Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 49549 August 30, 1990
EVELYN CHUA-QUA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JACOBO C. CLAVE, in his capacity as Presidential Executive Assistant, and TAY TUNG HIGH SCHOOL,
INC., respondents.
William C. Gunitang and Jaime Opinion for petitioner.
Laogan Law Offices for private respondent.

REGALADO, J.:
This would have been just another illegal dismissal case were it not for the controversial and unique situation that the marriage
of herein petitioner, then a classroom teacher, to her student who was fourteen (14) years her junior, was considered by the
school authorities as sufficient basis for terminating her services.
Private respondent Tay Tung High School, Inc. is an educational institution in Bacolod City. Petitioner had been employed
therein as a teacher since 1963 and, in 1976 when this dispute arose, was the class adviser in the sixth grade where one Bobby
Qua was enrolled. Since it was the policy of the school to extend remedial instructions to its students, Bobby Qua was imparted
1
such instructions in school by petitioner. In the course thereof, the couple fell in love and on December 24, 1975, they got
2
married in a civil ceremony solemnized in Iloilo City by Hon. Cornelio G. Lazaro, City Judge of Iloilo. Petitioner was then thirty
(30) years of age but Bobby Qua being sixteen (16) years old, consent and advice to the marriage was given by his mother, Mrs.
3
Concepcion Ong. Their marriage was ratified in accordance with the rites of their religion in a church wedding solemnized by
4
Fr. Nick Melicor at Bacolod City on January 10, 1976.
On February 4, 1976, private respondent filed with the sub-regional office of the Department of Labor at Bacolod City an
application for clearance to terminate the employment of petitioner on the following ground: "For abusive and unethical conduct
unbecoming of a dignified school teacher and that her continued employment is inimical to the best interest, and would
5
downgrade the high moral values, of the school."
6
Petitioner was placed under suspension without pay on March 12, 1976. Executive Labor Arbiter Jose Y. Aguirre, Jr. of the
National Labor Relations Commission, Bacolod City, to whom the case was certified for resolution, required the parties to submit
7
their position papers and supporting evidence. Affidavits were submitted by private respondent to bolster its contention that
petitioner, "defying all standards of decency, recklessly took advantage of her position as school teacher, lured a Grade VI boy
8
under her advisory section and 15 years her junior into an amorous relation." More specifically, private respondent raised
issues on the fact that petitioner stayed alone with Bobby Qua in the classroom after school hours when everybody had gone
home, with one door allegedly locked and the other slightly open.
On September 17, 1976, Executive Labor Arbiter Jose Y. Aguirre, Jr., without conducting any formal hearing, rendered an
"Award" in NLRC Case No. 956 in favor of private respondent granting the clearance to terminate the employment of petitioner.
It was held therein that —
The affidavits . . . although self-serving but were never disputed by the respondent pointed out that before the
marriage of respondent to Bobby Qua, fourteen (14) years her junior and during her employment with petitioner,
an amorous relationship existed between them. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the undisputed
written testimonies of several witnesses convincingly picture the circumstances under which such amorous
relationship was manifested within the premises of the school, inside the classroom, and within the sight of
some employees. While no direct evidences have been introduced to show that immoral acts were committed
during these times, it is however enough for a sane and credible mind to imagine and conclude what transpired
9
and took place during these times. . . .
10
Petitioner, however, denied having received any copy of the affidavits referred to.
On October 7, 1976, petitioner appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission claiming denial of due process for not
having been furnished copies of the aforesaid affidavits relied on by the labor arbiter. She further contended that there was
nothing immoral, nor was it abusive and unethical conduct unbecoming of a dignified school teacher, for a teacher to enter into
11
lawful wedlock with her student.
On December 27, 1976, the National Labor Relations Commission unanimously reversed the Labor Arbiter's decision and
ordered petitioner's reinstatement with backwages, with the following specific findings:
Affiant Maselliones deposed and said that he saw appellant and Qua sitting on the student desk inside a
classroom after classes. The depositions of affiants Despi and Chin are of the same tenor. No statements
whatever were sworn by them that they were eyewitnesses to immoral or scandalous acts.
xxx xxx xxx
Even if we have to strain our sense of moral values to accommodate the conclusion of the Arbiter, we could not
deduce anything immoral or scandalous about a girl and a boy talking inside a room after classes with lights on
and with the door open.
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioner-appellee naively insisted that the clearance application was precipitated by immoral acts which did not
lend dignity to the position of appellant. Aside from such gratuitous assertions of immoral acts or conduct by
herein appellant, no evidence to support such claims was introduced by petitioner-appellee. We reviewed the
the sequence of events from the beginning of the relationship between appellant Evelyn Chua and Bobby Qua
up to the date of the filing of the present application for clearance in search of evidence that could have proved
12
detrimental to the image and dignity of the school but none has come to our attention. . . .
The case was elevated by private respondent to the Minister of Labor who, on March 30, 1977, reversed the decision of the
13
National Labor Relations Commission. The petitioner was, however, awarded six (6) months salary as financial assistance.
14
On May 20, 1977, petitioner appealed the said decision to the Office of the President of the Philippines. After the
corresponding exchanges, on September 1, 1978 said office, through Presidential Executive Assistant Jacobo C. Clave,
rendered its decision reversing the appealed decision. Private respondent was ordered to reinstate petitioner to her former
position without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and with full back wages from the time she was not allowed to work
15
until the date of her actual reinstatement.
1
Having run the gamut of three prior adjudications of the case with alternating reversals, one would think that this decision of
public respondent wrote finis to petitioner's calvary. However, in a resolution dated December 6, 1978, public respondent, acting
16 17
on a motion for reconsideration of herein private respondent and despite opposition thereto, reconsidered and modified the
aforesaid decision, this time giving due course to the application of Tay Tung High School, Inc. to terminate the services of
18
petitioner as classroom teacher but giving her separation pay equivalent to her six (6) months salary.
In thus reconsidering his earlier decision, public respondent reasoned out in his manifestation/comment filed on August 14, 1979
in this Court in the present case:
That this Office did not limit itself to the legal issues involved in the case, but went further to view the matter
from the standpoint of policy which involves the delicate task of rearing and educating of children whose interest
must be held paramount in the school community, and on this basis, this Office deemed it wise to uphold the
judgment and action of the school authorities in terminating the services of a teacher whose actuations and
behavior, in the belief of the school authorities, had spawned ugly rumors that had cast serious doubts on her
integrity, a situation which was considered by them as not healthy for a school campus, believing that a school
teacher should at all times act with utmost circumspection and conduct herself beyond reproach and above
19
suspicion;
In this petition for certiorari, petitioner relies on the following grounds for the reversal of the aforesaid resolution of public
respondent, viz.:
1. The dismissal or termination of petitioner's employment, despite Tay Tung's claim to the contrary, was
actually based on her marriage with her pupil and is, therefore, illegal.
2. Petitioner's right to due process under the Constitution was violated when the hearsay affidavits of Laddy
Maselliones, Eleuterio Despi, Pina D. Chiu, and Ong Lee Bing, were admitted and considered in evidence
without presenting the affiants as witnesses and affording the petitioner the right to confront and cross-examine
them.
3. No sufficient proofs were adduced to show that petitioner committed serious misconduct or breached the trust
reposed on her by her employer or committed any of the other grounds enumerated in Article 283 (Now Article
20
282) of the Labor Code which will justify the termination of her employment.
We first dispose of petitioner's claim that her right to due process was violated. We do not agree. There is no denial of due
process where a party was afforded an opportunity to present his side. Also, the procedure by which issues are resolved based
on position papers, affidavits and other documentary evidence is recognized as not violative of such right. Moreover, petitioner
could have insisted on a hearing to confront and cross-examine the affiants but she did not do so, obviously because she was
convinced that the case involves a question of law. Besides, said affidavits were also cited and discussed by her in the
proceedings before the Ministry of Labor.
Now, on the merits. Citing its upright intention to preserve the respect of the community toward the teachers and to strengthen
the educational system, private respondent submits that petitioner's actuations as a teacher constitute serious misconduct, if not
an immoral act, a breach of trust and confidence reposed upon her and, thus, a valid and just ground to terminate her services. It
argues that as a school teacher who exercises substitute parental authority over her pupils inside the school campus, petitioner
had moral ascendancy over Bobby Qua and, therefore, she must not abuse such authority and respect extended to her.
Furthermore, it charged petitioner with having allegedly violated the Code of Ethics for teachers the pertinent provision of which
21
states that a "school official or teacher should never take advantage of his/her position to court a pupil or student."
On the other hand, petitioner maintains that there was no ground to terminate her services as there is nothing wrong with a
teacher falling in love with her pupil and, subsequently, contracting a lawful marriage with him. She argued that she was
dismissed because of her marriage with Bobby Qua This contention was sustained in the aforesaid decision of the National
Labor Relations Commission thus:
. . . One thing, however, has not escaped our observation: That the application for clearance was filed only after
more than one month elapsed from the date of appellant's marriage to Bobby Qua Certainly, such belated
application for clearance weakens instead of strengthening the cause of petitioner-appellee. The alleged
immoral acts transpired before the marriage and if it is these alleged undignified conduct that triggered the
intended separation, then why was the present application for clearance not filed at that time when the alleged
22
demoralizing effect was still fresh and abrasive?
After a painstaking perusal of the records, we are of the considered view that the determination of the legality of the dismissal
hinges on the issue of whether or not there is substantial evidence to prove that the antecedent facts which culminated in the
marriage between petitioner and her student constitute immorality and/or grave misconduct. To constitute immorality, the
circumstances of each particular case must be holistically considered and evaluated in the light of prevailing norms of conduct
and the applicable law. Contrary to what petitioner had insisted on from the very start, what is before us is a factual question, the
resolution of which is better left to the trier of facts.
Considering that there was no formal hearing conducted, we are constrained to review the factual conclusions arrived at by
public respondent, and to nullify his decision through the extraordinary writ of certiorari if the same is tainted by absence or
excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. The findings of fact must be supported by substantial evidence; otherwise,
23
this Court is not bound thereby.
We rule that public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion. As vividly and forcefully observed by him in his original
decision:
Indeed, the records relied upon by the Acting Secretary of Labor (actually the records referred to are the
affidavits attached as Annexes "A" to "D" of the position paper dated August 10, 1976 filed by appellee at the
arbitration proceedings) in arriving at his decision are unbelievable and unworthy of credit, leaving many
question unanswered by a rational mind. For one thing, the affidavits refer to certain times of the day during off
school hours when appellant and her student were found together in one of the classrooms of the school. But
the records of the case present a ready answer: appellant was giving remedial instruction to her student and the
school was the most convenient place to serve the purpose. What is glaring in the affidavits is the complete
absence of specific immoral acts allegedly committed by appellant and her student. For another, and very
important at that, the alleged acts complained of invariably happened from September to December, 1975, but
the disciplinenary action imposed by appellee was sought only in February, 1976, and what is more, the
affidavits were executed only in August, 1976 and from all indications, were prepared by appellee or its counsel.
The affidavits heavily relied upon by appellee are clearly the product of after-thought. . . . The action pursued by
appellee in dismissing appellant over one month after her marriage, allegedly based on immoral acts committed
2
 even much earlier, is open to basis of the action sought seriously doubted; on the question. The basis of the
action sought is seriously doubted; on the contrary, we are more inclined to believe that appellee had certain
24
selfish, ulterior and undisclosed motives known only to itself.
As earlier stated, from the outset even the labor arbiter conceded that there was no direct evidence to show that immoral acts
were committed. Nonetheless, indulging in a patently unfair conjecture, he concluded that "it is however enough for a sane and
25
credible mind to imagine and conclude what transpired during those times." In reversing his decision, the National Labor
Relations Commission observed that the assertions of immoral acts or conducts are gratuitous and that there is no direct
26
evidence to support such claim, a finding which herein public respondent himself shared.
We are, therefore, at a loss as to how public respondent could adopt the volte-face in the questioned resolution, which we
hereby reject, despite his prior trenchant observations hereinbefore quoted. What is revealing however, is that the reversal of his
original decision is inexplicably based on unsubstantiated surmises and non sequiturs which he incorporated in his assailed
resolution in this wise:
. . . While admittedly, no one directly saw Evelyn Chua and Bobby Qua doing immoral acts inside the classroom
it seems obvious and this Office is convinced that such a happening indeed transpired within the solitude of the
classrom after regular class hours. The marriage between Evelyn Chua and Bobby Qua is the best proof which
confirms the suspicion that the two indulged in amorous relations in that place during those times of the day. . .
27
.
With the finding that there is no substantial evidence of the imputed immoral acts, it follows that the alleged violation of the Code
of Ethics governing school teachers would have no basis. Private respondent utterly failed to show that petitioner took
advantage of her position to court her student. If the two eventually fell in love, despite the disparity in their ages and academic
levels, this only lends substance to the truism that the heart has reasons of its own which reason does not know. But, definitely,
yielding to this gentle and universal emotion is not to be so casually equated with immorality. The deviation of the circumstances
of their marriage from the usual societal pattern cannot be considered as a defiance of contemporary social mores.
It would seem quite obvious that the avowed policy of the school in rearing and educating children is being unnecessarily
bannered to justify the dismissal of petitioner. This policy, however, is not at odds with and should not be capitalized on to defeat
the security of tenure granted by the Constitution to labor. In termination cases, the burden of proving just and valid cause for
dismissing an employee rests on the employer and his failure to do so would result in a finding that the dismissal is unjustified.
The charge against petitioner not having been substantiated, we declare her dismissal as unwarranted and illegal. It being
apparent, however, that the relationship between petitioner and private respondent has been inevitably and severely strained,
we believe that it would neither be to the interest of the parties nor would any prudent purpose be served by ordering her
reinstatement.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the resolution of public respondent, dated December 6, 1978 is
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Private respondent Tay Tung High School, Inc. is hereby ORDERED to pay petitioner backwages
equivalent to three (3) years, without any deduction or qualification, and separation pay in the amount of one (1) month for every
year of service.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairman), Paras and Padilla, JJ., concur.
Sarmiento, J., is on leave.

