexually abused. She positively
identified appellants in open court as her ravishers without any hesitation. Indeed, where the
accusing words come from a girl of tender years and they are directed against her own relatives,
they are difficult to disbelieve. We further note that Melanie broke out in tears while testifying. 51 The
crying of a victim during her testimony is evidence of the truth of the rape charges, for the display of
such emotion indicates the pain that the victim feels when asked to recount her traumatic
experience.52 Melanie testified in a categorical, straightforward, and frank manner, and she
remained consistent under cross-examination. The inescapable conclusion is that she is a credible
witness. The sole testimony of a rape victim, if credible, suffices to convict.53
On the third issue, appellant Besmonte argues that his identification by complaining witness as her
rapist on December 15, 1994 is doubtful and cannot serve as the basis of his conviction, as it was
undisputed that the room where he supposedly raped Melanie had no illumination. Hence,
assuming arguendo, that she was indeed raped, it was improbable for her to positively identify him
as her assailant given the total darkness of the surroundings. She only presumed that it was him on
account of his underarm odor. Besmonte contends that it would be unjust to conclude that he was
the real culprit on account of his underarm odor. After all, he is not the only person with that smell.
The OSG, however, points out that private complainant was able to identify Besmonte not just from
his underarm smell but also from his voice. She was familiar with both, as the two of them had been
living in the same house for at least four years prior to her rape by Besmonte. Her identification of
Besmonte must be deemed both sufficient and indubitable, said the OSG.
Page | 55
Appellant Besmonte’s bid for exoneration on the theory of doubtful identification, in our view, is an
exercise in futility. The absence of illumination in the place of the commission of the crime does not
detract from the positive identification by Melanie of Besmonte as her ravisher. Although visibility is
an important factor in the identification of a felon, its relative significance depends largely on the
attending circumstances and the discretion of the trial court.54We have held that the sense of smell,
in the right circumstances, might be a reliable mode of identification, but it could also prove to be
tenuous if it were the sole source of identification under circumstances that leave much room for
other probabilities to contend with.55 In the case against Besmonte, there is not much room to doubt
the positive identification on account of the victim’s olfactory faculties.
The prosecution’s case against Besmonte is founded on Melanie’s familiarity with him. If she was
not at all familiar with appellant Besmonte, the prosecution’s whole case against him collapses, for
such familiarity was its very foundation. In the instant case, it was not disputed that Melanie had
lived in the same house with Besmonte for almost four years prior to the incident. In fact, Besmonte
himself testified that he had treated her like a daughter and was even responsible for her
schooling.56 Thus, the basis for her identification was her long familiarity with Besmonte. She
pointed to him because she knew him well prior to the sexual assault. Melanie was familiar with his
body smell. No doubt she could perceive and recognize that smell at the time of sexual contact. At
that time, private complainant was as close to Besmonte as was physically possible, for a man and
a woman could not be physically closer to each other than during a sexual act. 57 Moreover, the
victim did not solely rely upon her sense of smell in identifying her ravisher. She emphatically
declared in open court that she also recognized Besmonte from his voice58when he uttered
threatening words to her in the dark. It is highly inconceivable that complainant would not recognize
Besmonte’s voice, having lived with him for quite some time. The sound of the voice of a person is
an acceptable means of identification where it is established that the witness and the accused knew
each other personally and closely for a number of years.59
We find no reason to doubt the accuracy of the identification of the malefactor based on auditory
and olfactory perception by the victim on December 15, 1994. Under the circumstances, Melanie
was able to perceive who her rapist was and to make known that perception. Nor is there any
reason to doubt her sincerity to tell the truth, for there is no showing at all by the defense that she
charged Besmonte with rape due to an evil or corrupt motive.
In sum, the defense of denial and alibi interposed by appellants cannot prevail over their positive
identification by the victim. It is a time-honored principle that the positive and categorical assertions
of a witness generally prevail over bare denials.60 In the case against Apuyan, greater probative
value and evidentiary weight must be accorded to Melanie’s unwavering and categorical
identification of appellant Apuyan as one of her tormentors over this appellant’s feeble, self-serving,
and uncorroborated denial. Affirmative testimony from a credible witness is stronger and more
trustworthy than a bare negative testimony.61
Equally unmeritorious is appellant Besmonte’s alibi that he could not have raped Melanie because
he was in Sorsogon, Sorsogon from May 1994 to January 1995. For alibi to prosper, appellant must
not only prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed, he must also
convincingly demonstrate the physical impossibility of his presence at the locus criminis at the time
of the incident.62 In Besmonte’s case, it was not physically impossible for Besmonte to have been at
the crime scene at the time the rape was committed, in view of the trial court’s observation that:
It is of judicial notice that the poblacion of Magallanes can be reached thru a jeep, which is the
means of transportation from the town of Sorsogon for about one (1) hour only. Accused did not
even present the person he resides with while in Sorsogon.63
That Besmonte’s wife corroborated his alibi is no moment. No other witness unrelated to appellant
Besmonte was presented to corroborate his claim. Alibi cannot prosper if it is established mainly by
Evidence Cases
the accused and his relatives, and not by credible persons.64 This is because alibi is easy to
contrive and difficult to disprove.65
Rape is committed when a man has carnal knowledge of a victim with the use of force and
intimidation.66 In both cases, Melanie credibly testified on the details of her harrowing experiences
and positively identified the appellants as the persons who raped her. The evidence for the
prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt the elements of carnal knowledge and force
or intimidation. Hence, we must sustain the conviction of both appellants and deny their respective
appeals.
But did the trial court correctly impose the penalty of reclusion perpetua on appellants?
The OSG disagrees only in regard to appellant Apuyan. It recommends the imposition of the death
penalty on him. The OSG argues that with the amendment of the Revised Penal Code by R.A. No.
8353,67 rape was reclassified as a crime against persons. Under Article 266-B68 of the Revised
Penal Code, as so amended, rape is now punishable with reclusion perpetua to death whenever
the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon. The OSG stresses that the qualifying
circumstance of deadly weapon was proven with respect to appellant Apuyan. Moreover, according
to the OSG, the relationship of Melanie with Apuyan, while not alleged in the information, was
nonetheless proven during the trial and now should be considered as a generic aggravating
circumstance, for purposes of imposing the penalty. With the presence of the qualifying
circumstance of use of a deadly weapon in the commission of the rape coupled with the generic
aggravating circumstance of relationship, without any mitigating circumstance, then the proper
penalty for appellant Apuyan should be death, the OSG said.
As the OSG points out, since appellant Apuyan committed the rape with the use of knife, a deadly
weapon, the crime is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.69 However, the OSG’s stance that
the relationship between Apuyan (uncle) and Melanie (niece) should be treated as a generic
aggravating circumstance to justify imposing the death penalty is precipitate.
Under Sections 870 and 971 Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, a qualifying
or aggravating circumstance must first be specifically alleged in the information and then duly
proved during the trial. Otherwise, even if proved, such a circumstance cannot be appreciated in
determining the proper penalty.72
In Criminal Case No. 95-3919, the relationship between Apuyan and his victim was not alleged in
the information. Hence, for purposes of determining the penalty to be imposed, the relationship
even if proved during the trial, should not be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance.
The 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, providing that aggravating circumstances, whether
ordinary or qualifying, must be so stated in the complaint or information, 73applies to the cases
against appellants under the principle of retroactivity of procedural law because the rules favor the
accused. Since no aggravating circumstance could be appreciated in the commission of rape in
Criminal Case No. 95-3919, the trial court did not err in applying Article 63 (2)74 of the Revised
Penal Code by imposing on appellant Apuyan only the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Concerning damages awarded below, we find that the trial court awarded ₱50,000.00 as civil
indemnity but only ₱10,000.00 as moral damages to the victim. The amount awarded as civil
indemnity is sufficient but moral damages should be increased to ₱50,000.00 in accordance with
current jurisprudence.75 The award of ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages should be sustained, by
way of public example and to prevent minors from being sexually abused76 by their elders.
WHEREFORE, the consolidated judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon,
Branch 52, in Criminal Cases Nos. 95-3918 and 95-3919, finding appellants Frivaldo Besmonte
Page | 56
Loreno and Sonny Apuyan y Morin guilty of one (1) count of rape each and sentencing them to On January 14, 1986, respondent bank filed with the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City a
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Each of the appellants petition to reconstitute Transfer Certificate of Title No. 24604, which was lost in the Office of the
is also sentenced to pay the victim, Melanie Gozmo, ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as Registry of Deeds of Kalookan City, the said proceeding being docketed as Case No. C-2746. 2
moral damages, and ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages, as well as the costs.
On June 11, 1986, the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City ordered the reconstitution prayed for.
SO ORDERED. As a consequence, Transfer of Certificate of Title No. 24604 in the name of the Olizon spouses was
cancelled and, in lieu thereof, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 149858 was issued on June 5, 1987
in the name of respondent bank. 3
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila On November 27, 1989, respondent bank this time filed with the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan
City, a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession against petitioner spouses, docketed as LRC
Case No. C-3094, 4 and which petition was granted by the trial court on February 8, 1990. 5
SECOND DIVISION

On March 8, 1990, a petition, by way of opposition, was filed by petitioner spouses wherein they
sought the cancellation of the writ of possession, the nullification of the certificate of sale dated
March 11, 1974, and/or the nullification of the foreclosure proceedings. In support thereof, they
G.R. No. 107075 September 1, 1994 alleged lack of notice of the auction sale and lack of posting of the notice of sale as required by
Section 3 of Act No. 3135, as amended.6
ARMANDO S. OLIZON and ILUMINADA C. OLIZON, petitioners,
vs. After trial, the court a quo issued an order dated July 16, 1990, with the following dispositive
COURT OF APPEALS and PRUDENTIAL BANK, respondents. portion:

Roberto T. Neri for petitioners. WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares that:

Magno & Associates for private respondent. 1. The foreclosure of the real estate mortgage executed by the spouses
Olizons, as well as the certificate of sale dated March 11, 1974 as (sic) null and
void;

2. The writ of possession is hereby set aside; and

REGALADO, J.:

3. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City to cancel Transfer

The factual alpha of the present dispute was sometime in 1967 when the spouses Armando and Certificate of Title No. 149858 issued in the name of Prudential Bank and to
Iluminada Olizon obtained a loan from respondent Prudential Bank in the amount of P25,000.00 reinstate Transfer Certificate of Title No. 24604 to (sic) spouses Armando S.
and, as security therefor, they executed in favor of respondent bank a real estate mortgage over a Olizon and Iluminada C. Olizon.
parcel of land consisting of 1,000 square meters located at Barrio Calaanan, Kalookan City and
registered in their names under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 24604 of the Registry of Deeds of
Kalookan City. Unfortunately, that transaction spawned the succeeding events hereunder SO ORDERED. 7
chronologically narrated, eventuating in this appeal wherein we are now expected to pen the
judicial omega.
Private respondent appealed the said decision to the Court of Appeals which rendered its
questioned decision in CA—G.R. CV No. 29482, dated September 9, 1992, with a disposition of
It appears from the records that the Olizon spouses failed to pay their aforestated obligation upon reversal, thus:
its maturity, so private respondent extrajudicially foreclosed the real estate mortgage. At a public
auction thereafter held on March 11, 1975, the subject property was sold to respondent bank as the
WHEREFORE, the Decision (sic) dated July 16, 1990 of the Regional Trial
highest bidder, pursuant to which it was issued a certificate of sale as of the same date. On March
Court of Caloocan in LRC Case No. 3094 is hereby REVERSED and SET
12, 1974, the said certificate of sale was duly annotated at the back of petitioner's Transfer
ASIDE and another rendered upholding the validity of the foreclosure sale of
Certificate of Title No. 24604.
the real estate mortgage and the writ of possession dated February 8, 1990. 8

On June 5, 1978, again due to the failure of petitioner spouses to redeem the foreclosed property
Petitioners have now come to us through the present petition wherein they contend that:
within the period of redemption, title to the property was consolidated in favor of respondent bank. 1

1. The Court of Appeals erred in

reversing the trial court since there is

Evidence Cases Page | 57

 evidence to show that the
requirements of Sec. 3, Act No. 3135,
as amended, were not complied with.
2. The Court of Appeals erred in
holding that petitioners had notice of
the foreclosure sale.
3. The Court of Appeals erred in
holding that petitioners had totally
abandoned the subject property, as
this is not supported by the
evidence. 9
We do not find substantial merit in the petition.
Herein petitioners are now seeking the annulment of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale conducted
more than 20 years ago, invoking therefor two grounds, namely, lack of personal notice to the
mortgagors about the foreclosure sale, and the failure of the mortgagee bank to comply with the
posting requirement under Section 3 of Act No. 3135, as amended.
It is now a well-settled rule that personal notice to the mortgagor in extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings is not necessary. 10 Section 3 of Act No. 3135 governing extrajudicial foreclosure of
real estate mortgages, as amended by Act No. 4118, requires only the posting of the notice of sale
in three public places and the publication of that notice in a newspaper of general circulation.
Hence, the lack of personal notice to the mortgagors, herein petitioners, is not a ground to set aside
the foreclosure sale.
Neither can the supposed failure of respondent bank to comply with the posting requirement as
provided under the aforesaid Section 3, under the factual ambiance and circumstances which
obtained in this case, be considered a sufficient ground for annulling the aforementioned sale. We
are not unaware of the rulings in some cases that, under normal situations, the statutory provisions
governing publication of notice of extrajudicial foreclosure sales must be strictly complied with and
that failure to publish the notice of auction sale as required by the statute constitutes a jurisdictional
defect which invalidates the sale. However, the unusual nature of the attendant facts and the
peculiarity of the confluent circumstances involved in this case require that we rule otherwise.
Petitioners' cited authority on the requisite publication of notices is not so all-embracing as to deny
justified exceptions thereto under appropriate situations. Petitioners quote this passage
from Tambunting et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al. 11 which is not conclusive hereon for not being
exactly in point, based as it is on different facts, thus:
The rule is that statutory provisions governing publication of notice of mortgage
foreclosure sales must be strictly complied with, and that even slight deviations
therefrom will invalidate the notice and render the sale at least voidable.
Interpreting Sec. 457 of the Code of Civil Procedure (reproduced in Sec. 18[c]
of Rule 39, Rules of Court and in Sec. 3 of Act No. 3135) in Campomanes vs.
Bartolome and German & Co. (38 Phil. 8081), this Court held that if a sheriff
sells without the notice prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure induced
thereto by the judgment creditor, the sale is absolutely void and no title passes.
. . . (Emphasis supplied.)
Evidence Cases
At any rate, respondent Court of Appeals has this commendable ratiocination on the aforestated
twin errors assigned by petitioners:
The decisive issue which must be resolved is whether or not the statutory
requirements of notice have been complied with in this case. Section 12 of the
mortgage contract reads:
"12. All correspondence relative to this mortgage, including demand letters,
summonses, subpoenas or notifications of any judicial or extrajudicial action
shall be sent to the Mortgagor at No. 82 Naval Street, Malabon, Rizal or at the
address that may hereafter be given in writing by the Mortgagor to the
Mortgagee. The mere act of sending any correspondence by mail or by
personal delivery to the said address shall be valid and effective notice to the
Mortgagor for all legal purposes, and . . . shall not excuse or relieve the
mortgagor from the effects of such notice." (Emphasis supplied.)
The foregoing stipulation is the law between petitioner and oppositors-spouses
and should be complied with faithfully.
That the mortgagors were actually notified by appellant bank of the foreclosure
proceedings is shown by its letters to the Olizons before the actual sale at
public auction of the subject property, to wit: (1) Letter dated January 16, 1973
of Atty. Octavio D. Fule, Legal Officer of appellant bank to the Olizons
informing the latter that their failure to pay their obligations will constrain
appellant bank to institute appropriate legal action against them; (2) Letter
dated January 31, 1974 of Atty. Octavio D. Fule, Legal Officer of appellant
bank, informing the Olizons that Prudential Bank has filed foreclosure
proceedings under Act 3135, as amended.
xxx xxx xxx
Furthermore, notice of sale was duly published in accordance with law and
furnished the Olizons. The evidence presented during the trial of the case show
that the then Clerk of Court, Emma Ona, sent a printed letter dated February
18, 1974 informing the Olizons that appellant bank had filed an application to
foreclosure their real estate mortgage and the public auction of the mortgaged
parcel of land was sent on March 11, 1974, together with a copy of the Notice
of Sale. The document is more than ten (10) years old and the absence of a
registry receipt in the case folder of the foreclosure records of the Sheriff of the
City of Caloocan, does not indicate that the Olizons did not receive a copy of
the aforesaid notice of sale, it being presumed that the sheriff performed her
duties and that foreclosure proceedings are regular. . . . (Citations omitted.) 12
Furthermore, unlike the situation in previous cases 13 where the foreclosure sales were annulled by
reason of failure to comply with the notice requirement under Section 3 of Act No. 3135, as
amended, what is allegedly lacking here is the posting of the notice in three public places, and not
the publication thereof in a newspaper of general circulation.
We take judicial notice of the fact that newspaper publications have more far-reaching effects than
posting on bulletin boards in public places. There is a greater probability that an announcement or
notice published in a newspaper of general circulation, which is distributed nationwide, shall have a
readership of more people than that posted in a public bulletin board, no matter how strategic its
location may be, which caters only to a limited few. Hence, the publication of the notice of sale in
Page | 58
the newspaper of general circulation alone is more than sufficient compliance with the notice-
posting requirement of the law. By such publication, a reasonably wide publicity had been effected
such that those interested might attend the public sale, and the purpose of the law had been
thereby subserved.
The object of a notice of sale is to inform the public of the nature and condition of the property to be
sold, and of the time, place and terms of the sale. Notices are given for the purpose of securing
bidders and to prevent a sacrifice of the property. If these objects are attained, immaterial errors
and mistakes will not affect the sufficiency of the notice; but if mistakes or omissions occur in the
notices of sale, which are calculated to deter or mislead bidders, to depreciate the value of the
property, or to prevent it from bringing a fair price, such mistakes or omissions will be fatal to the
validity of the notice, and also to the sale made pursuant thereto. 14
In the instant case, the aforesaid objective was attained since there was sufficient publicity of the
sale through the newspaper publication. There is completely no showing that the property was sold
for a price far below its value as to insinuate any bad faith, nor was there any showing or even an
intimation of collusion between the sheriff who conducted the sale and respondent bank. This being
so, the alleged non-compliance with the posting requirement, even if true, will not justify the setting
aside of the sale.
Moreover, herein petitioners failed to discharge the burden of proving by convincing evidence their
allegation that there was actually no compliance with the posting requirement. The foreclosure
proceeding has in its favor the presumption of regularity, 15 and the burden of evidence to rebut the
same is on petitioners. Where the allegation is an essential part of the cause of action or defense in
a civil case, whether posited in an affirmative or negative form, the burden of evidence thereon lies
with the pleader. 16 Besides, the fact alone that there was no certificate of posting attached to the
sheriff's records of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale is not sufficient to prove the lack of posting,
especially in this case where the questioned act and the record thereof are already 16 years old. It
is quite unfair to now shift to respondent bank the burden of proving the fact of posting considering
the length of time that has elapsed, aside from the fact that the sheriff who conducted the public
sale and who was responsible for the posting of the notice of sale is already out of the country, with
the records being silent on his present whereabouts or the possibility of his returning here.
Indeed, even on equitable considerations alone, the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duty must stand. As aptly found by the Court of Appeals:
. . . It is not a matter of lack of compliance with the requirements of the law,
rather, it is a matter of unavailability of certain documents due to the loss
thereof, considering that more than sixteen (16) years had lapsed from the date
of the extra-judicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage. Indeed, the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty by the sheriff, more
particularly, compliance with the provisions of Act 3135, as amended, has not
been overturned by the Olizons. 17
Nor are these all that we wish to expound hereon, for this is one case where we find the necessity
for the application of the equitable principle of estoppel by laches in order to avoid an injustice.
Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of
time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could nor should have been done earlier; it is
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the
party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. 18
Evidence Cases
In the case at bar, petitioners are already considered estopped through laches from questioning the
regularity of the sale as well as the ownership of the land in question. It is evident from the records
that the petition to annul the foreclosure sale was filed by herein petitioners only after 16 long years
from the date of sale and only after a transfer certificate of title over the subject property had long
been issued to respondent bank. Herein petitioners failed to advance any justification for their
prolonged inaction. It would be inequitable to allow petitioners, after the lapse of an almost
interminable period of time, to defeat an otherwise indefeasible title by the simple and dubious
expedient of invoking a purported irregularity in the foreclosure proceedings.
Although a sale under a power contained in a mortgage or trust deed has been defectively
executed and the mortgagor has the right to disaffirm the same, he may, by laches or by acts
amounting to an estoppel or ratification, cure the defect and render the sale valid. 19 Where a sale
under a power is voidable at the election of the mortgagor for some irregularity — such as that the
mortgagee purchased without authority, or that there was an inadequacy in the price obtained, a
want of sufficient or proper notice, or the like — the mortgagor must institute proceedings for
avoidance within apt and reasonable time, or his laches will bar him of relief. 20 Thus, a party
seeking to set aside a foreclosure sale made under a power of sale must bring his action without
unreasonable delay. The court generally will refuse to grant relief when there has been great and
unreasonable delay, amounting to laches, in seeking its aid. 21
Besides, it has been said that in seeking to set aside a foreclosure sale, the moving party must act
promptly after he becomes aware of the facts on which he bases his complaint, and in this
connection, notice of an irregularity may be presumed from the fact that the mortgagor has
knowledge of the sale, as he is thereby put on inquiry, and is bound to use diligence in discovering
any defects in the proceedings. 22 Having failed to do so, petitioners cannot now be heard on their
much belated plaints.
Moreover, it is an entrenched doctrine in our jurisdiction that registration in a public registry is notice
to the whole world. The record is a constructive notice of its contents as well as of all interest, legal
and equitable, included therein. All persons are charged with knowledge of what it
contains. 23 Therefore, in the case at bar, the annotation of the certificate of sale on petitioners'
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 24604 and the filing of the affidavit of consolidation with the Register
of Deeds constituted constructive notice of both acts to herein petitioners. Consequently, as early
as March 11, 1974 24 when the certificate of sale was annotated at the back of their title, petitioners
were already charged with knowledge of the foreclosure sale, yet they still failed or refused to take
the necessary steps to protect their rights over the subject property.
It also bears stressing that petitioners entered their appearance in the Regional Trial Court of
Kalookan City where the petition for reconstitution of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 24604 was
filed by respondent bank, as shown by said court's order dated June 11, 1986. 25 It was then
incumbent on petitioners to have filed an objection or opposition to the reconstitution if they
sincerely believed that the property rightfully belongs to them. Significantly, petitioners neither
moved for the reconsideration of nor appealed from the order of the lower court granting
reconstitution of title in the name of respondent bank.
Finally, the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time warrants not only a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either had abandoned it or declined to assert it, but
also casts doubt on the validity of the claim of ownership. Such neglect to assert a right taken in
conjunction with the lapse of time, more or less great, and other circumstances causing prejudice to
the adverse party, operates as a bar in a court of equity. 26 In the present case, at no time after the
debt became due and demandable and the mortgage property had been foreclosed, or even
thereafter, did petitioners offer to pay their mortgage obligation to redeem their property. Petitioners'
collective acts are, therefore, indicative of their acquiescence to and acknowledgment of the validity
Page | 59
of the foreclosure proceedings and the sale, as well as a recognition of respondent bank's just and
legal title over the property acquired thereby.
We, therefore, cannot but concur in these observations of respondent Court:
The evidence on record, likewise show that after the foreclosure proceedings in
1974, the Olizons had totally abandoned actual ownership over the subject
property in favor of appellant bank, leaving it to appellant bank to pay the real
estate taxes over the subject property. In fact, in the reconstitution of the
owner's title in Case No. C-2746, while the Olizons entered their appearance
before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan, they did not oppose the petition of
appellant bank, despite the fact that the certificate of sale and final deed of sale
as well as consolidation of the ownership were submitted as evidence by
appellant bank in the reconstitution process. It was only after they noticed the
lack of certain documents in the possession of the sheriff that they thought of
raising technicalities. . . . 27
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit and the assailed judgment of
respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. RTJ-92-876 September 19, 1994
STATE PROSECUTORS, complainants,
vs.
JUDGE MANUEL T. MURO, Regional Trial Court, Branch 54, Manila, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
In assaying the requisite norms for qualifications and eminence of a magistrate, legal authorities
place a premium on how he has complied with his continuing duty to know the law. A quality thus
considered essential to the judicial character is that of "a man of learning who spends tirelessly the
weary hours after midnight acquainting himself with the great body of traditions and the learning of
the law; is profoundly learned in all the learning of the law; and knows how to use that learning." 1
Obviously, it is the primary duty of a judge, which he owes to the public and to the legal profession,
to know the very law he is supposed to apply to a given controversy. He is called upon to exhibit
more than just a cursory acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules. Party litigants will
have great faith in the administration of justice if judges cannot justly be accused of apparent
Evidence Cases
deficiency in their grasp of the legal principles. For, service in the judiciary means a continuous
study and research on the law from beginning to end. 2
In a letter-complaint 3 dated August 19, 1992, respondent Judge Manuel T. Muro of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 54, was charged by State Prosecutors Nilo C. Mariano, George
C. Dee and Paterno V. Tac-an with ignorance of the law, grave misconduct and violations of Rules
2.01, 3.01 and 3.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, committed as follows:
1. That on August 13, 1992, respondent judge issued an Order dismissing
eleven (11) cases (docketed as Crim. Cases Nos. 92-101959 to 92- 101969,
inclusive) filed by the undersigned complainant prosecutors (members of the
DOJ Panel of Prosecutors) against the accused Mrs. Imelda Romualdez
Marcos, for Violation of Central Bank Foreign Exchange Restrictions, as
consolidated in CB Circular No. 960, in relation to the penal provisions of Sec.
34 of R.A. 265, as amended, . . .;
2. That respondent Judge issued his Order solely on the basis of newspaper
reports (August 11, 1992 issues of the Philippine Daily Inquirer and the Daily
Globe) concerning the announcement on August 10, 1992 by the President of
the Philippines of the lifting by the government of all foreign exchange
restrictions and the arrival at such decision by the Monetary Board as per
statement of Central Bank Governor Jose Cuisia;
3. That claiming that the reported announcement of the Executive Department
on the lifting of foreign exchange restrictions by two newspapers which are
reputable and of national circulation had the effect of repealing Central Bank
Circular No. 960, as allegedly supported by Supreme Court decisions . . ., the
Court contended that it was deprived of jurisdiction, and, therefore, motu,
prop(r)io had to dismiss all the eleven cases aforementioned "for not to do so
opens this Court to charges of trying cases over which it has no more
jurisdiction;"
4. That in dismissing aforecited cases on August 13, 1992 on the basis of a
Central Bank Circular or Monetary Board Resolution which as of date hereof,
has not even been officially issued, and basing his Order/decision on a mere
newspaper account of the advance announcement made by the President of
the said fact of lifting or liberalizing foreign exchange controls, respondent
judge acted prematurely and in indecent haste, as he had no way of
determining the full intent of the new CB Circular or Monetary Board resolution,
and whether the same provided for exception, as in the case of persons who
had pending criminal cases before the courts for violations of Central Bank
Circulars and/or regulations previously issued on the matter;
5. That respondent Judge's arrogant and cavalier posture in taking judicial
notice purportedly as a matter of public knowledge a mere newspaper account
that the President had announced the lifting of foreign exchange restrictions as
basis for his assailed order of dismissal is highly irregular, erroneous and
misplaced. For the respondent judge to take judicial notice thereof even before
it is officially released by the Central Bank and its full text published as required
by law to be effective shows his precipitate action in utter disregard of the
fundamental precept of due process which the People is also entitled to and
exposes his gross ignorance of the law, thereby tarnishing public confidence in
the integrity of the judiciary. How can the Honorable Judge take judicial notice
of something which has not yet come into force and the contents, shape and
Page | 60
 tenor of which have not yet been published and ascertained to be the basis of
judicial action? The Honorable Judge had miserably failed to "endeavor
diligently to ascertain the facts" in the case at bar contrary to Rule 3.02 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct constituting Grave Misconduct;
6. That respondent Judge did not even ha(ve) the prudence of requiring first
the comment of the prosecution on the effect of aforesaid Central Bank
Circular/Monetary Board resolution on the pending cases before dismissing the
same, thereby denying the Government of its right to due process;
7. That the lightning speed with which respondent Judge acted to dismiss the
cases may be gleaned from the fact that such precipitate action was
undertaken despite already scheduled continuation of trial dates set in the
order of the court (the prosecution having started presenting its evidence . . .)
dated August 11, 1992 to wit: August 31, September 3, 10, 21, & 23 and
October 1, 1992, all at 9:30 o'clock in the morning, in brazen disregard of all
notions of fair play, thereby depriving the Government of its right to be heard,
and clearly exposing his bias and partiality; and
8. That, in fact, the motive of respondent Judge in dismissing the case without
even waiting for a motion to quash filed by the counsel for accused has even
placed his dismissal Order suspect.
Pursuant to a resolution of this Court dated September 8, 1992, respondent judge filed his
comment, 4 contending, inter alia, that there was no need to await publication of the Central Bank
(CB) circular repealing the existing law on foreign exchange controls for the simple reason that the
public announcement made by the President in several newspapers of general circulation lifting
foreign exchange controls was total, absolute, without qualification, and was immediately effective;
that having acted only on the basis of such announcement, he cannot be blamed for relying on the
erroneous statement of the President that the new foreign exchange rules rendered moot and
academic the cases filed against Mrs. Marcos, and which was corrected only on August 17, 1992
but published in the newspapers on August 18, 1992, and only after respondent judge had issued
his order of dismissal dated August 13, 1992; that the President was ill-advised by his advisers and,
instead of rescuing the Chief Executive from embarrassment by assuming responsibility for errors
in the latter's announcement, they chose to toss the blame for the consequence of their failures to
respondent judge who merely acted on the basis of the announcements of the President which had
become of public knowledge; that the "saving clause" under CB Circular No. 1353 specifically refers
only to pending actions or investigations involving violations of CB Circular No. 1318, whereas the
eleven cases dismissed involved charges for violations of CB Circular No. 960, hence the accused
cannot be tried and convicted under a law different from that under which she was charged; that
assuming that respondent judge erred in issuing the order of dismissal, the proper remedy should
have been an appeal therefrom but definitely not an administrative complaint for his dismissal; that
a mistake committed by a judge should not necessarily be imputed as ignorance of the law; and
that a "court can reverse or modify a doctrine but it does not show ignorance of the justices or
judges whose decisions were reversed or modified" because "even doctrines initiated by the
Supreme Court are later reversed, so how much more for the lower courts?"
He further argued that no hearing was necessary since the prosecution had nothing to explain
because, as he theorized, "What explanation could have been given? That the President was
talking 'through his hat' (to use a colloquialism) and should not be believed? That I should wait for
the publication (as now alleged by complainants), of a still then non-existent CB circular? . . . As it
turned out, CB Circular No. 3153 (sic) does not affect my dismissal order because the said
circular's so-called saving clause does not refer to CB Circular 960 under which the charges in the
dismissed cases were based;" that it was discretionary on him to take judicial notice of the facts
Evidence Cases
which are of public knowledge, pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 129; that the contention of
complainants that he acted prematurely and in indecent haste for basing his order of dismissal on a
mere newspaper account is contrary to the wordings of the newspaper report wherein the President
announced the lifting of controls as an accomplished fact, not as an intention to be effected in the
future, because of the use of the present perfect tense or past tense "has lifted," not that he
"intends to lift," foreign exchange controls.
Finally, respondent judge asseverates that complainants who are officers of the Department of
Justice, violated Section 6, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court which provides that "proceedings against
judges of first instance shall be private and confidential" when they caused to be published in the
newspapers the filing of the present administrative case against him; and he emphasizes the fact
that he had to immediately resolve a simple and pure legal matter in consonance with the
admonition of the Supreme Court for speedy disposition of cases.
In their reply 5 and supplemental reply, 6 complainants aver that although the saving clause under
Section 16 of CB Circular No. 1353 made specific reference to CB Circular No. 1318, it will be
noted that Section 111 of Circular No. 1318, which contains a saving clause substantially similar to
that of the new circular, in turn refers to and includes Circular No. 960. Hence, whether under
Circular No. 1318 or Circular No. 1353, pending cases involving violations of Circular No. 960 are
excepted from the coverage thereof. Further, it is alleged that the precipitate dismissal of the eleven
cases, without according the prosecution the opportunity to file a motion to quash or a comment, or
even to show cause why the cases against accused Imelda R. Marcos should not be dismissed, is
clearly reflective of respondent's partiality and bad faith. In effect, respondent judge acted as if he
were the advocate of the accused.
On December 9, 1993, this Court issued a resolution referring the complaint to the Office of the
Court Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation, pursuant to Section 7, Rule 140 of
the Rules of Court, as revised, there being no factual issues involved. The corresponding report
and recommendation, 7 dated February 14, 1994, was submitted by Deputy Court Administrator
Juanito A. Bernad, with the approval of Court Administrator Ernani Cruz-Paño.
The questioned order 8 of respondent judge reads as follows:
These eleven (11) cases are for Violation of Central Bank Foreign Exchange
Restrictions as consolidated in CB Circular No. 960 in relation to the penal
provision of Sec. 34 of R.A. 265, as amended.
The accused Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos pleaded not guilty to all these cases;
apparently the other accused in some of these cases, Roberto S. Benedicto,
was not arrested and therefore the Court did not acquire jurisdiction over his
person; trial was commenced as against Mrs. Marcos.
His Excellency, the President of the Philippines, announced on August 10,
1992 that the government has lifted all foreign exchange restrictions and it is
also reported that Central Bank Governor Jose Cuisia said that the Monetary
Board arrived at such decision (issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer, August
11, 1992 and issue of the Daily Globe of the same date). The Court has to give
full confidence and credit to the reported announcement of the Executive
Department, specially from the highest official of that department; the Courts
are charged with judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge,
without introduction of proof, the announcement published in at least the two
newspapers cited above which are reputable and of national circulation.
Page | 61
 Per several cases decided by the Supreme Court (People vs. Alcaras, 56 Phil.
520, People vs. Francisco, 56 Phil. 572, People vs. Pastor, 77 Phil. 1000,
People vs. Crisanto Tamayo, 61 Phil. 225), among others, it was held that the
repeal of a penal law without re-enactment extinguishes the right to prosecute
or punish the offense committed under the old law and if the law repealing the
prior penal law fails to penalize the acts which constituted the offense defined
and penalized in the repealed law, the repealed law carries with it the
deprivation of the courts of jurisdiction to try, convict and sentence persons
charged with violations of the old law prior to its repeal. Under the aforecited
decisions this doctrine applies to special laws and not only to the crimes
punishable in the Revised Penal Code, such as the Import Control Law. The
Central Bank Circular No. 960 under which the accused Mrs. Marcos is
charged is considered as a penal law because violation thereof is penalized
with specific reference to the provision of Section 34 of Republic Act 265,
which penalizes violations of Central Bank Circular No. 960, produces the
effect cited in the Supreme Court decisions and since according to the
decisions that repeal deprives the Court of jurisdiction, this Court motu
proprio dismisses all the eleven (11) cases as a forestated in the caption, for
not to do so opens this Court to charges of trying cases over which it has no
more jurisdiction.
This order was subsequently assailed in a petition for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals,
entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Hon. Manuel T. Muro, Judge, RTC of Manila, Br. 54 and
Imelda R. Marcos," docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 29349. When required to file her comment,
private respondent Marcos failed to file any. Likewise, after the appellate court gave due course to
the petition, private respondent was ordered, but again failed despite notice, to file an answer to the
petition and to show cause why no writ of preliminary injunction should issue. Eventually, on April
29, 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision 9 setting aside the order of August 13, 1992,
and reinstating Criminal Cases Nos. 92-101959 to 92-101969.
In finding that respondent judge acted in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the order of dismissal, the appellate court held that:
The order was issued motu proprio, i.e., without any motion to dismiss filed by
counsel for the accused, without giving an opportunity for the prosecution to be
heard, and solely on the basis of newspaper reports announcing that the
President has lifted all foreign exchange restrictions.
The newspaper report is not the publication required by law in order that the
enactment can become effective and binding. Laws take effect after fifteen
days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation unless it is otherwise provided (Section 1,
Executive Order No. 200). The full text of CB Circular 1353, series of 1992,
entitled "Further Liberalizing Foreign Exchange Regulation" was published in
the August 27, 1992 issue of the Manila Chronicle, the Philippine Star and the
Manila Bulletin. Per certification of the CB Corporate Affairs Office, CB Circular
No. 1353 took effect on September 2 . . . .
Considering that respondent judge admittedly had not seen the official text of
CB Circular No. 1353, he was in no position to rule judiciously on whether CB
Circular No. 960, under which the accused Mrs. Marcos is charged, was
already repealed by CB Circular No. 1353. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Evidence Cases
A cursory reading of the . . . provision would have readily shown that the repeal
of the regulations on non-trade foreign exchange transactions is not absolute,
as there is a provision that with respect to violations of former regulations that
are the subject of pending actions or investigations, they shall be governed by
the regulations existing at the time the cause of action (arose). Thus his
conclusion that he has lost jurisdiction over the criminal cases is precipitate
and hasty. Had he awaited the filing of a motion to dismiss by the accused, and
given opportunity for the prosecution to comment/oppose the same, his
resolution would have been the result of deliberation, not speculation.
I. The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the courts. The power to take
judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with caution; care must be taken that the requisite
notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt on the subject should be promptly resolved in the
negative. 10
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be
one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not
doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the
court. 11 The provincial guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is
that of notoriety. 12 Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public
records and facts of general notoriety. 13
To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely another way of saying that the usual
form of evidence will be dispensed with if knowledge of the fact can be otherwise acquired. 14 This
is because the court assumes that the matter is so notorious that it will not be disputed. 15 But
judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the judge is not the
judicial knowledge of the court, and he is not authorized to make his individual knowledge of a fact,
not generally or professionally known, the basis of his action. Judicial cognizance is taken only of
those matters which are "commonly" known. 16
Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial notice, may be matters coming to the
knowledge of men generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be
matters which are generally accepted by mankind as true and are capable of ready and
unquestioned demonstration. 17 Thus, facts which are universally known, and which may be found
in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are judicially noticed, provided they are of such
universal notoriety and so generally understood that they may be regarded as forming part of the
common knowledge of every person. 18
Respondent judge, in the guise of exercising discretion and on the basis of a mere newspaper
account which is sometimes even referred to as hearsay evidence twice removed, took judicial
notice of the supposed lifting of foreign exchange controls, a matter which was not and cannot be
considered of common knowledge or of general notoriety. Worse, he took cognizance of an
administrative regulation which was not yet in force when the order of dismissal was issued.
Jurisprudence dictates that judicial notice cannot be taken of a statute before it becomes
effective. 19 The reason is simple. A law which is not yet in force and hence, still inexistent, cannot
be of common knowledge capable of ready and unquestionable demonstration, which is one of the
requirements before a court can take judicial notice of a fact.
Evidently, it was impossible for respondent judge, and it was definitely not proper for him, to have
taken cognizance of CB Circular No. 1353, when the same was not yet in force at the time the
improvident order of dismissal was issued.
Page | 62
II. Central Bank Circular No. 1353, which took effect on September 1, 1992, further liberalized the III. It has been said that next in importance to the duty of rendering a righteous judgment is that of
foreign exchange regulations on receipts and disbursements of residents arising from non-trade doing it in such a manner as will beget no suspicion of the fairness and integrity of the judge. 20 This
and trade transactions. Section 16 thereof provides for a saving clause, thus: means that a judge should not only render a just, correct and impartial decision but should do so in
such a manner as to be free from any suspicion as to its fairness and impartiality and as to his
integrity. While a judge should possess proficiency in law in order that he can competently construe
Sec. 16. Final Provisions of CB Circular No. 1318. - All the provisions in
and enforce the law, it is more important that he should act and behave in such a manner that the
Chapter X of CB Circular No. 1318 insofar as they are not inconsistent with, or
parties before him should have confidence in his impartiality. Thus, it is not enough that he decides
contrary to the provisions of this Circular, shall remain in full force and
cases without bias and favoritism. Nor is it sufficient that he in fact rids himself of prepossessions.
effect: Provided, however, that any regulation on non-trade foreign exchange
His actuations should moreover inspire that belief. Like Caesar's wife, a judge must not only be
transactions which has been repealed, amended or modified by this Circular,
pure but beyond suspicion. 21
violations of which are the subject of pending actions or investigations, shall
not be considered repealed insofar as such pending actions or investigations
are concerned, it being understood that as to such pending actions or Moreover, it has always heretofore been the rule that in disposing of controverted cases, judges
investigations, the regulations existing at the time the cause of action accrued should show their full understanding of the case, avoid the suspicion of arbitrary conclusion,
shall govern. promote confidence in their intellectual integrity and contribute useful precedents to the growth of
the law. 22 A judge should be mindful that his duty is the application of general law to particular
instances, that ours is a government of laws and not of men, and that he violates his duty as a
Respondent judge contends that the saving clause refers only to the provisions of Circular No.
minister of justice under such a system if he seeks to do what he may personally consider
1318, whereas the eleven criminal cases he dismissed involve a violation of CB Circular No. 960.
substantial justice in a particular case and disregards the general law as he knows it to be binding
Hence, he insists, Circular No. 960 is deemed repealed by the new circular and since the former is
on him. Such action may have detrimental consequences beyond the immediate controversy. He
not covered by the saving clause in the latter, there is no more basis for the charges involved in the
should administer his office with due regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself,
criminal cases which therefore warrant a dismissal of the same. The contention is patently
remembering that he is not a depository of arbitrary power, but a judge under the sanction of the
unmeritorious.
law. 23 These are immutable principles that go into the very essence of the task of dispensing
justice and we see no reason why they should not be duly considered in the present case.
Firstly, the second part of the saving clause in Circular No. 1353 explicitly provides that
"any regulation on non-trade foreign transactions which has been repealed, amended or modified
The assertion of respondent judge that there was no need to await publication of Circular No. 1353
by this Circular, violations of which are the subject of pending actions or investigations, shall not be
for the reason that the public announcement made by the President in several newspapers of
considered repealed insofar as such pending actions or investigations are concerned, it being
general circulation lifting foreign exchange controls is total, absolute, without qualification, and
understood that as to such pending actions or investigations, the regulations existing at the time the
immediately effective, is beyond comprehension. As a judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
cause of action accrued shall govern." The terms of the circular are clear and unambiguous and
respondent is supposed to be well-versed in the elementary legal mandates on the publication of
leave no room for interpretation. In the case at bar, the accused in the eleven cases had already
laws before they take effect. It is inconceivable that respondent should insist on an altogether
been arraigned, had pleaded not guilty to the charges of violations of Circular No. 960, and said
different and illogical interpretation of an established and well-entrenched rule if only to suit his own
cases had already been set for trial when Circular No. 1353 took effect. Consequently, the trial
personal opinion and, as it were, to defend his indefensible action. It was not for him to indulge or
court was and is supposed to proceed with the hearing of the cases in spite of the existence of
even to give the appearance of catering to the at-times human failing of yielding to first
Circular No. 1353.
impressions. 24 He having done so, in the face of the foregoing premises, this Court is hard put to
believe that he indeed acted in good faith.
Secondly, had respondent judge only bothered to read a little more carefully the texts of the
circulars involved, he would have readily perceived and known that Circular No. 1318 also contains
IV. This is not a simple case of a misapplication or erroneous interpretation of the law. The very act
a substantially similar saving clause as that found in Circular No. 1353, since Section 111 of the
of respondent judge in altogether dismissing sua sponte the eleven criminal cases without even a
former provides:
motion to quash having been filed by the accused, and without at least giving the prosecution the
basic opportunity to be heard on the matter by way of a written comment or on oral argument, is not
Sec. 111. Repealing clause. - All existing provisions of Circulars 365, 960 and only a blatant denial of elementary due process to the Government but is palpably indicative of bad
1028, including amendments thereto, with the exception of the second faith and partiality.
paragraph of Section 68 of Circular 1028, as well as all other existing Central
Bank rules and regulations or parts thereof, which are inconsistent with or
The avowed desire of respondent judge to speedily dispose of the cases as early as possible is no
contrary to the provisions of this Circular, are hereby repealed or modified
license for abuse of judicial power and discretion, 25 nor does such professed objective, even if true,
accordingly: Provided, however, that regulations, violations of which are the
justify a deprivation of the prosecution's right to be heard and a violation of its right to due process
subject of pending actions or investigations, shall be considered repealed
of
insofar as such pending actions or investigations are concerned, it being
law. 26
understood that as to such pending actions or investigations, the regulations
existing at the time the cause of action accrued shall govern.
The lightning speed, to borrow the words of complainants, with which respondent judge resolved to
dismiss the cases without the benefit of a hearing and without reasonable notice to the prosecution
It unequivocally appears from the section above quoted that although Circular No. 1318 repealed
inevitably opened him to suspicion of having acted out of partiality for the accused. Regardless of
Circular No. 960, the former specifically excepted from its purview all cases covered by the old
how carefully he may have evaluated changes in the factual situation and legal standing of the
regulations which were then pending at the time of the passage of the new regulations. Thus, any
cases, as a result of the newspaper report, the fact remains that he gave the prosecution no chance
reference made to Circular No. 1318 necessarily involves and affects Circular No. 960.
Evidence Cases Page | 63
whatsoever to show or prove that it had strong evidence of the guilt of the accused. To repeat, he
thereby effectively deprived the prosecution of its right to due process. 27 More importantly,
notwithstanding the fact that respondent was not sure of the effects and implications of the
President's announcement, as by his own admission he was in doubt whether or not he should
dismiss the cases, 28 he nonetheless deliberately refrained from requiring the prosecution to
comment thereon. In a puerile defense of his action, respondent judge can but rhetorically ask:
"What explanation could have been given? That the President was talking 'through his hat' and
should not be believed? That I should wait for the publication of a still then non- existent CB
Circular?" The pretended cogency of this ratiocination cannot stand even the minutest legal
scrutiny.
In order that bias may not be imputed to a judge, he should have the patience and circumspection
to give the opposing party a chance to present his evidence even if he thinks that the oppositor's
proofs might not be adequate to overthrow the case for the other party. A display of petulance and
impatience in the conduct of the trial is a norm of conduct which is inconsistent with the "cold
neutrality of an impartial judge." 29 At the very least, respondent judge acted injudiciously and with
unjustified haste in the outright dismissal of the eleven cases, and thereby rendered his actuation
highly dubious.
V. It bears stressing that the questioned order of respondent judge could have seriously and
substantially affected the rights of the prosecution had the accused invoked the defense of double
jeopardy, considering that the dismissal was ordered after arraignment and without the consent of
said accused. This could have spawned legal complications and inevitable delay in the criminal
proceedings, were it not for the holding of the Court of Appeals that respondent judge acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. This saved the day for the People since
in the absence of jurisdiction, double jeopardy will not set in. To stress this point, and as a caveat to
trial courts against falling into the same judicial error, we reiterate what we have heretofore
declared:
It is settled doctrine that double jeopardy cannot be invoked against this
Court's setting aside of the trial court's judgment of dismissal or acquittal where
the prosecution which represents the sovereign people in criminal cases is
denied due process. . . . .
Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove
its case, its right to due process is thereby violated.
The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional
rights, courts are ousted of their jurisdiction. Thus, the violation of the State's
right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue . . . which cannot be
glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right
of due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void
for lack of jurisdiction . . . . 30
It is also significant that accused Marcos, despite due notice, never submitted either her comment
on or an answer to the petition for certiorari as required by the Court of Appeals, nor was double
jeopardy invoked in her defense. This serves to further underscore the fact that the order of
dismissal was clearly unjustified and erroneous. Furthermore, considering that the accused is a
prominent public figure with a record of influence and power, it is not easy to allay public skepticism
and suspicions on how said dismissal order came to be, to the consequent although undeserved
discredit of the entire judiciary.
Evidence Cases
VI. To hold a judge liable for rendering a manifestly unjust order through inexcusable negligence or
ignorance, it must be clearly shown that although he has acted without malice, he failed to observe
in the performance of his duty that diligence, prudence and care which the law is entitled to exact in
the rendering of any public service. Negligence and ignorance are inexcusable if they imply a
manifest injustice which cannot be explained by a reasonable interpretation, and even though there
is a misunderstanding or error of the law applied, it nevertheless results logically and reasonably,
and in a very clear and indisputable manner, in the notorious violation of the legal precept. 31
In the present case, a cursory perusal of the comment filed by respondent judge reveals that no
substantial argument has been advanced in plausible justification of his act. He utterly failed to
show any legal, factual, or even equitable justification for the dismissal of the eleven criminal cases.
The explanation given is no explanation at all. The strained and fallacious submissions therein do
not speak well of respondent and cannot but further depreciate his probity as a judge. On this point,
it is best that pertinent unedited excerpts from his comment 32 be quoted by way of graphic
illustration and emphasis:
On the alleged ignorance of the law imputed to me, it is said that I issued the
Order dismissing the eleven (11) cases against Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos on the
basis of newspaper reports referred to in paragraph 2 of the letter complaint
without awaiting the official publication of the Central Bank Circular. Ordinarily
a Central Bank Circular/Resolution must be published in the Official Gazette or
in a newspaper of general circulation, but the lifting of "all foreign exchange
controls" was announced by the President of the Philippines WITHOUT
QUALIFICATIONS; as published in the Daily Globe, August 11, 1992" the
government has lifted ALL foreign exchange controls," and in the words of the
Philippine Daily Inquirer report of the same date "The government yesterday
LIFTED the LAST remaining restrictions on foreign exchange transactions, . . ."
(emphasis in both quotations supplied) not only the President made the
announcement but also the Central Bank Governor Jose Cuisia joined in the
announcement by saying that "the Monetary Board arrived at the decision after
noting how the "partial liberalization" initiated early this year worked."
Therefore, because of the ABSOLUTE lifting of ALL restrictions on foreign
exchange transactions, there was no need to await the publication of the
repealing circular of the Central Bank. The purpose of requiring publication of
laws and administrative rules affecting the public is to inform the latter as to
how they will conduct their affairs and how they will conform to the laws or the
rules. In this particular case, with the total lifting of the controls, there is no
need to await publication. It would have been different if the circular that in
effect repealed Central Bank Circular No. 960, under which the accused was
charged in the cases dismissed by me, had provided for penalties and/or
modified the provisions of said Circular No. 960.
The Complainants state that the lifting of controls was not yet in force when I
dismissed the cases but it should be noted that in the report of the two (2)
newspapers aforequoted, the President's announcement of the lifting of
controls was stated in the present perfect tense (Globe) or past tense
(Inquirer). In other words, it has already been lifted; the announcement did not
say that the government INTENDS to lift all foreign exchange restrictions but
instead says that the government "has LIFTED all foreign exchange controls,"
and in the other newspaper cited above, that "The government yesterday lifted
the last remaining restrictions on foreign exchange transactions". The lifting of
the last remaining exchange regulations effectively cancelled or repealed
Circular No. 960.
Page | 64
 The President, who is the Chief Executive, publicly announced the lifting of all
foreign exchange regulations. The President has within his control directly or
indirectly the Central Bank of the Philippines, the Secretary of Finance being
the Chairman of the Monetary Board which decides the policies of the Central
Bank.
No official bothered to correct or qualify the President's announcement of
August 10, published the following day, nor made an announcement that the
lifting of the controls do not apply to cases already pending, not until August 17
(the fourth day after my Order, and the third day after report of said order was
published) and after the President said on August 17, reported in the
INQUIRER's issue of August 18, 1992, that the "new foreign exchange rules
have nullified government cases against Imelda R. Marcos, telling reporters
that the charges against the widow of former President Marcos "have become
moot and academic" because of new ruling(s) which allow free flow of currency
in and out of the country" (Note, parenthetically, the reference to "new rules"
not to "rules still to be drafted"). The INQUIRER report continues: "A few hours
later, presidential spokeswoman Annabelle Abaya said, RAMOS (sic) had
"corrected himself'." "He had been belatedly advised by the Central Bank
Governor Jose Cuisia and Justice Secretary Franklin Drilon that the Monetary
Board Regulation excluded from its coverage all criminal cases pending in
court and such a position shall stand legal scrutiny', Mrs. Abaya, said."
In one case, an RTC Judge was administratively charged for acquitting the accused of a violation of
CB Circular No. 960 despite the fact that the accused was apprehended with US$355,349.00 while
boarding a plane for Hongkong, erroneously ruling that the State must first prove criminal intent to
violate the law and benefit from the illegal act, and further ordering the return of US$3,000.00 out of
the total amount seized, on the mistaken interpretation that the CB circular exempts such amount
from seizure. Respondent judge therein was ordered dismissed from the government service for
gross incompetence and ignorance of the law. 33
Subsequently, the Court dismissed another RTC judge, with forfeiture of retirement benefits, for
gross ignorance of the law and for knowingly rendering an unjust order or judgment when he
granted bail to an accused charged with raping an 11-year old girl, despite the contrary
recommendation of the investigating judge, and thereafter granted the motion to dismiss the case
allegedly executed by the complainant. 34
Similarly, an RTC judge who was described by this Court as one "who is ignorant of fairly
elementary and quite familiar legal principles and administrative regulations, has a marked
penchant for applying unorthodox, even strange theories and concepts in the adjudication of
controversies, exhibits indifference to and even disdain for due process and the rule of law, applies
the law whimsically, capriciously and oppressively, and displays bias and impartiality," was
dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to
reinstatement in any branch of the government or any of its agencies or instrumentalities. 35

