International Journal of Industrial Ergonomics 72 (2019) 222–240

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International Journal of Industrial Ergonomics

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ergon

Risk analysis for occupational safety and health in the textile industry: T
Integration of FMEA, FTA, and BIFPET methods
Nazlı Gülüm Mutlu∗, Serkan Altuntas
Yildiz Technical University, Department of Industrial Engineering, Istanbul, Turkey

ARTICLE INFO ABSTRACT

Keywords: Identifying and managing health and safety risks that threaten personnel in production systems are vital for the
Manufacturing system continuity and success of organizations. Many tools are used to accurately analyze and assess risks. Failure mode
Risk analysis and effect analysis (FMEA) is one of the most commonly used tools in different industries. However, the accuracy
Occupational safety and health and reliability of FMEA method have been fairly criticized by many researchers in the field. In this study, an
FMEA
approach based on FMEA that integrates the advantages of the fault tree analysis (FTA) method and belief in
FTA
BIFPET algorithm
fuzzy probability estimations of time (BIFPET) algorithm has been proposed in order to improve the performance
PERT distribution of the FMEA method. In order to practically apply the proposed method to real life problems, it has been
employed to analyze and assess the potential risks for a finishing process in the fabric dyeing department of a
textile company. The performance of the proposed FMEA-FTA-BIFPET method has been compared to the results
obtained by FMEA-FTA and FMEA-FTA-program evaluation and review technique (PERT) distribution integrated
methods. The results of this study show that failure related to fabric trimming adjustment in the tenter has the
highest risk priority number. The proposed approach can be used in various industry for risk analysis. In ad-
dition, results obtained by the study have indicated that the proposed approach can be implemented in practice
to perform comprehensive risk assessment procedures as it reflects real-life dynamics to analyze and assess
potential risk.

1. Introduction Workplace risk analysis and assessment studies are conducted in

Technological advancements have had great impact on humanity.
Although technology has made life easier and more efficient, it can
carry big risks related to different aspects of engineering, economic,
social, political, environmental, and personnel health and safety. The
growing trend toward industrialization and mechanization along with
rapid technological advances have increased occupational accidents
and diseases. According to the social security institution (SSI) annual
statistical report (2007–2016), more than 1000 occupational accidents
are reported in Turkey every year, mostly due to non-compliance with
safe use instructions of machinery and tools, unsafe workplace condi-
tions, human errors by employees, or other unknown reasons (see
Fig. 1). Although accidents are rare, they have serious impact on the
employees and can lead to disability, mutilation, and even death. While
occupational accidents may cost the employees their lives, employers
can also lose their property and reputation, all of which greatly impacts
the society. As shown in Fig. 1, the change in the margin of death in
occupational accidents between 2007 and 2015 reveals the significance
of the occupational health and safety problems in Turkey.
order to prevent occupational accidents and diseases, reduce losses in
the production process, avoid damages to the company's reputation,
and minimize the impact of such accidents. According to the
Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) Law, no. 6331 adopted in June
2012, employers are required to conduct risk analysis based on the
codes of practice issued in December 2012 under the OHS Risk
Assessment Regulation no. 28,512.
Risk is defined by the OHS Risk Assessment Regulation (2012) as:
“The possibility of losses, injuries, or other harmful outcomes arising from
hazards”. Rowe (1977) refers to risk as the potential of incidents
causing unfavorable events or negative consequences. These definitions
indicate that the purpose of risk analysis and assessment practice is to
define the potential hazards in the production and service systems,
revise the existing warning systems and safety measures to detect po-
tential hazards, and ensure that such measures are properly im-
plemented and tracked. Nonetheless, the most important issue is to
recognize the main cause of the hazard and determine the appropriate
measures to avoid such risky conditions, in other words, determine the
primary risk. Chen (2007) indicated that appropriately implementing