Footnotes
1 Rollo, 189.
2 Ibid., 84.
3 Ibid., 14; Annex A, Petition,
4 Ibid., id.,: Annex B. id.
5 Ibid., id., Annex C, id.
6 Ibid., 43, Annex 1, id.
7 Annexes N-1 to N-4 Petition.
8 Rollo, 15; Annex F, Petition.
9 Rollo, 60-61.
10 Ibid., 74.
11 Ibid., 73-75.
12 Ibid., 85-87.
13 Ibid., 111-114.
14 Ibid,. 115-122.
15 Ibid., 137.
16 Ibid., 138-142.
17 Ibid., 143-144.
18 Ibid., 146.
19 Ibid., 180-181.
20 Ibid., 22.
21 Ibid., 127.
22 Ibid., 87.
23 Llobrera vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al., 162 SCRA 788 (1988).
24 Rollo, 135-136.
25 Ibid., 60-61.
26 Ibid., 86.
27 Ibid., 148.

3
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 198755 June 5, 2013
ALBERTO PAT-OG, SR., Petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which seeks to set aside the April 6,
1 2
2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 101700, affirming the April 11, 2007 Decision of the Civil
Service Commission (CSC), which ordered the dismissal of petitioner Alberto Pat-og, Sr. (Pat-og) from the service for grave
misconduct.
The Facts
On September 13, 2003, Robert Bang-on (Bang-on), then a 14-year old second year high school student of the Antadao
National High School in Sagada, Mountain Province, tiled an affidavit-complaint against Pat-og, a third year high school teacher
of the same school, before the Civil Service Commission-Cordillera Administrative Region (CSC-CAR).
Bang-on alleged that on the morning of August 26, 2003, he attended his class at the basketball court of the school, where Pat-
og and his third year students were also holding a separate class; that he and some of his classmates joined Pat-og’s third year
students who were practicing basketball shots; that Pat-og later instructed them to form two lines; that thinking that three lines
were to be formed, he stayed in between the two lines; that Pat-og then held his right arm and punched his stomach without
warning for failing to follow instructions; and that as a result, he suffered stomach pain for several days and was confined in a
hospital from September 10-12, 2003, as evidenced by a medico-legal certificate, which stated that he sustained a contusion
hematoma in the hypogastric area.
Regarding the same incident, Bang-on filed a criminal case against Pat-og for the crime of Less Serious Physical Injury with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bontoc, Mountain Province.
Taking cognizance of the administrative case, the CSC-CAR directed Pat-og to file his counter-affidavit. He denied the charges
hurled against him and claimed that when he was conducting his Music, Arts, Physical Education and Health (MAPEH) class,
composed of third year students, he instructed the girls to play volleyball and the boys to play basketball; that he later directed
the boys to form two lines; that after the boys failed to follow his repeated instructions, he scolded them in a loud voice and
wrested the ball from them; that while approaching them, he noticed that there were male students who were not members of his
class who had joined the shooting practice; that one of those male students was Bang-on, who was supposed to be having his
own MAPEH class under another teacher; that he then glared at them, continued scolding them and dismissed the class for their
failure to follow instructions; and that he offered the sworn statement of other students to prove that he did not box Bang-on.
On June 1, 2004, the CSC-CAR found the existence of a prima faciecase for misconduct and formally charged Pat-og.
While the proceedings of the administrative case were ongoing, the RTC rendered its judgment in the criminal case and found
Pat-og guilty of the offense of slight physical injury. He was meted the penalty of imprisonment from eleven (11) to twenty (20)
days. Following his application for probation, the decision became final and executory and judgment was entered.
Meanwhile, in the administrative case, a pre-hearing conference was conducted after repeated postponement by Pat-og. With
the approval of the CSC-CAR, the prosecution submitted its position paper in lieu of a formal presentation of evidence and
formally offered its evidence, which included the decision in the criminal case. It offered the affidavits of Raymund Atuban, a
classmate of Bang-on; and James Domanog, a third year high school student, who both witnessed Pat-og hit Bang-on in the
stomach.
For his defense, Pat-og offered the testimonies of his witnesses - Emiliano Dontongan (Dontongan), a teacher in another school,
who alleged that he was a member of the Municipal Council for the Protection of Children, and that, in such capacity, he
investigated the incident and came to the conclusion that it did not happen at all; and Ernest Kimmot, who testified that he was in
the basketball court at the time but did not see such incident. Pat-og also presented the affidavits of thirteen other witnesses to
prove that he did not punch Bang-on.
Ruling of the CSC-CAR
3
In its Decision, dated September 19, 2006, the CSC-CAR found Pat-og guilty and disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, all premises told, respondent Alberto Pat-og, Sr., Teacher Antadao National High School, is hereby found guilty
of Simple Misconduct.
Under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, the imposable penalty on the first offense of Simple
Misconduct is suspension of one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months.
Due to seriousness of the resulting injury to the fragile body of the minor victim, the CSC-CAR hereby imposed upon respondent
the maximum penalty attached to the offense which is six months suspension without pay.
The CSC-CAR gave greater weight to the version posited by the prosecution, finding that a blow was indeed inflicted by Pat-og
on Bang-on. It found that Pat-og had a motive for doing so - his students’ failure to follow his repeated instructions which
angered him. Nevertheless, the CSCCAR ruled that a motive was not necessary to establish guilt if the perpetrator of the offense
was positively identified. The positive identification of Pat-og was duly proven by the corroborative testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses, who were found to be credible and disinterested. The testimony of defense witness, Dontongan, was not given
credence considering that the students he interviewed for his investigation claimed that Pat-og was not even angry at the time of
the incident, contrary to the latter’s own admission.
The CSC-CAR held that the actions of Pat-og clearly transgressed the proper norms of conduct required of a public official, and
the gravity of the offense was further magnified by the seriousness of the injury of Bang-on which required a healing period of
more than ten (10) days. It pointed out that, being his teacher, Pat-og’s substitute parental authority did not give him license to
physically chastise a misbehaving student. The CSC-CAR added that the fact that Pat-og applied for probation in the criminal
case, instead of filing an appeal, further convinced it of his guilt.
The CSC-CAR believed that the act committed by Pat-og was sufficient to find him guilty of Grave Misconduct. It, however,
found the corresponding penalty of dismissal from the service too harsh under the circumstances. Thus, it adjudged petitioner
guilty of Simple Misconduct and imposed the maximum penalty of suspension for six (6) months.
4
On December 11, 2006, the motion for reconsideration filed by Pat-og was denied for lack of merit.
The Ruling of the CSC
4
 5
In its Resolution, dated April 11, 2007, the CSC dismissed Pat-og’s appeal and affirmed with modification the decision of the
CSC-CAR as follows:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The decision of the CSC-CAR is
affirmed with the modification that Alberto Pat-og, Sr., is adjudged guilty of grave misconduct, for which he is meted out the
penalty of dismissal from the service with all its accessory penalties of cancellation of eligibilities, perpetual disqualification from
6
reemployment in the government service, and forfeiture of retirement benefits.
After evaluating the records, the CSC sustained the CSC-CAR’s conclusion that there existed substantial evidence to sustain the
finding that Pat-og did punch Bang-on in the stomach. It gave greater weight to the positive statements of Bang-on and his
witnesses over the bare denial of Patog. It also highlighted the fact that Pat-og failed to adduce evidence of any ill motive on the
part of Bang-on in filing the administrative case against him. It likewise gave credence to the medico-legal certificate showing
that Bang-on suffered a hematoma contusion in his hypogastric area.
The CSC ruled that the affidavits of Bang-on’s witnesses were not bereft of evidentiary value even if Pat-og was not afforded a
chance to cross-examine the witnesses of Bang-on. It is of no moment because the cross- examination of witnesses is not an
indispensable requirement of administrative due process.
The CSC noted that Pat-og did not question but, instead, fully acquiesced in his conviction in the criminal case for slight physical
injury, which was based on the same set of facts and circumstances, and involved the same parties and issues. It, thus,
considered his prior criminal conviction as evidence against him in the administrative case.
Finding that his act of punching his student displayed a flagrant and wanton disregard of the dignity of a person, reminiscent of
corporal punishment that had since been outlawed for being harsh, unjust, and cruel, the CSC upgraded Pat-og’s offense from
Simple Misconduct to Grave Misconduct and ordered his dismissal from the service.
Pat-og filed a motion for reconsideration, questioning for the first time the jurisdiction of CSC over the case. He contended that
administrative charges against a public school teacher should have been initially heard by a committee to be constituted
pursuant to the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers.
7
On November 5, 2007, the CSC denied his motion for reconsideration. It ruled that Pat-og was estopped from challenging its
jurisdiction considering that he actively participated in the administrative proceedings against him, raising the issue of jurisdiction
only after his appeal was dismissed by the CSC.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
8
In its assailed April 6, 2011 Decision, the CA affirmed the resolutions of the CSC. It agreed that Pat-og was estopped from
questioning the jurisdiction of the CSC as the records clearly showed that he actively participated in the proceedings. It was of
the view that Pat-og was not denied due process when he failed to cross-examine Bang-on and his witnesses because he was
given the opportunity to be heard and present his evidence before the CSC-CAR and the CSC.
The CA also held that the CSC committed no error in taking into account the conviction of Pat-og in the criminal case. It stated
that his conviction was not the sole basis of the CSC for his dismissal from the service because there was substantial evidence
proving that Pat-og had indeed hit Bang-on.
9
In its assailed Resolution, dated September 13, 2011, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration filed by Pat-og.
Hence, the present petition with the following
Assignment of Errors
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT
AFFIRMED THE SUPREME PENALTY OF DISMISSAL FROM SERVICE WITH FORFEITURE OF RETIREMENT BENEFITS
AGAINST THE PETITIONER WITHOUT CONSIDERING PETITIONER’S LONG YEARS OF GOVERNMENT SERVICE?
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT RULED
THAT PETITIONER IS ESTOPPED FROM QUESTIONING THE JURISDICTION OF THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION TO
HEAR AND DECIDE THE ADMINISTRATIVE CASE AGAINST HIM?
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED AND COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN DISMISSING THE APPEAL DESPITE LACK OF SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE?
On Jurisdiction
Pat-og contends that Section 9 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4670, otherwise known as the Magna Carta for Public School
Teachers, provides that administrative charges against a public school teacher shall be heard initially by a committee constituted
under said section. As no committee was ever formed, the petitioner posits that he was denied due process and that the CSC
did not have the jurisdiction to hear and decide his administrative case. He further argues that notwithstanding the fact that the
issue of jurisdiction was raised for the first time on appeal, the rule remains that estoppel does not confer jurisdiction on a
tribunal that has no jurisdiction over the cause of action or subject matter of the case.
The Court cannot sustain his position.
The petitioner’s argument that the administrative case against him can only proceed under R.A. No. 4670 is misplaced.
10
In Puse v. Santos-Puse, it was held that the CSC, the Department of Education (DepEd) and the Board of Professional
Teachers-Professional Regulatory Commission (PRC) have concurrent jurisdiction over administrative cases against public
school teachers.
Under Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, the CSC is the body charged with the establishment and administration of a career
11
civil service which embraces all branches and agencies of the government. Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292 (the Administrative
12 13
Code of 1987) and Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 807 (the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines) expressly provide that the
CSC has the power to hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted with it or brought to it on appeal. Thus, the
CSC, as the central personnel agency of the government, has the inherent power to supervise and discipline all members of the
civil service, including public school teachers.
Indeed, under Section 9 of R.A. No. 4670, the jurisdiction over administrative cases of public school teachers is lodged with the
14
investigating committee constituted therein. Also, under Section 23 of R.A. No. 7836 (the Philippine Teachers
Professionalization Act of 1994), the Board of Professional Teachers is given the power, after due notice and hearing, to
15
suspend or revoke the certificate of registration of a professional teacher for causes enumerated therein.
Concurrent jurisdiction is that which is possessed over the same parties or subject matter at the same time by two or more
separate tribunals. When the law bestows upon a government body the jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving specific
matters, it is to be presumed that such jurisdiction is exclusive unless it be proved that another body is likewise vested with the
16
same jurisdiction, in which case, both bodies have concurrent jurisdiction over the matter.
Where concurrent jurisdiction exists in several tribunals, the body that first takes cognizance of the complaint shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others. In this case, it was CSC which first acquired jurisdiction over the case because the