Still in another administrative case, an RTJ judge was also dismissed by this Court for gross
I will elaborate on two points:
ignorance of the law after she ordered, in a probate proceeding, the cancellation of the certificates
of title issued in the name of the complainant, without affording due process to the latter and other
1. If the President was wrong in making the August 10 announcement interested parties. 36
(published in August 11, 1992, newspapers) and in the August 17
announcement, SUPRA, and thus I should have relied on the Presidential
Only recently, an RTC judge who had been reinstated in the service was dismissed after he
announcements, and there is basis to conclude that the President was at the
acquitted all the accused in four criminal cases for illegal possession of firearms, on the ground that
very least ILL-SERVED by his financial and legal advisers, because no one
there was no proof of malice or deliberate intent on the part of the accused to violate the law. The
bothered to advise the President to correct his announcements, not until
Court found him guilty of gross ignorance of the law, his error of judgment being almost deliberate
August 17, 1992, a few hours after the President had made another
and tantamount to knowingly rendering an incorrect and unjust judgment. 37
announcement as to the charges against Imelda Marcos having been rendered
moot and academic. The President has a lot of work to do, and is not, to my
knowledge, a financier, economist, banker or lawyer. It therefore behooved his ACCORDINGLY, on the foregoing premises and considerations, the Court finds respondent Judge
subalterns to give him timely (not "belated") advice, and brief him on matters of Manuel T. Muro guilty of gross ignorance of the law. He is hereby DISMISSED from the service,
immediate and far-reaching concerns (such as the lifting of foreign exchange such dismissal to carry with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of leave credits and retirement
controls, designed, among others to encourage the entry of foreign benefits, and disqualification from reemployment in the government service. 38
investments). Instead of rescuing the Chief Executive from embarrassment by
assuming responsibility for errors in the latter's announcement, these advisers
have chosen to toss the blame for the consequence of their failing to me, who Respondent is hereby ordered to CEASE and DESIST immediately from rendering any judgment or
order, or continuing any judicial action or proceeding whatsoever, effective upon receipt of this
only acted on the basis of announcements of their Chief, which had become of
decision.
public knowledge.

SO ORDERED.
xxx xxx xxx

EN BANC
The Court strongly feels that it has every right to assume and expect that respondent judge is
possessed with more than ordinary credentials and qualifications to merit his appointment as a
presiding judge in the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region, stationed in the
City of Manila itself. It is, accordingly, disheartening and regrettable to note the nature of the
arguments and the kind of logic that respondent judge would want to impose on this Court
notwithstanding the manifest lack of cogency thereof. This calls to mind similar scenarios and how G.R. No. 131472 March 28, 2000
this Court reacted thereto.

Evidence Cases Page | 65

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROMEO TIPAY Y NUITE, accused-appellant.
MELO, J.:
On automatic review is the decision of Branch 56 of the Regional Trial Court of the 5th Judicial
Region stationed in Libmanan, Camarines Sur, the Honorable Lore R. Valencia-Bagalacsa
presiding, the dispositive portion of which reads:
The Court is morally convinced that the accused ROMEO TIPAY y NUITE, is GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE, as defined and penalized under Article
335(2)(3) of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. 7659, and he is hereby
sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty of DEATH. He is directed to indemnify the
offended party the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages and
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as exemplary damages, and to acknowledge his
offspring Marissa, with the offended party.
SO ORDERED.
(pp. 36-37, Rollo.)
The instant case was initiated by a complaint against accused-appellant Romeo Tipay y Nuite filed
by Flora Deguiño [also referred to in the record as Dequiño], grandmother of victim Susan Pelaez,
which reads:
That sometime February or March of 1995 at Bgy. Inandaw, Ragay, Camarines Sur,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, who is the step-father of the private offended party, by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual
intercourse for several times with one Susan Pelaez y Dequiño, 15 years of age, against
the latter's will, to her damage and prejudice.
(p. 12, Rollo.)
During his arraignment on April 29, 1996, accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty.
Afterwards, trial on the merits ensued, resulting in the judgment of conviction now under automatic
review considering that the supreme penalty of death was imposed.
The inculpatory facts, as summarized by the Solicitor General, and based on the testimony of
private complainant Susan Pelaez, her mother Marissa Deguiño-Pelaez, her grandmother Flora
Deguiño, and Dr. Marilyn Cerilo-Folloso, the physician who examined the victim, are as follows:
Prosecution witness and private complainant Susan Pelaez was 17 year old at the time
she testified in 1997. She was diagnosed as suffering from mild mental retardation and
transient psychotic illness (p. 4, TSN, Dec. 6, 1996) and with the mental age of an eight
to nine year old (Exhibit "A").
Sometime in February or March 1995, about three weeks before classes ended, Susan
who was then fifteen years old and in Grade V, and was living with her grandmother,
Flora Deguino, in Barangay F. Simeon, was asked to stop schooling by her mother,
Evidence Cases
Marilyn, and her live-in partner, the appellant Romeo Tipay. She was brought to the
house in Barangay Inandawan where the couple lived.
One day in Barangay Inandawan, while Marilyn was out of the house and Susan's
siblings were at school, her mother's live-in partner Romeo Tipay (herein appellant)
poked a knife at her and made her lie down and ordered her to undress but Susan did not
obey. Appellant got angry and slapped her and banged her head to the post and she lost
her consciousness until her siblings arrived when Susan regained her consciousness.
She noticed that her vagina was hurting (p. 67-69, April 22, 1997). Petitioner threatened
Susan not to tell anybody or he would kill all of her family (p. 75, ibid.). Intimidated, Susan
suffered in silence while appellant was emboldened and continued to abuse her.
The above incident was repeated several times whenever her mother and sibling were
not around (ibid., p. 67). The abuse continued in Barangay F. Simeon where Marilyn and
appellant also occupied a house next to that of Flora Deguino who took care of their
children who were attending school in Barangay F. Simeon. Appellant would not allow
her to watch television with her siblings on the pretext that he would massage her.
Instead he switched off the light, covered her mouth and undressed her and succeeded
in having sexual intercourse with her (pp. 70-71, TSN, April 22, 1997). Out of fear for the
life of her family, Susan kept her ordeal secret.
In October 19, 1995 when Susan was back in Barangay F. Simeon and in Grade VI in
Pagod Elementary School, she was complaining to Flora Deguino of headache and
spoke angrily about appellant's cruelty (p. 45, April 21, 1997). In the last week of October,
Flora was summoned by a midwife Mrs. Helen Inciong, who after examining Susan
informed them that Susan was pregnant (p. 46, TSN, April 21, 1997, p. 18, Dec. 2, 1997).
Upon reaching home, Flora Deguino asked Susan who impregnated her. It was only then
that Susan informed her grandmother that she was being raped by appellant but was too
afraid to tell anyone about it (p. 47, TSN, ibid.). At that time Marilyn and her children were
staying in F. Simeon in a house beside the house of Flora since there was no school in
Inandawa.
Flora went to the police headquarters of Ragay to file a complaint against appellant (p.
48, TSN, April 21, 1997). Susan was subsequently brought to Dr. Marilyn Cerilo Folloso,
officer of Municipal Health Office of Ragay, Camarines Sur, who testified that Susan had
a healed hymenal-laceration at 6 o'clock and there was no menstruation due to a 4 to 5
month pregnancy (p. 38, TSN, Jan. 6, 1997). Susan gave birth to a daughter sired by
appellant on October 10, 1996 (p. 78, April 22, 1997).
Appellant was arrested in October 1995 claiming that the rape complaint was a mere
fabrication of Flora Deguino because she was angry at appellant for cohabiting with her
daughter, Marilyn Deguino. During his testimony in court, appellant also claimed that on
July 10, 1995, he saw Romeo Deguino the son of Flora raping Susan (pp. 93, 97, TSN,
May 19, 1997).
(pp. 106-109, Rollo.)
Accused-appellant denied all of Susan's allegations. He argued that his mother-in-law, Flora
Deguiño, was just angry at him because the latter was against his live-in relationship with Susan's
mother, Marilyn; that he never subjected Susan to maltreatment which she imputed against him;
and that his relationship with Marilyn's three children by her first husband was fine and they even
called him "itay". As regards Susan's child, he claimed that it was sired by Mario Deguiño, Marilyn's
brother. He witnessed the incident when he was about to return the coconut grater to Flora's house.
Page | 66
He saw Mario having intercourse with Susan. He informed Marilyn when he got home and the latter
cried.
Atty. Edwina Romanes, the Public Assistance Office (PAO) lawyer who was assigned in Ragay,
Camarines Sur, assisted accused-appellant in the circuit court and interviewed Marilyn Pelaez, her
son Ariel Pelaez, and Purificacion Ipay. Said three witnesses gave statements showing that
accused-appellant did not commit the crime charged.
As mentioned above, the trial court found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape as defined and penalized under Article 335 (2)(3) of the Revised Penal Code as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659. Its ruling reads in relevant part as follows:
however, she realized that accused-appellant wanted to leave her. She then had a change of heart,
and reneged on her earlier statement, to prevent accused-appellant from leaving her. This was also
the reason for Marilyn's belated act of having accused-appellant incarcerated (which was only in
October, 1995) when in truth and in fact she had known about the alleged rape as early as
February, 1995.
Accused-appellant also argues that Susan Pelaez's testimony creates a doubt on a very material
point considering that in her testimony in court, she said that she was raped at Barangay F.
Simeon, Ragay, Camarines Sur, or in her grandmother's home; whereas the criminal complaint
avers that it took place at Barangay Inandawa, Ragay, Camarines Sur, particularly at her mother's
house.

Accused-appellant likewise supports his denial by insisting that he saw Mario Deguiño actually rape
In an almost inaudible voice, Susan related how Romeo Tipay, the person whom she
Susan Pelaez. Consequently, the trial court gravely erred in not considering accused-appellant's
recognized as her surrogate father, told her to undress then slapped her and banged her
testimony that he actually saw said man as the perpetrators of the crime, as well as in disregarding
head when she disobeyed. She could not remember her sexual defloration, but she
the affidavit of Marilyn Deguiño dated November 13, 1995, which was voluntarily executed,
vividly recalled that when she came to after accused's physical assault, her vagina was
attesting to accused-appellant's innocence. Accused-appellant also posits that Marilyn's disclaimer
painful. She was however consistent and steadfast in her declaration that her stepfather,
was prompted by her desire to get back at him since he expressed his intentions to separate from
Romeo Tipay, sexually abused her. She did not waver in her testimony despite the
her. Lastly, he argues that it was grave error for the trial court to convict him under a fatally
lengthy cross-examination. She emphatically asserted that it was the accused, not any
defective complaint as it was Susan's grandmother who filed the same, when it should have been
other person who raped her and positively identified him as the person who ravished her.
Marilyn, in accordance with Section 5, Paragraph 3, Rule 110, Rules of Court.1âwphi1.nêt
Her statements clearly indicate that her answers are neither rehearsed nor dictated upon
by her vindictive grandmother, or even her mother. So it was held that "when a woman,
more so a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to In a long line of cases (People vs. Guamos, 241 SCRA 528 [1995]; People vs. Ramirez, 266 SCRA
show that rape was committed." (Pp. v. Vitor, 245 SCRA 392 [1995]). Moreover, "a 336 [1997]; People vs. Abad, 268 SCRA 246 [1997]; People vs. Corea, 269 SCRA 76 [1997]
candid and straightforward narration by the victim of how she had been raped bears the People vs. Perez, 270 SCRA 526 [1997]; People vs. Casinillo, 213 SCRA 777 [1992]; People vs.
earmarks of credibility (Pp. v. Umali, 242 SCRA 17 [1995]). Pizarro, 211 SCRA 325 [1992]; People vs. Dela Cruz, 207 SCRA 449 [1992]), the Court has laid
down certain guiding principles in reviewing rape cases, to wit: (a) an accusation of rape can be
made with facility and while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for the person
There is no showing that the offended party harbored evil motives against the accused.
accused, although innocent, to disprove the charge; (b) considering the intrinsic nature of the crime,
Even if she was taught by her grandmother to point out to Romeo Tipay as her rapist,
only two persons are usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant should
there was no way for the latter to let her memorize the details of what was done to her.
be scrutinized with great caution, and (c) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fail on its
Victim's answers to the questions propounded were spontaneous and categorical,
own merit, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the
lending credence to her narration. Her declarations are substantiated on material points
defense.
by the testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses and the medical certificate issued
by the doctor who examined the victim. Such medical evidence is an eloquent proof of
the "after the fact condition" of the coerced sexual congress. Moreover, even without the The crux of the prosecution's evidence would then rely on the credibility of Susan Pelaez's
testimonies of the other witnesses for the prosecution, it is axiomatic in rape cases that testimony. As mentioned above, the trial court found Susan's testimony spontaneous and
the lone declaration of facts of the offended party if credible, is sufficient to sustain a categorical, and not based on any ill motive. The trial court recognized the probability of her
conviction (Pp. vs. Rivera, 242 SCRA 26 [1995]). grandmother pointing out accused-appellant as her aggressor but held that this did not affect the
credibility of her testimony.
(p. 32, Rollo.)
It has long been held that the trial court's evaluation as to the credibility of witnesses is viewed as
correct and entitled to the highest respect because it is more competent to so conclude, having had
In his brief, accused-appellant argues that the trial court erred in: (1) finding him guilty beyond
the opportunity to observe the witnesses' demeanor and deportment on the stand, and the manner
reasonable doubt of the crime charged: (2) not considering his testimony that it was Mario Deguiño
in which they gave their testimonies. The trial judge, therefore, can better determine if such
that he saw raping Susan Pelaez; and (3) disregarding the affidavit executed by Marilyn Deguiño.
witnesses were telling the truth, being in the ideal position to weigh conflicting testimonies. Thus,
unless the trial judge plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value which, if considered,
In support of the aforementioned arguments, accused-appellant reiterates that Flora Deguiño, might affect the result of the case, his assessment on credibility must be respected (People vs.
grandmother of Susan, harbored ill-feelings against him since she vehemently objected to the live- Ramirez, supra; People vs. Gabris. 258 SCRA 663 [1996]; People vs. Vallena, 244 SCRA 685
in partnership of her daughter Marilyn and accused-appellant, and that Flora's antipathy toward him [1995]).
and her desire to have Marilyn break up with him was the primary motive why Flora prosecuted
him. Considering Flora's moral ascendancy over Susan, accused-appellant insists that the latter
This spontaneity is exhibited in the following excerpt of Susan's direct testimony:
was manipulated to believe that it was her stepfather who impregnated her. Further, he contends
that he wanted to leave Marilyn and that was why the latter had him jailed. Initially, she executed an
affidavit favoring accused-appellant and denying the latter's culpability for the crime charged. Later,

Evidence Cases Page | 67

Q: While you were still in Grade V, do you know what unusual thing done by Romeo A: Yes, sir.
Tipay?
xxx xxx xxx
A: There was, sir.
PROSECUTOR CONTRERAS:
Q: What did he do to you?
Would you kindly tell us when did you recover consciousness, before or after the arrival
A: Whenever my mother is away, I was made to take care of the children and when any of your brothers and sister?
brothers and sisters are no longer around, I was made to lie down, I resisted but I was
threatened, by him.
A: When my brothers and sister arrived that I recovered consciousness.

Q: You said that he threatened you, how did he threaten you?

Q: After recovering consciousness what did you observe from your self?

A: He poked a knife (witness pointed to the left side of her neck).

A: I felt something painful.

Q: After poking the knife what did he do?

Q: Which one was painful?

A: He made me undressed.
A: Witness pointed to her vagina.

Q: Did you follow him?

ATTY. NACIONAL:

A: No, sir until such time when my brothers and sister arrived.
May we ask that it should be specified.

Q: You said you did not obey what he wanted and when you did not obey him, what did
PROSECUTOR CONTRERAS:
Romeo Tipay do to you?

What do you call that part of your body which you said was painful?
A: He would hurt me.

A: My vagina "puke"
Q: How would he hurt you?

Q: What did you observe from your vagina?

A: He would slapped me and banged my head to the post.

A: It was painful.
Q: What happened whenever he slapped you and banged your head to the post?

Q: Tell us how many times did Romeo Tipay did that to you?
A: I felt dizzy.

ATTY. NACIONAL:
Q: Which post are you referring to? The post of your house?

What similar act?

A: Yes, sir.

PROSECUTOR CONTRERAS:
Q: Now, you said that after your head was banged to the post, aside from dizziness. what
else happened to you?
How many times if you could still remember did Romeo Tipay banged your head and you
lost consciousness, then after regaining consciousness you felt your vagina painful?
A: I don't recall anymore what happened next.

ATTY. NACIONAL:
Q: You mean you were unconscious?

Evidence Cases Page | 68

Your Honor, it is a vague question, considering that this witness is mentally. . . . A: He undressed me.

PROSECUTOR CONTRERAS: Q: After he undressed you what did he do with his penis?

Okay, I'll reform my question. Tell us how many times did Romeo Tipay banged your ATTY. NACIONAL:
head to the post?
No.
A: He used to banged my head on the post almost everyday.
PROSECUTOR CONTRERAS:
Q: Can you tell us how many times you lost consciousness everytime Romeo Tipay
banged your head to the post?
When she said he raped me, it's possibly attributed by counsel by the terminology of the
term, rape means that there was a penetration made by the accused to her.
A: I can't remember anymore because it's a long time already.
ATTY. NACIONAL:
Q: And will you also kindly tell us how many times did you observe pain in your vagina
after you regain consciousness?
No, we will not admit we will cling to the fact that what is being testified to when she said
she undressed me.
A: I can't remember how many times, but many times.
PROSECUTOR CONTRERAS:
Q: Aside from banging your head in the post, what else did Romeo Tipay do to you?
After undressing?
A: He slapped me.
ATTY. NACIONAL:
Q: While you were still in Grade V what other things did Romeo Tipay do to you?
Well, the question was — what did you understand when you said "ginagahasa"?
A: Whenever I asked permission to go to the movies he would not permit me.
PROSECUTOR CONTRERAS:
Q: Why after you were not permitted to go to the movies what did Romeo Tipay do to
you?
That would be now my follow up question because the term rape may not be what
counsel was in mind with what this witness had in mind. Further clarification from this
A: "Humihilot pero iba naman ang ginagawa". witness what she means when she said rape, taking into consideration her mental ability.

Q: Who is "humihilot"? ATTY. NACIONAL:

A: He would tell me that he will massage me but he does not massage me but he did She reached Grade VI.
other things, switch off the light.
PROSECUTOR CONTRERAS:
Q: You said he does not actually massage you but did something. What is it?
But she is mentally retarded, you should understand that also.
A: He covers my mouth, so I could not shout.
Q: After you were undressed, what else did Romeo Tipay do to you?
Q: After he covers my mouth, what else did he do to you?
A: He covered my mouth so that I could not shout.
A: He raped me.
Q: What else?
Q: What do you mean by raped you?

Evidence Cases Page | 69

 A: Whenever my lola calls me he covers my mouth and tell me not to shout or else I'll be
killed.
Q: Why, why did he warned you not to shout or else he will kill you, what was he doing to
you?
A: "Ni-re-rape niya po ako". He was raping me.
(tsn, April 22, 1997, pp. 6-11)
Another significant point of consideration is the fact that Susan Pelaez, although a young woman of
17 years, was diagnosed as suffering from mild mental retardation and transient psychotic illness
(tsn, December 6, 1996, p. 4) and with the mental age of an eight or nine year old child (Exhibit
"A"). Her demeanor in the courtroom was described by the trial court in this wise:
Susan Pelaez, is a dark-skinned, well-built seventeen year old who washes clothes for a
living. In the Courtroom she was observed to be unmindful of what is happening around
her, she laughs or sleeps whenever she wanted to do so. She taps her fingers on the
table or bites her fingernails even at the witness stand. However, she answered the
questions in a straightforward and categorical manner, although her r's and s' were
pronounced as "y" and "t", hence, "Mayita" and the like, but her declarations can easily
be understood. She can narrate her experiences, recognize persons, and explain
whatever is asked of her. She exuded the naivette and innocence of a child, despite her
ordeal. She glared and made faces at the accused everytime she had the opportunity to
do so.
(pp. 29-30, Rollo.)
Mental retardation refers significantly to sub-average intellectual functioning which originates during
the developmental period and is associated with impairment in adaptive behavior (The Sloane-
Dorland Annotated Medical-Legal Dictionary, 1987 ed., p. 616). That explains the finding that
despite her age (17 years), Susan had a mental age of an eight or nine year old child. Psychosis,
on the other hand, refers to a serious mental disorder where the individual's behavior and thought
process are so disturbed that he or she is out of touch with reality and can not cope with the
demands of daily life (Atkinson, Atkinson & Hilgard, Introduction to Psychology, 1983 ed., p. 455).
As diagnosed by Dr. Cuyos-Belmonte, Susan's psychosis is reactive and is considered to be mild,
and thus may improve even with short term treatment. However, her mental retardation was
diagnosed as a permanent organic condition and no amount of treatment can improve the same (p.
135, Record). From this diagnosis, it may be deduced that Susan is not mentally equipped for the
difficult situations in life. Unfortunately, she was cruelly subjected to one of the most trying and
bestial experiences which fortunately is visited on only a few.
In point is People vs. San Juan, (270 SCRA 693 [1997]) where the Court encountered a similar
scenario. A 26-year old victim had the mental development of a 5-year old child. We held then that
this fact did not lessen her credibility since the victim had shown her ability to communicate her
ordeal clearly and consistently. In the same vein, the preliminary a questioning during Susan's
direct testimony shows that her mental retardation was not an obstacle to the disclosure of the
truth, to wit:
PROSECUTOR CONTRERAS:
Evidence Cases
Susan, you were made to raise your right hand a while ago, do you know what does that
mean?
A: That I will tell the truth, sir.
Q: Why, if you tell a lie, is that good?
A: No, sir.
(tsn, April 22, 1997, p. 3.)
Further, it was held in People vs. Atuel (261 SCRA 339 [1996]), that sexual intercourse with an
insane, deranged, or mentally deficient, feebleminded, or idiotic woman is rape, pure and simple.
It can be observed from the aforequoted portion of Susan's testimony that notwithstanding her
mental handicap, she is a credible witness and this handicap is not an obstacle to her perseverance
in attaining justice for the bestiality that was done to her.
As aptly held in People vs. Ramirez (supra), citing People vs. Dela Cruz (251 SCRA 77 [1995])
and People vs. Sanchez (250 SCRA 14 [1995]), no woman especially one who is of tender age
would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts and thereafter permit
herself to be subjected to a public trial, if she is not motivated solely by the desire to have the culprit
apprehended and punished, for considering that the victim was of tender years and not exposed to
the ways of the world, it is most improbable that she would impute a crime so serious as rape to
any man if it were not true.
Significantly, Susan did not impute the crime just to any man, but to her surrogate father.
In response to the helpless child's cry for succor, surrogate father, accused-appellant, opted to
attempt to escape from liability by denying the charge on the basis of a concocted story.
First, he imputes the falsity of the charge on Flora Deguiño's antipathy toward him for living in with
her daughter. We find such evasion flimsy. No grandmother would be so callous as to instigate her
own granddaughter to report a rape and subject her to the trouble and humiliation of a public trial, if
the rape never happened.
Second, accused-appellant banks on the inconsistency in Susan's testimony as regards the place
of the crime. The Information states Barangay Inandawa, Ragay, Camarines Sur, whereas during
Susan's direct testimony, she named two places — as follows:
Q: While in Grade V were do you stay?
A: I was with my lola in Pugod.
Q: Is Pugod a barangay of Ragay?
A: Yes, sir.
Page | 70
Q: During off school days, where do you stay? Q: What did he do to you?

A: At Inandawa. A: Whenever my mother is away, I was made to take care of the children and when my
brothers and sisters are no longer around, I was made to lie sisters down, I resisted but I
was threatened, by him.
Q: While you were still in Grade V, did you stay at Inandawa?

(tsn, April 22, 1997, pp. 5-6)

A: Yes, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: With whom?

PROSECUTOR CONTRERAS:
A: With lola.

You said that your head was banged against the post of the house. Is that house also the
Q: In whose house?
place where you were raped?

A: Our house.
A: Yes, sir.

Q: When you said "our house" is it the house also of your Nanay and Romeo Tipay?
Q: Were you raped only in that place?

A: Yes, sir.
A: Anywhere, sir.

Q: Who were your companions in that house in Inandawa?

Q: When you said anywhere, which place are you referring to?

A: My siblings.
ATTY. NACIONAL:

Q: Who were those siblings you said were your companions in that house in Inandawa?
Your Honor, at this point in time, we will agree with the observation report that there is
only one charge of rape in this case and any other rape that was committed will be
A: Romnick, Romelyn and Fidel. immaterial.

Q: What about Mario, Roman and Rommel? PROSECUTOR CONTRERAS:

A: No, sir. When you said you were raped elsewhere or anywhere did it happen on February or
March 1995?
Q: Why, where do they live?
A: Yes, sir.
A: They are weaving sawali.
Q: After February or March 1995, were you still raped?
Q: Where?
A: Yes, sir.
A: At the sawali factory.
Q: How many times?
Q: While you were still in Grade V, do you know what unusual thing done by Romeo
Tipay? A: I cannot recall anymore, sir.

A: There was, sir. Q: Tell us in what place you were first raped?

Evidence Cases Page | 71

 A: At F. Simeon, sir. Third, accused-appellant attempts to shift the blame to Mario Deguiño, Susan's uncle and
housemate. Accused-appellant testified that he saw Deguiño rape Susan, as follow:
Q: In whose house?
Q: Can you tell the Hon. Court if you knew who was responsible for the pregnancy and
giving birth of Susan Pelaez?
A: At the house of my grandmother, sir.

A: What I know sir is that the one responsible is Romeo Dequiño, the brother of my live-in
Q: But who are living in that house of your grandmother?
partner.

A: The siblings of my mother.

Q: Why do you say that he was the one responsible?

Q: Where were the siblings of your mother when you were first raped?
A: They were at the dance hall.
Q: Who were the only persons in the house when you were first raped?
A: Children of Romeo Tipay.
Q: When you said children of Romeo Tipay, whom are you referring?
A: When I went to the house of my mother-in law on July 10, 1995, I saw how Romeo
Dequiño raped Susan.
Q: When you saw Susan Pelaez being raped by Romeo Dequiño, what did you do?
A: I was afraid because Romeo had a knife being poked at Susan Pelaez.
Q: You said that it was on July 10 1995 that Romeo Dequiño raped Susan, can you tell
the Court why you went there at the house of your mother-in-law on that date?

A: Romar and Romelyn. A: I was about to take back the coconut grater which was borrowed by my mother-in-law
because we have to make something, to cook a merienda out of banana.
Q: What were Romar and Romelyn doing when you were first raped?
Q: When you arrived there in the house of your mother-in-law on July 10, 1995 who were
the persons who were in that house?
A: They were all asleep, sir.

A: I saw only Susan Pelaez and Romeo Dequiño and that was the time that Susan
(tsn, April 22, 1997, pp. 13-14) Dequiño was being raped by Romeo Dequiño.

An examination of Susan Pelaez's direct testimony will show that the rape referred to in the Q: How about Mrs. Flora Dequiño? Where was she?
information was committed at the residence of her mother Marilyn and stepfather accused-appellant
at Barangay Inandawa, Ragay, Camarines Sur. And the abuse was repeated at Barangay F.
Simeon, Ragay, Camarines Sur, where Marilyn and accused-appellant later resided, next to Flora A: I don't know, sir.
Deguiño's house. In Marilyn's affidavit presented during the preliminary examination stage of the
case at bar wherein she stated: "[W]hen my daughter Susan was in Grade I to Grade IV, she
Q: How about her husband?
stayed with her grandmother in F. Simeon, because our residence then was still in Inandawa,
Ragay, Camarines Sur. It was only in July, 1995 that we decided to move to F. Simeon. Since then,
Susan stayed with us. On week-ends, however, whenever I join my husband in Inandawa, she is A: I don't know, sir.
left either at our own house or in the house of my mother" (p. 33, Record). However, the very first
time Susan was raped, it occurred at Flora Deguiño's house in F. Simeon when her uncles were all
Q: You mean to say that Susan Dequiño Pelaez and Romeo Dequiño were alone?
at the dance hall. Thus, when she said she was raped "anywhere," spoke the truth. Verily, it is quite
unfortunate that the information failed to charge the other counts of rape.
A: Yes, sir.
Nevertheless, inconsistencies in the testimony of a witness with respect to minor details or
inconsequential matters may be disregarded without impairing the witness' credibility (People vs. Q: After you were able to get the coconut grater, what did you do?
Magalang, 244 SCRA 17 [1995]) especially when these do not in actuality touch the basic aspects
of the whys and wherefores of the crime (People vs. Tacapit, 242 SCRA 241 [1995]).
A: I went home and reported what I saw, what Romeo Dequiño did to Susan Pelaez, to
live-in partner.

Evidence Cases Page | 72

 Q: What did Marilyn do after you reported the incident to her? Q: When you executed this affidavit you were at the Prosecutor's Office at Ragay,
Camarines Sur with Edwina Romanes?
A: She cried and while she was crying, she was saying why Romeo Dequiño did it to her
daughter. A: Yes, sir.

Q: What other actions did you do? Q: You were there because a notice was sent to you on November 13, 1995?