∗
Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: ngmutlu@yildiz.edu.tr (N.G. Mutlu), serkan@yildiz.edu.tr (S. Altuntas).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ergon.2019.05.013
Received 24 May 2018; Received in revised form 29 May 2019; Accepted 30 May 2019
0169-8141/ © 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
N.G. Mutlu and S. Altuntas
Fig. 1. Distribution of fatal occupational accidents in Turkey (SSI annual statistical report (2007–2016)).
interconnected practices as corrective actions can significantly improve
safety within the shortest time, and at minimum cost. Many risk ana-
lysis and assessment methods are used in risk rating. One of the most
widely used methods is failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA). It
outperforms other methods as it relies on quantitative-proactive ana-
lysis top re-detect risks. FMEA is adopted in this study because it is a
flexible tool to identify and mitigate risks that can further be improved.
FMEA method has areas that can be improved in practice. This study is
conducted to test the hypotehesis that explains the possiblity of the
integration of FTA and BIFPET algorithm with FMEA method to im-
prove the robustness of FMEA method. Belief in fuzzy probabilities
estimations of time (BIFPET) algorithm and the advantages of fault tree
analysis (FTA) method have been used to improve the performance of
the FMEA method. In order to demonstrate the practical applicability of
the proposed method to detect and mitigate real-life risks, it has been
implemented to assess the risks related to the finishing process of fabric
dyeing operations in a textile company.
In this study, the following points which are criticized are improved
by the proposed approach.
✓ The difficulty level to exactly determine the occurrence rating (O),
severity rating (S), and detection rating (D).
✓ Obtaining the same risk priority number (RPN) value with different
combinations of O, S, and D.
✓ Repeating RPN values.
✓ Inability to achieve a large number of intermediate values because
the RPN is a function of discrete variables.
✓ Unintuitive statistical properties of the RPN scale.
In the following sections, the scope of the proposed method, the
integration of FTA, FMEA, and BIFPET algorithm, and the application of
the proposed method have been demonstrated. In addition, the ob-
tained results have been presented in comparison to FMEA-FTA, FMEA-
FTA-BIFPET, and FMEA-FTA-PERT distribution, respectively.
2. Literature review
Risk analysis is implemented in order to adopt risk control measures
against potential hazards, decrease occupational accidents, and in-
crease the reliability of the production and service systems. Pham
(2011) stated that risk analysis is a practice for gaining information
regarding the nature and degree of risk and defined the main risk
analysis steps as; identifying the threats and hazards, recognizing the
cause and effect relations including exposure and weaknesses to risks,
and describing the potential risk.
Willquist and Törner (2003) classified the safety analysis methods
used for assessing risks that cause occupational hazards in the food
production industry as; biased reactive, unbiased proactive, and biased
proactive. Stave and Törner (2007) categorized the factors causing
accidents during the operation stages in food production systems as
visible and invisible risks factors. Furthermore, Zafra-Cabeza et al.
(2008) created a risk analysis action plan by identifying the situations
with uncertainties in the cogeneration system in their research to
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International Journal of Industrial Ergonomics 72 (2019) 222–240
prevent losses that may be caused by uncertainty and lack of knowl-
edge.
In addition to the studies summarized above, Kuşan and Özdemir
(2008) examined the risk analysis software that used for construction
management, including@Risk, CRIMS, Decision Pro, Crystal Ball, iDe-
cide, Monte Carlo, Precision Tree, Predict Risk Analyser, Risk+, Open
Plan Professional, REMIS, and Ris3Risgen’. In addition, the risk analysis
techniques commonly used in construction engineering practices, such
as benefit analysis, probability tree analysis, sensitivity analysis, and
Monte Carlo simulation techniques, were reviewed. Three categories of
risk analysis and assessment methods that reported in the literature
between 2000 and 2009 were identified by Marhavilas et al. (2011a);
namely, qualitative, quantitative, and semi-quantitative methods.
Goerlandt et al. (2016) examined the existing research in the field
and highlighted the few studies that investigated the validity and ac-
curacy of the currently used quantitative risk analysis methods for risk
assessment processes. Pluess et al. (2016) developed the laboratory
assessment and risk analysis (LARA) method, which enables untrained
personnel to identify and determine the significance of risks. The re-
liability and accuracy of the developed method, which used as an in-
tegrated risk management technique in different media, were evaluated
in in comparison to other well-designed risk analysis techniques.
Akyildiz and Mentes (2017) used fuzzy AHP and fuzzy TOPSIS methods
to assess the risks of cargo vessel accidents. Moreover, Zwirglmaier
et al. (2017) developed a method that allows determination of the
potential failure scenarios, their corresponding negative outcomes, and
occurrence probabilities of failure scenarios. Human reliability analysis
(HRA) and probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) methods were employed
to digitize human errors, and a Bayesian network model was used to
determine the cognitive causes of human errors. Mutlu and Altuntaş
(2017) conducted studies on occupational health and safety practices in
Turkey. Esmaeili et al. (2015a) proposed a risk analysis approach based
on attribute that has an impact on accident for construction industry.
Esmaeili et al. (2015b) developed attribute-based safety risk assessment
based on a linear model for estimating the type of accidents.
The categories of risk analysis and assessment methods identified by
Marhavilas et al. (2011b) are listed in Table 1.
While some studies in the current literature proposed risk analysis
methods, others involved risk analysis and assessment practices.
However, currently used risk analysis and assessment methods must be
further improved in order to enhance production safety and prevent
occupational accidents and diseases (Esmaeili et al., 2015a; Goerlandt
et al., 2016). Two key issues that must be addressed in risk analysis and
assessment processes are reported; namely, the lack of accurate in-
formation required for the analysis process and the obtained results
being affected by the opinions of decision-makers, which results in a
failure to completely reflect the actual situation based on the obtained
risk rates.
In order to address the shortcomings of the methods discussed
above, a risk analysis and assessment method is proposed in this study
to ensure the flow and integration of information using FMEA method,
BIFPET algorithm, and the FTA methods. The proposed method aims to
provide efficient production systems with improved occupational
N.G. Mutlu and S. Altuntas
Table 1
Risk analysis and assessment methods (Marhavilas et al., 2011b).
The Qualitative Techniques
Chek List
What if Analysis
Safety Audits
Task Analysis
The Sequentially Timed Event Plotting (STEP)
Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP)
The Quantitative Techniques
Proportional Risk-Assessment (PRAT)
Decision Matrix Risk-Assessment (DMRA)
Societal Risk
Quantitative Risk-Assessment (QRA)
Clinical Risk and Error Analysis (CREA)
Predictive, Epistemic Approach (PEA)
WeigFMed Risk Analysis (WRA)
The Hybrid Techniques
Human Error Analysis Techniques (HEAT/HFEA)
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
Event Tree Analysis (ETA)
Risk-Based Maintenance (RBM)
health and safety conditions. The proposed method ensures that the
stakeholders knowledge is considered at different levels during the risk
assessment process; thus, obtaining more accurate results in real-life
practices and applications. The risk analysis and assessment method
proposed in this study has not been encountered within the scope of the
attained literature.
3. Method
3.1. Fault tree analysis (FTA)
FTA is a deduction analysis method that allows identifying and
analyzing the potential causes, conditions, and factors that contribute
to the occurrence of an unidentified, undesirable major incident (IEC
61025: 2006, p. 6). FTA method is used to analyze, assess, and gra-
phically illustrate the hierarchical flow of potential incidents or situa-
tions that may negatively affect the system reliability and usability (IEC
61025: 2006, p. 11).
FTA method is used for multiple purposes, summarized as follows
(IEC 61025: 2006, p. 12):
✓ To determine logical combinations of minor incidents that con-
tribute to the occurrence of a major incident and prioritize minor
incidents to identify the measures required to reduce the major in-
cident.
✓ To determine the potential causes of undesirable incidents during
the development process of a system.
✓ To analyze a system, determine the components threatening its re-
liability, decide on proper design variations, etc.
✓ To assist in the probabilistic risk assessment process.
In literature, FTA method is recommended to be used along with
FMEA. While FTA performs a top-down deductive failure analysis,
FMEA adopts a top-down inductive failure analysis approach. The
combined approaches will increase the reliability of obtained results
(IEC 61025: 2006, p. 13).
Many studies have been conducted using both FTA and FMEA
methods. Li and Gao (2010) pointed out the necessity to identify the
potential root causes in the system and analyze the critical situation in
order to determine the maintenance operations required based on the
reliability-centered maintenance and radical maintenance approaches
using the FTA and failure mode effect and criticality analysis (FMECA)
methods. In addition, the FTA approach is adopted to evaluate the re-
liability of systems and analyze the probability of failures occurrence.
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International Journal of Industrial Ergonomics 72 (2019) 222–240
In another study, Liu et al. (2011a,b) proposed a method based on FTA
for risk decision making problem in emergency response.
3.2. Failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA)
FMEA is an engineering technique that used to identify the existing
or potential failures or problems in a design, process, or service struc-
ture of a system before they occur, to prevent undesirable incidents and
protect employees from occupational accidents and diseases by taking
the necessary measures (Stamatis, 2003). The severity and types of
potential failures in the analyzed system are identified by FMEA, which
allows decision makers to take the necessary risk-reducing measures
(IEC 60,812: 2006, p. 8).
FMEA should be conducted by a team of experts on the scope to be
analyzed. The method examines the causes of incidents and the con-
ditions triggering the incident. The analysis includes the equipment and
components used by the employee while performing the work, together
with the components and system conditions.
The purpose of conducting an FMEA analysis can be summarized as
follows (IEC 60,812: 2006, p. 9):
✓ To identify the errors or failures that will negatively affect the
proper operation of a system, and minimize the impacts of such
failures.
✓ To satisfactorily respond to customer demands.
✓ To determine the effects and probabilities of weak aspects of the
system to improve the safety and reliability of the system.
✓ To continuously improve the system.
FMEA method also provides benefits such as improving the quality
and reliability of the assessed products and processes, determining the
redesigning time of the product and decreasing the costs, reducing the
risks and their impacts to acceptable levels and creating risk control
plans, and providing information to eliminate primary risks improve
customer satisfaction (IEC 60,812: 2006, p. 33). FMEA approach is
frequently used and well known as an efficient risk analysis and as-
sessment tool (Meng Tay and Peng Lim, 2006; Mangeli et al., 2019;
Keskin and Özkan, 2009; Chiozza and Ponzetti, 2009; Abdelgawad and
Fayek, 2010; Mandal and Maiti, 2014; Trafialek and Kolanowski, 2014;
Pluess et al.,2016). However, FMEA has been criticized for having
major weaknesses (Chang et al., 2001; Ravi Sankar and Prabhu, 2001;
Braglia et al., 2003a; Cassanelli et al., 2003; Pillay &Wang, 2003;
Bowles, 2003; Chin et al., 2009; Chang et al., 2014a; Zhou and Thai,
2016). A review covering the criticism of FMEA method in the literature
was provided by Liu et al. (2013) and Liu (2016). The major short-
comings of FMEA that criticized by IEC 60812 (2006), Liu et al.(2013),
and Liu (2016) are listed in Table 2.
Considering the risks within the framework of the fuzzy rule along
with linguistic expressions has been recommended to improve FMEA.
Thus, more flexible RPN values can be obtained and the qualitative data
can be transformed into measurable quantities to reach more consistent
decisions. Many studies in the literature also reinterpreted the FMEA
method using fuzzy logic approach (Abdelgawad and Fayek, 2010;
Mandal and Maiti, 2014; Vahdani et al., 2015; Zhou and Thai, 2016;
Dağsuyu et al., 2016). However, some doubts still exist regarding the
practical application of risk assessment approaches using fuzzy rules,
and further studies are recommended in research this domain (Braglia
et al., 2003).
Yang et al. (2008), and Liu et al. (2013) examined various risk prior-
itization models that were proposed to improve the performance of FMEA
and revealed that the major weaknesses in FMEA are related to decision-
making problems. Multi-criteria decision-making methods to address such
decision issues have also been intensely used in the literature (Chang &
Cheng, 2010, 2011; Liu et al., 2012, 2014, 2015a, 2015b; Kutlu and
Ekmekçioğlu, 2012; Chang et al., 2013, 2014b; Maheswaran and
Loganathan, 2013; Ergu et al., 2014; Safari et al., 2016).
N.G. Mutlu and S. Altuntas
Table 2
Major shortcomings of FMEA (Adapted from IEC 60,812: 2006, Liu et al. (2013), and Liu (2016)).
Shortcomings
O, S and D are considered equal weight, the relative importance among them is not taken into
account.
The same RPN may produce with different combinations of O, S, and D. This can lead to wasting of
time and resources and leading to some high-risk situations out of focus.
It is quite difficult to determine exactly O, S and D (the area of expertise can vary with the experience
of the evaluator).
There is no scientific basis for the multiplication of O, S, and D for calculating RPN. The mathematical
formula for calculating RPN is questionable and debatable.
There is a similar relationship between “likelihood” and “degree” in the O evaluation tables and
“degree” and “violence” in the S evaluation tables while there is an opposite relationship between
“degree” and “detectability” expressions in the D evaluation table. There is also no linear
relationship between the probability level and likelihood values in the O evaluation table.
RPN cannot be used to measure the effectiveness of corrective actions.
120 different RPN values can be calculated, O, S, and D. The RPN value has no continuous values.
There are many numbers in the range of 1–1000.
Interdependencies among various failure modes and their effects are not taken into account.
The mathematical formula for calculating RPN is very sensitive to changes in risk factors. A small
change in the evaluation can lead to very different effects on the RPN value.
The RPN elements have many duplicate number.
The RPN assesses safety using only three risk factors. Other important risk factors such as the
economic direction of the error are not taken into account.
The RPN scale does not have intuitive statistical properties.
FMEA is an inductive risk analysis method. It is recommended to use
the deductive FTA method combined with FMEA to analyze the root
causes of potential risks down to the lowest level (IEC: 61,058, 2006, p.
34). FMEA and FTA methods are used integrally in many studies.
Within the context of reliability-centered maintenance, de Queiroz
Souza and Alvares (2008) used the FTA method to determine the root
causes of failures for the hydraulic turbine and oil circulation system of
a power generation system, while performed FMEA to calculate the risk
scores and rate the risks. In their study improve the safety of automated
gas proof systems, Khaiyum and Kumaraswamy (2014a) used the FTA
method to determine the failure types and various root causes, while
employed FMEA method to quantitatively analyze the risks. Khaiyum
and Kumaraswamy (2014b) analyzed the system by integrating the
FMEA and FTA methods in order to determine the strategies necessary
to increase the reliability, efficiency, and sustainability of real-time
integrated projects in the software industry. Zhang et al. (2014) used
the FTA and FMEA methods integrally in order to examine the failures
of pallet tools. The FTA method was used to analyze the root causes
starting from the main failure, and the correlation between the failures
was established. Risk rates of potential root causes determined by the
FTA method were calculated using the FMEA method. Furthermore,
Martins and Gorschek (2017) employed FMEA application to analyze a
critical system, and applied the FTA method to the most critical failures
in the system.
In the literature, risk-taking behaviors (Man et al., 2017), ergonomic
factors for Chinese coal mine workers (Deng et al., 2018), risk factors
for musculoskeletal injuries (Asadi et al., 2019), interactions of personal
and occupational risk factors (Çakmak ve Ergül, 2018), digital human
modeling in the occupational safety and health process (Schall et al.,
2018) and visual ergonomics (Zetterberg et al., 2019) related studies
are also conducted.
In this study, the analysis capacity of FMEA method (IEC 60812:
2006) is improved using calculation processes that involve the effect of
multiple decision makers, similar to real-life situations. The proposed
method utilizes the combined advantages of the FTA method (IEC
61025: 2006) and BIFPET algorithm to achieve better results.
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International Journal of Industrial Ergonomics 72 (2019) 222–240
Literature
Bowles (2003); Chang and Sun (2009); Wang et al. (2009); Chang et al.
(2001); Zhang and Chu (2011); 2014; Liu et al. (2016)
Ravi Sankar and Prabhu (2001); Chang et al. (2014a); IEC 60812: 2006,
p. 28
Yang et al. (2011); Liu et al. (2011a,b, 2012)
Liu et al. (2011, 2012)
Bowles (2003); Chang and Cheng (2011); Chang et al. (2014a); IEC
60812:2006,p. 28
Chen (2007); Yang et al. (2008), Pillay and Wang (2003)
Liu et al. (2012); Chang and Cheng (2010, 2011); Chang and Sun (2009);
IEC 60812:2006, p. 28
Lee (2001); Xu et al. (2002); Chang and Sun (2009); IEC 60812:2006, p.
28
Liu et al. (2011a,b, 2012); Kutlu and Ekmekçioğlu (2012); IEC
60812:2006, p. 28
Chang (2009); Chang and Sun (2009); Chang and Cheng (2010, 2011);
IEC 60812:2006, p. 28
Liu et al. (2011); Yang et al. (2008); Chang and Cheng (2010)
Ravi Sankar and Prabhu (2001); Chang and Cheng (2010); Rafie and
Namin (2015)
3.3. Belief in fuzzy probability estimations of time (BIFPET) algorithm
BIFPET algorithm has been developed by Shipley et al. (1996). The
algorithm is primarily used to determine the project completion time. It
adopts a logical approach that considers the expert opinions and sta-
keholders beliefs to calculate the project completion time. Thus, the
algorithm is unbiased and provides the most accurate project duration
estimates.
The BIFPET algorithm application in the literature is highly limited.
Shipley et al. (1997) expanded the BIFPET algorithm in order to handle
the uncertainties in the decision-making process and assign maximum
and minimum values to the anticipated completion time for each ac-
tivity in the project. Sanal et al. (2000) used a modified BIFPET algo-
rithm for tabulation problems. Shipley and Stading (2012) also utilized
the BIFPET algorithm to solve the supplier selection problem. Fur-
thermore, Altuntas et al. (2017) used the BIFPET algorithm to measure
the innovation capacity of investment projects.
Multi-level information contributes to obtaining the correct result
(Altuntas et al., 2017). Reliable knowledge is necessary in the atmo-
sphere of uncertainty associated with the risk analysis process.
Knowledge and opinions of the several stakeholders involved in such a
process, including experts, engineers, employees, and employers, must
be considered in order to achieve a reliable risk assessment (Chin et al.,
2009). Such process involves multi-level knowledge input. In this study,
the advantages of the BIFPET algorithm, which considers the opinions
of all the stakeholders, have been employed, based on the study by
Altuntas et al. (2017) that used BIFPET algorithm to establish a reliable
risk assessment process by determining the innovation capacity of in-
vestment projects. The algorithm advantages allow performing risk
assessment considering the multiple perspectives of various stake-
holders; namely, the expert, engineer, and employees with minimize
defects of uncertainty related to the knowledge and experience of the
stakeholders involved in the process. The stakeholders selected during
the risk analysis and assessment process comply with the procedures
stated in the OHS Risk Assessment Regulation (2012). In this study, a
risk assessment method based on FMEA, FTA, and BIFPET methods is
proposed and applied to a real production system.
The steps of the BIFPET algorithm are as follows (Shipley, 1996):
N.G. Mutlu and S. Altuntas International Journal of Industrial Ergonomics 72 (2019) 222–240

Fig. 2. The proposed approach.