5
complaint was filed before it. Thus, it had the authority to proceed and decide the case to the exclusion of the DepEd and the
17
Board of Professional Teachers.
18
In CSC v. Alfonso, it was held that special laws, such as R.A. No. 4670, do not divest the CSC of its inherent power to
supervise and discipline all members of the civil service, including public school teachers. Pat-og, as a public school teacher, is
first and foremost, a civil servant accountable to the people and answerable to the CSC for complaints lodged against him as a
public servant. To hold that R.A. No. 4670 divests the CSC of its power to discipline public school teachers would negate the
very purpose for which the CSC was established and would impliedly amend the Constitution itself.
19
To further drive home the point, it was ruled in CSC v. Macud that R.A. No. 4670, in imposing a separate set of procedural
requirements in connection with administrative proceedings against public school teachers, should be construed to refer only to
the specific procedure to be followed in administrative investigations conducted by the DepEd. By no means, then, did R.A. No.
4670 confer an exclusive disciplinary authority over public school teachers on the DepEd.
At any rate, granting that the CSC was without jurisdiction, the petitioner is indeed estopped from raising the issue. Although the
rule states that a jurisdictional question may be raised at any time, such rule admits of the exception where, as in this case,
20
estoppel has supervened. Here, instead of opposing the CSC’s exercise of jurisdiction, the petitioner invoked the same by
actively participating in the proceedings before the CSC-CAR and by even filing his appeal before the CSC itself; only raising the
issue of jurisdiction later in his motion for reconsideration after the CSC denied his appeal. This Court has time and again
frowned upon the undesirable practice of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment only if
21
favorable, but attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse.
On Administrative Due Process
On due process, Pat-og asserts that the affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are of questionable veracity having been
subscribed in Bontoc, which is nearly 30 kilometers from the residences of the parties. Furthermore, he claimed that considering
that the said affiants never testified, he was never afforded the opportunity to cross-examine them. Therefore, their affidavits
were mere hearsay and insufficient to prove his guilt.
The petitioner does not persuade.
The essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, a fair and reasonable opportunity
22
to explain one’s side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Administrative due
process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. In administrative proceedings, a formal or trial-type
23
hearing is not always necessary and technical rules of procedure are not strictly applied. Hence, the right to cross-examine is
24
not an indispensable aspect of administrative due process. The petitioner cannot, therefore, argue that the affidavit of Bang-on
and his witnesses are hearsay and insufficient to prove his guilt.
At any rate, having actively participated in the proceedings before the CSC-CAR, the CSC, and the CA, the petitioner was
apparently afforded every opportunity to explain his side and seek reconsideration of the ruling against him.1âwphi1
As to the issue of the veracity of the affidavits, such is a question of fact which cannot now be raised before the Court under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The CSC-CAR, the CSC and the CA did not, therefore, err in giving credence to the affidavits of
the complainants and his witnesses, and in consequently ruling that there was substantial evidence to support the finding of
misconduct on the part of the petitioner.
On the Penalty
Assuming that he did box Bang-on, Pat-og argues that there is no substantial evidence to prove that he did so with a clear intent
to violate the law or in flagrant disregard of the established rule, as required for a finding of grave misconduct. He insists that he
was not motivated by bad faith or ill will because he acted in the belief that, as a teacher, he was exercising authority over Bang-
on in loco parentis, and was, accordingly, within his rights to discipline his student. Citing his 33 years in the government service
without any adverse record against him and the fact that he is at the edge of retirement, being already 62 years old, the
petitioner prays that, in the name of substantial and compassionate justice, the CSC-CAR’s finding of simple misconduct and the
concomitant penalty of suspension should be upheld, instead of dismissal.
The Court agrees in part.
Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior. To constitute an
administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected with the performance of the official functions and duties of a
public officer. In grave misconduct, as distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate
25
the law or t1agrant disregard of an established rule must be manifest.
Teachers are duly licensed professionals who must not only be competent in the practice of their noble profession, but must also
possess dignity and a reputation with high moral values. They must strictly adhere to, observe, and practice the set of ethical
and moral principles, standards, and values laid down in the Code of Ethics of Professional Teachers, which apply to all
26
teachers in schools in the Philippines, whether public or private, as provided in the preamble of the said Code. Section 8 of
Article VIII of the same Code expressly provides that "a teacher shall not inflict corporal punishment on offending learners."
Clearly then, petitioner cannot argue that in punching Bang-on, he was exercising his right as a teacher in loco parentis to
discipline his student. It is beyond cavil that the petitioner, as a public school teacher, deliberately violated his Code of Ethics.
Such violation is a flagrant disregard for the established rule contained in the said Code tantamount to grave misconduct.
Under Section 52(A)(2) of Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, the penalty for grave
misconduct is dismissal from the service, which carries with it the cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits and
27
perpetual disqualification from reemployment in the government service. This penalty must, however, be tempered with
compassion as there was sut1icient provocation on the part of Bang-on. Considering further the mitigating circumstances that
the petitioner has been in the government service for 33 years, that this is his first offense and that he is at the cusp of
retirement, the Court finds the penalty of suspension for six months as appropriate under the circumstances.
WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petition and MODIFIES the April 6, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 101700. Accordingly, Alberto Pat-og, Sr. is found GUlLTY of Grave Misconduct, but the penalty is reduced from
dismissal from the service to SUSPENSION for SIX MONTHS.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson

6
 DIOSDADO M. PERALTA ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Court's Division.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's
Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
1
Rollo. pp. 35-47: Penned by Associate Justice Jane Aurora C. Lantion, and concurred in by Associate Justice Japar B.
Dimaampao and Associate Justice Ramon R. Garcia.
2
Id. at 97-100.
3
Id. at 79-91.
4
Id. at 97-100.
5
Id. at 111-119.
6
Id. at 119.
7
Id. at 123-129.
8
Id. at 35-47.
9
Id. at 49-50.
10
G.R. No. 183678, March 15, 2010, 615 SCRA 500, 513.
11
Section 2. (1) The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.
xxxx
Section 3. The Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the Government, shall establish a
career service and adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness,
and courtesy in the civil service. It shall strengthen the merit and rewards system, integrate all human resources
development programs for all levels and ranks, and institutionalize a management climate conducive to public
accountability. It shall submit to the President and the Congress an annual report on its personnel programs.
12
Chapter 3, Title I(A), Book V:
Section 12. Powers and Functions. - The Commission shall have the following powers and functions: x x x
(11) Hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal, including
contested appointments, and review decisions and actions of its offices and of the agencies attached to it. x x x
13
Section 9. Powers and Functions of the Commission. The Commission shall administer the Civil Service and shall
have the following powers and functions:
xxxx
(j) Hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly with it in accordance with Section 37 or
brought to it on appeal;
xxxx
Section 37. Disciplinary Jurisdiction.
(a) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a
penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days' salary, demotion in
rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from Office. A complaint may be filed directly with the
Commission by a private citizen against a government official or employee in which case it may hear and decide
the case or it may deputize any department or agency or official or group of officials to conduct the investigation.
The results of the investigation shall be submitted to the Commission with recommendation as to the penalty to
be imposed or other action to be taken. x x x
14
Section. 9. Administrative Charges. Administrative charges against a teacher shall be heard initially by a committee
composed of the corresponding School Superintendent of the Division or a duly authorized representative who should at
least have the rank of a division supervisor, where the teacher belongs, as chairman, a representative of the local or, in
its absence, any existing provincial or national teacher's organization and a supervisor of the Division, the last two to be
designated by the Director of Public Schools. The committee shall submit its findings and recommendations to the
Director of Public Schools within thirty days from the termination of the hearings: Provided, however, That where the
school superintendent is the complainant or an interested party, all the members of the committee shall be appointed by
the Secretary of Education.
15
Section. 23. Revocation of the Certificate of Registration, Suspension from the Practice of the Teaching Profession,
and Cancellation of Temporary or Special Permit. — The Board shall have the power, after due notice and hearing, to
suspend or revoke the certificate of registration of any registrant, to reprimand or to cancel the temporary/special permit
of a holder thereof who is exempt from registration, for any of the following causes:
(a) Conviction for any criminal offense by a court of competent jurisdiction;
(b) Immoral, unprofessional or dishonorable conduct;
(c) Declaration by a court of competent jurisdiction for being mentally unsound or insane;
(d) Malpractice, gross incompetence, gross negligence or serious ignorance of the practice of the teaching
profession;

7
 (e) The use of or perpetration of any fraud or deceit in obtaining a certificate of registration, professional license
or special/temporary permit;
(f) Chronic inebriety or habitual use of drugs;
(g) Violation of any of the provisions of this Act, the rules and regulations and other policies of the Board and the
Commission, and the code of ethical and professional standards for professional teachers; and
(h) Unjustified or willful failure to attend seminars, workshops, conferences and the like or the continuing
education program prescribed by the Board and the Commission.
The decision of the Board to revoke or suspend a certificate may be appealed to the regional trial court of the
place where the Board holds office within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the said decision or of the denial of
the motion for reconsideration filed in due time.
16
Puse v. Santos-Puse, supra note 10, at 513.
17
Id. at 516.
18
G.R. No. 179452, June 11, 2009, 589 SCRA 88, 97.
19
G.R. No. 177531, September 10, 2009, 599 SCRA 52,65; citing Ombudsman v. Masing, 566 Phil. 253, 274 (2008).
20
CSC v. Macud, G.R. No. 177531, September 10, 2009, 599 SCRA 52,66.
21
Rubio v. Munar. 561 Phil. 1, 9 (2007).
22
Ombudsman v. Reyes, G.R. No. 170512, October 5, 2011, 658 SCRA 626, 640; citing Ledesma v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 166780, December 27, 2007, 541 SCRA 444, 452.
23
Imperial v. GSIS, G.R. No. 191224, October 4, 2011, 658 SCRA 497, 505.
24
Velez v. De Vera, 528 Phil. 763, 802 (2006).
25
Ombudsman v. Reyes. G.R. No.l70512. supra note 22, at 637: citing Salazar v. Barriaga. A.M. No. P-05-20 16. 550
Phil. 44. 48-49 (2007).
26
Preamble. CODE OF ETHICS OF PROFESSIONAL TEACHERS.
27
Section 58(a). Rule IV. UNIFORM RULES ON ADMINISTRATIVE CASES IN THE CIVIL SERVICE.

8
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 172334 June 5, 2013
DR. ZENAIUA P. PIA, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. MARGARITO P. GERVACIO, JR., Overall Deputy Ombudsman, Formerly Acting Ombudsman, Office of the
Ombudsman, Dr. OFELIA M. CARAGUE, Formerly PUP President, Dr. ROMAN R. UANNUG, Formerly Dean, College of
Economics, Finance and Politics (CEFP), now Associate Professor, CEFP Polytechnic University of the Philippines
(PUP), Sta. Mesa, Manila, Respondents.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
1
This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Zenaida P. Pia (Pia) to assail the following:
2
1. the Decision dated June 29, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 75648, which affirmed the Office of
the Ombudsman’s decision finding Pia guilty of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service; and
3
2. the CA Resolution dated March 28, 2006, which denied Pia’s motion for reconsideration of the Decision dated June 29,
2005.
The Antecedents
4
The petition stems from a complaint filed in December 2001 by respondent Dr. Roman Dannug (Dannug), in his capacity as
Dean of the College of Economics, Finance and Politics (CEFP) of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines (PUP), against
Pia who was then a professor at PUP. Dannug claimed that Pia was directly selling to her students a book entitled "Organization
Development Research Papers" at a price of P120.00 per copy, in violation of Section 3, Article X of the Code of Ethics for
Professional Teachers, which reads:
No teacher shall act, directly or indirectly, as agents of, or be financially interested in any commercial venture, the business of
which is to furnish textbooks and other printed matter, stationery, athletic goods, school uniforms, and other materials, in the
5
purchase and disposal of which the teacher’s official influence can be exercised, x x x.
Pia’s act was also claimed to be violative of several memoranda issued by PUP officials against the sale of books, articles or any
6
items by any faculty member directly to their students. Furthermore, the books were believed to be overpriced at P120.00 each,
being mere bound machine copies of reports and research papers that were submitted by Pia’s former students. Dannug
attached to his complaint a list of the students who were allegedly made to buy copies of the book.
For her defense, Pia argued that her students were not forced to buy copies of the book, even submitting a certification to that
effect from students who had bought from her. Pia also claimed that the list of students attached to the complaint was a mere
attendance sheet of Dannug’s students in a research writing class, and not as Dannug claimed it to be.
After preliminary conference and the parties’ submission of their respective memoranda, the case was deemed submitted for
resolution.
The Ruling of the Ombudsman
7
In the Office of the Ombudsman’s Decision dated September 27, 2002, signed by Graft Investigation Officer II Joselito P.
Fangon and approved by herein respondent Margarito P. Gervacio, Jr. as the Overall Deputy Ombudsman and Acting
Ombudsman, Pia was declared guilty of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. It was explained:
It is of no moment that the students were not forced to buy the book. It stands to reason that the respondent Pia, as teacher,
exercises moral ascendancy over her students, such that an offer made by her directed to the students, to buy something from
her, operates as a compulsion which the students cannot easily avoid. x x x.
The actuation of the respondent (herein petitioner) appears to constitute a betrayal of the Code of Ethics for Professional
8
Teachers which amounts to Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. (Emphasis ours)
Thus, the dispositive portion of the Office of the Ombudsman’s decision reads:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered finding respondent ZENAIDA P. PIA, GUILTY of
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, for which the PENALTY of SUSPENSION FOR SIX (6) MONTHS
WITHOUT PAY is hereby imposed, pursuant to Section 10, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07, in relation to Section 25 of
Republic Act No. 6770.
The Honorable, the University President, Polytechnic University of the Philippines, Sta. Mesa, Manila, is hereby furnished a copy
of this Decision for its implementation in accordance with law, with the directive to inform this Office of the action taken thereon.
9
SO RESOLVED.
10
Pia’s motion for reconsideration was denied via an Order dated November 20, 2002.
Feeling aggrieved, Pia filed a petition for review with the CA. Even before she could have filed the petition, respondents Dannug
and Dr. Ofelia M. Carague (Carague), former PUP President, implemented the penalty of suspension that was imposed by the
Office of Ombudsman.
The Ruling of the CA
11
On June 29, 2005, the CA rendered its Decision affirming the rulings of the Office of the Ombudsman. For the appellate court,
the Office of the Ombudsman has sufficiently established by substantial evidence the culpability of Pia. In addition, the CA
explained that the appeal was dismissible on the ground that the Office of the Ombudsman’s decision and order had already
attained finality when the petition for review was filed with it by Pia on March 20, 2003.
Pia’s motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition for review.
The Issues
From Pia’s arguments, the main issues for the Court’s determination are:
1. Whether or not Pia’s petition with the CA was filed on time;
2. Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the Office of the Ombudsman’s decision finding Pia guilty of Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service; and
3. Whether or not Dannug and Carague erred in implementing the Office of the Ombudsman’s decision during the time that
Pia’s period to appeal had not yet expired.
This Court’s Ruling
Reglementary period for petitions for review with the CA
In the assailed CA decision, the appellate court declared that the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman was already final and
executory at the time that the petition for review was filed by Pia. It explained:
9
The petitioner did not controvert the contention that she received the denial of her motion for reconsideration of the questioned
decision on February 18, 2003. Under Sec. 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 14-A, Series of 2000, which prescribes the
Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, it allows the aggrieved party to appeal the decision of the said Office (in
administrative disciplinary cases to the Court of Appeals) within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the decision or
order denying the motion for reconsideration. Thus, in accordance with the said procedural rule, the petitioner has only until
February 28, 2003 to file her petition for review with this Court as enunciated in the Fabian case.
Consequently, on her last day to appeal on February 28, 2003, the petitioner filed a motion for extension of time (for an
additional fifteen [15] days) to file the said petition or until March 17, 2003. It may be pertinent to state here that the records are
bereft of evidence on the status of the said motion whether the same was granted or denied. However, even assuming that the
said motion was favorably acted upon in petitioner’s favor, her belated filing of her appeal on March 20, 2003 is clearly beyond
the reglementary period provided for by law if we consider in the computation the grant of the 15-day extension period as
12
requested in her motion. (Citations omitted)
We reverse such finding of the CA.
13
In Fabian v. Hon. Desierto, the Court declared unconstitutional the provisions in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6770, otherwise
known as The Ombudsman Act of 1989, that mandates a direct appeal to the Supreme cases. We then declared categorically
that "appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the CA
14
under the provisions of Rule 43."
Consistent with the foregoing jurisprudence, Pia claims that her petition for review was timely filed, as her motion for extension of
time to file the petition with the CA was filed on February 24, 2003; and she asked through the said motion for an additional
period of 15 days from the expiration of her original reglementary period of 15 days within which to file a petition for review. The
CA, however, adopted the view of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), counsel for respondent Overall Deputy
Ombudsman, that the petition with the CA should have been filed within ten days from Pia’s notice of her motion for
reconsideration’s denial, as required under the Office of the Ombudsman’s Administrative Order No. 14-A, Series of 2000.
15
The Court agrees with Pia. As the Court explained in Dimagiba v. Espartero, "considering that the Fabian ruling stated that
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court should be the proper mode of appeal from an Ombudsman decision in administrative cases, and
Section 4 of Rule 43 provides for a reglementary period of 15 days from receipt of the order appealed from, a motion for
16
extension of time to file petition within the 15-day period is considered timely filed." Between the 10-day period under R.A. No.
6770 and Section 4 of Rule 43, the latter shall apply.
In the present case, Pia filed with the CA her motion for extension of time within the allowed 15-day period. She received a copy
of the Ombudsman’s order on February 18, 2003, then filed her motion on February 24, 2003. Equally important is the fact that
her petition for review was filed within the period asked for in her motion, which was 15 days from the expiration of the original
period ending March 5, 2003, or until March 20, 2003.
Although the records do not include a particular CA resolution that granted Pia’s motion for extension of time, this may be
reasonably deduced from the appellate court’s reconsideration of an earlier dismissal of the petition, coupled with its issuance of
a temporary restraining order against the implementation of the Ombudsman’s decision that carried a penalty of Pia’s
17
suspension.
On the finding that Pia is guilty of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service
The petition, however, fails on the merits.
In administrative cases, the quantum of evidence necessary to find an individual administratively liable is substantial evidence.
Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court defines substantial evidence as that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable
18
mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.
The settled rule provides that factual findings of the Office of the Ombudsman are conclusive when supported by substantial
19
evidence and are accorded due respect and weight, especially when they are affirmed by the CA. Furthermore, only questions
of law may be raised in petitions filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court; the Court is not a trier of facts and it is not its function
20
to review evidence on record and assess the probative weight thereof.
Both the Office of the Ombudsman and the CA have sufficiently identified Pia’s act that constitutes Conduct Prejudicial to the
Best Interest of the Service. Although Pia questions the weight that should be accorded to the list of students attached to the
complaint of Dannug, it is significant that she readily admitted having directly sold copies of the book/compilation "Organization
Development Research Papers" to her students, an act that is proscribed among PUP faculty members, by the submission of a
certification from her students claiming that they were not forced to buy copies of the book.
In asking for the complaint’s dismissal, Pia argues that she was not covered by the Code of Ethics of Professional Teachers
which was cited by the Office of the Ombudsman to support the decision rendered against her. She contends that the Code only
applies to teachers in educational institutions at the pre-school, primary, elementary and secondary levels, but not to professors
in the tertiary level.
Our review of the CA decision indicates that such argument has already been sustained by the appellate court. Nonetheless, the
finding of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service remains justified given the standards that are required from Pia
as a faculty member in a staterun university. The appellate court correctly explained:
We sustain the petitioner’s contention that she is not covered under R.A. No. 7836 (The Philippine Teachers Professionalization
Act of 1994) relative to the definition of "teachers" therein. As we have earlier stated, the culpability of the petitioner is anchored
on her irregular and unjustifiable act being complained of, in violation of an existing regulation of a state-run university (the PUP,
in this case) where she is currently employed. Additionally, the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
21
Employees enunciates the State policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the public service.
(Emphasis ours)
22
In Avenido v. Civil Service Commission, we explained that acts may constitute Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Service as long as they tarnish the image and integrity of his/her public office. The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees (R.A. No. 6713) enunciates, inter alia, the State policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and
utmost responsibility in the public service. Section 4(c) of the Code commands that "public officials and employees shall at all
times respect the rights of others, and shall refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy,
23
public order, public safety and public interest."
In affirming the finding that the act imputed upon Pia amounts to Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, we take
into account her moral ascendancy over her students. Dannug’s complaint also indicates that the book/compilation was
overpriced, and that the students’ refusal to buy the book/compilation could result in their failure in the subject. In addition, Pia
was found to have directly violated memoranda issued by officials of PUP. It then appeared that she allowed her personal