A: I was not able to do other things because Romeo Dequiño's knife was poked at Susan A: Yes, sir.
Pelaez.
Q: Who were with you when you made the affidavit on November 13, 1995?
(tsn, May 19, 1997, pp. 7-8)
A: I was accompanied by Romeo Tipay and his parents.
As correctly pointed gut by the Solicitor General, accused-appellant, who was supposed to act as
Susan's surrogate father, did not even report the concocted incident to the proper authorities, or
xxx xxx xxx
even to Flora Deguiño at whose house he allegedly witnessed the rape. He testified that he told
Marilyn about the incident, but that was all that he did. Such inaction is definitely contrary to logic
and human experience. He failed to act as a father naturally would upon seeing a child under his Q: It was Atty. Edwina Romanes who interviewed you?
care being mercilessly ravished.
A: Yes, sir.
Further, Susan, who was subjected to grueling cross examination by the counsel for the defense
never faltered in her story. She was the one raped. She definitely knew who attacked her and who
Q: Before your were interviewed where you able to talk or confer with Romeo Tipay?
did not. As held in People vs. Castañeda (252 SCRA 247 [1996]), during the rape, the complainant
is close to her assailant as physically as possible, for a man and woman cannot be physically closer
to each other than during a sexual act. There is thus no doubt that complainant had a good look at A: Yes, sir. Romeo Tipay told his parents what to do.
the physical features of accused-appellant and hence could not have been mistaken in her charge,
especially when the person who ravished is one well known to her, he being her stepfather.
Q: How long have you conferred with Romeo Tipay before you were interviewed by Atty.
Romanes?
As regards the effect of Marilyn's retraction, we apply our ruling in Molina vs. People (259 SCRA
138 [1996]), where we held:
A: About 30 minutes.

. . . The rule is settled that in cases where previous testimony is retracted and a
subsequent different, if not contrary, testimony is made by the same witness, the test to Q: How long have you stayed in the office of Atty. Romanes?
decide which testimony to believe is one of comparison coupled with the application of
the general rules of evidence. A testimony solemnly given in court should not be set A: It was long, I didn't remember how long.
aside and disregarded lightly, and before this can be done, both the previous testimony
and the subsequent one should be carefully compared and juxtaposed, the
circumstances under which each was made, carefully and keenly scrutinized, and the Q: This affidavit you identified was read to you in Bicol by Judge Ramos?
reasons or motives for the charge, discriminatingly analyzed.
A: Yes, sir, but I did not understand other Bicol.
(at p. 159)
Q: It was explained to you by Atty. Edwina Romanes before you sign the affidavit?
When Marilyn Deguiño was asked on the stand why she retracted her previous testimony attesting
to accused-appellant's innocence, she said: A: Yes, sir but I did not sign yet.

Q: You mentioned in the direct that you made an affidavit, you said it was not true. I am Q: So you signed the affidavit before Judge Ramos?
showing you again the affidavit you identified yesterday.
A: Yes, sir because I was forced by the mother of Romeo Tipay because everything has
A: Yes, sir. to be ended already.

Q: Did you not complain?

Evidence Cases Page | 73
 A: No, sir. They were infront of me. xxx xxx xxx

Q: You did not complain to the police?
A: Because they did not let me go.
(tsn, December 3, 1996, pp. 7-9)
We have reason to believe that Marilyn Deguiño executed her affidavit of November 13, 1995 for
fear of being left by accused-appellant. She executed the same as a wife afraid of being
abandoned. However, when she took the stand on December 3, 1996, she did so as a mother, with
her maternal instincts prevailing over her dependence both financially and emotionally, on a man.
Lastly, we pass upon the procedural issue raised by accused-appellant, that is, the complaint
having been filed by Susan's grandmother contrary to Section 5, Paragraph 3, Rule 110 of the
Rules of Court.
The condition provided by law for the proper prosecution of the aforementioned offenses has been
imposed out of consideration for the offended woman and her family who might prefer suffer the
outrage in silence rather than go through with the scandal of public trial (Valdepeñas vs. People, 16
SCRA 871 [1966]). In People vs. Estrebella (164 SCRA 114 [1988]), we held that any technical
defect in a complaint for rape would be remedied by testimony showing the consent and willingness
of the family of the complainant who cannot give her consent (due to minority or mental retardation,
for instance), to have the private offense publicly tried. Substantially, this is what is required by the
rules. Evidently, by undergoing trial, the family of complainant chose to publicly denounce the
injustice committed against the latter and thus agreed to bear the personal effects of said exposure
(also see People vs. Gerones, 193 SCRA 263 [1991]).
In the case at bar, Marilyn Deguiño, complainant's mother herself requested Susan's grandmother
to take care of the case, as follows:
Q: In fact, there was no supporting affidavit to the affidavit of your mother Flora?

The above-cited provision reads: A: I asked my mother to take care of the case because I have no means to support the
case.
Sec. 5. Who must prosecute criminal actions. . . .
Q: On October 1995, you did not go to the police?
xxx xxx xxx
A: He was already apprehended by the police.
The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall not be
prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her parents, Q: So you have no knowledge that a case was filed to him in Ragay Police Station?
grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has been expressly pardoned
by the above-named persons, as the case may be. In case the offended party dies or
A: I have knowledge, in fact I have entrusted to my mother to take care of the case
becomes incapacitated before she could file the complaint and has no known parents,
because I have no mean to support the case.
grandparents or guardian, the State shall initiate the criminal action in her behalf.

Q: What date was that?

The offended party, even if she were a minor, has the right to initiate the prosecution for
the above offenses, independently of her parents, grandparents or guardian, unless she
is incompetent or incapable of doing so upon grounds other than her minority. Where the A: October 27, 1995.
offended party who is a minor fails to file the complaint, her parents, grandparents, or
guardian may file the same. The right to the action granted to the parents, grandparents
(tsn, December 3, 1996, p. 7)
or guardian shall be exclusive of all other persons and shall be exercised successively in
the order herein provided, except as stated in the immediately preceding paragraph.
The foregoing testimony clearly exhibits the consent of the mother to publicly pursue Susan's
assailant in compliance with the requirements of the law and jurisprudence.
The substantive law counterpart of the foregoing section is Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code
which, until its amendment by Republic No. 8353, effective October 13, 1997 (which reclassified
rape as a crime against persons and no longer a private crime, for which reason, the complaint can We, however, hold that the trial court erred in imposing the death penalty on accused-appellant.
now be instituted by any person), read: Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659 (the
Death Penalty Law), reads relevantly:
Art. 344. Prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape
and acts of lasciviousness. . . . xxx xxx xxx

The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall not be The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her parents, following attendant circumstances:
grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has been expressly pardoned
by the above named persons, as the case may be.

Evidence Cases Page | 74

 I. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, WHEREFORE, the decision under review is hereby AFFIRMED, with the following modifications:
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil (a) the penalty imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua; (b) aside from the payment of Fifty
degree, or the common-law-spouse of the parent of the victim. Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages to the victim, accused-appellant is further
ordered to indemnify private complainant in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00); and
(c) the exemplary damages awarded by the trial court in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos
xxx xxx xxx
(P50,000.00) are reduced to Twenty-five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00).1âwphi1.nêt

Pursuant to the aforecited provision, the trial court imposed the penalty of death upon accused-
SO ORDERED.
appellant, taking into account the minority of the victim as she is said to have been only 15 years
old at the time of the rape incident, as well as the relationship of step-father and daughter between
them. However, in a similar and recent case (People vs. Javier, G.R. No. 12696, July 26, 1999), EN BANC
this court pronounced:
G.R. No. 126538-39 November 20, 2001
. . . [I]t is significant to note that the prosecution failed to present the birth certificate of the
complainant. Although the victim's age was not contested by the defense, proof of age of
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
the victim is particularly necessary in this case considering that the victim's age which
vs.
was then 16 years old is just two years less than the majority age of 18. In this age of
RODELIO MARCELO, accused-appellant.
modernism, there is hardly any difference between a 16-year old girl and an 18-year old
one insofar as physical features and attributes are concerned. A physically developed 16-
year old lass may be mistaken for an 18-year old young woman, in the same manner that QUISUMBING, J.:
a frail and young looking 18-year old lady may pass as a 16-year old minor. Thus, it is in
this context that independent proof of the actual age of a rape victim becomes vital and
On automatic review is the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 68, finding
essential so as to remove an iota of doubt that the victim is indeed under 18 years of age
accused-appellant Rodelio Marcelo guilty in two out of three cases of rape and sentencing him to
as to fall under the qualifying circumstances enumerated in Republic Act No. 7659.
death in one case and reclusion perpetua in another.

This does not mean, however, that the presentation of the certificate of birth is at all times
Appellant was originally charged under three separate Informations:
necessary to prove minority. The minority of a victim of tender age who may be below the age of
ten is quite manifest and the court can take judicial notice thereof. The crucial years pertain to the
ages of fifteen to seventeen where minority may seem to be dubitable due to one's physical Criminal Case No. 107976-H:
appearance. In this situation, the prosecution has the burden of proving with certainty the fact that
the victim was under 18 years of age when the rape was committed in order to justify the imposition
of the death penalty under the above-cited provision. That on or about the 10th day of September, 1994 in the City of Pasig, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of
threats, force and intimidation did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
The record of the case at bar is bereft of any independent evidence which would accurately show carnal knowledge to (sic) the complainant, Cecilia Osorio, against her will and consent.
complainant's age. That complainant's was alleged in the information and/or complaint as under 16
years is not sufficient. Nor does the lack of denial on the part of accused-appellant excuse the
prosecution from discharging its burden in this regard (People vs. Javier, supra). CONTRARY TO LAW.

Consequently, considering that the penalty of death cannot be imposed in the case at bar due to
the aforestated technical flaw, accused-appellant should be made to pay P50,000.00 (not
P75,000.00) as indemnification for the rape committed (People v. Betonio, 279 SCRA 532 [19971),
the ruling in People v. Victor (G.R. No. 127903, July 9, 1998) being inapplicable.
The award of P50,000.00 granted by the trial court as and for moral damages is, however,
sustained in accordance with the ruling in People vs. Prades (G.R. No. 127569, July 30, 1998) that
moral damages may additionally be awarded to the victim in rape cases, in such amount as the
court deems just, without the necessity for pleading or proof as basis thereof.
Criminal Case No. 108000-H:
That sometime prior to March 31, 1995, in the City of Pasig, Philippines; and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of threats,
force and intimidation did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge to (sic) Mary Cyndel Marcelo, his own daughter, a minor 4 years of age,
against her will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

Lastly, the award of P50,000,00 granted by the trial court as exemplary damages should be
reduced to P25,000.00 which the Court believes is the reasonable amount to deter similar
perversities, particularly the raping of one's step-daughter and consequently siring a child with her,
in line with recent jurisprudence (People vs. Sangil, 276 SCRA 532 [1997]; People vs. Cristobal,
252 SCRA 507 [1996]).
Criminal Case No. 108001-H:
That sometime prior to March 31, 1995, in the City of Pasig, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of threats, force
and intimidation did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal

Evidence Cases Page | 75

 knowledge to (sic) Mariedel2 Marcelo, his own daughter, a minor 3 years of age, against appellant sat down and repeated his threat to kill her and her sister if she reported what he did to
her will and consent. her. Days after, Cecilia left and lived with a friend somewhere in Parang, Marikina.8

CONTRARY TO LAW.
During his arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the charges. Thereafter, trial on the merits
ensued.
The first witness for the prosecution was DR. OWEN J. LEBAQUIN, medico-legal officer of the PNP
Crime Laboratory. He testified that he examined Cecilia Osorio, Mary Cyndel and Mariedel Marcelo
and his findings reveal that both Cecilia and Mariedel suffered lacerations in their hymen and were
in non-virgin states. On the other hand, Mary Cyndel's hymen was still intact and she was, in fact, a
virgin.3
MARY CYNDEL MARCELO, the four-year-old daughter of the couple, testified that her father often
played with her and her sister Mariedel, using his "snake". He would place this "snake" inside their
mouths, anuses and private parts while all of them were naked. With Atty. Mateo posing as
appellant, Mary Cyndel pointed to the area of the groin when asked to point where her father's
"snake" was. She also testified that whenever her father placed this "snake" inside her mouth and
that of Mariedel's, it emitted a worm- like substance from its head arid then it dies. The said worm-
like substance was described by Mary Cyndel as "malagkit " and "lasang sipon."9
The last prosecution witness was ESTRELLA RAGUNOT. She testified that she was a friend of
Cecilia Osorio with whom the latter lived after she was sexually abused by appellant. She also
narrated the stories told to her by Cecilia regarding the latter's experience. 10

SPO1 LARRY PABLO testified that he was one of the police officers who apprehended appellant
In his defense, appellant RODELIO MARCELO denied the accusations against him. He alleged that
and who investigated the case.4
Cecilia's complaint could have been motivated by his refusal to succumb to her sexual advances.
He also opined that his wife might be the one responsible for the false accusations of their
ADELAIDA REYES, principal and guidance counselor of Silahis Katarungan Elementary School, daughters as she wanted to get rid of him so that she may live with her lover, a certain Jack
was presented to corroborate the testimonies of Cecilia and Cynthia on how Mary Cyndel and Victorino.11
Mariedel first related their harrowing experiences at the hands of their father. 5
MONINA MARCELO, cousin of appellant, was also presented to establish the fact that Cecilia had
Appellant's wife, MA. CYNTHIA IMELDA MARCELO, testified that she is the sister of complainant told her of her sexual experience in Singapore, and that Cecilia was a promiscuous woman who
Cecilia Osorio and the mother of Mary Cyndel Marcelo and Mariedel. She recalled that she and had sexual contacts with her lovers.12
appellant lived in Santolan, Pasig, on September 10, 1994 and transferred to Sta. Teresita Village
in Parang, Marikina, on September 16, 1994. Her sister, Cecilia, used to live with them but left them
SINFROSA13 MENDOZA, aunt of appellant, testified that appellant's wife and a certain Jack
on September 10, 1994. Thereafter, Cecilia would just go to their house occasionally to "change
Victorino were indeed lovers.14
her dress". Worried, Cynthia wrote their mother in Bicol to ask her to come to Manila to talk to
Cecilia. On March 24, 1995, their mother and Cecilia coincidentally met in her house. Cynthia
remembered that on March 31, 1995, she asked Cecilia to stay so they could talk but the latter On August 6, 1996, the trial court promulgated its decision, disposing as follows:
refused and went back to her boarding house. Cynthia followed her and confronted her sister about
her unwillingness to stay with them. Cecilia revealed that appellant raped her. Upon hearing this,
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby renders judgment finding
Cynthia brought Cecilia to her home in Sta. Teresita. There appellant admitted to her that he raped
accused RODELIO MARCELO GUlLTY beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of Rape
Cecilia but only because, according to him, "pinasukan ng demonyo ang utak ko" (the devil
and sentences him to suffer:
possessed my brain). Appellant then left them.

1. In Criminal Case No. 107976-H, the penalty of reclusion perpetua; and

Cynthia recounted that on April 11, 1995, appellant returned and asked her if they could still live
together. After she refused, appellant left her a letter to give to his parents. Confused, Cynthia
decided to call her Auntie Adelaida6Reyes for advice. As they spoke, they were rudely interrupted 2. In Criminal Case No. 108001-H, the penalty of death.
by her daughters, Mary Cyndel and Mariedel, who kept on talking about a "snake" which their father
used when he played with them. According to them, this "snake" was placed by their father inside
He is further ordered to pay complainant Cecilia Osorio and Mariedel Marcelo the sum of
their mouths, in their anuses and their private parts. Curious, Adelaida took them inside a room and
Fifty thousand pesos (Php 50,000.00) each as moral damages; the sum of Fifty thousand
asked the younger brother of Cynthia to remove his shorts. Mary Cyndel pointed to the boy's penis
pesos (Php 50,000.00) each as exemplary damages and cost of suit.
and told the elders that the "snake" of her father was much bigger than the "snake" of the boy.
Cynthia brought her children to Camp Crame Crime Laboratory to have them examined. Upon
reaching said laboratory Mary Cyndel pointed to a sketch of a male's genitalia and told her mother Insofar as Criminal Case No. 108000-H is concerned, the Court hereby ACQUITS the
that it was like her father's "snake."7 accused for insufficiency of evidence.

CECILIA OSORIO, sister-in-law of appellant, testified that she stayed in her sister Cynthia's home In view of the penalty imposed in Criminal Case No. 108001-H, let the records of this
while she was working for Purefoods. At around 3:00 A.M. of September 10, 1994, while asleep, case be elevated to the Supreme Court for automatic review.
something touched her body. When she opened her eyes, she saw appellant near her, naked. She
pleaded with him not to pursue whatever he had in mind, but he just poked a knife at her and
covered her mouth to prevent her from shouting. His threat to kill her terrified her. Appellant SO ORDERED.15
removed his hand from her mouth and started undressing her. After ejaculating inside her,
Evidence Cases Page | 76
Appellant raises the following errors in his brief:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AFFORDING FULL CREDENCE TO THE EVIDENCE
ADDUCED BY THE PROSECUTION THRU ITS WITNESS-COMPLAINANT CECILIA
OSORIO TO SUPPORT A CONVICTION AGAINST THE ACCUSED IN CRIMINAL
CASE NO. 107976-H
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT ON THE BASIS OF THE TOTALITY OF ALL THE EVIDENCE
ADDUCED BY THE PROSECUTION IN RESPECT TO CRIMINAL CASE NO. 108000-H
(sic)16
The issues here concern the credibility of witnesses and the sufficiency of the evidence for the
prosecution.
Appellant describes the testimony of Cecilia as full of half -truths, contradictions and improbabilities.
He assails the delay of six months which Cecilia allowed to pass before she reported the alleged
rape. He insists that Cecilia's complaint is nothing more than an act of "vengeance" for his refusal to
give in to her sexual propositions. On the alleged rape committed against Mariedel, appellant
attacks the paucity of evidence to prove the same. He asserts that the testimony of Mary Cyndel
was too fluid, precise and was promptly given after each question, giving the impression that the
responses were rehearsed and memorized. Appellant also points out that the cross- examination of
Mary Cyndel reveals that the "snake" she constantly refers to is not the sexual organ of her father.
Appellant likewise dismisses the findings of Dr. Lebaquin with regard to the lacerations found in
Mariedel's private parts for the simple reason that he was not able to identify the perpetrator
thereof. Finally, appellant insists that the testimonies of Cynthia, Cecilia and Adelaida are all
hearsay and deserve no probative value,17
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for the State, avers that there is no reason to detract
from the trial court's finding of credibility on the part of the prosecution's witnesses, The OSG
argues that delay and vacillation on the part of rape victims in reporting their sordid experience do
not impair their credibility, especially when such delay is grounded on fear. It also points out that the
testimony of Mary Cyndel was carried out in a candid, straightforward and innocent manner as only
a child of her age can, and it deserves utmost credence and belief.18
In resolving cases of rape, this Court is guided by the following principal (a) an accusation for rape
can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but even more difficult for the accused, though
innocent, to disprove; (b) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime where only two persons are
usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; (c) the
evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit, and cannot be allowed to draw
strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense;19 and (d) the evaluation of the trial
court judges regarding the credibility of witnesses deserves utmost respect on the ground that they
are in the best position to observe the demeanor, act, conduct, and attitude of the witnesses in
court while testifying.20
Guided by these principles and after a careful review of the records of this case, we find no reason
to overturn the conclusion reached by the trial court concerning the guilt of the accused-appellant,
Evidence Cases
The testimony of Cecilia Osorio was given in a candid and straightforward manner leaving no room
for doubt that she is telling the truth. Appellant tried to discredit her testimony by pointing out that it
took Cecilia more than six months before she reported the incident to her family and, eventually, to
the police. A delay of six months under the circumstances present in this case, however, is not
enough to taint Cecilia's credibility. In the first place, she adequately explained why it took her a
long time before she reported the incident. According to her, she was afraid and confused. This is
expected considering that the person who raped her was her brother-in-law. Further, she had just
gone through a harrowing experience. We cannot categorically state what might have entered the
thoughts and minds of a young lady who had such an experience, from the time she was raped up
to the time she decided to come out in the open. We are certain, however, that delay and her
reluctance to make public the assault on her virtue is neither unknown or uncommon. In People vs.
Malagar, 238 SCRA 512 (1994), the Court said:
Vacillation in the filing of complaint by rape victim is not an uncommon phenomenon. This
crime is normally accompanied by the rapist's threat on the victim's life, and the fear can
last for quite a while. There is also the natural reluctance of a woman to admit her sullied
chastity, accepting thereby all the stigma it leaves, and to then expose herself to the
morbid curiosity of the public whom she may likely perceived rightly or wrongly, to be
more interested in the prurient details of the ravishment than in her vindication and the
punishment of the rapist. In People vs. Coloma (222 SCRA 255) we have even
considered an 8-year delay in reporting the long history of rape by the victim's father as
understandable and so not enough to render incredible the complaint of a 13-year old
daughter.21
Cecilia's fear is a viable reason for her long silence. This should not be take against her. It is fear,
springing from the initial rape, from which the perpetrator hopes to build up a climate of extreme
psychological terror, which would numb his victim to silence and submissiveness. 22 And even if
delay could not be attributed to death threats and intimidation, the failure of complainant in promptly
reporting the offense to the proper authorities would not destroy the truth per se of the complaint.23
The attempt of the appellant to picture Cecilia as an indiscreet and sexually promiscuous woman
deserves scant consideration. Prior sexual intercourse with a different person is irrelevant in a rape
case.24
The "scorned woman theory" of appellant, i.e., his contention that the charge of rape was brought
about as an act of spite and vengeance on the part of Cecilia because of his refusal to give in to her
sexual desires, hardly inspires belief. If it were true that Cecilia entertained secret desires for
appellant, she would not leave all of a sudden. Her tendency would have been to keep close to the
man she was secretly in love with. She would not fabricate a charge of rape for this would only
expose her supposedly "secret love" and thwart her hidden designs. In other words, appellant's
attempt to find solace in the literary aphorism, " Hell hath no fury like a woman scorned" has no
basis in either the facts of this case or the law applicable. It is not a credible motivation for Cecilia to
humiliate and expose herself to public scrutiny, even ridicule, in the course of a public trial. No
woman would cry rape, allow an examination of her private parts, subject herself to humiliation, go
through the rigors of public trial and taint her good name if her claim were not true. 25
Coming now to the testimony of Mary Cyndel Marcelo, appellant suggests that her testimony is too
fluid and precise, signifying that it had been memorized and rehearsed. A close perusal of Mary
Cyndel's testimony reveals, however, that it was spontaneous, candid and straightforward. Mary
Cyndel was only four years old then, so innocent that she did not even know the word for a man
and woman's private parts. Such testimony is generally given much weight and cannot be easily
disregarded by appellant's mere denial.26 Note that Mary Cyndel testified with only her younger
sister by her side. Her mother and other relatives were asked by the court to leave the trial room.
Notwithstanding the intimidating situation wherein a young witness is confronted and scrutinized by
Page | 77
a judge and rigidly cross examined by the defense counsel, Mary Cyndel remained steadfast in her A: To the mouth. (witness pointing to the mouth)
narration. Her consistency is a strong indication that her narration was not fabricated. At such a
tender age, Mary Cyndel could hardly be expected to weave with uncanny recollection such a
Q: Where else?
complicated tale as the sexual assault unconscionably perpetrated against her and her sister by
their own father.27 It is unfortunate that despite the weighty and trustworthy testimony of Mary
Cyndel, appellant was acquitted of the charge of rape he committed against her on the sole basis A: (witness pointing to the area of her anus)
that the doctor did not find any laceration in her private parts, and that his medical report indicated
her hymen was intact. The trial court apparently missed our ruling in People vs.
Q: Where else Ms. witness aside from the mouth, your private part and the anus,
Palicte28 and People vs. Castro29 that the mere fact that the hymen remained intact is no proof that
where else?
rape was not committed.30

A: "Doon lang".
The testimonies of Mary Cyndel and Dr. Lebaquin suffice to support appellant's conviction for the
rape of Mariedel. Mary Cyndel clearly testified that her younger sister was ravished by appellant:
Q: What about Maridel, where did Daddy place the snake aside from the private part?
Q: You said you love your mother, how about your father do you love him?
A: To the mouth, the private part and also at the back.31
A: No, Ma'm.
And who would not be moved by Mary Cyndel's declaration, to wit:
Q: Why?
Q: When your daddy was playing that green snake, putting it in your body, and the
parts of the body of your sister, did you cry, laugh or enjoy?
A: "Kasi nilalagyan kami ng snake". (when literally translated because he is placing
snake on us)
A: Yes, I cried, sir.
Q: You mentioned we, aside from you, to whom was the snake being placed?
Q: Why did you cry?
A: The two of us.
A: Because my daddy is placing his snake to Mariedel, sir.
Q: And where is your Daddy placing snake on you?
Q: That was the only reason why you cried, because your daddy placed his snake to
Mariedel?
A: (witness pointing to her private part)

A: .Yes, sir.
COURT:

Make it of record that the witness lifted her maong skirt. Q: You cried because you pity your sister?

A: Yes, sir.32
PROS. UMALI:

For the better appreciation of the Court, may we request the witness to please
stand so that she could point (sic) out where the snake was placed by her
Daddy.
(witness pointing to the area of her private part)
Q: What about Maridel, where did Daddy place his snake on Maridel?
A: (Likewise the witness pointed to the area of her private part)
This testimony and the medical finding that Mariedel33 suffered "deep healed laceration on her
hymen at 3:00 o'clock position and was in a non-virgin state physically"34 constitute conclusive proof
that Mariedel was raped by appellant. Considering that Mariedel herself was only 3 years old, and
could hardly be expected to verbalize her ordeal and grief, she was not placed on the witness
stand. That the prosecution presented her person to medical examination and the results thereof
presented by the PNP medico-legal officer, Dr. Lebaquin, should suffice to prove the extent of her
injury.
Appellant urges that we disregard the testimony of Mary Cyndel because her cross-examination
revealed that she was referring to a green snake found in the grass. The pertinent portion of said
cross-examination is as follows:

Q: Where else?

Evidence Cases Page | 78

Q: Have you seen a snake before you draw this thing? Q: And that is the very same colored green snake that your daddy placed in the front
portion of your organ and anus?
A: Yes, sir.
A: Yes, sir.35
Q: Where did you see that snake, in the house or in the grass or in what place?
Appellant insists that the green snake Mary Cyndel was referring to could not have been his penis.
According to him, this casts a doubt on the commission of the alleged rape. However, we have to
A: In the grass, sir.
bear in mind that the above testimony came from a four-year-old child whose testimony ought not to
be treated similarly as that of an adult. It is not made clear whether Mary Cyndel knows what
Q: Did you remember the color of the snake which you saw, whether it was green, "green" means. It was not established that Mary Cyndel clearly understood the question about the
brown or what? "grass" asked by defense counsel before she answered. But the reference of "grass" could be to
the pubic hair. And the "snake" therein is the penis. We note the manifestation and objection of
Prosecutor Umali, thus:
A: Green, sir.

Pros. Umali:
Q: And this snake that your daddy played with you, is colored green, right?

Objection, your Honor, at this juncture may we suspend the questioning, your
A: Yes, sir. Honor, because it appears that the witness had been answering "yes" when
the question of counsel in English had not yet been translated in Tagalog and
Q: And that snake colored green was the same snake that your daddy put into your these children are not English speaking, your Honor. 36
mouth?
We are convinced that what Mary Cyndel referred to as "snake" is appellant's penis. This
A: Yes, sir. conclusion is supported by the following: (1) Mary Cyndel was able to point to the groin area of Atty.
Mateo when asked where the snake of her father can be located; (2) Mary Cyndel drew the snake
along the groin area of the paper dolls, marked as Exh. "U"37; (3) physical evidence showing that
Q: And from, that colored green snake, came out of the worm? Mariedel had been sexually molested is consistent with Mary Cyndel's testimony; (4) testimony of
Mary Cyndel was substantially corroborated by Cecilia, Adelaida and Cynthia on its material points;
A: Yes, sir. (5) Mary Cyndel categorically stated that her father was naked when he showed the "snake"; and
(6) she mentioned that after inserting the snake into her and her sister's mouths, the said snake
would "die" and a white, worm-like substance which is "malagkit" and "lasang sipon" would come
Q: And that is the very same colored green snake that your daddy used to place in out. It is beyond any doubt that this white substance refers to no less than semen coming out from
the mouth of your sister, right? appellant's penis after he had ejaculated inside the victim's mouth.1âwphi1.nêt

A: Yes, sir. Apparently Mary Cyndel was misled by the suggestion that the color of the "snake" was green. That
suggestion had no basis. Nor is it material. What is material is that the "snake" was placed by
Q: And from that snake, you came to know that a worm comes out to the mouth of appellant in the anus, vagina and mouth of babes, including the witness and her 3-year-old sister,
your sister? Mariedel.

A: Yes, sir. Appellant's assertion that it was Cynthia, Mary Cyndel's mother, who put her up to accuse him and
instructed her to lie in court, so that Cynthia could get rid of him appears to us far-fetched. No
mother in her right mind would stoop so low just to assuage her own hurt feelings as to subject her
Q: And that is the very same snake that your daddy placed at about your anus, right? own daughter to the hardship and shame concomitant to a rape prosecution, especially if the one
accused is the girl's own father. It is unnatural for a parent to use her offspring as an engine of
A: Yes, sir. malice and sacrifice her to the altar of public ridicule if she, in fact, has not been motivated by an
honest desire to have the culprit punished.38 The insistence of appellant that his wife fabricated the
rape charges because she had a lover and wanted to get rid of appellant also appears baseless
Q: And that is the very same green snake that your daddy placed at about the area of and illogical. It is not supported by the evidence. Moreover, appellant had testified that he left his
your front organ, right? family and even wrote a letter to his parents explaining why. If he had already left, there was no
more reason for his wife to falsely accuse him.
A: Yes, sir.
Appellant says that the testimony of Dr. Lebaquin on the lacerations suffered by the victim should
be disregarded since he did not after all identify who the perpetrator was. Appellant's contention
deserves no serious consideration. Naturally, Dr. Lebaquin could not have identified the perpetrator
Evidence Cases Page | 79
because said witness was not present when these lacerations were inflicted. His role was only that
of an expert witness, a physician, and not as an eyewitness to the crime.
In sum, we agree with the trial court's finding that appellant is guilty of raping Cecilia Osorio and
Mariedel Marcelo. However, we are unable to agree that the death penalty be imposed on appellant
in Criminal Case No. 108001-H, concerning the rape of Mariedel Marcelo.
Section 11 of Republic Act 7659,39 the law governing at the time the offenses were committed,
provides that the death penalty shall be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following attendant circumstances:
xxx
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,…..
xxx
4. when the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7) years old.
We find that, in regard to the first qualifying circumstance abovecited, the victim's minority and her
relationship to the offender have been alleged. But the fact of his being the father of Mariedel has
not been sufficiently established by competent and independent evidence. For the imposition of
capital punishment, we cannot rely on the silence of appellant regarding this point. In the case of
qualified rape, the prosecution bears the burden of establishing the qualifying circumstances that
characterize the offense as such. Unfortunately, the prosecution here did not present any
documentary proof to establish that appellant is the father of Mariedel. Nor did it try to elicit a
categorical declaration from the mother, or even from the appellant himself, that indeed Mariedel
was his offspring. As held in People vs. Javier:
...in a criminal prosecution especially of cases involving the extreme penalty of death,
nothing but proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the
crime with which an accused is charged must be established by the prosecution in order
for said penalty to upheld.40
Likewise, in regard to the fourth qualifying circumstance of Section 11 of R.A. 7659 earlier cited, we
find that it was not proved adequately. This circumstance pertinently requires that the victim must
be below seven years old. Mariedel was allowed to sit beside Mary Cyndel while the latter
testified,41 apparently to impress on the court by their youthful appearances that the sisters were
minors and below seven years old. But Mariedel was not presented so that her age could be of
judicial notice.42 Nor was there any admission by the defense of her age, much less a hearing
expressly on the point of her age being below seven years. Their mother's testimony that Mary
Cyndel was four while Mariedel was three years old, was not sufficient nor indubitable proof of their
ages. The failure of the prosecution to present Mariedel's birth certificate without credible
explanation leads to doubt, if not to an adverse conclusion.
We are not unmindful that in People vs. Tipay,43 citing People vs. Javier, G.R. No. 126096,
311 SCRA 122 (1999),we said that, "The minority of the victim of tender age who may be below the
age of ten is quite manifest and the court may take judicial notice thereof." Neither have we
overlooked that in People vs. Dela Cruz,44 we accepted the testimony of the mother as proof of the
minority of the victims who were 15 and 14 years old, without requiring their birth certificates in
compliance with the first circumstance of R.A. 7659. Note, however, that these aforementioned
cases referred to proof of minority and not of actual age. Carefully considered, said cases" are not
Evidence Cases
on all fours with the present case. We must stress that here what is required to qualify the penalty
to death is definite, independent, and indubitable proof that Mariedel was below seven years old at
the time of her rape, conformably with the fourth circumstance of Section 11, R.A. 7659. 45
To put a man to death based on implications and assumptions, or on his silence regarding
allegations against him, could be the height of injustice. As oftenly repeated, the evidence for the
prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit, and it cannot be allowed to draw strength from the
weakness of the evidence for the defense.46 It is the duty of the prosecution to establish, beyond a
shadow of a doubt, that (1) Mariedel was a minor and that appellant is her father, or (2) Mariedel
was aged below seven. Failure to discharge this duty on the part of the prosecution bars conviction
of the accused for the crime of rape in its qualified form. Absent clear, categorical, unequivocal and
indubitable proof of the qualifying circumstance required to convict for qualified rape, appellant must
be spared from capital punishment.
Anent the damages awarded, we find that modifications are called for. In Criminal Case No.
107976-H, the case of Cecilia Osorio, aside from the award of P50,000 as moral damages, there
should also be an award of P50,000 as civil indemnity in accordance with prevailing
jurisprudence.47 The award of exemplary damages is reduced to P25,000 pursuant to present case
law.48
In Criminal Case No. 108001-H, the case of Mariedel Marcelo, aside from the award of moral
damages, we should likewise grant civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000. The award for
exemplary damages should also be pegged at P25,000, pursuant to current jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court finding appellant Rodelio Marcelo guilty of two counts
of rape is AFFIRMED, with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(a) In Criminal Case No. 107976-H, the appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. Appellant is ordered to pay the offended party P50,000 as civil
indemnity , P50,000 as moral damages, and P25,000 as exemplary
damages.1âwphi1.nêt
(b) In Criminal Case No. 108001-H, the appellant's sentence of death is reduced
to reclusion perpetua. He is ordered to pay the offended party P50,000 as civil indemnity,
P50,000 as moral damages, and P25,000 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 137648 March 30, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
IRENEO PADILLA y VILLASEÑOR alias "Iring", defendant-appellant.
PER CURIAM:
On automatic review is the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 166 of Pasig City in
Criminal Case No. 109270-H finding herein accused-appellant Ireneo Padilla y Villaseñor guilty
Page | 80
beyond reasonable doubt of raping his own daughter and sentencing him to suffer the supreme General and Extra-Genital:
penalty of death.
Fairly nourished, fairly developed, and coherent female child. Breasts are undeveloped.
On November 8, 1995, Eula Padilla,1 assisted by her mother, Esmeralda D. Sarmiento, filed a Abdomen is flat and tight.
complaint charging her father, Ireneo Padilla with rape, committed as follows:
Genital:
That on or about the 3rd day of November, 1995 in the Municipality of Taguig, Metro
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
There is absence of pubic hair. Labia majora are full, convex and coaptated with an
accused, with lewd designs and by means of force, threats, violence and intimidation, did
abraded and congested labia minora presenting in between. On separating the same
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with the
disclosed an elastic, fleshy-type and markedly congested hymen with fresh, compound
undersigned complainant Eula Padilla, a 10 year old girl, who is his own daughter against
laceration at 6:00 o'clock extending to the posterior fourchette. External vaginal orifice
the latter's will and consent.2
offers strong resistance to the introduction of the examining index finger. Vaginal canal is
tight and reveals fresh and clotted blood.
On arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded guilty to the offense charged but upon being informed
that the imposable mandatory penalty is death, he withdrew his former plea and entered a plea of
Conclusion:
not guilty. The case then proceeded to trial.

Findings are compatible with recent loss of virginity.

The prosecution presented as evidence the testimonies as well as the sworn statements of private
complainant Eula Padilla and her mother, Esmeralda Sarmiento and the sworn statements of Dr.
Owen Libaquin, the examining physician and Police Officer I Romeo Oreta, the arresting officer. There are no external signs of application of any form of violence.

Eula Padilla recounted the incident as follows: Remarks:

At around three o'clock in the morning of November 4, 1995, while she was sleeping in their house
at No. 44 Pag-asa Street, Signal Village, Taguig, Metro Manila, her father Ireneo Padilla, the
accused-appellant, tied both her hands and feet, covered her mouth and undressed her. The
accused-appellant then forcibly inserted his penis inside her vagina. Eula felt pain in her private part
and cried but she could not do anything because her hands and feet were tied. After the sexual act,
her father untied her and immediately left the house.
At noontime of the same day, her mother noticed bloodstains on her shorts. Unsure of whether the
bloodstains were caused by menstrual period, her mother called her grandmother who lived just a
few houses away. Upon confrontation by her grandmother, Eula disclosed that she was raped by
her father. The following day, November 5, 1995, her mother brought her to the Philippine National
Police Crime Laboratory Service (PNPCLS) in Camp Crame, Quezon City for medical examination. 3
Complainant's mother, Esmeralda Sarmiento Padilla, corroborated complainant's account. She
testified that accused-appellant Ireneo Padilla is her husband and private complainant Eula Padilla
is their daughter. On November 4, 1995, she noticed bloodstains on the shorts of Eula so she
asked her to change. Unsure of whether her daughter was already menstruating, she her mother
(complainant's grandmother) who talked to private complainant and asked her what happened. It
was then that Eula disclosed that she was raped by the accused-appellant. Esmeralda confronted
her husband and asked him if there was any truth to what her daughter narrated. The accused-
appellant replied, "Hindi daw niya alam kung bakit nagawa niya iyon." After taking her daughter to
the Rizal Medical Center for treatment, she reported the incident to the police. On November 5,
1995, the police headed by Police Officer I Romeo Oreta arrested the accused-appellant in his
house and brought him to the police station where he was investigated and detained. Esmeralda
voluntarily turned over her daughter to the custody of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD).4
Vaginal and periurethral smears are negative for gram-negative diplococci and for
spermatozoa.5
In view of the admission by counsel for the accused-appellant of the due execution of the medico-
legal report prepared by Dr. Libaquin, his testimony was dispensed with. The prosecution also
admitted the due execution of the sworn statement of SPO1 Romeo Oreta and he was no longer
presented on the witness stand.6
On the other hand, accused-appellant Ireneo Padilla vehemently denied the accusation against
him. He claimed that in the evening of November 3, 1995, he was sleeping with his wife Esmeralda
and their three children, Eula, 10 years old, Joel, 7 years, and Angie, 5 in their house at No. 38
Pag-asa Street, Signal Village, Taguig, Metro Manila. At around six o'clock of the following morning,
he left their house and proceeded to the talipapa to check on his fruit and vegetable stall as it
rained the whole night due to typhoon "Rosing." In the early morning of November 5, 1995, he was
surprised when several police officers arrested him in their house and brought him to the Taguig
Police Station. He denied having sexually abused his daughter Eula and maintained that it is a
mere fabrication instigated by his parents-in-law who did not like him.7
On January 12, 1999, the trial court rendered its decision convicting accused-appellant and
sentencing him as follows:
WHEREFORE, the court finds accused Irineo Padilla y Villaseñor Guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape charged in the Information and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of Death, and indemnify the victim Eula Padilla,
the sum of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos.

After conducting a physical examination of private complainant, Dr. Owen Libaquin, the medico- The accused-appellant raises the following errors before us:
legal officer, submitted the following findings in his Medico-Legal Report:

Evidence Cases Page | 81

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED OF THE CRIME q I am presenting to you a one page sworn statement will you please examine it and
CHARGED DESPITE THE VAGUE TESTIMONY OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT. tell us if this is the statement?

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY DESPITE THE a Yes this my statement (sic).
PROSECUTION (sic) FAILURE TO PROVE THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF
RELATIONSHIP.
q There is a signature above the name Eula S. Padilla, do you know whose signature
is this?
The Court has repeatedly reiterated the three principles that guide its review of rape cases, to wit:
(1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the
a Mine sir.
person accused to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two
persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant is scrutinized with extreme caution;
and (3) the evidence for the prosecution stands or falls on its own merits and cannot be allowed to q Do you now affirm the contents of this statement?
draw strength from the weakness of the defense.8
a Yes sir.
Conviction or acquittal in a rape case more often than not depends almost entirely on the credibility
of the complainant's testimony because by the very nature of this crime, it is usually only the victim
FISCAL PANDAC:
who can testify as to its occurrence.9 In rape cases, the accused may be convicted solely on the
basis of the testimony of the victim, provided that such testimony is credible, natural, convincing
and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things.10 And, in the evaluation of the May I request that this be marked as Exh. A and the signature as Exh. A-1.
credibility of the complainant's testimony, the sound determination and conclusion by the trial court
is accorded much weight and respect.11
q In this question No. 9 and also the answer which I quote "Sinong isusumbong mo?"
and your answer "Ang tatay ko po" do you affirm this?
In the case under scrutiny, we find no compelling reason to overturn the factual findings of the trial
court. The testimony of the complainant, Eula Padilla, who was only ten years old at the time she
testified, deserves full faith and credit. Her simple, positive and straightforward recounting on the a Yes sir.
witness stand of her harrowing experience lends credence to her accusation. Moreover, being a
mere child of tender years, her age belies any allegation that her charge was a mere concoction or q And also in question no. 10 which I quote "Bakit mo isusumbong ang tatay mo?
fabrication impelled by some ill motive or revenge. As has been stressed by this Court in numerous "Kasi po itinali niya ang kamay pati paa ko at tinakpan niya ang bibig ko pagkatapos po
cases, when a woman or a child victim says that she has been raped, she in effect says all that is ay hinubaran niya ako at pinilit niyang ipinasok ang bird niya sa ari ko", do you
necessary to show that rape was indeed committed.12 understand this?