1. For each activity Ai, assign time, tki (k = 1, 2, and 3), defining op- 6. Defuzzify the expected activity time to yield as expressed in
timistic (t1i ), most possible (t2i ), and pessimistic (t3i ) times. Equation (4).

Then, activity completion time tAi is given by Equation (1). E (tAi) = cil bil / cil
l l (4)
tAi = ki/ tki for all Ai where ki = 1 (i = 1,2&.,m and k= 1,2, and 3)
k

(1) 3.4. Program evaluation and review technique (PERT) distribution

2. Define fuzzy probability (Q A1k ) , for each Ai in terms of tki as ex- PERT distribution is based on beta distibution and frequently used
pressed in Equation (2). to model expert decisions (Vose, 2008, p.405; Covert and COVARUS,
Q A1k = kij /akij for all tki 2013, p.186). Program evaluation and review technique (PERT) is used
j (2) to ensure time control of projects in the literature. This method is
commonly used in the literature to calculate the minimum completion
Where, each kij represents belief in the probability akij that Ai will be
time of projects (Gür, 2006). Mishakova et al. (2016) employed the
completed in time tki (k = 1,2, and 3; i = 1,2 …. m and j = 1,2 …. ,n).
PERT technique to control the project completion time. Klingel (1966)
criticized the PERT technique for providing biased results in the study
3. Consider all akij such that k H akijk = 1.00 for some set H of k's.
conducted to determine the probability of a project completion within
akijk = 0 for k H is automatically assigned.
the anticipated time frame. On the other hand, Agyei (2015) adopted
4. Compute bil value as expressed in Equation (3).
the PERT and critical path method (CPM) methods to establish a ba-
k
akij tki, k
akij = 1 lanced correlation between the minimum completion time and cost of a
bil =
0 , otherwise (3) project. The activity completion time is considered by the PERT
method. However, within the scope of this study, an integrative ap-
Where, (k = 1, 2, and 3) and p = distinct number of k
akij = 1, proach using the logic of the PERT distribution, FMEA, and FTA
1 l p. methods has been adopted, considering the risk parameters of each
failure used in the FMEA method; namely, the risk occurrence, severity
5. Determine cil = min{ ki, kij }for all kij 0 where cil is degree of and detectability have been applied. None of the studies in the existing
belief that expected to obtain the values of bil . literature has employed an integrative approach using FMEA-FTA and

226
N.G. Mutlu and S. Altuntas
PERT distribution for risk analysis and assessment practices. The results
obtained by this method have been comparatively presented in order to
assess the performance of the FMEA-FTA-BIFPET method.
An approximate completion time of the project is calculated using
the program assessment and revision technique. n number of activities
are assumed in a project, three parameters are defined for the com-
pletion time of Activity I; namely, ai (optimistic), ci (most possible), and
bi (pessimistic). The completion time for Activity i usually (ai, bi) fol-
lows the PERT distribution, and the average or expected completion
time of activity i can be denoted by mi. The values of mi and variance
( 2 ) are calculated using Equations (5) and (6), respectively (Vose,
2008, p.405; Covert and COVARUS, 2013, p.187).
ai + 4ci + bi
mi =
6 (5)
(bi ai ) 2
2 =
36 (6)
4. The proposed risk analysis approach
FMEA method is a frequently used and well-known risk analysis and
assessment tool in the literature. Although the method exhibits many
advantages, it is criticized in various aspects. Within the context of this
study, an integrated method is proposed using the BIFPET algorithm
combined with the advantages of FTA method in order to improved
analysis capacity. Application steps of the proposed method are illu-
strated in Fig. 2. Additionaly, the information flow wthin the proposed
framework is presented in Fig. 3.
Fig. 3. Information flow within the proposed framework.
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International Journal of Industrial Ergonomics 72 (2019) 222–240
5. Application of integrated FMEA- FTA-BIFPET, FMEA-FTA-PERT
distribution approaches in textile industry
5.1. Identifying the problem
The integrated approach proposed in this study has been applied to
an integrated business operating in the textile sector. The business
operations involve open-end and ring yarn production, weaving,
thread, and fabric dyeing processes that carried out on three shifts.
Their final products include yarn, dyed thread, and dyed fabric. Prior to
the commencement of risk analysis and assessment, the operating
manager in charge of the operations completed interviews to determine
the most challenging part of the business in terms of both occupational
health and safety and production failures. It was found that packaging
and transferring products to meet the customer demands were con-
sidered as the most challenging operation problem. The dyeing de-
partment plays a key role in solving this problem. Therefore, the types
of potential failures that can occur during the dyeing operations have
been identified and their root causes have been determined. The dyeing
plant information and processes are given in Table 3.
5.2. Application
In this section, practical application of the proposed method to the
Finishing process in the fabric dyeing operation of the textile company
discussed above is set forth. FMEA-FTA has been conducted on all the
processes constituting the dyeing operation. The total risk load value
and average risk priority number have been calculated for each process.
The results reveal that the process with the highest average risk load
value is “Fabric Preparation” (average RPN = 437.33; potential root
causes number = 3), and the “Finishing Process” (average
RPN = 226.40; potential root causes number = 15). According to the
FMEA team, a managerial improvement approach can be adopted to
prevent failures while opening a fabric lot. However, the FMEA team
N.G. Mutlu and S. Altuntas International Journal of Industrial Ergonomics 72 (2019) 222–240

Table 3
Dyeing operation and processes.
Priority Order Process Description

1 Planning
2 Raw Storehouse
3 Fabric Preparation
4 Laboratory
5 Fabric Dying
6 Finishing
7 Quality Control
8 Shipment
The process of creating the order form, in which the customers provide their desired fabric features.
There are raw fabrics that are not dyed in raw warehouse.
The customers place their orders to sew the raw fabric of the rolled fabric to the end.
Fabric color analysis is carried out according to the properties desired by the customer.
The coloring process by mechanical or chemical methods, depending on the chemical properties of the textile fibers, shapes, and dyes. It is
performed by connecting the dyestuff molecules using heat and water motion through the dyebath of the dye bond for a certain period of
time.
The final finishing operations are carried out after the pre-finishing and dyeing processes to improve the properties and set the finished
product appearance to obtain the bi-structure appropriate for their intended use.
The final quality control procedures are performed for the fabric before shipment.
The final product sent to the customer.

has agreed that controlling the potential root causes identified for the to Fig. 4). Herein, OR gate has been used.
Finishing process is rather challenging. Therefore, the proposed FMEA-
FTA-BIFPET integrated risk analysis and assessment method has been 5.2.3. FMEA method application steps
applied to the Finishing process, which is the second most prioritized
process of the dyeing operation (see Table 12). Step 7: For potential root cause(s) of each failure mode, occurrence
In order to evaluate the performance of the proposed method, the (Oij), severity (Sij), and detectability (Dij) value are assigned using
analysis results have been compared to the results obtained from the Tables 5–7 by FMEA team.
FMEA-FTA and FMEA-FTA-PERT distribution methods.
Stages of applying the proposed method (as shown in Fig. 2): The According to step 7:
integration of the FMEA-FTA methods, the developed information flow BIFPET algorithm application steps (the study by Shipley et al.
and application have been provided in Stages 1–8. The integration of (1996) has been reinterpreted according to FMEA approach).
the BIFPET algorithm to the FMEA-FTA method, the developed in-
formation flow and application have been p rovided in Stages 9–14. The Step 9: The optimistic (r = 1), most possible (r = 2), and pessimistic
integration of the FMEA-FTA method and the PERT distribution and its j j j j j j j j j j j
(r = 3) values for Oi r , (Oi 1, Oi 2Oi 3 ), Si r (Si 1, Si 2 Si 3 ) and Di r (Di 1, Di 2
application have been provided in Stages 15–16. j3
Di ) of each potential root cause(s) are assigned by the FMEA team
(see Table 10).
5.2.1. FMEA method application steps
Each Oi r , Si r , and Di r values are given by Equations (8)–(10), re-
j j j
Step 1: The framework to be analyzed has been determined as the
spectively. Herein, the maximum membership level of the possible
failure in the dyeing process in this study. j j j j j
values of Oi r , Si r , and Di r is considered. Thus, the values of Oi r , Si r ,
Step 2: The FMEA team was initiated to analyze the potential risk in
and Di are considered 1.
jr
the dyeing plant (see Table 4).
j
j j j j Oi r = 1
OFMi r = Oi r /Oi r , for all FMi , dir. (8)
5.2.2. FTA method application steps
j j j j
Step 5: The potential root causes are identified as each failure mode. SFMi r = Si r / Si r , for all FMij , Si r = 1 dir. (9)

For each failure mode FMi, (i = 1 … m), the potential root causes of DFMi r =
j j j
Di r / Di r , for all FMij Di r = 1 dir
j
(10)
each failure mode FMij (j = 1 … n) are determined.
According to step 5: FM181
“Weight and width adjustment failure in
Step 10: Consider the stakeholders d (d = 1: Head of Department,
the tenter” is determined for FM18 “Fabric weight failure”.
d = 2: Quality Control Manager, d = 3: Assistant Head of
Department and Employee Representative, and d = 4: Managing
Step 6: The logical relationship between the potential root causes
Director and OHS Specialist). In this step, fuzzy probabilities, QOFM jr ,
(input events) and failure modes (output event) are initiated (refer i
j j j
QSFM jr , and QDFM jr are defined in terms of Oi r , Si r , and Di r . For each
i i
jd jd jd
Oi r , Si r , and Di r , the probability values aOi r , aSi r , and aDi r are
j j j
Table 4
FMEA team for risk analysis. assigned by the stakeholders (d: 1st, 2nd, and 3rd). Then, for each
jd jd jd
Step 3: The Occurrence, Severity, and Detectability assessment tables and risk probability value, the belief values Oi r , Si r , and Di r are assigned
acceptability table within the scope of the FMEA method have been created by the stakeholders (d: 4th). The probability and belief values range
exclusively for the processes performed by the analyzed business based on between 0 and 1. The fuzzy probability values are obtained, as
the co-decision of the FMEA team formed for the purpose of this study, as follows:
listed in Tables 5–8.
jd jd
Decision Branch Department Experience QOFM jr = Oi r / aOi r
i (11)
Makers (Year)

1 ME∗ Head of Department 8 jd jd

QSFM jr = Si r / aSi r
2 TE∗ Quality Control Manager 12 i (12)
3 C∗ Assistant Head of Department and 3
Employee Representative jd jd
QDFM jr = Di r / aDi r
4 C∗ Managing Director and OHS Specialist 10 i (13)

ME : Mechanical Engineering, TE : Textile Engineering, C : Chemist.