10
interests to adversely affect the proper performance of her official functions, to the disadvantage of her students and in patent
violation of a policy in the state-run university where she was teaching.
The certification that was allegedly executed by Pia’s students in her defense deserves scant consideration: first, her moral
ascendancy as a professor could have easily allowed her to obtain such certification, regardless of the circumstances that
attended her students’ purchase of the book/compilation; and second, the certification in fact confirms that she directly sold the
book/compilation to her students, in violation of the prohibition imposed by the PUP officials.
Pia’s argument that she was not properly charged with the offense for which she was found guilty of committing still does not
warrant her exoneration from the offense. In Avenido, we emphasized that the designation of the offense or offenses with which
a person is charged in an administrative case is not controlling, and one may be found guilty of another offense where the
24
substance of the allegations and evidence presented sufficiently proves one’s guilt. Citing the case of Dadubo v. Civil Service
25
Commission, we held in Avenido that the charge against the respondent in an administrative case need not be drafted with the
precision of an information in a criminal prosecution. It is sufficient that he is apprised of the substance of the charge against
26
him; what is controlling is the allegation of the acts complained of, not the designation of the offense. 1âwphi1
Considering then that the acts alleged and proved to have been committed by Pia amounts to Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service, and that she has been afforded a full opportunity to present her side and refute the act imputed against
her, the Court finds no cogent reason to nullify the ruling made by the CA on Pia’s guilt.
Implementation of the ruling of the Office of the Ombudsman
The Court also finds no irregularity in Dannug and Carague’s implementation of the rulings of the Office of the Ombudsman,
notwithstanding the fact that Pia then still had the remedy of an appeal before the CA.
To support her stance that the Office of the Ombudsman’s order of suspension should not have been executed while her period
27 28 29
to appeal has not yet lapsed, Pia cites the cases of Tuzon v. CA, Lapid v. CA and Lopez v. CA. Given, however,
subsequent jurisprudence on the matter, Pia’s argument is misplaced.
A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman is immediately executory even pending appeal. The issue was fully explained by the
30
Court in Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals, viz:
In Lapid v. Court of Appeals, the Court anchored its ruling mainly on Section 27 of RA 6770, as supported by Section 7, Rule III
of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman. The pertinent provisions read:
"Section 27 of RA 6770:
SEC. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions.―(1) All provisionary orders at the Office of the Ombudsman are immediately
effective and executory.
A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the Office of the Ombudsman must be filed within five (5) days
after receipt of written notice and shall be entertained only on any of the following grounds:
(1) New evidence has been discovered which materially affects the order, directive or decision;
(2) Errors of law or irregularities have been committed prejudicial to the interest of the movant. The motion for
reconsideration shall be resolved within three (3) days from filing: Provided, That only motion for reconsideration shall be
entertained.
Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are conclusive. Any order, directive or
decision imposing the penalty of public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month’s salary shall be final and
unappealable.
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the
Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or
decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The above rules may be amended or modified by the Office of the Ombudsman as the interest of justice may require."
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman (AO 07):
Sec. 7. Finality of decision.―Where the respondent is absolved of the charge, and in case of conviction where the penalty
imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary, the
decision shall be final and unappealable. In all other cases, the decision shall become final after the expiration of ten (10) days
from receipt thereof by the respondent, unless a motion for reconsideration or petition for certiorari, shall have been filed by him
as prescribed in Section 27 of RA 6770. (Emphasis supplied)
The Court held in Lapid v. Court of Appeals that the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman "mandate that
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman where the penalty imposed is other than public censure or reprimand, suspension of
not more than one month salary are still appealable and hence, not final and executory."
Subsequently, on 17 August 2000, the Ombudsman issued Administrative Order No. 14-A (AO 14-A), amending Section 7, Rule
III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman. The amendment aims to provide uniformity with other disciplining
authorities in the execution or implementation of judgments and penalties in administrative disciplinary cases involving public
officials and employees. Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by AO 14-A,
reads:
"Section 7. Finality and execution of decision.- Where the respondent is absolved of the charge, and in case of conviction where
the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month
salary, the decision shall be final and unappealable. In all other cases, the decision may be appealed within ten (10) days from
receipt of the written notice of the decision or order denying the motion for reconsideration.
An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory In case the penalty is suspension or removal and the respondent
wins such appeal, he shall be considered as having been under preventive suspension and shall be paid the salary and such
other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal." (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
x x x In the 2007 case of Buencamino v. Court of Appeals, the primary issue was whether the decision of the Ombudsman
suspending petitioner therein from office for six months without pay was immediately executory even pending appeal in the
Court of Appeals. The Court held that the pertinent ruling in Lapid v. Court of Appeals has already been superseded by the case
of In the Matter to Declare in Contempt of Court Hon. Simeon A. Datumanong, Secretary of DPWH, which clearly held that
31
decisions of the Ombudsman are immediately executory even pending appeal. (Citations omitted)
Clearly from the foregoing, Pia's complaint against Carague and Dannug's immediate implementation of the penalty of
suspension imposed by the Office of the Ombudsman deserves no merit.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated June 29, 2005 and Resolution
dated March 28, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 75648 are AFFIRMED.
11
SO ORDERED.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
1
Rollo, pp. 9-32.
2
Penned by Associate Justice Amelita Ci. Tolentino, with Associate Justices Roberto A. Barrios and Vicente S. E.
Veloso, concurring; id. at 38-57.
3
Id. at 35-36.
4
Docketed as OMB-C-A-02-0022-A.
5
Rollo, p. 59.
6
Id.
7
Id. at 58-76.
8
Id. at 73.
9
Id. at 74-76.
10
Id. at 77-84.
11
Id. at 38-57.
12
Id. at 51-52.
13
356 Phil. 787 (1998).
14
Id. at 808.
15
G.R. No. 154952, July 16, 2012, 676 SCRA 420.
16
Id. at 434.
17
Rollo, p. 115.
18
Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) v. Zaldarriaga, G.R. No. 175349, June 22, 2010, 621 SCRA 373, 379-380.
19
Tolentino v. Loyola, G.R. No. 153809, July 27, 2011, 654 SCRA 420, 434.
20
Salumbides, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 180917, April 23, 2010, 619 SCRA 313, 328.
21
Rollo, pp. 49-50.
22
G.R. No. 177666, April 30, 2008, 553 SCRA 711.
23
Id. at 720-721.
24
Id. at 719.
25
G.R. No. 106498, June 28, 1993, 223 SCRA 747.
26
Id. at 754; supra note 21, at 719-720.
27
G.R. No. 90107, August 21, 1992, 212 SCRA 739.
28
390 Phil. 236 (2000).
29
438 Phil. 351 (2002).
30
G.R. No. 159395, May 7, 2008, 554 SCRA 75.
31
Id. at 91-95.