Accused-appellant faults the prosecution in the way it conducted its direct examination of the a Yes sir, I confirm that.
complainant. It is argued that a rape case is not prosecuted by merely referring to the sworn
statement executed by the complainant and asking her to confirm such statements; on the contrary,
all the material allegations sufficient to prove the crime complained of should be established by the FISCAL PANDAC:
clear testimony of the complainant on the witness stand. Reference is made to the following
portions of the direct examination: May I request your Honor that question no. 10 be marked as Exh. A-2.

COURT: q Did you ask your father why he do that to you? (sic)

The question is too general, you better ask her the event and the date. a No sir.

q Do you remember having executed or signed a sworn statement? xxx xxx xxx

a Yes sir. q In question no. 12 and 13 which I quote "Naipasok ba naman ng tatay mo ang bird
niya sa ari mo?" and your answer "Opo, naipasok po", do you affirm this?
q If that statement is presented to you can you recognize it?
a Yes sir.
a Yes sir.
q This q-13 ano naman ang naramdaman mo" answer "masakit po", do you affirm
this?
Evidence Cases Page | 82
 a Yes sir. is offered as part of her testimony but this cannot prove sexual abuse by the accused in
the person of the complainant Eula Padilla.
q This tanong no. 14 "Ano naman ang ginawa mo ng maramdaman mong masakit?"
sagot "sinabi ko po sa tatay ko na masakit pero wala po akong magawa dahil nakagapos xxx xxx xxx14
po ako", do you affirm this?
The Solicitor General correctly made this observation on the examination of witnesses: "[T]he Court
a Yes sir. gives considerable latitude and indulgence to characteristics of counsel, who is allowed, for the
most part, to follow the dictates of common sense and to choose his own methods of effective
presentation of his side of the case, but subject always to the control of the trial judge." 15
FISCAL PANDAC:

It also bears stressing that the testimony of Eula on direct examination did not consist alone of her
May I request that the question no. 12, 13 and 14 be bracketed and marked as Exh.
affirmation of the contents of her sworn statement. She also made direct and straightforward
A3.
declarations that she was raped by her father, thus:

q In tanong no. 15 which I quote "kailan ba naman ginawa sa iyo ng tatay mo?" sagot
xxx xxx xxx
"Noon pong bumabagyo ng gabi pets (sic) 3 ng Nobyembre 1995", do you affirm this?

q At that time when your father do (sic) that act to you, where was your mother?
a Yes sir.

a She was asleep.

q Tanong no. 16 "Saang lugar ba naman ginawa sa iyo ito ng tatay mo? sagot "sa
loob po ng bahay namin", do you affirm this?
q Which part of the house were your mother is sleeping? (sic)
a Yes sir.
a Beside my father.
q In Tanong No. 17 "Anong oras ba naman ginawa sa iyo ito ng tatay mo"? sagot —
"mag-uumaga na po, sa tingin ko po'y mag-aalas-tres ng umaga", do you affirm this? q Did your mother do anything to protect you when your father did that to you?

a Yes sir. a Yes, she followed-up at Baybreeze.

FISCAL PANDAC: q Why, where was your father at that time after he did that act to you?

May I request that questions Nos. 15, 16 and 17 and the answers be marked as a At Baybreeze.
Exh. A-4.13
q Where is that Baybreeze located?
We do not agree with accused-appellant's contention. It is not correct to say that the direct
examination of the complainant consisted merely of her oral confirmation of the contents of the
a At Tambak.
sworn statement she executed before the police. Indeed, in the direct examination of the
complainant, the prosecutor read to her certain portions of her sworn statement and asked her if
she made them and to confirm the truth thereof. The trial court allowed the procedure without any q At the time when your father having a sexual inter-course with you, what did your
objection from the defense. Moreover, in the hearing of February 12, 1997, where the prosecution mother do at that time? (sic)
made its offer of documentary evidence, the counsel for the accused-appellant admitted the sworn
statement as part of the testimony of the complainant Eula Padilla:
a She was asleep.

xxx xxx xxx

q Is there any other person aside from you, your mother, and your father in that
room?
Atty. Antonano:
a No more.
Your Honor, please, by way of comments and objections to the offer of exhibits, the
defense admits the existence of Exhibit "A" — the Sinumpaang Salaysay of Eula Padilla
xxx xxx xxx
Evidence Cases Page | 83
q You testified that at the time when your father do the act, your mother is also a Yes sir.
sleeping inside the room, did your mother came to know the incident right there and
here? (sic)
q Now, did you see a doctor in connection with your case?

a No sir.
a Yes sir.16

q At what time did you report the incident to your mother?

Complainant also positively testified as to the circumstances surrounding the rape when she was
cross examined by counsel for the accused:
a Tanghali po.
q You have mentioned Ms. witness that your hands were tied, is that correct?
q How about to your Lola?
a Yes ma'm.
a Also noontime.
q Could you describe how were they tied?
q Do you know what did your mother or Lola do after you reported the matter to
them?
a With the hands at the back.

ATTY. ANTONANO:
q And when you said that your feet were tied, are you telling the court that your both
feet were tied together?
Witness is having a hard time answering the question.
a Yes ma'm.
COURT:
q And you said that your mouth was covered also, is that correct?
Another question.
a Yes ma'm.
q You testified awhile ago that your mother looked for the whereabouts of your father
at Baybreeze, do you know why your mother is looking for your father?
xxx xxx xxx

a Yes sir.
q While the tying of the hands was being done to you, did you not even try to cry Ms.
witness?
q Can you inform this court about that?
a I cried.
a After I was raped and after my mother came to know about it, she followed my
father at Baybreeze.
q How loud was your cry?

q Did you report the matter to the police authorities?

a Mahina lang po.

a Yes sir.
xxx xxx xxx

q And your father was apprehended by the police after the report was made?
q You said that while your father was tying your hands, your mother was sleeping,
where was she sleeping?
a Yes sir.
a On the bamboo bed.
q Right there at the police station, you pointed the person of your father as the one
who did the act to you?
xxx xxx xxx

Evidence Cases Page | 84

 q You said that you also reported the incident to your Lola, is that correct? T: Naipasok ba naman ng Tatay mo ang bird niya sa ari mo?

a Yes ma'm. S: Opo, naipasok niy (sic) po.

q Do I get you right that you only come to report the incident to your lola because T: Ano ba naman ang naramdaman mo ng maipasok ng tatay mo ang bird niya?
according to you your short stained with blood? (sic)
S: Masakit po.
q And that your Lola saw these stains of blood?
T: Anong ginawa mo nang maramdaman mong masakit?
a Yes ma'm.
S: Sinabi ko po sa tatay ko na masakit pero wala po akong magawa dahil nakagapos
xxx xxx xxx ako.

q Where was the short that your grandmother saw blood stain in it? T: Kailan ba naman ginawa sa iyo ito ng Tatay mo?

a It was with the clothes to be laudered.(sic) S: Noon pong bumabagyo ng gabi, petsa-03 ng Nobyembre 1995.20

xxx xxx xxx17 Moreover, the testimony of complainant was buttressed by the declaration of her mother21 to whom
the victim related the dastardly acts committed by accused-appellant on her. The medico-legal
officer found fresh hymenal lacerations on her organ and concluded that his " findings are
Accused-appellant brands as vague the portion of complainant's testimony how she was raped:
compatible with (her) recent loss of virginity."22Ineluctably, the bare denial of herein accused-
"ipinasok niya ang bird niya sa ari ko."18 It is appellant's contention that such testimony does not
appellant cannot overcome the clear and positive evidence adduced by the prosecution to prove
positively establish that the rape was committed.
the commission of the crime charged.

The Court does not agree. To say that the word "bird" is vague is plain sophistry. A child victim of
Thus, this Court affirms the finding of the trial court that the accused-appellant is guilty beyond
rape could not be expected to be sophisticated and knowledgeable in the ways of sex. 19 What she
reasonable doubt of raping complainant Eula Padilla.
meant by the word "bird" was no other than a male genital organ. Although the term is not as
definitive as the word "penis," a young and innocent child cannot be expected to be as graphic and
explicit in her language as an adult. The amendment introduced by Republic Act 7659, otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law, to
the crime of rape under Section 335 of the Revised Penal Code, enumerates the special qualifying
circumstances which warrant the mandatory imposition of the death penalty. Since these special
In fact, the victim also described her father's sexual organ as "bird" in her sworn statement before
qualifying circumstances raise the penalty for the crime of rape by one degree, that is,
the police on November 8, 1995, the truth of which she later affirmed on the witness stand. She
from reclusion perpetua to the maximum penalty of death, great caution must be taken by the trial
declared in her affidavit:
court in their evaluation. For these special qualifying circumstances to be appreciated, they must
both be specifically pleaded in the information or complaint and duly proven during trial23 and the
xxx xxx xxx degree of proof required is proof beyond reasonable doubt, or equal certainty as the crime itself. 24

T: Bakit ka nasa pulis? The first qualifying circumstance, under which accused-appellant is prosecuted, provides:

S: Magsusumbong po ako. The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
T: Sinong isusumbong mo?
xxx xxx xxx
S: Ang tatay ko po.
1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil
T: Bakit mo isusumbong ang tatay mo? degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim;

S: Kasi po itinali niya ang kamay pati paa ko at tinakpan niya ang bibig ko xxx xxx xxx
pagkatapos po ay hinubaran niya ako at pinilit niyang ipinasok ang bird niya sa ari ko.

Evidence Cases Page | 85

It must be pointed out that the circumstances of minority and relationship under paragraph (1) must
concur;25otherwise, if there is failure to allege either one in the information, or to prove either during
trial, the penalty of death cannot be imposed.
In the case at bar, the complaint properly pleaded the special qualifying circumstances of minority
and relationship.26
As a rule, even if the age of the victim is not contested, there must be independent proof of the age
of the victim,27as well as the filiation between the victim and the accused.28 Independent proof of
age may consist of the certificate of live birth or the baptismal certificate of the victim.29 Should such
documents be unavailable, it must be shown that they were either lost or destroyed, and other
documents or oral evidence sufficient for the purpose may be presented. 30
In the present case, we find sufficient evidence of complainants minority and her relationship with
the accused even if independent proof of minority was not presented. Complainant declared on the
witness stand that she was ten years old when she was ravished by her father.31 Moreover, her
testimony was corroborated by her mother who also testified that her daughter's age at the time she
was raped was ten.32
In the case of People vs. Nelson dela Cruz,33 the two victims were 14 and 15 years old when their
father allegedly raped them. The evidence as to their minority consisted of the testimonies of the
victims themselves and their mother. On the basis thereof, we ruled that the prosecution proved the
minority age of the victims beyond reasonable doubt. The Court found no reason to doubt the
testimony of the victims' mother who, as a mother, has personal knowledge of the ages of her
children.
In those cases where the Court required independent proof of age of the victim, 34 the complainants'
ages ranged from 13 to 16 years old. Under such circumstances, independent evidence that
accurately shows the victim's age is thus necessary because the age range is so near the
borderline age of 18. As the Court succinctly pointed out in the case of People vs. Javier:35
. . . Although the victim's age was not contested by the defense, proof of age of the victim
is particularly necessary in this case considering that the victim's age which was then 16
years old [was] just two years less than the majority age of 18. In this age of modernism,
there is hardly any difference between a 16-year old girl and an 18-year old one insofar
as physical features and attributes are concerned. . . . Thus, it is in this context that
independent proof of the actual age of the rape victim becomes vital and essential as to
remove any iota of doubt that the victim was indeed under 18 years of age as to fall
under the qualifying circumstances enumerated in Republic Act 7659. . . .
In the case at bar, however, the victim was only ten years old when the rape was committed. In
such an instance, the court may take judicial notice of the victim's age and independent proof of
minority may not be necessary. In the case of People vs. Tipay,36 the Court pronounced that the
presentation of the certificate of birth is not at all times necessary to prove minority and the minority
of a victim of tender age who may be below the age of ten is quite manifest and the court can take
judicial notice thereof. In People vs. Bali-balita,37 the victim was only ten years old when she was
raped by the live-in partner of her mother. The Court held that the victim's minority was sufficiently
proven. As the victim, who was ten years and four months old at the time of the rape, testified in
court only about four months after the rape, it would not have been difficult for the trial court to take
judicial notice that she was under 18 years of age.
The Courts rulings in the two aforecited cases find application in the present case. Complainant
Eula was only ten years old at the time of the rape. And at the time she testified in court, only five
Evidence Cases
months had elapsed from the day of the commission of the crime. Thus, the trial court could have
easily taken judicial notice of her minority.
Relationship between the victim and the accused has likewise been established. Complainant
categorically declared that the accused-appellant is her father. This was corroborated by her
mother who testified that the accused is her husband. Accused-appellant himself, in his direct
testimony admitted that complainant Eula Padilla is one of his three children.38
Thus, having proven both minority and relationship, the penalty of death was correctly meted out by
the trial court.
Four members of the Court maintain their position that Republic Act No. 7659, insofar as it
prescribes the death penalty, is unconstitutional. Nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the
Court, by a majority vote, that the law is constitutional and that the death penalty should be
accordingly imposed.
In accordance with recent jurisprudence, we increase the amount of civil indemnity from
P50,000.00 to P75,000.00 as the crime of rape is qualified by circumstances warranting the
imposition of the death penalty.39 We additionally impose the award of moral damages in the
amount of P50,000.00 to the victim without need for proof of the victim's mental and physical
suffering as such injury has been consistently recognized as being inherently concomitant with and
necessarily resulting from the odious crime of rape.40
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 166 finding the
accused IRENEO PADILLA guilty of Rape under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended
by Section 11 of RA 7659 and imposing upon him the penalty of death is AFFIRMED, with the
modification that the amount of P50,000.00 civil indemnity is increased to P75,000.00 and moral
damages in the amount of P50,000.00 is additionally imposed.
In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, amending Section 83 of the Revised
Penal Code, upon finality of this Decision, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the
Office of the President for possible exercise of pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C .J ., Bellosillo, Melo, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo,
Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Santiago, De Leon, Jr. and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ ., concur.
Puno, J ., on official leave.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 123096 December 18, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARIO DUMANON y DUMANACAL and RICARDO LABRADOR y SUACILLO, alias "RIC-
RIC," accused-appellants.
DECISION
Page | 86
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
Accused-appellants Mario Dumanon y Dumanacal (hereafter MARIO) and Ricardo Labrador y
Suacillo (hereafter RICARDO) appeal from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Surigao City,
Branch 30, in Criminal Case No. 4247, finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rape and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to pay the complainant
Anacurita Anib (hereafter ANACURITA) the amount of ₱20,000 as moral damages and the costs of
the suit.
On 3 December 1993, Dominga Anib filed a complaint for rape2 against MARIO and RICARDO on
behalf of her mentally retarded daughter ANACURITA before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC) of Tagana-an-Sison, Surigao del Norte. The complaint, docketed as Criminal Case No.
993, alleged that ANACURITA is a "retardate" and the crime was committed at midnight of 2
December 1993. Submitted in support of the complaint was a medical certificate3 issued by the
Surigao Provincial Hospital and the affidavits4 of Dominga Anib, Eduardo Diaz and Anita Lisondra.
After conducting a preliminary examination, the MCTC found a prima facie case for rape, confirmed
the arrest and detention of MARIO and RICARDO without bail, and required them to submit their
counter-affidavits. Instead of filing their counter-affidavits, MARIO and RICARDO filed a joint motion
to dismiss the case on the grounds that the crime of rape cannot be prosecuted de oficio and the
complaint was not signed by the offended party, there being no proof that the latter was
incapacitated.
In its resolution5 of 10 January 1994, the MCTC ruled that the complaint was properly filed by the
mother of ANACURITA since the latter is a retarded woman and stated that "by merely looking
upon the victim, the Court finds that indeed Anacurita Anib is a retarded woman." It also found
probable cause that MARIO and RICARDO committed the crime charged and forwarded the case
to the Provincial Prosecutor for the filing of the information.
On 24 January 1994, the Provincial Prosecutor’s Office of Surigao del Norte filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Surigao del Norte a complaint6 for rape, bearing the thumb mark of ANACURITA and
approved by the Provincial Prosecutor. The complaint, docketed as Criminal Case No. 4247 and
assigned to Branch 30 thereof, alleges as follows:
That on or about the 2nd day of December 1993, at 12:00 o’clock [sic] midnight, more or less, at
Barangay Aurora, Tagana-an, Surigao del Norte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, said accused with full freedom and intelligence did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously by means of violence and intimidation, and taking advantage of nighttime
drag MISS ANACURITA ANIB y DUMANACAL inside the vacant house of Jaime Batac and have
carnal knowledge of herein complainant against her will.
All contrary to law and with the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and in an uninhabited place.
MARIO and RICARDO sought for a reinvestigation of the case. They questioned the unsigned
complaint for rape and alleged that ANACURITA’s filing of the complaint belied her mental
incapacity. Moreover, she never gave a categorical statement that she was raped. The defense
further asserted as hearsay the statement of Dominga Anib and Anita Lisondra in their affidavits
that ANACURITA confessed to them that she was raped. They also assailed the prosecution for its
failure to present any eyewitness. Finally, they maintained that they were deprived of their right to
submit their counter-affidavits.
Evidence Cases
The prosecution opposed the motion for reinvestigation. It claimed that MARIO and RICARDO were
actually required but failed to submit their counter-affidavits. Moreover, since it was already
resolved that ANACURITA is a retardate, thus mentally incapacitated, the law recognizes the right
of her mother to file the complaint on her behalf. However, as stated in the decision of the trial
court, MARIO and RICARDO abandoned the motion and instead proceeded with the arraignment
wherein they separately entered a plea of not guilty.7
Trial on the merits started only on 2 June 1994 and was completed on 22 November 1994. In its
decision the trial court attributed the delay "to postponements at the instance of both the
prosecution and the defense, especially that the parties, being related, manifested for a possible
settlement of the case." The prosecution presented as witnesses ANACURITA, Dominga Anib,
Eduardo Dizon and Dr. Gregoria Beberino-Comelon.
ANACURITA testified in court seven months after she was raped. She was then thirty-eight years
old. According to her she knew MARIO and RICARDO as they were her friends and townmates. In
the early evening of 2 December 1993, she was in the municipal gymnasium of Tagana-an, Surigao
del Norte, watching a parade of gays. At about 11:00 p.m. she left and headed for her home in
barangay Aurora, Tagana-an. As she was walking, she passed by RICARDO who was then sitting
on a bench, apparently drunk. Suddenly, RICARDO blocked her way. She tried to break free but he
continued to obstruct her way. Then he pulled her and brought her to the deserted house of Jaime
Batac, which was just about nine meters away from her home. Inside the house, RICARDO
stripped off his clothes and immediately removed her underwear. He then placed his penis inside
her vagina. After satisfying his lust, RICARDO ran away. Then she put on her underwear. After a
few minutes, MARIO, who was likewise drunk, entered Jaime’s house, pulled her down and
undressed her. Mario inserted his penis inside her vagina and just like RICARDO ran away after the
sexual intercourse. ANACURITA went home and told her mother what had happened.8
Dominga Anib testified that MARIO and RICARDO are her neighbors and that the former is even
her relative. In the evening of 2 December 1993, ANACURITA was out watching a show at the
municipal gymnasium. At about midnight she was awakened by her husband who told her that
ANACURITA had not yet arrived. When she turned on the light, she heard the protesting voice of
her daughter coming from the house of Jaime Batac. She went to the house and dragged
ANACURITA home. ANACURITA was holding her underwear and her hair and dress were soiled.
She asked ANACURITA if any man did anything to her. ANACURITA told her that she had just
been raped by RICARDO and MARIO inside Jaime’s house. Accompanied by Eduardo Diaz,
Dominga immediately reported the incident to the barangay captain and then later, to the police. On
4 December 1993, Dominga brought ANACURITA to the Provincial Hospital of Surigao del Norte
for examination. The turn of events caused Dominga to suffer shame and embarrassment.9
According to Eduardo Diaz, he knew MARIO and RICARDO. MARIO is a close friend and relative.
He, MARIO and RICARDO and the Anibs reside along the same street. On 2 December 1993,
Eduardo was in the municipal gymnasium to watch a show. He left for home at 10:00 p.m. Along
the way he saw MARIO and RICARDO. When he arrived home, he learned that there was no more
kerosene for the lamps. He went out to buy kerosene and a cigarette at the store next door. He saw
MARIO at the store who asked a cigarette from him. He obliged and then went back home. He
wanted to eat; but when he found out that there was no more food, he decided to request some
viand from MARIO. On the road he saw MARIO going inside the house of Jaime Batac. So, he
returned home. Later, he heard the voice of Dominga Anib from her house berating her weeping
daughter ANACURITA. He overheard that ANACURITA came from the house of Jaime Batac,
which was near the house of the Anibs. Dominga ordered ANACURITA to stay upstairs while she
went out of their house. It was about midnight.
Page | 87
Dominga saw Eduardo and sought his help. Eduardo accompanied Dominga to the barangay
captain, Mr. Jaime Pelarco.10 The latter looked for RICARDO and MARIO, who were eventually
arrested and detained.
Dr. Gregoria Beberino-Comelon physically examined ANACURITA on 4 December 1993 and
issued the corresponding medical certificate.11 She noted a fresh hymenal laceration at 6 o’clock
and a hematoma on the thigh. The laceration could have been caused by an erect male penis while
the hematoma was probably inflicted by a fist blow. She also found a vaginal discharge of yellowish
and whitish substance. She had the specimen brought to the laboratory for examination for the
presence of sperms. However, she was not informed of the results of the examination. 12
Only MARIO testified for the defense while RICARDO opted not to take the witness stand.
MARIO claimed that he and ANACURITA, his distant cousin, were lovers. On the evening of 2
December 1993 he was also at the municipal gymnasium to watch a coronation event. At about
10:15 p.m. he decided to go home and along the way, he saw ANACURITA and they talked by the
fence of Jaime Batac’s house. He confessed his love for her and he suggested if it was possible for
them to have sexual intercourse. ANACURITA nodded her head in consent and replied that she
had yearned to bear a child at her age. They talked for ten minutes. ANACURITA invited him inside
the abandoned house of Jaime so that they would not be seen by her mother. Inside Jaime’s
house, he asked her again if he could have sexual intercourse with her. She consented.
ANACURITA had no reaction at all during their sexual intimacy. After they were done, he escorted
her to her house and then he walked toward his house. He immediately heard Dominga Anib scold
ANACURITA. Dominga demanded to know where she came from and why she arrived late. In the
early morning of the following day the police arrested and detained him. 13
After the defense rested its case the trial court required both parties to submit their respective
memoranda. The parties waived the submission thereof.
The trial court rendered its decision of 21 June 1995. It specifically noted therein the trial judge’s
personal impression which he entered in his personal notes that ANACURITA is "a mongoloid
(physically) and mentally deficient who has difficulty in understanding the questions." While
conceding that ANACURITA’s narration of how she was sexually abused by the accused-appellants
was not "detailed," it nevertheless concluded that it was "candidly told by one who is mentally
deficient." She was "able to show and convince the Court that she, in fact, was taken advantage of
by the two drunken neighbors." It gave full credence to her testimony, which was supported by the
medical findings. It held that MARIO and RICARDO, especially the former, who is her cousin, knew
of ANACURITA’s mental condition. It ruled that "(e)vidently, … Anacurita Anib, in her retarded
understanding, was overcome with shock, fear and, otherwise, intimidated by her two drunken
neighbors, who accosted her."
The trial court characterized MARIO’s version as "simply out of this world," and "even assuming
that it was what has happened, it only manifests that the victim is, in fact, abnormal, not capacitated
to give a valid consent."
The trial court also considered RICARDO’s silence as an admission of the charge against him. The
trial court then decreed:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused, MARIO DUMANON Y DUMANACAL and RICARDO
LABRADOR Y SUACILLO, alias "Ric-Ric", GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape,
defined and penalized in Article 355, of the Revised Penal Code, and metes out the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua; to indemnify complainant-victim Anacurita Anib the sum of Twenty Thousand
Evidence Cases
(P20,000.00) Pesos moral damages, jointly and severally, without subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency; to suffer the accessory penalties, provided for by law; and, to pay the costs.
On 13 July 1995, MARIO and RICARDO seasonably appealed from the decision, which the Court
accepted on 23 September 1995. However, there was an undue delay in the filing of the Appellants’
Brief, and counsel for accused-appellants had to be fined before he finally filed the Appellant’s Brief
on 19 July 1999.
In their Appellants’ Brief, MARIO and RICARDO allege that:
1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS OF THE CRIME
OF RAPE COMMITTED ON A MENTAL RETARDATE WHEN THE INFORMATION ACCUSES
THEM OF RAPE COMMITTED ON A WOMAN WITH THE USE OF FORCE AND INTIMIDATION.
2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE COMPLAINANT IS A MENTAL
RETARDATE IN THE ABSENCE OF CLEAR MEDICAL OR EXPERT EVIDENCE SHOWING
SUCH ABNORMAL PHYSICAL AND MENTAL CONDITION.
3. NO FORCE OR INTIMIDATION ATTENDED THE SEX ACT BETWEEN THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS AND THE COMPLAINANT.
MARIO and RICARDO underscore the fact that the complaint filed with the court below alleges that
the rape was committed with the use of force and intimidation and hence they cannot be held guilty
of rape committed on a mental retardate since this circumstance was never alleged in the
Complaint. Neither can they be liable for rape committed with the use of force and intimidation since
the same was not sufficiently proven by the evidence for the prosecution.
MARIO and RICARDO emphasize that their conviction was based on the trial court’s conclusion
that ANACURITA is a mental retardate. Such a conclusion has no basis since no medical or expert
opinion categorically affirming such condition was offered by the prosecution. Accordingly, they
pray for their acquittal for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
In the Appellee’s Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) refutes the errors raised by MARIO
and RICARDO. It counters that the trial court did not convict MARIO and RICARDO of rape of a
mental retardate deprived of reason, but of simple rape through force and intimidation, although not
necessarily employed with immense measure but one that was sufficient for the victim not to resist.
The force contemplated by law in the commission of rape is relative, depending on the age, size
and strength of the parties. The only requirement is that force or intimidation be sufficient to
consummate the purpose which the accused had in mind. Intimidation must be viewed in light of the
victim’s perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime and not by any hard
and fast rule.
The OSG asserts that in this case the trial court found that ANACURITA was mentally deficient, as
revealed by its personal notes quoted in its decision, its forbearance in allowing the prosecution to
proceed with leading questions during her direct examination due to her difficulty in comprehending
and responsively answering the questions, and in acknowledging the observation of the MCTC
judge in his Resolution that ANACURITA was different from or less than those of a fully functioning
adult. Hence, the degree of force needed to overwhelm her is less. The force which may not be
sufficient for the rape of a normal person, may be more than enough when employed in the rape of
a mentally deficient person, like ANACURITA.
Page | 88
The OSG further asseverates that rape committed against a feeble-minded victim does not require
the use of physical force since the commission of the sexual act constitutes the force itself. There
was thus no need to establish that ANACURITA is a mental retardate since her rape was attendant
with force and intimidation. It also points out that the attempt of MARIO and RICARDO to settle the
case was an implied admission of their guilt.
Finally, the OSG seeks an award of civil indemnity to ANACURITA in the amount of ₱50,000 and
an increase of the award of moral damages from ₱20,000 to ₱50,000.
Having established that ANACURITA is a retardate even in the absence of an expert opinion
thereon, we shall now determine if MARIO and RICARDO were properly charged with rape by
means of force and intimidation. A thorough review of the assailed decision supports the findings
and conclusion of the trial court that ANACURITA was indeed raped by means of force and
intimidation. ANACURITA in her testimony declared that while she was on her way home,
RICARDO, then drunk, blocked her way, pulled her toward the uninhabited house of Jaime Batac
and once inside the house he undressed her and took off her panty and inserted his penis into her
vagina.24 After he was through, RICARDO ran away. Then later MARIO arrived. MARIO pulled
ANACURITA and also inserted his penis into her vagina.25

We sustain the conviction of MARIO and RICARDO.

The blocking, the holding of the hand, the pulling towards an uninhabited house, the removal of the
panty and the fact that both MARIO and RICARDO were in a state of drunkenness, were enough
On the issue of whether or not ANACURITA is a retardate, as correctly pointed out by the defense, force and intimidation considering the mental state of ANACURITA.
no expert testimony was offered to prove that, indeed ANACURITA is a retardate. But, this matter
gains importance if, in fact, the trial court’s conviction for rape was based on a finding that her
The use of force or intimidation was further shown in the cross-examination of ANACURITA by
retardation was of such an extent that she was deprived of reason or that she had mental age of a
defense counsel, Atty. Medina, thus:
child of less than 12 years old. As will be shown later, such is not the situation obtaining in the case
at bar, for we agree with the trial court’s finding that MARIO and RICARDO are guilty of rape by the
use of force and intimidation. xxx

It has been held that mental retardation can be proved by evidence other than medical Q Let’s go to that testimony of yours that Ricardo Labrador grab [sic] you to the house of Jaime
evidence.14 Thus, it is our considered opinion that for purposes of determining whether Batac, how did Ricardo Labrador grab you?
ANACURITA is mentally normal or does not have the mental capacity of a normal person, the
personal observation of the trial judge would suffice as a measure of determining the impact on her
A He pulled me.
of the force and intimidation foisted by MARIO and RICARDO vis-a-vis the legal requirement to
prove the commission of the crime of rape.
xxx
The original complaint,15 filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tagana-an-Sison, Surigao del
Norte by Dominga Anib on behalf of ANACURITA, alleged that ANACURITA is a retardate. The Q So you went [sic] to tell the Court that Ric-Ric was just leading you towards the house of Jaime
translation of the affidavit16 of Dominga Anib, which was submitted in support of the original and not dragging you with the used [sic] of one hand?
complaint, alleged that ANACURITA is "not mentally normal." During the preliminary examination
Dominga testified that ANACURITA is mentally retarded.17 The Resolution18 of the Municipal Circuit
A He pulled me, sir.
Trial Court of Tagana-an-Sison, Surigao del Norte categorically declared that "by merely looking
upon the victim," ANACURITA is indeed a "retarded woman."
Q You did not shout when Ric-Ric Labrador was pulling you towards the house of Jaime?
The transcript of stenographic notes is also replete with particulars on ANACURITA’s mental
condition. When she first testified, the trial court ordered to "make it on record the physical A No, sir.
appearance of the witness [ANACURITA] having [a] hard time in understanding the question of the
interpreter," and that she is "mentally deficient." As she continued with her testimony, it further
observed that she had difficulty answering the questions and, under the circumstances, it allowed Q You did not also pulled [sic] back your hand to free it from the hand of Ricardo Labrador?
leading questions during her direct examination.19
A No, also sir.
The appealed decision likewise bears the trial court’s personal impression that ANACURITA
"appears to be mongoloid (physically) and mentally deficient who has difficulty in understanding the Q There was not even an attempt on your part to free your hand?
questions."20 We often call a person who is suffering from mongolism as a mongoloid. Mongolism is
a condition characterized by a small, anteroposteriorly flattened skull, short, flat-bridged nose,
epicanthus, short-phalanges, and widened space between the first and second digits of hands and A I struggle [sic], sir.
feet, with moderate to severe mental retardation and associated with a chromosomal
abnormality.21 It is known as mongolism because its physiognomic features are suggestive of those Q How did you attempt to free your hand?
normally exhibited by the Mongolian race.22 It is also known as Down’s Syndrome.23 Hence, the
courts can take judicial notice of the appearance and features of those suffering from mongolism
and based thereon, conclude that a victim, like ANACURITA, is a mongoloid. A (Witness indicating her answer by pulling her hand towards the right side of her body reaching as
far as his palm as her palm towards her right side).

Evidence Cases Page | 89

Q But you were not able to free your hand? A No, sir.

A I was able to free my hand. Q You did not even shout for help?

Q So when you succeeded in freeing your hand from the grabs [sic] of Ricardo Labrador you did A No, sir.26
not make an attempt to run away?
Furthermore, the hematoma found on the victim’s left thigh as shown by the medical certificate
A I was not able to run, it did not occur to my mind. issued by the examining physician27 is physical evidence of the use of force in the consummation of
the beastly act.
Q Even if you were able to free your hand from the grab of Ric-Ric still you went with Ric-Ric
towards the house of Jaime? It is a settled rule that force in rape is relative, depending on the age, size and strength of the
parties. In the same manner, intimidation must be viewed in the light of the victim’s perception and
judgment at the time of the commission of the crime and not by any hard and fast rule. When the
A I try [sic] to run away but he blocked my way.
victim is a retardate the force required to overcome her is of a lesser degree than that used against
a normal adult.28 Thus, the degree of force which may not suffice when the victim is a normal
xxx person, may be more than enough when employed against an imbecile.29

Q And when Mario Dumanon arrived, did he say anything to you? With the foregoing disquisition, MARIO and RICARDO were correctly convicted of rape under the
first circumstance of Article 335, i.e. by the use of force or intimidation. Once the elements of force
and intimidation were properly alleged in the Information and duly proven during the trial, as in this
A None. case, the conviction becomes a matter of course. As correctly assessed by the OSG, the conviction
for rape decreed by the trial court was not based on the fact that ANACURITA is a mental retardate,
Q Without talking to you Mario Dumanon removed his pants? but on the use of force and intimidation. The mental retardation of ANACURITA was only a
circumstance which the trial court considered in evaluating the degree and extent of the force and
intimidation.1âwphi1
A Yes, sir.

We also take note of the trial court’s pronouncement30 that accused-appellants manifested a
xxx possible settlement of the case. The offer of compromise is an implied admission of guilt pursuant
to the second paragraph of Section 27, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.31
Q As a matter of fact when he removed your pantie [sic] you did not resist by telling him "not to do
that to me"? Finally, as regards the civil aspects in this case, in accordance with current jurisprudence 32 we grant
the award of ₱50,000 as civil indemnity for the rape of ANACURITA, and the increase of moral
A He was also drunk. damages from ₱20,000 to ₱50,000 even without proof thereof.33

Q And when he pulled you to lie down with him because he was already lying down, you did not
pushed [sic] him away?
A He was drunk.
Q You could have run away by pushing his hands but you did not, is it not a fact of the situation?
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Surigao City, Branch 30, finding accused-
appellants MARIO DUMANON y DUMANCAL and RICARDO LABRADOR y SUACILLO, alias
"RIC-RIC," guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape, defined and penalized under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua is hereby
AFFIRMED, with the modification that they are further ordered to pay civil indemnity in the amount
of ₱50,000 to the complainant ANACURITA ANIB, and the amount of moral damages awarded to
the latter is increased from ₱20,000 to ₱50,000.

A Yes, sir. Costs against accused-appellants.

Q Although you knew that you could have run away yet you did not run away? SO ORDERED.