∗ ∗ ∗
The fuzzy probability values of 1
O18 are as follows:

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N.G. Mutlu and S. Altuntas International Journal of Industrial Ergonomics 72 (2019) 222–240

Fig. 4. FTA for the processes of dyeing operation.

Table 5
Failure mode occurrence related to frequency and probability of occurrence.
Rating Failure mode occurrence Frequency Probability

10 Too High: Inevitable Failure > 100, Every thousand operations > 10−1
9 Too High: Inevitable Failure 50, Every thousand operations 5*10−2
8 Too High: Inevitable Failure 20, Every thousand operations 2*10−2
7 Too High: Inevitable Failure 10, Every thousand operations 1*10-2
6 Intermediate: Intermittent Failure 2, Every thousand operations 2*10−3
5 Intermediate: Intermittent Failure 0.5, Every thousand operations 5*10−4
4 Low: Relatively Low Failure 0.1, Every thousand operations 1*10−4
3 Low: Relatively Low Failure 0.01, Every thousand operations 1*10−5
2 Very Rare: Unlikely Failure 0.001, Every thousand operations 1*10−6
1 Very Rare: Unlikely Failure < 0.001, Every thousand operations < 1*10−6

Table 6
Failure mode severity evaluation criteria.
Severtiy Criteria Ranking

Hazardous without warning A possible fault condition has no effect on the safety of the operator, the maintenance personnel or the legal requirements, without any 10
indication being given
Hazardous with warning The operator influences the safety of the maintenance personnel by determining the potential fault condition or not meeting the 9
regulatory requirements
Very high The product is 100% scrap. Operation is stopped, shipping can not be performed. 8
High Part of your product is scrap. Slowing down the process speed or additional workload 7
Moderate Repair and approval of 100% of the product after the end of the operation 6
Low Part of the repair and approval of the product after the operation is over 5
Very low Repair 100% of the product during operation 4
Minor Some of the product is repaired during operation 3
Very minor Low impact on process, operation or operator 2
None No noticeable effect 1

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N.G. Mutlu and S. Altuntas International Journal of Industrial Ergonomics 72 (2019) 222–240

Table 7
Recommended ranking of evaluation criteria for failure mode detection.
Detectaion Criteria: Likelihood of detection Detection method Ranking

Absolutely uncertain The detectability of the cause of the potential failure and the subsequent failure is It can not be detection and controls 10
absoulutely uncertain
Very remote The detectability of the cause of the potential failure and the subsequent failure is Indirect and random controls 9
very remote
Remote The detectability of the cause of the potential failure and the subsequent failure is Audio/visual controls 8
remote
Very low The detectability of the cause of the potential failure and the subsequent failure is Audio/visual controls or qualitative controls 7
very low
Low The detectability of the cause of the potential failure and the subsequent failure is Various device controls or qualitative controls in the 6
low process
Moderate The detectability of the cause of the potential failure and the subsequent failure is Automatic control in production station, operator 5
moderate warning
Moderately High The detectability of the cause of the potential failure and the subsequent failure is Automatic warning on next operation, stopping faulty 4
moderate high production
High The detectability of the cause of the potential failure and the subsequent failure is Automatic control in process, stopping faulty production 3
high
Very high The detectability of the cause of the potential failure and the subsequent failure is Detection by automatic control in the process before 2
very high production
Almost Certain The detectability of the cause of the potential failure and the subsequent failure is Failure prevention system, machine, etc. recognized by 1
almost certain. the vehicle

Table 8 Table 10
Risk acceptance criteria for potential root The optimistic, most possible, and pessimistic values for O18
1
, S18
1
and D18
1
of.FM18
1

causes.
FMij FMi r
j j
Oi r
j j
Step 4: Potential failure modes are identi- Si r Di r
fied for the dyeing department. Historical
1 11 11 11 11
failure records have been used during the FM18 FM18 : Optimistik O18 =7 S18 =4 D18 =3
FMEA team interviews to determine failure 12
FM18 :Most possible 12
O18 =8 12
S18 =5 12
D18 =5
modes. According to step 4: One of the 13
FM18 :Pessimistic 13
O18 =9 13
S18 =6 13
D18 =7
failure modes is FM18 “Fabric weight
failure”.
Criteria RPN Table 11
Total and average risk values for the processes of dyeing operation.
Intolerable > 201
High 101–200 Order of Process Potential Root Causes Total RPN Average
Moderate 51–100 Priority Number RPN
Tolerable 1–50
1 Planning 7 1536 219.43
2 Raw Storage 4 526 131.50
3 Fabric 3 1312 437.33
preparation
Table 9 4 Laboratory 13 1512 116.31
O, S, and D values for potential root cause.FM18
1 5 Dyeing 14 3012 215.14
Step 8: For each potential root cause(s), the RPN has been calculated by 6 Finishing 15 3396 226.40
7 Quality Control 9 488 54.22
the Equation (7).
8 Shipment 2 147 73.50
Total 67 11,929 178.04
RPNij = (Oi j ) × (Si j) × (Di j ) (7)

RPN118 = (9) × (6) × (3) = 162

jd jd jd jd
Step 11: AllaOi r aSi r , and aDi r satisfying k H
aOikr = 1,
jd jd
Oij Sij Dij k H
aSikr = 1, and k H
aDikr = 1 condition for set H of each k
jd jd jd
sholud be considered. For each aOi r = 0 , aSi r = 0 and aDi r = 0 for
1
O18 =9 1
S18 =6 1
D18 =3
k H.

According to Step 11, there are four possible combinations that sum
111 112 113 111 112 113 to 1 for O18
1
, which are:
O18 = 0.4 O18 = 0.7 O18 = 0.6 aO18 = 0.6 aO18 = 0.1 aO18 = 0.4
1 1 1
11 12 13
112 122 132 112 122 132 aO18 + aO18 + aO18 = 0.6 + 0.3 + 0.1 = 1
O18 = 0.2 O18 = 0.7 O18 = 0.8 aO18 = 0.3 aO18 = 0.3 aO18 = 0.3
1 2 3 1 2 3
13 13 13 13 13 13 2 2 2
O18 = 0.4 O18 = 0.8 O18 = 0.6 aO18 = 0.1 aO18 = 0.6 aO18 = 0.3 11
aO18 12
+ aO18 13
+ aO18 = 0.1 + 0.3 + 0.6 = 1

For O18
11
= 7, the fuzzy probability values: QOFM 11 = 0.4/0.6 + 0.7/ 11
aO18
3
12
+ aO18
3
13
+ aO18
3
= 0.4 + 0.3 + 0.3 = 1
18
0.1 + 0.6/0.4.
For O18 = 8, the fuzzy probability values: QOFM 12 = 0.2/0.3 + 0.7/
12 13
aO18
2
11
+ aO18
3
= 0.6 + 0.4 = 1
18
0.3 + 0.8/0.3.
For O18
13
= 9, the fuzzy probability values: QOFM 13 = 0.4/0.1 + 0.8/
18 Step 12: The fuzzy probability is associated with the averaged fuzzy
0.6 + 0.6/0.3.

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Table 12
Failure modes and potential root causes for processes of the dyeing operation.
Process Failure Mode (FMi) Potential Root Causes FMij

Planning Faulty fabric production owing to noncompliance with work order Delivery of non-complying fabric FM11
Lack of employee knowledge and experience FM12
Miscommunication of the order planning FM13
Entry of non-complying color code FM14
Processing non-complying fabric to the production FM15
Failure to present the quality parameters required in the instructions FM16
X* Data entry errors (extra or missing zeros)and punctuation error FM21
Raw Storage Faulty work order in the raw storage Failure to process the fabric to the dyeing department with the properties FM31
stated in the bin card
Lot disordinance FM32
Wrong fabric in the pallets FM33
Tube/lattice disordinance failure FM34
Fabric Preparation Faulty work order in the Fabric preparation department Opening the wrong fabric in the fabric preparation process FM41
Failure to weigh the fabric in the fabric preparation process FM42
Failure to adjust the fabric length per eyelet FM43
Laboratory Faulty color application (failure to prepare a sample for dyeing) Fabric selection failure FM51
Fabric weighing failure FM52
Dye and chemical selection error FM53
Faulty color application (failure in loading formula to the pipetting Errors in proportions of dye and chemical FM61
machine) Error in proportions of dye and solvents used in dissolution FM62
Faulty operation of the dyeing machine by the personnel FM63
Faulty color application (Dyeing failure) Unclean tube selection FM71
Inappropriate machine heat failure FM72
Placing fabrics in wrong tubes FM73
Dyeing process selection failure FM74
Dyeing the fabric with wrong color Fault entry of dye and chemical proportions of an approved color work FM81
Delivering the same color product to the customer twice FM82
Fault entry of the sample code sent to the customer FM83
Dyeing Preparing incorrect formula Incorrect processing of the information received from the laboratory FM91
Incorrect information processing in the file sent by the laboratory FM92
Dye and chemical preparation failing to comply with formula Incorrect dye weighing by the dye-kitchen officer FM101
Wrong chemical request error from automation for the dyeing process FM102
Quantity (kilogram) differences between the eyelets of fabrics Fabric preparation personnel failing to adjust the eyelet-kg ratio FM111
loaded in the boiler
Noncomplying pH adjustment No pH adjustment during dyeing FM121
pH adjustment failure in the washing FM122
pH adjustment failure in boiler output FM123
Noncomplying process selection Incorrect process entry by the operator FM131
Failing to comply with work order in the selected process Shortened or extended process to be performed by the operator FM141
Machine malfunction Dyeing container mixer malfunction FM151
Dosage valve malfunction FM152
Employee incompetence Use of unplanned medical excuse and leave of absence FM161
System shutdown Power cut FM171

Process Failure Mode (FMi) Potential Root Causes FMij

Finishing Fabric weight failure Weight and width adjustment failure in the tenter FM181
Diameter, fine, and thread length failures in weaving FM182
Fabric weight adjustment failure FM183
Fabric handling failure Handling adjustment failure by the personnel (silicon quantity FM191
failure)
Handling adjustment failure between batches (pH control failure) FM192
Handling difference failure between batches (padding dose failure) FM193
Handling failure (silicon cylinder press adjustment failure) FM194
Forming non-complying fabric width Width difference failure between fabric batches fixed with incorrect FM201
yarn
Weaving machine and fabric width failure FM202
Forming non-complying fabric shrinkage Heat and speed adjustment failure during fix process FM211
Diameter, fine, and thread length adjustment failure FM212
Tenter fabric supply and speed adjustment failure FM213
Waste failure Fabric trimming adjustment failure in the tenter FM221
Weight loss failure due to excess enzyme FM222
Failure to return waste fabric to repair FM223
Quality Control Delivering fabric with non-complying quality Approval of a non-complying products FM231
Approval of a product with non-complying shrinkage and twist FM232
values
Approval of a product with non-complying color FM233
Approval of a product with disproportionate width-weight. FM234
Approval of a product manufactured with faulty procedure FM235
Approval of a product with faulty surface FM236
Approval of a product with flap difference FM237
Approval of a product with defective fastness FM238
Delay in solutions FM239
(continued on next page)

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Table 12 (continued)

Process Failure Mode (FMi) Potential Root Causes FMij

Shipment Failure to deliver to the customer within the time frame pre-set in the order Delay in product quality control FM241
contract terms An unauthorized purchase of a controlled finished product FM242

X* Miscommunication with the raw storage department due to miswritten fabric amount on the bin card.