12
FIRST DIVISION

RENE VENTENILLA PUSE, G.R. No. 183678

Petitioner,
Present:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

- versus - CARPIO MORALES,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

LIGAYA DELOS SANTOS-PUSE, Promulgated:

Respondent.
March 15, 2010
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari with Prayer for Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order filed
by petitioner Rene V. Puse assailing the Decision1[1] dated 28 March 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 100421.
Petitioner is a registered Professional Teacher stationed at S. Aguirre Elementary School, East District, Jose
Panganiban, Camarines Norte, while respondent is a Barangay Rural Health Midwife assigned at the Municipal Health Office of
Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte.
It appears that on 10 January 1992, petitioner married respondent Ligaya Delos Santos-Puse at the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of Daet, Camarines Norte before the Hon. Judge Oscar T. Osorio.2[2] He had two (2) children with her, and had a church
wedding before respondent found out that petitioner was already married. Respondent discovered that petitioner had already gotten
married to Cristina Pablo Puse at the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Laoag City, Ilocos Norte on 27 December 1986. Respondent
likewise learned that he has two (2) children with his first wife.3[3]
Thus, on 2 August 2005, respondent filed a letter-complaint with the Director of the Professional Regulation Commission
(PRC), National Capital Region, Manila, through the Director, PRC, Lucena City, seeking assistance regarding her husband
against whom she had filed a criminal case for ―Bigamy‖ and ―Abandonment.‖ She alleged that her husband has not been giving
her and their children support.4[4]
In a letter dated 16 August 2005, petitioner was directed by the PRC of Lucena City to answer the complaint for immorality
and dishonorable conduct filed by respondent.5[5] Per directive, petitioner submitted his Compliance6[6] dated 31 August 2005
denying the charges against him. He adopted his counter-affidavit and the affidavits of his witnesses, Jocelyn Puse Decena and
Dominador I. Blanco, which were submitted in Criminal Case Nos. 7228 and 7229 before the MTC of Jose Panganiban, Camarines
Norte. He argued that if respondent’s allegations were true, she herself would be equally guilty of immorality and dishonorable
conduct, as she was fully aware that petitioner was already married when she married him. He added he has not abandoned
respondent or their children and continually gives support for their children.
In her Reply to Answer/Compliance7[7] dated 6 September 2005, respondent said she married petitioner in good faith,
unaware that he was already married to Cristina N. Pablo. When she learned of petitioner’s deception regarding his marital
status, she filed a case for Bigamy before the MTC of Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, which found probable cause to hold
petitioner for trial. She found petitioner’s explanation ―Na ako ay wala ng balita o komunikasyon sa aking unang asawa at ang
paniwala ko ay siya ay patay na at ang aking kasal ay nawala ng saysay‖ to be lame and insufficient to justify his contracting a
subsequent bigamous marriage. She claimed that petitioner should have instituted in court a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death of his first wife before contracting a subsequent marriage. In the absence of such declaration,
her marriage to petitioner is bigamous and void ab initio. She added that the affidavits of his sister and close friend should not
be given weight.
In his Rejoinder8[8] dated 11 October 2005, petitioner reiterated the arguments in his Answer and prayed for the
dismissal of the complaint on the ground that it was not verified and for failure of the respondent to attach a valid certification
against forum-shopping.

1[1] CA rollo, pp. 134-138. Penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo V. Cosico, with Associate Justices Hakim S.
Abdulwahid and Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo concurring.

2[2] Rollo, p. 144.

3[3] Id. at 140.

4[4] Id. at 86.

5[5] Id. at 85.

6[6] Id. at 87-90.

7[7] Id. at 99-100.

8[8] Id. at 102-105.

13
 After due consideration of the complaint, affidavits, supporting documents and pleadings filed, the Board of Professional
Teachers, PRC, Lucena City, found a prima facie case for Immorality and Dishonorable Conduct against petitioner, and directed
respondent to pay docket and legal research fees.9[9] The case was docketed as Adm. Case No. LCN-0016.
On 16 February 2007, the Board of Professional Teachers (Board), PRC, Manila, found petitioner administratively liable
of the charges and revoked his license as a Professional Teacher. The dispositive portion of the Resolution reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Board finds Rene Ventenilla Puse guilty as charged and
accordingly revokes his license as a Professional Teacher. He is ordered to surrender his Certificate of
Registration and his Professional Identification Card to the Professional Regulation Commission within ten (10)
days from the time this decision becomes final and executory and to desist from the practice of the teaching
profession under the pain of criminal prosecution.
SO ORDERED.10[10]
The Board ruled that contrary to petitioner’s contentions, it had jurisdiction over petitioner and could validly order the
revocation of his license, as petitioner was a professional teacher. Under Section 23 of Republic Act No. 7836, otherwise known
as the Philippine Teachers Professionalization Act of 1994, the Board has the power and authority to regulate the practice of
teaching in the Philippines. The charge of Immorality and/or Dishonorable Conduct is also one (1) of the grounds for the
revocation or suspension of a license of a professional teacher. For entering into a second marriage without first seeking a
judicial declaration of the presumptive death of his first wife and thereafter cohabiting with his second wife and having children
with her, petitioner is liable for Immorality and Dishonorable Conduct. The Board added that whether respondent had knowledge
of the first marriage or not is irrelevant and further found petitioner’s claim that his cohabitation with respondent was under
duress, force or intimidation untenable. Citing Section 3,11[11] Article III and Section 3,12[12] Article XI of the Code of Ethics of
Professional Teachers, and the Oath of Professionals,13[13] the Board also explained that petitioner’s official life cannot be
detached from his personal life, contrary to his contention that the acts complained of were purely private. His immorality and
dishonorable conduct demonstrate his unfitness to continue practicing his profession as he is no longer the embodiment of a role
model for young elementary school pupils, the Board ruled.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the decision but his motion was denied by the Board per Resolution dated 9 July
2007.14[14]
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for review, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 100421, before the Court of Appeals
assailing the Resolutions dated 16 February 2007 and 9 July 2007 of the Board.
On 28 March 2008, the Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner’s appeal.15[15] The appellate court held that the
applicable law was Rep. Act No. 4670 or the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers because petitioner was occupying the
position of Teacher I at the S. Aguirre Elementary School. Under Rep. Act No. 4670, the one (1) tasked to investigate the
complaint was the Board of Professional Teachers. Thus, it was the Board of Professional Teachers that had jurisdiction over
the administrative case and not the Civil Service Commission (CSC) or the Department of Education (DepEd) as contended by
petitioner. As to the finding of immorality and/or dishonorable conduct, the Court of Appeals agreed with the Board in finding as
untenable petitioner’s excuse that he believed his first wife to be dead and that his first marriage was no longer subsisting. It
said that petitioner should have applied for a judicial order declaring his first wife presumptively dead before marrying
respondent. It further found without merit petitioner’s defense that the complaint is of a private nature, explaining that his actions
relate to the very nature of his career: to teach, mold and guide the youth to moral righteousness.

9[9] Id. at 106.

10[10] Id. at 82.

11[11] ARTICLE III – THE TEACHER AND THE COMMUNITY

xxxx

Section 3. Every teacher shall merit reasonable social recognition for which purpose he shall behave with
honor and dignity at all times and refrain from such activities as gambling, smoking, drunkenness and other
excesses, much less illicit relations.

12[12] ARTICLE XI – THE TEACHER AS A PERSON

xxxx

Section 3. A teacher shall maintain at all times a dignified personality which could serve as a model worthy of emulation by
learners, peers, and others.

13[13] Oath of Professionals

I further solemnly swear that at all times and places I will adhere closely to the ethical standards and
professional roles of teachers in the Philippines x x x.

14[14] Rollo, pp. 83-84.

15[15] CA rollo, pp. 134-138.

14
 As to petitioner’s defense of pari delicto, the appellate court upheld the Board’s finding that respondent was in good faith
when she married petitioner. The Board also afforded petitioner due process.
On 30 June 2008, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.16[16] Hence, the
present recourse.
Petitioner argues that:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN VALIDATING THE
RESOLUTIONS OF THE BOARD FOR PROFESSIONAL TEACHERS OF PRC-MANILA DESPITE THE
LACK OF SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE SAME AND ITS PATENT NULLITY FOR
HAVING BEEN ISSUED OUTSIDE OF ITS JURISDICTION AND IN VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT OF
YOUR PETITIONER TO DUE PROCESS;

II. THE HONORABLE BOARD FOR PROFESSIONAL TEACHERS OF THE PROFESSIONAL

REGULATION COMMISSION (PRC)-MANILA AND LUCENA CITY, GRAVELY ERRED AND
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, WHEN IT ASSUMED PRIMARY JURISDICTION
OVER THE UNVERIFIED COMPLAINT OF THE RESPONDENT IN CONTRAVENTION WITH
EXISTING RULES AND SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE ON THE MATTER;

III. THE HONORABLE BOARD FOR PROFESSIONAL TEACHERS OF THE PRC-MANILA GRAVELY
ERRED IN FINDING THE PETITIONER GUILTY OF IMMORALITY AND DISHONORABLE CONDUCT
AND SUBSEQUENTLY REVOKING HIS TEACHER’S LICENSE AS A PENALTY NOTWITHSTANDING
THE LACK OF SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUSTAINING THE COMPLAINT, WHICH IN EFFECT
VIOLATED THE RIGHT OF YOUR PETITIONER TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW.17[17]

From the foregoing, the issues may be summed up as follows: (1) Did the Board of Professional Teachers have
jurisdiction to hear and decide the complaint filed by respondent against petitioner? (2) Was petitioner denied administrative due
process? (3) Was there substantial evidence to sustain the complaint and to hold petitioner liable?
On the first issue, petitioner argues that the proper forum to hear and decide the complaint was either the CSC pursuant to
CSC Resolution No. 991936 (Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service) or the DepEd pursuant to Rep. Act No.
4670 (Magna Carta for Public School Teachers). Since the charge was for violation of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
for Public Officials and Employees, the complaint should have been brought before the CSC.
We do not agree. An administrative case against a public school teacher may be filed before the Board of Professional
Teachers-PRC, the DepEd or the CSC, which have concurrent jurisdiction over administrative cases such as for immoral,
unprofessional or dishonorable conduct.
Concurrent jurisdiction is that which is possessed over the same parties or subject matter at the same time by two or
more separate tribunals.18[18] When the law bestows upon a government body the jurisdiction to hear and decide cases
involving specific matters, it is to be presumed that such jurisdiction is exclusive unless it be proved that another body is likewise
vested with the same jurisdiction, in which case, both bodies have concurrent jurisdiction over the matter.19[19] The authority to
hear and decide administrative cases by the Board of Professional Teachers-PRC, DepEd and the CSC comes from Rep. Act
No. 7836, Rep. Act No. 4670 and Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 807, respectively.
Under Section 23 of Rep. Act No. 7836, the Board is given the power, after due notice and hearing, to suspend or
revoke the certificate of registration of a professional teacher for causes enumerated therein. Among the causes is immoral,
unprofessional or dishonorable conduct. Section 23 reads:
SEC. 23. Revocation of the Certificate of Registration, Suspension from the Practice of the Teaching
Profession, and Cancellation of Temporary or Special Permit. – The Board shall have the power, after due
notice and hearing, to suspend or revoke the certificate of registration of any registrant, to reprimand or to
cancel the temporary/special permit of a holder thereof who is exempt from registration, for any of the following
causes:
(a) Conviction for any criminal offense by a court of competent jurisdiction;
(b) Immoral, unprofessional or dishonorable conduct;
(c) Declaration by a court of competent jurisdiction for being mentally unsound or insane;
(d) Malpractice, gross incompetence, gross negligence or serious ignorance of the practice of the
teaching profession;
(e) The use of or perpetration of any fraud or deceit in obtaining a certificate of registration, professional
license or special/temporary permit;
(f) Chronic inebriety or habitual use of drugs;
(g) Violation of any of the provisions of this Act, the rules and regulations and other policies of the Board
and the Commission, and the code of ethical and professional standards for professional teachers; and
(h) Unjustified or willful failure to attend seminars, workshops, conferences and the like or the continuing
education program prescribed by the Board and the Commission. x x x20[20]

16[16] Id. at 162.