A The door is too small. FIRST DIVISION

Q Whether the door is small or not yet there is [sic] no attempt on your part to run away? G.R. No. L-54094 August 30, l982

Evidence Cases Page | 90

ALABANG DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and RAMON D. BAGATSING, petitioners,
vs.
HON. MANUEL E. VALENZUELA, (Presiding Judge, CFI, Rizal, Pasay City, Branch XXIX) and
NICOLAS A. PASCUAL CRISANTO F. PASCUAL, ANSELMO F. PASCUAL, MAMERTO F.
PASCUAL, PASCUALA A. MEJIA, DAMIANA A. MEJIA, CIRILO S. PASCUAL, CATALINA S.
PASCUAL and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF RIZAL, MAKATI BRANCH, respondents.
R,D. Bagatsing & Associates for petitioners.
Ramon S. Nieves for respondent.
Dennis E. Angeles and Oscar Herrera, Jr. for intervenor Greenfield Dev. Corp.
& Respondents on the other hand alleged that the petitioners filed in the court below a belated
TEEHANKEE, J.:1äwphï1.ñët
On the authority of relevant and controlling pronouncements in the related case of "Director of
Lands, petitioner, vs. Court of Appeals and Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal, respondents;
Greenfield Development Corporation, intervenor; Alabang Development Corporation and Ramon D.
Bagatsing, intervenors," * the Court declares as null and void the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Pasay City, Branch XXIX in Reconstitution Case No. 504-P, Land Registration Case
No. 9368 granting the reconstitution of the certificate of title, original and owner's duplicate copy, in
the name of Manuela Aquial supposedly covering Lots 2 and 4 of Survey Plan II-4374. As in the
authoritative case above mentioned, the said decision suffers from jurisdictional infirmity, fatal to the
petition for reconstitution since said petition and the notice thereof lacked essential data
mandatorily required by the law, 1 and, just as importantly, the decision was invalidly issued without
actual and personal notice having been served upon possessors, actual occupants and adjoining
owners of the property involved who are indispensable parties in interest and without whom a valid
judgment cannot be rendered.
The petition for certiorari and prohibition filed against the order of reconstitution alleges that the
petitioners are registered owners as evidenced by certain Transfer Certificates of Title 2 all issued
by the Register of Deeds of Rizal covering parcels of land located at Barrio Cupang, Muntinlupa,
Metro Manila; that TCT Nos. 175223 to 175235 were the subject of petition for Consolidation-
Subdivision Plan PCS 5878, LRC Record No. 6137 after approval by the Bureau of Lands and the
Land Registration Commission on petition of Alabang Development Corporation with the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Branch XIII; that after hearing the Court issued an order dated April 19,
1969, by virtue of which the Register of Deeds of Rizal issued among others sixty-seven (67)
Transfer Certificates of Titles; 3 that said parcels of land surrounded by a high perimeter wall on
their boundaries were sold to innocent purchasers in good faith for valuable consideration as part of
Alabang Hills Village Subdivision, owned by petitioner Alabang Development Corporation, many of
whom were already issued in turn the corresponding Transfer Certificates of Title in their favor; and
that these innocent purchasers for value have been in open, actual, adverse, continuous, notorious
and uninterrupted possession of their respective lands since 1969.
Petitioners further alleged that in the reconstitution case below, filed only in 1977, herein
respondents as petitioners therein sought to reconstitute a lost certificate of title, original and
owner's duplicate copy (allegedly lost or destroyed over 30 years earlier in the last World War II)
and issued allegedly pursuant to Decree No. 15170 dated March 4, 1914 in the name of their
predecessor-in-interest, deceased Manuela Aquial, covering two lots, 2 and 4, indicated in Plan II-
4374, situated in Barrio San Dionisio, Parañaque, Rizal, now Barrio Cupang, Muntinlupa, Rizal; that
on the basis of the technical descriptions contained in petitioners' titles and as appear in the alleged
Evidence Cases
title sought to be reconstituted, the latter overlap the parcels of land owned by petitioners and duly
registered in their names; that petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
actual, continuous, adverse, notorious possession since time immemorial of these parcels of land
and that they have been paying religiously the real estate taxes thereon up to the present time; that
petitioners being actual possessors and registered owners were not served with notice of the
hearing of the petition for reconstitution in violation of Republic Act 26 such that the court a
quo acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in granting the reconstitution and that there is no
appeal nor plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
As prayed for, the Court issued on June 27, 1980 a temporary restraining order upon the filing of
the petition and restrained the respondents from enforcing the challenged decision, and specifically
the Register of Deeds of Rizal from issuing a reconstituted title based on Decree No. 15170 in the
name of the respondents-members of the Aquial-Pascual family.
intervention and motion for new trial which were denied by respondent judge, and since neither
appealed therefrom nor did they question such denials by way of certiorari, the petition is barred by
laches; that the petition is not accompanied by copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and
pertinent thereto as required by Rule 65, section I and 2, Rules of Court; that certiorari being a
remedy against jurisdictional infirmity, the absence of any allegation of ultimate facts tending to
show such infirmity is fatal to the petition; that there is no allegation that private respondents knew
of such alleged facts and the addresses of petitioners' vendees and/or that they have better rights
than the alleged boundary owners who were notified, that petitioner Alabang Development
Corporation is an intangible juridical person incapable of physical possession of the property and
petitioner Bagatsing who is publicly known to be residing in Manila is not in physical possession or
occupation of any property adjacent to the property in question; that the question of boundary
owners not having been notified is a factual question not determinable a priori but in a proper action
for ownership of any overlapping; that if there is any "sensible question" (sic) raised in the petition,
the same is ownership over the alleged overlappings which cannot be sweepingly adjudicated in a
certiorari proceeding or a reconstitution case "especially if a good issue is on the validity of
petitioners' titles;" "that non-joinder of some alleged owners would render ineffective any judgment
petitioners may get in these proceedings;" that the existence of respondents' title is indubitably
established with the existence of the corresponding decree in the Land Registration Commission
which was examined and found authentic and genuine by NBI and PC handwriting experts,
approved plans reproduced from the microfilm (the plans duly approved by the Director of Lands on
July 25, 1911), survey plan, and relocation and verification plans in the Bureau of Lands - all
government document; and that private respondents have been in continuous possession of the
land and have been up to date in the payment of land taxes thereof.
After both parties had submitted their respective memoranda, Greenfield Development Corporation
moved to intervene in the proceedings stating, in brief, that upon comparison of the technical
descriptions of the two parcels of land with an aggregate area of 43 hectares designated as Lots 2
and 4 of Plan 11-4374, as set forth in the alleged copy of Decree No. 15170, Land Registration
Case 9368, relied upon by respondents in their petition for reconstitution, with those technical
descriptions set forth in the certificates of title in the name of said intervenor, 4 it appears that the
lots supposedly covered by the title sought to be reconstituted overlap and include a substantial
portion of intervenor's land covered by its titles. As in the Bernal case, supra, 5 the Court is called
upon to allow such intervention of an indispensable party "in view of the higher and greater interest
of the public and in order to administer justice consistent with a just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of the respective claims of the parties and their numerous successors-in-interest," in
view of the overlapping titles that respondent judge would authorize in his questioned decision in
derogation of the underlying indefeasibility and stability of the Torrens System of registration. As the
Court therein stressed, "the sprawling area of the property in question where various subdivisions,
residential houses and homes and infrastructures have mushroomed and the great number of
people living or having proprietary rights and interests in such a vast property would certainly bring
Page | 91
about the swamping of the courts and the clogging of their dockets with cases involving not only the
original parties and the movants but also their successors-in-interest. This litigation will have no
end, which this Court will not allow nor tolerate." 6
Unlike in the Bernal case, however, the Director of Lands need not be directed to conduct anew a
relocation-verification survey of the properties involved in this case, as the petition before us is
simply a special civil action attacking the jurisdiction of the lower court, and not a petition for review
where the court would need to delve deep into the issues on the merits. But even if the Court found
some need to do so, the land involved insofar as herein petitioners and intervenor are concerned
refers to one and same area involved in the Bernal case, and the report of the Bureau of Lands in
that sister case would suffice to enlighten us on the question of surrounding improvements,
boundaries and overlappings.
The basic issue in the case at bar is the jurisdiction of the lower court to act upon the petition for
reconstitution.
Section 12 and 13 of Republic Act 26 entitled "An Act Providing a Special Procedure for the
Reconstitution of Torrens Certificates of Titles Lost or Destroyed," read- 1äwphï1.ñët
Sec. 12. Petitions for reconstitution from sources enumerated in section 2(c),
2(d), 2(e), 2(f), 3(c), 3(e), and/or 3(f) of this Act, shall be filed with the proper
Court of First Instance, by the registered owner, his assigns, or any person
having an interest in the property. The petition shall state or contain, among
other things, the following: (a) that the owner's duplicate of the certificate of title
had been lost or destroyed; (b) that no co-owner's, mortgagee's or lessee's
duplicate had been issued, or, if any had been issued, the same had been lost
or destroyed; (c) the location, area and boundaries of the property; (d) the
nature and description of the buildings or improvements, if any, which do not
belong to the owner of the land, and the names and addresses of the owners
of such buildings or improvements; (e) the names and addresses of the
occupants or persons in possession of the property, of the owners of the
adjoining properties and of all persons who may have any interest in the
property; (f) a detailed description of the encumbrances, if any, affecting the
property; and (g) a statement that no deeds or other instruments affecting the
property have been presented for registration, or, if there be any, the
registration thereof has not been accomplished, as yet. All the documents, or
authenticated copies thereof, to be introduced in evidence in support of the
petition for reconstitution shall be attached thereto and filed with the same;
Provided, That in case the reconstitution is to be made exclusively from
sources enumerated in section 2 (f) or 3(f) of this Act, the petition shall be
further accompanied with a plan and technical description of the property duly
approved by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, or with a
certified copy of the description taken from a prior certificate of title covering
the same property.
Sec. 13. The court shall cause a notice of the petition, filed under the preceding
section, to be published, at the expense of the petitioner, twice in successive
issues of the Official Gazette, and to be posted on the main entrance of the
municipality or city in which the land is situated, at the provincial building and of
the municipal building at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing. The court
shall likewise cause a copy of the notice to be sent, by registered mail or
otherwise, at the expense of the petitioner, to every person named therein
whose address is known, at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing. Said
notice shall state, among other things, the number of the lost or destroyed
Evidence Cases
certificate of title, if known, the name of the registered owner, the names of the
occupants or persons in possession of the property, the owners of the
adjoining properties and all other interested parties, the location, area and
boundaries of the property, and the date on which all persons having any
interest therein must appear and file their claim or objections to the
petition.ït¢@lFº The petitioner shall, at the hearing, submit proof of the
publication, posting and service of the notice as directed by the court.
Upon examination of the subject petition for reconstitution, the Court notes that some essential data
required in section 12 and section 13 of Republic Act 26 have been omitted: the nature and
description of the buildings or improvements, which do not belong to the owner of the land, and the
names and addresses of the owners of such buildings or improvements, and the names and
addresses of the occupants or persons in possession of the property, of the owners of the adjoining
properties and of all persons who may have any interest in the property. Neither do these data
appear in the Notice of Hearing. 7 such that no adjoining owner, occupant or possessor was ever
served a copy thereof by registered mail or otherwise. On these glaringly conspicuous omissions,
the Court repeats its pronouncement in the Bernal case, to wit. 1äwphï1.ñët
And since the above data do not appear in the Amended Petition, the same
data do not also appear in the Notice of Hearing of the petition published in the
Official Gazette. Patently, the provisions of Section 12 which enumerates
mandatorily the contents of the Petition for Reconstitution and Section 13
which similarly require the contents of the Notice have not been complied
with. In view of these multiple omissions which constitute non-compliance with
the above cited sections of the Act, We rule that said defects have not invested
the Court with the authority or jurisdiction to proceed with the case because the
manner or mode of obtaining jurisdiction as prescribed by the statute which is
mandatory has not been strictly followed, thereby rendering all proceedings
utterly null and void. We hold that the mere Notice that 'all interested parties
are hereby cited to appear and show cause if any they have why said petition
should not be granted' is not sufficient for the law must be interpreted strictly; it
must be applied rigorously, with exactness and precision. We agree with the
ruling of the trial court granting the motion to amend the original petition
provided all the requisites for publication and posting of notices be complied
with, it appearing that the amendment is quite substantial in nature. As We
pointed above, respondent Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal failed to
comply with all the requirements for publication and posting of notices, which
failure is fatal to the jurisdiction of the Court. (Emphasis supplied)
The rule on notification to the possessor or one having interest in the property
whose title is sought to be reconstituted is laid down explicitly in Manila
Railroad Company vs. Hon. Jose M. Moya, et al., L-17913, June 22, 1965, 14
SCRA 358, thus: 1äwphï1.ñët
'Where a petition for reconstitution would have the
certificates of title reconstituted from the plans and
technical descriptions of the lots involved, which sources
may fall properly under section 3(e) or 3(f ) of Republic Act
No. 26, the possessor thereof or the one who is known to
have an interest in the property should be sent a copy of
the notice of the petition at the expense of the petitioner,
pursuant to section 13 of the said Act.
Page | 92
 'If no notice of the date of hearing of a reconstitution case
is served on a possessor or one having interest in the
property involved, he is deprived of his day in court
and the order of reconstitution is null and void, even if
otherwise the said order should have been final and
executory.
'Under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 26, notice by
publication is not sufficient but such notice must be
actually sent or delivered to parties affected by the petition
for reconstitution.'
The rule We have stated and quoted from Manila Railroad Company vs. Hon.
Jose M. Moya, et al. supra, is rightly so because one who seeks the
reconstitution of his title to the property is dutybound to know who are the
occupants, possessors thereof, or persons having an interest in the property
involved, specially where the property is so vast and situated in a suitable
residential and commercial location, where buildings and improvements have
been or are being constructed openly and publicly. As stated earlier,
indispensable parties have appeared, claiming ownership, possession, and
valuable interests in the property, which are not only numerous but also
patently conspicuous that private respondent cannot feign ignorance, much
less unawareness, nor blindness as to their existence of her or within her
claimed property. (Emphasis supplied)
After passing upon the jurisdiction issue, the Court cannot just let go unmentioned its observation
that the lots 8involved in this reconstitution case are part of the survey plan (Plan II-4373) allegedly
covering also Lots 1 and 3 which are involved in the Bernal case. In other words, these lots are
covered by the same survey plan and they are contiguous. As a matter of fact, "Annex 5-A" 9 of
respondents' memorandum which they claim to be a survey plan for their mother Manuela Aquial is
actually entitled "Plan of Property of Olimpia D. Sta. Maria." Olimpia Sta. Maria is supposed to be
the predecessor-in-interest of petitioner Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal, the petitioner in
the Bernal reconstitution case involving Lots 1 and 3. Also, in each of the technical descriptions of
Lots 1 and 3 of Plan II-4374 embodied in the petition for reconstitution filed by Demetria Sta. Maria
Vda. de Bernal 10, Manuela Aquial consistently appears to be an adjoining owner. This remarkable
coincidence warrants a reproduction here of the Court's findings as to the non-veracity and falsity of
the survey plan II-4374 submitted in support of reconstitution in the Bernal case.
It is to be remembered that per resolution of this Court dated September 25, 1979 in
the Bernal case, the Chief of the Survey Division of the Bureau of Lands was directed to conduct a
relocation survey of the property involved therein. Pursuant to such directive, a "Final Report" on
the matter was submitted by Amante R. Dumag, Officer-in-Charge, National Capital Regional Office
of the Bureau of Lands, based upon a memorandum addressed to him by the Staff Supervisor for
Technical Plan and Standards of said Bureau. Excerpts from both the report and the memorandum
as reproduced in the decision in the Bernal case are hereunder quoted. 1äwphï1.ñët
I. From the Final Report:
3. That while making a research on the survey data of the lands involved in this
case the surveyors of the Bureau of Lands found out that the properties
claimed by private respondent Demetria Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal consisting
of lots 1 and 3, Plan II-4374, does not have an original copy of a plan in the
Records Division of the Bureau of Lands. Attached with this Report is a
certified photocopy of a letter dated January 30, 1978 marked as Annex 'A' to
Evidence Cases
form an integral part of this Report sent by the Staff Supervisor for Technical
Plan and Standards, Bureau of Lands, Manila, addressed to the Officer- in-
Charge, Region IV, Bureau of Lands, Metro Manila, informing the latter of the
non-existence of the original copy of plan II-4374. However, he further informed
that there exists a microfilm copy of plan II-4374 with Accession No. 385637,
but he expressed his doubts as to its source and authenticity, and gave his
reasons for his apprehension in his aforementioned letter dated January 30,
1978 to the Officer-in-Charge of Region IV, Metro Manila;
xxx xxx xxx
6. That it was ascertained during the verification survey that the lands known
as Lots I and 3, plan II-4374 claimed by private respondent Demetria Sta.
Maria Vda. de Bernal does not actually exist on the ground;
7. That the properties claimed by private respondent Sta. Maria Vda. de Bernal
consisting of Lots 1 and 3, plan II-4374, were platted on the plan Vs-04-000153
using the xerox copies of uncertified technical descriptions furnished by the
Office of the Solicitor General;
8. That as directed by this Honorable Court, the location of industries, factories,
warehouses, plants and other commercial infrastructures, residential buildings,
public or private roads and other landmarks found inside the areas concerned
are properly indicated on the white print copies of plan Vs-04-000153 (Annex
'D').
II. From the Memorandum:
1. Inventory record book of the maps and plans salvaged after the last world
war and subsequently microfilmed during the Booz, Allen and Hamilton
Consultancy, clearly shows that Plan II-4374 was not among those salvaged.
Indeed, there is no copy of this plan in the file of Technical Reference Section
records were recently turned over to the Records Division. A perusal of the
folder of the case in the Records Division also shows that on July 17, 1972 Mr.
Gabriel Sansano, the then Chief of the Records Division certified that his
division (Survey Records Section in particular) has no copy of II-4374 (page
183 of the folio).
2. A further perusal of the records (pages 1 and 2) shows that on May 15, 1970
Mr. Angel Sogueco, retired surveyor, issued technical descriptions of Lots 1
and 3 of II-4374 allegedly approved on July 25, 1911. This record was
submitted to the Court. Stated therein is the alleged source of data Accession
No. 195551. This record turns out to be Plan 11-4005 approved on February 7,
1911 and the land is the property of the Municipality of Liloan, Island of
Pandan, Province of Leyte.
3. Apparently because of this finding, on November 5, 1971, Mr. Anselmo
Almazan, then Chief of Reconstruction Section upon request of the interested
party, issued technical descriptions for Lots 1 and 3 of II-4374. (This document
was submitted to the Court as part of the petition for reconstitution of title [pp. 1
and 2 of folio]) As to how the data were reconstituted by the then Chief of
Reconstruction Section in the absence of the original copy of the plan is not
Page | 93
 known. This not our standard operating procedure since we always issue
technical descriptions based on available approved survey records.
4. It appears in the records of the case that later Mr. Modesto Eloriaga, then
Chief, Reproduction Section, certified a copy of the microfilm enlargement of a
frame with Accession No. 385637 which frame bears the survey number II-
4374. As to how a record that was not salvaged after the war not microfilmed is
a mystery. Furthermore, as to how this frame is pinpointed without the locator
card indeed confounds us. We are not now privy to the testimonies made in
Court regarding this Microfilm.
5. We are surprised to learn that Reel No. 560 now bears II-4374. For this
reason, we caused the preparation of an enlargement of said microfilm for
further examination and evaluation.
6. A closer examination of said microfilm enlargement showed the following
significant discrepancies and deviations from similar survey plans on record ...
7. Considering the discrepancies and deviations of the microfilm enlargement
of the frame that purports to be that of survey plan II-4374 bearing Accession
No. 385637, our conclusion is that said plan is not authentic and does not and
has never represented any parcel of land properly surveyed and approved by
this Bureau. (Emphasis supplied)
As the Court accepted and approved in the Bernal case the above final report on the relocation-
verification survey of the regional officer of the Bureau of Lands and admitted it as evidence of the
falsity of the survey plan in question, there is no reason for this Court not to use it likewise as basis
for reaching. The conclusion that Lots 2 and 4 supposedly covered by the same Survey Plan II-
4374 are purely imaginary and "do not actually exist on the ground."
There are a number of other observations in the Bernal case that would warrant rejection of the
totality of the evidence presented by respondents in support of their petition for reconstitution 11 but
a discussion thereon would be superfluous since the weight of all such other evidence is anchored
upon the veracity or falsity of Survey Plan II-4374 as determined by the office of the Bureau of
Lands commissioned by the Court for that purpose, and also considering, as stated earlier, that this
is a special civil action wherein a ruling on jurisdiction is sufficient to adjudicate the matter in
controversy.
The herein respondents attribute laches to the petitioners for not appealing from the order of the
lower court denying their motion to intervene and motion for new trial hence allowing the said
order/decision to become final. There is no laches nor finality of any decision to speak of since the
decision under question is herein pronounced null and void for having been rendered without
jurisdiction. Prescinding therefrom, as admitted by themselves in their comment, the judgment of
reconstitution is "ineffective" against the owners of lands covered thereby who were not joined as
parties in the proceeding. As the Court ruled in the Bernal case on the matter of intervention 12 "a
valid judgment cannot even be rendered where there is want of indispensable parties" such as
petitioners who hold subsisting Torrens Titles to the properties in question and "this aspect of the
case commands the joinder of indispensable parties to allow them to uphold their interests based
upon the Torrens titles they hold overrides any question of late intervention." Petitioners have
precisely availed of the proper, speedy and adequate remedy of the present special civil action of
certiorari and prohibition to annul and set aside for want of jurisdiction the decision and all
proceedings of respondent judge.
Evidence Cases
If there is any laches at all to speak about, it is the respondents who should be held culpable
thereof. For they appear to have slept on their supposed rights to the property claimed by them. It is
of record that the petition for reconstitution was prepared and filed in September 1977, more than
thirty years after the alleged loss or destruction of the alleged certificate of title in the last World War
II. During this long span of time, herein respondents never protested the development and building
of residential subdivisions as well as factories, roads and infrastructures in the area which
unexplained inaction taken together with the falsity of their basic survey plan, supra, impress upon
their petition a most dubious character to say the least.
To repeat what the writer hereof said in his concurring opinion in the Bernal Case, "The first lesson
to be drawn here is that courts must exercise the greatest caution in entertaining such petitions for
reconstitution of allegedly lost certificates of title, particularly where the petitions are filed, as in this
case, after an inexplicable delay of 25 years after the alleged loss. Furthermore, the courts must
likewise make sure that indispensable parties, i.e. the actual owners and possessors of the lands
involved, are duly served with actual and personal notice of the petition (not by mere general
publication), particularly where the lands involved constitute prime developed commercial land
including a part of the South Superhighway. The stability and indefeasibility of the Torrens System
would have been greatly imperiled had the appellate court's judgment granting reconstitution
prevailed, resulting in two holders of Torrens certificates over the same lands. We can take judicial
notice of innumerable litigations and controversies that have been spawned by the reckless and
hasty grant of such reconstitution of alleged lost or destroyed titles as well as of the numerous
purchasers who have been victimized only to find that the 'lands' purchased by them were covered
by forged or fake titles or their areas simply 'expanded' through 'table surveys' with the cooperation
of unscrupulous officials." (Emphasis supplied)
The Court stresses once more that lands already covered by duly issued existing Torrens titles
(which become incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from their issuance under section
38 of the land Registration Act) cannot be the subject of petitions for reconstitution of allegedly lost
or destroyed titles filed by third parties without first securing by final judgment the cancellation of
such existing titles. (And as the Court reiterated in the recent case of Silvestre vs. Court of
Appeals, 13 "in cases of annulment and/or reconveyance of title, a party seeking it should establish
not merely by a preponderance of evidence but by clear and convincing evidence that the land
sought to be reconveyed is his.") The courts simply have no jurisdiction over petitions by such third
parties for reconstitution of allegedly lost or destroyed titles over lands that are already covered by
duly issued subsisting titles in the names of their duly registered owners.ït¢@lFº The very concept
of stability and indefeasibility of titles covered under the Torrens System of registration rules out as
anathema the issuance of two certificates of title over the same land to two different holders
thereof. A fortiori, such proceedings for "reconstitution" without actual notice to the duly registered
owners and holders of Torrens Titles to the land are null and void. Applicants, land officials and
judges who disregard these basic and fundamental principles will be held duly accountable therefor.
WHEREFORE, the subject judgment of the lower court ordering the register of deeds of Metro
Manila, Makati Branch IV to reconstitute from Decree No. 15170 and the plan and technical
descriptions submitted, the alleged certificate of title, original and owner's duplicate copy, in the
name of Manuela Aquial is hereby annulled and set aside, and the petition for reconstitution is
ordered dismissed.
The temporary restraining order of June 27, 1980 issued against respondents is hereby made and
declared permanent. With costs jointly and severally against private respondents.
The Division Clerk of Court is hereby directed to furnish the Honorable Minister of Justice a copy of
the decision at bar (as well as a copy, for ready reference, of the decision of January 27, 1981 in
the related Bernal case, G.R. No. L-45168, previously ordered furnished to him) for the institution of
Page | 94
appropriate criminal proceedings against private respondents and all others who have assisted or
conspired with them as may be warranted by the evidence of record.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Vasquez, Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.1äwphï1.ñët
Based on the police report and the medical report of the examining physician of the Al-Birk
Hospital, who conducted an autopsy of Jasmin’s body, the likely cause of her death was poisoning.
Thus:
According to letter No. 199, dated 27.2.1419H, issued by Al-Birk Police Station, for examining the
corpse of Jasmin Cuaresma, 12.20 P.M. 27.2.1419H, Sunday, at Al-Birk Hospital.

1. The Police Report on the Death

Makasiar, J., is on leave.

2. The Medical Diagnosis

THIRD DIVISION

Sex: Female Age: 25 years Relg: Christian

G.R. Nos. 182978-79 April 7, 2009

The said person was brought to the Emergency Room of the hospital; time 12.20 P.M.
BECMEN SERVICE EXPORTER AND PROMOTION, INC., Petitioner,
and she was unconscious, blue, no pulse, no respiration and the first aid esd undertaken
vs.
but without success.
SPOUSES SIMPLICIO and MILA CUARESMA (for and in behalf of their daughter, Jasmin G.
Cuaresma), WHITE FALCON SERVICES, INC. and JAIME ORTIZ (President,White Falcon
Services, Inc.), Respondents. 3. Diagnosis and Opinion: Halt in blood circulation respiratory system and brain damage
due to an apparentpoisoning which is under investigation.4
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
Name : Jasmin Cuaresma
G.R. Nos. 184298-99 April 7, 2009
Sex : Female
SPOUSES SIMPLICIO and MILA CUARESMA (for and in behalf of their daughter, Jasmin G.
Marital Status : Single Nationality: Philipino (sic)
Cuaresma),Petitioners,
vs.
Religion : Christian
WHITE FALCON SERVICES, INC. and BECMEN SERVICE EXPORTER AND PROMOTION,
INC., Respondents. Profession : Nurse

DECISION Address : Al-Birk Genrl. Hospital Birth Place: The Philippines

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
These consolidated petitions assail the Amended Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated May 14,
2008 in CA-G.R. SP No. 80619 and CA-G.R. SP No. 81030 finding White Falcon Services, Inc. and
Becmen Service Exporter and Promotion, Inc. solidarily liable to indemnify spouses Simplicio and
Mila Cuaresma the amount of US$4,686.73 in actual damages with interest.
On January 6, 1997, Jasmin Cuaresma (Jasmin) was deployed by Becmen Service Exporter and
Promotion, Inc.2(Becmen) to serve as assistant nurse in Al-Birk Hospital in the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia (KSA), for a contract duration of three years, with a corresponding salary of US$247.00 per
month.
Over a year later, she died allegedly of poisoning.
Jessie Fajardo, a co-worker of Jasmin, narrated that on June 21, 1998, Jasmin was found dead by
a female cleaner lying on the floor inside her dormitory room with her mouth foaming and smelling
of poison.3
On 27.2.1419H, Dr. Tariq Abdulminnem and Dr. Ashoki Komar, both have examined the dead body
of Jasmin Cuaresma, at 12.20 P.M., Sunday, 22.2.14189H, and the result was:
1. Report of the Police on the death
2. Medical Examination: Blue skin and paleness on the Extrimes (sic), total halt to blood
circulation and respiratory system and brain damage. There were no external
injuries. Likely poisoning by taking poisonous substance, yet not determined. There
was a bad smell in the mouth and unknown to us.5 (Emphasis supplied)
Jasmin’s body was repatriated to Manila on September 3, 1998. The following day, the City Health
Officer of Cabanatuan City conducted an autopsy and the resulting medical report indicated that
Jasmin died under violent circumstances, and not poisoning as originally found by the KSA
examining physician. The City Health Officer found that Jasmin had abrasions at her inner lip and
gums; lacerated wounds and abrasions on her left and right ears; lacerated wounds and hematoma
(contusions) on her elbows; abrasions and hematoma on her thigh and legs; intra-muscular
hemorrhage at the anterior chest; rib fracture; puncture wounds; and abrasions on the labia minora
of the vaginal area.6

Evidence Cases Page | 95

On March 11, 1999, Jasmin’s remains were exhumed and examined by the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI). The toxicology report of the NBI, however, tested negative for non-volatile,
metallic poison and insecticides.7
Simplicio and Mila Cuaresma (the Cuaresmas), Jasmin’s parents and her surviving heirs, received
from the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) the following amounts: P50,000.00 for
death benefits; P50,000.00 for loss of life; P20,000.00 for funeral expenses; and P10,000.00 for
medical reimbursement.
On November 22, 1999, the Cuaresmas filed a complaint against Becmen and its principal in the
KSA, Rajab & Silsilah Company (Rajab), claiming death and insurance benefits, as well as moral
and exemplary damages for Jasmin’s death.8
In their complaint, the Cuaresmas claim that Jasmin’s death was work-related, having occurred at
the employer’s premises;9 that under Jasmin’s contract with Becmen, she is entitled to "iqama
insurance" coverage; that Jasmin is entitled to compensatory damages in the amount of
US$103,740.00, which is the sum total of her monthly salary of US$247.00 per month under her
employment contract, multiplied by 35 years (or the remaining years of her productive life had death
not supervened at age 25, assuming that she lived and would have retired at age 60).
physician’s report as well as the KSA police report, finding the same to be inconclusive. It declared
that Jasmin’s death was the result of an "accident" occurring within the employer’s premises that is
attributable to her employment, or to the conditions under which she lived, and thus arose out of
and in the course of her employment as nurse. Thus, the Cuaresmas are entitled to actual
damages in the form of Jasmin’s lost earnings, including future earnings, in the total amount of
US$113,000.00. The Commission, however, dismissed all other claims in the complaint.
Becmen, Rajab and White Falcon moved for reconsideration, whereupon the Commission issued
its October 9, 2003 Resolution12 reducing the award of US$113,000.00 as actual damages to
US$80,000.00.13 The NLRC likewise declared Becmen and White Falcon as solidarily liable for
payment of the award.
Becmen and White Falcon brought separate petitions for certiorari to the Court of Appeals.14 On
June 28, 2006, the appellate court rendered its Decision,15 the dispositive portion of which reads, as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the subject petitions are DENIED but in the execution of the decision, it should first
be enforced against White Falcon Services and then against Becmen Services when it is already
impossible, impractical and futile to go against it (White Falcon).

The Cuaresmas assert that as a result of Jasmin’s death under mysterious circumstances, they SO ORDERED.16
suffered sleepless nights and mental anguish. The situation, they claim, was aggravated by findings
in the autopsy and exhumation reports which evidently show that a grave injustice has been
The appellate court affirmed the NLRC’s findings that Jasmin’s death was compensable, the same
committed against them and their daughter, for which those responsible should likewise be made to
having occurred at the dormitory, which was contractually provided by the employer. Thus her
pay moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.
death should be considered to have occurred within the employer’s premises, arising out of and in
the course of her employment.
In their position paper, Becmen and Rajab insist that Jasmin committed suicide, citing a prior
unsuccessful suicide attempt sometime in March or April 1998 and relying on the medical report of
Becmen and White Falcon moved for reconsideration. On May 14, 2008, the appellate court
the examining physician of the Al-Birk Hospital. They likewise deny liability because the Cuaresmas
rendered the assailed Amended Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads, as follows:
already recovered death and other benefits totaling P130,000.00 from the OWWA. They insist that
the Cuaresmas are not entitled to "iqama insurance" because this refers to the "issuance" – not
insurance – of iqama, or residency/work permit required in the KSA. On the issue of moral and WHEREFORE, the motions for reconsideration are GRANTED. Accordingly, the award of
exemplary damages, they claim that the Cuaresmas are not entitled to the same because they US$80,000.00 in actual damages is hereby reduced to US$4,686.73 plus interest at the legal rate
have not acted with fraud, nor have they been in bad faith in handling Jasmin’s case. computed from the time it became due until fully paid. Petitioners are hereby adjudged jointly and
solidarily liable with the employer for the monetary awards with Becmen Service Exporter and
Promotions, Inc. having a right of reimbursement from White Falcon Services, Inc.
While the case was pending, Becmen filed a manifestation and motion for substitution alleging that
Rajab terminated their agency relationship and had appointed White Falcon Services, Inc. (White
Falcon) as its new recruitment agent in the Philippines. Thus, White Falcon was impleaded as SO ORDERED.17
respondent as well, and it adopted and reiterated Becmen’s arguments in the position paper it
subsequently filed.
In the Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals found that although Jasmin’s death was
compensable, however, there is no evidentiary basis to support an award of actual damages in the
10
On February 28, 2001, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint for lack of amount of US$80,000.00. Nor may lost earnings be collected, because the same may be charged
merit. Giving weight to the medical report of the Al-Birk Hospital finding that Jasmin died of only against the perpetrator of the crime or quasi-delict. Instead, the appellate court held that
poisoning, the Labor Arbiter concluded that Jasmin committed suicide. In any case, Jasmin’s death Jasmin’s beneficiaries should be entitled only to the sum equivalent of the remainder of her 36-
was not service-connected, nor was it shown that it occurred while she was on duty; besides, her month employment contract, or her monthly salary of US$247.00 multiplied by nineteen (19)
parents have received all corresponding benefits they were entitled to under the law. In regard to months, with legal interest.
damages, the Labor Arbiter found no legal basis to warrant a grant thereof.
Becmen filed the instant petition for review on certiorari (G.R. Nos. 182978-79). The Cuaresmas, on
On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (Commission) reversed the decision of the the other hand, moved for a reconsideration of the amended decision, but it was denied. They are
Labor Arbiter. Relying on the findings of the City Health Officer of Cabanatuan City and the NBI as now before us via G.R. Nos. 184298-99.
contained in their autopsy and toxicology report, respectively, the Commission, via its November
22, 2002 Resolution11 declared that, based on substantial evidence adduced, Jasmin was the victim
of compensable work-connected criminal aggression. It disregarded the Al-Birk Hospital attending
Evidence Cases Page | 96
On October 6, 2008, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. Nos. 184298-99 with G.R. Nos. (THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED IN REDUCING THE DEATH BENEFITS
182978-79. AWARDED BY NLRC CONSIDERED FINDINGS OF FACT THAT CANNOT BE DISTURBED
THROUGH CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF COURT.
In G.R. Nos. 182978-79, Becmen raises the following issues for our resolution:
The issue for resolution is whether the Cuaresmas are entitled to monetary claims, by way of
benefits and damages, for the death of their daughter Jasmin.
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT GAVE MORE CREDENCE AND
WEIGHT TO THE AUTOPSY REPORT CONDUCTED BY THE CABANATUAN CITY HEALTH
OFFICE THAN THE MEDICAL AND POLICE REPORTS ISSUED BY THE MINISTRY OF HEALTH The terms and conditions of Jasmin’s 1996 Employment Agreement which she and her employer
OF KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA AND AL-BIRK HOSPITAL. Rajab freely entered into constitute the law between them. As a rule, stipulations in an employment
contract not contrary to statutes, public policy, public order or morals have the force of law between
the contracting parties.18 An examination of said employment agreement shows that it provides for
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN ON THE BASIS OF THE POSITION
no other monetary or other benefits/privileges than the following:
PAPERS AND ANNEXES THERETO INCLUDING THE AUTOPSY REPORT, IT CONCLUDED
THAT THE DEATH OF JASMIN CUARESMA WAS CAUSED BY CRIMINAL AGGRESSION.
1. 1,300 rials (or US$247.00) monthly salary;
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT THE DEATH OF JASMIN
CUARESMA WAS COMPENSABLE PURSUANT TO THE RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT 2. Free air tickets to KSA at the start of her contract and to the Philippines at the end
IN TALLER VS. YNCHAUSTI, G.R. NO. 35741, DECEMBER 20, 1932, WHICH IT FOUND TO BE thereof, as well as for her vacation at the end of each twenty four-month service;
STILL GOOD LAW.
3. Transportation to and from work;
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT HELD BECMEN LIABLE FOR THE
DEATH OF JASMIN CUARESMA NOTWITHSTANDING ITS ADMISSIONS THAT "IQAMA
4. Free living accommodations;
INSURANCE" WAS A TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR SINCE "IQAMA" IS NOT AN INSURANCE.

5. Free medical treatment, except for optical and dental operations, plastic surgery
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT THE DEATH OF
charges and lenses, and medical treatment obtained outside of KSA;
JASMIN WAS WORK RELATED.

6. Entry visa fees will be shared equally between her and her employer, but the exit/re-
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT HELD BECMEN LIABLE TO JASMIN’S
entry visa fees, fees for Iqama issuance, renewal, replacement, passport renewal,
BENEFICIARIES FOR THE REMAINDER OF HER 36-MONTH CONTRACT COMPUTED IN THIS
sponsorship transfer and other liabilities shall be borne by her;
MANNER: MONTHLY SALARY OF US$246.67 MULTIPLIED BY 19 MONTHS, THE REMAINDER
OF THE TERM OF JASMIN’S EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT, IS EQUAL TO US$4,686.73.
7. Thirty days paid vacation leave with round trip tickets to Manila after twenty four-
months of continuous service;
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT HELD BECMEN LIABLE TO PAY
INTEREST AT THE LEGAL RATE FROM THE TIME IT WAS DUE UNTIL FULLY PAID.
8. Eight days public holidays per year;
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT HELD BECMEN AND WHITE FALCON
JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH THE EMPLOYER NOTWITHSTANDING THE 9. The indemnity benefit due her at the end of her service will be calculated as per labor
ASSUMPTION OF LIABILITY EXECUTED BY WHITE FALCON IN FAVOR OF BECMEN. laws of KSA.

On the other hand, in G.R. Nos. 184298-99, the Cuaresmas raise the following issues:
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING THE PROVISIONS OF THE CIVIL
CODE CONSIDERED GENERAL LAW DESPITE THE CASE BEING COVERED BY E.O. 247,
R.A. 8042 AND LABOR CODE CONSIDERED AS SPECIAL LAWS.
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT APPLYING THE DECEASED’S FUTURE
EARNINGS WHICH IS (AN) INHERENT FACTOR IN THE COMPUTATION OF DEATH BENEFITS
OF OVERSEAS FILIPINO CONTRACT WORKERS.
Thus, the agreement does not include provisions for insurance, or for accident, death or other
benefits that the Cuaresmas seek to recover, and which the labor tribunals and appellate court
granted variably in the guise of compensatory damages.
However, the absence of provisions for social security and other benefits does not make Jasmin’s
employment contract infirm. Under KSA law, her foreign employer is not obliged to provide her
these benefits; and neither is Jasmin entitled to minimum wage – unless of course the KSA labor
laws have been amended to the opposite effect, or that a bilateral wage agreement has been
entered into.