Table 13
The results obtained by FMEA-FTA for the processes of dyeing operation. E QOFM jr = cOi jl /bOi jl
i
FMij Oij Sij Dij RPNij FMij Oij Sij Dij RPNij (17)

FM11 3 10 6 180 FM123 7 8 9 504

FM12 3 10 8 240 FM131 2 8 3 48 E QSFM jr = cSi jl/bSi jl
FM13 7 3 10 210 FM141 7 8 9 504 i

FM14 5 6 5 150 FM151 8 8 3 192

(18)
FM15 5 6 5 150 FM152 8 8 6 384
FM16 6 5 4 120 FM161 3 6 7 126
FM21 6 9 9 486 FM171 7 6 3 126 E QDFM jr = cDi jl /bDi jl
i
FM31 3 8 6 144 FM181 9 6 3 162 (19)
FM32 8 5 4 160 FM182 10 4 3 120
FM33 8 7 3 168 FM183 10 5 3 150 bOi and cOi values are calculated for
jl jl 1
O18 , as follows:
FM34 3 3 6 54 FM191 8 6 5 240
FM41 8 8 7 448 FM192 8 6 5 240 1 1 1
FM42 6 8 9 432 FM193 7 6 5 210 11
bO18 11
= aO18 x (O18
11
) + (aO1812) x (O1812) + (aO1813) x (O1813) = (7) x (0.6)
FM43 6 8 9 432 FM194 8 6 5 240
FM51 3 8 2 48 FM201 8 6 3 144
FM52 3 8 9 216 FM202 8 6 4 192 + (8) x (0.3) + (9) x (0.1) = 7.5
FM53 3 8 2 48 FM211 8 7 3 168
FM61 3 8 2 48 FM212 9 7 4 252
2 2 2
FM62 3 8 2 48 FM213 10 7 5 350 12
bO18 11
= aO18 x (O18
11
) + (aO1812) x (O1812) + (aO1813) x (O1813) = (7) x (0.1)
FM63 3 8 2 48 FM221 8 10 2 160
FM71 3 8 2 48 FM222 8 8 8 512
FM72 3 8 2 48 FM223 8 8 4 256 + (8) x (0.3) + (9) x (0.6) = 8.5
FM73 3 8 2 48 FM231 7 6 1 42
FM74 3 8 2 48 FM232 6 6 1 36
FM81 4 8 9 288 FM233 6 6 2 72 3 3 3
FM82 4 8 9 288 FM234 6 6 2 72
13
bO18 11
= aO18 x (O18
11
) + (aO1812) x (O1812) + (aO1813) x (O1813) = (7) x (0.4)
FM83 4 8 9 288 FM235 5 6 1 30
FM91 3 8 3 72 FM236 6 6 1 36
+ (8) x (0.3) + (9) x (0.3) = 7.9
FM92 4 8 3 96 FM237 6 6 2 72
FM101 6 8 4 192 FM238 6 6 2 72
FM102 4 8 10 320 FM239 7 4 2 56 3 2
FM111 5 8 4 160 FM241 3 3 3 27
14
bO18 11
= aO18 x (O18
11
) + (aO1813) x (O1813) = (7) x (0.4) + (9) x (0.6) = 8.2
FM121 6 8 3 144 FM242 6 5 4 120
FM122 6 8 3 144

cO1811 = min {0.4, 1; 0.2, 1; 0.4, 1} = 0.2

benefit E QOFM jr , E QSFM jr , and E (QDFM jr . Calculate bOi jl, bSi jl , cO1812 = min {0.7, 1; 0.7, 1; 0.8, 1} = 0.7
i i i

and bDi and the fuzzy benefit values, as follows:

jl
cO1813 = min {0.6, 1; 0.8, 1; 0.6, 1} = 0.6
jd
aOikr Oi r ,
j jd
aOikr = 1 cO1814 = min {0.6, 1; 0.0, 1; 0.8, 1} = 0.0
bOi jl = k k
0 otherwise (14) Step 13: Compute E (OFMij), E (SFMij), and E (DFMij) for defuzzi-
fication, as follows:
jd j jd
bSi jl = aSikr Si r , aSikr = 1
k k E(OFMi j ) = cOi jl bOi j / Oci jl
0 otherwise (15) l l (20)
j jl j jl
jd j jd E(SFMi ) = cSi bSi / Sci
bDi jl = k
aDikr Di r , k
aDikr =1 (21)
l l
0 otherwise (16)
E(DFMi j ) = cDi jl bDi j / Dci jl
jd jd
Where p=a distinct number: if k
aOikr = 1, k
aSikr = 1, l l (22)
jrd jr jrd
k
aDik = 1, and l=a determine cOi = min jl
Oi , Oi , c
E (OFM181) = [(7.5) × (0.2)+(8.5) × (0.7)+(7.9) × (0.6)+(8.2)
jr jrd jrd × (0.0)]/(0.2 + 0.7+0.6 + 0.0) = 8.13
, cDi = min{ Di , Di
jr
jl
Si = min Si , Si jl
for all satisfied
E (SFM181) = 5.12
jrd jrd jrd
Oi 0, Si 0 , Di 0 conditions. Herein, cOi shows the degree jl
E (DFM181) = 5.33
of belief that expected value is bOi jl .
Step 14: The expected risk priority number E (RPNi j ) is calculated

232
 Table 14
Occurrence, severity, detectability and fuzzy probability values obtained by"FMEA-FTA-BIFPET method” for potential root causes in finishing process.
FMij OFMij Oij1, Oij2, Oij3 Value Fuzzy Probability E (OFMij) FMij OFMij Oij1, Oij2, Oij3 Value Fuzzy Probability E (OFMij) FMij OFMij Oij1, Oij2, Oij3 Value Fuzzy Probability E (OFMij)
SFMij Sij1, Sij2, Sij3 QOFMijr E (SFMij) SFMij Sij1, Sij2, Sij3 QOFMijr E (SFMij) SFMij Sij1, Sij2, Sij3 QOFMijr E (SFMij)
DFMij Dij1, Dij2, Dij3 QSFMijr E (DFMij) DFMij Dij1, Dij2, Dij3 QSFMijr E (DFMij) DFMij Dij1, Dij2, Dij3 QSFMijr E (DFMij)
QDFMijr QDFMijr QDFMijr
N.G. Mutlu and S. Altuntas

FM181 O181 Optimistic 7.00 0.4/0.6 + 0.7/0.1 + 0.6/0.4 8.13 FM191 O191 Optimistic 8.00 0.4/0.2 + 0.7/0.4 + 0.5/0.3 8.59 FM194 O194 Optimistic 6.00 0.3/0.2 + 0.8/0.3 6.46
+ 0.5/0.2
Most possible 8.00 0.2/0.3 + 0.8/0.3 + 0.8/0.3 Most possible 8.00 0.6/0.3 + 0.8/0.4 + 0.9/0.4 Most possible 6.00 0.5/0.2 + 0.9/0.3
+ 0.4/0.4
Pessimistic 9.00 0.4/0.1 + 0.8/0.6 + 0.6/0.3 Pessimistic 10.00 0.3/0.5 + 0.7/0.2 + 0.8/0.3 Pessimistic 7.00 0.4/0.6 + 0.7/0.4
+ 0.3/0.4
1 1 4
S18 Optimistic 4.00 0.6/0.2 + 0.8/0.2 + 0.7/0.3 5.12 S19 Optimistic 4.00 0.3/0.6 + 0.8/0.3 + 0.6/0.2 5.05 S19 Optimistic 4.00 0.3/0.2 + 0.6/0.2 5.20
+ 0.5/0.3
Most possible 5.00 0.5/0.6 + 0.7/0.3 + 0.8/0.4 Most possible 5.00 0.6/0.3 + 0.7/0.3 + 0.6/0.4 Most possible 5.00 0.3/0.6 + 0.7/0.3
+ 0.6/0.2
Pessimistic 6.00 0.4/0.2 + 0.9/0.5 + 0.6/0.3 Pessimistic 6.00 0.3/0.1 + 0.8/0.4 + 0.6/0.4 Pessimistic 6.00 0.4/0.2 + 0.8/0.5
+ 0.3/0.5
D181 Optimistic 3.00 0.3/0.6 + 0.8/0.7 + 0.4/0.2 5.33 D191 Optimistic 4.00 0.4/0.2 + 0.6/0.2 + 0.5/0.3 4.77 D194 Optimistic 4.00 0.6/0.2 + 0.9/0.2 5.15
+ 0.6/0.2
Most possible 5.00 0.6/0.3 + 0.8/0.2 + 0.5/0.4 Most possible 5.00 0.6/0.4 + 0.7/0.4 + 0.8/0.2 Most possible 5.00 0.5/0.2 + 0.7/0.6
+ 0.5/0.4
Pessimistic 7.00 0.7/0.1 + 0.8/0.1 + 0.3/0.4 Pessimistic 5.00 0.5/0.4 + 0.6/0.4 + 0.4/0.5 Pessimistic 6.00 0.3/0.6 + 0.6/0.2
+ 0.3/0.4
FM182 O182 Optimistic 9.00 0.3/0.2 + 0.6/0.1 + 0.2/0.3 9.84 FM192 O192 Optimistic 8.00 0.6/0.2 + 0.5/0.4 + 0.4/0.2 8.89 FM201 O201 Optimistic 7.00 0.4/0.2 + 0.5/0.2 8.04
+ 0.6/0.3
Most possible 10.00 0.3/0.4 + 0.4/0.1 + 0.1/0.2 Most possible 8.00 0.6/0.2 + 0.4/0.4 + 0.6/0.4 Most possible 8.00 0.3/0.6 + 0.4/0.5
+ 0.2/0.2