17[17] Rollo, pp. 22-23.

18[18] Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, Vol. 1, Third Revision, p. 1761.

19[19] Civil Service Commission v. Sojor, G.R. No. 168766, May 22, 2008, 554 SCRA 160, 176.

20[20] Sec. 23 (h) has been repealed by Sec. 20, Rep. Act No. 8981 (PRC Modernization Act of 2000).

15
 Thus, if a complaint is filed under Rep. Act No. 7836, the jurisdiction to hear the same falls with the Board of
Professional Teachers-PRC.
However, if the complaint against a public school teacher is filed with the DepEd, then under Section 9 of Rep. Act No.
4670 or the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, the jurisdiction over administrative cases of public school teachers is
lodged with the investigating committee created pursuant to said section, now being implemented by Section 2, Chapter VII of
DECS Order No. 33, S. 1999, also known as the DECS Rules of Procedure. Section 9 of the Magna Carta provides:
SEC. 9. Administrative Charges. – Administrative charges against a teacher shall be heard initially by a
committee composed of the corresponding School Superintendent of the Division or a duly authorized
representative who should at least have the rank of a division supervisor, where the teacher belongs, as
chairman, a representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing provincial or national teachers’
organization and a supervisor of the Division, the last two to be designated by the Director of Public Schools.
The committee shall submit its findings and recommendations to the Director of Public Schools within thirty days
from the termination of the hearings: Provided, however, That where the school superintendent is the
complainant or an interested party, all the members of the committee shall be appointed by the Secretary of
Education.
A complaint filed under Rep. Act No. 4670 shall be heard by the investigating committee which is under the DepEd.
As to the CSC, under P.D. No. 807, also known as the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines, particularly Sections 9(j)
and 37(a) thereof, the CSC has the power to hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly with it or
brought to it on appeal. These sections state:
SEC. 9. Powers and Functions of the Commission.–The Commission shall administer the Civil Service
and shall have the following powers and functions:
xxxx
(j) Hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly with it in accordance with Section
37 or brought to it on appeal;
xxxx
SEC. 37. Disciplinary Jurisdiction.–(a) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative
disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in an
amount exceeding thirty days’ salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from office. A
complaint may be filed directly with the Commission by a private citizen against a government official or
employee in which case it may hear and decide the case or it may deputize any department or agency or official
or group of officials to conduct the investigation. The results of the investigation shall be submitted to the
Commission with recommendation as to the penalty to be imposed or other action to be taken.
As the central personnel agency of the government, the CSC has jurisdiction to supervise and discipline all government
employees including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.21[21]
Consequently, if civil service rules and regulations are violated, complaints for said violations may be filed with the CSC.
However, where concurrent jurisdiction exists in several tribunals, the body or agency that first takes cognizance of the
complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others.22[22] Here, it was the Board of Professional Teachers,
before which respondent filed the complaint, that acquired jurisdiction over the case and which had the authority to proceed and
decide the case to the exclusion of the DepEd and the CSC.
Petitioner’s reliance on the cases of Emin v. De Leon23[23] and Office of the Ombudsman v. Estandarte24[24] to
support his claim that it was the DepEd Investigating Committee created pursuant to Rep. Act No. 4670 which had jurisdiction to
try him because he is a public school teacher, is without merit as these cases are not in point. In Emin, the issue was which
between the DepEd Investigating Committee (under Rep. Act No. 4670) and the CSC (under P.D. No. 807) had jurisdiction to try
the administrative case, while in Estandarte, the issue was which between the Office of the Ombudsman and the DepEd
Investigating Committee had jurisdiction over the administrative case filed in said case. In contrast, the instant case involves the
Board of Professional Teachers which, under Rep. Act No. 7836, had jurisdiction over administrative cases against professional
teachers and has the power to suspend and revoke a licensed teacher’s certificate of registration after due proceedings.
As to the issue of due process, was petitioner denied administrative due process?
Petitioner questions the authority of the Board of Professional Teachers-Lucena City to assume jurisdiction over the
complaint, arguing that venue was improperly laid as he and respondent are residents of Parang, Jose Panganiban, Camarines
Norte; they were married in Daet, Camarines Norte where the alleged immoral and dishonorable conduct was committed; his
professional teacher’s license was issued in the Central Office of the PRC in Manila and renewed in the PRC Regional Office in
Legaspi City, Albay; and he is a Teacher I of S. Aguirre Elementary School, East District, Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte.
Moreover, petitioner also faults the Board of Professional Teachers-Lucena City for acting on respondent’s unverified
letter in violation of CSC Resolution No. 94-0521 which provides:
Section 4. Complaint in Writing and Under Oath. – No complaint against a civil servant shall be given
due course, unless the same is in writing and under oath.
He also asserts that respondent purposely filed the complaint before the Board of Professional Teachers in Lucena City
because the investigating officer was her colleague and belonged to the same religious denomination as her. This, according to
petitioner, showed the partiality of the board. The Board of Professional Teachers also allegedly denied him due process
because he was allegedly informed of the retraction of the testimony/affidavit of his witness (Dominador Blanco) only upon
receipt of the Board’s decision.
Petitioner’s contentions are without merit.

21[21] Civil Service Commission v. Alfonso, G.R. No. 179452, June 11, 2009, pp. 7-8.

22[22] Department of Justice v. Liwag, G.R. No. 149311, February 11, 2005, 451 SCRA 83, 98.

23[23] G.R. No. 139794, February 27, 2002, 378 SCRA 143.

24[24] G.R. No. 168670, April 13, 2007, 521 SCRA 155.

16
 Petitioner’s allegation of improper venue and the fact that the complaint was not under oath are not sufficient grounds for
the dismissal of the complaint. Well to remember, the case was an administrative case and as such, technical rules of
procedure are liberally applied. In administrative cases, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied and
administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense.25[25] The intention is to resolve
disputes brought before such bodies in the most expeditious and inexpensive manner possible.26[26]
Petitioner was likewise amply afforded administrative due process the essence of which is an opportunity to explain
one’s side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.27[27] The records show that
petitioner filed the following: (1) Compliance-Answer to the Complaint; (2) Rejoinder; (3) Position paper; (4) Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution of the Board of Professional Teachers finding him guilty as charged; and (5) Motion for
Reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals. He attended the preliminary conference and hearing where he was
able to adduce his evidence. With the opportunities he had, he cannot claim he was denied due process.
As regards his claim that the Board of Professional Teachers-Lucena City was partial because the investigating officer
knew respondent personally, the same was not substantiated. Even assuming arguendo that the investigating officer knew
respondent, convincing proof was still required to establish partiality or bias. Extrinsic evidence is required to establish
bias.28[28] For failure of petitioner to adduce such evidence, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty
prevails.29[29]
That he was allegedly informed of Dominador Blanco’s retraction upon receipt of the Board’s resolution is also of no
moment. Even if it were true that petitioner was only informed of the retraction when he received a copy of the Board’s
resolution, there was still no denial of due process because he still had the opportunity to question the same in his Motion for
Reconsideration. This, he did not do.
But was there substantial evidence to show that petitioner was guilty of immoral and dishonorable conduct? On this
issue, we likewise find against petitioner.
Petitioner claims good faith and maintains that he married respondent with the erroneous belief that his first wife was
already deceased. He insists that such act of entering into the second marriage did not qualify as an immoral act, and asserts
that he committed the act even before he became a teacher. He said that for thirteen (13) years, he was a good husband and
loving father to his children with respondent. He was even an inspiration to many as he built a second home thinking that he had
lost his first. He wanted to make things right when he learned of the whereabouts of his first family and longed to make up for
his lost years with them. He maintains that he never violated the Code of Ethics of Professional Teachers but embraced it like a
good citizen when he opted to stop his illicit marriage to go back to his first family. He adds that respondent knew fully well he
was married and had children when they contracted marriage. Thus, she was also at fault. Lastly, he claims there was no
substantial proof to show that his bigamous marriage contracted before he became a teacher has brought damage to the
teaching profession.
However, the issues of whether petitioner knew his first wife to be dead and whether respondent knew that petitioner
was already married have been ruled upon by both the Board of Professional Teachers and the Court of Appeals. The Board
and the appellate court found untenable petitioner’s belief that his first wife was already dead and that his former marriage was
no longer subsisting. For failing to get a court order declaring his first wife presumptively dead, his marriage to respondent was
clearly unlawful and immoral.
It is not the Court’s function to evaluate factual questions all over again. A weighing of evidence necessarily involves the
consideration of factual issues - an exercise that is not appropriate for the Rule 45 petition filed. Under the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, the parties may raise only questions of law in petitions filed under Rule 45, as the Supreme Court is not
a trier of facts. As a rule, we are not duty-bound to again analyze and weigh the evidence introduced and considered in the
tribunals below.30[30] This is particularly true where the Board and the Court of Appeals agree on the facts. W hile there are
recognized exceptions to this general rule and the Court may be prevailed upon to review the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals when the same are manifestly mistaken, or when the appealed judgment was based on a misapprehension of facts, or
when the appellate court overlooked certain undisputed facts which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion,31[31] no such circumstances exist in this case.
Indeed, there is no sufficient reason to overturn the findings of the Board as affirmed by the appellate court. It is clear
from the evidence that petitioner’s claim that he believed his first wife Cristina Puse to be already dead was belied by the latter’s
declaration. In the affidavit submitted before the CSC in A.C. No. CSC RO5 D-06-012 entitled Cristina Puse v. Ligaya de los
Santos, Cristina Puse, petitioner’s first wife, declared that ―Sometime in 1993, complainant decided to work in Hongkong x x x.
Since then up to the present, she has regularly sent financial support to her children and husband. From time to time,
complainant would visit her family in the Philippines at least once a year every year.‖ From this statement, petitioner cannot
claim that he had no knowledge of the whereabouts of his first wife or that she was already dead given that she regularly sent
her family financial support and visited them in the Philippines at least once a year.

25[25] Emin v. De Leon, supra at 154.

26[26] De la Cruz v. Department of Education, Culture and Sports-Cordillera Administrative Region, G.R. No.
146739, January 16, 2004, 420 SCRA 113, 124.

27[27] Alcala v. Villar, G.R. No. 156063, November 18, 2003, 416 SCRA 147, 154.

28[28] De la Cruz v. Department of Education, Culture and Sports-Cordillera Administrative Region, supra at 123.

29[29] Id.

30[30] Madrid v. Mapoy, G.R. No. 150887, August 14, 2009, p. 8.

31[31] Orix Metro Leasing and Finance Corporation v. M/V “Pilar-1,” G.R. No. 157901, September 11, 2009, p. 15.