Our next inquiry is, should Jasmin’s death be considered as work-connected and thus
compensable? The evidence indicates that it is not. At the time of her death, she was not on duty,
or else evidence to the contrary would have been adduced. Neither was she within hospital
Evidence Cases Page | 97
premises at the time. Instead, she was at her dormitory room on personal time when she died.
Neither has it been shown, nor does the evidence suggest, that at the time she died, Jasmin was
performing an act reasonably necessary or incidental to her employment as nurse, because she
was at her dormitory room. It is reasonable to suppose that all her work is performed at the Al-birk
Hospital, and not at her dormitory room.
We cannot expect that the foreign employer should ensure her safety even while she is not on duty.
It is not fair to require employers to answer even for their employees’ personal time away from
work, which the latter are free to spend of their own choosing. Whether they choose to spend their
free time in the pursuit of safe or perilous undertakings, in the company of friends or strangers,
lovers or enemies, this is not one area which their employers should be made accountable for.
While we have emphasized the need to observe official work time strictly,19 what an employee does
on free time is beyond the employer’s sphere of inquiry.
While the "employer’s premises" may be defined very broadly not only to include premises owned
by it, but also premises it leases, hires, supplies or uses,20 we are not prepared to rule that the
dormitory wherein Jasmin stayed should constitute employer’s premises as would allow a finding
that death or injury therein is considered to have been incurred or sustained in the course of or
arose out of her employment. There are certainly exceptions,21 but they do not appear to apply
here. Moreover, a complete determination would have to depend on the unique circumstances
obtaining and the overall factual environment of the case, which are here lacking.
But, did Jasmin commit suicide? Rajab, Becmen and White Falcon vehemently insist that she did;
thus, her heirs may not claim benefits or damages based on criminal aggression. On the other
hand, the Cuaresmas do not believe so.
The Court cannot subscribe to the idea that Jasmin committed suicide while halfway into her
employment contract. It is beyond human comprehension that a 25-year old Filipina, in the prime of
her life and working abroad with a chance at making a decent living with a high-paying job which
she could not find in her own country, would simply commit suicide for no compelling reason.
The Saudi police and autopsy reports – which state that Jasmin is a likely/or apparent victim of
poisoning – are patently inconclusive. They are thus unreliable as evidence.
On the contrary, the autopsy report of the Cabanatuan City Health Officer and the exhumation
report of the NBI categorically and unqualifiedly show that Jasmin sustained external and internal
injuries, specifically abrasions at her inner lip and gums; lacerated wounds and abrasions on
her left and right ears; lacerated wounds and hematoma (contusions) on her
elbows; abrasions and hematoma on her thigh and legs; intra-muscular hemorrhage at the
anterior chest; a fractured rib; puncture wounds; and abrasions on the labia minora of the
vaginal area. The NBI toxicology report came up negative on the presence of poison.
All these show that Jasmin was manhandled – and possibly raped – prior to her death.
Even if we were to agree with the Saudi police and autopsy reports that indicate Jasmin was
poisoned to death, we do not believe that it was self-induced. If ever Jasmin was poisoned, the
assailants who beat her up – and possibly raped her – are certainly responsible therefor.
We are not exactly ignorant of what goes on with our OFWs. Nor is the rest of the world blind to the
realities of life being suffered by migrant workers in the hands of some foreign employers. It is
inconceivable that our Filipina women would seek employment abroad and face uncertainty in a
foreign land, only to commit suicide for unexplained reasons. Deciding to leave their family, loved
Evidence Cases
ones, and the comfort and safety of home, to work in a strange land requires unrivaled strength and
courage. Indeed, many of our women OFWs who are unfortunate to end up with undesirable
employers have been there more times than they care to, beaten up and broken in body – yet they
have remained strong in mind, refusing to give up the will to live. Raped, burned with cigarettes,
kicked in the chest with sharp high-heeled shoes, starved for days or even weeks, stabbed, slaved
with incessant work, locked in their rooms, forced to serve their masters naked, grossly debased,
dehumanized and insulted, their spirits fought on and they lived for the day that they would once
again be reunited with their families and loved ones. Their bodies surrendered, but their will to
survive remained strong.
It is surprising, therefore, that Rajab, Becmen and White Falcon should insist on suicide, without
even lifting a finger to help solve the mystery of Jasmin’s death. Being in the business of sending
OFWs to work abroad, Becmen and White Falcon should know what happens to some of our
OFWs. It is impossible for them to be completely unaware that cruelties and inhumanities are
inflicted on OFWs who are unfortunate to be employed by vicious employers, or upon those who
work in communities or environments where they are liable to become victims of crime. By now
they should know that our women OFWs do not readily succumb to the temptation of killing
themselves even when assaulted, abused, starved, debased and, worst, raped.
Indeed, what we have seen is Rajab and Becmen’s revolting scheme of conveniently avoiding
responsibility by clinging to the absurd theory that Jasmin took her own life. Abandoning their legal,
moral and social obligation (as employer and recruiter) to assist Jasmin’s family in obtaining justice
for her death, they immediately gave up on Jasmin’s case, which has remained under investigation
as the autopsy and police reports themselves indicate. Instead of taking the cudgels for Jasmin,
who had no relative or representative in the KSA who would naturally demand and seek an
investigation of her case, Rajab and Becmen chose to take the most convenient route to avoiding
and denying liability, by casting Jasmin’s fate to oblivion. It appears from the record that to this
date, no follow up of Jasmin’s case was ever made at all by them, and they seem to have
expediently treated Jasmin’s death as a closed case. Despite being given the lead via the autopsy
and toxicology reports of the Philippine authorities, they failed and refused to act and pursue justice
for Jasmin’s sake and to restore honor to her name.
Indeed, their nonchalant and uncaring attitude may be seen from how Jasmin’s remains were
repatriated. No official representative from Rajab or Becmen was kind enough to make personal
representations with Jasmin’s parents, if only to extend their condolences or sympathies; instead, a
mere colleague, nurse Jessie Fajardo, was designated to accompany Jasmin’s body home.
Of all life’s tragedies, the death of one’s own child must be the most painful for a parent. Not
knowing why or how Jasmin’s life was snuffed out makes the pain doubly unbearable for Jasmin’s
parents, and further aggravated by Rajab, Becmen, and White Falcon’s baseless insistence and
accusation that it was a self-inflicted death, a mortal sin by any religious standard.
Thus we categorically hold, based on the evidence; the actual experiences of our OFWs; and the
resilient and courageous spirit of the Filipina that transcends the vilest desecration of her physical
self, that Jasmin did not commit suicide but a victim of murderous aggression.
Rajab, Becmen, and White Falcon’s indifference to Jasmin’s case has caused unfathomable pain
and suffering upon her parents. They have turned away from their moral obligation, as employer
and recruiter and as entities laden with social and civic obligations in society, to pursue justice for
and in behalf of Jasmin, her parents and those she left behind. Possessed with the resources to
determine the truth and to pursue justice, they chose to stand idly for the sake of convenience and
in order that they may avoid pecuniary liability, turning a blind eye to the Philippine authorities’
autopsy and toxicology reports instead of taking action upon them as leads in pursuing justice for
Jasmin’s death. They have placed their own financial and corporate interests above their moral and
Page | 98
social obligations, and chose to secure and insulate themselves from the perceived responsibility of
having to answer for and indemnify Jasmin’s heirs for her death.
Under Republic Act No. 8042 (R.A. 8042), or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of
1995,22 the State shall, at all times, uphold the dignity of its citizens whether in country or overseas,
in general, and Filipino migrant workers, in particular.23 The State shall provide adequate and timely
social, economic and legal services to Filipino migrant workers.24 The rights and interest
of distressed25 overseas Filipinos, in general, and Filipino migrant workers, in particular,
documented or undocumented, are adequately protected and safeguarded.26
Becmen and White Falcon, as licensed local recruitment agencies, miserably failed to abide by the
provisions of R.A. 8042. Recruitment agencies are expected to extend assistance to their deployed
OFWs, especially those in distress. Instead, they abandoned Jasmin’s case and allowed it to
remain unsolved to further their interests and avoid anticipated liability which parents or relatives of
Jasmin would certainly exact from them. They willfully refused to protect and tend to the welfare of
the deceased Jasmin, treating her case as just one of those unsolved crimes that is not worth
wasting their time and resources on. The evidence does not even show that Becmen and Rajab
lifted a finger to provide legal representation and seek an investigation of Jasmin’s case. Worst of
all, they unnecessarily trampled upon the person and dignity of Jasmin by standing pat on the
argument that Jasmin committed suicide, which is a grave accusation given its un-Christian nature.
We cannot reasonably expect that Jasmin’s parents should be the ones to actively pursue a just
resolution of her case in the KSA, unless they are provided with the finances to undertake this
herculean task. Sadly, Becmen and Rajab did not lend any assistance at all in this respect. The
most Jasmin’s parents can do is to coordinate with Philippine authorities as mandated under R.A.
8042, obtain free legal assistance and secure the aid of the Department of Foreign Affairs, the
Department of Labor and Employment, the POEA and the OWWA in trying to solve the case or
obtain relief, in accordance with Section 2327 of R.A. 8042. To our mind, the Cuaresmas did all that
was within their power, short of actually flying to the KSA. Indeed, the Cuaresmas went even
further. To the best of their abilities and capacities, they ventured to investigate Jasmin’s case on
their own: they caused another autopsy on Jasmin’s remains as soon as it arrived to inquire into the
true cause of her death. Beyond that, they subjected themselves to the painful and distressful
experience of exhuming Jasmin’s remains in order to obtain another autopsy for the sole purpose of
determining whether or not their daughter was poisoned. Their quest for the truth and justice is
equally to be expected of all loving parents. All this time, Rajab and Becmen – instead of extending
their full cooperation to the Cuaresma family – merely sat on their laurels in seeming unconcern.
In Interorient Maritime Enterprises, Inc. v. NLRC,28 a seaman who was being repatriated after his
employment contract expired, failed to make his Bangkok to Manila connecting flight as he began to
wander the streets of Bangkok aimlessly. He was shot to death by Thai police four days after, on
account of running amuck with a knife in hand and threatening to harm anybody within sight. The
employer, sued for death and other benefits as well as damages, interposed as defense the
provision in the seafarer agreement which provides that "no compensation shall be payable in
respect of any injury, incapacity, disability or death resulting from a willful act on his own life by the
seaman." The Court rejected the defense on the view, among others, that the recruitment agency
should have observed some precautionary measures and should not have allowed the seaman,
who was later on found to be mentally ill, to travel home alone, and its failure to do so rendered it
liable for the seaman’s death. We ruled therein that –
The foreign employer may not have been obligated by its contract to provide a companion for a
returning employee, but it cannot deny that it was expressly tasked by its agreement to assure the
safe return of said worker. The uncaring attitude displayed by petitioners who, knowing fully
well that its employee had been suffering from some mental disorder, nevertheless still
allowed him to travel home alone, is appalling to say the least. Such attitude harks back to
Evidence Cases
another time when the landed gentry practically owned the serfs, and disposed of them
when the latter had grown old, sick or otherwise lost their usefulness.29 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, more than just recruiting and deploying OFWs to their foreign principals, recruitment
agencies have equally significant responsibilities. In a foreign land where OFWs are likely to
encounter uneven if not discriminatory treatment from the foreign government, and certainly a
delayed access to language interpretation, legal aid, and the Philippine consulate, the recruitment
agencies should be the first to come to the rescue of our distressed OFWs since they know the
employers and the addresses where they are deployed or stationed. Upon them lies the primary
obligation to protect the rights and ensure the welfare of our OFWs, whether distressed or not. Who
else is in a better position, if not these recruitment agencies, to render immediate aid to their
deployed OFWs abroad?
Article 19 of the Civil Code provides that every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith. Article 21 of the Code states that any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage. And, lastly, Article 24 requires that in all contractual, property or other relations, when one
of the parties is at a disadvantage on account of his moral dependence, ignorance, indigence,
mental weakness, tender age or other handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his protection.
Clearly, Rajab, Becmen and White Falcon’s acts and omissions are against public policy because
they undermine and subvert the interest and general welfare of our OFWs abroad, who are entitled
to full protection under the law. They set an awful example of how foreign employers and
recruitment agencies should treat and act with respect to their distressed employees and workers
abroad. Their shabby and callous treatment of Jasmin’s case; their uncaring attitude; their
unjustified failure and refusal to assist in the determination of the true circumstances surrounding
her mysterious death, and instead finding satisfaction in the unreasonable insistence that she
committed suicide just so they can conveniently avoid pecuniary liability; placing their own
corporate interests above of the welfare of their employee’s – all these are contrary to morals, good
customs and public policy, and constitute taking advantage of the poor employee and her family’s
ignorance, helplessness, indigence and lack of power and resources to seek the truth and obtain
justice for the death of a loved one.
Giving in handily to the idea that Jasmin committed suicide, and adamantly insisting on it just to
protect Rajab and Becmen’s material interest – despite evidence to the contrary – is against the
moral law and runs contrary to the good custom of not denouncing one’s fellowmen for alleged
grave wrongdoings that undermine their good name and honor.30
Whether employed locally or overseas, all Filipino workers enjoy the protective mantle of Philippine
labor and social legislation, contract stipulations to the contrary notwithstanding. This
pronouncement is in keeping with the basic public policy of the State to afford protection to labor,
promote full employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed, and
regulate the relations between workers and employers. This ruling is likewise rendered imperative
by Article 17 of the Civil Code which states that laws which have for their object public order, public
policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by
determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.31
The relations between capital and labor are so impressed with public interest,32 and neither shall
act oppressively against the other, or impair the interest or convenience of the public. 33 In case of
doubt, all labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and
decent living for the laborer.34
Page | 99
The grant of moral damages to the employee by reason of misconduct on the part of the employer vs.
is sanctioned by Article 2219 (10)35 of the Civil Code, which allows recovery of such damages in THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PERICO V. JAO, respondents.
actions referred to in Article 21.36
PADILLA, J.:
Thus, in view of the foregoing, the Court holds that the Cuaresmas are entitled to moral damages,
which Becmen and White Falcon are jointly and solidarily liable to pay, together with exemplary
Appeal by certiorari from the decision* of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 51078-R, dated 29
damages for wanton and oppressive behavior, and by way of example for the public good.
August 1978, which dismissed petitioner"s action for recognition and support against private
respondent, and from the respondent Court"s resolution, dated 11 October 1978, denying
Private employment agencies are held jointly and severally liable with the foreign-based employer petitioner"s motion for reconsideration of said decision.
for any violation of the recruitment agreement or contract of employment. This joint and solidary
liability imposed by law against recruitment agencies and foreign employers is meant to assure the
On 28 October 1968, petitioner Janice Marie Jao, then a minor, represented by her mother and
aggrieved worker of immediate and sufficient payment of what is due him.37 If the
guardian-ad-litemArlene Salgado, filed a case for recognition and support with the Juvenile and
recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being, the corporate officers and directors and partners
Domestic Relations Court against private respondent Perico V. Jao. The latter denied paternity so
as the case may be, shall themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation or
the parties agreed to a blood grouping test which was in due course conducted by the National
partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages.38
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) upon order of the trial court. The result of the blood grouping test,
held 21 January 1969, indicated that Janice could not have been the possible offspring of Perico V.
White Falcon’s assumption of Becmen’s liability does not automatically result in Becmen’s freedom Jao and Arlene S. Salgado.1
or release from liability. This has been ruled in ABD Overseas Manpower Corporation v.
NLRC.39 Instead, both Becmen and White Falcon should be held liable solidarily, without prejudice
The trial court initially found the result of the tests legally conclusive but upon plaintiff"s (herein
to each having the right to be reimbursed under the provision of the Civil Code that whoever pays
petitioner"s) second motion for reconsideration, it ordered a trial on the merits, after which, Janice
for another may demand from the debtor what he has paid.40
was declared the child of Jao, thus entitling her to his monthly support.

WHEREFORE, the Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 14, 2008 in CA-G.R. SP
Jao appealed to the Court of Appeals, questioning the trial court"s failure to appreciate the result of
No. 80619 and CA-G.R. SP No. 81030 is SET ASIDE. Rajab & Silsilah Company, White Falcon
the blood grouping tests. As there was no showing whatsoever that there was any irregularity or
Services, Inc., Becmen Service Exporter and Promotion, Inc., and their corporate directors
mistake in the conduct of the tests, Jao argued that the result of the tests should have been
and officers are found jointly and solidarily liable and ORDERED to indemnify the heirs of Jasmin
conclusive and indisputable evidence of his non-paternity.
Cuaresma, spouses Simplicio and Mila Cuaresma, the following amounts:

The Court of Appeals upheld Jao"s contentions and reversed the trial court"s decision. In its
1) TWO MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P2,500,000.00) as moral
decision, the Court of Appeals held:
damages;

From the evidence of the contending parties, it appears undisputed that JAO was
2) TWO MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P2,500,000.00) as exemplary
introduced to ARLENE at the Saddle and Sirloin, Bay Side Club, by Melvin Yabut. After
damages;
this meeting, JAO dated and courted ARLENE. Not long thereafter, they had their first
sexual intercourse and subsequently, they lived together as husband and wife. ...
3) Attorney’s fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total monetary award; and,
It further appears undisputed that in April 1968, JAO accompanied ARLENE to the
4) Costs of suit. Marian General Hospital for medical check-up and her confinement was with JAO"s
consent. JAO paid the rentals where they lived, the salaries of the maids, and other
household expenses. ...
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-49162
JANICE MARIE JAO, represented by her mother and guardian ad litem, ARLENE S.
SALGADO, petitioner,
The record discloses that ARLENE gave birth to JANICE on August 16, 1968, after
Republic of the Philippines
completing 36 weeks of pregnancy, which indicates that ARLENE must have conceived
SUPREME COURT
JANICE on or about the first week of December, 1967. "Thus, one issue to be resolved in
Manila
this appeal is whether on or about that time, JAO and ARLENE had sexual intercourse
and were already living with one another as husband and wife.
SECOND DIVISION
In this connection, ARLENE contends that she first met JAO sometime in the third or
July 28, 1987 fourth week of November, 1967 at the Saddle and Sirloin, Bayside Club; that after several
dates, she had carnal knowledge with him at her house at 30 Long beach, Merville,
Paranaque. Rizal in the evening of November 30, 1967, and that he started to live with
her at her dwelling after December 16, 1967, the date they finished their cruise to
Mindoro Island.
Evidence Cases Page | 100
On the other hand, JAO, albeit admitting that he met ARLENE at the Saddle and Sirloin,
Bayside Club, however, maintains that this was on December 14, 1967 because the day
following, he and his guests: ARLENE, Melvin Yabut, Didi Crescini and Charlie Litonjua
went to Mindoro by boat. He dated ARLENE four times in January, 1968. He
remembered he had carnal knowledge of her for the first time on January 18, 1968,
because that was a week after his birthday and it was only in May, 1968 that he started
cohabiting with her at the Excelsior Apartments on Roxas Boulevard.
These conflicting versions of the parties emphasize, in resolving the paternity of JANICE,
the role of the blood grouping tests conducted by the NBI and which resulted in the
negative finding that in a union with ARLENE, JAO could not be the father of JANICE.
The Court of Appeals also found other facts that ran contrary to petitioner"s contention that JAO"s
actions before and after JANICE was born were tantamount to recognition. Said the respondent
We cannot sustain the conclusion of the trial court that the NBI is not in a position to
appellate court:
determine with mathematical precision the issue of parentage by blood grouping test,
considering the rulings of this Court ... where the blood grouping tests of the NBI were
admitted; especially where, in the latter case, it was Dr. Lorenzo Sunico who conducted
the test and it appears that in the present case, the same Dr. Sunico approved the
findings and report. ... In Co Tao vs. Court of Appeals, 101 Phil. 188, the Supreme Court
had given weight to the findings of the NBI in its blood grouping test. Thus, it cannot be
gainsaid that the competency of the NBI to conduct blood grouping tests has been
recognized as early as the 1950"s.
The views of the Court on blood grouping tests may be stated as follows:
Paternity — Science has demonstrated that by the analysis of blood samples
of the mother, the child, and the alleged father, it can be established
conclusively that the man is not the father of the child. But group blood testing
cannot show that a man is the father of a particular child, but at least can show
only a possibility that he is. Statutes in many states, and courts in others, have
recognized the value and the limitations of such tests. Some of the decisions
have recognized the conclusive presumption of non-paternity where the results
of the test, made in the prescribed manner, show the impossibility of the
alleged paternity. This is one of the few cases in which the judgment of the
Court may scientifically be completely accurate, and intolerable results
avoided, such as have occurred where the finding is allowed to turn on oral
testimony conflicting with the results of the test.
The findings of such blood tests are not admissible to prove the fact of
paternity as they show only a possibility that the alleged father or any one of
many others with the same blood type may have been the father of the child.
But the Uniform Act recognizes that the tests may have some probative value
to establish paternity where the blood type and the combination in the child is
shown to be rare, in which case the judge is given discretion to let it in (I Jones
on Evidence, 5th Ed., pp. 193-194).
In one specific biological trait, viz, blood groups, scientific opinion is now in
accord in accepting the fact that there is a causative relation between the trait
of the progenitor and the trait of the progeny. In other words, the blood
composition of a child may be some evidence as to the child"s paternity. But
thus far this trait (in the present state of scientific discovery as generally
accepted) can be used only negativelyi.e. to evidence that a particular man F is
not the father of a particular child C. (I Wigmore on Evidence 3rd Ed., pp. 610-
611).
Evidence Cases
In a last ditch effort to bar the admissibility and competency of the blood test, JANICE
claims that probative value was given to blood tests only in cases where they tended to
establish paternity; and that there has been no case where the blood test was invoked to
establish non-paternity, thereby implying that blood tests have probative value only when
the result is a possible affirmative and not when in the negative. This contention is
fallacious and must be rejected. To sustain her contention, in effect, would be recognizing
only the possible affirmative finding but not the blood grouping test itself for if the result
were negative, the test is regarded worthless. Indeed, this is illogical. .... As an admitted
test, it is admissible in subsequent similar proceedings whether the result be in the
negative or in the affirmative. ...
On the contrary, after JANICE was born, JAO did not recognize her as his own. In fact,
he filed a petition that his name as father of JANICE in the latter"s certificate of live birth
be deleted, evidencing his repudiation, rather than recognition. The mere acts of JAO in
cohabiting with ARLENE, the attention given to her during her pregnancy and the
financial assistance extended to her cannot overcome the result of the blood grouping
test. These acts of JAO cannot be evaluated as recognizing the unborn JANICE as his
own as the possession of such status cannot be founded on conjectures and
presumptions, especially so that, We have earlier said, JAO refused to acknowledge
JANICE after the latter"s birth.
JAO cannot be compelled to recognize JANICE based on paragraph 2 of Article 283 in
relation to Article 289 of the New Civil Code which provides: "When the child is in
continuous possession of status of a child of the alleged father by the direct acts of the
latter.
Nor can there be compulsory recognition under paragraphs 3 or 4 of said article which
states:
(3) When the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited
with the supposed father;
(4) When the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is
his father.
As aptly appreciated by the court below, JANICE could have been conceived from
November 20, 1967 to December 4, 1967. Indeed, ARLENE claims that her first sexual
intercourse with JAO was on November 30, 1967 while the latter avers it was one week
after January 18, 1968. However, to satisfy paragraph 3 as above-quoted, JANICE must
have been conceived when ARLENE and JAO started to cohabit with one another. Since
ARLENE herself testified that their cohabitation started only after December 16, 1967,
then it cannot be gainsaid that JANICE was not conceived during this cohabitation.
Hence, no recognition will lie. Necessarily, recognition cannot be had under paragraph 4
as JANICE has no other evidence or proof of her alleged paternity.
Apart from these, there is the claim of JAO that, at the critical time of conception,
ARLENE had carnal knowledge with two other men: "Oying" Fernandez and Melvin
Yabut, which was not even rebutted; and considering that it was Melvin Yabut, who
introduced ARLENE to JAO at the Bayside Club. Moreover, the testimony of ARLENE is
Page | 101
 not wholly reliable. When the trial court said that "the Court is further convinced of cannot be father and child by consanguinity. The Courts of Europe today regard a blood
plaintiff"s cause by ARLENE"s manner of testifying in a most straight-forward and candid test exclusion as an unanswerable and indisputable proof of non-paternity. 12
manner," the fact that ARLENE was admittedly a movie actress may have been
overlooked so that not even the trial court could detect, by her acts, whether she was
Moreover,
lying or not.

The cohabitation between the mother and the supposed father cannot be a ground for
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby set aside and a new one entered
compulsory recognition if such cohabitation could not have produced the conception of
dismissing plaintiff-appellee"s complaint. Without pronouncement as to costs. SO
the child. This would be the case, for instance, if the cohabitation took place outside of
ORDERED.
the period of conception of the child. Likewise, if it can be proved by blood tests that the
child and the supposed father belong to different blood groups, the cohabitation by itself
The petitioner now brings before this Court the issue of admissibility and conclusiveness of the cannot be a ground for recognition. 13
result of blood grouping tests to prove non-paternity.
Petitioner has attempted to discredit the result of the blood grouping tests in the instant case by
In this jurisdiction, the result of blood tests, among other evidence, to, affirm paternity was dealt impugning the qualifications of the NBI personnel who performed the tests and the conduct of the
with in Co Tao v. Court of Appeals,2 an action for declaration of filiation, support and damages. In tests themselves. Her allegations, in this regard, appear to be without merit. The NBI"s forensic
said case, the NBI expert"s report of the blood tests stated that "from their blood groups and types, chemist who conducted the tests is also a serologist, and has had extensive practice in this area for
the defendant Co Tao is a possible father of the child." From this statement the defendant several years. The blood tests were conducted six (6) times using two (2) scientifically recognized
contended that the child must have been the child of another man. The Court noted: "For obvious blood grouping systems, the MN Test and the ABO System,14 under witness and supervision.15
reasons, the NBI expert cannot give assurance that the appellant was the father of the child; he can
only give his opinion that he is a "possible father." This possibility, coupled with the other facts and
Even the allegation that Janice was too young at five months to have been a proper subject for
circumstances brought out during the trial, tends to definitely establish that appellant Co Tao is the
accurate blood tests must fall, since nearly two years after the first blood test, she, represented by
father of the child Manuel."3
her mother, declined to undergo the same blood test to prove or disprove their allegations, even as
Jao was willing to undergo such a test again.16 1avvphi1
Where the issue is admissibility and conclusiveness of blood grouping tests to disprove paternity,
rulings have been much more definite in their conclusions. For the past three decades, the use of
Accordingly, the Court affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals and holds that the result of the
blood typing in cases of disputed parentage has already become an important legal procedure.
blood grouping tests involved in the case at bar, are admissible and conclusive on the non-paternity
There is now almost universal scientific agreement that blood grouping tests are conclusive as to
of respondent Jao vis-a-vis petitioner Janice. No evidence has been presented showing any defect
non-paternity, although inconclusive as to paternity — that is, the fact that the blood type of the
in the testing methods employed or failure to provide adequate safeguards for the proper conduct of
child is a possible product of the mother and alleged father does not conclusively prove that the
the tests. The result of such tests is to be accepted therefore as accurately reflecting a scientific
child is born by such parents; but, if the blood type of the child is not the possible blood type when
fact.
the blood of the mother and that of the alleged father are crossmatched, then the
child cannot possibly be that of the alleged father.4
In view of the findings of fact made by the Court of Appeals, as heretofore quoted, which are
binding on this Court, we do not find it necessary to further pass upon the issue of recognition
In jurisdictions like the United States, the admissibility of blood tests results to prove non-paternity
raised by petitioner.
has already been passed upon in several cases. In Gilpin v. Gilpin5 the positive results of blood
tests excluding paternity, in a case in which it was shown that proper safeguards were drawn
around the testing procedures, were recognized as final on the question of paternity. In Cuneo v. WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is hereby denied. Without pronouncement as to costs.
Cuneo6 evidence of non-paternity consisting of the result of blood grouping tests was admitted
despite a finding that the alleged father had cohabited with the mother within the period of
SO ORDERED.
gestation. The Court said that the competent medical testimony was overwhelmingly in favor of the
plaintiff, and to reject such testimony would be tantamount to rejecting scientific fact. Courts, it was
stated, should apply the results of science when competently obtained in aid of situations Republic of the Philippines
presented, since to reject said result was to deny progress.7 This ruling was also echoed in Clark v. SUPREME COURT
Rysedorph,8 a filiation proceeding where an uncontradicted blood grouping test evidence, excluding
paternity, was held conclusive.9 Legislation expressly recognizing the use of blood tests is also in
force in several states.10 Tolentino,11 affirms this rule on blood tests as proof of non-paternity, thus THIRD DIVISION
—
G.R. No. 153535. July 28, 2005
Medical science has shown that there are four types of blood in man which can be
transmitted through heredity. Although the presence of the same type of blood in two SOLIDBANK CORPORATION, Petitioners,
persons does not indicate that one was begotten by the other, yet the fact that they are of vs.
different types will indicate the impossibility of one being the child of the other. Thus, MINDANAO FERROALLOY CORPORATION, Spouses JONG-WON HONG and SOO-OK KIM
when the supposed father and the alleged child are not in the same blood group, they HONG,*TERESITA CU, and RICARDO P. GUEVARA and Spouse,** respondents.

Evidence Cases Page | 102

 DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
To justify an award for moral and exemplary damages under Articles 19 to 21 of the Civil Code (on
human relations), the claimants must establish the other party’s malice or bad faith by clear and
convincing evidence.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the December 21,
2001 Decision2and the May 15, 2002 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No.
67482. The CA disposed as follows:
"IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision appealed
from is AFFIRMED."4
The assailed Resolution, on the other hand, denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
The Facts
The CA narrated the antecedents as follows:
"The Maria Cristina Chemical Industries (MCCI) and three (3) Korean corporations, namely, the
Ssangyong Corporation, the Pohang Iron and Steel Company and the Dongil Industries Company,
Ltd., decided to forge a joint venture and establish a corporation, under the name of the Mindanao
Ferroalloy Corporation (Corporation for brevity) with principal offices in Iligan City. Ricardo P.
Guevara was the President and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Corporation. Jong-Won
Hong, the General Manager of Ssangyong Corporation, was the Vice-President of the Corporation
for Finance, Marketing and Administration. So was Teresita R. Cu. On November 26, 1990, the
Board of Directors of the Corporation approved a ‘Resolution’ authorizing its President and
Chairman of the Board of Directors or Teresita R. Cu, acting together with Jong-Won Hong, to
secure an omnibus line in the aggregate amount of ₱30,000,000.00 from the Solidbank x x x.
xxxxxxxxx
"In the meantime, the Corporation started its operations sometime in April, 1991. Its indebtedness
ballooned to ₱200,453,686.69 compared to its assets of only ₱65,476,000.00. On May 21, 1991,
the Corporation secured an ordinary time loan from the Solidbank in the amount of ₱3,200,000.00.
Another ordinary time loan was granted by the Bank to the Corporation on May 28, 1991, in the
amount of ₱1,800,000.00 or in the total amount of ₱5,000,000.00, due on July 15 and 26, 1991,
respectively.
"However, the Corporation and the Bank agreed to consolidate and, at the same time, restructure
the two (2) loan availments, the same payable on September 20, 1991. The Corporation executed
‘Promissory Note No. 96-91-00865-6’ in favor of the Bank evidencing its loan in the amount of
₱5,160,000.00, payable on September 20, 1991. Teresita Cu and Jong-Won Hong affixed their
signatures on the note. To secure the payment of the said loan, the Corporation, through Jong-Won
Hong and Teresita Cu, executed a ‘Deed of Assignment’ in favor of the Bank covering its rights, title
and interest to the following:
Evidence Cases
‘The entire proceeds of drafts drawn under Irrevocable Letter of Credit No. M-S-041-2002080
opened with The Mitsubishi Bank Ltd. – Tokyo dated June 13, 1991 for the account of Ssangyong
Japan Corporation, 7F. Matsuoka-Tamura-Cho Bldg., 22-10, 5-Chome, Shimbashi, Minato-Ku,
Tokyo, Japan up to the extent of US$197,679.00’
"The Corporation likewise executed a ‘Quedan’, by way of additional security, under which the
Corporation bound and obliged to keep and hold, in trust for the Bank or its Order, ‘Ferrosilicon for
US$197,679.00’. Jong-Won Hong and Teresita Cu affixed their signatures thereon for the
Corporation. The Corporation, also, through Jong-Won Hong and Teresita Cu, executed a ‘Trust
Receipt Agreement’, by way of additional security for said loan, the Corporation undertaking to hold
in trust, for the Bank, as its property, the following:
‘1. THE MITSUBISHI BANK LTD., Tokyo L/C No. M-S-041-2002080 for account of Ssangyong
Japan Corporation, Tokyo, Japan for US$197,679.00 Ferrosilicon to expire September 20, 1991.
‘2. SEC QUEDAN NO. 91-476 dated June 26, 1991 covering the following:
Ferrosilicon for US$197,679.00’
"However, shortly after the execution of the said deeds, the Corporation stopped its operations. The
Corporation failed to pay its loan availments from the Bank inclusive of accrued interest. On
February 11, 1992, the Bank sent a letter to the Corporation demanding payment of its loan
availments inclusive of interests due. The Corporation failed to comply with the demand of the
Bank. On November 23, 1992, the Bank sent another letter to the [Corporation] demanding
payment of its account which, by November 23, 1992, had amounted to ₱7,283,913.33. The
Corporation again failed to comply with the demand of the Bank.
"On January 6, 1993, the Bank filed a complaint against the Corporation with the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, entitled and docketed as ‘Solidbank Corporation vs. Mindanao Ferroalloy
Corporation, Sps. Jong-Won Hong and the Sps. Teresita R. Cu, Civil Case No. 93-038’ for ‘Sum of
Money’ with a plea for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. x x x
xxxxxxxxx
"Under its ‘Amended Complaint’, the Plaintiff alleged that it impleaded Ricardo Guevara and his
wife as Defendants because, [among others]:
‘Defendants JONG-WON HONG and TERESITA CU, are the Vice-Presidents of defendant
corporation, and also members of the company’s Board of Directors. They are impleaded as joint
and solidary debtors of [petitioner] bank having signed the Promissory Note, Quedan, and Trust
Receipt agreements with [petitioner], in this case.
x x x x x x x x x’
"[Petitioner] likewise filed a criminal complaint x x x entitled and docketed as ‘Solidbank Corporation
vs. Ricardo Guevara, Teresita R. Cu and Jong Won Hong x x x for ‘Violation of P.D. 115’. On April
14, 1993, the investigating Prosecutor issued a ‘Resolution’ finding no probable cause for violation
of P.D. 115 against the Respondents as the goods covered by the quedan ‘were nonexistent’:
xxxxxxxxx
Page | 103
"In their Answer to the complaint [in the civil case], the Spouses Jong-Won Hong and Soo-ok Kim
Hong alleged, inter alia, that [petitioner] had no cause of action against them as:
‘x x x the clean loan of ₱5.1 M obtained was a corporate undertaking of defendant
MINFACO executed through its duly authorized representatives, Ms. Teresita R. Cu and Mr. Jong-
Won Hong, both Vice Presidents then of MINFACO. x x x.’
xxxxxxxxx
"[On their part, respondents] Teresita Cu and Ricardo Guevara alleged that [petitioner] had no
cause of action against them because: (a) Ricardo Guevara did not sign any of the documents in
favor of [petitioner]; (b) Teresita Cu signed the ‘Promissory Note’, ‘Deed of Assignment’, ‘Trust
Receipt’ and ‘Quedan’ in blank and merely as representative and, hence, for and in behalf of the
Defendant Corporation and, hence, was not personally liable to [petitioner].
"In the interim, the Corporation filed, on June 20, 1994, a ‘Petition’, with the Regional Trial Court of
Iligan City, for ‘Voluntary Insolvency’ x x x.
xxxxxxxxx
"Appended to the Petition was a list of its creditors, including [petitioner], for the amount of
₱8,144,916.05. The Court issued an Order, on July 12, 1994, finding the Petition sufficient in form
and substance x x x.
xxxxxxxxx
"In view of said development, the Court issued an Order, in Civil Case No. 93-038, suspending the
proceedings as against the Defendant Corporation but ordering the proceedings to proceed as
against the individual defendants x x x.
xxxxxxxxx
"On December 10, 1999, the Court rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint for lack of cause
of action of [petitioner] against the Spouses Jong-Won Hong, Teresita Cu and the Spouses Ricardo
Guevara, x x x.
xxxxxxxxx
"In dismissing the complaint against the individual [respondents], the Court a quo found and
declared that [petitioner] failed to adduce a morsel of evidence to prove the personal liability of the
said [respondents] for the claims of [petitioner] and that the latter impleaded the [respondents], in its
complaint and amended complaint, solely to put more pressure on the Defendant Corporation to
pay its obligations to [petitioner].
"[Petitioner] x x x interposed an appeal, from the Decision of the Court a quo and posed, for x x x
resolution, the issue of whether or not the individual [respondents], are jointly and severally liable to
[petitioner] for the loan availments of the [respondent] Corporation, inclusive of accrued interests
and penalties.
Evidence Cases
"In the meantime, on motion of [petitioner], the Court set aside its Order, dated February 2, 1995,
suspending the proceedings as against the [respondent] Corporation. [Petitioner] filed a ‘Motion for
Summary Judgment’ against the [respondent] Corporation. On February 28, 2000, the Court
rendered a ‘Summary Judgment’ against the [respondent] Corporation, the decretal portion of which
reads as follows:
‘WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court hereby resolves to give due course to the motion
for summary judgment filed by herein [petitioner]. Consequently, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of [Petitioner] SOLIDBANK CORPORATION and against [Respondent] MINDANAO
FERROALLOY CORPORATION, ordering the latter to pay the former the amount of
₱7,086,686.70, representing the outstanding balance of the subject loan as of 24 September 1994,
plus stipulated interest at the rate of 16% per annum to be computed from the aforesaid date until
fully paid together with an amount equivalent to 12% of the total amount due each year from 24
September 1994 until fully paid. Lastly, said [respondent] is hereby ordered to pay [petitioner] the
amount of ₱25,000.00 to [petitioner] as reasonable attorney’s fees as well as cost of litigation." 5
In its appeal, petitioner argued that (1) it had adduced the requisite evidence to prove the solidary
liability of the individual respondents, and (2) it was not liable for their counterclaims for damages
and attorney’s fees.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Affirming the RTC, the appellate court ruled that the individual respondents were not solidarily liable
with the Mindanao Ferroalloy Corporation, because they had acted merely as officers of the
corporation, which was the real party in interest. Respondent Guevara was not even a signatory to
the Promissory Note, the Trust Receipt Agreement, the Deed of Assignment or the Quedan; he was
merely authorized to represent Minfaco to negotiate with and secure the loans from the bank. On
the other hand, the CA noted that Respondents Cu and Hong had not signed the above documents
as comakers, but as signatories in their representative capacities as officers of Minfaco.
Likewise, the CA held that the individual respondents were not liable to petitioner for damages,
simply because (1) they had not received the proceeds of the irrevocable Letter of Credit, which
was the subject of the Deed of Assignment; and (2) the goods subject of the Trust Receipt
Agreement had been found to be nonexistent. The appellate court took judicial notice of the
practice of banks and financing institutions to investigate, examine and assess all properties offered
by borrowers as collaterals, in order to determine the feasibility and advisability of granting loans.
Before agreeing to the consolidation of Minfaco’s loans, it presumed that petitioner had done its
homework.
As to the award of damages to the individual respondents, the CA upheld the trial court’s findings
that it was clearly unfair on petitioner’s part to have impleaded the wives of Guevara and Hong,
because the women were not privy to any of the transactions between petitioner and Minfaco.
Under Articles 19, 20 and 2229 of the Civil Code, such reckless and wanton act of pressuring
individual respondents to settle the corporation’s obligations is a ground to award moral and
exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees.
Hence this Petition.6
Issues
In its Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues:
Page | 104
"A. Whether or not there is ample evidence on record to support the joint and solidary liability of
individual respondents with Mindanao Ferroalloy Corporation.
"B. In the absence of joint and solidary liability[,] will the provision of Article 1208 in relation to
Article 1207 of the New Civil Code providing for joint liability be applicable to the case at bar.
"C. May bank practices be the proper subject of judicial notice under Sec. 1 [of] Rule 129 of the
Rules of Court.
"D. Whether or not there is evidence to sustain the claim that respondents were impleaded to apply
pressure upon them to pay the obligations in lieu of MINFACO that is declared insolvent.
"E. Whether or not there are sufficient bases for the award of various kinds of and substantial
amounts in damages including payment for attorney’s fees.
"F. Whether or not respondents committed fraud and misrepresentations and acted in bad faith.
"G. Whether or not the inclusion of respondents spouses is proper under certain circumstances and
supported by prevailing jurisprudence."7
In sum, there are two main questions: (1) whether the individual respondents are liable, either
jointly or solidarily, with the Mindanao Ferroalloy Corporation; and (2) whether the award of
damages to the individual respondents is valid and legal.
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition is partly meritorious.
First Issue:
Liability of Individual Respondents
Petitioner argues that the individual respondents were jointly or solidarily liable with Minfaco, either
because their participation in the loan contract and the loan documents made them comakers; or
because they committed fraud and deception, which justifies the piercing of the corporate veil.
The first contention hinges on certain factual determinations made by the trial and the appellate
courts. These tribunals found that, although he had not signed any document in connection with the
subject transaction, Respondent Guevara was authorized to represent Minfaco in negotiating for a
₱30 million loan from petitioner. As to Cu and Hong, it was determined, among others, that their
signatures on the loan documents other than the Deed of Assignment were not prefaced with the
word "by," and that there were no other signatures to indicate who had signed for and on behalf of
Minfaco, the principal borrower. In the Promissory Note, they signed above the printed name of the
corporation -- on the space provided for "Maker/Borrower," not on that provided for "Co-maker."
Petitioner has not shown any exceptional circumstance that sanctions the disregard of these
findings of fact, which are thus deemed final and conclusive upon this Court and may not be
reviewed on appeal.8
Evidence Cases
No Personal Liability
for Corporate Deeds
Basic is the principle that a corporation is vested by law with a personality separate and distinct
from that of each person composing9 or representing it.10 Equally fundamental is the general rule
that corporate officers cannot be held personally liable for the consequences of their acts, for as
long as these are for and on behalf of the corporation, within the scope of their authority and in
good faith.11 The separate corporate personality is a shield against the personal liability of corporate
officers, whose acts are properly attributed to the corporation.12
Tramat Mercantile v. Court of Appeals13 held thus:
"Personal liability of a corporate director, trustee or officer along (although not necessarily) with the
corporation may so validly attach, as a rule, only when —
‘1. He assents (a) to a patently unlawful act of the corporation, or (b) for bad faith or gross
negligence in directing its affairs, or (c) for conflict of interest, resulting in damages to the
corporation, its stockholders or other persons;
‘2. He consents to the issuance of watered stocks or who, having knowledge thereof, does not
forthwith file with the corporate secretary his written objection thereto;
‘3. He agrees to hold himself personally and solidarily liable with the corporation; or
‘4. He is made, by a specific provision of law, to personally answer for his corporate action.’"
Consistent with the foregoing principles, we sustain the CA’s ruling that Respondent Guevara was
not personally liable for the contracts. First, it is beyond cavil that he was duly authorized to act on
behalf of the corporation; and that in negotiating the loans with petitioner, he did so in his official
capacity. Second, no sufficient and specific evidence was presented to show that he had acted in
bad faith or gross negligence in that negotiation. Third, he did not hold himself personally and
solidarily liable with the corporation. Neither is there any specific provision of law making him
personally answerable for the subject corporate acts.
On the other hand, Respondents Cu and Hong signed the Promissory Note without the word "by"
preceding their signatures, atop the designation "Maker/Borrower" and the printed name of the
corporation, as follows:
__(Sgd) Cu/Hong__
(Maker/Borrower)
MINDANAO FERROALLOY
While their signatures appear without qualification, the inference that they signed in their individual
capacities is negated by the following facts: 1) the name and the address of the corporation
appeared on the space provided for "Maker/Borrower"; 2) Respondents Cu and Hong had only one
set of signatures on the instrument, when there should have been two, if indeed they had intended
to be bound solidarily -- the first as representatives of the corporation, and the second as
Page | 105
themselves in their individual capacities; 3) they did not sign under the spaces provided for "Co-
maker," and neither were their addresses reflected there; and 4) at the back of the Promissory
Note, they signed above the words "Authorized Representative."
Solidary Liability
Not Lightly Inferred
Moreover, it is axiomatic that solidary liability cannot be lightly inferred. 14 Under Article 1207 of the
Civil Code, "there is a solidary liability only when the obligation expressly so states, or when the law
or the nature of the obligation requires solidarity." Since solidary liability is not clearly expressed in
the Promissory Note and is not required by law or the nature of the obligation in this case, no
conclusion of solidary liability can be made.
Furthermore, nothing supports the alleged joint liability of the individual petitioners because, as
correctly pointed out by the two lower courts, the evidence shows that there is only one debtor: the
corporation. In a joint obligation, there must be at least two debtors, each of whom is liable only for
a proportionate part of the debt; and the creditor is entitled only to a proportionate part of the
credit.15
Moreover, it is rather late in the day to raise the alleged joint liability, as this matter has not been
pleaded before the trial and the appellate courts. Before the lower courts, petitioner anchored its
claim solely on the alleged joint and several (or solidary) liability of the individual respondents.
Petitioner must be reminded that an issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, but
seasonably in the proceedings before the trial court.16
So too, the Promissory Note in question is a negotiable instrument. Under Section 19 of the
Negotiable Instruments Law, agents or representatives may sign for the principal. Their authority
may be established, as in other cases of agency. Section 20 of the law provides that a person
signing "for and on behalf of a [disclosed] principal or in a representative capacity x x x is not liable
on the instrument if he was duly authorized."
The authority of Respondents Cu and Hong to sign for and on behalf of the corporation has been
amply established by the Resolution of Minfaco’s Board of Directors, stating that "Atty. Ricardo P.
Guevara (President and Chairman), or Ms. Teresita R. Cu (Vice President), acting together with Mr.
Jong Won Hong (Vice President), be as they are hereby authorized for and in behalf of the
Corporation to: 1. Negotiate with and obtain from (petitioner) the extension of an omnibus line in the
aggregate of ₱30 million x x x; and 2. Execute and deliver all documentation necessary to
implement all of the foregoing."17
Further, the agreement involved here is a "contract of adhesion," which was prepared entirely by
one party and offered to the other on a "take it or leave it" basis. Following the general rule, the
contract must be read against petitioner, because it was the party that prepared it,18 more so
because a bank is held to high standards of care in the conduct of its business. 19
In the totality of the circumstances, we hold that Respondents Cu and Hong clearly signed the Note
merely as representatives of Minfaco.
No Reason to Pierce
the Corporate Veil
Evidence Cases
Under certain circumstances, courts may treat a corporation as a mere aggroupment of persons, to
whom liability will directly attach. The distinct and separate corporate personality may be
disregarded, inter alia, when the corporate identity is used to defeat public convenience, justify a
wrong, protect a fraud, or defend a crime. Likewise, the corporate veil may be pierced when the
corporation acts as a mere alter ego or business conduit of a person, or when it is so organized and
controlled and its affairs so conducted as to make it merely an instrumentality, agency, conduit or
adjunct of another corporation.20 But to disregard the separate juridical personality of a corporation,
the wrongdoing must be clearly and convincingly established; it cannot be presumed.21
Petitioner contends that the corporation was used to protect the fraud foisted upon it by the
individual respondents. It argues that the CA failed to consider the following badges of fraud and
evident bad faith: 1) the individual respondents misrepresented the corporation as solvent and
financially capable of paying its loan; 2) they knew that prices of ferrosilicon were declining in the
world market when they secured the loan in June 1991; 3) not a single centavo was paid for the
loan; and 4) the corporation suspended its operations shortly after the loan was granted. 22
Fraud refers to all kinds of deception -- whether through insidious machination, manipulation,
concealment or misrepresentation -- that would lead an ordinarily prudent person into error after
taking the circumstances into account.23 In contracts, a fraud known as dolo causante or causal
fraud24 is basically a deception used by one party prior to or simultaneous with the contract, in order
to secure the consent of the other.25 Needless to say, the deceit employed must be serious. In
contradistinction, only some particular or accident of the obligation is referred to by incidental fraud
or dolo incidente,26 or that which is not serious in character and without which the other party would
have entered into the contract anyway.27
Fraud must be established by clear and convincing evidence; mere preponderance of evidence is
not adequate.28Bad faith, on the other hand, imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity
and conscious doing of a wrong, not simply bad judgment or negligence.29 It is synonymous with
fraud, in that it involves a design to mislead or deceive another.30
Unfortunately, petitioner was unable to establish clearly and precisely how the alleged fraud was
committed. It failed to establish that it was deceived into granting the loans because of respondents’
misrepresentations and/or insidious actions. Quite the contrary, circumstances indicate the
weakness of its submission.
First, petitioner does not deny that the ₱5 million loan represented the consolidation of two
loans,31 granted long before the bank required the individual respondents to execute the
Promissory Note, Trust Receipt Agreement, Quedan or Deed of Assignment. Hence, no words, acts
or machinations arising from any of those instruments could have been used by them prior to or
simultaneous with the execution of the contract, or even as some accident or particular of the
obligation.
Second, petitioner bank was in a position to verify for itself the solvency and trustworthiness of
respondent corporation. In fact, ordinary business prudence required it to do so before granting the
multimillion loans. It is of common knowledge that, as a matter of practice, banks conduct
exhaustive investigations of the financial standing of an applicant debtor, as well as appraisals of
collaterals offered as securities for loans to ensure their prompt and satisfactory payment. To
uphold petitioner’s cry of fraud when it failed to verify the existence of the goods covered by the
Trust Receipt Agreement and the Quedan is to condone its negligence.
Judicial Notice
of Bank Practices
Page | 106
This point brings us to the alleged error of the appellate court in taking judicial notice of the practice For the same reason, attorney’s fees cannot be granted. Article 2208 of the Civil Code states that in
of banks in conducting background checks on borrowers and sureties. While a court is not the absence of a stipulation, attorney’s fees cannot be recovered, except in any of the following
mandated to take judicial notice of this practice under Section 1 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, it circumstances:
nevertheless may do so under Section 2 of the same Rule. The latter Rule provides that a court, in
its discretion, may take judicial notice of "matters which are of public knowledge, or ought to be
"(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;
known to judges because of their judicial functions."