233
Pessimistic 10.00 0.2/0.4 + 0.5/0.8 + 0.3/0.5 Pessimistic 10.00 0.8/0.6 + 0.3/0.2 + 0.5/0.4 Pessimistic 9.00 0.3/0.2 + 0.4/0.3
+ 0.2/0.5
S182 Optimistic 4.00 0.6/0.2 + 0.9/0.7 + 0.2/0.3 5.17 S192 Optimistic 4.00 0.9/0.2 + 0.4/0.4 + 0.6/0.3 4.98 S201 Optimistic 5.00 0.4/0.2 + 0.5/0.2 6.05
+ 0.6/0.3
Most possible 6.00 0.3/0.5 + 0.7/0.2 + 0.4/0.4 Most possible 5.00 0.7/0.6 + 0.4/0.4 + 0.3/0.2 Most possible 6.00 0.4/0.6 + 0.8/0.6
+ 0.7/0.2
Pessimistic 7.00 0.6/0.3 + 0.9/0.1 + 0.6/0.3 Pessimistic 6.00 0.6/0.2 + 0.5/0.2 + 0.5/0.5 Pessimistic 7.00 0.5/0.2 + 0.7/0.2
+ 0.3/0.5
D182 Optimistic 3.00 0.3/0.4 + 0.7/0.6 + 0.8/0.2 5.75 D192 Optimistic 4.00 0.6/0.2 + 0.6/0.2 + 0.8/0.3 4.35 D201 Optimistic 3.00 0.2/0.6 + 0.9/0.8 3.51
+ 0.3/0.3
Most possible 3.00 0.3/0.4 + 0.8/0.2 + 0.3/0.4 Most possible 5.00 0.7/0.2 + 0.5/0.4 + 0.3/0.4 Most possible 4.00 0.4/0.3 + 0.7/0.1
+ 0.6/0.4
Pessimistic 4.00 0.4/0.2 + 0.5/0.2 + 0.3/0.4 Pessimistic 5.00 0.9/0.4 + 0.9/0.4 + 0.7/0.3 Pessimistic 5.00 0.8/0.1 + 0.7/0.1
+ 0.8/0.3
(continued on next page)
International Journal of Industrial Ergonomics 72 (2019) 222–240
 Table 14 (continued)

FMij OFMij Oij1, Oij2, Oij3 Value Fuzzy Probability E (OFMij) FMij OFMij Oij1, Oij2, Oij3 Value Fuzzy Probability E (OFMij) FMij OFMij Oij1, Oij2, Oij3 Value Fuzzy Probability E (OFMij)
SFMij Sij1, Sij2, Sij3 QOFMijr E (SFMij) SFMij Sij1, Sij2, Sij3 QOFMijr E (SFMij) SFMij Sij1, Sij2, Sij3 QOFMijr E (SFMij)
DFMij Dij1, Dij2, Dij3 QSFMijr E (DFMij) DFMij Dij1, Dij2, Dij3 QSFMijr E (DFMij) DFMij Dij1, Dij2, Dij3 QSFMijr E (DFMij)
QDFMijr QDFMijr QDFMijr

FM183 O183 Optimistic 9.00 0.2/0.6 + 0.7/0.1 + 0.4/0.3 9.79 FM193 O193 Optimistic 6.00 0.7/0.4 + 0.8/0.3 + 0.6/0.2 6.36 FM202 O202 Optimistic 9.00 0.4/0.2 + 0.5/0.6 9.71
N.G. Mutlu and S. Altuntas

+ 0.7/0.2
Most possible 10.00 0.6/0.2 + 0.9/0.4 + 0.5/0.2 Most possible 6.00 0.6/0.4 + 0.7/0.3 + 0.5/0.4 Most possible 10.00 0.3/0.4 + 0.6/0.2
+ 0.8/0.4
Pessimistic 10.00 0.6/0.2 + 0.9/0.5 + 0.8/0.5 Pessimistic 7.00 0.5/0.2 + 0.8/0.4 + 0.7/0.4 Pessimistic 10.00 0.5/0.4 + 0.7/0.2
+ 0.8/0.4
3 3 2
S18 Optimistic 4.00 0.3/0.2 + 0.8/0.4 + 0.7/0.3 5.65 S19 Optimistic 4.00 0.7/0.2 + 0.8/0.2 + 0.5/0.3 5.20 S20 Optimistic 4.00 0.4/0.3 + 0.4/0.1 5.94
+ 0.6/0.2
Most possible 6.00 0.6/0.5 + 0.7/0.3 + 0.8/0.4 Most possible 5.00 0.3/0.6 + 0.5/0.2 + 0.7/0.2 Most possible 6.00 0.3/0.4 + 0.4/0.7
+ 0.5/0.4
Pessimistic 7.00 0.5/0.3 + 0.6/0.3 + 0.4/0.3 Pessimistic 6.00 0.5/0.2 + 0.3/0.6 + 0.8/0.5 Pessimistic 7.00 0.4/0.3 + 0.5/0.2
+ 0.4/0.4
3 3 2
D18 Optimistic 3.00 0.6/0.4 + 0.7/0.4 + 0.5/0.4 3.23 D19 Optimistic 4.00 0.7/0.2 + 0.8/0.2 + 0.6/0.3 4.77 D20 Optimistic 3.00 0.3/0.4 + 0.7/0.1 3.52
+ 0.3/0.3
Most possible 3.00 0.5/0.4 + 0.7/0.4 + 0.6/0.3 Most possible 5.00 0.6/0.4 + 0.7/0.4 + 0.6/0.4 Most possible 3.00 0.5/0.4 + 0.6/0.2
+ 0.7/0.2
Pessimistic 4.00 0.7/0.2 + 0.8/0.2 + 0.7/0.3 Pessimistic 5.00 0.6/0.4 + 0.7/0.4 + 0.6/0.3 Pessimistic 4.00 0.4/0.2 + 0.7/0.7
+ 0.5/0.5

FMij OFMij, Oij1, Oij2, Oij3 Value Fuzzy Probability E (OFMij) FMij OFMij, Oij1, Oij2, Oij3 Value Fuzzy Probability E (OFMij)
SFMij, Sij1, Sij2, Sij3 QOFMijr E (SFMij) SFMij, Sij1, Sij2, Sij3 QOFMijr E (SFMij)
DFMij Dij1, Dij2, Dij3 QSFMijr E (DFMij) DFMij Dij1, Dij2, Dij3 QSFMijr E (DFMij)
QDFMijr QDFMijr

234
FM211 O211 Optimistic 7.00 0.5/0.2 + 0.6/0.3 + 0.4/0.2 8.06 FM221 O221 Optimistic 8.00 0.6/0.2 + 0.7/0.6 + 0.5/0.3 8.79
Most possible 8.00 0.6/0.6 + 0.7/0.5 + 0.8/0.4 Most possible 9.00 0.4/0.6 + 0.8/0.3 + 0.3/0.2
Pessimistic 9.00 0.3/0.2 + 0.5/0.2 + 0.7/0.4 Pessimistic 10.00 0.5/0.2 + 0.7/0.1 + 0.4/0.5
S211 Optimistic 5.00 0.5/0.6 + 0.8/0.1 + 0.4/0.3 6.25 S221 Optimistic 7.00 0.2/0.3 + 0.6/0.1 + 0.3/0.3 6.99
Most possible 6.00 0.4/0.3 + 0.7/0.2 + 0.6/0.2 Most possible 7.00 0.3/0.3 + 0.7/0.2 + 0.4/0.2
Pessimistic 7.00 0.3/0.1 + 0.8/0.7 + 0.4/0.5 Pessimistic 7.00 0.4/0.3 + 0.8/0.7 + 0.5/0.5
D211 Optimistic 3.00 0.5/0.5 + 0.6/0.6 + 0.2/0.3 3.70 D221 Optimistic 7.00 0.5/0.3 + 0.7/0.1 + 0.6/0.3 6.97
Most possible 4.00 0.5/0.3 + 0.7/0.4 + 0.4/0.4 Most possible 7.00 0.6/0.3 + 0.8/0.1 + 0.3/0.4
Pessimistic 5.00 0.7/0.2 + 0.8/0.2 + 0.7/0.3 Pessimistic 7.00 0.5/0.3 + 0.3/0.8 + 0.7/0.3
FM212 O212 Optimistic 8.00 0.8/0.2 + 0.9/0.2 + 0.9/0.2 9.10 FM222 O222 Optimistic 6.00 0.6/0.6 + 0.5/0.1 + 0.8/0.2 7.09
Most possible 9.00 0.7/0.6 + 0.8/0.6 + 0.6/0.4 Most possible 7.00 0.5/0.3 + 0.4/0.2 + 0.8/0.4
Pessimistic 10.00 0.5/0.2 + 0.7/0.2 + 0.7/0.4 Pessimistic 8.00 0.7/0.1 + 0.6/0.7 + 0.8/0.4
S212 Optimistic 3.00 0.3/0.5 + 0.5/0.1 + 0.2/0.3 5.31 S222 Optimistic 6.00 0.6/0.1 + 0.8/0.1 + 0.8/0.3 7.20
Most possible 4.00 0.5/0.3 + 0.7/0.2 + 0.3/0.2 Most possible 7.00 0.4/0.3 + 0.7/0.8 + 0.6/0.2
Pessimistic 5.00 0.4/0.2 + 0.8/0.7 + 0.5/0.5 Pessimistic 8.00 0.5/0.6 + 0.6/0.1 + 0.7/0.5
D212 Optimistic 3.00 0.5/0.6 + 0.9/0.1 + 0.8/0.3 3.96 D222 Optimistic 4.00 0.7/0.3 + 0.6/0.1 + 0.8/0.3 5.05
Most possible 4.00 0.3/0.3 + 0.8/0.6 + 0.7/0.4 Most possible 5.00 0.8/0.6 + 0.5/0.3 + 0.9/0.4
Pessimistic 5.00 0.3/0.1 + 0.7/0.3 + 0.6/0.3 Pessimistic 6.00 0.6/0.1 + 0.4/0.6 + 0.7/0.3
FM213 O213 Optimistic 9.00 0.2/0.6 + 0.8/0.1 + 0.6/0.2 9.82 FM223 O223 Optimistic 6.00 0.5/0.6 + 0.7/0.6 + 0.8/0.2 6.82
Most possible 10.00 0.4/0.2 + 0.6/0.4 + 0.6/0.4 Most possible 7.00 0.5/0.3 + 0.6/0.2 + 0.7/0.4
Pessimistic 10.00 0.2/0.2 + 0.7/0.5 + 0.5/0.4 Pessimistic 8.00 0.6/0.1 + 0.5/0.2 + 0.8/0.4
S213 Optimistic 4.00 0.7/0.6 + 0.8/0.7 + 0.6/0.3 4.86 S223 Optimistic 6.00 0.7/0.6 + 0.5/0.7 + 0.8/0.3 6.79
Most possible 5.00 0.3/0.3 + 0.7/0.2 + 0.4/0.2 Most possible 7.00 0.6/0.2 + 0.6/0.3 + 0.7/0.2
Pessimistic 7.00 0.7/0.1 + 0.8/0.1 + 0.8/0.5 Pessimistic 8.00 0.5/0.2 + 0.7/0.1 + 0.8/0.5
D213 Optimistic 4.00 0.5/0.6 + 0.7/0.2 + 0.3/0.2 4.91 D223 Optimistic 3.00 0.4/0.2 + 0.8/0.6 + 0.7/0.3 3.81
Most possible 5.00 0.4/0.3 + 0.6/0.6 + 0.7/0.4 Most possible 4.00 0.5/0.6 + 0.7/0.3 + 0.8/0.4
Pessimistic 6.00 0.7/0.1 + 0.8/0.2 + 0.6/0.4 Pessimistic 5.00 0.3/0.2 + 0.6/0.1 + 0.7/0.3
International Journal of Industrial Ergonomics 72 (2019) 222–240
 Table 15
Occurrence, severity and detectability values obtained by “FMEA-FTA-PERT distribution method” for potential root causes in finishing process.
FMij OFMij Oij1, Oij2, Oij3 Value p OFMij FMij OFMij Oij1, Oij2, Oij3 Value p OFMij FMij OFMij Oij1, Oij2, Oij3 Value p OFMij
SFMij Sij1, Sij2, Sij3 p SFMij SFMij Sij1, Sij2, Sij3 p SFMij SFMij Sij1, Sij2, Sij3 p SFMij
DFMij Dij1, Dij2, Dij3 p DFMij DFMij Dij1, Dij2, Dij3 p DFMij DFMij Dij1, Dij2, Dij3 p DFMij