17
 Petitioner’s contention that there was no substantial evidence to show his guilt because respondent did not even
formally offer her exhibits also does not persuade. As we have already said, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not
strictly applied in administrative proceedings. The fact that respondent did not formally offer her exhibits the way she would in
the courts of justice does not prevent the Board of Professional Teachers or Court of Appeals from admitting said exhibits and
considering them in the resolution of the case. Under Section 5 of PRC Resolution No. 06-342 (A), Series of 2006, also known
as the New Rules of Procedure in Administrative Investigations in the Professional Regulation Commission and the Professional
Regulatory Boards, ―technical errors in the admission of the evidence which do not prejudice the substantive rights of the parties
shall not vitiate the proceedings.‖ Here, we do not find any evidence that respondent’s failure to formally offer her exhibits
substantially prejudiced petitioner.
Neither is there merit to petitioner’s contention that because he contracted the bigamous marriage before he even
became a teacher, he is not required to observe the ethical standards set forth in the Code of Ethics of Professional
Teachers.32[32]
In the practice of his profession, he, as a licensed professional teacher, is required to strictly adhere to, observe and
practice the set of ethical and moral principles, standards and values laid down in the aforesaid code. It is of no moment that he
was not yet a teacher when he contracted his second marriage. His good moral character is a continuing requirement which he
must possess if he wants to continue practicing his noble profession. In the instant case, he failed to abide by the tenets of
morality. Petitioner kept his first marriage secret to his second wife. Unfortunately for him, his second wife discovered his true
marital status which led to the filing of the administrative and criminal cases against him.
In Santos, Jr. v. NLRC, a case involving a teacher dismissed from work on account of immorality, we declared:
On the outset, it must be stressed that to constitute immorality, the circumstances of each particular case
must be holistically considered and evaluated in light of the prevailing norms of conduct and applicable laws.
American jurisprudence has defined immorality as a course of conduct which offends the morals of the community
and is a bad example to the youth whose ideals a teacher is supposed to foster and to elevate, x x x Thus, in
petitioner’s case, the gravity and seriousness of the charges against him stem from his being a married man and at
the same time a teacher.

xxxx

As a teacher, petitioner serves as an example to his pupils, especially during their formative years and
stands in loco parentis to them. To stress their importance in our society, teachers are given substitute and
special parental authority under our laws.

Consequently, it is but stating the obvious to assert that teachers must adhere to the exacting standards
of morality and decency. There is no dichotomy of morality. A teacher, both in his official and personal conduct,
must display exemplary behavior. He must freely and willingly accept restrictions on his conduct that might be
viewed irksome by ordinary citizens. In other words, the personal behavior of teachers, in and outside the
classroom, must be beyond reproach.

Accordingly, teachers must abide by a standard of personal conduct which not only proscribes the
commission of immoral acts, but also prohibits behavior creating a suspicion of immorality because of the
harmful impression it might have on the students. Likewise, they must observe a high standard of integrity and
honesty.

From the foregoing, it seems obvious that when a teacher engages in extra-marital relationship,
especially when the parties are both married, such behaviour amounts to immorality, justifying his termination
from employment.33[33]
The Code of Ethics of Professional Teachers contains, among others, the following:
PREAMBLE
Teachers are duly licensed professionals who possess dignity and reputation with high moral values
as well as technical and professional competence. In the practice of their noble profession, they strictly adhere
to, observe, and practice this set of ethical and moral principles, standards, and values.
xxxx
ARTICLE II
THE TEACHER AND THE STATE
Section 1. The schools are the nurseries of the citizens of the state. Each teacher is a trustee of the
cultural and educational heritage of the nation and is under obligation to transmit to learners such heritage as
well as to elevate national morality, x x x.
xxxx
Section 3. In the interest of the State of the Filipino people as much as of his own, every teacher shall
be physically, mentally and morally fit.
xxxx
ARTICLE III
THE TEACHER AND THE COMMUNITY
xxxx
Section 3. Every teacher shall merit reasonable social recognition for which purpose he shall behave
with honor and dignity at all times and refrain from such activities as gambling, smoking, drunkenness and
other excesses, much less illicit relations.
xxxx

32[32] Professional Regulation Commission Resolution No. 435, Series of 1997.

33[33] G.R. No. 115795, March 6, 1998, 287 SCRA 117, 123-125.

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 ARTICLE XI
THE TEACHER AS A PERSON
Section 1. A teacher shall live with dignity in all places at all times.
xxxx
Section 3. A teacher shall maintain at all times a dignified personality which could serve as model
worthy of emulation by learners, peers, and others. [Emphasis supplied.]
The foregoing provisions show that a teacher must conform to the standards of the Code. Any deviation from the
prescribed standards, principles and values renders a teacher unfit to continue practicing his profession. Thus, it is required that
a teacher must at all times be moral, honorable and dignified.
The discovery of petitioner’s bigamous marriage has definitely caused damage to the teaching profession. How can he
hold his head up high and expect his students, his peers and the community to look up to him as a model worthy of emulation
when he failed to follow the tenets of morality?
The fact that he is now allegedly walking away from his second marriage in order to be with his first family to make up
for lost time does not wipe away the immoral conduct he performed when he contracted his second marriage. If we are to
condone immoral acts simply because the offender says he is turning his back on his immoral activities, such would be a
convenient excuse for moral transgressors and which would only abet the commission of similar immoral acts.
His assertion that he fulfilled his responsibilities as a father and a husband to his second family will, even if true, not cleanse his
moral transgression. In a case involving a lawyer who raised this same defense, we held:
Before we write finis to this case, we find it necessary to stress certain points in view of respondent’s
additional reason why he should be exonerated – that he loves all his children and has always provided for
them. He may have indeed provided well for his children. But this accomplishment is not sufficient to show his
moral fitness to continue being a member of the noble profession of law. It has always been the duties of
parents – e.g., to support, educate and instruct their children according to right precepts and good example; and
to give them love, companionship and understanding, as well as moral and spiritual guidance. But what
respondent forgot is that he has also duties to his wife. As a husband, he is obliged to live with her; observe
mutual love, respect and fidelity; and render help and support. And most important of all, he is obliged to remain
faithful to her until death.34[34]

Petitioner’s claim that he is a good provider to his second family is belied by the complaint of respondent wherein it was
alleged that he failed financially to support his second family. Moreover, he is already delinquent as to his duties to his second
wife. How can he live with her, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, render help and support, and to remain faithful to her
until death when he has another family to whom he is returning to?
All told, petitioner’s act of entering into said second marriage constitutes grossly immoral conduct. No doubt, such
actuation demonstrates a lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the teaching profession. When he
contracted his second marriage despite the subsistence of the first, he made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution
demanding respect and dignity.
We now go to the penalty imposed on petitioner. The penalty imposed on petitioner was the revocation of his license
which penalty was upheld by the Court of Appeals. He claims that such penalty was harsh and inappropriate. He cites Section
22, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations which states that disgraceful and immoral conduct is a grave
offense punishable by suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year for the first offense and dismissal for the
second offense. Considering that the charge was supposedly his first offense and taking into account his years of committed
service, the commensurate penalty, according to petitioner, is only the suspension of his professional license. He refers to the
case of Vitug v. Rongcal,35[35] where this Court considered remorse and the brevity of the illicit relationship as mitigating
circumstances taken in favor of the respondent lawyer.
It must be remembered, however, that petitioner was charged before the Board of Professional Teachers under Rep. Act
No. 7836 and not under Civil Service Law, Rules and Regulations. Under Section 23 of Rep. Act No. 7836, the Board has the
power to suspend or revoke the certificate of registration36[36] of any teacher for any causes mentioned in said section, one (1)
of which is immoral, unprofessional or dishonorable conduct. The Board has the discretion, taking into account the circumstances
obtaining, to impose the penalty of suspension or revocation. In the imposition of the penalty, the Board is not guided by Section 22
of Rule XIV of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations which provides for suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day
to one (1) year for the first offense, and dismissal for the second offense for disgraceful and immoral conduct. Petitioner, therefore,
cannot insist that Section 22 be applied to him in the imposition of his penalty, because the Board’s basis is Section 23 of Rep. Act
No. 7836 which does not consider whether the offense was committed the first or second time.

34[34] Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma, A.C. No. 2474, June 30, 2005, 462 SCRA 310, 322.

35[35] A.C. No. 6313, September 7, 2006, 501 SCRA 166, 185.

36[36] SEC. 17. Issuance of Certificate of Registration and Professional License. – The registration of a professional
teacher commences from the date his name is enrolled in the roster of professional teachers.

Every registrant who has satisfactorily met all the requirements specified in this Act shall, upon payment of
the registration fee, be issued a certificate of registration as a professional teacher x x x as evidence that the person
named therein is entitled to practice the profession x x x. The certificate shall remain in full force and effect until
withdrawn, suspended and/or revoked in accordance with law.

A professional license x x x shall likewise be issued to every registrant who has paid the annual registration
fees for three (3) consecutive years. This license shall serve as evidence that the licensee can lawfully practice his
profession until the expiration of its validity.

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 As to the supposed mitigating circumstances of remorse and brevity of the illicit relationship, these cannot be appreciated in
petitioner’s favor, as these circumstances are not present in the instant case. We do not find any expression of remorse in petitioner.
What we note, instead, is obduracy on his part. Despite the clear evidence (first wife’s statement that she regularly sends financial
support to her children and husband [referring to petitioner] and that she visits them in the Philippines at least once a year) showing
that petitioner knew that his first wife was still alive, he remains unyielding on his stand that he thought that his wife was already
deceased. We also cannot consider the illicit and immoral relationship to be brief because it lasted for more than twelve (12) years
until respondent learned about petitioner’s deception.
Under the circumstances, we find the penalty imposed by the Board proper.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 28 March 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
100421 is AFFIRMED.
With costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

CASE DIGEST
G.R. 156109 November 18, 2004

KRISTINE REA M. REGINO, Assisted and Represented by Armando Regino, petitioner, vs. PANGASINAN
COLLEGES OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, RACHELLE A GAMUROT AND ELISSA BALADBAD,
respondents

Facts:
Kristine Rea M. Rgino, a petitioner was a first year Computer Science student at RESPONDENT
Pangasinan College of Science and Technology (PST). Reared in a poor family. Regino went to college
mainly through the financial of her relatives. During the second semester of school year 2001-2002, she
enrolled in logic and statistics subjects under respondents Rachelle A. Gamurot and Elissa Baladad,
respectively, as teachers.
In February 2002, PCST held a fund raising campaign dubbed the ‘Rave Paqrty and Dance
Revolution,” the proceeds of which were to go to the construction of the school’s tennis and volleyball
courts. Each student was required to pay for two tickets at the price of P100 each. The project was
allegedly implemented by recompensing students who purchased tickets with additional points in their test
scores.; those who refused to pay were denied the opportunity to take the final examinations.

On March 14, 2002, the scheduled dates of the final examinations in logic and statistics, her
teachers allegedly disallowed her from taking the tests. According to petitioner, Gamurot made her sit out
her logic class while her classmates were taking their examinations. The next day Baladbad, after
announcing to the entire class that she was not permitting petitioner and another student to take their
statistics examinations for failing to pay for the tickets, allegedly ejected them from the classroom.
Petitioner’s pleas ostensibly went unheeded by Gamurot and Baladbad, who unrelentingly defended their
positions as compliance with PCST’s policy.
On April 25, 2002 petitioner filed, as pauper litigant, a complaint for damages against, PCST,
Gamurot and Baladbad. In her Complaint she prayed for P500,000

20