"(2) When the defendant’s act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or
Thus, the Court has taken judicial notice of the practices of banks and other financial institutions.
to incur expenses to protect his interest;
Precisely, it has noted that it is their uniform practice, before approving a loan, to investigate,
examine and assess would-be borrowers’ credit standing or real estate32 offered as security for the
loan applied for. "(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff;

Second Issue: "(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff;

Award of Damages "(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff’s
plainly valid, just and demandable claim;
The individual respondents were awarded moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees
under Articles 19 to 21 of the Civil Code, on the basic premise that the suit was clearly malicious "(6) In actions for legal support;
and intended merely to harass.
"(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and skilled workers;
Article 19 of the Civil Code expresses the fundamental principle of law on human conduct that a
person "must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
"(8) In actions for indemnity under workmen’s compensation and employer’s liability laws;
every one his due, and observe honesty and good faith." Under this basic postulate, the exercise of
a right, though legal by itself, must nonetheless be done in accordance with the proper norm. When
the right is exercised arbitrarily, unjustly or excessively and results in damage to another, a legal "(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime;
wrong is committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible.33
"(10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded;
To be liable under the abuse-of-rights principle, three elements must concur: a) a legal right or duty,
b) its exercise in bad faith, and c) the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.34 Needless to
say, absence of good faith35 must be sufficiently established. "(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney’s fees and
expenses of litigation should be recovered."

Article 20 makes "[e]very person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to
another" liable for damages. Upon the other hand, held liable for damages under Article 21 is one In the instant case, none of the enumerated grounds for recovery of attorney’s fees are present.
who "willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy." WHEREFORE, this Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision is AFFIRMED, but
the award of moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees is DELETED. No costs.
For damages to be properly awarded under the above provisions, it is necessary to demonstrate by
clear and convincing evidence36 that the action instituted by petitioner was clearly so unfounded SO ORDERED.
and untenable as to amount to gross and evident bad faith.37 To justify an award of damages for
malicious prosecution, one must prove two elements: malice or sinister design to vex or humiliate
and want of probable cause.38 Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, and Garcia, JJ., concur.

Petitioner was proven wrong in impleading Spouses Guevara and Hong. Beyond that fact, however, Republic of the Philippines
respondents have not established that the suit was so patently malicious as to warrant the award of SUPREME COURT
damages under the Civil Code’s Articles 19 to 21, which are grounded on malice or bad faith.39 With
the presumption of law on the side of good faith, and in the absence of adequate proof of malice, SECOND DIVISION
we find that petitioner impleaded the spouses because it honestly believed that the conjugal
partnerships had benefited from the proceeds of the loan, as stated in their Complaint and
subsequent pleadings. Its act does not amount to evident bad faith or malice; hence, an award for G.R. No. 159467 December 9, 2005
damages is not proper. The adverse result of an act per se neither makes the act wrongful nor
subjects the actor to the payment of damages, because the law could not have meant to impose a
penalty on the right to litigate.40

Evidence Cases Page | 107

SPOUSES NORA SAGUID and ROLANDO P. SAGUID, Petitioners,
vs.
SECURITY FINANCE, INC., Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Assailed in a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
are the decision1of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68129 dated 31 January 2003
reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 135, in Civil Case
No. 98-1803, dated 07 July 2000, ordering respondent Security Finance, Inc. to pay petitioner
Spouses Nora and Rolando Saguid the daily earnings of the seized motor vehicle as well as
damages, attorney’s fees and costs of suit, and its Resolution2 dated 10 June 2003 denying
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
On 30 July 1998, respondent filed a case for Recovery of Possession with Replevin with Alternative
Prayer for Sum of Money and Damages against petitioners and one John Doe in whose possession
and custody the mortgaged property may be found.3 It alleged that petitioners, for value, jointly and
severally executed in its favor a Promissory Note4 in the amount of ₱508,248.00, payable in
monthly installments per schedule indicated therein. To secure payment of the Promissory Note,
petitioners executed a Chattel Mortgage5 over a motor vehicle particularly described as follows:
MAKE : TOYOTA COROLLA XL
MODEL : 1996
ENGINE NO. : 2E-2895512
SERIAL NO. : EE100-9555787
Respondent alleged that petitioners defaulted in complying with the terms and conditions of the
Promissory Note and Chattel Mortgage by failing to pay several monthly installments on the
Promissory Note. As provided for in the Promissory Note and Chattel Mortgage, the failure of the
petitioners to pay any installment when due shall make the entire balance of the obligation
immediately due and payable. The total obligation of petitioners amounted to ₱756,634.64 as of 15
May 1998.6
Despite demand7 for payment or the surrender, if in good order and condition, of the mortgaged
motor vehicle, petitioners failed and refused to comply with the demand. Thus, respondent was
constrained to file the instant case praying that (1) a Writ of Replevin be issued ordering the seizure
of the afore-described vehicle, complete with all its accessories, and that same be delivered to it; or
(2) in the event that manual delivery thereof cannot be effected, order the petitioners to pay the
amount of ₱756,634.64 exclusive of accruing interest and penalty charges thereon at the rate of
five percent (5%) per month until fully paid. In either case, to order petitioners to pay respondent the
amount of ₱189,158.66 as and for attorney’s fees, replevin bond premium and other expenses
incurred in the seizure of the motor vehicle, and costs of suit.
On 03 August 1998, the Hon. Francisco B. Ibay, Presiding Judge, Branch 135, RTC, Makati City,
issued an Order directing the branch sheriff to seize the aforementioned vehicle upon filing of a
Evidence Cases
bond in the amount of ₱1,513,270.00 which is double the value of the property to be seized, and to
take it into his custody upon further orders from the court. 8
Upon being informed by respondent in a Motion for Clarification9 that the reasonable estimated
value of the vehicle involved is ₱150,000.00, the RTC lowered the Replevin Bond to be filed to
₱300,000.0010 which respondent filed on 12 August 1998.
On 12 October 1998, the RTC issued a Writ of Seizure ordering the Branch Sheriff to seize the
vehicle, to keep it in his possession for five (5) days, and then to deliver it to respondent. 11
On 13 October 1998, after service upon petitioners of the copy of the summons with the complaint
and annexes, affidavit, writ of seizure and bond, the vehicle subject of this case was repossessed
by the sheriff upon issuance of the corresponding receipt. On 20 October 1998, the vehicle was
delivered to respondent.12
In their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim,13 petitioners specifically denied the allegations in
the Complaint. They maintained they, whether individually or as spouses, did not and never
executed a Promissory Note and Chattel Mortgage in favor of respondent. They claimed they
bought the car subject of the case in cash as evidenced by the Vehicle Sales Invoice 14 of Toyota
Balintawak, Inc. dated 15 March 1996. Petitioner Nora Saguid alleged that she could not have
physically executed the Promissory Note on 23 April 1996 as she was in Australia when the same
was supposedly executed. On the part of petitioner Rolando Saguid, he admitted that he signed the
promissory note in preparation for an application for loan upon the request of one Sonny Quijano
who promised to facilitate the same for the purchase of another motor vehicle to be converted into a
taxicab, but not with respondent. As compulsory counterclaim, they ask that respondent be ordered
to pay moral, exemplary and actual damages, as well as attorney’s fees and costs of suit.
After pre-trial, the RTC issued a Pre-Trial Order containing the following stipulation of facts:
1. The personal and corporate personalities of the parties;
2. That the promissory note dated April 23, 1996 in the amount of P508,248.00 in favor of plaintiff
was signed by defendant Rolando Saguid; and
3. That the chattel mortgage was signed by defendant Rolando Saguid; . . .15
Trial ensued. The respective evidence of the parties are substantially summarized in the decision of
the RTC.
Evidence of the Petitioners:
The plaintiff presented two (2) witnesses: 1] Rosauro G. Maghirang, Jr., 43 years of age, married,
Assistant Vice-President for Marketing of the plaintiff, and a resident of No. 140 J. Molina Street,
Marikina City; and 2] Antonio B. Placido, 37 years of age, married, an employee of the plaintiff, and
a resident of 263 Santo Cristo Street, Angat, Bulacan.
It can be culled from plaintiff’s evidence that an application [Exhibit A] for a loan to finance the
purchases [of] a new car was filed with the plaintiff. The application was not signed by any of the
defendants. The signature appearing on the application [Exhibit A] belongs to one David Garcia, a
Marketing Assistant of the plaintiff. The application was evaluated and investigated and was
approved. The Promissory Note No. 96-01447 dated April 23, 1996 [Exhibit B] and the Chattel
Page | 108
Mortgage Contract dated September 3, 1996 [Exhibit D] were signed. Submitted to the plaintiff were
postdated checks [Exhibits E, E-1 to E-12]. When deposited these checks were dishonored for the
reason that the account was already closed. The dishonored checks were replaced with
P27,137.67 cash for which O.R. No. 12467 dated June 27, 1996 [Exhibit F]. After the payment
made on June 27, 1996, the checks that subsequently bounced were not replaced. The case was
referred to counsel for collection. A demand letter was delivered by witness Placido to the
residence of the defendants. There being no response from the defendants this case was filed
against them. Placido conducted a surveillance of the place where the vehicle could possibly be
found. He accompanied the sheriff in implementing the writ of seizure. After seizure of the vehicle it
was stowed at the warehouse of plaintiff in Las Pinas.
On cross-examination of Rosauro G. Maghirang, Jr., Assistant Vice-President for Marketing of the
plaintiff, it was established that the mortgage of subject motor vehicle was not registered with the
LTO because the dealer did not submit to plaintiff the certificate of registration. In transactions of
this nature, loan applicants are required to submit the original certificate of registration and the
official receipt. The dealer, Toyota Balintawak, did not send to the plaintiff these documents. 16
Evidence of the Respondent:
Defendants testified for and in their behalf. Zenaida Marquinez Maralit, 33 years of age, single, a
resident of Orlon Street, Litex Village, San Jose, Rodriguez, Rizal, and the Credit and Collection
Head of Toyota Balintawak testified for the defendants. Defendant Rolando bought in cash the
subject motor vehicle from Toyota Balintawak. He was issued Vehicle Delivery Invoice No. 7104
[Exhibit1] and Vehicle Delivery Note No. 7104 [Exhibit 2]. The same vehicle was registered [Exhibit
3]. He identified his signatures in the promissory note [Exhibit B] and in the chattel mortgage
[Exhibit D]. He was asked by one Sonny Quijano to sign these documents in blank on the
representation of the latter that he will help him secure additional capital to enable him to purchase
another taxi.
Rolando met for the first time Sonny Quijano sometime in January 1996 at Toyota Quezon Avenue.
Rolando was then planning to purchase two units of taxi colored white. But at that time there was
only one available unit at Toyota Quezon Avenue. Quijano approached Rolando informing him that
there are units colored white available at Toyota Balintawak and that he will help him secure one.
Rolando was able to secure one. In the month of May, Quijano went to the house of defendants
and asked Rolando if he is still interested in getting additional capital to purchase a taxi. Rolando
was asked to sign documents in blank. The name of the plaintiff does not appear in these
documents. When Rolando asked Quijano why the documents are in blank, Quijano told him just to
sign and that he will take care of everything. Nora did not sign the documents because at that time
she was in Australia. Rolando do (sic) not know what happened to the documents he signed. He
read from the papers that Quijano was shot. He denied the issuance of the checks [Exhibits E, E-1
to E-12]. Defendants received a letter [Exhibit 8] dated February 21, 1997 from De Castro Law
Office. Rolando went to this Law Office and presented his documents evidencing payment of the
subject motor vehicle. He was told by Atty. De Castro that everything is okay and that he will take
care of everything.
On October 28, 1998 at about 7:00 in the morning two [2] units of taxi including subject motor
vehicle were seized by the sheriff assisted by three [3] SWAT members. The boundary of the
subject motor vehicle, which is a taxi, is P750.00 for every 24 hours. From October 28, 1998 to
October 1999 defendants lost P180,000 in income. Defendants retained the services of counsel for
P100,000 plus P1,500 per appearance. With this incident on October 28, 1998, Rolando was
embarrassed in front of his neighbors. For his sufferings Rolando is praying for P1 Million in
damages plus P3 Million in exemplary damages.
Evidence Cases
Witness Maralit corroborated that testimony of Rolando that the subject motor vehicle was
purchased in cash and not through financing. Had subject vehicle been purchased through
financing the original Certificate of Registration and Certificate of Registration would have been
transmitted to the financing company marked by the LTO "encumbered". This did not happen in this
case. Security Finance, the plaintiff in this case was not accredited by Toyota Balintawak not even
in one transaction. The appearance in both Exhibits 1 and 2 of "SPQ Center/Nora Saguid" as
purchaser of the subject motor vehicle was satisfactorily explained by witness Maralit. The subject
motor vehicle was initially reserved by SPQ Center but later on it waived its right in favor of Nora. It
is for this reason that "SPQ Center/Nora Saguid" appears as the purchaser of the vehicle.17
In its decision18 dated 07 July 2000, the RTC ruled in favor of petitioners, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering plaintiff SECURITY FINANCE,
INCORPORATED to pay defendant-spouses ROLANDO and NORA SAGUID:
1. The total amount of the daily earnings of the seized motor vehicle computed from the date of its
seizure on October 28, 1998 up to its return to the defendants, at the rate of P750.00 daily;
2. The amount of P500,000 for moral damages;
3. The amount of P1,000,000 for exemplary damages;
4. The amount P200,000 for and as attorney’s fees; and
5. The Costs.
In reaching its verdict, the RTC ruled that the promissory note and the deed of mortgage were not
valid contracts and were not binding on petitioners. It explained that respondent failed to show with
convincing evidence that it loaned to petitioners the money used in the purchase of the subject
motor vehicle. On the contrary, it found that there was preponderance of evidence showing that the
motor vehicle was purchased in cash by petitioners from Toyota Balintawak, Inc.
Respondent appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals via a Notice of Appeal.19
On 31 January 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision. It reversed and set aside
the decision of the RTC and ruled in favor of respondent. It disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the trial court is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE, and another one is rendered in favor of the plaintiff-appellant. Costs against the
defendants-appellees.20
The Court of Appeals found the ruling of the trial court that there was no valid contract entered into
between the parties on the ground there was no cause or consideration when they executed the
same, and that respondent failed to show with convincing evidence that it loaned the money to
petitioners which was used to purchase the subject motor vehicle, to be bereft of factual and legal
basis. It relied heavily on the admission of petitioner Rolando Saguid during pre-trial and during his
direct-examination that he signed the promissory note dated 23 April 1996 and the chattel mortgage
dated 03 September 1996. It did not give weight to petitioners’ bare denial that they never
transacted with respondent for the subject loan and that they never executed the promissory note
Page | 109
and the deed of chattel mortgage because it belied the admission made by petitioner Rolando
Saguid.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration21 dated 24 February 2003 while respondent filed a
Motion for Clarificatory Judgment22 dated 17 February 2003.
In a resolution dated 10 June 2003, the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration
and granted the Motion for Clarificatory Judgment. It amended the dispostive portion of its 31
January 2003 decision as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the trial court is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE, and another one is rendered in favor of the plaintiff-appellant ordering the
defendants-appellees:
1) To deliver to the plaintiff-appellant the motor vehicle described as follows:
MAKE : Toyota Corolla XL
MODEL : 1996
ENGINE NO. : 2E-2895512
SERIAL NO. : EE100-9555787
2) In the event the manual delivery of the above-described motor vehicle is not feasible, to pay the
plaintiff appellant the amount of ₱508,248.00 plus interest and penalty charges at the legal rate per
annum until fully paid, in line with the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Medel vs. Court
of Appeals, 299 SCRA 481; and
3) To pay the costs of suit.23
Hence, the instant petition, contending that:
I parties; (2) object certain which is the subject matter of the contract; and (3) cause of the obligation
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS ENTERED INTO A TRANSACTION WITH RESPONDENT
CONCERNING THE SUBJECT MOTOR VEHICLE BASED ON THE PROMISSORY NOTE AND
CHATTEL MORTGAGE, DESPITE THE FACT THAT PETITIONER ROLANDO SAGUID’S
ADMISSION OF HAVING SIGNED THE DOCUMENTS WAS MERELY IN PREPARATION FOR A
LOAN APPLICATION PRESENTED TO HIM BY THE LATE SONNY QUIJANO, A CAR SALES
AGENT.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
NOT HOLDING THAT THE PROMISSORY NOTE AND THE DEED OF MORTGAGE ARE NOT
VALID AND NOT BINDING ON THE PETITIONERS CONSIDERING PETITIONER ROLANDO
SAGUID’S EXPLANATION REGARDING HIS ADMISSION AND THE SOLID AND COMPETENT
Evidence Cases
EVIDENCE THAT PETITIONER WIFE WAS NOT IN THE PHILIPPINES AT THE TIME OF THE
EXECUTION OF THE SAID DOCUMENTS BUT WAS IN AUSTRALIA.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE MISAPPREHENSION OF
FACTS AND THE EVIDENCE WHEN IT GRANTED RESPONDENT’S MOTION FOR
CLARIFICATORY JUDGMENT AND ORDERED PETITIONER TO DELIVER THE SUBJECT
MOTOR VEHICLE TO RESPONDENT AND TO PAY RESPONDENT THE AMOUNT OF
P508,248.00 PLUS INTEREST AND PENALTY CHARGES IN CASE MANUAL DELIVERY OF
THE VEHICLE WAS NOT FEASIBLE, OVERLOOKING THE FACT THAT THE SUBJECT MOTOR
VEHICLE WAS ALREADY FORCIBLY CONFISCATED AND SEIZED BY THE SHERIFF BY
VIRTUE OF THE WRIT OF SEIZURE ISSUED BY THE TRIAL COURT AND DULY
ACKNOWLEDGED TO HAVE BEEN RECEIVED BY THE SHERIFF FROM THE PETITIONERS.
Respondent would like to impress on the Court that there is a valid Contract of Loan between it and
petitioners, and that the proceeds of the loan were used to buy the vehicle involved in this case. In
support thereof, it offered, among other things, a Promissory Note24 dated 23 April 1996 and Chattel
Mortgage25 dated 03 September 1996 over the subject vehicle which served as security for the
payment of the amount indicated in the former. On the other hand, petitioners contend that they
neither entered into any contract with respondent nor did they receive any money from it that was
used to buy the subject car. Though petitioner Rolando Saguid admitted that the signatures in the
Promissory Note and Chattel Mortgage are his, he clarified that when he signed said documents
upon the prodding of Sonny Quijano, he signed them in blank. Petitioner Nora Saguid, on her part,
denied signing said documents. She claimed that the signatures purporting to be hers are forgeries
since she was in Australia when said documents were executed.
Petitioners maintained that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that they entered into a transaction
with respondent based on the promissory note and chattel mortgage despite petitioner Rolando
Saguid’s explanation of the circumstances surrounding his signing thereof, and in not holding that
these documents are not valid and binding on them.
To ascertain whether or not petitioners are bound by the promissory note and chattel mortgage, it
must be established that all the elements of a contract of loan are present. Like any other contract,
a contract of loan is governed by the rules as to the requisites and validity of contracts in general. It
is basic and elementary in this jurisdiction that what determines the validity of a contract, in general,
is the presence of the elements constituting the same, namely: (1) consent of the contracting
which is established.26 In this case, petitioners insist the third element is lacking since they never
transacted with respondent for the proceeds of the loan which were used in purchasing the subject
motor vehicle.
The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners transacted with respondent and are bound by the
promissory note and chattel mortgage they signed. It anchored its ruling on the admission of
petitioner Rolando Saguid that he signed said documents. Citing Section 4, Rule 129 27 of the Rules
of Court, it reasoned out that petitioner Rolando Saguid’s bare denial cannot qualify the admission
he made during pre-trial and during trial that they transacted with respondent and executed the
aforesaid documents. It brushed aside the explanation made by petitioner Rolando Saguid that he
signed the same in blank and only as preparation for a loan application presented to him by Sonny
Quijano.
From the record, it is clear that what petitioner Rolando Saguid admitted was only his signatures in
the aforementioned documents and not the contents thereof. In petitioners’ Answer, Rolando
Page | 110
Saguid admitted signing the promissory note in preparation for an application for loan upon the In proving that there is no consideration for the aforementioned documents, petitioners proffered in
request of Sonny Quijano who promised to facilitate the same for the purchase of another motor evidence the following documents that showed that they bought the subject vehicle in cash and not
vehicle to be converted into a taxicab, but not with respondent. During trial, Rolando Saguid in installment basis: (a) Vehicle Sales Invoice No. 7104;32 (b) Vehicle Delivery Note;33 (c) Official
explained the circumstances under which he signed the documents with emphasis that he signed Receipts No. 20864634 and No. 208648;35(d) Certificate of Registration No. 32862328;36 and (e)
them in blank. Official Receipt No. 40459605.37 In addition, Ms. Zenaida Maralit of Toyota Balintawak, Inc.
confirmed that the subject car was indeed paid in cash and not through financing for the reasons
that the originals of the Certificate of Registration and the Official Receipt of the subject vehicle
We find that the Court of Appeals committed an error when it closed its eyes to the clarification
have not been marked as encumbered by the Land Transportation Office and are in the possession
made by petitioner Rolando Saguid on the ground that same belied his admission. The rule that an
of the buyer. She added that respondent is not accredited in Toyota Balintawak, Inc. She testified:
admission cannot be contradicted unless it can be shown that it was made through palpable
mistake or that no such admission was made will not apply under the circumstances obtaining in
this case. It does not follow that the admission of the signatures carries with it the admission of the Q: Madam Witness, do you know if this vehicle was purchased in cash or through financing?
contents of the documents especially when the person who affixed his signatures thereon questions
its execution and the veracity of the details embodied therein. Petitioners could have been bound
A: It was purchased in cash.
by the terms and conditions of the promissory note and chattel mortgage if petitioner Rolando
Saguid admitted not only his signatures but also as to what are contained therein. This is not to be
in the case before us. Petitioners can therefore adduce evidence that would nullify or invalidate Q: What proof do you have to show that it was purchased in cash?
both the promissory note and the chattel mortgage. In other words, they can show that the
elements of the contract of loan are wanting.
A: There was an invoice cash return.

The Court of Appeals held that it was not in a proper position to entangle itself in resolving the
matter as regards the qualification made by petitioner Rolando Saguid on his admission because
whatever the documents he signed in favor of Mr. Quijano is not the concern of the court as the
same is not one of the issues presented before it, and that Mr. Quijano is not a party in the case.
Petitioners claim that if only the Court of Appeals ruled on the matter, it could have ruled in their
favor and sustained the decision of the trial court.
The Court of Appeals should have ruled on the same it being the primal defense of petitioners. It
should not have wholly disregarded the qualification made by petitioner Rolando Saguid
considering that said defense can easily be supported by other competent evidence. Instead of
relying heavily on the admitted signatures, it should have evaluated other evidence that could have
either bolstered or disproved the defense of petitioners.
This did not happen in this case. The Court of Appeals conveniently did not mention in its decision
the testimony of Zenaida M. Maralit, an employee of Toyota Balintawak, Inc., who testified as to the
circumstances on how the subject car was bought, and the documentary evidence that originated
from Toyota Balintawak, Inc. We consider her to be an impartial witness whose testimony is vital in
the proper resolution of this case.
Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the ruling of the trial court that the
promissory note and the deed of chattel mortgage are not valid contracts and are not binding on
them on the ground that the contracts did not contain the essential element of cause. The Court of
Appeals said the trial court did not clearly declare in categorical terms the absence of cause in the
aforesaid contracts and that petitioners failed to disprove that they are debtors of respondent since
it is presumed that the cause exists in the contract.
Under Article 1354 of the Civil Code, it is presumed that consideration28 exists and is lawful unless
the debtor proves the contrary.29 Moreover, under Section 3(r) of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it
is presumed that there is a sufficient consideration for a contract. The presumption that a contract
has sufficient consideration cannot be overthrown by a mere assertion that it has no
consideration.30 To overcome the presumption of consideration, the alleged lack of consideration
must be shown by preponderance of evidence.31
Q: By the way, being the head of the Credit and Collection, what are your duties and functions?
A: We are in-charge of collection, we are in-charge of the documentation with LTO, insurance and
financing documents.
Q: As far as the purchase of vehicle through financing, what is your specific duty?
A: We are the one who asked the client to sign the documents.
Q: Will you tell the Honorable Court what is the procedure in case the vehicle is purchased from
your office through financing?
A: After the client signed the documents, we get all the requirements based on the credit advice
issued by the financing company. So together with the documents and all the requirements, valid
ID, post dated checks, we are the one transmitting them to the financing company and after
processing, the financing company gave us the proceed two to four days after the release of the
vehicle.
Q: As far as the Certificate of Registration and Official Receipt are concerned, what did you do with
them if the vehicle was purchased through financing?
A: If it was through financing, the original Official Receipt and Certificate of Registration goes to the
financing company. We are the one transmitting them. Only the xerox copies of the Official Receipt
and Certificate of Registration go to the client through financing transaction.
Q: As far as the security of the financing company, when it comes to purchase of vehicle through
financing, what do you do with the Official Receipt and Certificate of Registration?
A: The LTO marked there encumbered. It means it was mortgaged to that particular financing
company.