FM181 O181 Optimistic 7.00 8.00 FM191 O191 Optimistic 8.00 8.33 FM194 O194 Optimistic 6.00 6.17
N.G. Mutlu and S. Altuntas

Most possible 8.00 Most possible 8.00 Most possible 6.00

Pessimistic 9.00 Pessimistic 10.00 Pessimistic 7.00
S181 Optimistic 4.00 5.00 S191 Optimistic 4.00 5.00 S194 Optimistic 4.00 5.00
Most possible 5.00 Most possible 5.00 Most possible 5.00
Pessimistic 6.00 Pessimistic 6.00 Pessimistic 6.00
D181 Optimistic 3.00 5.00 D191 Optimistic 4.00 4.83 D194 Optimistic 4.00 5.00
Most possible 5.00 Most possible 5.00 Most possible 5.00
Pessimistic 7.00 Pessimistic 5.00 Pessimistic 6.00
FM182 O182 Optimistic 9.00 9.83 FM192 O192 Optimistic 8.00 8.33 FM201 O201 Optimistic 7.00 8.00
Most possible 10.00 Most possible 8.00 Most possible 8.00
Pessimistic 10.00 Pessimistic 10.00 Pessimistic 9.00
S182 Optimistic 4.00 5.83 S192 Optimistic 4.00 5.00 S201 Optimistic 5.00 6.00
Most possible 6.00 Most possible 5.00 Most possible 6.00
Pessimistic 7.00 Pessimistic 6.00 Pessimistic 7.00
D182 Optimistic 3.00 3.17 D192 Optimistic 4.00 4.83 D201 Optimistic 3.00 4.00
Most possible 3.00 Most possible 5.00 Most possible 4.00
Pessimistic 4.00 Pessimistic 5.00 Pessimistic 5.00
FM183 O183 Optimistic 9.00 9.83 FM193 O193 Optimistic 6.00 6.17 FM202 O202 Optimistic 9.00 9.83
Most possible 10.00 Most possible 6.00 Most possible 10.00
Pessimistic 10.00 Pessimistic 7.00 Pessimistic 10.00
S183 Optimistic 4.00 5.83 S193 Optimistic 4.00 5.00 S202 Optimistic 4.00 5.83
Most possible 6.00 Most possible 5.00 Most possible 6.00

235
Pessimistic 7.00 Pessimistic 6.00 Pessimistic 7.00
D183 Optimistic 3.00 3.17 D193 Optimistic 4.00 4.83 D202 Optimistic 3.00 3.17
Most possible 3.00 Most possible 5.00 Most possible 3.00
Pessimistic 4.00 Pessimistic 5.00 Pessimistic 4.00

FMij OFMij Oij1, Oij2, Oij3 Value p OFMij FMij OFMij Oij1, Oij2, Oij3 Value p OFMij
SFMij Sij1, Sij2, Sij3 p SFMij SFMij Sij1, Sij2, Sij3 p SFMij
DFMij Dij1, Dij2, Dij3 p DFMij DFMij Dij1, Dij2, Dij3 p DFMij

FM211 O211 Optimistic 7.00 8.00 FM221 O221 Optimistic 8.00 9.00
Most possible 8.00 Most possible 9.00
Pessimistic 9.00 Pessimistic 10.00
S211 Optimistic 5.00 6.00 S221 Optimistic 7.00 7.00
Most possible 6.00 Most possible 7.00
Pessimistic 7.00 Pessimistic 7.00
D211 Optimistic 3.000 4.00 D221 Optimistic 7.00 7.00
Most possible 4.00 Most possible 7.00
Pessimistic 5.00 Pessimistic 7.00
FM212 O212 Optimistic 8.00 9.00 FM222 O222 Optimistic 6.00 7.00
Most possible 9.00 Most possible 7.00
Pessimistic 10.00 Pessimistic 8.00
S212 Optimistic 3.000 4.00 S222 Optimistic 6.00 7.00
Most possible 4.00 Most possible 7.00
Pessimistic 5.00 Pessimistic 8.00
D212 Optimistic 3.000 4.00 D222 Optimistic 4.00 5.00
Most possible 4.00 Most possible 5.00
Pessimistic 5.00 Pessimistic 6.00
(continued on next page)
International Journal of Industrial Ergonomics 72 (2019) 222–240
N.G. Mutlu and S. Altuntas International Journal of Industrial Ergonomics 72 (2019) 222–240

p OFMij for each potential root cause, as follows:

p DFMij
p SFMij

7.00

7.00

4.00
E(RPNi j ) = E(OHTi j ) × E(SHTi j ) × E(DHTi j ) (23)
1
E(RPN18 ) = (8.3 )× (5.12 )× (5.33 )= 221. 81

5.2.4. PERT distribution application steps

Value

6.00
7.00
8.00
6.00
7.00
8.00
3.00
4,00
5,00
Step 15: For each potential root cause, the expected occurrence,
severity, and detectability, E(pOHTi j ), E(pSHTi j ), and E(pDHTi j ) are
calculated, respectively, as follows:
j j j
Oi 1 + 4Oi 2 + Oi 3
E(pOHTi j ) =
6 (24)
Most possible

Most possible

Most possible
Oij1, Oij2, Oij3

Dij1, Dij2, Dij3

Sij1, Sij2, Sij3

j j j
Si 1 + 4Si 2 + Si 3
Pessimistic

Pessimistic

Pessimistic
Optimistic

Optimistic

Optimistic

E(pSHTi j ) =
6 (25)
j1 j2 j
Di + 4Di + Di 3
E(pDHTi j ) =
6 (26)
1
E(pOHT18 ) = [7 + (4) × (8) + 9]/6 = 8
1
E(pSHT18 ) = [4 + (4) × (5) + 6]/6 = 5
OFMij

DFMij
SFMij

O223

D223
S223

1
E(pDHT18 ) = [3 + (4) × (5) + 7]/6 = 5

Step 16: The expected risk priority number E ( pRPNi j ) is calculated

for each potential root cause, as follows:

E(pRPNi j ) = E(pOHTi j ) × E(pSHTi j ) × E(pDHTi j ) (27)

FM223
FMij

1
E(pRPN18 ) = (8 ) × (5) × (5) = 200

Step 17: The results obtained by FMEA-FTA-BIFPET (see Step 14)

are compared to the result obtained by FMEA-FTA-PERT distribu-
tion and FMEA-FTA.
p OFMij

p DFMij
p SFMij

6. Results
9.83

5.17

5.00

The proposed risk analysis and assessment method has been applied
to the “Finishing” process of the fabric dyeing operation in a textile
company. Process flow charts corresponding to 8 process are used to
define possible failures related to Dyeing operation in Textile Company.
Failures related to human, machine and environment are determined by
10.00
10.00
Value

9.00

4.00
5.00
7.00
4.00
5.00
6.00

the FMEA team. Brainstorming approach is also performed during the

determination of possible failures. FMEA-FTA has been conducted for
all processes in the dyeing operation. The total risk load value and
average risk score of each process have been calculated. The analysis
results revealed that the riskiest process with the highest average risk
priority value is in the “Fabric Preparation” process (see Table 11). The
Most possible

Most possible

Most possible
Oij1, Oij2, Oij3

Dij1, Dij2, Dij3

number of failures during the Fabric Preparation process is significantly

Sij1, Sij2, Sij3

Pessimistic

Pessimistic

Pessimistic
Optimistic

Optimistic

Optimistic

above the risk acceptability level. According to the FMEA team, a

managerial improvement approach can be adopted to prevent the
failures experienced in the Fabric Preparation process. The FMEA team
also agreed that controlling the failures in the Finishing process, which is
the second riskiest process in the dyeing operation, is rather challen-
ging. Therefore, the proposed FMEA-FTA-BIFPET integrated risk ana-
lysis and assessment method have been applied to the Finishing process
in the dyeing operation.
OFMij