Evidence Cases Page | 111

Q: Where it was marked?
A: At the Certificate of Registration, it was marked encumbered.
Q: On the face?
A: On the face.
Q: Do you have any policy as far as your company is concerned with regards to the purchase of
vehicle through financing?
A: We have only the accredited financing companies.
Q: Is the plaintiff herein, Security Finance, accredited in your company?
A: No, not even in one transaction.
Q: What would be the significance if the original copy of the Certificate of Registration and the
corresponding Official Receipt is in the possession of the buyer?
A: That means it was on cash transaction.38
On the other hand, respondent, through Rosauro G. Maghirang, Jr., Vice-President for Marketing,
said that it paid the dealer in checks and that they have proof of payment. He testified:
Q: Mr. witness, you said you paid the dealer. In what form did you pay the dealer?
A: In checks, sir.
Q: Do you have any proof of your payment?
A: Yes, sir. 39
It is thus clear that the subject car was bought in cash and not through financing via respondent.
We find the evidence presented by respondent to be unreliable and erratic. The testimony of
Rosauro Maghirang, Jr. that respondent paid Toyota Balintawak, Inc. is simply unsubstantiated by
competent evidence. If respondent truly paid the dealer how come it never presented the checks it
used to pay Toyota Balintawak, Inc.? Even assuming arguendo that respondent released the loan
proceeds to petitioners, the same would be inconsistent with its allegation that it was the one that
paid the dealer. Furthermore, another telltale sign that strengthens the claim of petitioners that they
did not transact with respondent for a loan was the fact that the alleged loan/credit application40was
not signed by any or both of them.
Respondent’s contention that petitioners did not deny drawing postdated checks in its favor is
untenable. Petitioner Rolando Saguid categorically denied issuing the check and claimed that the
signatures appearing thereon were not his.41
Evidence Cases
As to the alleged signature of petitioner Nora Saguid in the promissory note, evidence points that
she could not have signed the document she being in Australia when she allegedly executed said
document on 23 April 1996 as established by a certification42 from the Bureau of Immigration that
she left for Sydney, Australia, on 30 September 1995 and returned to the country on 15 June 1996.
From the foregoing, the Court is convinced that petitioners’ allegation of absence of consideration
has been substantiated and the presumption of consideration disproved and overcome. We are of
the mind that petitioners bought the car with their own money. There being no cause or
consideration in the contract of loan allegedly entered into by the parties, the promissory note is not
binding on the petitioners.
As regards the chattel mortgage, it is settled that a mortgage is a mere accessory contract and its
validity would depend on the validity of the loan secured by it.43 The chattel mortgage constituted
over the subject vehicle is an accessory contract to the loan obligation as embodied in the
promissory note. It cannot exist as an independent contract since its consideration is the same as
that of the principal contract. A principal obligation is an indispensable condition for the existence of
an accessory contract.44 Since it has been sufficiently established that there was no cause or
consideration for the promissory note, it follows that the chattel mortgage has no leg to stand on.
Hence, it must be extinguished and cannot have any legal effect on petitioners.
Having ruled that both promissory note and chattel mortgage are not binding on petitioners, the
return of the subject vehicle to petitioners is in order. In case the vehicle can no longer be delivered
in the condition when it was seized, respondent shall pay petitioners the amount of
₱150,000.0045 plus interest of 6% per annum to be computed from 13 October 1998,46 the date
when said vehicle was seized, until finality of judgment after which interest rate shall become 12%
per annum until actual payment.
We now go to the award of damages.
It is well-settled that actual or compensatory damages must be proved and proved with reasonable
degree of certainty. A party is entitled only up to such compensation for the pecuniary loss that he
has duly proven.47 It cannot be presumed.48 Absent proof of the amount of actual damages
sustained, the Court cannot rely on speculations, conjectures, or guesswork as to the fact and
amount of damages, but must depend upon competent proof that they have been suffered by the
injured party and on the best obtainable evidence of the actual amount thereof. 49
In the instant case, the trial court awarded as actual damages the amount of ₱750.00 per day as
daily earnings of the seized vehicle from 28 October 1998 until its return. Same should be deleted
for lack of competent proof. The bare assertion of petitioner Rolando Saguid that the subject vehicle
was earning ₱750.00 a day before it was seized is inadequate, if not speculative, and should not be
accepted because it is not supported by independent evidence. Petitioners should have at least
presented a record or journal that would clearly show how much the vehicle earned in a specific
period. This, petitioners failed to do. Instead, they relied on mere allegations that do not prove
anything.
Petitioners are entitled to moral damages having suffered undue embarrassment when the subject
vehicle was seized from their home. There is no hard-and-fast rule in the determination of what
would be a fair amount of moral damages since each case must be governed by its own peculiar
facts. The yardstick should be that it is not palpably and scandalously excessive. 50 We find the
amount of ₱500,000.00 awarded by the lower court to be excessive. In our view, the award of
₱50,000.00 as moral damages is reasonable under the facts obtaining in this case.
Page | 112
Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the public
good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. 51 When moral
damages are awarded, exemplary damages may also be granted.52 We, however, find the
₱1,000,000.00 awarded by the lower court to be excessive and should accordingly be reduced to
₱50,000.00.
Moreover, attorney’s fees may be awarded when a party is compelled to litigate or incur expenses
to protect his interest by reason of an unjustified act of the other party. 53 Petitioners are entitled
thereto because they were compelled to litigate in order to protect their interest. Moreover, there
being an award for exemplary damages,54 it follows that there should be an award thereof. An
award of ₱20,000.00 will be sufficient as the award of ₱200,000.00 by the RTC is too much.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
68129 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Security Finance, Inc. is ordered to deliver the
possession of the subject vehicle to petitioners, or, in the alternative if such delivery can no longer
be made, to pay petitioners the amount of ₱150,000.00 plus interest of 6% per annum to be
computed from 13 October 1998 until finality of judgment after which interest rate shall become
12% per annum until actual payment. Respondent is also ordered to pay petitioners ₱50,000.00 as
moral
damages, ₱50,000.00 as exemplary damages and ₱20,000.00 by way of attorney’s fees.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. NO. 148273 April 19, 2006
MILAGROS SIMON and LIBORIO BALATICO, Petitioners,
vs.
GUIA W. CANLAS, Respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
dated May 23, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 62789 which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 65, Tarlac City dated July 31, 1998 in Civil Case No. 7384.
The factual background of the case is as follows:
On February 11, 1991, Edgar H. Canlas (Edgar) filed a complaint for judicial foreclosure of real
estate mortgage against Milagros Simon (Milagros) and her husband, Liborio Balatico (petitioners).
In the complaint, Edgar alleges that: on September 10, 1987, Milagros obtained a loan from him in
the amount of P220,000.00 secured by a real estate mortgage2 over her paraphernal property, a
748-square meter parcel of land located at San Nicolas, Victoria, Tarlac, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 139884; the loan was payable within a period of three years or until
Evidence Cases
September 18, 1990; Milagros defaulted in the payment of the loan and repeated demands for
payment went unheeded, prompting the filing of a case in court.3
On March 25, 1991, petitioners filed their Answer with Counterclaim, alleging that Milagros never
transacted any business with Edgar and she did not receive the consideration of the alleged
mortgage.4
On March 26, 1991, Edgar filed his Reply and Answer to Counterclaim, reiterating validity and due
execution of the real estate mortgage.5
On November 12, 1991, with leave of court,6 petitioners filed a Third-Party Complaint against
Virginia Canlas (Virginia) and Aurelia Delos Reyes (Aurelia), claiming that they duped Milagros to
part with her title and sign the mortgage documents without giving her the consideration and
refusing to return her title when demanded.7
On November 18, 1991, Virginia and Aurelia filed their Answer with Counterclaim to Third-Party
Complaint, alleging that the complaint states no cause of action against them since they are not
privies to the real estate mortgage and Aurelia is only a witness to the mortgage document.8
On November 28, 1991, petitioners filed their Reply and Answer to Counterclaim, reiterating their
claims in the third-party complaint.9
Edgar died during the pendency of the case. On December 4, 1991, upon proper motion, 10 the RTC
ordered that Edgar be substituted by his wife, Guia W. Canlas (respondent), as plaintiff. 11
On August 12, 1996, the RTC issued a pre-trial order stating that the parties failed to arrive at a
settlement. However, they agreed to stipulate on the following: "[t]hat the defendant executed a
deed of real estate mortgage in favor of the plaintiff involving a parcel of land covered by TCT No.
139884 located at San Nicolas, Victoria, Tarlac."12
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued with respondent presenting her witnesses, namely: Nelson
Nulud, the records custodian of the Registry of Deeds of Tarlac; Aurelia, the third-party defendant
and one of the instrumental witnesses to the real estate mortgage; and respondent herself. When
petitioners’ turn came, they presented Crisostomo Astrero, the other instrumental witness to the
real estate mortgage. 1avvphil.net
On April 15, 1998, petitioner’s counsel, Atty. Norberto De Jesus, filed an Ex-Parte Urgent Motion for
Postponement since he is busy campaigning as a candidate in the coming elections. 13 There being
no objection from respondent, the RTC reset the hearing to May 28, 1998.14
On May 28, 1998, Atty. De Jesus and petitioners failed to appear in court. The RTC reset the
hearing on June 17, 1998 with a warning that if the petitioners will still fail to appear on said date,
they will be considered to have waived their right to present further evidence.15
On June 17, 1998, Atty. De Jesus failed to appear in court but petitioners were present. Milagros
informed the RTC that Atty. De Jesus withdrew his appearance as their counsel. In view thereof,
the RTC directed petitioners to secure the services of another counsel and the hearing was reset to
June 24, 1998 with a warning that should petitioners still fail to present evidence at said hearing,
they will be considered to have waived their right to present further evidence.16 On June 23, 1998,
Atty. De Jesus filed his Withdrawal of Appearance as Counsel for the Defendants with the
conformity of Milagros.17
Page | 113
On June 24, 1998, Milagros informed the RTC that they have retained Atty. Alejo Y. Sedico 18 as
new counsel. The hearing was again reset to July 2, 1998 with the final warning that should
petitioners’ witnesses fail to appear at the said hearing, they would be considered to have waived
their right to present further evidence.19
On July 1, 1998, Atty. Sedico formally filed his Entry of Appearance with Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to
Reset, praying that the hearing scheduled on July 2, 1998 be reset to August 12, 1998 due to
conflict of schedule and his trial calendar for July is fully occupied, as well as to give him more time
to study the case since he had just been retained.20
On July 2, 1998, the RTC allowed, in the interest of justice, the resetting of the hearing for
presentation of petitioners’ evidence for the last time on July 15, 1998. The RTC directed petitioners
to secure the services of a counsel of their choice to represent them in the said hearing considering
that it postponed motu propio the hearing in the interest of justice over the vigorous objection of the
respondent due to failure of petitioners’ counsel to appear for three successive times. It warned
petitioners that in case they would be unable to present evidence in the next scheduled hearing,
they would be deemed to have waived their right to present further evidence. 21
On July 9, 1998, Atty. Sedico filed an Urgent Motion to Reset the scheduled hearing on July 15,
1998 due to a previously scheduled hearing on the same date of Criminal Case Nos. 6463 to 6510
for Estafa entitled "People of the Philippines v. Eddie Sentero" before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 172, Valenzuela. He reiterated that his trial calendar for the whole month of July is fully
occupied and requested the hearing be reset to August 10 or 19, 1998.22
At the scheduled hearing on July 15, 1998, the RTC was apprised of the Urgent Motion to Reset
filed by petitioners’ counsel. In view of the vigorous objection of respondent’s counsel on the ground
that the case has been postponed several times at petitioners’ instance, the RTC denied the motion
to reset and petitioners were deemed to have waived their right to present evidence. The case was
then considered submitted for decision.23
Sixteen days later, on July 31, 1998, the RTC rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff having substantiated her claim by a preponderance of evidence, this
Court hereby renders judgment in her favor, ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiff within a
period of ninety (90) days from the entry of judgment hereof, the following sums of:
(1) P220,000.00, representing the principal obligation plus interest thereof of 12% per
annum from the filing of the complaint until fully paid;
(2) P30,000.00 as attorney’s fees; and
(3) The costs of suit.
It is further adjudged that in the event defendants default in the payment of the above determined
amounts, Lot No. 2763, with an area of 748 square meters situated in San Nicolas, Victoria, Tarlac
and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 13984 – Tarlac Registry, particularly identified and
described in the Real Estate Mortgage contract (Exhibit "A"), shall be sold at public auction to
satisfy this judgment.
SO ORDERED.24
Evidence Cases
The RTC held that Milagros executed a deed of real estate mortgage in favor of Edgar and she
received the consideration for the mortgage in the amount of P220,000.00; that petitioners’ inaction
for three years before the filing of the complaint against them to protest the alleged non-receipt of
the consideration for the mortgage casts serious doubts on their claim; and that the deed of real
estate mortgage was duly notarized and assumed the character of a public instrument.
On September 2, 1998, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, claiming that they were
denied due process when the RTC decided the case without petitioners’ evidence. 25 On October
16, 1998, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration, holding that petitioners were given ample
opportunity to hire a counsel, prepare for trial and adduce evidence, which they took for granted
and they should bear the fault.26
Dissatisfied, petitioners filed an appeal with the CA. On May 23, 2001, the CA affirmed the decision
of the RTC.27The CA ruled that petitioners were not denied due process since they were duly
accorded all the opportunities to be heard and present evidence to substantiate their defense but
they forfeited their right for not appearing in court together with their counsel at the scheduled
hearings; that since Milagros admitted the existence, due execution, authenticity and validity of the
Deed of Real Estate Mortgage during the Pre-Trial Conference on June 7, 1995, absence of
consideration is no longer an issue; that, in any case, the amount of P220,000.00 was actually
received by Milagros per the testimony of Aurelia; that petitioners slept on their rights, if they had
any, since they never lifted a finger to protect and preserve their alleged rights and interests; and
that the mortgaged property is not conjugal property but the exclusive property of Milagros which
she could validly dispose of or encumber without her husband’s consent.
The CA merely noted that the RTC failed to dispose of petitioners’ third-party complaint and without
any further discussion, dismissed the third-party complaint in the dispositive portion of its decision,
to wit:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto as to the main case. The
third-party complaint is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.28
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari anchored on the following Assignment of Errors:
1. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND ACTED WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION OR IN EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT UPHELD THE VALIDITY OF THE QUESTIONED REAL
ESTATE MORTAGE EVEN AS THERE WAS LACK OF CONSIDERATION AND THAT
THE SAME WAS EXECUTED THROUGH FRAUDULENTLY [sic] SCHEME;
2. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND ACTED WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION OR IN EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT RULED THAT THE DUE EXECUTION OF THE REAL
ESTATE MORTGAGE WAS ADMITTED WHILE WHAT WAS ADMITTED ONLY IS ITS
EXECUTION;
3. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND ACTED WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION OR IN EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT RULED THAT THE SUBJECT REAL PROPERTY IS
PARAPHERNAL EVEN AS EXISTING LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE HAD
CONSIDERED IT CONJUGAL OR ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY OF PROPERTY;
Page | 114
 4. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND ACTED WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION OR IN EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT RULED THAT DESPITE OF [sic] HAVING DENIED
PETITIONER TO BE REPRESENT [sic] BY A COUNSEL OF CHOICE DUE PROCESS
IS SATISFIED.29
Petitioners contend that the real estate mortgage was fraudulently executed and there was lack of
consideration but material facts relating thereto were not fully ventilated because the RTC denied
petitioners’ motion to reset the hearing. They maintain that they never admitted the due execution
of the real estate mortgage, but only its execution or existence. They further insist that the
mortgaged property is conjugal, not paraphernal, and therefore, Milagros could not dispose of or
encumber without her husband’s consent; and the CA disregarded Article 9930 of the Family Code
which provides that all the property owned by the spouses at the time of the celebration of the
marriage or acquired thereafter forms part of the community property. Lastly, they submit that while
they were given the opportunity to secure the services of a new counsel to defend them, the RTC’s
apathy to the plight of petitioners’ counsel on the latter’s conflict of schedule amounted to stripping
such right to counsel and denial of due process.
For her part, respondent contends that the petition should be dismissed outright for impleading the
CA as respondent, despite the clear directive of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure against it. She
further points out that the petition lacks verification, a certification against forum shopping, a copy of
the assailed CA decision, and it fails to raise any specific question of law but only presents and
discusses an "assignment of errors."
In any event, even if these procedural defects are disregarded, respondent argues that petitioners
were not denied due process when the RTC denied their motion for postponement since they were
duly accorded all the opportunities to be heard and to present their evidence to substantiate their
defense but they forfeited this right for not appearing in court together with their counsel at the
scheduled hearings. They also aver that the real estate mortgage is valid and duly executed and
the mortgaged property is the paraphernal property of Milagros such that she can validly dispose of
or encumber it without her husband’s consent.
Anent the procedural defects raised by respondent, the Court agrees that the correct procedure, as
mandated by Section 4, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, is not to implead the lower
court which rendered the assailed decision.31 However, impleading the lower court as respondent in
the petition for review on certiorari does not automatically mean the dismissal of the appeal but
merely authorizes the dismissal of the petition.32 Besides, formal defects in petitions are not
uncommon. The Court has encountered previous petitions for review on certiorari that erroneously
impleaded the CA. In those cases, the Court merely called the petitioners’ attention to the defects
and proceeded to resolve the case on their merits.33
The Court finds no reason why it should not afford the same liberal treatment in this case. While
unquestionably, the Court has the discretion to dismiss the appeal for being defective, sound policy
dictates that it is far better to dispose of cases on the merits, rather than on technicality as the latter
approach may result in injustice.34 This is in accordance with Section 6, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure35 which encourages a reading of the procedural requirements in a manner that will
help secure and not defeat justice.36
As to respondent’s claim that the petition lacks verification, a certification against forum shopping
and a copy of the assailed CA decision, the Court has carefully examined the rollo of the case and
found them to be attached to the petition.37
Evidence Cases
Anent respondent’s submission that the petition failed to raise a question of law, the Court
disagrees. For a question to be one of law, it must not involve an examination of the probative value
of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them.38 Petitioners’ contention that they were
denied substantive due process is a pure question of law. 39
As a rule, the grant or denial of a motion for postponement is addressed to the sound discretion of
the court, which should always be predicated on the consideration that more than the mere
convenience of the courts or of the parties in the case, the ends of justice and fairness should be
served thereby. After all, postponements and continuances are part and parcel of our procedural
system of dispensing justice."40 When no substantial rights are affected and the intention to delay is
not manifest with the corresponding motion to transfer the hearing having been filed accordingly, it
is sound judicial discretion to allow the same to the end that the merits of the case may be fully
ventilated.41 Thus, in considering motions for postponements, two things must be borne in mind: (1)
the reason for the postponement, and (2) the merits of the case of the movant.42 Unless grave
abuse of discretion is shown, such discretion will not be interfered with either by mandamus or
appeal.43
In the present case, there are circumstances that justify postponement of the July 15, 1998 hearing.
Atty. Sedico had only been formally retained as petitioners’ new counsel as of July 1, 1998, or
merely two weeks before July 15, 1998. Atty. Sedico also had a previously intransferable hearing in
a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 172, Valenzuela scheduled on the same
date of July 15, 1998. The distance factor, from Valenzuela to Tarlac, is enough consideration to
call for postponement. Moreover, Atty. Sedico twice informed the RTC that his entire calendar for
July is already full such that he requested specific dates in August for the hearing. 44 The motion to
reset the hearing has not been shown to be manifestly dilatory. Besides, except for the May 28,
1998 scheduled hearing,45 petitioners have always been present in court. They cannot be said to
have lost interest in fighting the civil case to the end; only that Atty. De Jesus withdrew his
appearance as their counsel and petitioners had to look for new counsel to take their case on short
notice. Absolutely wanting from the records is any evidence that the change of counsel was
intended to delay the proceedings. In fact, only 48 days have lapsed from the time Atty. De Jesus
failed to appear on May 28, 199846 to the time when Atty. Sedico’s motion to reset was denied on
July 15, 1998.47 Such intervening time cannot be said to have greatly impaired the substantial rights
of respondent. Thus, absent unreasonable delay and manifest intent to employ dilatory tactic
prejudicial to the respondent and trifling court processes, Atty. Sedico’s request for resetting should
have been granted.
It cannot be disputed that the case has been pending since February 11 1991,48 or more than
seven years until petitioners were able to start their presentation of their evidence on March 11,
1998.49
The Court is as aware as anyone of the need for the speedy disposition of cases. However, it must
be emphasized that speed alone is not the chief objective of a trial. It is the careful and deliberate
consideration for the administration of justice, a genuine respect for the rights of all parties and the
requirements of procedural due process, and an adherence to this Court’s standing admonition that
the disposition of cases should always be predicated on the consideration that more than the mere
convenience of the courts and of the parties in the case, the ends of justice and fairness would be
served thereby. These are more important than a race to end the trial.50Indeed, court litigations are
primarily for the search for truth, and a liberal interpretation of the rules by which both parties are
given the fullest opportunity to adduce proofs is the best way to ferret out such truth. 51
Ironically, the precipitate action of the RTC prolonged the litigation and unnecessarily delayed the
case, in the process, causing the very evil it apparently sought to avoid. Instead of unclogging
dockets, it has actually increased the workload of the justice system as a whole. Such action does
not inspire public confidence in the administration of justice.
Page | 115
Moreover, it is noted that petitioners filed a third-party complaint which the RTC simply disregarded.
On the other hand, the CA, while stating in its Decision that "[a]ll thus told, we find no reversible
error in the judgment of the trial court, except that it failed to dispose of the third-party
complaint,"52 it simply proceeded to dismiss the third-party complaint in the dispositive portion of
herein assailed decision, without giving any reason or justification therefor.
As to the effect of petitioners’ admission of the due execution of the real estate mortgage during the
pre-trial conference, it must be noted that in Benguet Exploration, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 53 this
Court ruled that the admission of the genuineness and due execution of a document simply means
that the party whose signature it bears admits that he voluntarily signed the document or it was
signed by another for him and with his authority; that at the time it was signed it was in words and
figures exactly as set out in the pleading of the party relying upon it; that the document was
delivered; and that any formalities required by law, such as a seal, an acknowledgment, or revenue
stamp, which it lacks, are waived by him. However, it does not preclude a party from arguing
against it by evidence of fraud, mistake, compromise, payment, statute of limitations, estoppel and
want of consideration. Petitioners therefore are not barred from presenting evidence regarding their
claim of want of consideration.
It bears stressing that the matter of absence of consideration and alleged fraudulent scheme
perpetuated by third-party defendants, being evidentiary, should be threshed out in a proper trial.
To deny petitioners their right to present evidence constitutes a denial of due process, since there
are issues that cannot be decided without a trial of the case on the merits.
Ordinarily, when there is sufficient evidence before the Court to enable it to resolve the fundamental
issues, the Court will dispense with the regular procedure of remanding the case to the lower court,
in order to avoid further delays in the resolution of the case.54 However, a remand in this case,
while time-consuming, is necessary, because the proceedings had in the RTC are grossly
inadequate to settle factual issues. Petitioners were unduly deprived of the full opportunity to
present evidence on the merits of their defense and third-party complaint.
Considering the foregoing, the Court need not delve on the other issues raised by petitioners.
Suffice it to say that such matters are best decided by the RTC only after full reception of
petitioners’ evidence.
WHEREFORE, the present petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated May 23, 2001 of the
Court of Appeals and the Decision dated July 31, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 65,
Tarlac City in Civil Case No. 7384, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to
the said Regional Trial Court for reception of petitioners’ evidence and further proceedings.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 165987 March 31, 2006
JOSHUA S. ALFELOR and MARIA KATRINA S. ALFELOR, Petitioners,
vs.
JOSEFINA M. HALASAN, and THE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
Evidence Cases
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking to nullify the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 74757, as well as the Resolution 2 dated June 28, 2004 denying the motion
for reconsideration thereof.
On January 30, 1998, the children and heirs of the late spouses Telesforo and Cecilia Alfelor filed a
Complaint for Partition3 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City. Among the plaintiffs
were Teresita Sorongon and her two children, Joshua and Maria Katrina, who claimed to be the
surviving spouse of Jose Alfelor, one of the children of the deceased Alfelor Spouses. The case,
docketed as Civil Case No. 26,047-98, was raffled to Branch 17 of said court.
On October 20, 1998, respondent Josefina H. Halasan filed a Motion for Intervention, 4 alleging as
follows:
1. That she has legal interest in the matter of litigation in the above-entitled case for
partition between plaintiffs and defendants;
2. That she is the surviving spouse and primary compulsory heir of Jose K. Alfelor, one of
the children and compulsory heirs of Telesforo I. Alfelor whose intestate estate is subject
to herein special proceedings for partition;
3. That herein intervenor had not received even a single centavo from the share of her
late husband Jose K. Alfelor to the intestate estate of Telesforo K. Alfelor.
WHEREFORE, movant prays that she be allowed to intervene in this case and to submit attached
Answer in Intervention.5
Josefina attached to said motion her Answer in Intervention,6 claiming that she was the surviving
spouse of Jose. Thus, the alleged second marriage to Teresita was void ab initio for having been
contracted during the subsistence of a previous marriage. Josefina further alleged that Joshua and
Maria Katrina were not her husband’s children. Josefina prayed, among others, for the appointment
of a special administrator to take charge of the estate. Josefina attached to her pleading a copy of
the marriage contract7 which indicated that she and Jose were married on February 1, 1956.
Since petitioners opposed the motion, the judge set the motion for hearing. Josefina presented the
marriage contract as well as the Reply-in- Intervention8 filed by the heirs of the deceased, where
Teresita declared that she knew "of the previous marriage of the late Jose K. Alfelor with that of the
herein intervenor" on February 1, 1956.9However, Josefina did not appear in court.
Teresita testified before the RTC on February 13, 2002.10 She narrated that she and the deceased
were married in civil rites at Tagum City, Davao Province on February 12, 1966, and that they were
subsequently married in religious rites at the Assumption Church on April 30, 1966. Among those
listed as secondary sponsors were Josefina’s own relatives–Atty. Margarito Halasan, her brother,
and Valentino Halasan, her father.11 While she did not know Josefina personally, she knew that her
husband had been previously married to Josefina and that the two did not live together as husband
and wife. She knew that Josefina left Jose in 1959. Jose’s relatives consented to her (Teresita’s)
marriage with Jose because there had been no news of Josefina for almost ten years. In fact, a few
Page | 116
months after the marriage, Josefina disappeared, and Jose even looked for her in Cebu, Bohol, and
Manila. Despite his efforts, Jose failed to locate Josefina and her whereabouts remained unknown.
Teresita further revealed that Jose told her that he did not have his marriage to Josefina annulled
because he believed in good faith that he had the right to remarry, not having seen her for more
than seven years. This opinion was shared by Jose’s sister who was a judge. Teresita also
declared that she met Josefina in 2001, and that the latter narrated that she had been married three
times, was now happily married to an Englishman and residing in the United States.
On September 13, 2002, Judge Renato A. Fuentes issued an Order12 denying the motion and
dismissed her complaint, ruling that respondent was not able to prove her claim. The trial court
pointed out that the intervenor failed to appear to testify in court to substantiate her claim.
Moreover, no witness was presented to identify the marriage contract as to the existence of an
original copy of the document or any public officer who had custody thereof. According to the court,
the determinative factor in this case was the good faith of Teresita in contracting the second
marriage with the late Jose Alfelor, as she had no knowledge that Jose had been previously
married. Thus, the evidence of the intervenor did not satisfy the quantum of proof required to allow
the intervention. Citing Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals,13 the RTC ruled that while Josefina
submitted a machine copy of the marriage contract, the lack of its identification and the
accompanying testimony on its execution and ceremonial manifestation or formalities required by
law could not be equated to proof of its validity and legality.
The trial court likewise declared that Teresita and her children, Joshua and Maria Katrina, were the
legal and legitimate heirs of the late Jose K. Alfelor, considering that the latter referred to them as
his children in his Statement of Assets and Liabilities, among others. Moreover, the oppositor did
not present evidence to dispute the same. The dispositive portion of the Order reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the evidence of intervenor, Josephina (sic) Halasan through counsel, not
sufficient to prove a preponderance of evidence and compliance with the basic rules of evidence to
proved (sic) the competent and relevant issues of the complaint-in-intervention, as legal heir of the
deceased Jose K. Alfelor, the complaint (sic) of intervention is ordered dismiss (sic) with cost[s] de
oficio.
On the other hand, finding the evidence by Teresita Sorongon Aleflor, oppositor through counsel
sufficient to proved (sic) the requirement of the Rules of Evidence, in accordance with duly
supporting and prevailing jurisprudence, oppositor, Teresita Sorongon Alfelor and her children,
Joshua S. Alfelor and Maria Katrina S. Alfelor, are declared legal and legitimate Heirs of the late
Jose K. Alfelor, for all purposes, to entitled (sic) them, in the intestate estate of the latter in
accordance to (sic) law, of all properties in his name and/or maybe entitled to any testate or
intestate proceedings of his predecessor-[in]-interest, and to receive such inheritance, they are
legally entitled, along with the other heirs, as the case maybe (sic). 13
Josefina filed a Motion for Reconsideration,15 insisting that under Section 4, Rule 129 of the
Revised Rules of Court, an admission need not be proved. She pointed out that Teresita admitted
in her Reply in Intervention dated February 22, 1999 that she (Teresita) knew of Jose’s previous
marriage to her. Teresita also admitted in her testimony that she knew of the previous
marriage.16 Since the existence of the first marriage was proven in accordance with the basic rules
of evidence, pursuant to paragraph 4, Article 80 of the New Civil Code, the second marriage was
void from the beginning. Moreover, contrary to the ruling of the trial court, Article 83 of the Civil
Code provides that the person entitled to claim good faith is the "spouse present" (thus, the
deceased Jose and not Teresita). Josefina concluded that if the validity of the second marriage
were to be upheld, and at the same time admit the existence of the second marriage, an absurd
situation would arise: the late Jose Alfelor would then be survived by two legitimate spouses.
Evidence Cases
The trial court denied the motion in its Order17 dated October 30, 2002.
Aggrieved, Josefina filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA, alleging that the
RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in declaring
that she failed to prove the fact of her marriage to Jose, in considering the bigamous marriage valid
and declaring the second wife as legal heir of the deceased. Josefina also stressed that Articles 80
and 83 of the New Civil Code provide for a presumption of law that any subsequent marriage is null
and void. She insisted that no evidence was presented to prove that she had been absent for seven
consecutive years before the second marriage.
In their comment, Teresita and her children countered that anyone who claims to be the legal wife
must show proof thereof. They pointed out that Josefina failed to present any of the following to
prove the fact of the previous marriage: the testimony of a witness to the matrimony, the couple’s
public and open cohabitation as husband and wife after the alleged wedding; the birth and the
baptismal certificates of children during such union, and other subsequent documents mentioning
such union. Regarding Teresita’s alleged admission of the first marriage in her Reply in Intervention
dated February 22, 1999, petitioners claim that it was mere hearsay, without probative value, as
she heard of the alleged prior marriage of decedent Jose Alfelor to Josefina only from other
persons, not based on her own personal knowledge. They also pointed out that Josefina did not
dispute the fact of having left and abandoned Jose after their alleged marriage in 1956, and only
appeared for the first time in 1988 during the filing of the case for partition of the latter’s share in his
parents’ estate. They further pointed out that Josefina does not even use the surname of the
deceased Alfelor. Contrary to the allegations of Josefina, paragraph 2, Article 83 of the Civil Code,
now Article 41 of the Family Code, is applicable. Moreover, her inaction all this time brought to
question her claim that she had not been heard of for more than seven years.
In its Decision dated November 5, 2003, the CA reversed the ruling of the trial court. It held that
Teresita had already admitted (both verbally and in writing) that Josefina had been married to the
deceased, and under Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Evidence, a judicial admission no
longer requires proof. Consequently, there was no need to prove and establish the fact that Josefa
was married to the decedent. Citing Santiago v. De los Santos,18the appellate court ruled that an
admission made in a pleading cannot be controverted by the party making such admission, and is
conclusive as to such party; and all contrary or inconsistent proofs submitted by the party who
made the admission should be ignored whether objection is interposed by the other party or not.
The CA concluded that the trial court thus gravely abused its discretion in ordering the dismissal of
Josefina’s Complaint-in-Intervention. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the assailed orders, having been issued with grave
abuse of discretion are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Resultantly, the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 17, Davao City, is ordered to admit petitioner’s complaint in intervention and to forthwith
conduct the proper proceeding with dispatch. No costs.
SO ORDERED.19
Thus, Joshua and Maria Katrina Alfelor filed the instant petition, assailing the ruling of the appellate
court.
Petitioners limit the issue to the determination of whether or not the CA erred in ordering the
admission of private respondent’s intervention in S.P. Civil Case No. 26,047-98. They insist that in
setting aside the Orders of the trial court, dated September 13, 2002 and October 30, 2002, the CA
completely disregarded the hearsay rule. They aver that while Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Revised
Rules of Evidence provides that an admission does not require proof, such admission may be
contradicted by showing that it was made through palpable mistake. Moreover, Teresita’s statement
Page | 117
in the Reply-in-Intervention dated February 22, 1999, admitting knowledge of the alleged first
marriage, is without probative value for being hearsay.
Private respondent, for her part, reiterates that the matters involved in this case fall under Section
4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Evidence, and thus qualify as a judicial admission which does
not require proof. Consequently, the CA did not commit any palpable error when it ruled in her
favor.
Petitioners counter that while Teresita initially admitted knowledge of Jose’s previous marriage to
private respondent in the said Reply-in- Intervention, Teresita also testified during the hearing, for
the purpose, that the matter was merely "told" to her by the latter, and thus should be considered
hearsay. They also point out that private respondent failed to appear and substantiate her
Complaint-in-Intervention before the RTC, and only submitted a machine copy of a purported
marriage contract with the deceased Jose Alfelor.
The issue in this case is whether or not the first wife of a decedent, a fact admitted by the other
party who claims to be the second wife, should be allowed to intervene in an action for partition
involving the share of the deceased "husband" in the estate of his parents.
The petition is dismissed.
The fact of the matter is that Teresita Alfelor and her co-heirs, petitioners herein, admitted the
existence of the first marriage in their Reply- in-Intervention filed in the RTC, to wit:
1.1. Plaintiff Teresita S. Alfelor admits knowledge of the previous marriage of the late Jose K.
Alfelor, with that of the herein intervenor were married on February 1, 1956; 20
Likewise, when called to testify, Teresita admitted several times that she knew that her late
husband had been previously married to another. To the Court’s mind, this admission constitutes a
"deliberate, clear and unequivocal" statement; made as it was in the course of judicial proceedings,
such statement qualifies as a judicial admission.21A party who judicially admits a fact cannot later
challenge that fact as judicial admissions are a waiver of proof;22production of evidence is
dispensed with.23 A judicial admission also removes an admitted fact from the field of
controversy.24 Consequently, an admission made in the pleadings cannot be controverted by the
party making such admission and are conclusive as to such party, and all proofs to the contrary or
inconsistent therewith should be ignored, whether objection is interposed by the party or not.25 The
allegations, statements or admissions contained in a pleading are conclusive as against the
pleader. A party cannot subsequently take a position contrary of or inconsistent with what was
pleaded.26
On the matter of the propriety of allowing her motion for intervention, the pertinent provision of the
Revised Rules of Court is Section 1, Rule 19, which provides:
SEC. 1. Who may intervene. – A person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the
success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely
affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer
thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The court shall consider
whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the
original parties, and whether or not the intervenor’s rights may be fully protected in a separate
proceeding.
Evidence Cases
Under this Rule, intervention shall be allowed when a person has (1) a legal interest in the matter in
litigation; (2) or in the success of any of the parties; (3) or an interest against the parties; (4) or
when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or disposition of property in the
custody of the court or an officer thereof.27Intervention is "a proceeding in a suit or action by which
a third person is permitted by the court to make himself a party, either joining plaintiff in claiming
what is sought by the complaint, or uniting with defendant in resisting the claims of plaintiff, or
demanding something adversely to both of them; the act or proceeding by which a third person
becomes a party in a suit pending between others; the admission, by leave of court, of a person not
an original party to pending legal proceedings, by which such person becomes a party thereto for
the protection of some right of interest alleged by him to be affected by such proceedings."28
Considering this admission of Teresita, petitioners’ mother, the Court rules that respondent Josefina
Halasan sufficiently established her right to intervene in the partition case. She has shown that she
has legal interest in the matter in litigation. As the Court ruled in Nordic Asia Ltd. v. Court of
Appeals:29
x x x [T]he interest which entitles a person to intervene in a suit between other parties must be in
the matter in litigation and of such direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain
or lose by direct legal operation and effect of the judgment. Otherwise, if persons not parties to the
action were allowed to intervene, proceedings would become unnecessarily complicated, expensive
and interminable. And this would be against the policy of the law. The words "an interest in the
subject" means a direct interest in the cause of action as pleaded, one that would put the intervenor
in a legal position to litigate a fact alleged in the complaint without the establishment of which
plaintiff could not recover.30
In Uy v. Court of Appeals,31 the Court allowed petitioners (who claimed to be the surviving legal
spouse and the legitimate child of the decedent) to intervene in the intestate proceedings even after
the parties had already submitted a compromise agreement involving the properties of the
decedent, upon which the intestate court had issued a writ of execution. In setting aside the
compromise agreement, the Court held that petitioners were indispensable parties and that "in the
interest of adjudicating the whole controversy, petitioners’ inclusion in the action for partition, given
the circumstances, not only is preferable but rightly essential in the proper disposition of the
case."32
Contrary to petitioners’ argument, the case of Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals33 is not in point, as the
Court therein did not discuss the propriety of allowing a motion for intervention, but resolved the
validity of a marriage. In relying on the merits of the complaint for partition, the Court ultimately
determined the legitimacy of one of the petitioners therein and her entitlement to a share in the
subject properties.
CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74757
is AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Davao City, is ORDERED to admit respondent
Josefina Halasan’s Complaint-in-Intervention and forthwith conduct the proper proceedings with
dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Page | 118

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner,
vs.
REDERICK A. RECIO, respondents.
G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree
is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the
governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Our courts
do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment; hence, like any other facts, both the
divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven according to our law
on evidence.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the
January 7, 1999 Decision1 and the March 24, 1999 Order2 of the Regional Trial Court of
Cabanatuan City, Branch 28, in Civil Case No. 3026-AF. The assailed Decision disposed as
follows:
"WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between Grace J. Garcia and Rederick
A. Recio solemnized on January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan City as dissolved and both
parties can now remarry under existing and applicable laws to any and/or both parties." 3
The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above-quoted Decision.
The Facts
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon,
Rizal, on March 1, 1987.4 They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18,
1989,5 a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family
court.
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a "Certificate of
Australian Citizenship" issued by the Australian government.6 Petitioner – a Filipina – and
respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in
Cabanatuan City.7 In their application for a marriage license, respondent was declared as "single"
and "Filipino."8
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial
dissolution of their marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided
on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia. 9
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage10 in the court a
quo, on the ground of bigamy – respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he
married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of respondent's marriage to Editha
Samson only in November, 1997.
Evidence Cases
In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to petitioner his prior
marriage and its subsequent dissolution.11 He contended that his first marriage to an Australian
citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australian in 1989;12 thus, he
was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994.1âwphi1.nêt
On July 7, 1998 – or about five years after the couple's wedding and while the suit for the
declaration of nullity was pending – respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family
court in Sydney, Australia because the "marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken down."13
Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complained be dismissed on the ground that it stated no
cause of action.14 The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with respondent.15 The court marked
and admitted the documentary evidence of both parties.16 After they submitted their respective
memoranda, the case was submitted for resolution.17
Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision and Order.
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in Australia
was valid and recognized in the Philippines. It deemed the marriage ended, but not on the basis of
any defect in an essential element of the marriage; that is, respondent's alleged lack of legal
capacity to remarry. Rather, it based its Decision on the divorce decree obtained by respondent.
The Australian divorce had ended the marriage; thus, there was no more martial union to nullify or
annual.
Hence, this Petition.18
Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:
"I
The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree obtained in Australia by the
respondent ipso facto terminated his first marriage to Editha Samson thereby
capacitating him to contract a second marriage with the petitioner.
"2
The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized Australian, to present a certificate
of legal capacity to marry constitutes absence of a substantial requisite voiding the
petitioner' marriage to the respondent.
"3
The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26 of the Family Code in this case.
"4
Page | 119
 The trial court patently and grievously erred in disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35, 40, 52
and 53 of the Family Code as the applicable provisions in this case.
"5
The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce gravely erred in pronouncing
that the divorce decree obtained by the respondent in Australia ipso facto capacitated the
parties to remarry, without first securing a recognition of the judgment granting the
divorce decree before our courts."19
The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this Decision, we shall concentrate on two
pivotal ones: (1) whether the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven, and (2)
whether respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner. Because of our ruling
on these two, there is no more necessity to take up the rest.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is partly meritorious.
First Issue:
Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha Samson
Petitioner assails the trial court's recognition of the divorce between respondent and Editha
Samson. Citing Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,20 petitioner argues that the divorce decree, like any
other foreign judgment, may be given recognition in this jurisdiction only upon proof of the existence
of (1) the foreign law allowing absolute divorce and (2) the alleged divorce decree itself. She adds
that respondent miserably failed to establish these elements.
Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, marriages
solemnized abroad are governed by the law of the place where they were celebrated (the lex loci
celebrationist). In effect, the Code requires the presentation of the foreign law to show the
conformity of the marriage in question to the legal requirements of the place where the marriage
was performed.
At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the take-off points for our discussion.
Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. 21 A marriage
between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles
1522 and 1723 of the Civil Code.24 In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article
2625 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is
"validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry." 26 A divorce
obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it
is consistent with their respective national laws.27
A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof are concerned, can be
made. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees that "aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law." 28 Therefore,
before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove
the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. 29 Presentation
solely of the divorce decree is insufficient.
Evidence Cases
Divorce as a Question of Fact
Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted in evidence, it must first comply with
the registration requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family Code. These articles read
as follows:
"ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting parties shall file
separately a sworn application for such license with the proper local civil registrar which
shall specify the following:
xxx xxx xxx
"(5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved or
annulled;
xxx xxx xxx
"ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the
applicant shall be required to furnish, instead of the birth of baptismal certificate required
in the last preceding article, the death certificate of the deceased spouse or the judicial
decree of annulment or declaration of nullity of his or her previous marriage. x x x.
"ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition
and distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the children's
presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of
property; otherwise, the same shall not affect their persons."
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce decree is a public document – a
written official act of an Australian family court. Therefore, it requires no further proof of its
authenticity and due execution.
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary
value, the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence.30 A divorce obtained abroad
is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment
itself.31 The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an officially body or tribunal of
a foreign country.32
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as
a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy
thereof attested33 by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the
Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record
is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.34
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one
issued by an Australian family court.35 However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the
aforemetioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in
evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not
been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City.36 The trial court ruled that it was
Page | 120
admissible, subject to petitioner's qualification.37Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded
weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner's failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree
admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.38
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary;
respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian
citizenship in 1992.39 Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the
political and civil rights belonging to a citizen.40 Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak
of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian,
respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to
Philippine personal laws.
Burden of Proving Australian Law
Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner, because
she is the party challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He contends that petitioner was
satisfied with the original of the divorce decree and was cognizant of the marital laws of Australia,
because she had lived and worked in that country for quite a long time. Besides, the Australian
divorce law is allegedly known by Philippine courts: thus, judges may take judicial notice of foreign
laws in the exercise of sound discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with "the party who alleges the existence of a fact
or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action."41 In civil cases, plaintiffs have the
burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer;
and defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they
introduce new matters.42 Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of
proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. 43 Like
any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among those
matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function.44 The power of
judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should
be resolved in the negative.
Second Issue:
Respondent's Legal Capacity to Remarry
Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the divorce, respondent was legally
incapacitated to marry her in 1994.
Hence, she concludes that their marriage was void ab initio.
Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted in evidence,
adequately established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law.
Respondent's contention is untenable. In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal dissolution
of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different types. The two
basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et
thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the bond in
Evidence Cases
full force.45 There is no showing in the case at bar which type of divorce was procured by
respondent.
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree – a conditional or provisional
judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as a separation from bed and board, although an
absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period during which no reconciliation is
effected.46
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes and practices,
still restrict remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by statute; thus,
the guilty party in a divorce which was granted on the ground of adultery may be prohibited from
remarrying again. The court may allow a remarriage only after proof of good behavior. 47
On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:
"1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless
the other party has died) commits the offence of bigamy." 48
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may have been
restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national law.
Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously assumed that the
Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondent's capacity to remarry despite the paucity of
evidence on this matter.
We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree raises a disputable presumption or
presumptive evidence as to his civil status based on Section 48, Rule 3949 of the Rules of Court, for
the simple reason that no proof has been presented on the legal effects of the divorce decree
obtained under Australian laws.
Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity
Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by Article 21 of the Family Code was
not submitted together with the application for a marriage license. According to her, its absence is
proof that respondent did not have legal capacity to remarry.
We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of
the party concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have been
sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A duly
authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part
of the alien applicant for a marriage license.50
As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondent's legal capacity to marry
petitioner. A review of the records before this Court shows that only the following exhibits were
presented before the lower court: (1) for petitioner: (a) Exhibit "A" – Complaint;51 (b) Exhibit "B" –
Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recto (Filipino-Australian) and Grace J. Garcia
(Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija;52 (c) Exhibit "C" – Certificate of
Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino) and Editha D. Samson (Australian) on March 1,
1987 in Malabon, Metro Manila;53 (d) Exhibit "D" – Office of the City Registrar of Cabanatuan City
Certification that no information of annulment between Rederick A. Recto and Editha D. Samson
was in its records;54 and (e) Exhibit "E" – Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A.
Recto;55 (2) for respondent: (Exhibit "1" – Amended Answer;56 (b) Exhibit "S" – Family Law Act 1975
Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia;57 (c) Exhibit "3" – Certificate
Page | 121
of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recto;58 (d) Exhibit "4" – Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Respondent was deployed on February 17, 2000 but was terminated from employment on February
Marriage in the Family Court of Australia Certificate;59 and Exhibit "5" – Statutory Declaration of the 11, 2001, she not having allegedly passed the probationary period.
Legal Separation Between Rederick A. Recto and Grace J. Garcia Recio since October 22, 1995. 60
As the Ministry denied respondent’s request for reconsideration, she returned to the Philippines on
Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a naturalized March 17, 2001, shouldering her own air fare.
Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. We agree with
petitioner's contention that the court a quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed
On July 27, 2001, respondent filed with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a
respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to
complaint2 for illegal dismissal against petitioner ATCI as the local recruitment agency, represented
show the Australian personal law governing his status; or at the very least, to prove his legal
by petitioner, Amalia Ikdal (Ikdal), and the Ministry, as the foreign principal.
capacity to contract the second marriage.

By Decision3 of November 29, 2002, the Labor Arbiter, finding that petitioners neither showed that
Neither can we grant petitioner's prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and void on the
there was just cause to warrant respondent’s dismissal nor that she failed to qualify as a regular
ground of bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he was really capacitated to
employee, held that respondent was illegally dismissed and accordingly ordered petitioners to pay
marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree. Hence, we believe that the most judicious
her US$3,600.00, representing her salary for the three months unexpired portion of her contract.
course is to remand this case to the trial court to receive evidence, if any, which show petitioner's
legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a quo may declare a nullity of the
parties' marriage on the ground of bigamy, there being already in evidence two existing marriage On appeal of petitioners ATCI and Ikdal, the NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s decision by
certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila dated March Resolution4 of January 26, 2004. Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration having been denied by
1, 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994. Resolution5 of April 22, 2004, they appealed to the Court of Appeals, contending that their principal,
the Ministry, being a foreign government agency, is immune from suit and, as such, the immunity
extended to them; and that respondent was validly dismissed for her failure to meet the
WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, we REMAND the case to
performance rating within the one-year period as required under Kuwait’s Civil Service Laws.
the court a quofor the purpose of receiving evidence which conclusively show respondent's legal
Petitioners further contended that Ikdal should not be liable as an officer of petitioner ATCI.
capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring the parties' marriage void on the ground
of bigamy, as above discussed. No costs.
By Decision6 of March 30, 2007, the appellate court affirmed the NLRC Resolution.
SO ORDERED.
In brushing aside petitioners’ contention that they only acted as agent of the Ministry and that they
cannot be held jointly and solidarily liable with it, the appellate court noted that under the law, a
Republic of the Philippines
private employment agency shall assume all responsibilities for the implementation of the contract
SUPREME COURT
of employment of an overseas worker, hence, it can be sued jointly and severally with the foreign
Manila
principal for any violation of the recruitment agreement or contract of employment.

THIRD DIVISION
As to Ikdal’s liability, the appellate court held that under Sec. 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, the
"Migrant and Overseas Filipinos’ Act of 1995," corporate officers, directors and partners of a
G.R. No. 178551 October 11, 2010 recruitment agency may themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the recruitment agency for
money claims and damages awarded to overseas workers.
ATCI OVERSEAS CORPORATION, AMALIA G. IKDAL and MINISTRY OF PUBLIC HEALTH-
KUWAITPetitioners, Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court by Resolution7 of
vs. June 27, 2007, the present petition for review on certiorari was filed.
MA. JOSEFA ECHIN, Respondent.
Petitioners maintain that they should not be held liable because respondent’s employment contract
DECISION specifically stipulates that her employment shall be governed by the Civil Service Law and
Regulations of Kuwait. They thus conclude that it was patent error for the labor tribunals and the
appellate court to apply the Labor Code provisions governing probationary employment in deciding
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
the present case.

Josefina Echin (respondent) was hired by petitioner ATCI Overseas Corporation in behalf of its
Further, petitioners argue that even the Philippine Overseas Employment Act (POEA) Rules relative
principal-co-petitioner, the Ministry of Public Health of Kuwait (the Ministry), for the position of
to master employment contracts (Part III, Sec. 2 of the POEA Rules and Regulations) accord
medical technologist under a two-year contract, denominated as a Memorandum of Agreement
respect to the "customs, practices, company policies and labor laws and legislation of the host
(MOA), with a monthly salary of US$1,200.00.
country."

Under the MOA,1 all newly-hired employees undergo a probationary period of one (1) year and are
covered by Kuwait’s Civil Service Board Employment Contract No. 2.
Evidence Cases Page | 122
Finally, petitioners posit that assuming arguendo that Philippine labor laws are applicable, given
that the foreign principal is a government agency which is immune from suit, as in fact it did not sign
any document agreeing to be held jointly and solidarily liable, petitioner ATCI cannot likewise be
held liable, more so since the Ministry’s liability had not been judicially determined as jurisdiction
was not acquired over it.
The petition fails.
Petitioner ATCI, as a private recruitment agency, cannot evade responsibility for the money claims
of Overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) which it deploys abroad by the mere expediency of claiming
that its foreign principal is a government agency clothed with immunity from suit, or that such
foreign principal’s liability must first be established before it, as agent, can be held jointly and
solidarily liable.
In providing for the joint and solidary liability of private recruitment agencies with their foreign
principals, Republic Act No. 8042 precisely affords the OFWs with a recourse and assures them of
immediate and sufficient payment of what is due them. Skippers United Pacific v.
Maguad8 explains:
. . . [T]he obligations covenanted in the recruitment agreement entered into by and between
the local agent and its foreign principal are not coterminous with the term of such
agreement so that if either or both of the parties decide to end the agreement, the responsibilities
of such parties towards the contracted employees under the agreement do not at all end, but the
same extends up to and until the expiration of the employment contracts of the employees recruited
and employed pursuant to the said recruitment agreement. Otherwise, this will render nugatory
the very purpose for which the law governing the employment of workers for foreign jobs
abroad was enacted. (emphasis supplied)
The imposition of joint and solidary liability is in line with the policy of the state to protect and
alleviate the plight of the working class.9 Verily, to allow petitioners to simply invoke the immunity
from suit of its foreign principal or to wait for the judicial determination of the foreign principal’s
liability before petitioner can be held liable renders the law on joint and solidary liability inutile.
As to petitioners’ contentions that Philippine labor laws on probationary employment are not
applicable since it was expressly provided in respondent’s employment contract, which she
voluntarily entered into, that the terms of her engagement shall be governed by prevailing Kuwaiti
Civil Service Laws and Regulations as in fact POEA Rules accord respect to such rules, customs
and practices of the host country, the same was not substantiated.
Indeed, a contract freely entered into is considered the law between the parties who can establish
stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, including the laws which
they wish to govern their respective obligations, as long as they are not contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order or public policy.
It is hornbook principle, however, that the party invoking the application of a foreign law has the
burden of proving the law, under the doctrine of processual presumption which, in this case,
petitioners failed to discharge. The Court’s ruling in EDI-Staffbuilders Int’l., v. NLRC10 illuminates:
In the present case, the employment contract signed by Gran specifically states that Saudi Labor
Laws will govern matters not provided for in the contract (e.g. specific causes for termination,
termination procedures, etc.). Being the law intended by the parties (lex loci intentiones) to apply to
Evidence Cases
the contract, Saudi Labor Laws should govern all matters relating to the termination of the
employment of Gran.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the
burden of proving the foreign law. The foreign law is treated as a question of fact to be properly
pleaded and proved as the judge or labor arbiter cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law. He is
presumed to know only domestic or forum law.
Unfortunately for petitioner, it did not prove the pertinent Saudi laws on the matter; thus, the
International Law doctrine of presumed-identity approach or processual presumption comes into
play. Where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that
foreign law is the same as ours. Thus, we apply Philippine labor laws in determining the issues
presented before us. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Philippines does not take judicial notice of foreign laws, hence, they must not only be alleged;
they must be proven. To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and
comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court which reads:
SEC. 24. Proof of official record. — The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of
Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or
by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the
custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made
by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or
by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. (emphasis supplied)
SEC. 25. What attestation of copy must state. — Whenever a copy of a document or record is
attested for the purpose of the evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a
correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be
under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a
seal, under the seal of such court.
To prove the Kuwaiti law, petitioners submitted the following: MOA between respondent and the
Ministry, as represented by ATCI, which provides that the employee is subject to a probationary
period of one (1) year and that the host country’s Civil Service Laws and Regulations apply; a
translated copy11 (Arabic to English) of the termination letter to respondent stating that she did not
pass the probation terms, without specifying the grounds therefor, and a translated copy of the
certificate of termination,12 both of which documents were certified by Mr. Mustapha Alawi, Head of
the Department of Foreign Affairs-Office of Consular Affairs Inslamic Certification and Translation
Unit; and respondent’s letter13 of reconsideration to the Ministry, wherein she noted that in her first
eight (8) months of employment, she was given a rating of "Excellent" albeit it changed due to
changes in her shift of work schedule.
These documents, whether taken singly or as a whole, do not sufficiently prove that respondent
was validly terminated as a probationary employee under Kuwaiti civil service laws. Instead of
submitting a copy of the pertinent Kuwaiti labor laws duly authenticated and translated by
Embassy officials thereat, as required under the Rules, what petitioners submitted were
mere certifications attesting only to the correctness of the translations of the MOA and the
termination letter which does not prove at all that Kuwaiti civil service laws differ from
Philippine laws and that under such Kuwaiti laws, respondent was validly terminated. Thus
the subject certifications read:
Page | 123
xxxx

This is to certify that the herein attached translation/s from Arabic to English/Tagalog and or vice
versa was/were presented to this Office for review and certification and the same was/were found
to be in order. This Office, however, assumes no responsibility as to the contents of the
document/s.

This certification is being issued upon request of the interested party for whatever legal purpose it
may serve. (emphasis supplied)1avvphi1

Respecting Ikdal’s joint and solidary liability as a corporate officer, the same is in order too following
the express provision of R.A. 8042 on money claims, viz:

SEC. 10. Money Claims.—Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters
of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of the complaint, the
claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving
Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual moral, exemplary and other
forms of damages.

The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency for any and all claims
under this section shall be joint and several. This provision shall be incorporated in the contract for
overseas employment and shall be a condition precedent for its approval. The performance bond to
be filed by the recruitment/placement agency, as provided by law, shall be answerable for all
money claims or damages that may be awarded to the workers. If the recruitment/placement
agency is a juridical being, the corporate officers and directors and partners as the case may be,
shall themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation or partnership for the aforesaid
claims and damages. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

Evidence Cases Page | 124