DFMij
SFMij

O213

D213
S213

For each process of the dyeing operation, the priority risks, number
of potential root causes, and average and total risk priority values are
Table 15 (continued)

listed in Table 11. The results of the FMEA-FTA study conducted for a
total of 8 main processes of the dyeing operation indicate that 67 po-
tential root causes have been identified, as listed in Table 12. The FTA
of the dyeing operation, in which the logical hierarchical correlations of
FM213

failure types and root causes for the dyeing operation, is shown in
FMij

Fig. 4. Additionally, the 67 potential root causes have been rated by the

236
N.G. Mutlu and S. Altuntas International Journal of Industrial Ergonomics 72 (2019) 222–240

FMEA approach, and the obtained RPN values ranged between 27 and
504 (see Table 13). The fuzzy probability value and the expected values
for risk occurrence, severity and detectability have been calculated
when the FMEA-FTA-BIFPET method was applied to the Finishing pro-
cess. Table 14 gives the results of FMEA-FTA-BIFPET. Furthermore, the
occurrence, severity, and detectability values calculated for the failure
root causes by the FMEA-FTA-PERT distribution method are listed in
Table 15. The RPN is used to determine the acceptability of a risk and to
identify the unacceptable levels of critical failure modes of the potential
failures.
In this study, the RPNs, risk rates and risk acceptability levels of
potential root causes obtained by all three methods are compared, as
listed in Table 16. Methods compared to evaluate FMEA shortcomings
and improved aspects are given in Table 17.
7. Evaluation
In this study, an integrative risk analysis approach that was devel-
oped based on meaningful information flow among FMEA, FTA, and
BIFPET risk assessment tools has been introduced. The results obtained
by the proposed method are compared to those obtained using in-
tegrated FMEA-FTA and FMEA-FTA-PERT distribution methods. The
performance of the developed technique, which evaluated based on the
obtained results, is discussed below.
The classic FMEA-FTA approach relies on the assessment scales
listed in Tables 5–7 to present the consensus of stakeholders and assign
the occurrence, severity and detectability values for root causes without
weighing their values. According to the results obtained using this ap-
proach, 4 different values that range between 7 and 10 have been as-
signed for the occurrence value of root causes, 6 different values that
range between 4 and 10 have been assigned for severity values, and 5
different discrete values that range between 2 and 8 have been assigned
for detectability values (see Table 13). The RPN has been calculated
using combinations of 9 different O, S and D values in the range of
1–10. The results show that 13 different discrete RPN values in the
range of 120–512 have been obtained for 15 potential root causes (see
Table 16). When the proposed FMEA-FTA-BIFPET approach was em-
ployed, 15 different continuous values within the range 6.36–9.84 for
occurrence values, 14 different continuous values within the range
4.86–7.20 for severity values, and 14 different continuous value within
the range 3.23–6.97 for detectability values have been obtained for 15
potential root causes (see Table 14). The O, S, and D values used to
calculate E (RPN) values have been calculated using 42 different con-
tinuous values within the range 3.23–9.84. Accordingly, 15 different
continuous E (RPN) values within the range 157.75–428.25 have been
obtained for 15 potential root causes (see Table 16).
When the FMEA-FTA-PERT approach was employed, 6 different
continuous values within the range 6.17–9.83 for probability values, 6
different discrete values within the range 4–7 for severity values, and 6
different values (2 continuous, 4 discrete values) within the range 3–7
for detectability values have been obtained. These values have been
calculated to rate the root causes of potential types of failure (see
Table 15). Hence, 14 different O, S, and D values within the range
3–9.83 have been used to calculate E (PRPN). The results show that 11
different E (PRPN) values (7 discrete values, 4 continuous values) that
range between 144 and 441 have been obtained (see Table 16).
The risk acceptability assessment of the potential root causes shows
good agreement with the results obtained by the tested methods. While
a total of 7 potential root causes are rated as “High” by the classic
FMEA-FTA method, 4 of these failure types have been considered as
“Intolerable” by the FMEA-FTA-BIFPET method (see Table 16).
A total of 8 potential root causes are rated as “Intolerable” by the
Classic FMEA-FTA method, while 5 of these potential root causes are
considered of “High” risk level by the FMEA-FTA-BIFPET method.
Similarly, the results obtained by the FMEA-FTA-PERT method show
“High” risk level result for 3 potential root causes of failure, and those
same root causes have been considered as “Intolerable” by the FMEA-
FTA-BIFPET method (see Table 16). Comparison of O, S, D, and RPN

Table 16
RPN, RPN ranking and risk acceptability levels of potential root causes obtained by FMEA-FTA, FMEA-FTA-BIFPET, and FMEA-FTA-PERT distribution methods.
FMij FMEA-FTA-BIFPET FMEA-FTA-PERT Distribution FMEA-FTA

E (RPNij) Risk Acceptance Level of Risk E (pRPNij) Risk Acceptance Level of Risk RPNij Risk Acceptance Level of Risk
Ranking Ranking Ranking

FM181 221.86 5 Intolerable 200.00 5 High 162.00 9 High

FM182 292.51 2 Intolerable 181.66 8 High 120.00 13 High
FM183 178.66 11 High 181.66 8 High 150.00 11 High
FM191 206.92 6 Intolerable 201.16 4 Intolerable 240.00 5 Intolerable
FM192 191.25 9 High 201.16 4 Intolerable 240.00 5 Intolerable
FM193 157.75 15 High 149.00 10 High 210.00 6 Intolerable
FM194 172.99 13 High 154.25 9 High 240.00 5 Intolerable
FM201 170.73 14 High 192.00 7 High 144.00 12 High
FM202 203.02 7 Intolerable 181.66 8 High 192.00 7 High
FM211 186.38 10 High 192.00 7 High 168.00 8 High
FM212 191.35 8 High 144.00 11 High 252.00 4 Intolerable
FM213 234.33 4 Intolerable 254.10 2 Intolerable 350.00 2 Intolerable
FM221 428.25 1 Intolerable 441.00 1 Intolerable 160.00 10 High
FM222 257.79 3 Intolerable 245.00 3 Intolerable 512.00 1 Intolerable
FM223 176.43 12 High 196.00 6 High 256.00 3 Intolerable

Table 17
Methods compared to evaluate FMEA shortcomings and improved aspects.
Shortcomings FMEA-FTA- FMEA-FTA-PERT Distribution FMEA-FTA
BIFPET

The difficulty of exact determination of O, S, and D NO NO YES

Attaining the same RPN value with different combinations of O, S, and D NO PARTLY NO YES
Repeating RPN values NO PARTLY NO YES
Inability to attain a large number of intermediate values in analysis results due to RPN values having discrete variables NO PARTLY NO YES
Unintuitive statistical characteristic of the RPN scale NO NO YES

237
N.G. Mutlu and S. Altuntas
Table 18
Comparison of O, S, D, and RPN values for 15 potential root causes obtained by
three methods.
FMEA-FTA
Occurrence 7 - 10 range, with 4 different discrete values
Severity 4 - 10 range, with 6 different discrete values
Detectability 2 - 8 range, with 5 different discrete values
RPN 120 - 512 range, with13 different discrete values
FMEA-FTA-BIFPET
Occurrence 6.36–9.84 range, with 15 different continuous values
Severity 4.86–7.20 range, with 14 different continuous values
Detectability 3.23–6.97 range, with 14 different continuous values
E (RPN) 157.75–428.25 range, with 15 different continuous values
FMEA-FTA-PERT distribution
Occurrence 6.17–9.83 range, with 6 different continuous values
Severity 4 - 7 range, with 6 different discrete values
Detectability 3 - 7 range, 2 with different continuous and 4 different discrete
values
E (PRPN) 144 - 441 range, with 4 different continuous and 7 different
discrete values
values for 15 potential root causes obtained by three methods is sum-
murized in Table 18.
The results discussed above reveal that the proposed method suc-
cessfully detected and prioritized the potential root causes with higher
levels of risk potentials. Accordingly, the significantly improved results
achieved by the proposed risk analysis approach indicate its capability
to address the shortcomings of the classic FMEA approach, including:
the difficulty to precisely determine the values of O, S, and D (Yang
et al., 2011; Liu et al., 2011a,b, 2012), obtaining constant RPN value
with different combinations of O, S, and D (Sankar & Prabhu, 2001;
Chang et al., 2014a; IEC 60812: 2006, p.28), repeating RPN values
(Chang, 2009; Chang and Sun, 2009; Chang and Cheng, 2010, 2011;
IEC 60812: 2006, p.28) failing to attain many intermediate values
owing to the discrete RPN values (Liu et al., 2012; Chang and Cheng,
2010, 2011; Chang and Sun, 2009; IEC 60812: 2006, p.28), and the
statistically unintuitive RPN scale (Ravi Sankar and Prabhu, 2001;
Chang and Cheng, 2010; Rafie and Namin, 2015).
8. Discussion and conclusion
Various risk analysis and assessment methods are employed in many
industries in order to assess and control the health and safety risks that
threaten the personnel in production systems and improve the effi-
ciency of these systems operations and processes. FMEA is one of the
most frequently used risk analysis and assessment methods. However,
the accuracy and reliability of FMEA method have been criticized in
many aspects by both the FMEA standard (IEC 60812: 2006, p. 28) and
many researchers in this field (see Table 2). In this study, an integrated
method, utilizing the FTA method and advantages of BIFPET algorithm,
is proposed to improve the performance of the FMEA method. The
proposed method has been applied to the fabric dyeing operation of a
textile company. FMEA-FTA approach has been employed to assess the
potential risks in eight processes of the fabric dyeing operation, and a
total of 67 failure root causes have been identified (see Table 11). The
risk analysis approach proposed in this study has been employed to
assess the potential risks in the Finishing process, which is the second
riskiest process of the fabric dyeing operation. In order to evaluate the
performance of the proposed approach, the results obtained by the
proposed method have been compared to those obtained by the FMEA-
FTA method and FMEA-FTA-PERT distribution methods for the same
Finishing process.
The reliability of the analysis results obtained by the FMEA-FTA-
BIFPET risk analysis approach proposed in this study has been im-
proved by integrating the inductive FMEA method to the deductive
properties of the FTA approach. Furthermore, the BIFPET algorithm
238
International Journal of Industrial Ergonomics 72 (2019) 222–240
allows assigning occurrence probability values for probability, severity,
and detectability (optimistic, most possible, pessimistic) values during
the analysis process. Based on the fuzzy logic approach, the assigned
values are determined by the stakeholders involved in the process, in-
cluding engineers and employee representatives, in addition to poten-
tial root causes and belief values that are assigned to occurrence
probability values by FMEA team members involved in the operation
management as OHS experts. Thus, the most accurate and reliable risk
values that most likely mirror the actual potential root causes of failure
are obtained.
In conclusion, significantly improved performance has been
achieved by the methods proposed in this study, considering the aspects
listed in Table 17. Hence, the performance of tested methods can be
rated as follows: FMEA-FTA-BIFPET > FMEA-FTA-PERT distribu-
tion > FMEA-FTA. As the analysis of potential root causes of failures in
the Finishing process, which has been analyzed in the study, are per-
formed independently, their reciprocal influences have been ignored.
Solely independent failures must not be considered in evaluating the
reliability and accuracy of the analyses results (IEC 60812: 2006, p. 30).
Hence, employing integrative approaches that consider the dependence
of all potential root causes and include impacts of potential failures,
such as cost, loss of time, and waste of resources, in the analysis will
expand the scope of potential risks and enhance the reliability of the
risk analysis tool.
9. Limitations
In order to implement the proposed risk analysis approach suc-
cessfully, it is necessary to have experts in the field. Collecting the re-
quired information and applying the method can be time consuming.
The method is understandable but there is little complexity in the cal-
culation process.
Conflict of interest
The authors declare that there is no conflict of interest.
Acknowledgement
This work was supported by Research Fund of the Yildiz Technical
University. Project Number: FBA-2018-3303. The authors would like to
thank the anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments and
suggestions that have significantly improved the paper.
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